THE NEW REFORM BILL.
We feel compelled to address ourselves to an ungracious and disagreeable task. At this moment but one thought ought to be encouraged throughout the British empire—that of encountering and beating back the new and formidable aggressor on the liberties of Europe. We shall not enter now upon the history of past transactions. We shall not stop to inquire whether the Ministry acted foolishly or not in allowing themselves, in spite of repeated warnings and most pregnant instances, to be deceived, cajoled, and outwitted by the agents of Russian diplomacy. It is enough for us that the war has, to all intents and purposes, begun—that we are sending forth our armaments and making our preparations for such a struggle as has not been known during the lifetime of the present generation—and that we have, directly, the most colossal force in Europe to cope with, to which possibly may be united a central power of the Continent, with an army at its disposal more than twice as numerous as our own.
Gladly do we hail the spirit which at present animates the nation. It assures us that we have not degenerated during the long period of peace which we have enjoyed. It shows that we are still alive to our dignity as a people, to our duty as the enemies of outrage and aggression—that we have heart enough and will enough, at any sacrifice, to maintain our high position—and that the love of Mammon has not so occupied our souls as to render us insensible to the part which we are bound to take, as the freest state and most advanced community in Europe. We deny, on the part of the people of Great Britain, that they have either been rash or headstrong in this matter; they have submitted, with remarkable patience, to negotiations protracted beyond hope, and with advantage to the enemy; and, so far from being precipitate or impetuous towards war, they have urged nothing upon the Ministry until, after unparalleled vacillation, the latter have been compelled to see that no other course was open to them but a final rupture with Russia.
This session of Parliament began as leisurely and lazily as though there were no combustible elements visible in Europe—as though there had been no aggression—as though no severe blow had been struck by Russia at Turkey, almost in the presence of and in defiance of our fleet. Had we been at peace with all the world, Ministers could not have shown less symptoms of excitement. The meeting of Parliament was postponed to the last day; possibly on account of negotiations still pending, after Wallachia and Moldavia had been occupied by the Russian troops—after engagements had taken place upon the Danube—and after a Turkish fleet had been assailed and annihilated within the Turkish harbour of Sinope. Negotiation is long-lived. The Premier has even now such faith in protocols that he professes to believe the peace of Europe maybe preserved—an opinion, the gallantry of which cannot be questioned, inasmuch as he stands alone; and for which he will certainly be entitled to immortal credit, if the Czar chooses to yield and withdraw after all that has taken place. But with Lord Aberdeen’s opinions or convictions we have nothing, at the present moment, to do. We think that, considering the important nature of the crisis, and the vastness of the interests at stake, it was the duty of Ministers to have advised an earlier meeting of Parliament, so that the natural anxiety of the nation might not be prolonged, nor any feeling of distrust engendered. Such a step would at all events have been satisfactory to the public, as an implied assurance that it was intended to obliterate, by a decided course of action, the memory of the apathetic indifference and vacillating policy of the latter half of the bygone year.
Pass we from that, however, to the actual meeting of Parliament. No sooner were the members assembled, and, as it were, shaken into their places, than Lord John Russell, a Cabinet Minister, announced that it was his intention to move for leave to bring in a bill for amending the representation of the country; and, notwithstanding the urgent dissuasions both of friend and foe, grounded upon the exceeding impolicy, under present circumstances, of forcing on a measure for which there has been no call or necessity, he, on the evening of the 13th February, proceeded to develop his scheme.
Now, it is perfectly true that, in the course of last session, Lord John Russell, and, if we mistake not, Lord Aberdeen, stated that it was the intention of Ministers to bring forward some measure of the kind. It is true also that the former seems resolved, with characteristic obstinacy, to effect some great change in the representation, and that his resolution is not of yesterday’s date; for in 1852, just two years ago, he obtained leave to bring in a bill for the same object, but with provisions and machinery entirely different from this. It is not our intention in the present paper to compare the two schemes propounded by this consistent statesman for amending the representation. Whether, however, the present bill is insisted on or not, we certainly shall take an opportunity of instituting such a comparison, were it merely for the purpose of exposing, beyond the possibility of refutation or defence, the reckless, inconsistent, and almost crazy tamperings of the noble Lord with the fabric of our constitution. We shall not judge him by any other test than his own words and his own measures. He must either admit—and we shall challenge his warmest adherent or advocate to deny this—that he regards the British constitution as something that may be altered and adjusted to suit special circumstances and party ends; or that, in 1852, he, then First Minister of the Crown, introduced, with culpable want of consideration, a measure, the details of which he now repudiates. It has been the fashion, on the strength of a flippant saying of the late Sydney Smith, to talk of Lord John Russell as a man adequate, in his own conceit, to the conduct of any affair or enterprise, and rigidly and unalterably wedded to his own opinions. We cannot give him even that dubious credit now. He either committed a gross blunder in his former bill, which is no slight imputation upon the judgment of a Prime Minister, or he is acting just now under the direct dictation of others. Nothing has occurred, during the last two years, to make the Reform Bill of 1854 totally and entirely different, not only in details, but in principle, from that which was proposed in 1852; and yet the new measure is utterly inconsistent with the older one. We all remember that, in 1852, Lord John failed to engage the public support—can it be that he is now playing the bad and unpatriotic game of which he was formerly suspected—that he is bidding for popularity and party power, irrespective altogether of the true interests of the country?
That comparison, however, we shall reserve for a future article. We have said already that it was intimated last session, on the part of the Ministry, that a bill for amending the representation would be introduced. The question now is, whether it is for the advantage of the country that such a resolution should be adhered to. That Ministers ought to keep faith with the public is a proposition which we shall never question. If it can be shown that the public, in any proper sense of the term, has become aware of the existence of a grievance, and has demanded a remedy or relief; and if, therefore, Ministers, toward the end of a session, have admitted the justness of the demand, but have been necessitated to postpone the remedy, they are certainly, under ordinary circumstances, bound to come forward and redeem their pledge. But, even in such a case as that which we have supposed, when non-fulfilment of the pledge would naturally create dissatisfaction, circumstances may arise to justify Ministers in declining, on public grounds, to pursue a line of action which otherwise they would willingly adopt. The present is not even a case of that kind. There was no demand at all upon the part of the nation for any immediate measure of reform of representation; and although, beyond all question, there are serious points yet to be settled—for example, the relative representation of Scotland as compared with England—Ministers were not urged to undertake any specific measure, and the responsibility of having done so must rest entirely on themselves.
But we ask, in the name of common sense, is this a time to breed dissension in the country? Set aside such matters as this, which are not clamoured for in any way, and there is absolutely no party feeling among us. All that has been absorbed in the national and British feeling; and we are now sending forth our navy and our army—parting with our sons and our brothers—not knowing whether they may again return to us, but believing that they have gone to support a just cause, and knowing that, in the worst event, they will be mourned by more than ourselves. We shall be called upon, and we are ready, one and all, to submit to increased taxation, and to perform the part which our fathers performed when the integrity of the land was threatened. But is it the part of Ministers,now, at the very opening of the campaign, to do all in their power to excite angry feelings among us, to awake party jealousies, and to rouse antagonism between town and country?
In England, the proposed disfranchisement of nineteen boroughs, returning twenty-nine members, and the reduction of thirty-three others, now returning two, to one member each, will, beyond all question, excite a vast deal of animosity and discussion. We are not by any means so bigotted or besotted in our admiration of the present system as to deny that a plausible argument maybe maintained in favour of much of this disfranchisement and reduction; for the old Reform Act was eminently a party measure, and dealt tenderly with existing interests whenever these belonged to the Whigs. But when we look to the simple facts, that our system and arrangements for the distribution of the franchise, such as they are, stood the triumphant test of 1848, when every other state in Europe was rocking before the whirlwind of revolution—and that no clamour has been heard for their alteration—we humbly venture to think that this is not the time for any extensive experiment. Nor are we by any means convinced that the suppression of small constituencies in favour of larger ones which are already represented, would be a practical improvement. We would much rather see large existing constituencies subdivided, so that no elector should be allowed to vote for more than one member. This might very easily be effected. Edinburgh, for example, would still return two members, but these would be elected by two distinct bodies of voters in different wards. In like manner, where there are two or more members for a county, these should be returned by separate votes in three departments or districts of parishes, which, indeed, would be simply an extension of the system now followed in the larger English counties. This would at once supersede the necessity of having recourse to such ridiculous and fantastic devices as “the representation of minorities,” which is contemplated by the present bill, and which is grossly unfair, inasmuch as its operation is only practicable in the case of constituencies returning three members. From what we have seen of their working, we are not at all enamoured of large constituencies. They have at present more power than they are entitled to; for we maintain it to be contrary to the just principle of representation that any elector should have more than one representative. If the other system, which Lord John Russell practically advocates, is a good one, why should not the three Ridings of Yorkshire be united, so that electors in the county might vote for six representatives? It is just as easy to divide a town as a county. The machinery is already supplied by the municipal arrangements; and if that system were to be adopted—and we earnestly recommend it for consideration—we should hear nothing more of the tyranny of majorities. Until some such plan, founded on principle and recommended by reason, is matured, we oppose the disfranchisement of any of the boroughs. But let us again revert to the time which has been selected for propounding these sweeping changes.
We have been told, in ridiculously pompous language, that Great Britain will present a magnificent spectacle to the world, if, while engaging in a deadly struggle with the most colossal power of Europe, she applies herself, at the same time, to the remodelment of her own constitution. With all deference to the speaker, we never listened to more atrocious nonsense. What should we think of the sanity of the man who, at the very moment when his house was attacked from without, should set fire to it within, for the purpose of exhibiting the “sublime spectacle” of simultaneous external defence and internal extinguishment? Of course we should consider him as mad, clap a blister on his head, and have him instantly conveyed to bedlam. And yet that is, just now, the precise language of Ministers. We really are surprised that any of them should have the audacity to hazard such an argument; if, indeed, that can be called an argument which is no better than a preposterous hyperbole. They know, perfectly well, that this measure of theirs cannot be persevered in without exciting very general dissatisfaction in various parts of the country—that it must necessarily lead to protracted discussion, and a strong demonstration of party feeling in both Houses of Parliament; that if they are unsuccessful in carrying it through, they will have weakened their own influence at a time when it is most desirable that the hands of Government should be strengthened; and that if, on the contrary, they are successful, an immediate dissolution of Parliament, and new general election, must take place. These are the obvious and inevitable consequences, if they persist in their present course; and we hesitate not to say that faction, in its worst spirit, could devise no more dangerous scheme for disturbing the unanimity of the country. “But,” say some of the Whig and Liberal journals, “it is obvious that the present move is a mere indication of what may take place hereafter. Lord John Russell has no serious intention of pushing through this bill at the present time, nor would his colleagues permit him to do so—this is merely to be regarded as the fulfilment of his pledge, and in due time it will be withdrawn.” If we are to take that as the true interpretation of the business—if we are to suppose that this measure has been introduced as a sham, without serious intentions of carrying it into execution, the sooner Lord John Russell retires from public life the better for his own reputation. Sham bills, we are aware, are not novelties. Of late years we have seen, with infinite sorrow and disgust, this species of deception practised upon the public, but never at such a time and under such circumstances as now. It is no valid excuse to say that this is the mere redemption of a pledge, and that Lord John Russell could not act otherwise with honour. What is Lord John Russell, that considerations personal to him should be allowed to disturb the unanimity of the British people at such a crisis; or that his gratuitous pledges and random promises should interfere with the public weal? If such a step, in such a juncture, had been taken by a Tory instead of a Whig minister, the offence would not have been allowed, even on the first night, to pass without a storm of reprobation. Lord John himself would have risen, with an unblushing front, and a total disregard of antecedents, to prove from Whig tradition that any attempt to divide the country, at the moment when it was collecting its energies for action, was a crime worthy of impeachment. Mr Macaulay would have been hurried from his books at the Albany to explain, in sonorous language, what course would have been taken by the Roman senate, in regard to any one who might have proposed, when the Gauls were at the gate, to undermine the Roman constitution; and the Tarpeian rock would, doubtless, have been suggested as the proper punishment. Sir James Graham would have started up to protest that this was not the time for “pottering” over constitutions, or revising constituencies, and have insulted the parent of the bill with the imperious airs of a Commodore Trunnion. Sir Charles Wood—but we shall not pursue the imaginary case further, because the name we have last cited is suggestive of a counting-out. What we mean to convey is, that the political changes contemplated by this bill, without reference to minor details, such as lowering of the franchise, &c., are so serious, that the Ministry, if they really intend, or intended, to carry them through, could not, by possibility, have selected a worse or more injudicious time; and that they are, by persevering, abusing the confidence of the country. If, on the contrary, this measure is to be regarded as a sham, or merely tentatory, then we say that the country has excellent reason for feeling indignant and disgusted that, under present circumstances, such a hoax should be practised upon it.
Lord John Russell is unfortunate in his experiences. By accident rather than by choice—for he was then no eminent political character—his was the hand to open the floodgates more than twenty years ago. He heard the roaring of the pent-up waters, pouring down as if in jubilee, and his soul was big with triumph. Since then, he has heard nothing of the kind; but still his memory lingers on the far-off Niagara roll, and he wishes, before he dies, to have the sound repeated. Hence he is perpetually prowling about the locks of the constitution, devising schemes for another flood, just as the schoolboy, who has assisted at the sluicing of one dam, is energetic for a repetition of the experiment, regardless altogether of the havoc he may be making below. His Nemesis—as it is the fashion now to call it—has been more decided and humiliating than that of any public man of our age. He has sunk from a Premier to a subordinate, under the command of a chief to whom, for the better part of his life, he was diametrically opposed in politics. He was not even allowed to remain long as a recognised subordinate. He descended to the rank of an attaché, in which situation he now remains. He has affected partial retirement from politics, but, at best, he is only half a Cincinnatus. We do not know accurately what were the farming capabilities of the conqueror of the Volsci; but we know, accurately enough, what are the literary achievements of Lord John Russell. We regret, very sincerely, that he has not been able to establish for himself a name in letters; because, if he had done so, we might have hoped to get rid of him as a politician. But that remorseless public, upon whose fiat all authors and editors are dependent, stood in the way; and decreasing sales bore a lamentable evidence to the noble Lord’s decreasing literary popularity. In order, if possible, to redeem his reputation, he touched, with doubtful gallantry, the shield of the most aged antagonist in the lists; and the result was that, like the Admiral Guarinos in the Spanish ballad, the old warrior—though in bad case and wretchedly battered armour—spurred out, and overthrew him in a canter. Nettled at this discomfiture, he comes back to politics; and—availing himself of his position, which the Premier cannot well gainsay, inasmuch as he has no sure hold on the affections of the leading Whigs, who would pitch him over, if an opportunity were afforded, as freely as ever hencoop was given to the waves—he propounds a project of further reform, for which, we doubt not, he is frightfully objurgated by some of his associates in the Cabinet. But, let them say their worst, he knows that he is still in power—that he can threaten them, in one way or another, with active opposition—and therefore they are constrained to let him appear as the author of a new Reform Bill; and although in their hearts they curse his recklessness, they dare not, in as many words, repudiate his false position. Such are the national advantages and inevitable results of that species of combination known as a “Coalition Ministry.”
Let us now see what changes are to be made in the electoral body. These are various and complicated, but we shall state them in order; and first, as to the new qualifications. The following are to be entitled to enrolment, either in town or country:—
So there is an end at once of property and occupancy as the basis of the electoral franchise. If you have five sons, and wish to qualify them for voting, you have simply to deposit £50 in name of each in a savings’ bank, and in three years’ time they will be placed on the register. And remark this, that, once on the register, there they abide for ever; for Lord John distinctly tells us, “we make the register of votes final.” So that, on the day after your son is placed on the roll, you may reclaim your money with interest! Happy graduates of universities! They are entitled to the franchise in virtue of the magical letters appended to their names; and they may flit about from place to place, the adornment of twenty registers, because the register is to be final. Take out a game-certificate, and you may not only shoot partridges for the year, but may vote at elections in perpetuity! Any person who wears hair-powder, keeps a terrier, and has a crest engraved on his seal, for which valuable privileges he pays £2, 8s. 8d. of assessed taxes, is henceforward a voter! We are not joking. Such are absolutely the provisions of this precious Reform Bill, the result, as we are told, of the deliberate and collective wisdom of the Ministry!
Faintly, and like a dream, the recollection of the beautiful old Whig moral sentiments steals upon our memory. We remember the touching pictures, limned some twenty years ago, of the industrious man working his way to the rank of the ten-pounders, in order to attain the glorious privilege of the franchise. We were told then that it was most desirable to have a distinct property qualification, in order that men might exert themselves to attain it, and by their exertions stimulate others in the like course of frugality and perseverance. Is that to be the case in future? Certainly not. Every common carrier who pays for his van £2, 6s. 8d. yearly, as the tax on an implement of trade, is to be as politically powerful as the acred squire, or the manufacturer who gives employment to thousands—every horse-dealer, dog-breaker, and tavern-keeper may vote in virtue of the assessed taxes—every clerk in a shop who has £100 a-year, and every warehouseman, who has either saved or succeeded to £50—are to be entitled to vote either in town or county. We said, long ago, when the Whigs were lauding their earlier measure as a grand incentive to industry, and as a splendidly devised scheme for stimulating deserving operatives, that before many years were over the same party would attempt to lower the qualification, so as to embrace all who were likely to forward and promote their designs. Our prophecy is now demonstrated to be true. We showed that, after the first successful attempt, there never can be an end of swamping, or, at all events, of proposals to swamp. The ten-pound householders, then in the full enjoyment of their monopoly, did not seem to believe us. Somehow or other they had been impressed with the idea that the Whigs were the devoted friends of the “middle classes”—that they had a firm faith in what was termed “shopocracy”—and that they never would attempt to supplant the power which they had created. And, certainly, the ten-pounders have done nothing to merit this treatment at the hands of the Whigs. They have clung to them, especially in the large towns, with a fidelity which we cannot but respect, and, in spite of occasional scurvy treatment, have shown themselves the most zealous of partisans. But the time has now arrived when their ascendancy is to give way. Respectability is no longer the fashion. If the ten-pounders, indeed, had been able to give the Whigs a large majority in Parliament, and to have insured their continuance in power, matters might have been different. There would then have been no occasion for lowering the franchise; because the Whigs, ever since they have been a party (which is now an old story), have never taken a single step except as means towards an end; and they would not, but for party necessity, have attempted to swamp their friends. But the old Reform Bill, though devised especially for the purpose of securing to the Whigs an unlimited range of power, did not succeed in its object. It was based essentially upon property, and, by degrees, property and Conservatism came to a common understanding. The Whigs lost ground every year: partly because their champions were either effete or insincere; partly because they were foolish enough to presume on their new ascendancy, and to insult the rooted Protestantism of the country; and partly, because they showed themselves in their arrangements grasping, greedy, and nepotical, to a degree never yet paralleled even in a corrupted state. They wanted to make, and did in fact make, with scarce an exception, the Cabinet a mere family Junta. They married and forwarded marriages on the strength of political connexion, and jobbed out public employment accordingly. Grey, Russell, and Elliot, were the three names preferred; and Heaven only knows what amount of perquisites was absorbed by the scions of these illustrious races. Such things cannot be done in a corner, so secretly as to escape observation. The popular ire was roused at such an exhibition of awful selfishness, and the Whigs declined in character. Had Sir Robert Peel not been the Minister and type of expediency, he might have gained an easy and lasting victory over them; but unfortunately, both for the party which he then led and for himself, he had a weak perception of principle. The two rivals sate, on opposite sides of the table, watching each other at the game of popularity, but never for a moment reflecting that, in any event, Great Britain had to pay the loss. The game, though it had continued a great deal too long, was somewhat abruptly terminated. Those who had supported the Baronet while he played fair, withdrew their confidence; and the noble lord was left in possession of the field. Did he maintain it? By no means. He juggled and traversed until every one was weary of him, and at last he was ejected. The election of 1852 showed that parties were very nearly balanced; so nearly indeed that, but for the union of the Peelites with the Whigs, Lord Derby would have had a majority in the House of Commons. This state of things may be embarrassing to politicians, but it does not justify a violent change in the Constitution. However desirable majorities may be to either party, an attempt to obtain ascendancy by means of legislative enactment and tampering with the franchise, is so very reprehensible that it amounts almost to a crime.
But we must not lose sight of the bill by indulging in remarks upon the past. Its object is to swamp the present class of voters by a wholesale admission of others who have not been able to raise themselves to the enviable level which is the limit of the existing qualification. The bill is ingeniously devised. Let it pass, and every tradesman will consider himself sure of three or four votes which he can direct. Because, of course, the clerk, with £100 a-year, dares not vote against his master; and, even if he is entitled, after dismissal, to remain on the register, the mere privilege of voting, perhaps once in seven years, will be a poor compensation for the immediate loss of employment. Can you call a clerk or book-keeper, with a bare £100 a-year, independent? To do so is a mere perversion of terms. He is more liable even than the operative to the influence of his employer, inasmuch as the nature of his employment is more precarious. We heard a great deal last year about Government influence being used among the persons employed in the dockyards, and it was gravely proposed by some of the leading Whig journals, that all such should be disfranchised, as they could not be expected to vote independently. But a Government official, however zealous and unscrupulous he may be, is amenable to public opinion and public censure, and cannot exercise the same stringent means of compulsion which are open to the tradesman or the attorney.
Then as to bribery: the tendency of lowering the franchise must be to increase that to a very great extent. In many places, even under the present system, votes are bought and sold; but if this bill is carried into effect, the corruption will become enormous. Experience has shown us, very clearly, that there is a large class in this country by whom votes are considered in the light of marketable commodities, and this bill seems specially framed for the purpose of adding to their numbers. The possession of £50 in a savings-bank is by no means a guarantee that the depositor will be inaccessible to the influences of a bribe. But besides the other changes which we have discussed, it is proposed that residence of two years and a-half in a house rated at £6 in a municipal borough shall confer the right of voting, and that previous payment of rates and taxes is to be no longer required! Can any one for a moment doubt that the consequence of this will be to render constituencies venal to an extent never yet known in this country? If even under the present system it is found that bribery prevails, will not the offence become much more rank and general when you enfranchise a class peculiarly liable from their position to such influences? And remember this, that candidates or their agents are not always, nor indeed in the majority of cases, the tempters. Enough has been revealed to show us that, in a very large number of the English towns, there exist regularly organised clubs or societies of voters, who force their terms upon candidates. These fine patriots do not concern themselves much with party politics. They do not object to one man because he is a Tory, or to another because he is a Whig. Pledges as to future conduct are not at all in their line: they much prefer the immediate tender of a crisp bank-note or of a few shining sovereigns. They have their agents and their office-bearers, and must be bought in the lump. Let this bill pass, and there will hardly be an urban constituency in this kingdom without such a club. Is that a state of things to be envied? Is it fair to the honest and upright voter that he should be swamped by organised rascality, and that his privilege should be rendered of no avail? We can hardly express ourselves too strongly on this subject, for the provocation is very great. The Whig party, for years past, have affected to mourn over the corruption of the constituencies, and yet here is their accredited leader bringing in a bill which must necessarily have the effect of increasing that corruption tenfold!
But we have not yet quite done. Lord John Russell proposes to give 46 new members to the English counties; but then the county constituency is not to remain as before. Occupiers, not proprietors, of £10 a-year are to have votes in counties; and it is by no means contemplated that the house occupied by the voter should be of that value. “We propose,” said Lord John Russell, “with respect to the county right of voting, that—with the exception of a dwelling-house, which may be of any value, provided the voter lives in it—in all other cases the building must be of the value of £5 a-year. Supposing there is a house and land, the house may be rated at £1 or £2 a-year, provided the voter resides in it; but if the qualification is made out by any other building—a cattle-shed or any other building of that kind—then we propose this check, that such building shall be of the value of £5 a-year. This, then, is the franchise we propose to give in counties for the future; and the House will see that it has a very considerable bearing upon the question of the increase of number of members which I have stated we propose. Out of the whole number I have mentioned I shall propose that 46 members shall be given to counties; but as these counties will hereafter include the £10 householders, it is obvious that the constituency will be less of a special character. It does seem to me that all the endeavours made to run down the agricultural interest, or to run down the manufacturing interest, are totally foolish and absurd, and that there can be no better system of representation than that which takes into consideration the whole of the great interests of the country, which contribute to its glory and prosperity.” We have thought it right to insert these paragraphs, because they contain a doctrine quite new to statesmen, and one which has hitherto been unbroached. There is certainly a little obscurity in the language, but not enough to conceal the true nature of the sentiment. What Lord John Russell means to say is this:—It is absurd any longer to maintain the special character of constituencies—absurd to make distinctions between agriculture, manufactures, or any branch of industry—absurd to frame your system so that one member shall represent agriculture, another commerce, and another manufactures, because you should in every case combine the whole of the great interests of the country. Carry that doctrine into effect, and the distinction between counties and towns ceases altogether. But how can you bring it fairly into effect? In the towns which have the privilege of returning members, agriculture is not, and cannot be, represented at all. The urban voters are all engaged in other pursuits, and they send to the House of Commons members to represent that branch of industry which is their staple. From the towns, therefore, the territorial interest, which is in reality the greatest and most enduring in England, never can be adequately represented. You may, however, easily enough, swamp the agricultural interest in the counties, and that by the method which Lord John Russell proposes, namely, of admitting to the county-roll ten-pound occupiers from the towns, which do not send a representative to Parliament. It has often been remarked, as a special defect in the Act of 1832, that it allowed in many cases the votes of small proprietors in villages and towns to swamp the votes of the agriculturists; and in several counties in Scotland this is notoriously the case. The manufacturing towns in Forfarshire, in Roxburghshire, and in Fife, furnish so many votes, that the landed interest is entirely unrepresented; and as new seats of manufacture are laid down, the evil is always progressive. There can be no doubt that in the instances which we have referred to, the landed interest is incomparably greater than all the others; and yet, in so far as representation goes, it has virtually no voice at all. It has been proposed, more than once—and the scheme carries reason with it—that these anomalies should be removed by the attachment of the unrepresented boroughs to the nearest ones which have representation; thus increasing and consolidating a class of voters who have a distinct common interest. If this were done, and the counties freed from an incubus, there might be no objection to the lowering of the agricultural tenant’s qualification, so that the man who paid £20 of yearly rent might be entitled to admission to the roll. But Lord John Russell takes exactly the opposite view. He wants to swamp the country constituencies altogether, and he proposes to effect that by letting in every man from the villages who pays £10 of rent! He himself admits that by this arrangement, persons occupying houses not rated at more than £1 or £2 a-year—in fact, mere hovels—may become county voters, and this he considers a fitting method of combining “the whole of the great interests of the country!” And yet, mark his inconsistency. By the same bill which proposes this amalgamation of interests in the counties, it is provided that University representation shall be extended, and that special members shall be allotted to the English Inns of Court. Surely there cannot be a more direct recognition of separate and exclusive interests than this; and yet, in counties, the agricultural interest is to be put down.
We have not the least fear that the law will be so altered; but that such proposals should emanate from a Ministry, is, we think, a disgraceful and a lamentable fact. They are no doubt entitled to have their opinion. They may think, though on what grounds we cannot divine, that it is good policy not to maintain any balance in the constitution, and that the franchise in town and country should be made the same. They may consider it advisable that small manufacturing towns, too unimportant to return members of themselves, should be allowed to furnish the majority of county voters, and that, virtually, the land should cease to have any representatives. If they think so, it is much to be regretted that they do not say so openly, so that we might have the opportunity of doing battle in a fair field. But this measure of theirs is intended to be deceptive, and convey a false impression that they are dealing impartially with all classes. In the first place, they take from the smaller boroughs no fewer than 66 members. Their principle is, that no borough having less than 300 electors, or less than 5000 inhabitants, ought to return a member; and that no borough having less than 500 electors, or less than 10,000 inhabitants, should return two members. Let us, for the sake of argument, admit the justice of this proposition. Does it therefore follow that it was wise to disfranchise such boroughs? That is by no means a necessary consequence. If the constituency is at present too small, extend it by all means. Wherever practicable, join these boroughs together; where that cannot be done, take an increased constituency from the nearest unrepresented town, until you reach the magic number which is to be the minimum of representation. Bring in fresh blood, which it is quite easy to do, without exciting the clamour and dissatisfaction which the abolition or curtailment of a privilege long enjoyed is sure to create. It cannot be denied that there is plenty of material at hand. There is also Parliamentary precedent and usage; for in Scotland, at the present moment, groups of small burghs return a single member, and some of these burghs are infinitesimally small. We have them so low, in point of voters, as 12, 14, and 22. Yet they are not disfranchised. They share their peculiar privilege along with others, making in the aggregate very respectable constituencies. Surely such an arrangement as that would be preferable to the Government proposition, which does wanton violence to constituencies against which no accusation has been made. We fear, however, that the disfranchisement of the smaller boroughs was considered an indispensable preliminary to the grand attack upon the counties.
Having thus secured the disposal of sixty-six seats, the Government come forward with an immense show of liberality, and offer forty-six of these to the counties. But then it is only on condition that the counties will allow themselves to be swamped. Nine large towns are each to have an additional member; there are to be five new borough seats; the Inns of Court are to have two, and the London University one member; the remaining three seats are to be given to Scotland.
This brings us to a point which we are absolutely bound to notice, because it serves as a further illustration of the impropriety and folly of bringing forward such a bill at such a time. If the Emperor Nicholas had the direction of our internal affairs, he could not have devised a more notable plan for fomenting dissension among us; and it is but right to show that this measure, if pushed on, must excite an angry feeling in the country. We, who are opposing any change in the electoral franchise at the present time, mainly because we think it an unhappy and dangerous juncture for making experiments, cannot be blamed if we state our own views of what is really required when the proper time shall arrive for making a readjustment of the representation. We do not wish, by any means, to argue the question at present: we state it simply to show the extent of the disagreement which may arise, if this measure is to be prosecuted just now.
Independent of the wholesale disfranchisement of English boroughs, which must necessarily excite great disgust and dissatisfaction, we take leave to tell Lord John Russell, and the other members of the Cabinet, that this bill of theirs is not likely to meet with any favour in the eyes of the Scottish people. The question of adequate representation has been mooted, discussed, and is now thoroughly understood by us; and we are determined, in the event of a change, to insist that our rights shall be recognised and allowed. This new bill, proposing to give us three additional members, whereas in respect either of population or of taxation we are entitled to twenty, cannot be satisfactory. It is not only right, but necessary, that our English friends should know the feeling in Scotland. We are not represented on the same scale or in the same manner as England is, and we complain of the inequality. We ask a common standard and a just proportion. Now, it does not appear that, by the present bill, the existing anomalies are to be removed, although, by the disfranchisement of so many boroughs, it would have been easy to have given Scotland her just share of members. If there be any reason why Scotland should have fewer proportional representatives than England, let it be boldly stated. If there is no reason at all, then let justice be done to us. We do not wish at present to go into details—indeed, that would be premature, until the new Scottish Reform Bill is before us; but as it is quite plain that the aggregate number of the House of Commons is not to be augmented, and as Lord John Russell proposes to give only three additional members to Scotland, we are perfectly entitled to enter our emphatic protest against a measure which has no solid principle for its foundation. The first point for consideration, in a redistribution of the representation such as is now contemplated, was undoubtedly the number of members which England, Scotland, and Ireland are entitled respectively to return. Lord John Russell either does not see the principle, or he refuses to acknowledge it. Now, this is a matter which will cause much excitement, and create not a little angry feeling in Scotland; and it is as well that our English friends should be made aware of it. We are, of course, anxious for a proper increase of national representatives, and we are perfectly aware that we cannot attain that object without a general measure for altering and abolishing constituencies. But this measure, while it is sure to create a turmoil in England, hardly professes to benefit us at all, and avoids the principle for which the Scottish people are contending. Any arrangements which may be made as to the future distribution of the representation, ought to be well weighed, considered, and matured; for this country will not submit to the confusion of a new reform bill once in every three or four years. This measure seems to us to be utterly deficient in these respects, and to be so loosely conceived as to give some colour to the prevalent opinion that it furnished an agreeable relaxation to the noble Lord between the intervals of his more serious editorial labours.
In Scotland, therefore, the bill will be considered highly objectionable, as evading the only popular demand from that portion of Great Britain. Beyond an increase of numbers, we have no desire for any change—Whigs, Tories, and Radicals, being for once agreed.
But we are not so unreasonable as to wish to fight that battle now. We earnestly deprecate anything like internal discord, for we have other battles to fight, and the people of Great Britain ought now, if ever, to be cordially united in sentiment. Therefore, although we think that we are not altogether fairly treated, and that we have not only a strong case, but an absolute right to claim redress, we shall not be guilty of the lamentable folly of urging our claims for increased representation at such a time. We believe that to be the general feeling of the people of Scotland; but then their forbearance is entirely contingent upon the course which the Government may pursue in respect to this measure. There may be, and probably will be, agitation hereafter; but there need be none now, at least on the score of representation, if the Ministry will but tacitly acknowledge their error, and remove this source of dissension.
There are several other points in this bill which are not only open to comment, but, as we think, decidedly objectionable. We shall merely refer to two of these. The first is, the preposterous notion of giving a member to minorities. The more we consider this plan, the more egregiously absurd does it appear. Why, in the name of all that is rational, should minorities be represented? And if that question can be answered satisfactorily, there is still another beyond it:—Why should only a limited number of constituencies be put in possession of such a privilege? But it may be worth while to suppose the new system in operation.
Manchester, under the new bill, will have three members. At present it has two, and these two are Liberals. On the hypothesis of Lord John Russell, though that by no means follows as a matter of course, the third, or minority member, will be a Conservative. What does that amount to but the cancelling, on any great political occasion, of two of the members for Manchester? The Conservative pairs off with one of the Liberals, or they go into the opposite lobby, which is exactly the same thing, and the opinions of Cottonopolis are only represented and enforced on a division, by a single member! We suspect that the present electorate of Manchester is much too shrewd and far-sighted to accept any arrangement of the kind; and that they would much prefer having two members whose votes tell on each division, to having nominally three, but, in reality, only one. Suppose that a minority member dies during a session of Parliament, or accepts the Chiltern Hundreds, how is his place to be supplied? Is there to be an election with three candidates in the field, and is the lowest to be proclaimed the victor? If not, what becomes of Lord John Russell’s “principle?” Then observe that, setting aside its absurdity, this crotchet would establish a new relation between representatives and represented. At present, the choice of the majority is recognised by all, and in matters of business there is free communication between the electors and the member, irrespectivealtogether of their party tendencies. This is a great privilege, and a great advantage. It has done much to soften acerbity, and, in some instances, has reconciled powerful parties to acquiesce in the return of a good and energetic member, albeit he might support a different policy from that to which they were inclined. But now the majority is to have its members, and the minority is to have its member, and the House is to be divided against itself. We seriously aver that we do not remember to have ever heard of a proposal more singularly silly, or more utterly absurd; and if this really be, as we are told, the keystone of the New Reform Bill, we may be allowed to express a hope that Lord John Russell will, for the future, desist from all architectural experiments.
We have barely space or time to advert to one other portion of this Bill—namely, that whereby it is proposed that members accepting office under the Crown should not vacate their seats. So far from being inclined to approve of that proposition, we condemn it utterly. The existing rule is a safeguard, and a most valuable one, against profligacy in high places, and ought not, by any means, to be abolished. It is rather amusing to see that Lord John Russell has been compelled to reflect upon his own measure of 1832, in order to make a rational excuse for his new proposal. He says—“In those times, when a seat could always be found for any person for whom it was required, Ministers suffered little inconvenience from the Act of Anne; but when the principle of popular representation was introduced into all our elections, the statute created difficulties which were hardly compensated by the advantage of having new elections.” What difficulties? There were no difficulties of any kind. If an honest man, with a clear conscience, who was the choice of a constituency, accepted office, he was sure to be returned again, and almost always without opposition; if, on the contrary, his conscience was not quite clear, he had to undergo a wholesome ordeal. But perhaps we owe this proposal to the clause about the minority members, since it is plain that an unfortunate senator in that position need not go down to his constituency unless, as we have already said, provision is made for his being returned, in virtue of his being lowest on the poll.
Whether the Ministry collectively have acted wisely or not in allowing this measure to be brought forward, we cannot say. They may have reasons which are not apparent to us. They may, for example, wish to allow Lord John Russell to expose himself, preparatory to some new arrangement. He is evidently a dangerous member of the Cabinet; for, while the Prime Minister is maintaining that there is still a chance of avoiding war with Russia, it is intolerable that a subordinate should use language of the most unguarded and opprobrious nature in respect to the Emperor. It is just a repetition of the offence of which both Sir James Graham and Sir Charles Wood were guilty in respect of Louis Napoleon; and although, in this case, the commentary may be just enough, we cannot but deplore such exhibitions on the part of Ministers. But if the Ministry intend seriously to proceed with this bill, at the present time, we shall be compelled to draw upon the noble lord, for terms sufficiently severe to express our indignation at their conduct.