Chapter 9

B:Ibid.

If there were only they two on earth as tenants, there would be no way of deciding between them; for, according to his argument, the truth is apparently decided by majority of opinions. Each individual, equipped with his own particular kind of senses and reason, gets his own particular experience, and draws his own particular conclusions from it. If it be asked whether these conclusions are true or not, the only answer is that the question is absurd; for, under such conditions, there cannot be either truth or error. Every one's opinion is its own criterion. Each man is the measure of all things; "His own world for every mortal," as the poet puts it.

"To each mortal peradventure earth becomes a new machine,Pain and pleasure no more tally in our sense than red and green."A

"To each mortal peradventure earth becomes a new machine,

Pain and pleasure no more tally in our sense than red and green."A

A:La Saisiaz.

The first result of this subjective view of knowledge is clearly enough seen by the poet. He is well aware that his convictions regarding the high matters of human destiny are valid only for himself.

"Only for myself I speak,Nowise dare to play the spokesman for my brothers strong and weak."B

"Only for myself I speak,

Nowise dare to play the spokesman for my brothers strong and weak."B

B:Ibid.

Experience, as he interprets it, that is, present consciousness, "this moment's me and mine," is too narrow a basis for any universal or objective conclusion. So far as his own inner experience of pain and pleasure goes,

"All—for myself—seems ordered wise and wellInside it,—what reigns outside, who can tell?"A

"All—for myself—seems ordered wise and well

Inside it,—what reigns outside, who can tell?"A

A:Francis Furini.

But as to the actual world, he can have no opinion, nor, from the good and evil that apparently play around him, can he deduce either

"Praise or blame of its contriver, shown a niggard or profuseIn each good or evil issue."B

"Praise or blame of its contriver, shown a niggard or profuse

In each good or evil issue."B

B:La Saisiaz.

The moral government of the world is a subject, regarding which we are doomed to absolute ignorance. A theory that it is ruled by the "prince of the power of the air" has just as much, and just as little, validity as the more ordinary view held by religious people. Who needs be told

"The spaceWhich yields thee knowledge—do its bounds embraceWell-willing and wise-working, each at height?Enough: beyond thee lies the infinite—Back to thy circumscription!"C

"The space

Which yields thee knowledge—do its bounds embrace

Well-willing and wise-working, each at height?

Enough: beyond thee lies the infinite—

Back to thy circumscription!"C

C:Francis Furini.

And our ignorance of God, and the world, and ourselves is matched by a similar ignorance regarding moral matters.

"Ignorance overwraps his moral sense,Winds him about, relaxing, as it wraps,So much and no more than lets through perhapsThe murmured knowledge—' Ignorance exists.'"D

"Ignorance overwraps his moral sense,

Winds him about, relaxing, as it wraps,

So much and no more than lets through perhaps

The murmured knowledge—' Ignorance exists.'"D

D:Ibid.

We cannot be certain even of the distinction and conflict of good and evil in the world. They, too,and the apparent choice between them to which man is continually constrained, may be mere illusions—phenomena of the individual consciousness. What remains, then? Nothing but to "wait."

"Take the joys and bear the sorrows—neither with extreme concern!Living here means nescience simply: 'tis next life that helps to learn."A

"Take the joys and bear the sorrows—neither with extreme concern!

Living here means nescience simply: 'tis next life that helps to learn."A

A:La Saisiaz.

It is hardly necessary to enter upon any detailed criticism of such a theory of knowledge as this, which is proffered by the poet. It is well known by all those who are in some degree acquainted with the history of philosophy—and it will be easily seen by all who have any critical acumen—that it leads directly into absolute scepticism. And absolute scepticism is easily shown to be self-contradictory. For a theory of nescience, in condemning all knowledge and the faculty of knowledge, condemns itself. If nothing is true, or if nothing is known, then this theory itself is not true, or its truth cannot be known. And if this theory is true, then nothing is true; for this theory, like all others, is the product of a defective intelligence. In whatsoever way the matter is put, there is left no standing-ground for the human critic who condemns human thought. And he cannot well pretend to a footing in a sphere above man's, or below it. There is thus one presupposition which every one must make, if he is to propound any doctrine whatsoever, even if that doctrine be that no doctrine can bevalid; it is the presupposition that knowledge is possible, and that truth can be known. And this presupposition fills, for modern philosophy, the place of theCogito ergo sumof Descartes. It is the starting-point and criterion of all knowledge.

It is, at first sight, a somewhat difficult task to account for the fact, that so keen an intellect as the poet's did not perceive the conclusion to which his theory of knowledge so directly and necessarily leads. It is probable, however, that he never critically examined it, but simply accepted it as equivalent to the common doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, which, in some form or other, all the schools of philosophy adopt. But the main reason will be found to lie in the fact that knowledge was not, to Browning, its own criterion or end. The primary fact of his philosophy is that human life is a moral process. His interest in the evolution of character was his deepest interest, as he informs us; he was an ethical teacher rather than a metaphysician. He is ever willing to asperse man's intelligence. But that man is a moral agent he will in no wise doubt. This is his

"Solid standing-place amidThe wash and welter, whence all doubts are bidBack to the ledge they break against in foam."A

"Solid standing-place amid

The wash and welter, whence all doubts are bid

Back to the ledge they break against in foam."A

A:Francis Furini.

His practical maxim was

"Wholly distrust thy knowledge, then, and trustAs wholly love allied to ignorance!There lies thy truth and safety."B

"Wholly distrust thy knowledge, then, and trust

As wholly love allied to ignorance!

There lies thy truth and safety."B

B:A Pillar of Sebzevar.

All phenomena must, in some way or other, be reconciled by the poet with the fundamental and indubitable fact of the progressive moral life of man. For the fundamental presupposition which a man makes, is necessarily his criterion of knowledge, and it determines the truth or illusoriness of all other opinions whatsoever.

Now, Browning held, not only that no certain knowledge is attainable by man, but also that such certainty is incompatible with moral life. Absolute knowledge would, he contends, lift man above the need and the possibility of making the moral choice, which is our supreme business on earth. Man can be good or evil, only on condition of being in absolute uncertainty regarding the true meaning of the facts of nature and the phenomena of life.

This somewhat strange doctrine finds the most explicit and full expression inLa Saisiaz. "Fancy," amongst the concessions it demands from "Reason," claims that man should know—not merely surmise or fear—that every action done in this life awaits its proper and necessary meed in the next.

"I also will that man become awareLife has worth incalculable, every moment that he spendsSo much gain or loss for that next life which on this life depends."A

"I also will that man become aware

Life has worth incalculable, every moment that he spends

So much gain or loss for that next life which on this life depends."A

A:La Saisiaz.

But Reason refuses the concession, upon the ground that such sure knowledge would be destructive ofthe very distinction between right and wrong, which the demand implies. The "promulgation of this decree," by Fancy, "makes both good and evil to cease." Prior to it "earth was man's probation-place"; but under this decree man is no longer free; for certain knowledge makes action necessary.

"Once lay down the law, with Nature's simple 'Such effects succeedCauses such, and heaven or hell depends upon man's earthly deedJust as surely as depends the straight or else the crooked lineOn his making point meet point or with or else without incline,'Thenceforth neither good nor evil does man, doing what he must."A

"Once lay down the law, with Nature's simple 'Such effects succeed

Causes such, and heaven or hell depends upon man's earthly deed

Just as surely as depends the straight or else the crooked line

On his making point meet point or with or else without incline,'

Thenceforth neither good nor evil does man, doing what he must."A

A:La Saisiaz, 195.

If we presuppose that "man, addressed this mode, be sound and sane" (and we must stipulate sanity, if his actions are to be morally judged at all)—then a law which binds punishment and reward to action in a necessary manner, and is known so to bind them, would "obtain prompt and absolute obedience." There are some "edicts, now styled God's own nature's," "which to hear means to obey." All the laws relating to the preservation of life are of this character. And, if the law—"Would'st thou live again, be just"—were in all ways as stringent as the other law—

"Would'st thou live now, regularly draw thy breath!For, suspend the operation, straight law's breach results in death"—B

"Would'st thou live now, regularly draw thy breath!

For, suspend the operation, straight law's breach results in death"—B

B:Ibid.

then no one would disobey it, nor could. "It isthe liberty of doing evil that gives the doing good a grace." And that liberty would be taken away by complete assurance, that effects follow actions in the moral world with the necessity seen in the natural sphere. Since, therefore, man is made to grow, and earth is the place wherein he is to pass probation and prove his powers, there must remain a certain doubt as to the issues of his actions; conviction must not be so strong as to carry with it man's whole nature. "The best I both see and praise, the worst I follow," is the adage rife in man's mouth regarding his moral conduct. But, spite of his seeing and praising,

"he disbelievesIn the heart of him that edict which for truth his head receives."A

"he disbelieves

In the heart of him that edict which for truth his head receives."A

A:La Saisiaz.

He has a dim consciousness of ways whereby he may elude the consequences of his wickedness, and of the possibility of making amends to law.

"And now, auld Cloots, I ken ye're thinkin',A certain Bardie's rantin', drinkin',Some luckless hour will send him linkin'To your black pit;But, faith, he'll turn a corner jinkin',And cheat you yet."

"And now, auld Cloots, I ken ye're thinkin',

A certain Bardie's rantin', drinkin',

Some luckless hour will send him linkin'

To your black pit;

But, faith, he'll turn a corner jinkin',

And cheat you yet."

The more orthodox and less generous individual is prone to agree, as regards himself, with Burns; but, he sees, most probably, that such an escape is impossible to others. He has secret solacement in a latent belief that he himself is an exception. There will be a special method of dealing withhim. He is a "chosen sample"; and "God will think twice before He damns a man of his quality." It is just because there is such doubt as to the universality and necessity of the law which connects actions and consequences in the moral sphere, that man's deeds have an ethical character; while, to disperse doubt and ignorance by the assurance of complete knowledge, would take the good from goodness and the ill from evil.

In this ingenious manner, the poet turns the imperfect intellect and delusive knowledge of man to a moral use. Ordinarily, the intellectual impotence of man is regarded as carrying with it moral incapacity as well, and the delusiveness of knowledge is one of the strongest arguments for pessimism. To persons pledged to the support of no theory, and to those who have thenaïveté, so hard to maintain side by side with strong doctrinal convictions, it seems amongst the worst of evils that man should be endowed with fallacious faculties, and cursed with a futile desire for true knowledge which is so strong, that it cannot be quenched even in those who believe that truth can never be attained. It is the very best men of the world who cry

"Oh, this false for real,This emptiness which feigns solidity,—Ever some grey that's white, and dun that's black,—When shall we rest upon the thing itself,Not on its semblance? Soul—too weak, forsooth,To cope with fact—wants fiction everywhere!Mine tires of falsehood: truth at any cost!"A

"Oh, this false for real,

This emptiness which feigns solidity,—

Ever some grey that's white, and dun that's black,—

When shall we rest upon the thing itself,

Not on its semblance? Soul—too weak, forsooth,

To cope with fact—wants fiction everywhere!

Mine tires of falsehood: truth at any cost!"A

A:A Bean-Stripe.

The poet himself was burdened in no small degree with this vain desire for knowing the truth; and he recognized, too, that he was placed in a world which seems both real and beautiful, and so well worth knowing. Yet, it is this very failure of knowledge—a failure which, be it remembered, is complete and absolute, because, as he thinks, all facts must turn into phantoms by mere contact with our "relative intelligences,"—which he constitutes into the basis of his optimistic faith.

So high is the dignity and worth of the moral life to Browning, that no sacrifice is too great to secure it. And, indeed, if it were once clearly recognized that there is no good thing but goodness, nothing of supreme worth, except the realization of a loving will, then doubt, ignorance, and every other form of apparent evil would be fully justified—provided they were conditions whereby this highest good is attained. And, to Browning, ignorance was one of the conditions. And consequently, the dread pause in the music which agnosticism brings, is only "silence implying sound"; and the vain cry for truth, arising from the heart of the earth's best men, is only a discord moving towards resolution into a more rapturous harmony.

I do not stay here to inquire whether sure knowledge would really have this disastrous effect of destroying morality, or whether its failure does not rather imply the impossibility of a moral life. I return to the question asked at the beginning of this chapter, and which it is now possible toanswer. That question was: How does Browning reconcile his hypothesis of universal love with the natural and moral evils existing in the world?

His answer is quite explicit. The poet solves the problem by casting doubt upon the facts which threaten his hypothesis. He reduces them into phenomena, in the sense of phantoms begotten by the human intellect upon unknown and unknowable realities.

"Thus much at least is clearly understood—Of power does Man possess no particle:Of knowledge—just so much as shows that stillIt ends in ignorance on every side."A

"Thus much at least is clearly understood—

Of power does Man possess no particle:

Of knowledge—just so much as shows that still

It ends in ignorance on every side."A

A:Francis Furini.

He is aware of the phenomena of his own consciousness,

"My soul, and my soul's home,This body ";

"My soul, and my soul's home,

This body ";

but he knows not whether "things outside are fact or feigning." And he heeds little, for in either case they

"TeachWhat good is and what evil,—just the same,Be feigning or be fact the teacher."B

"Teach

What good is and what evil,—just the same,

Be feigning or be fact the teacher."B

B:Ibid.

It is the mixture, or rather the apparent mixture, of shade and light in life, the conflict of seeming good with seeming evil in the world, that constitutes the world a probation-place. It is a kind of moral gymnasium, crowded with phantoms, wherein by exercise man makes moral muscle. And thevigour of the athlete's struggle is not in the least abated by the consciousness that all he deals with are phantoms.

"I have lived, then, done and suffered, loved and hated, learnt and taughtThis—there is no reconciling wisdom with a world distraught,Goodness with triumphant evil, power with failure in the aim,If—(to my own sense, remember! though none other feel the same!)—If you bar me from assuming earth to be a pupil's place,And life, time—with all their chances, changes,—just probation-space,Mine, for me."A

"I have lived, then, done and suffered, loved and hated, learnt and taught

This—there is no reconciling wisdom with a world distraught,

Goodness with triumphant evil, power with failure in the aim,

If—(to my own sense, remember! though none other feel the same!)—

If you bar me from assuming earth to be a pupil's place,

And life, time—with all their chances, changes,—just probation-space,

Mine, for me."A

A:La Saisiaz.

And the world would not be such a probation-space did we once penetrate into its inmost secret, and know its phenomena as veritably either good or evil. There is the need of playing something perilously like a trick on the human intellect if man is to strive and grow.

"Here and there a touchTaught me, betimes, the artifice of things—That all about, external to myself,Was meant to be suspected,—not revealedDemonstrably a cheat—but half seen through."B

"Here and there a touch

Taught me, betimes, the artifice of things—

That all about, external to myself,

Was meant to be suspected,—not revealed

Demonstrably a cheat—but half seen through."B

B:A Bean-Stripe.

To know objects as they veritably are, might reveal all things as locked together in a scheme of universal good, so that "white would rule unchecked along the line." But this would be the greatest of disasters; for, as moral agents, we cannot do without

"the constant shadeCast on life's shine,—the tremor that intrudesWhen firmest seems my faith in white."C

"the constant shade

Cast on life's shine,—the tremor that intrudes

When firmest seems my faith in white."C

C:Ibid.

The intellectual insight that would penetrate through the vari-colour of events into the actual presence of the incandescent white of love, which glows, as hope tells us, in all things, would stultify itself, and lose its knowledge even of the good.

"Think!Could I see plain, be somehow certifiedAll was illusion—evil far and wideWas good disguised,—why, out with one huge wipeGoes knowledge from me. Type needs antitype:As night needs day, as shine needs shade, so goodNeeds evil: how were pity understoodUnless by pain? "A

"Think!

Could I see plain, be somehow certified

All was illusion—evil far and wide

Was good disguised,—why, out with one huge wipe

Goes knowledge from me. Type needs antitype:

As night needs day, as shine needs shade, so good

Needs evil: how were pity understood

Unless by pain? "A

A:Francis Furini.

Good and evil are relative to each other, and each is known only through its contrary.

"For me(Patience, beseech you!) Knowledge can but beOf good by knowledge of good's opposite—Evil."B

"For me

(Patience, beseech you!) Knowledge can but be

Of good by knowledge of good's opposite—

Evil."B

B:Ibid.

The extinction of one of the terms would be the extinction of the other. And, in a similar manner, clear knowledge that evil is illusion and that all things have their place in an infinite divine order would paralyze all moral effort, as well as stultify itself.

"Make evident that painPermissibly masks pleasure—you abstainFrom out-stretch of the finger-tip that savesA drowning fly."C

"Make evident that pain

Permissibly masks pleasure—you abstain

From out-stretch of the finger-tip that saves

A drowning fly."C

C:Ibid.

Certainty on either side, either that evil is evil forevermore, irredeemable and absolute, a drench of utter dark not illuminable by white; or that it is but mere show and semblance, which the good takes upon itself, would alike be ruinous to man. For both alternatives would render all striving folly. The right attitude for man is that of ignorance, complete uncertainty, the equipoise of conflicting alternatives. He must take his stand on the contradiction. Hope he may have that all things work together for good. It is right that he should nourish the faith that the antagonism of evil with good in the world is only an illusion; but that faith must stop short of the complete conviction that knowledge would bring. When, therefore, the hypothesis of universal love is confronted with the evils of life, and we ask how it can be maintained in the face of the manifold miseries everywhere apparent, the poet answers, "You do not know, and cannot know, whether they are evils or not. Your knowledge remains at the surface of things. You cannot fit them into their true place, or pronounce upon their true purpose and character; for you see only a small arc of the complete circle of being. Wait till you see more, and, in the meantime, hope!"

"Why faith—but to lift the load,To leaven the lump, where liesMind prostrate through knowledge owedTo the loveless Power it triesTo withstand, how vain!"A

"Why faith—but to lift the load,

To leaven the lump, where lies

Mind prostrate through knowledge owed

To the loveless Power it tries

To withstand, how vain!"A

A:Reverie—Asolando.

And, if we reply in turn, that this necessary ignoranceleaves as little room for his scheme of love as it does for its opposite, he again answers: "Not so! I appeal from the intellect, which is detected as incompetent, to the higher court of the moral consciousness. And there I find the ignorance to be justified: for it is the instrument of a higher purpose, a means whereby what is best is gained, namely,Love."

"My curls were crownedIn youth with knowledge,—off, alas, crown slippedNext moment, pushed by better knowledge stillWhich nowise proved more constant; gain, to-day,Was toppling loss to-morrow, lay at last—Knowledge, the golden?—lacquered ignorance!As gain—mistrust it! Not as means to gain:Lacquer we learn by: ...The prize is in the process: knowledge meansEver-renewed assurance by defeatThat victory is somehow still to reach,But love is victory, the prize itself:Love—trust to! Be rewarded for the trustIn trust's mere act."A

"My curls were crowned

In youth with knowledge,—off, alas, crown slipped

Next moment, pushed by better knowledge still

Which nowise proved more constant; gain, to-day,

Was toppling loss to-morrow, lay at last

—Knowledge, the golden?—lacquered ignorance!

As gain—mistrust it! Not as means to gain:

Lacquer we learn by: ...

The prize is in the process: knowledge means

Ever-renewed assurance by defeat

That victory is somehow still to reach,

But love is victory, the prize itself:

Love—trust to! Be rewarded for the trust

In trust's mere act."A

A:A Pillar at Sebzevar.

Now, in order to complete our examination of this theory, we must follow the poet in his attempt to escape from the testimony of the intellect to that of the heart. In order to make the most of the latter, we find that Browning, especially in his last work, tends to withdraw his accusation of utter incompetence on the part of the intellect. He only tends to do so, it is true. He is tolerably consistent in asserting that we know our own emotions and the phenomena of our own consciousness; but he is not consistent in his account of our knowledge,or ignorance, of external things. On the whole, he asserts that we know nothing of them. But inAsolandohe seems to imply that the evidence of a loveless power in the world, permitting evil, is irresistible.ATo say the least, the testimony of the intellect, such as it is, is more clear and convincing with regard to evil than it is with regard to good. Within the sphere of phenomena, to which the intellect is confined, there seems to be, instead of a benevolent purpose, a world ruled by a power indifferent to the triumph of evil over good, and either "loveless" or unintelligent.

A:See passage just quoted.

"Life, from birth to death,Means—either looking back on harm escaped,Or looking forward to that harm's returnWith tenfold power of harming."B

"Life, from birth to death,

Means—either looking back on harm escaped,

Or looking forward to that harm's return

With tenfold power of harming."B

B:A Bean-Stripe.

And it is not possible for man to contravene this evidence of faults and omissions: for, in doing so, he would remove the facts in reaction against which his moral nature becomes active. What proof is there, then, that the universal love is no mere dream? None! from the side of the intellect, answers the poet. Man, who has the will to remove the ills of life,

"Stop change, avert decay,Fix life fast, banish death,"C

"Stop change, avert decay,

Fix life fast, banish death,"C

C:Reverie—Asolando.

has not the power to effect his will; while the Power, whose limitlessness he recognizes everywherearound him, merely maintains the world in its remorseless course, and puts forth no helping hand when good is prone and evil triumphant. "God does nothing."

"'No sign,'—groaned he,—No stirring of God's finger to denoteHe wills that right should have supremacyOn earth, not wrong! How helpful could we quoteBut one poor instance when He interposedPromptly and surely and beyond mistakeBetween oppression and its victim, closedAccounts with sin for once, and bade us wakeFrom our long dream that justice bears no sword,Or else forgets whereto its sharpness serves.'"A

"'No sign,'—groaned he,—

No stirring of God's finger to denote

He wills that right should have supremacy

On earth, not wrong! How helpful could we quote

But one poor instance when He interposed

Promptly and surely and beyond mistake

Between oppression and its victim, closed

Accounts with sin for once, and bade us wake

From our long dream that justice bears no sword,

Or else forgets whereto its sharpness serves.'"A

A:Bernard de Mandeville.

But he tells us in his later poems, that there is no answer vouchsafed to man's cry to the Power, that it should reveal

"What heals all harm,Nay, hinders the harm at first,Saves earth."B

"What heals all harm,

Nay, hinders the harm at first,

Saves earth."B

B:Reverie—Asolando.

And yet, so far as man can see, there were no bar to the remedy, if "God's all-mercy" did really "mate His all-potency."

"How easy it seems,—to senseLike man's—if somehow metPower with its match—immenseLove, limitless, unbesetBy hindrance on every side!"C

"How easy it seems,—to sense

Like man's—if somehow met

Power with its match—immense

Love, limitless, unbeset

By hindrance on every side!"C

C:Ibid.

But that love nowhere makes itself evident. "Power," we recognize,

"finds nought too hard,Fulfilling itself all ways,Unchecked, unchanged; while barred,Baffled, what good beganEnds evil on every side."A

"finds nought too hard,

Fulfilling itself all ways,

Unchecked, unchanged; while barred,

Baffled, what good began

Ends evil on every side."A

A:Reverie—Asolando.

Thus, the conclusion to which knowledge inevitably leads us is that mere power rules.

"No more than the passive clayDisputes the potter's act,Could the whelmed mind disobeyKnowledge, the cataract."B

"No more than the passive clay

Disputes the potter's act,

Could the whelmed mind disobey

Knowledge, the cataract."B

B:Ibid.

But if the intellect is thus overwhelmed, so as to be almost passive to the pessimistic conclusion borne in upon it by "resistless fact," the heart of man is made of another mould. It revolts against the conclusion of the intellect, and climbs

"Through turbidity all between,From the known to the unknown here,Heaven's 'Shall be,' from earth's 'Has been.'"C

"Through turbidity all between,

From the known to the unknown here,

Heaven's 'Shall be,' from earth's 'Has been.'"C

C:Ibid.

It grasps a fact beyond the reach of knowledge, namely, the possibility, or even the certainty, that "power is love." At present there is no substantiating by knowledge the testimony of the heart; and man has no better anchorage for his optimism than faith. But the closer view will come, when even our life on earth will be seen to have within it the working of love, no less manifest than that of power.

"When see? When there dawns a day,If not on the homely earth,Then, yonder, worlds away,Where the strange and new have birth,And Power comes full in play."D

"When see? When there dawns a day,

If not on the homely earth,

Then, yonder, worlds away,

Where the strange and new have birth,

And Power comes full in play."D

D:Ibid.

Now, what is this evidence of the heart, which is sufficiently cogent and valid to counterpoise that of the mind; and which gives to "faith," or "hope," a firm foothold in the very face of the opposing "resistless" testimony of knowledge?

Within our experience, to which the poet knows we are entirely confined, there is a fact, the significance of which we have not as yet examined. For, plain and irresistible as is the evidence of evil, so plain and constant is man's recognition of it as evil, and his desire to annul it. If man's mind is made to acknowledge evil, his moral nature is made so as to revolt against it.

"Man's heart ismadeto judgePain deserved nowhere by the common fleshOur birth-right—bad and good deserve alikeNo pain, to human apprehension."A

"Man's heart ismadeto judge

Pain deserved nowhere by the common flesh

Our birth-right—bad and good deserve alike

No pain, to human apprehension."A

A:Mihrab Shah—Ferishtah's Fancies.

Owing to the limitation of our intelligence, we cannot deny but that

"In the eye of GodPain may have purpose and be justified."

"In the eye of God

Pain may have purpose and be justified."

But whether it has its purpose for the supreme intelligence or not,

"Man's sense avails to only see, in pain,A hateful chance no man but would avertOr, failing, needs must pity."B

"Man's sense avails to only see, in pain,

A hateful chance no man but would avert

Or, failing, needs must pity."B

B:Ibid.

Man must condemn evil, he cannot acquiesce in its permanence, but is, spite of his consciousnessof ignorance and powerlessness, roused into constant revolt against it.

"True, he makes nothing, understands no whit:Had the initiator-spasm seen fitThus doubly to endow him, none the worseAnd much the better were the universe.What does Man see or feel or apprehendHere, there, and everywhere, but faults to mend,Omissions to supply,—one wide diseaseOf things that are, which Man at once would easeHad will but power and knowledge?"A

"True, he makes nothing, understands no whit:

Had the initiator-spasm seen fit

Thus doubly to endow him, none the worse

And much the better were the universe.

What does Man see or feel or apprehend

Here, there, and everywhere, but faults to mend,

Omissions to supply,—one wide disease

Of things that are, which Man at once would ease

Had will but power and knowledge?"A

A:Francis Furini.

But the moral worth of man does not suffer the least detraction from his inability to effect his benevolent purpose. "Things must take will for deed," as Browning tells us. David is not at all distressed by the consciousness of his weakness.

"Why is it I dareThink but lightly of such impuissance? What stops my despair?This;—'tis not what man Does which exalts him, but what man Would do."B

"Why is it I dare

Think but lightly of such impuissance? What stops my despair?

This;—'tis not what man Does which exalts him, but what man Would do."B

B:Saul.

The fact that "his wishes fall through," that he cannot, although willing, help Saul, "grow poor to enrich him, fill up his life by starving his own," does not prevent him from regarding his "service as perfect." The will was there, although it lacked power to effect itself. The moral worth of an action is complete, if it is willed; and it is nowise affected by its outer consequences, as both Browning and Kant teach. The loving will, the inner act of loving, though it can bear no outward fruit,being debarred by outward impediment, is still a complete and highest good.

"But Love is victory, the prize itself:Love—trust to! Be rewarded for the trustIn trust's mere act. In love success is sure,Attainment—no delusion, whatso'erThe prize be: apprehended as a prize,A prize it is."A

"But Love is victory, the prize itself:

Love—trust to! Be rewarded for the trust

In trust's mere act. In love success is sure,

Attainment—no delusion, whatso'er

The prize be: apprehended as a prize,

A prize it is."A

A:A Pillar at Sebzevar.

Whatever the evil in the world and the impotence of man, his duty and his dignity in willing to perform it, are ever the same. Though God neglect the world

"Man's partIs plain—to send love forth,—astray, perhaps:No matter, he has done his part."B

"Man's part

Is plain—to send love forth,—astray, perhaps:

No matter, he has done his part."B

B:The Sun.

Now, this fact of inner experience, which the poet thinks incontrovertible—the fact that man, every man, necessarily regards evil, whether natural or moral, as something to be annulled, were it only possible—is an immediate proof of the indwelling of that which is highest in man. On this basis, Browning is able to re-establish the optimism which, from the side of knowledge, he had utterly abandoned.

The very fact that the world is condemned by man is proof that there dwells in man something better than the world, whose evidence the pessimist himself cannot escape. All is not wrong, as long as wrongseemswrong. The pessimist, in condemning the world, must except himself. In hisvery charge against God of having made man in His anger, there lies a contradiction; for he himself fronts and defies the outrage. There is no depth of despair which this good cannot illumine with joyous light, for the despair is itself the reflex of the good.

"Were earth and all it holds illusions mere,Only a machine for teaching love and hate, and hope and fear,"If this life's conception new life fail to realize—Though earth burst and proved a bubble glassing hues of hell, one hugeReflex of the devil's doings—God's work by no subterfuge,"A

"Were earth and all it holds illusions mere,Only a machine for teaching love and hate, and hope and fear,

"Were earth and all it holds illusions mere,

Only a machine for teaching love and hate, and hope and fear,

"If this life's conception new life fail to realize—Though earth burst and proved a bubble glassing hues of hell, one hugeReflex of the devil's doings—God's work by no subterfuge,"A

"If this life's conception new life fail to realize—

Though earth burst and proved a bubble glassing hues of hell, one huge

Reflex of the devil's doings—God's work by no subterfuge,"A

A:La Saisiaz.

still, good is good, and love is its own exceeding great reward. Alone, in a world abandoned to chaos and infinite night, man is still not without God, if he loves. In virtue of his love, he himself would be crowned as God, as the poet often argues, were there no higher love elsewhere.

"If he believesMight can exist with neither will nor love,In God's case—what he names now Nature's Law—While in himself he recognizes loveNo less than might and will,"B

"If he believes

Might can exist with neither will nor love,

In God's case—what he names now Nature's Law—

While in himself he recognizes love

No less than might and will,"B

B:Death in the Desert.

man takes, and rightly takes, the title of being "First, last, and best of things."

"Since if man prove the sole existent thingWhere these combine, whatever their degree,However weak the might or will or love,So they be found there, put in evidence—He is as surely higher in the scaleThan any might with neither love nor will,As life, apparent in the poorest midge,Is marvellous beyond dead Atlas' self,Given to the nobler midge for resting-place!Thus, man proves best and highest—God, in fine."A

"Since if man prove the sole existent thing

Where these combine, whatever their degree,

However weak the might or will or love,

So they be found there, put in evidence—

He is as surely higher in the scale

Than any might with neither love nor will,

As life, apparent in the poorest midge,

Is marvellous beyond dead Atlas' self,

Given to the nobler midge for resting-place!

Thus, man proves best and highest—God, in fine."A

A:A Death in the Desert.

To any one capable of spiritually discerning things, there can be no difficulty in regarding goodness, however limited and mated with weakness, as infinitely above all natural power. Divinity will be known to consist, not in any senseless might, however majestic and miraculous, but in moral or spiritual perfection. If God were indifferent to the evil of the world, acquiesced in it without reason, and let it ripen into all manner of wretchedness, then man, in condemning the world, though without power to remove the least of its miseries, would be higher than God. But we have still to account for the possibility of man's assuming an attitude implied in the consciousness that, while he is without power, God is without pity, and in the despair which springs from his hate of evil. How comes it that human nature rises above its origin, and is able—nay, obliged—to condemn the evil which God permits? Is man finite in power, a mere implement of a mocking will so far as knowledge goes, the plaything of remorseless forces, and yet author and first source of something in himself which invests him with a dignity that God Himself cannot share? Is the moral consciousness which, by its very nature, mustbear witness against the Power, although it cannot arrest its pitiless course, or remove the least evil,

"Man's own work, his birth of heart and brain,His native grace, no alien gift at all?"

"Man's own work, his birth of heart and brain,

His native grace, no alien gift at all?"

We are thus caught between the horns of a final dilemma. Either the pity and love, which make man revolt against all suffering, are man's own creation; or else God, who made man's heart to love, has given to man something higher than He owns Himself. But both of these alternatives are impossible.

"Here's the touch that breaks the bubble."

The first alternative is impossible, because man is by definition powerless, a mere link in the endless chain of causes, incapable of changing the least part of the scheme of things which he condemns, and therefore much more unable to initiate, or to bring into a loveless world abandoned to blind power, the noble might of love.

"Will of man create?No more than this my hand, which strewed the beansProduced them also from its finger-tips."A

"Will of man create?

No more than this my hand, which strewed the beans

Produced them also from its finger-tips."A

A:A Bean-Stripe.

All that man is and has is a mere loan; his love no less than his finite intellect and limited power, has had its origin elsewhere.

"Back goes creation to its source, source primeAnd ultimate, the single and the sole."B

"Back goes creation to its source, source prime

And ultimate, the single and the sole."B

B:Ibid.

The argument ends by bringing us back

"To the starting-point,—Man's impotency, God's omnipotence,These stop my answer."A

"To the starting-point,—

Man's impotency, God's omnipotence,

These stop my answer."A

A:A Bean-Stripe.

I shall not pause at present to examine the value of this new form of the old argument, "Ex contingentia mundi." But I may point out in passing, that the reference of human love to a divine creative source is accomplished by means of the idea of cause, one of the categories of the thought which Browning has aspersed. And it is a little difficult to show why, if we are constrained to doubt our thought, when by the aid of causality it establishes a connection between finite and finite, we should regard it as worthy of trust when it connects the finite and the infinite. In fact, it is all too evident that the poet assumes or denies the possibility of knowledge, according as it helps or hinders his ethical doctrine.

But, if we grant the ascent from the finite to the infinite and regard man's love as a divine gift—which it may well be although the poet's argument is invalid—then a new light is thrown upon the being who gave man this power to love. The "necessity," "the mere power," which alone could be discerned by observation of the irresistible movement of the world's events, acquires a new character. Prior to this discovery of love in man as the work of God—

"Head praises, but heart refrainsFrom loving's acknowledgment.Whole losses outweigh half-gains:Earth's good is with evil blent:Good struggles but evil reigns."A

"Head praises, but heart refrains

From loving's acknowledgment.

Whole losses outweigh half-gains:

Earth's good is with evil blent:

Good struggles but evil reigns."A

A:Reverie—Asolando.

But love in man is a suggestion of a love without; a proof, in fact, that God is love, for man's love is God's love in man. The source of the pity that man shows, and of the apparent evils in the world which excite it, is the same. The power which called man into being, itself rises up in man against the wrongs in the world. The voice of the moral consciousness, approving the good, condemning evil, and striving to annul it, is the voice of God, and has, therefore, supreme authority. We do wrong, therefore, in thinking that it is the weakness of man which is matched against the might of evil in the world, and that we are fighting a losing battle. It is an incomplete, abstract, untrue view of the facts of life which puts God as irresistible Power in the outer world, and forgets that the same irresistible Power works, under the higher form of love, in the human heart.

"Is not God now i' the world His power first made?Is not His love at issue still with sin,Visibly when a wrong is done on earth?Love, wrong, and pain, what see I else around?"B

"Is not God now i' the world His power first made?

Is not His love at issue still with sin,

Visibly when a wrong is done on earth?

Love, wrong, and pain, what see I else around?"B

B:A Death in the Desert.

In this way, therefore, the poet argues back from the moral consciousness of man to the goodness of God. And he finds the ultimate proof of thisgoodness in the very pessimism and scepticism and despair, that come with the view of the apparently infinite waste in the world and the endless miseries of humanity. The source of this despair, namely, the recognition of evil and wrong, is just the Godhood in man. There is no way of accounting for the fact that "Man hates what is and loves what should be," except by "blending the quality of man with the quality of God." And "the quality of God" is the fundamental fact in man's history. Love is the last reality the poet always reaches. Beneath the pessimism is love: without love of the good there were no recognition of evil, no condemnation of it, and no despair.

But the difficulty still remains as to the permission of evil, even though it should prove in the end to be merely apparent.

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