CHAPTER XVI.

The “Ashburton Capitulation”—Boundaries of Quebec—Arbitration in 1831—Lord Ashburton’s Mission—The Questions in Dispute—“The Sea”v.“The Atlantic”—American Diplomatists—Franklin’s Red Line—Compromise—The Maps—Maine—Damage to Canada—Mr. Webster’s Defence—His Opinion of the Road—Value of the Heights—Our Share of Equivalents—Value of Rouse’s Point—Vermont—New Hampshire.

It was by the celebrated Treaty of Washington, August 9th, 1842, that the boundary line between the British possessions in Canada and the State of Maine in the territories of the United States, was settled and determined. That treaty has been sometimes spoken of as the “Ashburton Capitulation.” The story of the two maps which played so distinguished a part in the negotiations, is tolerably well known, and has formed a subject of many discussions which have now settled down into fixed convictions. By many, if not by most Americans, acquainted with the subject, it is believed that Mr. Webster did a very smart thing. Englishmen, similarly instructed, believe their country to have been cheated by the great American elocutionist. Canadians are of opinion that they have suffered an irreparable injury at the hands of, or through the weakness of, those appointed to guard their interests by the Imperial Government. The Treaty of Paris, in 1783, did not define the north-eastern boundary of the United States; it merely declared that the boundary wasdrawn along the highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean. If we had had at that time the knowledge of geography and geology, with respect to the basin of the St. Lawrence, which, thanks to the labours of the United States’ engineers and of Sir William Logan, we now possess, there would not have been much difficulty in fixing on the real line, as there could not well be any dispute respecting the exact line of highlands from which the rivers flowing into the St. Lawrence came, and from the other side of which the water-shed was towards the Atlantic Ocean. Tons of pamphlets, years of controversy, and thousands of pounds might have been spared, not to speak of much national animosity.

It may be remarked here, that the difficulty of reconciling States’ rights with Imperial Federal policy was fore-shadowed in the original disputes which took place at the time of the treaty adjustment. The Treaty speaks of the “boundaries between the possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America and the territories of the United States;” but the State of Maine in its vehement protest against the line of the King of the Netherlands, assumed the language and the port of an independent Power. Mr. Thomas Colley Grattan, in his work, “Civilised America,” has collected an immense amount of information, and has drawn up an argument on the subject, which prove beyond a doubt, even without collateral aid, that the line yielded by Lord Ashburton was not that which was meant by the framers of the Treaty of 1783. Let us consider how the case stood.

In 1763 the French possessions in North Americawere ceded to Great Britain, and in the October of that year a royal proclamation defined the boundaries of the government of Quebec, “bounded on the Labrador coast by the river St. John, which falls into the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and from there by a line drawn from the head of that river through the Lake of St. John to the south end of the Lake Nipissing, from whence the said line, crossing the river St. Lawrence and Lake Champlain in 45 degrees of north latitude, passes along the highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the said river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the sea, and also along the north coast of the Bay of Chaleurs and the coast of the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Cape Rosière, and from thence crossing the mouth of the river St. Lawrence by the west end of the island of Anticosti, terminates in the aforesaid Lake of St. John.” It is fortunate enough that we have no neighbours to raise any question about “the line drawn through the Lake of St. John to the south end of the Lake Nipissing.”

Previous to the Treaty of Independence only one Act was passed bearing upon the southern boundary of Canada. The Quebec Act of 1774 draws its boundaries between the province of Quebec and the colonies of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts, in words nearly the same as those of the Proclamation of 1763. When the State of Massachusetts and the State of Maine were acknowledged to be “free, sovereign, and independent,” by the Treaty of 1783, the contracting parties appeared to have defined the boundary-line with tolerable exactitude. They wished to prevent disputes between the United States andthe colonies, and therefore the boundaries were constituted “from the north-west angle of Nova Scotia,—viz., that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix river to the highlands, along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean,—to the north-westernmost head of Connecticut river east, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid highlands which divide the rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the river St. Lawrence, comprehending all highlands within twenty leagues of any harbour of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, except such highlands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia.”

The north-west angle of Nova Scotia thus becomes a point of consequence—upon the determination of it rests the true line. The British maintain that the angle is contained at the point “where the line due north from the river St. Croix touches the highlands at a point about 100 miles south of the point claimed by the United States.” The Americans argue that the north-west angle was “considerably nearer to the St. Lawrence, at a spot 145 miles north of the source of the St. Croix.” In 1794 Commissioners were appointed to determine “where a line drawn due northfrom the St. Croix would intersect a line of highlands corresponding with those mentioned in the Treaty of 1783.” The umpire called in by the Commissioners fixed on the most northern point of the river as the place from which the line to the highlands was to be drawn, and the result was that the line so drawn did not strike the highlands which we held to be those meant by the treaty, but passing them at a distance of twenty miles on the west, came to an isolated mountain called Mars Hill, from which the Americans desired to prolong it northwards beyond the river St. John to the highlands above the sourceof the Restigouche; but the British Commissioners insisted that the line should not proceed further north, and that the highlands which ran west from near that point to the head of the Connecticut river should form the next boundary-line.

Events of greater importance for a time prevented any attempt to adjust a question, which promised, however, no slight difficulty in time to come. Then war broke out between the United States and Great Britain; but the Peace of 1814 rendered it necessary to renew the attempt to define the boundaries of the two States. The Commissioners appointed by the Treaty of Ghent were not more fortunate than their predecessors; and it was thirteen years after the signing of that treaty before the Governments of the two countries arranged a convention, to carry out the provision made by an article in the Treaty for the appointment of a referee in case of disagreement. The King of the Netherlands, who accepted the office of arbiter in 1831, delivered his award, which, taking the line drawn north from the St. Croix to Mars Hill, passed beyond it tothe river St. John, whence it took the course of the river westward, inside the line claimed by the United States to the head of the Connecticut River. This compromise was identical with the actual line established by the Treaty of 1842, except on the western side, where the line fixed by the King and that claimed by the United States are the same. The King’s line approximates much more closely to the United States’ line than it does to that which we claim: however, the Americans refused to accept it, on the grounds that the King had no right to go beyond the matter referred to him of determining which of the two lines was right, and that he had exceeded his province in proposing a line which had not been referred to him by either of the parties.

Eleven years passed in unavailing endeavours to adjust a question which rose into the highest rank of diplomatic difficulties. Lord Ashburton, the head of the commercial house of Baring, whose relations with American commerce were supposed to be likely to recommend him to American statesmen, was dispatched in 1842 to determine the boundary, in concert with Mr. Webster. These gentlemen were assisted by seven Commissioners from Maine and Massachusetts. The author of a pamphlet of very great ability, quoted by Mr. Grattan, arrived at the conclusion that the line designated in the Proclamation of 1763, is identical with that claimed by the United States, and that the line indicated in the treaty of 1783 is almost the same as that claimed by Great Britain. He argued that it was clearly intended to create a new boundary, because Mr. Townsend said so, and Lord North repeated the statement in Parliament. He maintained that the variations in the wording of the treaty fromthat of the proclamation, were specially introduced to show that a new boundary was intended, and that if it had not been so, the description in the treaty would have been the same as it was in the proclamation; and he then proceeded further to contend, with greater force of reasoning, that the proclamation boundary, although it might have adequately defined the limits of a province, would have been obviously unsuitable as between two independent nations, because it would cut off communication between two portions of the territory of one of the Powers, and give it to another independent State. He further asserted, that all negotiations and projects for peace on the part of the United States were based on the supposition that England would demand a new line, and that Congress never contemplated an adherence to the Proclamation of 1763. All the reasoning of the pamphleteer in support of these propositions is distinguished by acuteness, and inclines the mind to accept them with confidence; and he is not less happy in his argument that the Madawaska river is distinct from the river St. John—that it is a tributary, not a branch, of that stream.

The question as to the range of highlands meant by the treaties can only be settled by analytical reasoning, which, in relation to matters of fact of the kind under dispute, is satisfactory only to those who direct their own course of argument. There are two ranges of highlands dividing the rivers which flow into the St. Lawrence and those which empty themselves into the Atlantic; the first, running from the sources of the Connecticut towards the Bay of Chaleurs, certainly separates rivers emptying into the St. Lawrence from those emptying into the sea; but the second linestarting from the same mountainous germ at the sources of the Connecticut, branching off from the first range at a point about eighty miles from its commencement, takes a southern course towards the head of the St. Croix, and divides the rivers which empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which flow into the Atlantic Ocean. It is contended on one side, with much force of reasoning and probability, that the highlands specified in the Treaty of 1783 are those of the southern range. It was necessary of course to fix upon some great natural features in a district vast in extent and unknown to all but the Red men and the hunter. Rivers and the summit level between two great watersheds would be obviously selected. It was the object of England to secure free communication between all parts of her American territory, and, of course, between Canada and Nova Scotia. The Americans proposed the line of the St. John, which was at once rejected. That being the case, it is difficult to conceive how they could go back and propose, as a line more likely to meet the views of England, the highlands of the northern range close to the St. Lawrence, which would throw the greatest difficulties in the way of the communication which it was a vital point for England to secure. It will have been observed that the words “the Sea” and the “Atlantic Ocean” are used in the treaties, and it certainly is not easy to comprehend how the Americans can maintain that these terms have an identical meaning, if the description of the maps which they had before them at the time is correct. The Connecticut, the Penobscot, and the Kennebeck, can be considered as flowing into the Atlantic Ocean from one range of highlandsonly, and it is equally plain that the other, or northern, range was that which was meant as the highlands from which rivers flowed into the “sea.”

It has been urged, ingeniously and truly, that the words “The Sea,” give a larger range of boundary than the words “The Atlantic;” and that therefore the boundary which depended on a reference to the Atlantic, was intended to have a smaller extent than that which was made to depend upon the Sea. The Atlantic was certainly substituted for the Sea, not only in the treaty, but in the Commissions of the Governors of Quebec, showing an alteration of the boundary of their jurisdiction, whilst no change was made in the Commissions of the Governors of New Brunswick, because the boundary of their province depended upon that of Quebec. The highlands separating rivers that empty into the Atlantic Ocean, are by no means identical with the highlands separating the rivers that empty into the Sea. The Americans have urged that the northern range divides the rivers of the St. Lawrence from the Atlantic rivers, but it certainly does not separate the Penobscot branches north and east which flow into the Atlantic from the southern range; and the term “The rivers,” of course means all the rivers, because, otherwise, such a considerable stream as the Penobscot would have been excepted specially. The southern range separated all the rivers which flow into the Atlantic, from all the rivers which flow into the St. Lawrence.

Had the Commissioners drawn the due north line from the western branch of the St. Croix, which formed the ancient boundary of Nova Scotia, instead of from the northern branch, the whole of the complicated and vexatious questions might have been evaded, andthe claim urged by the United States might never have been heard. It was the doctrine of State rights alone which justified the rejection of the Netherlands compromise. The tract in dispute was indeed but seven million acres of river, mountain, and forest, but the northern boundary of this tract overlooked the course of the St. Lawrence, and carried American territory within a day’s march of its stream, whilst the direct roads and communications between the Provinces east and west, would be placed inside American territory. To the Maine lumberers, however, this tract was not uninviting, and it became a debateable land, in which British colonists from New Brunswick, and American squatters, carried on a series of inroads and forcible settlements, which were fortunately unattended by actual bloodshed. Lord Palmerston, who in 1835 notified the refusal of the British Government to accept the Netherlands compromise, appointed Commissioners in 1839 to inquire into the state of the question upon the spot, and their report, which was handed to the United States Government in 1840, in the most absolute terms laid it down that the southern range was that intended by the treaty of 1783. Mr. Grattan, who was by no means unduly disposed to favour American pretensions, describes with terse propriety the disputes which now arose. “All on our side,” he says, “was supercilious pride; on that of the United States, aggressive coarseness.”

To Sir Robert Peel is due the praise of having taken a decided step to settle the north-eastern boundary. Lord Ashburton, received with considerable enthusiasm in the United States, was at once accepted by President Tyler, and for the better adjustment of the difficulty,it was arranged that he should be met by Mr. Webster in a spirit of perfect candour; that memoranda and despatches were to be dispensed with, and that every honest, straightforward exertion should be made on both sides to come to a satisfactory settlement of the vexed question. Lord Ashburton had, however, to encounter not only the Secretary of State, but the Commissioners of Maine and Massachusetts, among whom were Mr. Abbott Lawrence and Mr. Preble.

Mr. Grattan, who was actually invited to assist at the negotiations by the American Commissioners, and went to Washington asamicus curiæ, gives a most minute and interesting account of the whole of the proceedings, and states positively that Mr. Webster sent a confidential agent to the Commissioners, proposing a line far south of the St. John’s River, before they had got further than New York, which gave great offence to Mr. Preble, by whose influence it was rejected. His pertinacity and the pomposity of Lawrence, with which we are well acquainted in England, were obstacles in the way of a calm discussion of adverse claims, but the other Commissioners are described as exceedingly forbearing, unassuming, and well-behaved.

At first Lord Ashburton seemed to make way with Mr. Webster, and to be on the point of obtaining a more favourable line than that proposed by the Netherlands compromise, but the British Commissioner had no special proof or absolute document to show that the highlands south of St. John indicated the boundary meant by the treaty of 1783. It was known that Dr. Franklin sent from Paris to Washington, at the time ofmaking the treaty, a map on which was drawn a red ink line to show the boundary to Mr. Jefferson.

It is strange enough that, in the state of confusion caused by conflicting statements and contradictory documents, it should not have occurred to Lord Ashburton or to Mr. Grattan, who records his own anxious searches after Dr. Franklin’s map, that a counterpart might have been readily found in Paris in the archives of the Foreign Office; but the fact was, Franklin’s map could nowhere be found in the State Paper Department of Washington.

The production of that map with the red ink line must have placed the boundary question beyond the reach of controversy; in fact, the map of De Vergènnes could have been consulted at Paris, and the same red line might have been seen on it as that which was seen in Franklin’s. Lord Aberdeen had for some inscrutable reason resolved that the boundary should be drawn so as to include the settlement of Madawaska on the St. John, within the British possessions, whilst the Commissioners were equally resolute not to except an inch south of the St. John itself; and the arrangement proposed by a small European monarch was regarded by the Americans as a proof that they were entitled to all that they had asked, and that the compromise was suggested to propitiate England.

The expectations which had been entertained of an immediate adjustment were followed by a renewal of angry feeling and political commotion. Lord Ashburton, after an unequal struggle with Webster and the Commissioners, in a controversial correspondence on which he had not very wisely entered, yielded in a spirit of honourable concession the claim ofGreat Britain to the southern line of highlands. He was impressed somewhat, no doubt, by the vehemence and force of unanimous public opinion in America respecting the justice of their claim, the strong and general conviction felt that the country was in the right. Extended and accessible on every side, his mind could not resist the constant pressure of the audacious and penetrating weight of Webster’s intellect, and he gradually gave way like a crumbling wall to the flood-tide of intense determination by which he was assailed. The middle of the St. John was accepted as the boundary, but instead of following the highlands overlooking the valley of the St. Lawrence, a line was determined upon sixty miles more to the south, which thus removes the United States frontier to a tolerable distance from the navigation of the river and the military control of the banks.

On both sides of the Atlantic this compromise was received with expressions of disgust and anger. The Americans, knowing themselves very well and Englishmen very little, declared that Daniel Webster had been bought.

In the land of liberty it is the custom of the representatives of the people to conduct their debates in secret whenever any question of public interest arises, and the Senate ratified the treaty by a large majority, after a long debate carried on with closed doors for several days.

Some time after the treaty had been signed, it turned out that Mr. Webster had all the time possessed a map on which Franklin’s red line, tracing the boundary of 1783 south of the St. John, was distinctly marked.

The map in question was an authentic copy of one which was given to De Vergènnes by Dr. Franklin himself when the treaty was made. Its existence had been made known to the President, to the Senate, and to all the Americans engaged in the negotiation. This map was no doubt the same as that which had disappeared from the State Department. Its existence was known to many people. It appears that Mr. Jared Sparkes, of Boston, found in the archives at Paris the following letter.

“Paissey, Decr. 6th, 1782.“Sir,—I have the honour of returning herewith the map your Excellency sent me yesterday. I have marked with a strong red line, according to your desire, the limits of the United States as settled in the preliminaries between the British and American Plenipotentiaries.“With great respect,“I am, &c.,“B. Franklin.”

“Paissey, Decr. 6th, 1782.

“Sir,—I have the honour of returning herewith the map your Excellency sent me yesterday. I have marked with a strong red line, according to your desire, the limits of the United States as settled in the preliminaries between the British and American Plenipotentiaries.

“With great respect,“I am, &c.,“B. Franklin.”

This letter was addressed to the Count De Vergènnes, the French Minister. Mr. Sparkes, in fact, discovered the actual map of North America of 1746, and on it was drawn a strong red line throughout the entire boundary of the United States, answering exactly to Franklin’s description. “Imagine,” says Mr. Sparkes, “my surprise on discovering that this line runs wholly south of the St. John’s, and between the head waters of that river and those of the Penobscot and Kennebec; in short, it is exactly the line contended for by Great Britain, except that it concedes more than is claimed.”

When the secret debates of the Senate were published, it was seen that Mr. Rives, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, had fortified his argument against the rejection of this Ashburton line by quoting the existence of this map, and warning them of the risk and danger of a further search into the archives of Europe. In the debate that followed, Mr. Benton, eager to overthrow the value of Mr. Sparkes’ discovery and of Mr. Rives’s argument, produced a map from the Jefferson collection in the library of Congress, which contained a dotted line marking the boundary of the Government of Quebec under the proclamation of 1763, but strange to say, he overlooked the fact which was at once visible to every eye, that a strong red line, indicating the limits of the United States according to the Treaty of Peace, was traced across it, which coincided minutely and exactly with the boundary on Mr. Sparkes’ map.

Those who wish for the most minute details respecting this map, may be referred to Mr. Grattan’s work. The map of Baron Steiben, and that of Faden, coincide in a most remarkable manner in marking the limits of the United States.

It is worthy of note that Mr. Buchanan, the last President of the United States, did his very best to maintain the propriety of the deceit. Mr. Calhoun is supposed to have appreciated the importance of the discoveries, and to have felt the injury to American diplomacy which Mr. Webster’s suppressions of truth might create on future occasions. The Americans actually made use of the weakness of the English Minister as an argument that they had been cheated themselves, and Mr. Webster’s ability in concealingthe truth was considered evidence that he had not gone far enough in the same line, and his reputation as a skilful and successful negotiator was considered not to stand very high. The action of Sir Robert Peel, however, prevented any endeavour to obtain the legitimate advantages which the discovery of these maps ought to have produced.

The decision arrived at affected the State of Maine and the pretensions of its people, but it had little to do with the prosperity or military strength of the whole of the Union: whilst it weakened Canada in its weakest point, and conferred most signal advantage on the only enemy it had to fear: it bit in to the substance of the Provinces, and at the same time cut the vein of communication with the sea for five long winter months. Strange that a line drawn upon a piece of paper by the hand of a man gathered to his fathers for so many years, should for a time at least decide so much of a nation’s happiness and prosperity—for a time only, because it must soon be that the increasing power or failing resources of the United States, or of Canada, will cause a modification of the present frontier, more in accordance with the commercial and military exigencies of the two States. The Canadians feel that Imperial diplomacy has done them a great wrong, possibly very much as France feels in respect to her Rhenish boundary; but in a military point of view, perhaps the cession of Rouse’s Point has been the most serious of all the circumstances affecting the relations for aggressive purposes of the United States with the Provinces.

In order that we may appreciate the importance of Mr. Webster’s achievement, let us quote his owndescription of it in the great debate which took place in the Senate on the Washington Treaty. Mr. Webster, in noticing some of the many charges made against him in reference to the treaty, dealt with the question of military concession in the following manner:—

“Lord Palmerston (if he be the author of certain publications ascribed to him) says that all the important points were given up by Lord Ashburton to the United States. I might here state, too, that Lord Palmerston called the whole treaty ‘the Ashburton capitulation,’ declaring that it yielded everything that was of importance to Great Britain, and that all its stipulations were to the advantage of the United States, and to the sacrifice of the interests of England. But it is not on such general, and, I may add, such unjust statements, nor on any off-hand expressions used in debate, though in the roundest terms, that this question must turn. He speaks of this military road, but he entirely misplaces it. The road which runs from New Brunswick to Canada follows the north side of the St. John to the mouth of the Madawaska, and then, turning north-west, follows that stream to Lake Temiscoata, and thence proceeds over a depressed part of the highlands till it strikes the St. Lawrence 117 miles below Quebec. This is the road which has been always used, and there is no other.“I admit that it is very convenient for the British Government to possess territory through which they may enjoy a road; it is of great value as an avenue of communication in time of peace; but as a military communication it is of no value at all. What business can an army ever have there? Besides, it is no gorge,no pass, no narrow defile, to be defended by a fort. If a fort should be built there, an army could, at pleasure, make adétourso as to keep out of the reach of its guns. It is very useful, I admit, in time of peace. But does not everybody know, military man or not, that unless there is a defile, or some narrow place through which troops must pass, and which a fortification will command, that a mere open road must, in time of war, be in the power of the strongest? If we retained by treaty the territory over which the road is to be constructed, and war came, would not the English take possession of it if they could? Would they be restrained by a regard to the treaty of Washington? I have never yet heard a reason adduced why this communication should be regarded as of the slightest possible advantage in a military point of view.“But the circumstance to which I allude is, that, by a map published with the speech of the honourable member from Missouri, made in the Senate, on the question of ratifying the treaty, this well-known and long-used road is laid down, probably from the same source of error which misled Lord Palmerston, as following the St. John, on its south side, to the mouth of the St. Francis; thence along that river to its source, and thence, by a single bound, over the highlands to the St. Lawrence, near Quebec. This is all imagination. It is called the ‘Valley Road,’ Valley Road, indeed! Why, Sir, it is represented as running over the very ridge of the most inaccessible part of the highlands! It is made to cross abrupt and broken precipices, 2000 feet high! It is, at different points of its imaginary course, from fifty to a hundred miles distant from the real road.“So much, Mr. President, for the great boon of military communication conceded to England. It is nothing more nor less than a common road, along streams and lakes, and over a country in great part rather flat. It then passes the heights to the St. Lawrence. If war breaks out, we shall take it if we can, and if we need it, of which there is not the slightest probability. It will never be protected by fortifications, and never can be. It will be just as easy to take it from England, in case of war, as it would be to keep possession of it, if it were our own.“In regard to the defence of the heights, I shall dispose of that subject in a few words. There is a ridge of highlands which does approach the river St. Lawrence, although it is not true that it overlooks Quebec; on the contrary, the ridge is at the distance of thirty or forty miles.“It is very natural that military men in England, or indeed in any part of Europe, should have attached great importance to these mountains. The great military authority of England, perhaps the highest living military authority, had served in India and on the European continent, and it was natural enough that he should apply European ideas of military defences to America. But they are quite inapplicable. Highlands such as these are not ordinarily found on the great battle-fields of Europe. They are neither Alps nor Pyrenees; they have no passes through them, nor roads over them, and never will have.“Then there was another cause of misconception on this subject in England. In 1839 anex partesurvey was made, as I have said, by Colonel Mudge and Mr. Featherstonhaugh, if survey it could be called, of theregion in the North of Maine, for the use of the British Government. I dare say Colonel Mudge is an intelligent and respectable officer; how much personal attention he gave the subject I do not know. As to Mr. Featherstonhaugh, he has been in our service, and his authority is not worth a straw. These two persons made a report, containing this very singular statement: That in the ridge of highlands nearest to the St. Lawrence, there was a greathiatusin one particular place, a gap of thirty or forty miles, in which the elevation did not exceed fifty feet. This is certainly the strangest statement that ever was made. Their whole report gave but one measurement by the barometer, and that measurement stated the height of 1200 feet. A survey and map were made the following year by our own commissioners, Messrs. Graham and Talcott, of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, and Professor Renwick, of Columbia College. On this map, the very spot where this gap was said to be situated is dotted over thickly with figures, showing heights varying from 1200 to 2000 feet, and forming one rough and lofty ridge, marked by abrupt and almost perpendicular precipices. When this map and report of Messrs. Mudge and Featherstonhaugh were published, the British authorities saw that this alleged gap was laid down as an indefensible point, and it was probably on that ground alone that they desired a line east of that ridge, in order that they might guard against access of a hostile power from the United States. But in truth there is no such gap; our engineers proved this, and we quite well understood it when agreeing to the boundary. Any man of common sense, military or not, must therefore now see, that nothing can be moreimaginary or unfounded than the idea that any importance attaches to the possession of these heights.“Sir, there are two old and well-known roads to Canada; one by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu, to Montreal—this is the route which armies have traversed so often, in different periods of our history. The other leads from the Kennebec river to the sources of the Chaudière and the Du Loup, and so to Quebec—this last was the track of Arnold’s march. East of this, there is no practicable communication for troops between Maine and Canada, till we get to the Madawaska. We had before us a report from General Wool, while this treaty was under negotiation, in which that intelligent officer declares that it is perfectly idle to think of fortifying any point east of this road. East of Arnold’s track it is a mountain region, through which no army can possibly pass into Canada. With General Wool was associated, in this examination, Major Graham, whom I have already mentioned. His report to General Wool, made in the year 1838, clearly points out the Kennebec and Chaudière road as the only practicable route for an army between Maine and Quebec. He was subsequently employed as a commissioner in theex partesurveys of the United States. Being an engineer officer of high character for military knowledge and scientific accuracy, his opinion had the weight it ought to have, and which will be readily given to it by all who know him. His subsequent and still more thorough acquaintance with this mountain range, in its whole extent, has only confirmed the judgment which he had previously formed. And, Sir, this avenue to Canada, this practicable avenue, andonly practicable avenue east of that by way of Lake Champlain, is left now just as it was found by the treaty. The treaty does not touch it, nor in any manner affect it.“But I must go further. I said that the treaty of Washington was a treaty of equivalents, in which it was expected that each party should give something and receive something. I am now willing to meet any gentleman, be he a military man or not, who will make the assertion, that, in a military point of view, the greatest advantages derived from that treaty are on the side of Great Britain. It was on this point that I wished to say something in reply to an honourable member from New York, who will have it that in this treaty England supposes that she got the advantage of us. Sir, I do not think the military advantages she obtained by it are worth a rush. But even if they were, if she had obtained advantages of the greatest value, would it not have been fair in the member from New York to state, nevertheless, whether there were not equivalent military advantages obtained on our side, in other parts of the line? Would it not have been candid and proper in him, when adverting to the military advantages obtained by England, in a communication between New Brunswick and Canada, if such advantages there were, to have stated, on the other hand, and at the same time, our recovery of Rouse’s Point, at the outlet of Lake Champlain? an advantage which overbalanced all others, forty times told. I must be allowed to say, that I certainly never expected that a member from New York, above all other men, should speak of this treaty as conferring military advantages on Great Britain without full equivalents.I listened to it, I confess, with utter astonishment. A distinguished senator from that State saw at the time, very clearly, the advantage gained by this treaty to the United States and to New York. He voted willingly for its ratification, and he never will say that Great Britain obtained a balance of advantages in a military point of view.“Why, how is the State of New York affected by this treaty? Sir, is not Rouse’s Point perfectly well-known, and admitted, by every military man, to be the key of Lake Champlain? It commands every vessel passing up or down the lake, between New York and Canada. It had always been supposed that this point lay some distance south of the parallel of 45°, which was our boundary line with Canada, and therefore was within the United States; and, under this supposition, the United States purchased the land, and commenced the erection of a strong fortress. But a more accurate survey having been made in 1818, by astronomers on both sides, it was found that the parallel of 45° ran south of this fortress, and thus Rouse’s Point, with the fort upon it, was found to be in the British dominions. This discovery created, as well it might, a great sensation here. None knows this better than the honourable member from South Carolina, who was then at the head of the Department of War. As Rouse’s Point was no longer ours, we sent our engineers to examine the shores of the lake, to find some other place or places which we might fortify. They made a report on their return, saying that there were two other points some distance south of Rouse’s Point, one called Windmill Point, on the east side of the lake, and the other called StonyPoint, on the west side, which it became necessary now to fortify, and they gave an estimate of the probable expense. When this treaty was in process of negotiation, we called for the opinion of military men respecting the value of Rouse’s Point, in order to see whether it was highly desirable to obtain it. We had their report before us, in which it was stated that the natural and best point for the defence of the outlet of Lake Champlain was Rouse’s Point. In fact, anybody might see that this was the case who would look at the map. The point projects into the narrowest passage by which the waters of the lake pass into the Richelieu. Any vessel passing into or out of the lake, must come within point-blank range of the guns of a fortress erected on this point; and it ran out so far that any such vessel must approach the fort, head on, for several miles, so as to be exposed to a raking fire from the battery, before she could possibly bring her broadside to bear upon the fort at all. It was very different with the points farther south. Between them the passage was much wider; so much so, indeed, that a vessel might pass directly between the two, and not be in reach of point-blank shot from either.”

“I admit that it is very convenient for the British Government to possess territory through which they may enjoy a road; it is of great value as an avenue of communication in time of peace; but as a military communication it is of no value at all. What business can an army ever have there? Besides, it is no gorge,no pass, no narrow defile, to be defended by a fort. If a fort should be built there, an army could, at pleasure, make adétourso as to keep out of the reach of its guns. It is very useful, I admit, in time of peace. But does not everybody know, military man or not, that unless there is a defile, or some narrow place through which troops must pass, and which a fortification will command, that a mere open road must, in time of war, be in the power of the strongest? If we retained by treaty the territory over which the road is to be constructed, and war came, would not the English take possession of it if they could? Would they be restrained by a regard to the treaty of Washington? I have never yet heard a reason adduced why this communication should be regarded as of the slightest possible advantage in a military point of view.

“But the circumstance to which I allude is, that, by a map published with the speech of the honourable member from Missouri, made in the Senate, on the question of ratifying the treaty, this well-known and long-used road is laid down, probably from the same source of error which misled Lord Palmerston, as following the St. John, on its south side, to the mouth of the St. Francis; thence along that river to its source, and thence, by a single bound, over the highlands to the St. Lawrence, near Quebec. This is all imagination. It is called the ‘Valley Road,’ Valley Road, indeed! Why, Sir, it is represented as running over the very ridge of the most inaccessible part of the highlands! It is made to cross abrupt and broken precipices, 2000 feet high! It is, at different points of its imaginary course, from fifty to a hundred miles distant from the real road.

“So much, Mr. President, for the great boon of military communication conceded to England. It is nothing more nor less than a common road, along streams and lakes, and over a country in great part rather flat. It then passes the heights to the St. Lawrence. If war breaks out, we shall take it if we can, and if we need it, of which there is not the slightest probability. It will never be protected by fortifications, and never can be. It will be just as easy to take it from England, in case of war, as it would be to keep possession of it, if it were our own.

“In regard to the defence of the heights, I shall dispose of that subject in a few words. There is a ridge of highlands which does approach the river St. Lawrence, although it is not true that it overlooks Quebec; on the contrary, the ridge is at the distance of thirty or forty miles.

“It is very natural that military men in England, or indeed in any part of Europe, should have attached great importance to these mountains. The great military authority of England, perhaps the highest living military authority, had served in India and on the European continent, and it was natural enough that he should apply European ideas of military defences to America. But they are quite inapplicable. Highlands such as these are not ordinarily found on the great battle-fields of Europe. They are neither Alps nor Pyrenees; they have no passes through them, nor roads over them, and never will have.

“Then there was another cause of misconception on this subject in England. In 1839 anex partesurvey was made, as I have said, by Colonel Mudge and Mr. Featherstonhaugh, if survey it could be called, of theregion in the North of Maine, for the use of the British Government. I dare say Colonel Mudge is an intelligent and respectable officer; how much personal attention he gave the subject I do not know. As to Mr. Featherstonhaugh, he has been in our service, and his authority is not worth a straw. These two persons made a report, containing this very singular statement: That in the ridge of highlands nearest to the St. Lawrence, there was a greathiatusin one particular place, a gap of thirty or forty miles, in which the elevation did not exceed fifty feet. This is certainly the strangest statement that ever was made. Their whole report gave but one measurement by the barometer, and that measurement stated the height of 1200 feet. A survey and map were made the following year by our own commissioners, Messrs. Graham and Talcott, of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, and Professor Renwick, of Columbia College. On this map, the very spot where this gap was said to be situated is dotted over thickly with figures, showing heights varying from 1200 to 2000 feet, and forming one rough and lofty ridge, marked by abrupt and almost perpendicular precipices. When this map and report of Messrs. Mudge and Featherstonhaugh were published, the British authorities saw that this alleged gap was laid down as an indefensible point, and it was probably on that ground alone that they desired a line east of that ridge, in order that they might guard against access of a hostile power from the United States. But in truth there is no such gap; our engineers proved this, and we quite well understood it when agreeing to the boundary. Any man of common sense, military or not, must therefore now see, that nothing can be moreimaginary or unfounded than the idea that any importance attaches to the possession of these heights.

“Sir, there are two old and well-known roads to Canada; one by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu, to Montreal—this is the route which armies have traversed so often, in different periods of our history. The other leads from the Kennebec river to the sources of the Chaudière and the Du Loup, and so to Quebec—this last was the track of Arnold’s march. East of this, there is no practicable communication for troops between Maine and Canada, till we get to the Madawaska. We had before us a report from General Wool, while this treaty was under negotiation, in which that intelligent officer declares that it is perfectly idle to think of fortifying any point east of this road. East of Arnold’s track it is a mountain region, through which no army can possibly pass into Canada. With General Wool was associated, in this examination, Major Graham, whom I have already mentioned. His report to General Wool, made in the year 1838, clearly points out the Kennebec and Chaudière road as the only practicable route for an army between Maine and Quebec. He was subsequently employed as a commissioner in theex partesurveys of the United States. Being an engineer officer of high character for military knowledge and scientific accuracy, his opinion had the weight it ought to have, and which will be readily given to it by all who know him. His subsequent and still more thorough acquaintance with this mountain range, in its whole extent, has only confirmed the judgment which he had previously formed. And, Sir, this avenue to Canada, this practicable avenue, andonly practicable avenue east of that by way of Lake Champlain, is left now just as it was found by the treaty. The treaty does not touch it, nor in any manner affect it.

“But I must go further. I said that the treaty of Washington was a treaty of equivalents, in which it was expected that each party should give something and receive something. I am now willing to meet any gentleman, be he a military man or not, who will make the assertion, that, in a military point of view, the greatest advantages derived from that treaty are on the side of Great Britain. It was on this point that I wished to say something in reply to an honourable member from New York, who will have it that in this treaty England supposes that she got the advantage of us. Sir, I do not think the military advantages she obtained by it are worth a rush. But even if they were, if she had obtained advantages of the greatest value, would it not have been fair in the member from New York to state, nevertheless, whether there were not equivalent military advantages obtained on our side, in other parts of the line? Would it not have been candid and proper in him, when adverting to the military advantages obtained by England, in a communication between New Brunswick and Canada, if such advantages there were, to have stated, on the other hand, and at the same time, our recovery of Rouse’s Point, at the outlet of Lake Champlain? an advantage which overbalanced all others, forty times told. I must be allowed to say, that I certainly never expected that a member from New York, above all other men, should speak of this treaty as conferring military advantages on Great Britain without full equivalents.I listened to it, I confess, with utter astonishment. A distinguished senator from that State saw at the time, very clearly, the advantage gained by this treaty to the United States and to New York. He voted willingly for its ratification, and he never will say that Great Britain obtained a balance of advantages in a military point of view.

“Why, how is the State of New York affected by this treaty? Sir, is not Rouse’s Point perfectly well-known, and admitted, by every military man, to be the key of Lake Champlain? It commands every vessel passing up or down the lake, between New York and Canada. It had always been supposed that this point lay some distance south of the parallel of 45°, which was our boundary line with Canada, and therefore was within the United States; and, under this supposition, the United States purchased the land, and commenced the erection of a strong fortress. But a more accurate survey having been made in 1818, by astronomers on both sides, it was found that the parallel of 45° ran south of this fortress, and thus Rouse’s Point, with the fort upon it, was found to be in the British dominions. This discovery created, as well it might, a great sensation here. None knows this better than the honourable member from South Carolina, who was then at the head of the Department of War. As Rouse’s Point was no longer ours, we sent our engineers to examine the shores of the lake, to find some other place or places which we might fortify. They made a report on their return, saying that there were two other points some distance south of Rouse’s Point, one called Windmill Point, on the east side of the lake, and the other called StonyPoint, on the west side, which it became necessary now to fortify, and they gave an estimate of the probable expense. When this treaty was in process of negotiation, we called for the opinion of military men respecting the value of Rouse’s Point, in order to see whether it was highly desirable to obtain it. We had their report before us, in which it was stated that the natural and best point for the defence of the outlet of Lake Champlain was Rouse’s Point. In fact, anybody might see that this was the case who would look at the map. The point projects into the narrowest passage by which the waters of the lake pass into the Richelieu. Any vessel passing into or out of the lake, must come within point-blank range of the guns of a fortress erected on this point; and it ran out so far that any such vessel must approach the fort, head on, for several miles, so as to be exposed to a raking fire from the battery, before she could possibly bring her broadside to bear upon the fort at all. It was very different with the points farther south. Between them the passage was much wider; so much so, indeed, that a vessel might pass directly between the two, and not be in reach of point-blank shot from either.”

Mr. Dickinson, of New York, here interposed, to ask whether the Dutch line did not give us Rouse’s Point.

“Certainly not. It gave us a semicircular line, running round the fort, but not including what we had possessed before. And besides, we had rejected the Dutch line, and the whole point now clearly belonged to England. It was all within the British territory.“I was saying that a vessel might pass between Windmill Point and Stony Point, and be without the rangeof both, till her broadside could be brought to bear upon either of them. The forts would be entirely independent of each other, and, having no communication, could not render each other the least assistance in case of attack. But the military men told us there was no sort of question that Rouse’s Point was extremely desirable as a point of military defence. This is plain enough, and I need not spend time to prove it. Of one thing I am certain, that the true road to Canada is by the way of Lake Champlain. That is the old path. I take to myself the credit of having said here, thirty years ago, speaking of the mode of taking Canada, that, when an American woodsman undertakes to fell a tree, he does not begin by lopping off the branches, but strikes his axe at once into the trunk. The trunk, in relation to Canada, is Montreal, and the River St. Lawrence down to Quebec; and so we found in the last war. It is not my purpose to scan the propriety of military measures then adopted, but I suppose it to have been rather accidental and unfortunate that we began the attack in Upper Canada. It would have been better military policy, as I suppose, to have pushed our whole force by the way of Lake Champlain, and made a direct movement on Montreal; and though we might thereby have lost the glories of the battles of the Thames and of Lundy’s Lane, and of the sortie from Port Erie, yet we should have won other laurels of equal, and perhaps greater value, at Montreal. Once successful in this movement, the whole country above would have fallen into our power. Is not this evident to every gentleman?“Rouse’s Point is the best means of defending both the ingress into the lake, and the exit from it. And Isay now, that on the whole frontier of the State of New York, with the single exception of the Narrows below the city, there is not a point of equal importance. I hope this government will last for ever; but if it does not, and if, in the judgment of Heaven, so great a calamity shall befall us as the rupture of this Union, and the State of New York shall thereby be thrown upon her own defences, I ask, is there a single point, except the Narrows, the possession of which she will so much desire? No, there is not one. And how did we obtain this advantage for her? The parallel of 45° north was established by the treaty of 1783 as our boundary with Canada in that part of the line. But, as I have stated, that line was found to run south of Rouse’s Point. And how did we get back this precious possession? By running a semicircle like that of the King of the Netherlands? No; we went back to the old line, which had always been supposed to be the true line, and the establishment of which gave us not only Rouse’s Point, but a strip of land containing some thirty or forty thousand acres between the parallel of 45° and the old line.“The same arrangement gave us a similar advantage in Vermont; and I have never heard that the constituents of my friend near me made any complaint of the treaty. That State got about sixty or seventy thousand acres, including several villages, which would otherwise have been left on the British side of the line. We received Rouse’s Point, and this additional land, as one of the equivalents for the cession of territory made in Maine. And what did we do for New Hampshire? There was an ancient dispute as to which was the north-westernmost head of the ConnecticutRiver. Several streams were found, either of which might be insisted on as the true boundary. But we claimed that which is called Hall’s Stream. This had not formerly been allowed; the Dutch award did not give to New Hampshire what she claimed; and Mr. Van Ness, our commissioner, appointed under the Treaty of Ghent, after examining the ground, came to the conclusion that we were not entitled to Hall’s Stream. I thought that we were so entitled, although I admit that Hall’s Stream does not join the Connecticut River till after it has passed the parallel of 45°. By the Treaty of Washington this demand was agreed to, and it gave New Hampshire 100,000 acres of land. I do not say that we obtained this wrongfully; but I do say that we got that which Mr. Van Ness had doubted our right to. I thought the claim just, however, and the line was established accordingly. And here let me say, once for all, that, if we had gone for arbitration, we should inevitably have lost what the treaty gave to Vermont and New York; because all that was clear matter of cession, and not adjustment of doubtful boundary.”

“I was saying that a vessel might pass between Windmill Point and Stony Point, and be without the rangeof both, till her broadside could be brought to bear upon either of them. The forts would be entirely independent of each other, and, having no communication, could not render each other the least assistance in case of attack. But the military men told us there was no sort of question that Rouse’s Point was extremely desirable as a point of military defence. This is plain enough, and I need not spend time to prove it. Of one thing I am certain, that the true road to Canada is by the way of Lake Champlain. That is the old path. I take to myself the credit of having said here, thirty years ago, speaking of the mode of taking Canada, that, when an American woodsman undertakes to fell a tree, he does not begin by lopping off the branches, but strikes his axe at once into the trunk. The trunk, in relation to Canada, is Montreal, and the River St. Lawrence down to Quebec; and so we found in the last war. It is not my purpose to scan the propriety of military measures then adopted, but I suppose it to have been rather accidental and unfortunate that we began the attack in Upper Canada. It would have been better military policy, as I suppose, to have pushed our whole force by the way of Lake Champlain, and made a direct movement on Montreal; and though we might thereby have lost the glories of the battles of the Thames and of Lundy’s Lane, and of the sortie from Port Erie, yet we should have won other laurels of equal, and perhaps greater value, at Montreal. Once successful in this movement, the whole country above would have fallen into our power. Is not this evident to every gentleman?

“Rouse’s Point is the best means of defending both the ingress into the lake, and the exit from it. And Isay now, that on the whole frontier of the State of New York, with the single exception of the Narrows below the city, there is not a point of equal importance. I hope this government will last for ever; but if it does not, and if, in the judgment of Heaven, so great a calamity shall befall us as the rupture of this Union, and the State of New York shall thereby be thrown upon her own defences, I ask, is there a single point, except the Narrows, the possession of which she will so much desire? No, there is not one. And how did we obtain this advantage for her? The parallel of 45° north was established by the treaty of 1783 as our boundary with Canada in that part of the line. But, as I have stated, that line was found to run south of Rouse’s Point. And how did we get back this precious possession? By running a semicircle like that of the King of the Netherlands? No; we went back to the old line, which had always been supposed to be the true line, and the establishment of which gave us not only Rouse’s Point, but a strip of land containing some thirty or forty thousand acres between the parallel of 45° and the old line.

“The same arrangement gave us a similar advantage in Vermont; and I have never heard that the constituents of my friend near me made any complaint of the treaty. That State got about sixty or seventy thousand acres, including several villages, which would otherwise have been left on the British side of the line. We received Rouse’s Point, and this additional land, as one of the equivalents for the cession of territory made in Maine. And what did we do for New Hampshire? There was an ancient dispute as to which was the north-westernmost head of the ConnecticutRiver. Several streams were found, either of which might be insisted on as the true boundary. But we claimed that which is called Hall’s Stream. This had not formerly been allowed; the Dutch award did not give to New Hampshire what she claimed; and Mr. Van Ness, our commissioner, appointed under the Treaty of Ghent, after examining the ground, came to the conclusion that we were not entitled to Hall’s Stream. I thought that we were so entitled, although I admit that Hall’s Stream does not join the Connecticut River till after it has passed the parallel of 45°. By the Treaty of Washington this demand was agreed to, and it gave New Hampshire 100,000 acres of land. I do not say that we obtained this wrongfully; but I do say that we got that which Mr. Van Ness had doubted our right to. I thought the claim just, however, and the line was established accordingly. And here let me say, once for all, that, if we had gone for arbitration, we should inevitably have lost what the treaty gave to Vermont and New York; because all that was clear matter of cession, and not adjustment of doubtful boundary.”

Unfortunately Mr. Webster but too well described our share of the advantages obtained by this “treaty of equivalents.” The consequences to us in a war might be more disastrous than those he indicated.

Back to Index Next