CHAPTER XIII.
Possible Dangers—The Future Danger—Open to Attack—Canals and Railways—Probable Lines of Invasion—Lines of Attack and Defence—London—Toronto—Defences of Kingston—Defences of Quebec.
Possible Dangers—The Future Danger—Open to Attack—Canals and Railways—Probable Lines of Invasion—Lines of Attack and Defence—London—Toronto—Defences of Kingston—Defences of Quebec.
The return of able-bodied males fit for military service in Montcalm’s time, exceeded the whole number of volunteers now actually enrolled; but the present force is possessed of seven field batteries, of several squadrons of cavalry, and of 15,000 men armed with rifled muskets. There must be at this moment in Canada at least 50,000 rifles of the best kind. There were four 18-pound batteries, two 20-pound Armstrong batteries, a large number of howitzers, and an immense accumulation of stores last year, which have received constant accessions ever since, as the threats of the New York press have produced to us in increased expense some of the evil results of war. There are also in the stores great quantities of old-fashioned brass and iron field and siege guns, of shot and shell, of mortars, and of ammunition.
The Americans can find no fault with us for taking steps, in view of contingencies which they havethreatened, to obviate, as far as possible, the disadvantages to which distance from the mother country exposes the Provinces. It was enough that before the days of steam, which has greatly increased the disparity between us, Great Britain submitted to conditions in regard to the Lakes which could only be justified by the supposition that Canada was the western shore of Great Britain. By the articles of the Treaty of 1817, the United States of America and Great Britain are limited to one vessel with one 18-pounder and a crew of one hundred men each on Lake Ontario, Lake Champlain, and the upper lakes. No other vessels of war are to be built or armed, and six months’ notice is required to terminate the treaty obligations.
It will have been observed that the Americans of the Northern States are spoken of as the only enemies whom Canada has to fear. They are the only people who threaten from time to time the conquest and annexation of the Provinces, and who have declared by the mouths of their statesmen, that they intend to insist, when they are strong enough, on the fulfilment of the doctrine that the whole continent is theirs; for the natural basis of the Monroe dogma is, the right of the Americans to lay down the doctrine at all, and if they can say to the nations of Europe, “You shall make no further settlements on this soil,” they can say, when it pleases them, with just as much right, “You who are now occupying this soil must either leave it or own allegiance to the Union.” The Union is now, what it never was before, a sovereignty, and Americans in its name fancy that they can do what they please. The Canadians are by no means well-disposed towards theirneighbours’ institutions, manners, and customs, and do not desire to be incorporated with them. The annexation must, therefore, be effected by force, sufficiently great to overpower the resistance of the inhabitants, whether singly, or supported by the British army and navy.
It fortunately happens that the freedom of speech and writing prevalent in the United States are safety-valves for the popular steam, and that words are not always indicative of immediate or even of remote action. It would be difficult to estimate the nature of the influences which shall prevail when the American civil war is over. If the North succeeds in overcoming the South, no great danger of war with Great Britain or of invasion of Canada will exist. It will need every man of the Federal army to occupy the Southern States. If, on the other hand, the North should be obliged to abandon her project of forcing the carcase of the South back into the Union by the sword, she will suddenly find herself with a large army on her hands, with a ruined exchequer, and an immense fund of mortified ambition and angry passion to discount.
It is possible that the sober and just-minded men who form a large part of American society may be able to avert a conflict, if the American soldiery and statesmen entertain the views attributed to them; but that is just the point on which no information exists. It is not easy to ascertain the actual weight of the classes who would naturally oppose the press and the populace in a crusade against Great Britain. My own experience, limited and imperfect as it is, leads me to think that there is in the States a very great number, if not an actualmajority, of people whose views are not much influenced by violent journals or intemperate politicians, who rarely take part in public affairs, but exercise, nevertheless, their influence on those who do. There is not a community in the Northern States which does not contain a large proportion of educated, intelligent, and upright men, who shrink from participation in party struggles and intrigue; and I regret that they are not more largely known. Their existence is marked by no outward sign which foreign nations can recognise. It is on them, however, that the safety and reputation of the Federal Government depends; it will be on them that their country’s reliance must be placed when the legions return home.
If the war were over in 1865 there would probably be 600,000 men under arms, and there would be at least 200,000 more men in the States who had served, and would take up arms against England with alacrity. A considerable proportion of that army would indeed seek their discharge, and go quietly back to their avocations; but the Irish, Germans, &c., to whom the license of war was agreeable, would not be unwilling to invade Canada, anda percentageof Americans would doubtless eagerly seek for an opportunity of gaining against a foreign enemy the laurels they had not found whilst contending with their fellow countrymen. Commerce indeed would suffer—the Americans would find for the first time what it was to enter upon a quarrel single-handed with the British nation. They have hitherto met only the side blows and stray shots of the old mother country—and they believe they have encountered the full weight of her arm, and the utmost extent of her energies. Thewicked men who are striving to engage the two States in a quarrel which would cover the seas of the world with blood and wreck, cannot be deterred from their horrible work by any appeals to fear or conscience; but the influence of the past, and of the Christian and civilised people of the ex-United States will, it is to be hoped, defeat their efforts, seconded though they may be by the prejudice, religious animosity, and national dislike of a portion of the people. If the war party prevail they will have no want of pretexts—the San Juan question alone would suffice them if they had not a whole series of imaginary wrongs to resent arising from the incidents of the present war, and a multitude of claims to prefer to which England can never listen.
At some day, near or remote, Canada must become either independent in whole or in part, or a portion of a foreign state. It will be of no small moment for those then living in Great Britain whether they have alienated the affections or have won the hearts of the newly-created power. Those who doubt this may consider how a Gaul now rules over the ruler of Rome, and how all that remains of an evidence of the occupancy of this Island by the masters of the world for four hundred years, are tumuli, ruined walls, stratified roads, and bits of tile and pottery. The climate of Canada is not more severe than that of Russia—her natural advantages are much greater—her inland seas are never frozen—her communications with Europe are easy—she offers a route to all the world from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The United States will be no longer a country for the poor man to live in; the load of taxation will force emigration to Canada, and the Stateslying on the left banks of the lakes and of the St. Lawrence will be enriched by the demands of America for her produce, in proportion as the waste lands are occupied, and the Union is filled with a tax-paying swarming population. It is astonishing how soon a man liberates himself from the traditions and allegiance of his native country in the land of his adoption, when his interests and his pride are touched. The attitude of our immediate colonies in face of the transportation question will at once satisfy us that the mother country has little to expect from old associations, whenever her interests are made to appear antagonistic to those of her colonies. Canada has the most liberal institutions in the world—her municipal freedom is without parallel—education is widely disseminated—religious toleration restrains the violence of factions. The cold is by no means as great as that which is borne by the inhabitants of the greater part of northern Europe, and is far less dangerous to health than the more temperate climates of lower latitudes, where rain and tempest are substituted for snow and hard frosts.
The frontier of Canada is assailable at all points. In some places it is constituted by a line only visible on a map, in others it is a navigable inland sea, in others a line drawn in water, in others the bank of a river or the shore of a lake. Coincident with it runs the frontier of the United States.
The best guarantee against invasion would be, complete naval supremacy on the lakes and rivers, because they constitute the most accessible roads for the invaders, and the most serviceable barriers for defenders if they have the proper means of defence. To give any chance of successful resistance, some equality of naval forceon the part of the invaded is almost indispensable. The question arises, who shall provide this naval force? Canada cannot. She is prevented by Imperial treaties, by want of means, and even if she had them, she is forbidden to use the means, by the principle which forbids a dependency equipping ships of war in times of peace. Great Britain has no doubt a powerful fleet, but the far inferior navy of the United States, close at hand, contains more vessels suitable for warlike operations in inland waters and canals than we possess, 4000 miles away. In fact we ought to have a very great preponderance of small vessels to give us a fair start, and even then it would be difficult to begin hostilities on equal terms. Lake Michigan, with the enormous resources of Chicago, is entirely American, and the possession of such a base is an advantage which is by no means counterbalanced by our position on Lake Huron. To prevent the enemy clearing all before them on the lakes, by an energetic naval sortie from their ports, it would be necessary to have the means of furnishing a flotilla as soon as hostilities became imminent, and to watch every point, particularly such as that of Sorel, where communication from Richelieu to the St. Lawrence might be interrupted. But it is thought we cannot hope to cope with the Americans on equal terms in all the lakes, and that we must be content with concentrating our strength on Lake Ontario and in the St. Lawrence. All our water-ways are very much exposed. Whilst Great Britain retains her supremacy, the St. Lawrence is open during the summer, and can be kept free by iron-plated vessels as far up as Montreal. The day of wooden gunboats has passed, and it becomes requisite for the Government totake immediate steps to secure an adequate supply of armoured vessels on the spot as soon as hostilities become probable. It is gratifying to know that the Canadian Legislature is about to fortify the harbour and arsenal at Kingston, so as to cover the infant naval force. Under any circumstances, it is not possible to defend a canal by guarding the locks, or by placing forts at particular places, and yet the canals are of vital importance to us. The Beauharnais Canal runs on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, and is peculiarly unfortunate in its military position. The Welland Canal is of consequence, but it would be better to destroy it than permit an enemy to hold it. The Rideau Canal, which runs from Lake Huron to Kingston, is a very valuable communication, but it needs to be deepened and enlarged at the Rapids. All the canals require to be enlarged and improved, but they are far better placed, bad as their state and position are, than the roads and railways. The Grand Trunk Railway is open to attack for many miles at different parts of its course, and in some places trains could be fired upon from American territory! Our reinforcements last winter were sent through New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, in sleighs, along a route which for miles could be cut across at any time by the enemy from Maine, and it would be necessary, to make all safe, for us to follow the Metapodliac road, or to construct the intercolonial railway.
The harbours of Halifax and of St. John’s are not closed in winter, and the mode which was adopted of sending troops into Canada by those points would no doubt be reverted to till some better means shall be provided. From St. Andrew’s, in New Brunswick,there is a railroad to Woodstock, which lies near the state boundary of Maine. Here the route from St. John’s meets the St. Andrew road, and united the line follows the course of the St. John River, and may be divided into four days’ marches—to Florenceville, 1; to Tobique, 2; to Grand Falls, 3; to Little Falls, 4. All this route lies close to the American frontier, and is therefore quite unfit for the march of troops in detachments. The St. John’s route also takes four days to Woodstock. Even with the advantages afforded by the line of railroad, it must be remembered that the snows of winter may often mar all combinations;—our first detachments suffered considerably from cold in the railway carriages, and it may be readily conceived that the course of an army in sleighs to Rivière du Loup on the St. Lawrence, where the Grand Trunk Railway begins or terminates, might be rendered very unsafe by no more formidable agencies than violent snow-storms alone.
Our military authorities do not, it is said, fear a winter campaign, but the Americans have already shown that they are not to be deterred by frost and snow from moving troops into Canada. To ensure moderate security the Metis road, notwithstanding its greater length, should be improved and adapted for military purposes, and the railway should be constructed to complete the work. In considering the three modes of invasion of which I shall speak, it may be inferred that Montreal will be the most likely point of attack, and that Quebec will be comparatively safe at first, but it would not be wise to act on the hypothesis as if it were an absolute certainty.
In the State of New York, at its capital of Albany,the Americans possess an admirable base of operations against us. Except in winter, the Hudson is an open highway between Albany and New York, and the sea and railways connect it with the shores of the lakes and with the vast centres of American resource and industry. Albany is specially capable of serving as a base against the very places most likely to be assailed, Montreal and Quebec. There is no necessity for any argument to show that the loss of these places would be equivalent to the overthrow of the British in Canada. From the Hudson there is a canal to Lake Champlain, on the upper extremity of which, and almost on the railroad connecting Montreal with New York, is situated a casemated work popularly known as Rouse’s Point, about two days’ march from the commercial capital of Canada. Rouse’s Point would serve as an immediate base for the collection of supplies and the concentration of an army, whilst Albany would become the great dépôt for the war. It is probable that the Americans would try to strike several blows at once. They might direct one expeditionary force from Rouse’s Point against Montreal, and others from Albany and Rouse’s Point against Quebec. They might also menace, or actually attack, the frontier at Detroit or at Niagara. As a war with Great Britain would be popular, and no lack of men would be found, it would also be practicable for them to direct from either of those points an expedition to attack Ottawa, or the towns west of the river Ottawa.
Kingston would also be a point of attack, as much from its importance to us as from its value to the enemy, who would, by the possession of it, command the Rideau Canal, which connects the river Ottawa with Lake Ontario. It is plain that if the points liable toattack were left in their present state, there would be little hope of our ability to defend them by fighting in the open field. United, the Americans are to the Canadians as about eight to one. The State of New York alone is as populous, and is richer, than the Canadas. Great Britain, thousands of miles away, could not hope, by any expenditure of money, or by any display of military skill, to equalise the conditions of the assailants and the defenders of her sovereignty. The engineers are right, therefore, in the argument, that the only way of enabling the Canadians and their British allies to make way against the Republicans, is to establish fortified works supported by or supporting a naval force. The Americans have an idea that it is possible to carry on operations during winter. Our engineers start with the assumption that it is impossible to do so on any large scale, and that it is out of the question for some five months of the year in Canada. The obstructions to siege operations might not be so serious, but they would be so considerable as to render the undertaking of them exceedingly hazardous, and little likely to succeed. The question, then, presents itself whether Canada can be defended for the time in each year during which operations are practicable, and if so, in what manner the defence is to be conducted. Our military authorities are of opinion that Canada can be defended. The Americans, as far as I could judge from their remarks on the subject, and from conversations with several of their officers, conceive that Canada lies at their mercy whenever they choose to attack it. As a chain of great frontier fortresses could not be established or maintained, the means suggested for the purposes of defence are principally of a provisionalcharacter. To meet the flood of invasion, it is proposed to cover the approaches to the vulnerable points. Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec would be defended by forces posted in earthworks, and covered by entrenched camps at Prescott and Richmond, and other suitable places.
If we examine the modes of proceeding to which the enemy would probably resort, we shall find them classified under five heads. First, a naval descent on Goderich. Second, the descent of a force between Detroit and London. Thirdly, the descent of a force on Niagara. Fourthly, the passage of a force between the St. Lawrence and Ogdensburg. Fifthly, an attack by several columns converging in concert on a point between Derby and Huntingdon, with a view of concentrating on Montreal, and cutting the communications with Kingston as well as with Quebec. Let us take a glance at the present state of the principal points, and consider what is needed to improve their condition.
If we look at the map of Upper Canada, the position of Paris at once attracts the eye as a favourable site for the main body of the defensive force; whilst Stratford and London, being points of railway junction, would naturally be held as long as possible. Guelph would serve as a point of concentration for troops obliged to fall back from London or from Stratford, according to the direction from which the enemy came. Toronto would become the natural point of concentration for troops obliged to retire from Guelph, and under the conditions necessitating such a retreat the force defending the Niagara frontier would be obliged to fall back upon Hamilton to the entrenched position covering thattown. If the Americans attack the western settlements near Georgian Bay, it seems impossible to oppose them with assured advantage. A calm consideration of the subject has led the best authorities to the conclusion that we cannot hope at present to establish a naval force on either Lake Huron or Lake Erie. The Welland Canal is, in its present state, unsuited to the purposes of modern naval warfare, and a canal is at all times, and under the most favourable circumstances, very little to be depended upon. With the aid of fortified harbours there is, however, no reason to fear for our naval supremacy on Lake Ontario, and it is to that object our best efforts should be directed. It would of course be impolitic to leave Toronto and Hamilton open to naval demonstrations, but the principal efforts of the authorities should be directed to establish permanent works to protect Ottawa, Montreal, Kingston, and Quebec, and to prepare positions for entrenched camps and earthworks on the points most likely to be assailed.
It is plain that a navy alone can prevent descents on the land line of such extensive waters, and that the possession of Rouse’s Point enables the Americans to turn the line of the Richelieu and threaten Montreal. Let us run rapidly over the positions, beginning with the west. If works were thrown up at Goderich and Sydenham on points there which are suitable for defensive positions, it might be possible to check any adventurous force intent on speedy victory and conquest; but no fortifications could be maintained on those remote points for permanent occupation, as the enemy could operate on the flanks and rear and turn them from Huron or Georgian Bay.
A permanent work on Point Edward Sarnia, to command the St. Clair River, has been suggested, and it has been recommended that the defences of Fort Maldon and Bar Island should be made permanent works, but other engineers have considered it unwise to erect fortifications at Sarnia or Amherstburg, and contend that the Niagara and Detroit frontiers are too much exposed to be tenable by any works. Guelph should also be rendered worthy of its important position. London, being a railway station, is, in event of a war, an important point to hold for the carriage of troops; and although there is no ground close at hand admitting of tenacious grip, there is a tolerably good line of defence at Konoska, which the spade could convert into a fair position.
When we come to consider the condition of the Toronto district it becomes apparent that two points require especial attention—Fort Dalhousie and Port Colborne. It is unwise to leave these places without defences to cover the garrisons, and to enable them to protect the shore against desultory operations and isolated detachments. Domville and Maitland are open to predatory attacks which might be prevented by ordinary fortifications or earthworks on eligible sites. It is impossible to defend a canal; but much good might be done by enlisting the employés on the Welland as a sort of guard, whose local knowledge would be available in time of danger. Although, as I have said, strong reasons are urged against any outlay for the defence of the Niagara frontier, on the ground of its exposure, there are distinguished authorities who insist that a permanent work is required at Fort Erie; and who contend that another fort should be erected atNiagara, in support of an entrenched camp, which would exercise a most powerful influence over the movements of an invading force, particularly if there were gunboats placed on the Chippewa. One of the painful necessities of war between the United States and Great Britain would be the destruction of the suspension bridges over the river. Hamilton is generally considered as incapable of defence, but it lies in a district which presents two lines of hills capable of being adapted to defensive purposes, and earthworks there might be stiffly held, in case of attack, by the troops of the district, to enable the forces to concentrate and retire along routes previously determined. Toronto itself may be regarded as an open place equally incapable of defence by ordinary works; but it should not be left open to such acoupby a single cruiser, as might be obviated by the erection of a fort on the site of the new barracks: and it would be necessary to construct a strong entrenched camp to cover it and protect the troops retiring before the enemy. A chain of earthworks might be placed on the elevated ridges which run from the Don River towards Humber Bay. A casemated fort on the island is also most desirable. Toronto has something more than its mere strategical importance to recommend it. It has special claims to consideration as an important centre of civilised life, commerce, enterprise, and learning.
The defences of Kingston are more worthy of its ancient importance. In fact, the only works in Canada suited to modern warfare are those at Kingston and Quebec. The latter are capable of much improvement, as has been already pointed out. Both need to be strengthened, and to be extended. If theAmericans have beaten us by treaty, why should we not at all events have iron-plated vessels sent up the St. Lawrence as far as treaty will allow them to go, and prepare naval establishments and encourage naval volunteers for times of danger at Kingston? Port Henry, Fort Frederick, an earthen work, and the Market Battery, are in good condition, but much must be done before the place can be regarded as being in a satisfactory state. The Shoal Tower, the Cedar Island Tower, and the Murney Tower, constructed of stone, are placed on points covering the water approaches to Kingston. But all the guns in these works, with one exception, areen barbette, and to render Kingston safe it would be necessary to erect strong works to resist the advance of an enemy landing either above or below the town. It is estimated that £390,000 would be sufficient for the purpose of erecting the permanent forts absolutely indispensable for the safety of the harbour and dockyard establishment. The position of these works should be chosen with a due regard to all possible conditions of attack. Wolfe Island, Abraham’s Head, Snake Island, Simcoe Island, and Garden Island, should be provided with adequate forts to support the new scheme of defence. The Navy Yard should be removed, and the points now open to attack at once fortified. Belleville and Prescott both afford admirable ground for works of great importance: the former possesses a most advantageous site for temporary works and for a line of defence; and the latter has such a commanding situation that a permanent work, with casemates, should be constructed there to guard what is, according to some of our engineers, one of the most valuable positions in the province.
When we come to consider the actual state of Montreal, its importance, its liability to attack and the difficulty of offering an adequate defence, the best means to adopt are not very obvious. The best method of defence would doubtless be to construct an entrenched position, consisting of a parapet strengthened by redoubts, to cover the approach from the south side. Atête de pontshould be built to cover the approaches now so open and exposed to attack.
The enlargement of the Ottawa and Rideau canals is of obvious importance, and outlying works might be traced which could be used in case of invasion to hold the enemy in check; but still, as a precautionary measure, it would be desirable to remove the more important stores at Montreal to Quebec and Ottawa, if it is in contemplation to make this valuable position subsidiary to any other place in Canada.
Permanent works might be erected at St. John’s, the Isle aux Noix and St. Helen’s Island, where forts should be reconstructed on improved principles. But the most obvious measure, in the opinion of some engineers, the fortification of the hill over the city, and the erection of a Citadel upon it, which would render the mere occupation of the town below valueless to an enemy, is not approved of by more recent authorities.
Gunboats on Lake St. Louis would prove most valuable in defending the works at Vaudrueuil.
Quebec is however the key of Canada; and that key can be wrested from our own grasp at any moment by a determined enemy, unless the recommendations so strongly urged from time to time by all military authorities meet with consideration. The old enceinteshould be removed, and the French works restored, according to the suggestions of scientific officers, and of the ablest engineers we possess. An entrenched camp might be marked out to the west of the Citadel, with a line of parapet and redoubts extending from the St. Lawrence to the St. Charles river. In order to cover the city from an attack on the south side, it would be necessary to occupy Point Levi, and to construct a strong entrenched line, with redoubts at such a distance as would prevent the enemy from coming near the river to shell the city and citadel. But it is evident that they arenil ad rem, unless behind these works, and in support of them in the open, can be assembled a force of sufficient strength to prevent an investment, or to attack the investing armies, and at the same time to hold front against them in the field. It is estimated that 150,000 men might hold the whole of the Canadas, East and West, against twice that number of the enemy. If we are to judge by what has passed, it is not probable the United States will be inclined or able for such an effort. Quebec might be held with 10,000 men against all comers. From 25,000 to 30,000 men would make Montreal safe. Kingston would require 20,000 men, and Ottawa would need 5000. The greater part, if not all of them, might be composed of militia, and volunteers trained to gunnery and the use of small arms. For the protection of the open country, and to meet the enemy in the field, an army of from 25,000 to 35,000 men would be needed from Lake Ontario to Quebec. The western district on Lake Erie could not be protected by less than 60,000 men.
Thus, in case of a great invasion from the UnitedStates, Canada, with any assistance Great Britain could afford her, must have 150,000 men ready for action. What prospect there is of this, may best be learned from a consideration, not so much of the resources of Canada, as of the willingness of the people to use them.