“What is there now amissThat Cæsar and his senate must redress?”
“What is there now amissThat Cæsar and his senate must redress?”
“What is there now amissThat Cæsar and his senate must redress?”
“What is there now amiss
That Cæsar and his senate must redress?”
We apprehend that the noble lord would be greatly puzzled to frame an intelligible answer to such queries. Well then, we are, perforce, compelled to fall back upon theory, and to assume that he vindicates his proposal, not because future measures will be of a better kind, or better discussed than heretofore, but because it is desirable, for symmetry’s sake, that the representation should be readjusted.
Be it so. We are content to take that view, albeit a low one, and to examine his scheme without any partial leaning to the present constitution of the House of Commons. And first, let us see what regard he has paid to the principle of equal representation.
It will not, we presume, be denied by any one that the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, ought to be put upon an equitable footing as regards one another in this matter of representation. If imperial measures were all that the House of Commons had to discuss, this relative equality might be of less importance; but with separate laws and separate institutions guaranteed to and existing in the three kingdoms, it is proper that each should be fairly represented in the grand council of the nation. At present that is not the case. If we take the test of population, Scotland ought to have 18 more members than are now allotted to her; if we take the test of taxation and revenue, she ought to have 25 more. Combining the two, there is a deficit of more than 20 members to Scotland in her share of the national representation. Now, that is a matter which ought, in the very first instance, to have occupied the attention of the noble lord, and would have so occupied it, had he laid down for himself any fixed principles of action. It is nonsense to talk of inequalities between one borough and another, or between town and country qualification, before the first grand inequality is remedied. Apply the double test of population and revenue, and you will find that Ireland is upon an equality in point of representation with England, but that Scotland is not; and no reason has been, or can be, assigned for this anomaly. The quota for Scotland was fixed by the Act of Union at 45 members. It was increased by the Reform Act of 1832 to 53, but the number is still insufficient. Lord John Russell proposes, out of the 66 disfranchised seats, to givethreeto Scotland, but he has assigned no reason for doing so. The people of Scotland are not in the position of men supplicating for a boon. They are demanding that, when such a change as this is made, their political rights shall be respected and allowed; and they will not be satisfied with less than a measure of perfect justice. We think it right to put forward this point prominently, because it lies at the foundation of the whole question of the readjustment of the representation.
The question of the disfranchisement of the boroughs is one which should be approached with very great caution. In 1852, as we have already seen, Lord John Russell did not propose to touch them—now he has made up his mind to lop away 66 members from this branch of the representation. This is, in our opinion, by far too reckless a proceeding. We can see no good ground or principle for the entire disfranchisement of any of the boroughs, a step which we think ought never to be taken, except in case of absolute and proved corruption. When constituencies are too small, the proper and natural plan is, to annex and unite, not to abolish; and we believe that this could be effected with very little difficulty. The new Schedule A contains a list of 19 boroughs, returning at present 29 members, which are to be wholly disfranchised, on the ground either that the number of the electors is under 300, or that of the inhabitants under 5000. Therefore the privilege is to be taken from them, and the voters are to be thrown into the counties. We agree with Lord John Russell, that some constituencies are too small, but we do not agree with him in his scheme of disfranchisement, and we utterly object to his proposal of quartering the electors on the counties. They are borough voters, and so they ought to remain; and it is a very poor pretext, indeed, to make this disfranchisement the excuse for altering the county qualification. Let a union of the boroughs, by all means, take place; let the number of their members, if necessary, be considerably reduced; but let us have no disfranchisement, or assimilation between the town and county qualification, which would quite upset the whole system throughout the kingdom.
We do not profess to be conversant with local details, so that we cannot speak with perfect confidence; but it appears to us that some such arrangement as the following, which would unite the smaller boroughs, and at the same time diminish the number of members, might be adopted with advantage:—
Thus, without any disfranchisement, or violent displacement, fifteen boroughs, at present returning twenty-two members, might be formed into seven respectable constituencies, returning one member each to Parliament. There are, however, four others—Knaresborough, Evesham, Reigate, and Andover—which cannot be so easily thrown together. We would proceed with these on the same principle, by adding them to boroughs at present returning two members, but which Lord John Russell proposes to restrict to one member each. The following is our view:—
Here there are twenty-three seats set at liberty, without disfranchisement in any one instance. In justice to ourselves, we must state that we have implicitly followed the schedule attached to Lord John Russell’s bill, and not indulged in speculations of our own. Had the latter been the case, we might have been tempted to ask why Westbury, with an electorate of 289, is to be spared, while Wells, with 368, is to be blotted from the list of boroughs?
Besides these, Lord John Russell proposes that thirty other seats shall be made vacant, by restricting boroughs now returning two members to one. (His number is thirty-three, but we have already noticed Ripon, Tewkesbury, and Guildford.) If it could be shown that there is a really clamant case for representation elsewhere, the reduction might be allowed, but only to the extent required. It seems to us perfect madness to proceed with wholesale disfranchisement, until the necessity of transferring seats to other places is satisfactorily established. We can very well understand why some of the smaller boroughs which have now two members should be restricted to one, in order to satisfy the just requirements of some rising township which has hitherto been unrepresented. We have no doubt that Lord John Russell is quite right in his proposals to give members to Birkenhead, Burnley, and Staleybridge, and to erect Chelsea and Kensington into a Parliamentary borough to return two members. We think that two additional members each might be granted to the West Riding of Yorkshire and to the county of Lancaster—that Salford should return two members instead of one—and that the London University should be represented. We think that these are rational demands, and such as might be accorded; and the necessary number for these purposes, and for putting Scotland on a fair footing of equality with England and Ireland, would amount to the vacation of about thirty or thirty-two existing seats. We have already shown how, without entirely disfranchising any borough, twenty-three seats may be obtained; and if nine others are required, it would be no hardship to take from each of the following boroughs one out of the two members which they presently return:—
This would take out of Schedule B no less than twenty-one seats which are now included in it; and it would be obviously unwise to exhaust, all at once, the only source from which new rising constituencies can be endowed. Lord John Russell seems to think—and we agree with him—that the present number of the House of Commons (654) is quite large enough; and although there is no principle to fix numbers, it may be as well to maintain them as they are. It is but natural to expect that, in future years, some places will decrease, and others increase, and that partial changes will be required. For that very reason we deprecate too hasty a reduction of the boroughs, and an apportionment of their seats to places and constituencies which do not require them. Suppose that in ten years after this, new seats of commerce and manufacture, like Birkenhead, Burnley, and Staleybridge, start into existence—that places like Salford increase immensely—and that new Chelseas require to be conjoined with new Kensingtons—where are we to find members for them, without unduly swelling the bulk of the House of Commons, if all the smaller borough seats are to be disposed of at the present time? The Legislature may say just now, with perfect propriety, to the men of Lymington—“Your borough is the smallest in the country which returns two members to Parliament. Birkenhead is a place of such importance that it requires a member; and therefore, as it is not expedient to increase the aggregate number of the national representatives, we shall take a member from you, and give one to Birkenhead.” That is quite intelligible; but why disfranchise boroughs when you do not know what to do with the vacancies? It is true that Lord John Russell tells us what he means to do with them; but we entirely demur to every proposal of his beyond those which we have already noticed. He proposes, we observe, to give three members instead of two to the following cities and boroughs whose constituencies we have noted:—
It must strike every one that there can be no principle in this. The constituencies both of Manchester and Liverpool are more than five times larger than that of Bradford, and yet all of them are to have three members; whereas the Tower Hamlets with 25,366, Marylebone with 20,377, and Lambeth with 18,522 electors, are but to have two each as heretofore. Even the sage of theEdinburgh Reviewhas borne testimony to the impropriety and injustice of adding to the number of representatives returned for large towns. In his article of October 1852, he says:—
“It would appear that the large towns have their full share of the representation; since, if we add the small boroughs to the counties, on the supposition of their returning a somewhat similar class of members, and containing a somewhat similar constituency, the comparison would stand thus:—
—whereas the proper arithmetical proportion for the cities would be 169, instead of 206.”
The fact is, that Lord John Russell has assigned an additional number to each of these towns, not because they require one, but in order to make the extraordinary experiment, to which we have already alluded, of the representation of minorities in Parliament. For that reason, also, he proposes to give thirty-six additional members to so many counties and their divisions, making each up to the number of three, so that minorities may be represented on rather an extensive scale. We shall have occasion presently to say a word or two on that subject. The notion seems to us not only impracticable, but positively silly; and such as no man of ordinary sense could entertain for a moment. Even were it more feasible than it appears, that would not justify an unnecessary disfranchisement of the boroughs. We can see no reason for parting with them so abruptly—many for retaining them; because, undoubtedly, they keep the balance even between town and country, and so perform a very valuable function in the Legislature. We do not dispute the propriety of their remodelment or curtailment. Our views, in that respect, are, we submit, sufficiently liberal; for we think it just that from them, as small constituencies, any palpable defect or positive need in the national representation should be supplied. But we will not consent to their sacrifice merely for theoretical experiment; or in order to give colour to the proposal for assimilating the town and county franchise—in other words, for swamping the latter representation. We are greatly surprised that Lord John Russell should, in his mature years, have thus been led astray. In the popular ferment of 1831–2—the particulars of which are better known to his lordship than to us—almost any proposal might have gone down; but now reason instead of passion must be appealed to and satisfied, before any one can be allowed to make a material inroad on the Constitution. Lord John is singularly unfortunate. Mr Bright is quite as much opposed to the notion of the representation of minorities as we are; and we venture to say that the collective voice of the counties, to which he proposes to give an additional member, will be raised against him. We need not press the point that the borough electors will be especially unwilling to lose their existing privileges. And if it should so happen—as we know, and as every man who knows the political feeling of the country, must be the case—that both the disfranchised parties, and those whose franchise is thereby nominally increased, hold the scheme in detestation and contempt, how is it possible that he can hope to carry it even through the House of Commons? He has no enthusiasm to back him. He is not attempting to give voice to the opinion of any large section of the public—he is simply repeating, parrot-like and without examination, in opposition to all he has heretofore said, the opinions enunciated by another. He is theorising, contrary to his own experience; and sacrificing, for a mere crotchet, his own arrangements, which, for twenty years, and until 1852, he deemed to be mathematically correct.
We now come to the question of qualification. This is a very serious one, and cannot be properly treated without reference to our existing fiscal arrangements. Indirect taxation has been reduced to the lowest possible limit; and, in order to make up the deficiency in the revenue occasioned by numerous relaxations, we are forced to submit to an income-tax which amounted last year to more than five and a half millions, levied from those persons only who are in receipt of more than £100 yearly. From Mr Gladstone’s financial statement, it appears that the Government does not intend to increase the amount of the national debt by contracting fresh loans, but that the inevitable expenses of the war, however large, are to be defrayed by additional yearly taxation. Further, we are told that it is not proposed to raise any portion of this by again resorting to indirect taxation, but that the whole of it is to be charged upon those persons who are already rated to the income-tax. We subscribe in theory to the opinion, that it is not advisable for the interests of posterity to increase the amount of the national debt; which might, however, have been cleared off during the years of peace but for the insane system pursued by successive Ministries, of abandoning indirect taxation for the sake of immediate popularity. In practice, it may be found impossible to avoid the contraction of fresh loans. It is not likely, for some time at least, that any Ministry will be bold enough to resort to the customs and excise duties for the supply of the yearly deficiency, so that there really seems no other available course than that of taxing property and income still farther. The effect of this is, that a certain limited class is made to pay for the others, and that the great bulk of the population are exempted. How long this can be endured we shall not venture to predict. We have demonstrated over and over again, in the pages of the Magazine, the extreme impolicy and ultimate danger of continuing a war tax in time of peace, and the result shows the soundness of our warning. The day will arrive when this burden will become so great as to be intolerable; and then, perhaps, it may be discovered that, in abandoning easy and evident sources of revenue, our commercial legislators have committed a most grievous error. At present, however, we can only look to the fiscal arrangements which have been proposed. It is obvious, at least to us, that it would be highly inexpedient, and even dangerous, to lodge political power in the hands of those who are not called upon to contribute directly to the necessities of the State. If you are to select a certain class as peculiar rate-payers, and to compel them, year after year, to make up the deficiency of the national income, whatever that may be, you are bound also to give them peculiar privileges. We care not how low you make the assessment. Indeed, we are of opinion that it should be brought down to the lowest possible limit, which, probably, would be fixed, as regards income, at £60 per annum. But whatever that limit may be, this principle ought to be established, that no man, not rated to the property and income tax, shall hereafter be capable of voting, or of being enrolled. This is the only good security we can have against confiscation. It is said that the idea of a war is peculiarly popular in the country. No wonder that it should be so. The artisan is informed that no additional tax will be laid in consequence upon any article of his consumpt; that the price of his beer, spirits, tea, coffee, sugar, and tobacco, will not be raised; and that others will defray the cost of equipping those fine fleets, and maintaining those splendid troops, which he cheers as they leave our shores. Very different are the feelings of the unfortunate individual who, by dint of industry, has worked his way to an income of £150 a-year, and has a wife and family to support. Last year he had to pay £4, 7s. 6d., directly to the Exchequer, and was consoling himself with the vision that, after April 1855, his contribution would be lowered to £3, 15s. Down upon him, like a vulture, swoops the tax-gatherer, with a demand for £7, 11s. 3d., to be increased if the war goes on. You cannot expect that man to be quite as enthusiastic as the artisan, whose voice, like that of Sempronius, is still for war, so long as he escapes untaxed. It is easy to be patriotic when there is nothing whatever to pay. What we advocate, therefore, is, an extension of the property and income tax to the lowest available limit, and an exclusion from the franchise of all those who do not contribute to it. It is a proposition not only fair and reasonable, but imperatively necessary under the circumstances in which we are placed; and no one can complain of injustice in being excluded from a privilege for which he does not pay, either from want of means, or because he fraudulently evades the tax.
Of course, this is tantamount to a rejection of Lord John Russell’s proposal, that persons having £50 for a certain period of time deposited in a savings’ bank, shall be entitled to the franchise. This is a proposal which really will not bear examination. In the first place, it would lead to a prodigious deal of fictitious registration and wholesale manufacture of votes; in the second place, it is a most invidious and senseless preference given to one species of property beyond another. Why a savings’ bank? Are chartered, joint-stock, or private banks not as good? And why give a vote for £50 in the shape of a deposit only? Money is only equivalent to money’s worth. The man who expends £50 in the furnishing of his house, or in purchasing a share in some small business, or in fifty other ways of investment, is as good or better than his neighbour, who lets his money lie in the savings’ bank. It is utterly absurd to select one only kind of deposit for the franchise, practically excluding hundreds of thousands, who have more money invested in a different way. Then, again, what means are to be devised for ascertaining the right of parties so registered to continue on the roll? The tenure is obviously of the most precarious kind. An election takes place to-day, and a depositor votes in virtue of his £50; to-morrow he withdraws it from the bank. How is that to be ascertained? We presume it is not contemplated that the savings’-bank books shall be open to the inspection of the public; and if not, where are the means of ascertaining the continued qualification of parties? In like manner, we object to the qualification of £10 of yearly dividend from the Funds, or from bank stock. It is reasonable enough, perhaps, on account of their educational attainments, that graduates of universities should be admitted to vote either in town or county,provided that they are assessed to the property and income tax, but not otherwise; and the receipt of £100 a-year of salary, as it implies direct rating, may be taken as a sufficient qualification for borough or town voting.
But we are not at all prepared to agree to the proposed assimilation of the town and county franchise. It is a direct and dangerous innovation on the principle of the British constitution, which is, that the county representation shall be kept apart from that of the towns and boroughs. The Act of 1832 admitted the proprietor of a £10 house, not situated within the boundaries of a borough, to a county vote; and the result of that, in some localities, has been, that the voters in villages and small towns which were not boroughs, have been numerous enough to swamp and overpower the proper county constituency. That was bad enough; but it is now proposed thatoccupiersshall have the franchise; and, as we remarked last month, it is not by any means necessary that the house which the voter occupies should be of the yearly value of £10. We must again quote the words of Lord John Russell: “We propose, with respect to the county right of voting, that—with the exception of a dwelling-house,which may be of any value, provided the voter lives in it—in all other cases the building must be of the value of £5 a-year. Supposing there is a house and land, the house may be rated at £1 or £2 a-year, provided the voter resides in it; but if the qualification is made out by any other building—a cattle-shed, or any other building of that kind—then we propose this check, that such building shall be of the value of £5 a-year. This, then, is the franchise we propose to give in counties for the future.” Thus the English counties are to be inundated, 1st, By £10 occupiers, not resident within borough boundaries; and, 2dly, By the voters of sixty-six disfranchised boroughs, who are to be thrown loose upon them! We are confident that, in any case, such a proposal as this will be rejected. The counties do not want additional members at the expense of the boroughs; and we think it is, on principle, most important that the two kinds of representation should be preserved distinct. Indeed, but for the crotchet of giving representation to minorities, by assigning to as many constituencies as possible three members each, we should probably have heard nothing of this transfer of borough representation. That the county franchise may be advantageously lowered as regards tenants, we are ready to admit. Let them be enrolled from £20 upwards, provided they pay property and income tax, which, according to our view, ought to be made an indispensable condition to the franchise.
But we shall be asked, what is to become of £10 occupants residing beyond borough boundaries, who are really rated to the income-tax? Are they to remain unrepresented? Our reply is, that they ought to be represented, and can be represented, without sending them to the county-roll. The true, sound, and equitable method is to enlarge the parliamentary boundaries of boroughs, so that persons of this class may be enrolled in the nearest borough to their residence. Such enlargement may be made irrespective of other persons who are entitled to the county franchise, and who would still claim to be placed upon that roll. In this way, no one really entitled to vote would be excluded: both counties and boroughs would be preserved; and the latter would receive a very considerable augmentation of numbers from a class of men who at present do not enjoy the franchise.
There is but one point more to which we shall specially refer, and that is the proposed representation of minorities. We have shown, in a former article, that this is perfectly unworkable, and moreover greatly to be deprecated, as entirely changing the relations of the electors and their representatives. It can only, according to Lord John Russell’s admission, be attempted in constituencies which are to be allowed three representatives; and the simple fact of its being the exception, and not the rule, seems to us sufficient to condemn it. We have already put the case of the death or resignation of one of these minority members, and we cannot see how his place can be supplied, unless it is enacted that the candidate lowest on the poll is to be returned. It is neither sensible nor equitable to challenge the authority of majorities. If you leave a question, whether it relate to men or measures, to be decided by a certain number of people, you must perforce adopt and acquiesce in the verdict of the majority. But it is within our power to render the majorities less oppressive, by multiplying as much as possible the number of the tribunals of appeal.
This brings us to the consideration of a topic which we broached in the last number of the Magazine, and which, we venture to say, is well worthy of the attention of our statesmen. It cannot be denied that in many places, especially large towns, there is an immense degree of apathy on the part of those who are entitled to the franchise. Men who are in the possession or occupation of property far more than sufficient to entitle them to vote, do not even take the pains to place themselves on the roll; and many of those who are on the roll will not give themselves the trouble to vote. It is remarkable also that these are generally men of wealth, station, and intelligence—belonging, in short, to the class most likely to use the franchise with discretion and independence. The reason of this apparent apathy is, that they know quite well that they will be outvoted. In urban constituencies of four thousand or upwards, returning two members each, every one knows beforehand how the election will go, and consequently no effort is made by a desponding minority. We grant that such ought not to be the case; because an elector, though he may not be able to find a candidate of his own way of thinking, can always exercise a wholesome control, by voting for the man who, in his judgment, is the best in the field—but there can be no doubt that the case is as we represent it. For example, at last election, there voted, in round numbers, at London, only 7,500 out of 20,000 electors—at Finsbury, 9,000 out of 20,000—at Lambeth, 8,000 out of 18,000—at Manchester, 9,000 out of 13,000—at Westminster, 800 out of 14,800—at Sheffield, 3,500 out of 5,300—at York, 2,500 out of 4,100—at Edinburgh, 3,500 out of 6,900—at Glasgow, 5,000 out of 16,500. These represent the actual numbers on the register, but not the number of those entitled to be enrolled, but who have not lodged claims. In short, the activity in voting and enrolling seems to decline in proportion to the size of the constituency.
There is but one way of remedying this, and that is by recurring to the simple principlethat no man shall be entitled, in one place, to vote for more than a single member. We do not mean by this that large populations should be restricted to a single member—that would be unfair, and even preposterous. We mean that each county, division of a county, city, town, or borough, which has more than one member allotted to it, should be subdivided into parishes, districts, or wards, each to return a member, according to the votes of the majority of the qualified electors within it. Thus London would be divided into four electoral districts; Liverpool, Manchester, Edinburgh, and others into two; and the counties would, in the same way, be partitioned into so many districts as there were members to be returned. This system is at present in partial operation in the counties of England, which are split into divisions, and there undoubtedly the system has worked well and satisfactorily. No man in his senses would propose that each county elector of Yorkshire should have six votes; and we really cannot see why one man, because he happens to live in a large town, should have double the personal political influence of another who resides in a small borough. It does not necessarily follow, by any means, that the members to be returned under the operation of the system which we propose should be antagonistic to one another. It would, we are convinced, materially tend to improve the representation, by infusing fresh energy into the constituencies; it is already recognised, and partially in effect; and it is not liable to any of the objections which it requires no ingenuity to rear against Lord John Russell’s absurd scheme for giving members to minorities.
We might say a great deal more on the subject of the present bill, but we think that further comment is needless. We have shown, by absolute demonstration, that it is not the result of Lord John Russell’s own Parliamentary experience—that, for twenty years of his public life, dating from 1832, he had failed to see the proper method of amending the representation of the people—and that he was at last enlightened by a series of articles, which display as little consistency as wisdom. We have shown also that he has not probed the great question of the relative proportional representation of the three united kingdoms—that he proposes to demolish borough representation, without any necessity for doing so—and that he wishes entirely to change, or rather to abrogate, the ancient distinction between town and county franchise. We have shown that he has not taken at all into consideration the recent fiscal changes, and that he proposes to place those who are heavily and directly taxed on the same footing with those who are allowed to escape that burden. We have shown that other parts of his scheme are either merely fantastical, or dictated by party motives; and having said so much, we are content to abide by the decision of the country.
If this bill is again brought forward on the 27th of April, or a later day in the session, we do not believe that it will ever pass into the statute-book. If it is withdrawn, on the score of inconvenience or otherwise, we are perfectly certain that it will not again appear in its present shape; for, many as are the legislative proposals which we have had occasion to consider, this is, beyond comparison, the worst digested, most incoherent and most rambling measure of them all.