THE COST OF THE COALITION MINISTRY.
It is probable that ere these pages issue from the press, war will have been formally declared with Russia, and Great Britain will be irretrievably engaged in a contest of which it is impossible to see the termination. Already our choicest troops have left our shores for the Mediterranean, inspired by the cheers and accompanied by the blessing of many hundreds of thousands of their fellow-countrymen, who, for the first time in their lives, have witnessed so solemn yet exciting a spectacle. Already has a noble fleet sailed for the waters of the Baltic, to sweep that inland sea, and to launch its thunders against the foe. Wellnigh forty years have elapsed since such din of martial preparation has been heard. On the last occasion, Russia and Britain were combined against France—now, Britain and France are combined together against Russia. Such a struggle, so commenced, must be a desperate, but not therefore necessarily a short one. We cannot yet calculate on the part to be taken by the central powers of Europe; for, notwithstanding Lord Clarendon’s assurance that Austria is with us, we have every reason to believe that the government of that country is so closely leagued with Russia, that when compelled to throw off its appearance of neutrality, its forces will be ranged upon her side.[11]We cannot depend upon the cordial co-operation of Prussia—which power, besides having no direct interest in the Eastern quarrel, is intimately allied with Russia, and has always acted, during times of European disturbance, with a view to its own aggrandisement. It would be folly to underrate the magnitude of the contest in which we are engaging. The re-pacification of Europe cannot be achieved without an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, and without very considerable alterations in its territorial adjustment. The war once begun, Russia will know that she is fighting, not for the occupation of the Danubian provinces, but for the retention of the territories which she has absorbed or pillaged from her neighbours. The penalty she must pay in the event of defeat is dismemberment, and she will resist that to the uttermost.
We must not, therefore, blind ourselves to consequences, which, in so far as human judgment can go, appear to be inevitable. We may be able to disperse or even to annihilate the Russian fleets in the Baltic and the Black seas—we may be able to prevent the colossal northern power from crossing the Danube, or even beat it back from the Principalities—but the contest will not end there. We are on the verge of a general European embroilment, in which there will not only be wars, but bloody revolutions; and as we have been the first to enter, so we must be the last to withdraw. We do not say this for the purpose of checking enthusiasm—God forbid! We are already committed to the struggle; and if in the minds of any there has lingered a doubt as to the propriety of Christian intervention for the maintenance of a Mahometan power in Europe, that ought to be dispelled by the revelations recently made of the objects of the Russian ambition. The Czar is no crusader; nor is he influenced by any tender regard for the religious liberties of the Christian population dwelling beneath the government of the Sultan. He has set his eyes upon Turkey, just as Catherine in 1772 fixed hers upon Poland, and he has had the astounding effrontery to propose that Great Britain should take part in the spoliation. Here is his own proposition, as communicated to Lord John Russell, by Sir G. H. Seymour, in his despatch of 22d February 1853:—
“The Emperor went on to say that, in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, he thought it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed. ‘The Principalities are,’ he said, ‘in fact an independent state under my protection; this might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of government. So again with Bulgaria. There seems to be no reason this province should not form an independent state. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory.I can then only say that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia: that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.’”
Such was the language used by the Emperor of Russia to the British minister at the Court of St Petersburg, and we really cannot imagine anything more absolutely infamous. It was a bribe, tendered evidently in the belief that it would be accepted; and the offer ought to have been at once most indignantly repelled. Was it so? We shall see presently—for the correspondence recently published is far too remarkable and momentous to be passed over with a single extract from its contents.
The Government of Lord Aberdeen, it will be remembered, acceded to office in the latter part of December 1852. On the 9th of January following, the Emperor Nicholas, at a private meeting in the palace of the Grand-duchess Helen, thus approached Sir G. H. Seymour. We shall be as short in quotation as possible; but it is absolutely necessary that the leading points of such an extraordinary transaction as this should be kept before the public view. We quote from Sir Hamilton Seymour’s despatch to Lord John Russell, then Foreign Secretary, of date 11th January 1853:—
“The Emperor came up to me, in the most gracious manner, to say that he had heard with great pleasure of Her Majesty’s Government having been definitively formed,adding that he trusted the Ministry would be of long duration.
“His Imperial Majesty desired meparticularly to convey this assurance to the Earl of Aberdeen, with whom, he said, he had been acquainted for nearly forty years, and for whom he entertained equal regard and esteem. His Majesty desired to be brought to the kind recollection of his Lordship.”
Then follows the report of some expressions regarding the close amity which ought to prevail between the two countries, and their community of interests, which, being general, we may pass over: but Nicholas speedily comes to the point—
“In the mean time, the Emperor went on to say—‘I repeat, that it is very essential that the two Governments—that is, that the English Government and I, and I and the English Government—should be upon the best terms;and the necessity was never greater than at present. I beg you to convey these words to Lord John Russell. When we are agreed (d’accord), I am quite without anxiety to the west of Europe; it is immaterial what the others may think or do. Asto Turkey, that is another question; that country is in a critical state, and may give us all a great deal of trouble. And now I will take my leave of you,’ which His Majesty proceeded to do by shaking hands with me very graciously.”
The Czar probably thought that he had said enough in the first instance, and that it would be prudent to allow Sir Hamilton Seymour to chew, for a day or two, the cud of thought. But that active and astute diplomatist saw that something more than common was intended, and pressed for a further explanation. The following conversation is certainly as curious as any which is recorded in the pages of history:—
“‘Sir,’ I observed, ‘your Majesty has been good enough to charge me with general assurances as to the identity of views between the two Cabinets, which assuredly have given me the greatest pleasure, and will be received with equal satisfaction in England; but I should be particularly glad that your Majesty should add a few words which may tend to calm the anxiety with regard to the affairs of Turkey, which passing events are so calculated to excite on the part of Her Majesty’s Government. Perhaps you will be pleased to charge me with some additional assurances of this kind.’
“The Emperor’s words and manner, although still very kind, showed that His Majestyhad no intention of speaking to me of the demonstration which he is about to make in the South. He said, however, at first with a little hesitation, but, as he proceeded, in an open and unhesitating manner—‘The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces (menace ruine); the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised.’
“I observed in a few words, that I rejoiced to hear that His Imperial Majesty held this language; that this was certainly the view I took of the manner in which Turkish questions were to be treated.
“‘Tenez,’ the Emperor said, as if proceeding with his remark, ‘tenez; nous avons sur les bras un homme malade—un homme gravement malade; ce sera, je vous le dis franchement, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous échapper, surtout avant que toutes les dispositions nécessaires fussent prises. Mais enfin ce n’est point le moment de vous parler de cela.’
“It was clear that the Emperor did not intend to prolong the conversation. I therefore said, ‘Votre Majesté est si gracieuse qu’elle me permettra de lui faire encore une observation. Votre Majesté dit que l’homme est malade; c’est bien vrai, mais votre Majesté daignera m’excuser si je lui fais observer, que c’est à l’homme généreux et fort de ménager l’homme malade et faible.’
“The Emperor then took leave of me in a manner which conveyed the impression of my having, at least, not given offence, and again expressed his intention of sending for me on some future day.”
It is proper to subjoin Sir Hamilton Seymour’s own impressions of this interview, as communicated to Lord John Russell.
“Your Lordship will pardon me if I remark that, after reflecting attentively upon my conversation with the Emperor, it appears to me that this, and any overture of the kind which may be made, tends to establish a dilemma by which it is very desirable that Her Majesty’s Government should not allow themselves to be fettered. The dilemma seems to be this:—If her Majesty’s Government do not come to an understanding with Russia as to what is to happen in the event of the sudden downfall of Turkey, they will have the less reason for complaining if results displeasing to England should be prepared. If, on the contrary, Her Majesty’s Government should enter into the consideration of such eventualities, they make themselves in some degree consenting parties to a catastrophe which they have so much interest in warding off as long as possible.
The sum is probably this:—That England has to desire a close concert with Russia, with a view to preventing the downfall of Turkey; while Russia would be well pleased that the concert should apply to the events by which this downfall is to be followed.”
In a postscript to this despatch, we learn that the Emperor had communicatedto the Austrian Ministerthe tenor of the above conversation. That circumstance is, to say the least of it, significant.
Five days afterwards, Sir Hamilton Seymour waited upon the Emperor, at the request of the latter, and was favoured from the imperial lips with a remarkably choice specimen of what our Irish friends denominateblarney. The Czar began by asseverating that he had not the least intention of increasing the extent of his territorial dominions. The only danger, he said, which he could foresee to Russia would arise from an extension given to an empire already too large. From this general statement he presently condescended to particulars.
“Close to us lies Turkey, and, in our present condition, nothing better for our interests can be desired; the times have gone by when we had anything to fear from the fanatical spirit or the military enterprise of the Turks, and yet the country is strong enough, or has hitherto been strong enough, to preserve its independence, and to insure respectful treatment from other countries.”
These were, we venture to think, injudicious premises on the part of the Emperor, for they are tantamount to an admission that Turkey, if left alone, was quite able to maintain its own position. We are not quite sure that the same could be said of Austria, which, but a few years ago, owed its integrity to the intervention of Russian bayonets. Be that as it may, the Emperor went on to state that he had the right of surveillance over some millions of Christians in the Ottoman empire—a right which he regarded as a duty, but used sparingly, because it was “attended with obligations occasionally very inconvenient.” And then we arrive at a statement, quite inconsistent, we think, with what had gone before.
“Now, Turkey, in the condition which I have described, has by degrees fallen into such a state of decrepitude, that, as I told you the other night,eager as we all are for the prolonged existence of the man(and that I am as desirous as you can be for the continuance of his life, I beg you to believe), he may suddenly die upon our hands (nous rester sur les bras); we cannot resuscitate what is dead: if the Turkish empire falls, it falls to rise no more; and I put it to you, therefore, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency, than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched? This is the point to which I am desirous that you should call the attention of your Government.”
We had better givein extensothe conversation which immediately followed; because we think that Sir Hamilton Seymour might, without any breach of propriety, have used more decided language than he did employ, with regard to the view likely to be taken by the British Cabinet. We are quite aware of the difficulties of an ambassador in such a situation; still we cannot avoid the conclusion that Sir H. Seymour was unnecessarily timid, and not nearly decided enough in the tone which he assumed. He objected, indeed, but the objection was rather feeble; which was unfortunate, as his principal in England immediately adopted the like inconclusive tone.
“‘Sir,’ I replied, ‘your Majesty is so frank with me that I am sure you will have the goodness to permit me to speak with the same openness. I would then observe that, deplorable as is the condition of Turkey, it is a country which has long been plunged in difficulties supposed by many to be insurmountable. With regard to contingent arrangements, her Majesty’s Government, as your Majesty is well aware, objects, as a general rule to taking engagements upon possible eventualities, and would, perhaps, be particularly disinclined to doing so in this instance. If I may be allowed to say so, a great disinclination (répugnance) might be expected in England to disposing by anticipation (d’escompter) of the succession of an old friend and ally.’
“‘The rule is a good one,’ the Emperor replied, ‘good at all times, especially in times of uncertainty and change, like the present: still it is of the greatest importance that we should understand one an other, and not allow events to take us by surprise;maintenant je désire vous parler en ami et engentleman; si nous arrivons à nous entendre sur cette affaire, l’Angleterre et moi, pour le reste peu m’importe; il m’est indifferent ce que font ou pensent les autres. Usant donc de franchise, je vous dis nettement, que si l’Angleterre songe à s’établir un de ces jours à Constantinople, je ne le permettrai pas; je ne vous prête point ces intentions, mais il vaut mieux dans ces occasions parler clairement; de mon côté, je suis également disposé de prendre l’engagement de ne pas m’y établir,en propriétaire il s’entend, car en dépositaire je ne dis pas; il pourrait se faire que les circonstances me misent dans le cas d’occuper Constantinople, si rien ne se trouve prévu, si l’on doit tout laisser aller au hazard.’
“I thanked his Majesty for the frankness of his declarations, and for the desire which he had expressed of acting cordially and openly with her Majesty’s Government, observing at the same time that such an understanding appeared the best security against the sudden danger to which his Majesty had alluded. I added that, although unprepared to give a decided opinion upon questions of such magnitude and delicacy, it appeared to me possible that some such arrangement might be made between her Majesty’s Government and his Majesty as might guard, if not for, at least against certain contingencies.
“To render my meaning more clear,” I said, further, “I can only repeat, Sir, that in my opinion her Majesty’s Government will be indisposed to make certain arrangements connected with the downfall of Turkey,but it is possible that they may be ready to pledge themselves against certain arrangements which might, in that event, be attempted.”
We have no desire whatever to reflect upon the conduct of the prudence of Sir Hamilton Seymour, but we cannot help saying that he seems to have missed one very material point—that beinga distinct explanation of the quarter from which the anticipated danger to Turkey was to arise. Sir Hamilton was perfectly justified in intimating that Britain did not intend to subvert the integrity of Turkey, and that she would not be passive if France were to manifest such a design. There was no earthly danger from either quarter; and certainly Austria, whatever she may wish to have or is ready to receive, would not have dared, under existing circumstances, to disturb the peace of Europe. Turkey itself was in a far better position than it ever had been. “L’homme gravement malade,” was exhibiting every symptom of convalescence, and the only danger to be apprehended was from the Muscovite doctor, who, without being summoned, was preparing to administer his pills. Therefore, we think that the rejoinder to the Emperor’s confidences—subject, of course, to the official Cabinet approval—should have been in the shape of a query as to the nature of the apprehended danger. The Czar had protested, in the most emphatic language, that he was “eager for the prolonged existence of the man;” and, if that were the case, his dissolution was an event much less likely than that of many a dynasty of Christian Europe. With Russia and Britain as determined protectors, who was to give him thecoup-de-grace? Surely Sir Hamilton Seymour erred in not putting that point more forcibly and distinctly in his confidential conversations with the Emperor.
We say this, because the last paragraph in Sir Hamilton Seymour’s despatch, of 22d January 1853, to Lord John Russell shows that he was not altogether uninfluenced by the Imperial blandishments and affectation of perfect sincerity.
“A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilisation of the nineteenth century if the void left by the extinction of Mahommedan rule in Europe could be filled up without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the precautions adopted by the two principal Governments the most interested in the destinies of Turkey.”
Precautions indeed! Precautions which would have made Russia, without assuming the name of proprietor, the virtual and absolute occupier of Constantinople, with the power of the keys of the Bosphorus! It is marvellous that so acute a minister as Sir Hamilton Seymour—who otherwise deserves great praise for his lucid exposition of the designs and motives of the Czar—did not perceive that any approach to an arrangement for disposing of the inheritance, was tantamount to a declaration of the immediate dissolution of Turkey.
In answer to these communications, Lord John Russell, on the 9th February, forwarded a despatch, of the wisdom of which it is for the public to form their own opinion. It commences with an acknowledgment of “the moderation, the frankness, and the friendly disposition of his Imperial Majesty.” Why the first of these terms should have been employed, we really do not comprehend. Then Lord John, adverting to the indirect proposal of the Emperor, observes that—“In considering this grave question, the first reflection which occurs to Her Majesty’s Government is, that no actual crisis has occurred which renders necessary a solution of this vast European problem”—that “there is no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours”—and that “it occurs further to her Majesty’s Government to remark that the event which is contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time.” After pointing out the impropriety as well as the impolicy of devising a partition for providing for a settlement under such circumstances, Lord John intimates, in tolerably distinct terms, that “neither England nor France, nor probably Austria, would be content to see Constantinople permanently in the hands of Russia.” He then draws the following conclusions:—
“Upon the whole, then, Her Majesty’s Government are persuaded that no course of policy can be adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Europe, than that which His Imperial Majesty has so long followed, and which will render his name more illustrious than that of the most famous sovereigns who have sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory.
“With a view to the success of this policy, it is desirable that the utmost forbearance should be manifested towards Turkey; that any demands which the Great Powers of Europe may have to make should be made matter of friendly negotiation rather than of peremptory demand; that military and naval demonstrations to coerce the Sultan should as much as possible be avoided; that differences with respect to matters affecting Turkey, within the competence of the Sublime Porte, should be decided after mutual concert between the great powers, and not be forced upon the weakness of the Turkish Government.”
To this succeeds a passage which we cannot help considering as unfortunate, because it gives decided colour to the Russian pretext, that a protectorate over Turkey was necessary for securing the rights of the Christian inhabitants. There was no occasion whatever for its introduction, especially as the Emperor had not thought it necessary to ask advice upon the subject:—
“To these cautions Her Majesty’s Government wish to add, that in their view it is essential that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects in conformity with the principles of equity and religious freedom which prevail generally among the enlightened nations of Europe. The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which his Imperial Majesty has found so burdensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty.
We observe that theTimes, notwithstanding its notorious ministerial leaning, has declined awarding praise to this state document, and we are not surprised at it. It is dissuasive and declinatory, but it is altogether feeble. We should have expected to find in it, not hypocritical acknowledgments of Imperial moderation and so forth, but a distinct, firm, and energetic protest against any attempt to disturb the peace, or to violate the integrity of Turkey. The infamous proposals made to Britain—for they were infamous not only as regarded Turkey but other European powers—should have been rejected in a manner that could have left no doubt in the mind of the Czar as to the part which the British Government was prepared to take in the event of his entering into hostilities with the Sultan. From the beginning to the end of this despatch there is not a single word which can be construed into a plain warning to the Czar, that any attempt made by him upon Turkey would provoke the hostility of Britain. On the contrary, the declinature to participate in the scheme is mainly founded on the fact that no “actual crisis” has yet arrived; but there is nothing said to indicate that Britain would oppose the forcing on of such a crisis, if Russia thought proper to precipitate it; and a more unlucky expression than “that the event which was contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time” it is utterly impossible to conceive. The perusal of this despatch could leave no other impression upon the mind of the Czar, than that the British Ministry were afraid to commit themselves by entering into any secret or separate treaty with Russia for the disposal of the Turkish dominions, until a crisis actually should occur. That they would have preferred the maintenance of thestatus quoto a disturbance of it, was tolerably clear; but it was not in the least degree clear that they would take umbrage at an act of aggression, or be indisposed to treat with Russia after the aggression was made, and the weakness of the Ottoman empire exhibited by its being forced to succumb to the attack of the northern Colossus. The despatch, in short, was not couched in such manly, distinct, and positive terms as a British Secretary of State for foreign affairs should have employed on such an occasion. It is weak, timid, and almost subservient; and we are not in the least degree surprised to find that the Czar considered that it gave him sufficient encouragement again to renew his attack. Here is an extract from his next conversation with the British envoy, Sir Hamilton Seymour.
“‘I think your Government does not well understand my object. I am not so eager about what shall be done when the sick man dies, as I am to determine with England what shall not be done upon that event taking place.’
“‘But, sir,’ I replied, ‘allow me to observe, that we have no reason to think that the sick man (to use your Majesty’s expression) is dying. We are as much interested as we believe your Majesty to be in his continuing to live; while, for myself, I will venture to remark that experience shows me that countries do not die in such a hurry. Turkey will remain for many a year, unless some unforeseen crisis should occur. It is precisely, sir, for the avoidance of all circumstances likely to produce such a crisis that Her Majesty’s Government reckons upon your generous assistance.’
“‘Then,’ rejoined the Emperor, ‘I will tell you that, if your Government has been led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of existence, your Government must have received incorrect information. I repeat to you, that the sick man is dying; and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding; and this we should do, I am convinced, if I could hold but ten minutes’ conversation with your Ministers—with Lord Aberdeen, for instance, who knows me so well, who has full confidence in me, as I have in him. And, remember, I do not ask for a treaty or a protocol; a general understanding is all I require—that between gentlemen is sufficient; and in this case I am certain that the confidence would be as great on the side of the Queen’s Ministers as on mine.’”
The despatch, containing the report of this conversation, was written on the 21st February, and received at the Foreign Office on 6th March 1853; so that the Emperor Nicholas, whatever may be thought of his conduct otherwise, cannot be justly charged with deliberate perfidy in concealing his views from our Government. Indeed, Sir Hamilton Seymour, in this very document, gave Lord John Russell a distinct intimation of the real objects of the Czar.
“It can hardly be otherwise but that the Sovereign, who insists with such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighbouring state, must have settled in his own mind that the hour, if not of its dissolution, at all events for its dissolution, must be at hand.
“Then, as now, I reflected that this assumption would hardly be ventured upon unless some, perhaps general, but at all events intimate understanding, existedbetween Russia and Austria.
“Supposing my suspicion to be well founded, the Emperor’s object is to engage Her Majesty’s Government, in conjunction with his own Cabinet and that of Vienna, in some scheme for the ultimate partition of Turkey, and for the exclusion of France from the arrangement.”
On the following day a more particular, and, if possible, more interesting, conversation took place between the Czar and the British envoy. We regret extremely that our limits will not allow us to detail this so fully as we could wish, but we shall advert to the principal points, which were in the form of a commentary upon Lord John Russell’s despatch. The Emperor began by saying,—
“That he was, perhaps, even more interested than England could be in preventing a Turkish catastrophe, but that it was constantly impending; that it might be brought about at any moment, either by an external war, or by a feud between the old Turkish party and that of the ‘new superficial French reforms,’ or again, by a rising of the Christians, already known to be very impatient of shaking off the Mussulman yoke. As regards the first cause, the Emperor said that he had a good right to advert to it, inasmuch as, if he had not stopped the victorious progress of General Diebitch in 1829, the Sultan’s authority would have been at an end.”
Next he descanted upon what couldnotbe permitted in the event of a break-up of the Ottoman empire. This is perhaps the most curious passage of the whole.
“‘Well, there are several things which I never will tolerate; I will begin by ourselves. I will not toleratethe permanent occupationof Constantinople by the Russians; having said this, I will say that it never shall be held by the English, or French, or any other great nation. Again, I never will permit an attempt at the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful state; still less will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other revolutionists of Europe; rather than submit any of these arrangements I would go to war, and as long as I have a man and a musket left would carry it on. These,’ the Emperor said, ‘are at once some ideas; now give me some in return.’”
This was an awkward demand, but Sir H. Seymour seems to have acquitted himself with sufficient adroitness. He put the following case: “How would it be if, in the event of any catastrophe occurring in Turkey, Russia and England were to declare that no Power should be allowed to take possession of its provinces; that the property should remain, as it were, under seals, until amicable arrangements could be made as to its adjudication?” Of course this notion could not be countenanced; and the Emperor’s reply allowed Sir Hamilton the opportunity of making the following remark:—
“‘Sir,’ I then observed, ‘if your Majesty will allow me to speak plainly, I would say that the great difference between us is this—that you continue to dwell upon the fall of Turkey, and the arrangements requisite before and after the fall; and that we, on the contrary, look to Turkey remaining where she is, and to the precautions which are necessary for preventing her condition from becoming worse.’ ‘Ah!’ replied the Emperor, ‘that is what the Chancellor is perpetually telling me; but the catastrophe will occur some day, and will take us all unawares.’”
Then follows a passage of very great interest at the present moment, when the course which Austria may adopt is still matter of speculation. Our impression has been, and is, that she will ultimately co-operate with Russia.
“Being desirous, if possible, of ascertaining whether there was any understanding between the Cabinets of St Petersburg and Vienna, I added, ‘But your Majesty has forgotten Austria; now all these Eastern questions affect her very nearly; she, of course, would expect to be consulted.’ ‘Oh!’ replied the Emperor, greatly to my surprise, ‘but you must understand that when I speak of Russia I speak of Austria as well: what suits the one suits the other; our interests as regards Turkey are perfectly identical.’ I should have been glad to make another inquiry or two upon this subject, but I did not venture to do so.”
Next comes the bribe—for we can call it nothing else—implied in the Emperor’s statement, already quoted, that he saw no reason why, in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, Great Britain should not obtain possession of Egypt and Candia! And so completely does he seem to have considered that point settled, that a few days afterwards, and without any further intercourse with Britain (for so we are given to understand), a confidential memorandum, dictated by the Czar, and containing the following passage, was placed in the hands of Sir Hamilton Seymour:—
“In short, the Emperor cannot but congratulate himself at having given occasion for this intimate interchange of confidential communications between Her Majesty and himself. He has found therein valuable assurances, of which he takes note with a lively satisfaction. The two Sovereigns have frankly explained to each other, what in the extreme case of which they have been treating, their respective interests cannot endure. England understands that Russia cannot suffer the establishment at Constantinople of a Christian Power sufficiently strong to control and disquiet her. She declares, that for herself she renounces any intention or desire to possess Constantinople. The Emperor equally disclaims any wish or design of establishing himself there. England promises that she will enter into no arrangement for determining the measures to be taken in the event of the fall of the Turkish empire, without a previous understanding with the Emperor. The Emperor, on his side, willingly contracts the same engagement. As he is aware that in such a case he can equally reckon upon Austria, who is bound by her promises to concert with him, he regards with less apprehension the catastrophe which he still desires to prevent, and avert as much as it shall depend on him to do so.”
This is, perhaps, the most extraordinary note that was ever issued. If founded upon nothing else than Lord John Russell’s single despatch of 9th February 1853, it is an attempt to make a memorandum supply the place of a treaty, and that not with regard to existing circumstances, but to a contingency involving the destruction of an ally. The Emperor must, indeed, have had great faith in the subserviency of the British Cabinet to his views, before he could have ventured on such a step. Lord Clarendon now comes into action, as the successor of Lord John Russell in the Home Office; but we need not pursue the correspondence further than to say, that it was conducted on the same principle of remonstrance, though very feeble on the part of the British Minister, against the assumption that Turkey was absolutely in a critical state, and of assertion to the contrary on the part of the Czar. His object was to alienate Britain from France—to keep the latter power out of any arrangement which might be made for the partition of the Turkish territories—and to hasten the crisis as fast as possible, in order that Britain might be compelled to come to definite terms. Lord Clarendon’s despatches are couched in terms quite unworthy of his position. Lord John Russell, who had primarily to state the views of the British Cabinet, may be excused for a certain weakness of expression; but no such apology can be made for Lord Clarendon, who was bound emphatically to have informed the Czar that this country disdained his proposals, and was prepared, at any hazard, to maintain the integrity of Turkey. We say that he was bound to have done so, on the supposition that the Aberdeen Ministry disapproved of the partition of Turkey, and were prepared, by force of arms, to oppose it. Disapproval is of two kinds: There is the faint remonstrance, which is usually considered to imply reluctant consent; and there is strong distinct denial, which cannot possibly be misinterpreted. We find no such strong distinct denial in Lord Clarendon’s despatches. They are filled with almost fulsome adulation of the Czar, who had previously tendered a bribe. Thus, in the despatch of 23d March, we find the following passage:—
“The generous confidence exhibited by the Emperor entitles His Imperial Majesty to the most cordial declaration of opinion on the part of Her Majesty’s Government, who are fully aware that, in the event of any understanding with reference to future contingencies being expedient, or indeed possible, the word of His Imperial Majesty would be preferable to any convention that could be framed.”
Scarce less miserably sycophantish are the terms of the despatch of April 5th. “My despatch of the 23d ult. will have furnished you with answers upon all the principal points alluded to in the memorandum which Count Nesselrode placed in your hands; but it is my duty to inform you that that important and remarkable document was received by her Majesty’s Government with feelings of sincere satisfaction, as a renewed proof of the Emperor’s confidence and friendly feelings; and her Majesty’s Government desire to convey their acknowledgments to his Imperial Majesty for having thus placed on record the opinions he expressed at the interview with which you were honoured by his Imperial Majesty.”
We do not profess to know much about the language of diplomacy; but if these are the sort of terms to be addressed to an avowed disturber of the peace of Europe, who has attempted to engage us in a conspiracy by offer of a bribe, we are at a loss to know what language can afford by way of adequate encomium to a really honest ally. The excuse of sincere belief in the sincerity of the Czar is entirely precluded by the terms of the previous communications from Sir Hamilton Seymour, which not only indicate but demonstrate the game which the Autocrat was playing. It is certainly remarkable to observe the extreme cordiality with which the Emperor greeted the accession of his old friend, Lord Aberdeen, to power, and the fervency of his wishes for his long continuance in office. Immediately thereafter—or rather on the same occasion—he begins to develop his designs upon Turkey, states his prognosis of the condition of the sick gentleman, and requests to be informed what are our views as to the partition of his property. Our Ministers demur as to the fact of the sickness; but the Imperial Doctor assures them that it is so, or shall immediately be so, and states that he will be contented with a temporary occupation of the dying man’s domicile—the catastrophe to be hastened by a bolus of his own administration—but that we are perfectly welcome to seize upon certain outlying hereditaments! And in return to such proposals, which, if agreed to, would have made us deservedly infamous throughout Europe, the Ministers of Queen Victoria think fit to beslaver the Czar! Since the days of Charles II. England has seen no similar instance of adulation to a foreign potentate.
The correspondence is now before the world, and the public must decide whether it is such as to justify Lord Aberdeen’s assertion, in reply to Lord Derby, “that if he thought it would be found to contain anything on which a charge could be founded against the Government, he would find himself egregiously mistaken.” Undoubtedly they are not chargeable with connivance—but they are chargeable with incapacity and misconduct so gross, that even connivance could not have produced effects more disastrous. If they did not play directly into the hands of the Czar, they failed to make him aware of the part which they were bound to take should he persist in his nefarious designs. They manifested no kind of honourable indignation at his offers; they received his cajolements with complacency, and paid him back with compliments and assurances not one whit more sincere than his own. If this really is the style in which our diplomatic intercourse is usually conducted, there is ample room for a reform. They cannot with justice assert that the Emperor was keeping them in the dark as to the nature of his own projects. He was, on the contrary, particularly frank. He insisted, over and over again, that Turkey was on the eve of dissolution; he even indicated that he might himself be the agent to force on that catastrophe—and yet Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues are now maintaining that he had deceived them! How, where, and when were they deceived? He showed them the victim, prophesied his immediate death, intimated that the fatal deathblow might be given by his hand, told them that he was in accord with Austria, invited them to declare their wishes as to the subsequent partition, and emphatically assured them that there was no time to be lost. Let us call things by their proper names. Stigmatise the conduct of the Czar, if you will, as ambitious, tyrannical, unprincipled, or nefarious—but do not accuse him of having concealed his purpose from the British Ministry.
Were the Ministers then so blind that they failed to perceive his purpose? Of course they were not. The Cabinet which contained Lords Aberdeen and Palmerston, both of them experienced in foreign affairs, could be at no loss to divine his meaning, even if that had been more obscurely expressed; and consequently we must conclude that so early as March 1853 they were put thoroughly on their guard. They were aware that the Czar meditated the destruction of the Ottoman empire, and having that knowledge, every movement of his in the East, whether diplomatic or military, could only be regarded as progressive means towards the end proposed.
Now there were two courses open to Ministers. The one was to have intimated at once, without any circumlocution or compliment, that Great Britain would not submit to any invasion of the Turkish territories on the part of a European power, but would be prepared, by force of arms, to resist any such attempt. That would have been a manly and honourable course; and we are satisfied that, if adopted, the Czar would not have had the temerity to provoke a crisis. Unfortunately no declaration was made. A faint dissuasive, accompanied by an immense deal of complimentary sugar, was all that our Ministers ventured to tender; and the Czar was accordingly allowed to proceed, under the evident impression that Great Britain would not actively interfere to prevent his designs upon Turkey, any more than she interfered to prevent those of his ancestress upon Poland.
The other course was to have maintained a strict neutrality, and to have treated the Eastern question as an affair entirely between Russia and Turkey. To that, however, it is more than doubtful whether the people of this country would have submitted. The appetite of Russia for territorial aggrandisement is so insatiable, and her advances have been pushed so far, that the virtual cession to her of so fair and fertile a country as Turkey, and the entire command of the entrance to the Black Sea, would, very justly, have been deemed an act of culpable cowardice. Setting aside the position of India, and the facilities which the occupation of Turkey would afford for any hostile demonstration upon that part of our dominions, we have now, in consequence of Free Trade, a direct interest in the Danubian Principalities, as so many granaries for our home consumption. Since we ceased to act upon the principle of growing corn for our own population, and made ourselves dependent upon foreign supplies, it would be suicidal to give Russia the power of cutting us short both in the north and on the south—in the Baltic and the Black Seas. Still that was the only other course which Ministers could consistently have adopted, if they wished to avoid or postpone the terrible calamity of a war.
They followed neither the one course nor the other. They did not tell the Czar that, if he persisted in the schemes which he had disclosed to them, he must be prepared to meet Britain in the field; nor did they tell him that, in so far as they were concerned, he might do what he pleased with Turkey.They halted between two opinions.In full knowledge of his designs, they allowed him to commit himself—to pick a quarrel with Turkey about some rubbish relating to the keys of the Holy Places—to march his forces across the Pruth—to occupy the Principalities,—to do, in short, the work of one effective campaign. They never intimated to the country that the religious questions,—on which Russia, with scandalous hypocrisy, rested her justification of invasion,—were mere pretexts to mask the avowed intentions of Nicholas. They did not even send a fleet at once to Constantinople, but kept it hovering between Malta and Besika Bay, in the attitude of observation, long after the Russian guns were roaring upon the Danube. Is it fair to suppose that Nicholas,—after having frankly communicated to them his intentions more than a twelvemonth ago; after having told them that the sick gentleman was sure to die immediately; and after having taken measures to secure the fulfilment of that prophecy,—could consider their late hesitating and dilatory movement as otherwise than a convenient sham? It must have appeared to him that if the British Government was determined to oppose his project, they would at once have said so, with the same openness which he manifested in his communications to them. They said nothing of the kind. They gave him fulsome compliments. Of course he went farther, and marched into the sick man’s territory. What did our Ministers then?They concealed what they knew, and entered into negotiations about the Russian Protectorate of Christian subjects in Turkey, as if that were the sole point which had occasioned the disturbance! What, under such circumstances, could the Czar conceive, but that they were playing into his hands? He had apprised them, in almost as many words, that he intended to take possession of Turkey, so that they knew perfectly well that the question involved was not one of religion, but of political aggrandisement. It was, however, his policy to make it appear to the uninitiated that religion was his paramount motive; and when the British Cabinet began to negotiate and issue notes upon that footing, he was, after the confidential correspondence which had taken place, fairly entitled to believe that they were not in earnest. The Czar is a remarkably able man—we question whether, politically speaking, he is not the ablest man in Europe—but his own extraordinary position precludes him from understanding the effect of public opinion in such a country as our own. He is accustomed to deal with Cabinets, not with nations or parliaments; and he attributes more power to the former than they possess, at least according to the constitution of Great Britain. The British Cabinet cannot, like that of Prussia or Austria, commit the country to a course which is inconsistent with or derogatory to its honour.
In consequence of this irresolution on the part of our rulers, we are now precipitated into war, and are already beginning to feel some of its inconveniences. Let us now endeavour to ascertain the causes which have led to so very serious a denouement as the disruption of the peace of Europe. It is important that we should do so now, and not leave the question entirely to the future speculation of historians.
During Lord Derby’s short tenure of office, relations of peculiar amity had been established between Britain and France. Lord Malmesbury, than whom no more able or judicious minister ever held the seals of the Foreign Office, saw that the interests of civilisation not only in the west, but throughout the whole of Europe, could only be maintained by a close and permanent co-operation, and mutual good understanding between these two countries; and he addressed himself to the task with equal discretion and success. It is not too much to say that Britain and France never were more cordially united and confidentially allied than during the period we refer to. This, of course, was anything but agreeable to the Czar, whose opportunity lay in a separation of the interests of the two great powers of the West.
The dissolution of Lord Derby’s Government and the accession of the Aberdeen Ministry effected a material alteration. The new Premier, Lord Aberdeen, had been for a great many years on the most intimate footing with the despotic Courts and Cabinets. He had not, it was true, the ability of the Nesselrodes or Metternichs; but he was considered in the highest diplomatic circles as a person who might easily be led, and upon whom a certain show of deference would not be thrown away. It was supposed, also, that he regarded with particular dislike the recent changes in France, and was not favourable to the re-establishment of the Empire under the rule of Napoleon III. This veteran ally of the despotic powers was now associated with men whose former political opinions had differed greatly from his, but who were openmouthed and unscrupulous in their attacks upon the Emperor of the French. We need hardly remind our readers of the highly reprehensible language which was employed by Sir James Graham, and Sir Charles Wood—both of them Cabinet Ministers—in respect to the Emperor Napoleon, or of the foul and scurrilous attacks upon him with which, about the beginning of last year, the columns of the Liberal press abounded. All that is changed now. There is, indeed, plenty of invective and abuse, but it is directed towards another quarter. The French Emperor, formerly pilloried by the Coalitionists, has become the object of their laudation. The Russian Emperor, whom they formerly lauded, is now put into the pillory.
Such being the declared views of the Coalitionists in regard to France, it very naturally occurred to the Czar, that a more favourable opportunity could not possibly arise for detaching Britain from the side of France, and so rendering a future combination between these two powers impracticable. Accordingly, as the published correspondence shows, he did not lose a moment in opening his views to the British envoy at St Petersburg: France, as we have seen, was not to be consulted at all regarding the disposal of Turkey. Provided Britain and Russia were of accord, it mattered nothing what view might be taken by any other European power. France might do as she pleased, but the others would be an overmatch for her. Here are the expressions which the Emperor used on the 21st February:—
“His Imperial Majesty spoke of France. ‘God forbid,’ he said, ‘that I should accuse any one wrongfully, but there are circumstances both at Constantinople and Montenegro which are extremely suspicious; it looks very much as if the French Government were endeavouring to embroil us all in the East, hoping in this way the better to arrive at their own objects, one of which, no doubt, is the possession of Tunis.’
“The Emperor proceeded to say that, for his own part, he cared very little what line the French might think proper to take in Eastern affairs, and that little more than a month ago he had apprised the Sultan that if his assistance was required for resisting the menaces of the French, it was entirely at the service of the Sultan!”
But for the temptation held out by the accession of the Coalition Ministry to power in Great Britain, it is more than improbable that the Czar would have made any overtures of the kind. But at the head of that Ministry he saw Lord Aberdeen, “who knows me so well, who has full confidence in me as I have in him”—the extent of that confidence being marked by the statement, that he was convinced he could bring his lordship to an understanding in the course of ten minutes’ conversation. He had also remarked that at least two members of the Cabinet, in violation both of decency and of their duty as Ministers of the Crown, had been indulging in coarse and unmannerly invective against the Sovereign of France; and, as a matter of course, he arrived at the conclusion that they would be more ready to coalesce with him than to ally themselves cordially with a government which they had spoken of in public in such unexampled terms of contempt. In this calculation, however, he was deceived. Wrong-headed as Lord John Russell is, we do not believe that he would, for one moment, have allowed himself to become a consenting party to such a flagitious transaction as the partition of Turkey; and the same thing may be said of Lord Palmerston, whose exclusion, through short-sighted jealousy, from the Foreign Office at that particular time, we must regard as a national misfortune. But that matters not in the consideration of the point before us. Both circumstance and time concur to show that it was the accession of the Coalition Ministry to power, and the unwarrantable language used by some of its members towards the Emperor of France, that encouraged the Czar to bring forward, and to put into shape, the project which, no doubt, he had long entertained, but which could not be previously pursued for the want of a fitting opportunity.
We regard, therefore, the formation of the Coalition Ministry in Britain as the event which directly led to the original overture—the hopes of the Czar being founded upon the political connections and understood tendencies of Lord Aberdeen, and also on the declared aversion of some of his colleagues to the head of the French Government. But for the formation of that Ministry the designs of Russia upon Turkey would have been postponed.
We have already commented upon the course which was pursued by the Ministry from the time when they were apprized of the designs of the Czar, down to that when the Danubian Principalities were invaded. We have expressed our opinion that a serious remonstrance, coupled with a plain intimation that Great Britain would not permit an occupation of the Turkish territory, would have sufficed during the earlier part of last year, and before any overt step was taken, to have deterred the Czar from proceeding with his project. We ground that view upon the policy which has been invariably pursued by Russia—which is to bully and cajole, not to fight. Let us grant that the possession of Constantinople is the darling project of the Czar—let us grant that, in order to attain it, he would run considerable risk, and submit to extraordinary sacrifices; still we are of opinion that had he been aware, before utterly committing himself, that he would be opposed by the combined forces of Britain and France, he never would have plunged into the contest. See what he risks. First, the annihilation of his fleets, both in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, for he can hardly hope to contend with Britain and France upon the waters. Next, the derangement and stoppage of trade, so vital to the real interests of Russia, and equivalent to a sentence of bankruptcy against many of her nobles and merchants, who depend entirely upon the amount and continuance of their exports. Then there are the chances of insurrection in Poland, and revolt in Finland; and the certainty that Russia, if worsted, will be so dismembered as to prevent her from again disturbing the peace of Europe. These are very serious considerations; and we may be certain that the Czar, great as his appetite undoubtedly is for appropriation, would rather have foregone his purposes upon Turkey, than have proceeded had he believed that the two Western powers would be firm and united in their resistance. Indeed, singular as it may appear, we are about to engage in a war for which no one country in Europe is desirous. Britain, with her eight hundred millions of debt, is by no means desirous to increase the burden of taxation, or to imperil or impede that commerce to which she owes so much of her greatness. In like manner France has no interest to go to war, for she also is heavily burdened, and the present Emperor has nothing so much at heart as to restore the state of the finances. Austria has anything but an interest that war should take place, for in that event, if she takes the side of Russia, there will be immediate insurrection both in Hungary and Lombardy; and if she takes the other side, she must quarrel with a very old partner in iniquity. Prussia has no interest, for the age of subsidies has gone by, and she is likely to suffer to whichever side she adheres; but most especially if she adopts the cause of Russia. Neutral she cannot remain. We need not say that Turkey, the state which is attacked, does not desire war; and we are thoroughly convinced that the Czar, were he not committed so deeply, would be glad to withdraw his pretensions. Now, who suffered him to commit himself so deeply? We answer, the Coalition Ministry.
Had they been of one accord among themselves, nothing of this kind would have happened. If Lord Aberdeen had been sole and supreme master in his Cabinet, it is possible that Russia might have succeeded in acquiring a protectorate over Turkey. The Sultan could hardly have attempted to resist without powerful European aid; and France, had she found Britain lukewarm or indifferent, could not be expected to come forward as the defender of the balance of power without a single ally. No doubt, had this occurred, it would have given Russia a most dangerous preponderance in Europe, and probably necessitated a future struggle; but, in the mean time, there would have been no war. Had the Cabinet been under the guidance of Palmerston or Russell, the first advances of the Emperor, if made at all, would have been met by a distinct and peremptory refusal, and by a threat which would have effectually deterred him from moving a step further. But unfortunately—most unfortunately for us, and for our children, and for the general peace of Europe, this isnota united Cabinet. It is a congregation of men holding totally opposite opinions—bred up in adverse schools—adhering to antagonistical traditions—influenced by jealousy among themselves—and unable, upon any one important point, whether it relates to foreign or domestic policy, to arrive at a common conclusion. Take the case now before us. But for Palmerston and Russell, and their other adherents in the Cabinet, Lord Aberdeen might have established the principle of non-interference between Russia and Turkey—and there would have been no war. But for Lord Aberdeen and his adherents, Palmerston and Russell might have checked the designs and met the overtures of the Czar, by declaring at once that they would not suffer him to send a single soldier across the Pruth, and that if he persisted in his design, they would invite the co-operation of France, and defend Turkey to the uttermost—and in that case also there would have been no war. But the Cabinet was split into two, if not three, parties; and the adoption of a middle course, of feeble dissuasion, unaccompanied by any hint of ulterior consequences, but rather couched in terms of extreme and unworthy subserviency, deceived the Czar, encouraged him to proceed,—and now war is all but declared, and our fleet is riding in the Baltic. We have approached the subject in anything but a party spirit—we have perused the correspondence, recently published, over and over again, in the hope that we might gather from it a justification of the course which the British Ministry has pursued—but we are unable to arrive at any conclusion except this, that but for the formation of the Coalition Cabinet, the ambitious schemes of Russia would not have been developed; and that, but for its continuance and internal divisions, those schemes would have been effectually checked. In plain language, had it not been determined by a secret cabal that Lord Derby’s Government should be overthrown by the most extraordinary combination of parties ever known in this country, there would have been no war; and it is right that the country should know to whom they are indebted for the burdens which are now to be imposed upon us.
We do not object to the principle upon which the war proceeds. We think it full time that the grasping ambition, insidious progress, and inordinate arrogance of Russia should receive a check. It is to us matter of pride and congratulation to know that, in the coming struggle, the colours of Britain and France will be displayed side by side. But we detest war, for its own sake, as fervently as any member of the Peace Society can do, and we are perfectly alive to the awful consequences which it entails. What we wish is, that the public should not misapprehend the real cause of the present rupture of the peace of Europe. That it originally arose from the exorbitant ambition of the Czar, is beyond all question; but ambition can be controlled, and, fortunately, the Czar is not yet master of the universe. Nay, he is not yet master of Europe; for although, by spoliation and absorption, he has secured to himself a vast extent of territory to which he had no patrimonial claim; and although he exercises a great influence over States which, in former times, have acquired accretions by unprincipled subserviency to his house, he has yet to encounter the exerted power and civilisation of the West. Had our Cabinet been united, and true to their trust, that encounter might have been avoided. But it was not so. Some of them were Russian, and some anti-Russian in their views, principles, and antecedents; and so, in consequence of having a Coalition Ministry, which, after being warned of the designs of Russia, egregiously bungled our finance, and left us with a prospect of a deficit, we are to be forced into a war of which no man can foresee the issue.
Let those who shudder at the cost, at least know to whom the cost is due. We are now paying, and are likely to pay for a long time to come, for the privilege of having a Coalition Ministry. But we submit, that the continuance of such a form of government is not desirable. We have shown, in regard to foreign affairs, and from evidence which cannot be gainsayed, what are its results; we could show, if space allowed us, its results upon domestic legislation. But we shall not enter into the lesser topics now. We have, as yet, but touched upon a part of the expediency of coalition; and our deliberate conclusion is, that to the fact of the formation of the Coalition Ministry we must attribute the development of the schemes of Russia, and to its extraordinary vacillation and want of concert the catastrophe of a European war.