CHAPTER V.1824.Arrival at Rangoon—Taking of that town—Position of the troops—State of the neighbourhood—Confidence of the king of Ava—Attack of Joazong—Burmese embassy—Capture of Kemendine—Reinforcements from Madras—Sickness of the army—Endurance of the British soldier.
Arrival at Rangoon—Taking of that town—Position of the troops—State of the neighbourhood—Confidence of the king of Ava—Attack of Joazong—Burmese embassy—Capture of Kemendine—Reinforcements from Madras—Sickness of the army—Endurance of the British soldier.
The country on the way to Rangoon is very flat, and consequently the vessels were easily seen coming up the river; and they did not escape the rayhoon of the city. So unusual a number of vessels (they were forty-five in all) could not fail to arouse some dormant ideas of harm in the minds of the treacherous officials. At the time of their descrial, the principal European inhabitants were assembled at the house of Mr. Sarkies, an Armenian merchant, where they were going to dine. The rayhoon immediately sent for them, and demanded what the ships were. The reply was, that there were some expected, and that these were probably them. As the number of vessels was, however, continually increasing, the governor was not satisfied, and he seized the equally ignorant Europeans, and threatened their immediate execution. He also sent notice of his intention to Sir Archibald Campbell, who declared his determination of destroying the town altogether if the governor carried his menace into effect.[279]Upon this the captives were chained and confined in different places.
TheLiffeywas the first to arrive opposite the king’s quay, where a weak battery was planted, and it anchored at that place about twelve o’clock in the forenoon; the other ships took their places in different ways, so as to command the whole neighbourhood. I shall continue in the words of an eye-witness:—
“Having furled sails and beat to quarters, a pause of some minutes ensued, during which not a shot was fired;on our side, humanity forbade that we should be the first aggressors upon an almost defenceless town, containing, as we supposed, a large population of unarmed and inoffensive people; besides, the proclamations and assurances of protection which had been sent on shore the preceding day led us to hope that an offer of capitulation would still be made.”[280]However, all the Burmans did was to pour a feeble, ill-sustained fire into theLiffey, which, returning it with tremendous force, forced away the natives.
Upon landing, after the second broadside, the author of Two Years in Ava informs us that “three men lying dead, and the broken gun-carriages, were the only vestiges of the injury done by the fire from the frigate. The town was completely deserted. It seemed indeed incredible whither the inhabitants could have fled to within such a short space of time; and, as night was coming on, we could not proceed in search of them; the troops, therefore, remained in and about the town, and the next morning were placed in positions, in two lines, resting on the Great Pagoda and the town. On entering the terrace of the Great Pagoda, the advanced guard discovered in a miserable dark cell four of the European residents at Rangoon, who were ironed, and had been otherwise maltreated; the others had been released by us the evening before; so that we had now the satisfaction of knowing that none of our countrymen were subjected to the cruelty of the Burman chieftains.”[281]
After taking possession of the place, proclamations were immediately sent out among the inhabitants through a few stragglers, assuring the townspeople of protection, in the hope of inducing them to return. “The strictest orders were issued to prevent plunder, and a Burman having claimed several head of cattle which had been seized for the use of the army, they were immediately restored, in order to prove the sincerity of our protestations; but none of the inhabitants availed themselves of our offers, and we understood that the officers of government were driving the women and children into the interior, as hostages for the good conduct of the men.”[282]
The soldiers while at Rangoon were billeted in a longstreet which leads from the Dagon Pagoda to Rangoon, and in this exposed situation, without fresh supplies, they had to await the arrival of information regarding the position assumed by the Burmese government. Space will not permit me to refer to the many anxieties which had to be considered in regard to the present position of our troops, but the reader will find them amply discussed in Snodgrass;[283]however, I shall lay before the reader a few remarks of that gentleman, which will amply show the many difficulties which beset the army.
“The enemy’s troops and new-raised levies were gradually collecting in our front from all parts of the kingdom; a cordon was speedily formed around our cantonments, capable, indeed, of being forced at every point, but possessing, in a remarkable degree, all the qualities requisite for harassing and wearing out in fruitless exertions the strength and energies of European or Indian troops. Hid from our crew on every side in the darkness of a deep, and, to regular bodies, impenetrable forest, far beyond which the inhabitants and all the cattle of the Rangoon district had been driven, the Burmese chiefs carried on their operation and matured their future schemes with vigilance, secrecy, and activity. Neither rumour nor intelligence of what was passing within his posts ever reached us. Beyond the invisible line which circumscribed our position, all was mystery or vague conjecture.[284].... To form a correct idea of the difficulties which opposed the progress of the invading army, even had it been provided with land-carriage and landed at the fine season of the year, it is necessary to make some allusion to the natural obstacles which the country presented, and to the mode of warfare generally practised by the Burmese. Henzawaddy, or the province of Rangoon, is a delta, formed by the mouths of the Irrawaddy, and, with the exception of some considerable plains of rice-grounds, is covered by a thick and tenacious jungle, interspersed by numerous creeks and rivers, from whose wooded banks an enemy may, unseen and unexposed, render their passage difficult and destructive.
“Roads, or anything deserving that name, are wholly unknown in the lower provinces. Footpaths, indeed, lead through the woods in every direction, but requiring greattoil and labour to render them applicable to military purposes: they are impassable during the rains, and are only known and frequented by the Carian tribes, who cultivate the lands, are exempt from military service, and may be considered as the slaves of the soil, living in wretched hamlets by themselves, heavily taxed and oppressed by the Burmese authorities, by whom they are treated as altogether an inferior race of beings from their countrymen of Pegu.... The Burmese, in their usual mode of warfare, rarely meet their enemy in the open field. Instructed and trained from their youth in the formation and defence of stockades, in which they display great skill and judgment, their wars have been for many years a series of conquests: every late attempt of the neighbouring nations to check their victorious career had failed, and the Burmese government, at the time of our landing at Rangoon, had subdued and incorporated into their overgrown empire all the petty states by which it was surrounded, and stood confessedly feared and respected even by the Chinese, as a powerful and warlike nation. When opposed to our small but disciplined body of men, it may easily be conceived with how much more care and caution the system to which they owed their fame and reputation as soldiers was pursued—constructing their defences in the most difficult and inaccessible recesses of the jungle, from which, by constant predatory inroads and nightly attacks, they vainly imagined they would ultimately drive us from their country.”[285]
The confidence which the king of Ava had in his own military resources is amply shown in a speech reported by Snodgrass.[286]“As to Rangoon,” said the king, “I will take such measures as will prevent the English from even disturbing the women of the town in cooking their rice.” This speech, however, only lends additional force to the remark of the Edinburgh Reviewer, that “the Burmese are much too arrogant even to attempt to improve themselves; and such as their rabble of soldiery is now, such it will be found fifty years hence—utterly unable to stand for a moment against British troops, even when protected by stockades.”[287]The events at present passing in the kingdom of Ava are but a practical demonstrationof the truth of this assertion. However, such preparations as could be made were completed. Armies were stockaded in all directions near Rangoon, nor was the river at all neglected. The boatmen, an enterprising and brave part of the community, all attached to the royal interests, were soon in readiness, and a respectable kind of fleet covered the waters of the Irawadi.
Nothing of consequence occurred for some days. Some boats, sent up by Sir A. Campbell to gather intelligence as to the force and resources of the Burmese, were fired upon on the 15th May, near the village of Kemendine, and to prevent the recurrence of such an event, a body of men were embarked in order to drive the enemy from that place. Accordingly, after some little skirmishing and the loss of some men and officers, the detachment succeeded in their endeavours. Afterward, however, the Burmese returned, and annoyed the Anglo-Indian army very much by attempting to set the fleet on fire. “Our shipping,” says an eye-witness, “were now daily and nightly exposed to a great deal of danger and annoyance from an engine of destruction much confided in by our invisible enemy, and which, if properly managed, might have caused us much injury. This was a large raft formed of pieces of wood and beams tied together, but loosely, so that if it came athwart a ship’s bows, it would swing round and encircle her. On this were placed every sort of firewood, and other combustibles, such as jars of petroleum or earth oil, which, rising in a flame, created a tremendous blaze, and as this raft extended across the river, it often threatened to burn a great portion of our fleet. Rafts of this description were chiefly launched from Kemendine, where the greater number of them were constructed; but fortunately the river made a bend a little above the anchorage, and the current running strong towards the opposite shore, the rafts were not unfrequently grounded, and thus rendered useless; whilst, on the other hand, the precautions adopted by our naval officers of anchoring a number of beams across the river, in most instances effectually arrested those unwieldy masses in their descent towards Rangoon.”[288]
During this time the confidence of the Burmese had increased, and on the 27th they actually advanced withinsight of the picquets, and sat down. This was observed by Major Snodgrass, who, desirous of knowing whether they were merely stragglers, or part of any considerable body, immediately pursued them. He and his men found their way, however, stopped by a small stockade stretching right across the road. After a few shots, the British party, only twenty-two in number, charged the work, and carried it. The natives, sixty in number, immediately fled. The success which had attended this movement determined Sir Archibald Campbell in his resolution to attempt a reconnoissance in person; a measure that was put into execution the next morning. On arriving at the stockade just mentioned, it was found reoccupied by the Burmese, who were repairing it with great rapidity. However, on perceiving the troops, they immediately fled. The same thing took place at a bridge beyond the village of Kokein, “and,” observes Snodgrass, “at every turn of the road, breastworks and half-finished stockades, hastily abandoned, proved that so early a visit was neither anticipated nor provided for.”[289]
“Our troops,” says the author of Two Years in Ava,[290]“continued advancing in echellon, the light company of the thirty-eighth on the left skirting the jungle; the grenadiers in the centre, on the plain; and the thirteenth on the right: when, at a sudden turn, the light company observed a stockade about a hundred yards distant, having a ravine full of water in front of it. A dead silence pervaded the work; and Captain Piper, instantly forming his men in line, charged up to the stockade, and through the ravine without firing a shot. When we were within about thirty yards, the Burmans gave a most terrific yell, accompanied by beating of drums, tom-toms, and other instruments, and opened a sharp and well-directed fire, by which we suffered severely. As the enemy was covered by a thick palisade, with loopholes, we saw not a man; and even if we had, our fire could not have proved serviceable, as not a single musket would go off, in consequence of the wet; whereas the Burmans were protected from the weather by sheds, and consequently their arms were uninjured. On arriving at the foot of the work, after forcing the way through a capital abatis, the entrance was found barred up; and the height of the work, and thewant of ladders, preventing escalading, the men were for some time, therefore, exposed to the assaults of the enemy, who threw out spears, and tried every effort to drive us off. They were unavailing: the passage was forced, and the troops rushed on with the bayonet. Finding this face of the work carried, a number of Burmans rushed with their spears to the opposite side, and there awaited the approach of the assailants; but a section dashing at them with the bayonets, annihilated almost the whole.... Evening was now coming on fast, we were encumbered with between thirty and forty wounded, without any means of carrying them, except the officers’ horses, and three or four doolies;[291]and Sir A. Campbell, therefore, determined on returning without attacking a small stockade a little farther on, having first made a forward movement with his troops to see whether the Burman line, which was still drawn up, would await our approach. It fell back as we advanced, and we then, after burning the two stockades of Joazong, recommenced the march home.” In this action several officers were severely, some mortally, wounded. On the Burmese side the loss was about four hundred. The commander on the native side was the former Rayhoon of Rangoon, a man of talent and experience. The enemy retired from the field during the night, after digging up and horribly mutilating the bodies of two soldiers who had fallen there the day before!
The unexpected results of the skirmish opened the eyes of the Burmese commanders to the inefficacy of their system of warfare. Feeling their inferiority, and wishing to gain time for altering and strengthening their defences, the Burmese sent two ambassadors to the English camp. This was on the 9th June. Major Snodgrass thus describes the whole interview:[292]—
“The principal personage of the two, who had formerly been governor of Bassein, was a stout, elderly man, dressed in a long scarlet robe, with a red handkerchief tied round his head, in the usual Burman style. His companion, although dressed more plainly, had much more intelligence in his countenance; and notwithstanding his assumed indifference and humble demeanour, it soon becameevident that to him the management of the interview was intrusted, though his colleague treated him in every respect as an inferior.
“The two chiefs, having entered the house, sat down with all the ease and familiarity of old friends; neither constraint nor any symptom of fear appeared about either; they paid their compliments to the British officers, and made their remarks on what they saw with the utmost freedom and good-humour. The elder chief then opened the subject of their mission, with the question, ‘Why are you come here with ships and soldiers?’ accompanied with many professions of the good faith, sincerity, and friendly disposition of the Burmese government. The causes of the war and the redress that was demanded were again fully explained to them. The consequences of the line of conduct pursued by their generals, in preventing all communication with the court, was also pointed out, and they were brought to acknowledge that a free and unreserved discussion of the points at issue could alone avert the evils and calamities with which their country was threatened. Still they would neither confess that the former remonstrances of the Indian government had reached their king, nor enter into any arrangement for removing the barrier they had placed in the way of negotiation, but urged, with every argument they could think of, that a few days’ delay might be granted, to enable them to confer with an officer of high rank then at some distance up the river: they were, however, given to understand, that delay and procrastination formed no part of our system, and that the war would be vigorously prosecuted, until the king of Ava thought proper to send officers with full authority to enter upon a treaty with the British commissioners.
“The elder chief, who had loudly proclaimed his love of peace, continued chewing his betel-nut with much composure, receiving the intimation of a continuance of hostilities with more of the air and coolness of a soldier who considered war as his trade, than became the pacific character he assumed; while his more shrewd companion vainly endeavoured to conceal his vexation at the unpleasant termination of their mission, and unexpected failure of their arts and protestations. But although the visit had evidently been planned for no other purpose than that ofgaining time, the chiefs did not object to carry with them to their camp a declaration of the terms upon which peace would still be restored; and that they might take their departure with a better grace, expressed their intention of repeating their visit in the course of a few days, for the purpose of opening a direct communication between the British general and the Burmese ministers. The elder chief, again alluding to his being no warrior, hoped that the ships had strict orders not to fire upon him; but while he said so, in stepping into his boat, there was a contemptuous smile upon his own face and the countenances of his men, that had more of defiance than entreaty in it.”
The next morning (June 10th) the British intentions regarding Kemendine were put into execution. A breach was soon made in the teak-wood stockade by the cannon, and a column of English and Indian troops stormed the place. Major Sale, with his detachment, had some hot work, for the place at which he entered was full of men, who defended themselves with the bravery of despair. Thirty of the Anglo-Indians fell, though for them one hundred and sixty Burmese perished. Even when this place was taken, little had been accomplished, as the principal stockade, about half a mile distant, had yet to be besieged. “We lost no time,” says an eye-witness, and actor in the affair, “in advancing to it; and in order completely to hem the Burmahs in, the flotilla was sent up the river, beyond the works, so as to prevent their escaping by water; whilst the land force proceeded through the jungle. The left of our line rested on the river, and the right was moving round the north of the stockade; thus completing a semicircle; when it was discovered that, in addition to the main work, two smaller ones existed further up, which it was impossible for us with our force to surround; a space of two hundred yards was therefore unavoidably left between our right and the river, it being exposed to the fire of both stockades. Night had already approached; the rain began to pour without intermission, and neither men nor officers were sheltered from it, or had any cover, not even of great coats. The night we passed in this situation was such as may easily be imagined.... The shouts of the Burmahs had a curious effect, much heightened by the wild sceneryof the dark, gloomy forest which surrounded us; first, a low murmur might be heard, rising as it were gradually in tone, and followed by the wild and loud huzza of thousands of voices; then, again, all was silence, save now and then a straggling shot or challenge from our own sentries; and soon after, another peal of voices would resound through the trees. This they continued all night; but towards morning the yells became fainter and fainter, and at daybreak they totally ceased.”[293]
In the morning, operations were resumed; and on the storming parties advancing to the capture, they found, to their astonishment, that the enemy had decamped! Possession was immediately taken, and a regiment left in garrison, while the rest returned to cantonments, very much irritated by the loss of their opponents. Five pieces of cannon were found in the inclosure, and numbers of jinjals. Outside the upper gate lay a gilt chattah or umbrella of rank, and some distance beyond, the body of the elder chief, who had visited the English camp.
Major Wahab and Brigadier McCreagh returned from Cheduba and Negrais about this time, having accomplished the purpose for which they were detached. The capture of these places had not been completed without some loss and considerable slaughter. Cheduba was expected to have proved of some use, but it was found that, with the exception of a few buffaloes, the supplies were not of any utility. About this time also, the force was augmented by the 89th British regiment from Madras.
The effects of heavy work in the swamps now began to be seen in the fatal form of disease among the Anglo-Indian troops. “Constantly exposed to the vicissitudes of a tropical climate, and exhausted by the necessity of unintermitted exertion, it need not be a matter of surprise that sickness now began to thin the ranks and impair the energies of the invaders. No rank was exempt from the operation of these causes; and many officers, amongst whom were the senior naval officer, Captain Marryat; the political commissioner, Major Canning; and the Commander-in-Chief himself, were attacked with fever, during the month of June. Amongst the privates, the Europeans especially, the sickness incident to fatigueand exposure was aggravated by the defective quantity and quality of the provisions which had been supplied for their use. Relying upon the reported facility of obtaining cattle and vegetables at Rangoon, it had not been thought necessary to embark stores for protracted consumption on board the transports from Calcutta, and the Madras troops landed with a still more limited stock. As soon as the deficiency was ascertained, arrangements were made to remedy it; but in the mean time, before supplies could reach Rangoon, the troops were dependent for food upon salt meat, much of which was in a state of putrescence, and biscuit, in an equally repulsive condition, under the decomposing influence of heat and moisture. The want of sufficient and wholesome food enhanced the evil effects of the damp soil and atmosphere, and of the malaria from the decaying vegetable matter of the surrounding forests, and the hospitals were rapidly filled with sick, beyond the means available of medical treatment. Fever and dysentery were the principal maladies, and were no more than the ordinary consequences of local causes; but the scurvy and hospital gangrene, which also made their appearance, were ascribable as much to depraved habits and inadequate nourishment as to fatigue and exposure. They were also latterly, in some degree, the consequences of extreme exhaustion, forming a peculiar feature of the prevailing fever, which bore an epidemic type, and which had been felt with equal severity in Bengal. The fatal operation of these causes was enhanced by their continuance; and towards the end of the rainy season, scarcely three thousand men were fit for active duty. The arrival of adequate supplies, and more especially the change in the monsoon, restored the troops to a more healthy condition.”[294]
It is, however, worthy of especial notice, that though the army wanted provisions, health, and strength, their natural energy did not fail. In the midst of a crowd of foes, whose numerous force and equipments were alike unknown to the English soldier, his constitutional dominance of will flagged not at all, but seemed rather to become stronger, the more great the odds grew against it. Indeed, one of the authorities I have quoted tells us, that there went a feeling abroad among the Burmese, that itwas of no use to contend with an English soldier; for, if the arm he had grasped the top of the stockade with were chopped, he never was disconcerted, but immediately applied the other; even then they were at disadvantage, for the skill of the British doctors was so great, that they could replace the severed limbs upon the trunk; and for this reason diligent search was always made on the field after the battle, for these legs and arms!