PREDESTINATION, CONTINUED.
Frommy last number the reader will perceive that there are two classes of Calvinists, so-called, with whom we have no need to contend; with one there is no cause of controversy, because they have given up the doctrine; and with the other there is noneedof controversy, because their plain manner of avowing the doctrine,logical consequences and all, renders any arguments against it unnecessary. Its character is too monstrous and abhorrent to gain much credit. There is yet another and a larger portion, who, while they reject the views both of the New-Haven divines and of the old school and Hopkinsian Calvinists, are nevertheless strongly opposed to the issue proposed in the sermon. They deny, as appears from some public intimations and many private statements, that I have given a fair representation of the doctrine. They appear to manifest as much horror as an Arminian would to the idea, that “the responsible acts of moral agents are definitely fixed and efficiently produced by the purpose and decree of God,”—that these acts “are the result of an overruling and controlling power,”—“that the will, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement.” Hence, I suppose, if it can be proved that these are the genuine characteristics of Calvinism, the system itself will, by many at least, be given up. At any rate, since the exception is taken to the definition of the doctrine, it may be presumed, by sustaining this, we sustain our own cause and refute the opposite. The present inquiry then is, are these, in very deed, the characteristics of absolute predestination? I shall endeavour to maintain that they are. Let the intelligent and the candid judge.
1. It may be urged as a consideration of no small weight in this question, that all but predestinarians, as well as many predestinarians themselves, have entertained these views of the doctrine. With respect to anti-predestinarians, I know of no exception; all unite, in charging these things, directly or by consequence, upon the Calvinistic system. And will Calvinists say, this is owing to prejudice and to a want of understanding the subject? With what kind of modesty will they assume that they are free from blinding prejudice infavourof their own doctrine, and all the world beside are prejudiced against it? It may be asserted, as it often has been, that these doctrines are humbling to the pride of the natural heart, and this is the ground of the universal opposition to them! But this is a gratuitous assumption of what ought first to be proved, viz. that these doctrines are true; and it also exhibits a most reprehensible spirit of pride and Pharisaism—a spirit that says to a brother, “Stand by, for I am holier than thou!” There have doubtless been as many eminently pious Arminians as Calvinists, and how is it, that these men have never had this doctrine so explained to them as to be able to see it free from these charges?
But not only anti-predestinarians have universally entertained these opinions of this doctrine; even the advocates themselves have, in a great variety of instances, acknowledged the same. Mention has before been made, (in the sermon,) of the opposition raised against free will, by the Calvinists of Mr. Wesley’s day—and quotations have also been given from the early Calvinistic authors, showing how decidedly they held that God moved the will to sin, by a direct positive influence. To these we may add all the Hopkinsians of modern days, who openly acknowledge “that those scriptures which teach that God has decreed the sinful acts of men, do imply that he is the efficient cause of moral evil.” (See review of my sermon in the Boston Telegraph.) It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the New-Haven divines, who have studied Calvinism all their lives, with the best opportunities for understanding it, inform us that the view of Calvinism which makes sin preferable to holiness in its stead, is unanswerably exposed to all the objections brought against it in the sermon. It is known too, that most of the Methodists in New-England, and many elsewhere, were educated predestinarians; but have revolted from the traditions of their fathers for the very reason that Calvinism is what we have described it to be. The Universalists are almost all predestinarians, and they understand that this doctrine necessarily implies theDivine efficiencyin producing sin; and hence they very consistently infer that God is not angry with them, and will not punish them for being controlled by his decrees.
Suppose now an intelligent person, who knew nothing of the arguments on either side, should be informed of what is true in this case, viz. that a great portion, probably on the whole by far the greatest portion of predestinarians, andallanti-predestinarians, understood the doctrine of absolute predestination, as involving directly, or by consequence, certain specified principles; but that a portion of predestinarians persisted in denying that these principles were involved in the doctrine; and suppose this intelligent person should be informed of the additional facts, that these predestinarians had tried all their skill at explanation and argument, generation after generation, but had never succeeded in the view of the other party in freeing their doctrine from these charges, nay, that they had so far failed of it, that many, very many were leaving them, and adopting the anti-predestinarian system, for thevery reasonthat they could not rid the system, in which they had been educated, from those principles which were charged upon it—and that even among those who had adhered to the old doctrine there were new modes of explaining and stating the theory, constantly springing up, until finally numbers of themhad explained themselves entirely out of the doctrine, and into the opposite sentiment; and that very many others, by adhering to the doctrine, and following out the principles involved in it, had come to the conclusion that there was “no hell”—no judgment, and “no angry God.” Suppose, I say, this intelligent man should be informed of all these facts, and then be requested topresumewhether or not these contested principles were involved in the doctrine—what would be his judgment? I need not answer this question. There isstrongpresumptive evidence that the views in the sermon are correct.
2. Another reason for believing that this doctrine is what we have defined it to be, and involves in it the principles we have charged upon it, is drawn from the terms in which it is expressed, and the manner and circumstances in which these terms are used. The more common terms aredecree, predestination, foreordination, predetermination, purpose, &c.—These are all authoritative terms, and carry with them the idea of absolute sovereignty. But lest they should not be sufficiently strong and imperious, they are, in this theory, generally accompanied by some strong qualifying terms, such assovereign decree, eternal and immutable purposes;and without any reference to other bearings, the whole is placed on the ground of God’s absolute and sovereign will. These sovereign decrees, however, are not proposed to his subjects in the light of a law enforced by suitable sanctions, and liable to be broken. They are thesecret counselsof his own will; and so far from being law, that often, perhaps oftener than otherwise, in the moral world, they are in direct opposition to the precepts of the law. When these decrees come in contact with the law they supersede it. Laws may sometimes be broken, the decrees, never. God commits his law to subordinate moral agents, who may break or keep them; but his decrees he executes himself. It should also be understood that the advocates of this theory, in their late controversy with Dr. Taylor, strenuously maintain that sin, wherever it occurs, is preferable to holiness in its stead, and is thenecessary meansof thegreatest good. The idea that God, foreseeing what moral agents would do, under all possible circumstances,so ordered his worksas to take up and incorporate into his plan the foreseen volitions of moral agents, and thus constitute a grand whole, as perfect as any system which involves a moral government could be, they discard as rank Arminianism. Now is it possible that decrees like these, concealed in the eternal mind of him that conceived them—dependent solely on Almighty power to execute them, not modified by subordinate agencies, but made to control these agencies with absolute and arbitrary sway; can it bepossible, I say, that such decrees do not efficiently control and actuate the human will. Must not he who, in this manner, forms and executes the general plan, also form and execute all its parts? Must not he who gives the first impulse to this concatenation of events, linked together by his eternal purposes, follow up the whole with his continued and direct agency, and carry on this work in every mind and through every emotion? Most assuredly he must. His is, undoubtedly, according to this doctrine, that operative, controlling and propelling energy that
“Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Acts undivided, operates unspent.”
And that we may be sure not to misrepresent the Calvinists on this subject, let them speak for themselves. Dr. Hill, who is a modern, and is reputed a moderate Calvinist, says:—“The Divine decree is the determination toproducethe universe, that is, thewhole seriesofbeingsandeventsthat was then future.” Dr. Chalmers, who has been esteemed so moderate a Calvinist, that some had doubted whether he had not given up absolute predestination altogether, comes out in his sermon on predestination in the following language:—“Every step of every individual character, receives as determinate a character from the hand, of God, as every mile of a planet’s orbit, or every gust of wind, or every wave of the sea, or every particle of flying dust, or every rivulet of flowing water. This power of God knows no exceptions: it is absolute and unlimited. And while it embraces the vast, it carries its resistless influence to all the minute and unnoticed diversities of existence. Itreignsand operates through all the secrecies of the inner man. It gives birth to every purpose, it gives impulse to every desire, it gives shape and colour to every conception. It wields an entire ascendancy over every attribute of the mind; and the will, and the fancy, and the understanding, with all the countless variety of their hidden and fugitive operations, are submitted to it. It gives movement and direction through every one point of our pilgrimage. At no moment of time does it abandon us. It follows us to the hour of death, and it carries us to our place, and to our everlasting destiny in the region beyond it!!!” These quotations need no comment; if they do not come up to all we have ever charged upon this doctrine, there is no definite meaning in words.
But we have another authority on this subject, which bears more directly on the Calvinists of this country, the Assembly’s Catechism. Dr. Fitch, who is certainly as well qualified to judge in this matter as another man, informs us, through the medium of the Christian Spectator, that “the articles of faith prepared by that body, (the assembly of English and Scotch divines at Westminster,) are considered as expressing essentially the views not only of the Presbyterian Church in this country, but also of the orthodox Congregational Churches of New-England.” It is known, also, that the Shorter Catechism has been almost universally used by them in their families, and in the religious instruction of their children. Here then we have a standard of faith, which all theclasses, I suppose, will acknowledge,—and what saith it? After stating that the decrees of God are his eternal purpose, according to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath foreordained whatsoever cometh to pass, it goes on to say, “Godexecutethhis decrees in the works of creation and providence,” and then for farther explanation adds—“God’s works of providence are his most holy, wise, and powerful, preserving and governing all his creatures and all their actions.” This is certainly an awkward sentence, if I may be allowed to say this of the productions of an assembly which has been characterised as a paragon of excellency in erudition and theology. Its meaning, however, according to grammar and logic, must be, that by his acts of providence God, in a most holy, wise, and powerful manner, preserves and governs both all his creatures, and all their actions. But as it seems to be a solecism to talk aboutpreserving actions, we will understandpreservingto belong tocreatures, andgoverningtoactions, and then it will be thus: God powerfully preserves all his creatures, and powerfully governs all their actions: and it is in this way heexecuteshis decrees. There are evidently two methods of governing. That control which is made up of legal precepts, and sanctions, and retributions, is called a government; not that all the subjects of such a government always obey its ordinances, but if they violate them, they are subjected to punishment.Thisis evidently not the kind of government that the assembly contemplated. It was a government by which Godexecuted his decrees;but, as we have seen, his decrees are not his laws, for they are frequently in direct opposition to his laws. Decree and law are not only frequently opposed, in respect to the moral action demanded by each, but even where those demands are coincident they differ greatly in themannerandcertaintyof their fulfilment. Of course government, byexecuting decrees, is another thing altogether from government byexecuting laws. But there is another kind of government. It is thatefficient controlof a superior, by which a being or an act ismade to be what it is, in opposition tonon-existence, or adifferent existence. Now this appears to be precisely the kind of government alluded to when it said, “Godexecutes his decreesby powerfullygoverningall the actions of his creatures.” That is, he efficiently produces and controls all the responsible volitions, good and bad, of the moral universe. And what is this, but affirming all that the sermon has affirmed on this subject? If any one is disposed to deny that this is a fair exposition of the Catechism, let him reflect that as he cannot pretend thatgovernmenthere means alegal administration, it will be incumbent on him to show what other fair construction can be put upon it than the one given above; to show how God can execute a secret decree, by his own powerful act, in any other way than in the one already explained.
In corroboration of the foregoing views it should also be borne in mind, that the Calvinists uniformly use these very same terms,decree, predestination, &c, in thesame sense, in reference toall events. They say, God’s decrees extend to all events, physical and moral, good and evil, by which they must mean, if they mean any thing intelligible, that his predestination bears the same relation to all events. If then his decree of election embraces the means to the accomplishment of the end, so also must his decree of reprobation. If his decree of election requires for its accomplishment anefficientoperation, so also does his decree of reprobation. If Divine agency is directly and efficiently, requisite to produce a good volition, it must follow that it is in the same sense requisite to produce a sinful volition.
To tell us a thousand times, without any distinction or discrimination, that all things areequallythe result of the Divine decree, and then tell us that the relation between God’s decree and sin is essentially different from the relation existing between his decree and holiness, would certainly be a very singular and unwarrantable use of language. How then, I inquire, does God produce holy volitions?—Why, say the Calvinists, by a direct, positive, and efficient influence upon the will, and in proof quote —“Thy peopleshallbe willing in the day of thy power.” Well, how, I ask again, does God execute his decrees respecting unholy volitions? Consistency requires the same reply. But, says the Calvinist, he need not exert the same influence to produce unholy volitions, because it is in accordance with the nature of sinful men to sin. Indeed! and is not thisnaturethe result of a decree? It would seem God approaches his work of executing his decreerespecting sin, either more reluctantly or with greater difficulty, so that it requires two steps to execute this, and only one the other. It is in both cases, however, equally his work. This will be seen more clearly if we turn our attention to the first sin; for it is certainly as much against a perfectly holy nature to commit sin, as it is against an unholy nature to have a holy volition. Hence the one as much requires a direct and positive influence as the other, and therefore the passage in the 110th Psalm, if it applies at all to a positive Divine influence in changing the will, must have a much more extensive meaning, than has been generally supposed. It should be paraphrased thus:—Not only shall thy elect people, who are yet in their sins, and therefore not yet in a strict and proper sense thine, be made willing to become holy in the day that thou dost efficiently change their will, but also thy angels and thy first created human pair, who were before their fall more truly thine, as they were made perfectly holy, shall be made willing to become unholy in the day that thou dost efficiently change their wills from submission to rebellion. For if Divine efficiency is necessary to make a naturally perverse will holy, it is also necessary to make a naturally holy will perverse.
I am aware that we may be met here by this reply, that although God does efficiently control the will, still it is in a way suited to the nature of mind, and consistent with free agency, because he operates upon the mind through the influence of moral suasion, or by the power of motives. To this it may be answered, that the Calvinists generally condemn Dr. Taylor’s views of conversion, because they suspect him of holding that motives alone convert the sinner; whereas they deem it necessary that the Holy Spirit should act directly upon the will; if so, then, as I have shown above, it is also necessary that there should be a direct Divine influence upon the will of a holy being, to make him sinful. And this more especially, since both changes are decreed, and both stand in the same relation to the Divine purpose. But this doctrine of motives leads me to another argument, viz.
3. That the view I have taken of predestination is correct, appears evident from the Calvinistic doctrine of motives, especially when this doctrine is viewed in connection with the Calvinistic theory of depravity.
The doctrine of motives I understand to be this, that “the power of volition is never excited, norcan be, except in the presence and from the excitement of motives,” (see “Views in Theology,”) and that the mind must necessarily be swayed by the strongest motive, or by what appears to the mind to be the greatest good. Dr. Edwards, following Leibnitz, incorporated this doctrine of philosophical necessity with the Calvinistic theology. In this he has been followed by a great portion, I believe, of the Calvinistic clergy. Without stopping here to attempt a refutation of this theory, my present object is to show that it necessarily fastens upon Calvinism the charges brought against it, and sustains the definition that has been given to predestination. For since God creates both the mind and the motives, and brings them together for theexpress purposethat the former should be swayed by the latter, it follows conclusively that Godefficientlycontrols the will, and produces all its volitions. And this is according to express Calvinistic teaching:—“God,” says the author of “Views in Theology,” already quoted, “God is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the determiners of choices.” The inference therefore is plain and unavoidable,God is the determiner of choices. The plea that God does not produce volitions, by a direct influence, but indirectly, through second causes, avails nothing. Although there should be ten, or ten thousand intermediate links, if they are all arranged by our Creator in such order as to produce the intellectual vibration intended, whenever he pleases to give the impulse, what is the difference? In point of efficient agency, none at all. Nor yet will it alter the case to say, that “this effect is produced by God through such a medium as is suited to the nature of the mind, and therefore it cannot be said, that God does any violence to the will, or to man’s free agency.” God created themind, and themeansthat were to influence it. He gave to mind its nature, and to motives their influence and arrangement, forthis very purpose. Hence, unless man can unmake himself, he isbound by the law of his natureto act in all cases as he does. Why talk about afreeagency when it is such an agency asmust, bythe constitutionofGod, lead inevitably to sin and ruin! That old, and in the premises, foolish reply, that man could do differently,if he chose, does not help the case. It is only saying, the nature of man is such that it is governed by his perceptions, and since “God is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions the determiners of choices,” whenever God pleases to alter the perceptions so as thereby to change the choice,then, and not before, man can do differently. According to this doctrine is it possible, according to the very nature of mind, for the choice to be different until the perceptions are changed? And can the perceptions be changed, until God changes them? To answer either or both of these questions in the affirmative, would be to give up the doctrine of motives. To answer them in the negative, would be to entail upon the doctrine all that I have charged upon it. The advocates of the theory may have their choice. Nor yet, again, will it destroy the force of this argument, to say “man has anunholy nature;and this is the reason why the motives presented influence him to sin; therefore the guilt is chargeable upon himself, and God is clear.” For, in the first place, this would not account for the first unholy volitions of holy angels and the first human pair.
This argument presupposes that, but for the consideration of man’sunholy nature, the charge against the Calvinistic theory would be valid. And inasmuch as here are cases in which the argument obviously affords no relief to the system, it follows that in these uses, at least, God is the efficient and procuring cause of unholy volitions—and therefore the charges against predestination are established. But by a little farther attention we shall see that this argument affords as little relief to the system in the case of man as he now is. For this first sin, which was itself the necessary result of the Divine arrangement and of positive Divine influence, threw, if possible, a stronger and a more dire necessity over all the coming generations of men. For this act entailed upon man a depraved heart. Hence this corrupt nature came upon man without his knowledge or agency. We trace it back then, thus:—Man’s love of sin was produced by the unholy choice of the first pair—that choice was produced by perceptions—these perceptions were produced by motives —and these motives were brought by God to bear upon the minds which he had made for this very purpose—therefore God, by design, and because he purposed it, produced our corrupt nature; and then, for the express purpose of leading that unholy nature to put forth unholy volitions, he brings those motives to bear upon our minds, which, from the unavoidable nature of those minds,must producethe sin designed. It is thus that, according to his theory, our Creator binds the human mind by the strong cords of depravity with one hand, and with the other lashes it, by the maddening scourge of motives, into all the excitement of unholy delirium; and then, for his own glory, consigns the sinner over to the prison house of wo!! Turn this system, then, as you will, you find this doctrine of predestination binding the human mind, and efficiently producing all the volitions of the moral universe. The strong arm of Jehovah not more directly and irresistibly moves and binds the planets in their orbits, than it moves and controls, in the mysterious circle of his eternal decrees, “all the actions of all his creatures.”
I know, as a closing argument, it is urged, whatever may be our inferences, we all know that we are free, and that we are responsible, becausewe are conscious of it. This is a most singular course of reasoning, and seems to have been adopted to reconcile contradictions. If this doctrine be true, I am notsurethat I am free, and that I am responsible merely because I feel that I am. I am at leastquiteas conscious that I ought not to be held responsible for what is unavoidable, as I am that I am possessed of moral liberty. Break down my consciousness in one case, and you prepare the way for me to suspect it of fallacy in another. And if I must give up my consciousness, between two alternatives I will choose that which will not involve the government of God in injustice, and myriads of intelligent beings in unavoidable perdition. Hence, with Dr. Edwards’ premises, which he holds in common with Lord Kaimes, I would come to his lordship’s conclusion, viz. that God never intended to hold men responsible, and the universal feeling of responsibility is a kind of pious fraud—a salutary delusion, imposed as a check and restraint upon man here, but to be followed by no unpleasant consequences either here or hereafter. But this would be charging our Creator with both deception and folly—deception in the delusive consciousness of responsibility, and folly in suffering Lord Kaimes and others to disclose the secret, and frustrate the Divine purpose! This cannot be. The charge of deception and of fallacy, therefore, must be rolled back from consciousness and from the throne of God upon the doctrine of predestination. And if the reaction should crush the theory for ever, it would doubtless be a blessing to the Church and to the world.
To conclude. For the reasons given, I must still maintain that the charges contained in the sermon against that modification of Calvinism I am now opposing, are just; and the definition assumed, is correct. If the advocates of the system can clear themselves, or their doctrine, let it be done. If not, let one of two courses be pursued—either let the system be abandoned, orlet us have it as it is.
I have dwelt the longer on this subject, because I am weary, and I believe we all are, of hearing the oft-repeated complaint, “You misrepresent us!” “You mistake our doctrine!”
In the next No., by the leave of Providence, the nature of human agency, and the ground of human responsibility, will be examined.
MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
Bywhat has been said on the theory of Calvinistic predestination, it will be seen, I think, that this system involves such necessity of moral action as is incompatible with free agency. It is possible, I grant, to give to the termswill, liberty, free agency, such a definition as will make these terms,thus defined, compatible with the other peculiarities of the Calvinistic system.—Both parties agree that man is a free moral agent; both maintain that he is responsible; but we maintain that what the Calvinists call free moral agency, is not such in fact as is commonly understood by the term, nor such as is requisite to make man accountable. Here, therefore, we are again thrown back upon our definitions, as the starting point of argument. What is that power, or property, or faculty of the mind, which constitutes man a free moral agent? It is the power of choice, connected with liberty to choose either good or evil. Both thepowerandlibertyto choose eithergoodorevilare requisite to constitute the free agency of a probationer. It has been contended that choice, though from the condition of the moral agent it must of necessity be exclusivelyon one side, is nevertheless free; since it implies avoluntarypreference of the mind. Hence it is contended that the fallen and the holy angels, glorified and lost human spirits, though some of these are confined in an impeccable state, and the others have a perpetual and invincible enmity to good, are nevertheless free agents. With respect to the free agency of these beings, a question might be started, whether it is such as renders them responsible for theirpresent acts, the decision of which might have some bearing on the subject under investigation; but not such bearing as would make it important to discuss it here. If they are responsible for theirpresent acts, it must be on account of a former probation, which by sin they have judicially forfeited. Or if any one thinks otherwise, and is disposed to maintain that a being who is not, andnever wasso circumstanced as to render the choice of good possible to him, is nevertheless a free moral agent, in any such sense as renders him accountable, with such a sentiment at present I have no controversy. Indeed such an opinion is so violent an outrage upon all the acknowledged principles of justice, that to controvert it would be a work of little profit.
It is certain that the moral standing of those angels and men whose states are now unalterably fixed, differs materially from their probationary state; and this difference renders their moral agency unsuited to illustrate the agency of beings who are on probation. Man, in this life, is in a state of trial; good and evil are presented before him as objects of choice; and upon this choice are suspended eternal consequences of happiness or misery. Of a being thus circumstanced, it is not enough to say he is free to choose as he does, unless you can say, also, he is equally free to make an opposite choice.—Hence, in defining the free agency of man, as a probationer, we say, as above, that it implies a power of choice, with full liberty to choose either good or evil.
The foregoing definition, at first view, seems sufficient for all practical purposes, and so indeed it would have been, if a speculative philosophy had not thrown it into the alembic of metaphysics for decomposition and analysis. It is doubtful whether this process has subserved the cause of truth; nay, it is certain, I think, that it has produced many perplexing refinements and speculations that have greatly aided the cause of error. Into these abstrusities, therefore, it seems necessary to follow this question, to try, if possible, to draw out and combine the elements of truth.
Having defined free agency to meanthe power of choice, &c, it is asked again,What is this power of choice?It is probable that the different answers given to this question constitute the fundamental differences between Calvinists and Arminians. To the above question some, like the reply of the Jews to Christ, have said, “We cannot tell.” And they give this evasive reply perhaps for a reason similar to that which influenced the Jews; they fear that a definite answer will involve themselves or their theory in difficulty. This is a very convenient way to avoid responsibility, but not indicative of much fairness, or confidence in their cause. When men have involved their system in apparent contradictions, it will hardly satisfy the candid inquirer after truth to see them start aside from the very point that is to give character to their whole system. We are told by men who reason upon foreknowledge, &c, that “God hath decreed whatsoever comes to pass;” and then we are told that all men are free, and they enter into a great deal of metaphysical speculation about foreknowledge, the nature of voluntary action, &c, to prove these positions; but when they are pressed upon this point, “How can you reconcile with free agency that kind of Divine efficiency necessary to secure the execution of the decrees, and that kind of dependency of moral agents which this efficiency implies?” the reply is, “We cannot tell—the how in the case we cannot explain.” This evasion might be allowable, perhaps, in either of the two following cases: 1. If the apparent discrepancy of the two positions grew out of what ismysterious, and not of what ispalpably contradictory;or, 2. If both propositions were soclearly proved, that it would do greater violence to our reasons, and be a greater outrage upon all acknowledged principles of belief, to disbelieve either of them, than it would to believe them with all their apparent contradictions. With respect to the first alternative, it appears to me, and doubtless it would so appear to all whose prejudices did not mislead the mind, that the want of apparent agreement between the two is not for lack of light in the case, but from the natural incongruity of the things compared. When you say, “God executes his decrees by efficiently controlling the will of man,” and say also, “The mind of man is free,” both these propositions are clear; there is nothing mysterious about them. But you say, perhaps, “The mystery is in the want of light to see theagreementof the two; we cannotseetheir agreement, but we should not therefore infer that they do not agree.” I answer, What is light, in this case, but a clear conception of the propositions? This we have, and we see that they are,in their nature, incompatible; and the more light you can pour upon this subject, the more clearly must this incompatibility appear. If you say that “perhaps neither you nor I fully understand the meaning of these propositions;” then I reply,We have no business to use them. “Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge?” And this is what I have already complained of; men will reason themselves into propositions which they call doctrinal facts, but which seem to the eye of common sense to have all the characteristics of contradictions, and when we urge these contradictions in objection, the objection is not allowed to have any weight, because we do not fully understand the propositions. So then the propositions must be received,though we do not understand them!and though, as far as we do understand them, they are obviously incompatible!! Is this the way to gain knowledge, and to make truth triumphant? How much more consistent to say, Since it is evident the mind is free, and since the doctrine of predestination is apparently incompatible with that freedom, therefore this doctrine should be exploded!
Or will this second alternative be resorted to? Will it be said that both of these propositions are so clearly proved, that to deny them would do greater violence to our reasons, and the principles of belief, than to acknowledge them, notwithstanding their apparent incongruity? Let us examine them. Of one of them we cannot doubt, unless we doubt all primary truths, viz. That the human mind is free. It is presumed, if the question come to this, that they must either give up human liberty or the dogma of predestination, candid Calvinists themselves would not hesitate; they would say, theformermust stand, whatever becomes of thelatter. If I am correct here, it follows that, predestinarians themselves being judges, the doctrine of predestination is not so clear as some other moral truths. But is there any thing clearer than that man ought not to be held accountable for what is unavoidable? that he ought not to be held to answer for volitions that are efficiently controlled by a superior? To me this is as clear as consciousness itself can make it, and I think it must be to mankind in general. If I am correct, then we come to the conclusion at once, that to believe in the compatibility of predestination with human liberty and accountability does more violence to the laws of belief than it would to discard predestination. Whatever, therefore, mayseemto be favourable to this doctrine, should be sacrificed to a stronger claim upon our belief in another direction. But, that the argument may be set in as strong light as possible, let the evidence of predestination be adduced. What is it? It is not consciousness certainly; and it is almost as clear that it is not moral demonstration by a course of reasoning. The most I believe that has ever been said, in the way of moral demonstration, has been in an argument founded on foreknowledge, which argument, it is supposed by the author, is fairly disposed of in the sermon on predestination, by reasoning which has not, to his knowledge, ever been refuted. A refutation has been attempted, I grant, by some of the reviewers of the sermon, but the only apparent success that attended those attempts was, as we have already seen, in consequence of their taking the very ground of the sermon, and building the decrees of God upon a prior view and knowledge of all possible contingencies. If consciousness and reasoning are taken away from this doctrine, it has nothing left to stand upon but testimony. And no testimony but Divine will here be of any authority; and does revelation prove this doctrine? In the sermon on predestination it was stated that “there was not a single passage in the Bible which teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass;” and it is not known to the writer, that among the different reviews of the sermon it has even been attempted to show that the statement was incorrect. But if a solitary passage could have been adduced, should we not have heard of it? The evidence from Scripture then, if there is any, is indirect, and merely by inference. And even this indirect testimony is far from being the best of its kind; so, at least, a great portion of believers in revelation think.
Now, candid reader, if you have carefully followed the chain of thought thus far, let me ask you to pause and propound for yourself, and honestly answer the following question—“Is there so much evidence in favour of predestination, that I should do more violence to my own reason, and the laws of belief, by rejecting it, than I should by believing that this doctrine is compatible with free agency and accountability?” Indeed, Calvinists themselves have so felt the force of these difficulties, when the terms predestination and free will have been understood in their common and obvious sense, that they have attempted a variety of explanations of these terms to do away, if possible, the apparent discrepancy. These attempts have been the principal cause of those changes and modifications in the Calvinistic system, alluded to in a former number. The various explanations and definitions that have been given to foreordination, have already been noticed. We have seen how every effort failed of affording any relief to the system, until we came down to the last; I mean that of the New-Haven divines. This new theory does indeed avoid the difficulty, but avoids it only by giving up the doctrine! Any thing short of this amounts to nothing; it stands forth still the “absolute decree,” fixed as fate, and fixing, strong as fate, all the acts of subordinate intelligences. Anyrealmodification of it is a virtual renunciation, and a substitution in its stead of the public and consistent decree of Heaven, “He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned.”
Not succeeding as was hoped in such a definition of predestination as would harmonize the opposing propositions, repeated trials have been made to define and explainhuman libertyand thepower of choice, so as tobendthese into a coincidence with theinflexible decree. This brings us back to the inquiry started above: “What is this power of choice?” Now as this is a point more metaphysical in its nature than the proposition embracing the decrees, so there is more ground for laboured argument and refined speculation. Only one theory, however, needs to be particularly noticed:—1. Because it is the most plausible of any other, so that if this will not bear the test, it is probable no other will; and 2. Because this is the theory which is now pretty generally, and perhaps almost universally adopted by the Calvinists; I mean the Calvinistic doctrine of motives. It is in substance this: the power of choice is that power which the mind has of acting in view of motives, and of deciding according to the strongest motive. The strength and direction of volition are always in accordance with the motive. And this relation between mind and motives is fixed by the very constitution of our natures, so that it may be said there is a constitutional necessity that the mind should be controlled by motives. These motives are multitudinous and various.—All conceptions and perceptions of the mind, from whatever cause, productive of pleasure or pain, exciting emotions of love or aversion, are motives; or, more properly, perhaps, the causes of these mental states are motives. Between these motives and the mind there is such a connection, that theformernot only excite, but control thelatter, in all its volitions. The nature of this relation is of course beyond the limits of human investigation: all we can say is, such is the nature of motives and of mind. Such is the theory. The arguments by which it is defended are in substance the following—experience and observation. We are conscious, it is said, of acting from motives, and it is universally understood that others also act from motives. It is on this principle that we govern ourselves in our intercourse with men; by this we calculate with moral certainty, in many instances, what will be the conduct of a man in a given case; and, upon such calculations, we form most of our maxims, and rules of conduct in social life: nay, it is said a man that will act without a reason must be insane—that, on this ground, whenever a man acts it is common to inquire whatinducedhim. What motive had he? That even children, at a very early age so readily recognize this principle, that they are constantly inquiring why do you do this or that. Such are the strongest arguments by which this theory is sustained—arguments too strong it is supposed to be overthrown.
I object to the sovereign control of the mind by motives. But in offering my objections, it should first be observed that no man, in his senses, it is presumed, will deny that motives have an important influence in determining our volitions. Nor is it necessary, in order to oppose the doctrine of the controlling power of motives, to deny that the power of volition may have been waked up to action, in the first instance, by motive influence, or that the mind ever after may, in all its volitions, be more or less under this influence. As these are points which do not materially affect the question at issue between us and the Calvinists, they may be left out of the discussion for the present. The question is this—Has the mind a self-determining power, by which it can spontaneously decide, independent of thecontrolof motives, or is the mind absolutely controlled by motives? We maintain the former—our opponents the latter. By establishing our position, we disprove theirs—by disproving theirs we establish ours—and it is believed that theirs can be directly disproved, and ours directly established; at least so far as we can hope to arrive at demonstration on these extremely difficult points.
1. My first objection to this doctrine of motive influence is, that most of the arguments by which it is defended, as directly and certainly prove that the Divine mind is subject to the absolute control of motives as that human minds are. It is argued, that to maintain the doctrine of spontaneous volition, independent of thecontrolof motives, involves the absurdity, that “our volitions are excited without any intelligent reasons whatever, and as the effect, consequently, of nothing better than a mere brute or senseless mechanism.” (Views in Theology, p. 163.)—Now if this has any bearing on the question, it relates not to human mind and human volition merely, but tomind in general, and must apply to the Divine mind. The same may be said, in fact, of most of the arguments that are brought in favour of this doctrine. Calvinists are convinced of this—and hence this also is a part of their creed. It was defended by Dr. Edwards, and is thus avowed by Professor Upham, in his System of Mental Philosophy. Speaking of the control of motives, he says, “Our condition, in this respect, seems to be essentially the same with that of the Supreme Being himself—he isinevitablygoverned in all his doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest and best.” (Vol. ii, p. 381.) Thus the Divine Being is, according to this theory, and by the express showing of the leading advocates of the theory, “inevitably” made a subordinate to a superior. It is believed there is no avoiding this conclusion; and what then? Why then the doctrine makes God a necessary agent, and leads to atheism! It is nearly, if not exactly, the same as the old heathen doctrine of fate. The ancient heathens supposed that Jupiter himself, the omnipotent father of the gods and men, must yield to fate. Modern Christians teach that there is a certain fitness of things, certain constitutional relations, existing independent of the Divine will, which God himself cannot supersede, but to which he must yield. How does this sink, at once, both the natural and moral perfections of God! The exercises of his wisdom and goodness are nothing more than the result of certain fixed and irresistible influences. Fixed not by God himself, for that would be to give up the doctrine; for in that case, in the order of cause and effect, the Divine mind must have acted without control of motive, if this law of motive influence did not exist until the Divine volition willed it into being and if he could once act independent of this control, he might so act for ever; and the argument built on the absurdity of volition, without an intelligent reason, is contradicted. But if that argument has any weight, it fixes, in the order of cause and effect, a paramount influence eternally antecedent to the exercise of the Divine mind, and controlling that mind with irresistible sway. This is fate! This is atheism! Once set up an influence that controls the Divine mind, call that influence what you will,fitness of things—fate—energyof nature—or necessary relation, and that moment you make God a subordinate; you hurl him from his throne of sovereignty, and make him the instrument of a superior. Of what use is such a Deity? Might we not as well have none! Nay better, as it seems to me, if under the control of his own native influence he is led to create beings susceptible of suffering, and fix the relations of those beings to the motives around them such, that by a law of their nature they are “inevitably” led to sin and endless wo! Is it to be wondered at, that many Calvinists have become infidels? This doctrine of motives is the very essence of the system of Spinoza, whose deity was theenergy of nature!The supreme controlling power of Dr. Edwards and his followers is theenergy of motives, which exists in the nature of things, anterior to the will of God. Can any one point out any essential difference between the two systems?
Such are the objections toany argumentsin favour of the doctrine that motives “inevitably” control the volitions of intelligent beingsin general, involving of course the highest intelligence. But if any are disposed to give up this doctrine, as essential to intelligent volition in general, and choose to maintain it only in respect to the volitions of some particular intelligent beings; then they must give up all the strongest of their arguments. If God is free from thiscontrol, they must acknowledge also, or give some reason for their dissent, that he may, if he chooses, make and sustain subordinate intelligences, having the same freedom from this control; and if they acknowledge that there is nothing in the nature of the case that renders this an impossibility, then they must show, if they can, that though Godmightconstitute beings otherwise, he hasso constituted manas to render him incapable of choice, exceptwhenandasmotives direct, by an inevitable influence. But in attempting this they must meet other difficulties in their course, which, it is believed, will greatly embarrass the system. These difficulties, however, together with the arguments which I design to advance directly in favour of the opposite view, must be reserved for another number.