"As Mr. Potter closed reading the letter there were loud cries from theCanadian delegates of 'Name, name.'
"Mr. Potter gave the name, 'O. S. Wood, Superintendent of the Montreal Telegraph Company'—a gentleman, he said, of wealth and the highest respectability in Montreal.
"Some one asked whether Wood was a born Canadian.
"Mr. Potter replied he was not, but came originally from New York.
"The Republican journals in the West have since taken up this tone, andMr. Morrill, the Protectionist chairman of the 'Committee of Ways andMeans,' echoed it even in conference with the provincial delegates atWashington last February:—Witness the following:—
"'Chicago Tribune' (Republican), Jan. 6th, 1866.
"The 'Tribune' concludes:—'The Canadians will soon discover that free trade and smuggling will not compensate them for the loss of the Reciprocity Treaty. They will stay out in the cold for a few years and try all sorts of expedients, but in the end will be constrained to knock for admission into the Great Republic. Potter was right when he predicted that the abrogation of the treaty would cause annexation.'
"(Mr. MORRILL, Chairman of Ways and Means, "Washington, Feb. 6th, 1866.)
"'Mr. GALT: We would not build those canals for our own trade alone. I think, indeed, it might well be considered whether it would not suit both parties to put this trade on a better footing. I am not authorized to make any proposition looking to this end, but my idea is that these waters might be neutralized with advantage to both.
"'Mr. MORRILL: That will have to be postponed untilyou, gentlemen, assume your seats here.'
"Mr. Derby coolly discusses the question as to whether concession or coercion will best succeed in inducing the British Provinces to 'come over,' and his recipe for all outstanding grievances is the following. He says, in his report of January 1st, 1866:—
"'And if as an inducement for this treaty and in settlement of Alabama claims we can obtain a cession of Vancouver's Island, or other territory, it will be a consummation most devoutly to be wished for.'
"Would our Government 'devoutly wish' such a consummation?
"Mr. O. S. Wood had to resign his position as manager of the Montreal Telegraph Company: that was done by public opinion in Canada. But Mr. Potter, who attends a meeting to enforce the annexation of a part of the Queen's dominions, by the consent of the Washington Government, is still Consul at Montreal.
"But what are these dominions which Mr. Potter would annex? Read whatMr. Ward's Report of 1862 says:—
"'The great and practical value of the British North American Provinces and possessions is seldom appreciated. Stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, they contain an area of at least 3,478,380 square miles—more than is owned by the United States, and not much less than the whole of Europe, with its family of nations!
* * * * *
"'The climate and soil of these Provinces and possessions, seemingly less indulgent than those of tropical regions, are precisely those by which the skill, energy, and virtues of the human race are best developed. Nature there demands thought and labour from man as conditions of his existence, and yields abundant rewards to a wise industry.'
"Specially, as regards Canada; let us recapitulate her progress, as compared with that of her giant neighbour, the United States.
"During the interval between the last census and the preceding one (1850-1860), the decennial rate of increase of population in Canada exceeded that in the United States by nearly 51/2 per cent.—Canada adding 40.87 per cent. to her population in ten years, while the United States added only 35.58 per cent. to theirs. She brought her wild land into cultivation at a rate, in nine years, exceeding the rate of increase of cultivated lands in the United States in ten years by nearly 6 per cent.,—Canada in 1860 having added 50 acres of cultivated land to every 100 acres under cultivation in 1851, while the United States in 1860 had only added 14 acres to every 100 acres under cultivation in 1850. The value per cultivated acre of the farming lands in Canada in 1860 exceeded the value per cultivated acre of the farming lands of the United States—the average value per cultivated acre in Canada being $20.87 and in the United States $16.32. In Canada a larger capital was invested in agricultural implements, in proportion to the amount of land cultivated, than in the United States—the average value of agricultural implements used on a farm having 100 cultivated acres being in Canada $182 and in the United States $150. In proportion to population, Canada in 1860 raised twice as much wheat as the United States—Canada in that year raising 11.2 bushels for each inhabitant, while the United States raised only 5.50 bushels for each inhabitant. Bulking together eight leading staples of agriculture—wheat, corn, rye, barley, oats, buckwheat, peas and bean, and potatoes,—Canada, between 1851 and 1860, increased her production of these articles from 57 millions to 123 millions of bushels—an increase; of 113 per cent.; while the United States in ten years, from 1850 to 1860, increased their productions of the same articles only 45 per cent. In 1860 Canada raised, of those articles, 49.12 bushels for each inhabitant, against a production in the United States of 43.42 bushels for each inhabitant. Excluding Indian corn from the list—Canada raised of the remaining articles 48.07 bushels for each inhabitant, almost three times the rate of production in the United States, which was 16.74 bushels for each inhabitant. And as regards live stock and their products, Canada in 1850, in proportion to her population, owned more horses and more cows, made more butter, kept more sheep, and had a greater yield of wool, than the United States.
"Our British Government having thus allowed the treaty to expire, and having thereby damped the energies of the colonies, and excited the hopes of the Protectionist and Annexationist parties in the States, what are we to do?
"In the first place, Parliament should express its condemnation of the failure of the executive; in the second, its desire for peace and fraternity with the United States; and in the third, its determination to stand by the Queen's dominions on the other side of the Atlantic. Language so just and so clear would lead to the inevitable result of renewed negociation. But who should negociate? The incapable, nonchalant people who have so signally perilled the interests of Great Britain,—or new and capable men? Or should the whole state of our relations with the United States be remitted to a plenipotentiary?
"What ought we to seek now to secure, in the interests of peace and civilization?
"1. A neutralization of the 3,000 miles of frontier, rendering fortifications needless.
"2. A continuance of the neutrality of the lakes and rivers bordering upon the two territories.
"3. Common navigation of the lakes and the outlets of the sea.
"4. An enlargement of canals and locks, to enable the food of the west to flow unimpeded and at the smallest cost direct in the same bottom to Europe, or any other part of the world.
"5. Neutrality of telegraphs and post routes between the Atlantic and Pacific, no matter on which territory they may traverse.
"6. A free interchange of untaxed, and an exchange, at internal revenue duty rate only, of taxed, commodities.
"7. The passage of goods in bond through the respective territories as heretofore.
"8. A common use of ports on both sides of the Continent."
It seems to me, now, in 1887, that this paper sums up a question of the past, now re-appearing in full prominence. It also sums up what ought to be done if civilization and friendship between English-speaking nations still exist.
[Endnote 1]
The Government of the United States being equally desirous with Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain to avoid further misunderstanding between their respective citizens and subjects in regard to the extent of the right of fishing on the coasts of British North America secured to each by Article I of a Convention between the United States and Great Britain, signed at London on the 20th day of October, 1818; and being also desirous to regulate the commerce and navigation between their respective territories and people, and more especially between Her Majesty's possessions in North America and the United States, in such manner as to render the same reciprocally beneficial and satisfactory, have respectively named Plenipotentiaries to confer and agree thereupon—that is to say, the President of the United States of America, William L. Marcy, Secretary of State of the United States; and Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, James, Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Lord Bruce and Elgin, a peer of the United Kingdom, knight of the most ancient and most noble Order of the Thistle, and Governor General in and over all Her Britannic Majesty's provinces on the continent of North America and in and over the island of Prince Edward—who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:—
ART. I. It is agreed by the high contracting parties that, in addition to the liberty secured to the United States fishermen by the above- mentioned convention of October 20, 1818, of taking, curing, and drying fish on certain coasts of the British North American Colonies therein defined, the inhabitants of the United States shall have, in common with the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, the liberty to take fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on the sea-coasts and shores, and in the bays, harbours, and creeks of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward's Island, and of the several islands thereunto adjacent, without being restricted to any distance from the shore; with permission to land upon the coasts and shores of those colonies and the islands thereof, and also upon the Magdalen Islands, for the purpose of drying their nets and curing their fish: provided that, in so doing, they do not interfere with the rights of private property or with British fishermen in the peaceable use of any part of the said coast in their occupancy for the same purpose.
It is understood that the above-mentioned liberty applies solely to the sea fishery, and that the salmon and shad fisheries, and all fisheries in rivers and the mouths of rivers, are hereby reserved exclusively for British fishermen.
And it is further agreed that, in order to prevent or settle any disputes as to the places to which the reservation of exclusive right to British fishermen contained in this article, and that of fishermen of the United States contained in the next succeeding article, apply, each of the high contracting parties, on the application of either to the other, shall, within six months thereafter, appoint a commissioner. The said commissioners, before proceeding to any business, shall make and subscribe a solemn declaration that they will impartially and carefully examine and decide, to the best of their judgment and according to justice and equity, without fear, favour, or affection to their own country, upon all such places as are intended to be reserved and excluded from the common liberty of fishing under this and the next succeeding article, and such declaration shall be entered on the record of their proceedings.
The commissioners shall name some third person to act as an arbitrator or umpire in any case or cases on which they may themselves differ in opinion. If they should not be able to agree upon the name of such third person, they shall each name a person, and it shall be determined by lot which of the two persons so named shall be the arbitrator or umpire in cases of difference or disagreement between the commissioners. The person so to be chosen to be arbitrator or umpire shall, before proceeding to act as such in any case, make and subscribe to a solemn declaration in a form similar to that which shall already have been made and subscribed by the commissioners, which shall be entered on the record of their proceedings. In the event of the death, absence, or incapacity of either of the commissioners, or of the arbitrator or umpire, or of their or his omitting, declining, or ceasing to act as such commissioner, arbitrator, or umpire, another and different person shall be appointed or named as aforesaid to act as such commissioner, arbitrator, or umpire in the place and stead of the person so originally appointed or named as aforesaid, and shall make and subscribe such declaration as aforesaid.
Such commissioners shall proceed to examine the coasts of the North American Provinces and of the United States embraced within the provisions of the first and second articles of this treaty, and shall designate the places reserved by the said articles from the common right of fishing therein.
The decision of the commissioners and of the arbitrator or umpire shall be given in writing in each case, and shall be signed by them respectively.
The high contracting parties hereby solemnly engage to consider the decision of the commissioners conjointly, or of the arbitrator or umpire, as the case may be, as absolutely final and conclusive in each case decided upon by them or him respectively.
ART. 2. It is agreed by the high contracting parties that British subjects shall have, in common with the citizens of the United States, the liberty to take fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on the eastern sea-coasts and shores of the United States north of the 36th parallel of north latitude, and on the shores of the several islands thereunto adjacent, and in the bays, harbours, and creeks, of the said sea-coasts and shores of the United States and of the said islands, without being restricted to any distance from the shore, with permission to land upon the said coasts of the United States and of the islands aforesaid for the purpose of drying their nets and curing their fish; provided that, in so doing, they do not interfere with the rights of private property, or with the fishermen of the United States in the peaceable use of any part of the said coasts in their occupancy for the same purpose.
It is understood that the above-mentioned liberty applies solely to the sea fishery, and that salmon and shad fisheries, and all fisheries in rivers and months of rivers, are hereby reserved exclusively for fishermen of the United States.
ART. 3. It is agreed that the articles enumerated in the schedule hereunto annexed, being the growth and produce of the aforesaid British Colonies or of the United States, shall be admitted into each, country respectively free of duty:—
Grain, flour and breadstuffs of all kinds.Animals of all kinds.Fresh, smoked, and salted meats.Cotton-wool, seeds, and vegetables.Undried fruits, dried fruits.Fish of all kinds.Products of fish, and all other creatures living in the water.Poultry, eggs.Hides, furs, skins, or tails, undressed.Stone or marble, in its crude or unwrought state.Slate.Butter, cheese, tallow.Lard, horns, manures.Ores of metals of all kinds.Coal.Pitch, tar, turpentine, ashes.Timber and lumber of all kinds, round, hewed and sawed, unmanufactured,in whole or in part.Firewood.Plants, shrubs, and trees.Pelts, wool.Fish oil.Rice, broom-corn, and bark.Gypsum, ground or unground.Hewn or wrought or unwrought burr or grindstones.Dye-stuffs.Flax, hemp, and tow, unmanufactured.Unmanufactured tobacco.Rags.
ART. 4. It is agreed that the citizens and inhabitants of the United States shall have the right to navigate the river St. Lawrence, and the canals in Canada, used as the means of communicating between the great lakes and the Atlantic Ocean, with their vessels, boats, and crafts, as fully and freely as the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, subject only to the same tolls and other assessments as now are or may hereafter be exacted of Her Majesty's said subjects; it being understood, however, that the British Government retains the right of suspending this privilege on giving due notice thereof to the Government of the United States.
It is further agreed that, if at any time the British Government should exercise the said reserved right, the Government of the United States shall have the right of suspending, if it think fit, the operation of article three of the present treaty, in so far as the Province of Canada is affected thereby, for so long as the suspension of the free navigation of the river St. Lawrence or the canals may continue.
It is further agreed that British subjects shall have the right freely to navigate Lake Michigan with their vessels, boats, and crafts, so long as the privilege of navigating the river St. Lawrence, secured to American citizens by the above clause of the present article, shall continue; and the Government of the United States further engages to urge upon the State Governments to secure to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty the use of the several State canals on terms of equality with the inhabitants of the United States.
And it is further agreed that no export duty or other duty shall be levied on lumber or timber of any kind cut on that portion of the American territory in the State of Maine watered by the river St. John and its tributaries, and floated down that river to the sea, when the same is shipped to the United States from the Province of New Brunswick.
ART. 5. The present treaty shall take effect as soon as the laws required to carry it into operation shall have been passed by the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain and by the Provincial Parliaments of those of the British North American Colonies which are affected by this treaty on the one hand, and by the Congress of the United States on the other. Such assent having been given, the treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the date at which it may come into operation, and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same; each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of ten years, or at any time afterwards:
It is clearly understood, however, that this stipulation is not intended to affect the reservation made by article four of the present treaty, with regard to the right of temporarily suspending the operation of articles three and four thereof.
ART. 6. And it is further hereby agreed that the provisions and stipulations of the foregoing articles shall extend to the Island of Newfoundland, so far as they are applicable to that colony. But if the Imperial Parliament, the Provincial Parliament of Newfoundland, or the Congress of the United States shall not embrace in their laws, enacted for carrying this treaty into effect, the Colony of Newfoundland, then this article shall be of no effect; but the omission to make provision by law to give it effect, by either of the legislative bodies aforesaid, shall not in any way impair the remaining articles of this treaty.
ART. 7. The present treaty shall be duly ratified and the mutual exchange of ratifications shall take place in Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.
In faith whereof we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty, and have hereunto affixed our seals.
Done in triplicate at Washington, the fifth day of June, anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four.
[Endnote 2:]
"SEC. 7. That any imported merchandize which has been entered, and the duties paid or secured according to law, for drawback, may be exported to the British North American Provinces, adjoining the United States; and the ports of Plattsburg, in the District of Champlain; Burlington, in the District of Vermont; Sackett's Harbour, Oswego, and Ogdensburg, in the District of Oswegatchie; Rochester, in the District of Genesee; Buffalo and Erie, in the District of Prequ'isle; Cleveland, in the District of Cuyahoga; Sandusky and Detroit, together with such ports on the seaboard from which merchandize may now be exported for the benefit of drawback, are hereby declared ports from whence foreign goods, wares and merchandize on which the import has been paid or secured to be paid, may be exported to ports in the adjoining British Provinces, and to which ports foreign goods, wares, and merchandize may be transported inland, or by water from the port of original importation, under existing provisions of law, to be thence exported for benefit of drawback. Provided, that such other ports situated on the frontiers of the United Sates, adjoining the British North American Provinces, as may hereafter be found expedient, may have extended to them the like privileges on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Treasury, and proclamation duly made by the President of the United States, specially designating the ports to which the aforesaid privileges are to be extended."
NOTE—Several other ports have since been proclaimed, viz., Whitehall,Lewiston, and others.
"SEC. 11. That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby further authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the laws of the United States, as he may deem necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act, and to prevent the illegal re- importation of any goods, wares, or merchandize which shall have been exported as herein provided; and that all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be, and the same are hereby repealed."
See, also, Warehousing Act of United States Congress, chapter 48, Dunlop's United States Statutes, page 1106, passed 6th August, 1846, in which it is enacted as follows:—
"And in case the owner, importer, consignee or agent of any goods on which the duties have not been paid shall give to the collector satisfactory security that the said goods shall be landed out of the jurisdiction of the United States in the manner now required by existing laws relating to exportations, for the benefit of drawback, the collector, &c., on an entry to re-export the same shall, upon payment of the appropriate expenses, permit the said goods, under the inspection of the proper officers, to be shipped without the payment of any duties thereon," &c.
The Defences of Canada.
In February and March, 1865, I spoke in the House of Commons on the general question of the defences of Canada; and, also, on the special vote (carried by a majority of 235) of 50,000_l_. for the fortifications of Quebec. The first of these speeches was delivered on the 13th March, 1865; the second on the 23rd March. On the second occasion I was followed by Lord Palmerston; and I commend his speech, pithy and decisive as it was, to the statesmen who have to deal with our Imperial relations with Canada, and with her Canadian Pacific Railway.
"Hansard" reports that,—
"Mr. WATKIN said that having, like the right hon. gentleman the member for Calne, visited Canada not once but frequently, he felt unable to corroborate the description given of Quebec; nor could he agree as to what had been said of other places. The fortifications of Quebec were not those of the days of Wolfe; they had been systematically enlarged and strengthened. Quebec, naturally a position of enormous strength, was now most efficiently fortified, and so far from the nature of the surrounding country exposing it to attack, that country presented features enabling the speedy and easy construction of additional works rendering the fortress impregnable. In fact, it might easily be made the strongest work upon the continent. Nor was it fair to say, as the gallant member opposite had declared, that the guns were all antiquated and the gun-carriages rotten. It was true that many of the guns were old, but newer ordnance had been supplied; there were abundant stores of shot, shell, and rockets, and a considerable number of Armstrong guns had been received at the citadel very recently. Canada could be made capable of defence, without difficulty, though, of course, not without cost. No one would contend that the defence of Canada, if an Imperial duty, was simply an Imperial liability. Every one would admit that the colony should contribute, both in times of peace and of war, its fair share of the burden. Independence and defence were co-existent ideas, and Canada, desiring to be free of foreign control, should, and he hoped would, be ready to defray her just and honest share of the burden. He took this as admitted on all hands and on both sides of the Atlantic. His objection, then, to the proposal of the Government was that it was not worthy of that emergency which alone could justify the policy of the fortification of a frontier. But the question really before the House was not one of the extent of territory to defend, but plainly this—Was this House, was the country, ready to abandon—to alienate for ever from the British Crown—the vast expanse of territory lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans? There was no half-way house between 'cutting the painter,' as one or two hon. gentlemen near him now and then suggested, in conversation only, as regarded Canada, and severing all connection, now and for ever, with Prince Edward's Island, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Canada, on the east; British Columbia, one of the most thriving and hopeful of the British possessions, on the west; and that vast intermediate country known as the 'Hudson's Bay Territory,' which they were told contained within itself fertile land enough to sustain 50,000,000 of people—and holding on to the Queen's possessions. Hon. gentlemen near him should remember their geography a little, and they would cease to speak of Canada as more than a section of that northern continent over which the Queen of Great Britain ruled, and which comprised an area larger than that of the Federal and Confederate States put together. Now what was that great property? He could not describe it better than in the language of the United States. If the House would refer to the report on the Reciprocity Treaty laid before the House of Representatives at Washington in 1862 by Mr. Ward, they would find a glowing description of the vast extent, the wonderful means of internal navigation, the richness of mineral resources, the bracing healthiness of climate, and the immense extent of fertile soil which British North America contained. The report said:—'The great and practical value of the British North American Provinces and possessions is seldom appreciated. Stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, they contain an area of at least 3,478,380 square miles—more than is owned by the United States, and not much less than the whole of Europe, with its family of nations.' And, again, it said—'The climate and soil of these Provinces and possessions, seemingly less indulgent than those of tropical regions, are precisely those by which the skill, energy, and virtues of the human race are best developed. Nature there demands thought and labour from man as conditions of his existence, and yields abundant rewards to a wise industry.' Indeed, the warmth of language used irresistibly suggested the idea that the people of the United States, with whom the love of territory was a passion, were disposed to cast a covetous eye upon these possessions of old England. Now, knowing something of America, he must express his belief that there was no very imminent danger of war with the United States. The issues of peace and war, however, depended upon the attitude of that House and of the country. Weakness never promoted peace, and an uncertain and half- hearted attitude was provocative of war. This country had, he believed, the desire to preserve its power and influence on the American continent. It was for the good of mankind that the rule of the British Crown and the influence of the wisely-regulated liberty of Britain and of the British Constitution should continue. The way to prevent war was not to talk of severing the connection with Canada or of withdrawing our troops from Canada for fear they should be caught in a net, but to announce boldly but calmly, in language worthy of the traditions of that House, that these vast American possessions are integral parts of the great British Empire, and come weal, come woe, would be defended to the last. If that language were held there would be no war in America. The only danger arose from impressions produced by speeches in that House and elsewhere, leading to the belief that we were indifferent to our duties or our interests on the American Continent; for we had duties as well as interests. Those who thus spoke—humanitarians by profession—could support the continuance of a war which, in his humble opinion, disgraced the civilization of our time; and, while professing to be Liberals, they were ready to thrust out from our Imperial home of liberty the populations of some of our most important possessions to satisfy some imaginary economical theory of saving. They spoke of the Empire as if it were this mere island, and they seemed enchanted with the idea of narrowing our boundaries everywhere. That was not a question of simple arithmetic, it was a question of empire; not a question of a single budget, but a question of the future destiny of our race. These gentlemen seemed to prefer to live in a small country. For his part, he hoped he should all his life live in a great one. No country could be stationary without becoming stagnant, or restrict its natural progress without inviting its decay. It was so in all human affairs; it was so even in ordinary business. Every man of business knew that if his enterprise ceased to grow bigger, it soon began to dwindle down; and so a country must grow greater or else must slide away to weakness, until at last it would be despised. Now the Government proposed to spend 50,000_l_. at Quebec; 50,000_l_., he repeated, was really nothing if it were necessary to carry out the fortification policy at all. He had two objections to make. One was, that Quebec was not the vulnerable point; that point was Montreal. Montreal was the key to Canada. Once holding that key, the enemy would cut Canada in two—would separate Upper and Lower Canada from each other. Yet the Government proposed to leave all that to the unaided resources of Canada—to do nothing, in fact, where, if action were necessary at all, that action was pressing and imperative. He should deplore to see this country commencing and carrying on a competition of expenditure on fortifications with the United States. The results must be, as he warned the House, excessive votes of money, of which this one was only the small beginning, and an entire change in the nature of those relations which had so happily subsisted between the United States and the British North American possessions. Let the House remember the case of France. England and France had for years been running a race of competition of this kind. If France raised a new regiment, or added a new ship of war, or built an ironclad, or erected a fortress, we must do the same. And thus it had been that the forces still remained on a measure of some sort of equality, notwithstanding a vast outlay, which had crippled the resources of both countries, and here at home had delayed fiscal reform and retarded, nay even prevented, the most obvious measures for the elevation and education of our people. Were we to play the same game over again with the States? Now, as regards the great lakes and water ways of America, possessing a coast line of above 3,000 miles, we had since 1817 neutralized these waters as regards armaments. Under that truly blessed arrangement, the sound of a hostile shot, or even of a shot fired for practice, had never been heard now for nearly half a century. Here was a precedent of happy history and worthy of all gratitude and of all imitation. Now, if they were to fortify, let it be done adequately, whatever the cost. That cost would, he repeated, be great and also uncertain. Now he would venture to make a suggestion to the Government. It was to try negociation. Place before the minds of American statesmen the neutralization of the lakes and ask if the frontiers could not be neutralized also. Was it not possible that if Her Majesty's Government took Brother Jonathan in a quiet mood, he might be disposed to save his own pocket and thereby to save ours, and unite with us to set a bright example to surrounding nations? The people of the United States had their faults and we had ours; but they were distinguished by their common sense. No people had more of it. This suggestion would, he thought, come home to it; for they would argue, if we lay out millions so will the British, and, after all, it is merely adding burdens to both and not really strength or dignity to either. Let the Government try. If they failed the trial would have shown them to be just and in the right. If they succeeded how happy would it be for us. Reference had been made by the right hon. gentleman to the fortifications at New York, Boston, and Portland; but no one had mentioned a very strong work within forty miles of Montreal itself. He had seen that work. It was called 'Fort Montgomery,' and there was a railway all the way from it to Montreal. It was now very strong. He believed it had embrasures for some 200 guns. All the time this war had been going on, this work had been going on also. Now this looked like menace. Our Government had been informed about it, but he failed to find that they had made any representation to Washington. Surely they might have said, and would have been justified in saying to a friendly nation—'If you must have 200 guns 40 miles from Montreal, we must have 250 at Montreal; and whatever you do, we must imitate—therefore, why should either of us lay out our money?' But Government had done nothing; and now, before attempting any negociation, they asked the House to agree to make fortifications. He had humbly offered a suggestion to the Government. Let them take one of two decided courses. Let them deal firmly and wisely with the question. Let them state, in no spirit of offence, to the United States that, as Canada was part of the British Empire, we would defend it at all cost; or let them endeavour to induce the Government of Washington to distinguish itself for ever by adopting the alternative—the neutralization of the lakes and the avoidance of hostile fortifications on both sides of the frontier."
The second speech is reported as follows:
"Mr. WATKIN, member for Stockport, said, that he felt concerned to hear the United States so often spoken of in the debate as 'the enemy;' and if he thought that the vote before the committee would in any manner increase international irritation, he should regret his vote in favour of the proposition of the Government. As it was, he felt that he could not quite agree with the policy the vote indicated. That policy was one of armament against an enemy. The proposition, in his opinion, went either too far or not far enough. It did not go far enough to inspire undoubted confidence and to deter attack by providing for absolute defence; and still it went far enough to raise suspicion and to excite or to aggravate a frontier feeling. But he thought that our actual relations with the United States were guiding considerations in reference to the policy of this vote. Government ought, therefore, to tell the House how far they could repeat the peaceful assurances of a former debate. Did the despatches by the mail just arrived tend towards peace or misunderstanding? Was it true, on one side, that formal notice had a few days ago been given to our Government by the United States to terminate the Reciprocity Treaty? and was it true that that notice had been entirely unaccompanied by any overture or suggestion for a re- discussion of the question? On the other and more friendly side, was it true that the vexatious passport system had been abrogated? and, above all, was it also true that the Government of Washington had expressed to Her Majesty's Government their intention to revoke the notice to terminate the arrangement of 1817, and to place gunboats on the great American lakes? If this was true, and if it should also appear that the notice to put an end to the Reciprocity Treaty had either not yet been given or had been accompanied by some friendly declaration of a desire to negociate anew, the House must receive the intelligence with satisfaction; but should it, unfortunately, be the fact that non- intercourse regulations were maintained, that the lakes were to be covered by armaments, and that international trade was to be interfered with, then he thought the House would consider the question as one affecting a hostile neighbour, whose unfriendly designs had to be met by preparation. He hoped, therefore, that the right hon. gentleman would give the House all the information at his command. Had he been in possession of all the facts, he should have been disposed to move as an amendment that it was inexpedient to consider a vote of money for the construction of fortifications adjoining the United States frontier until negociations had been undertaken and had failed, with a view to the suspension of such works under treaty obligation. He was strongly in favour of negociation. There was an example and precedent in the arrangement of 1817 for the neutralization of the lakes. That peaceful compact had endured for fifty years, and had alike saved the expense and obviated the dangers attending rival navies on the great internal waters of America. It was self-evident that we must either fortify efficiently or let it alone. The United States could not fail to see that if they laid out large sums on permanent works of defence, we must do the same; while if we voted money, they must follow us. And thus while both countries made themselves poorer in the process, neither became much stronger, because a sort of equilibrium of forces would after all be maintained. The Government at Washington surely had no present desire to enter upon a race of expenditure for military works on both sides of the frontier. If they had, the sooner we knew it the better, for then the House would only have one course, however they might deplore it, to pursue. But here was a case where the common sense of the American people could, he thought, be appealed to not in vain. Instead of fortifying, let us neutralize the frontier—let us agree to do away with the expenditure. [Mr. BRIGHT: On both sides the frontier?] Yes, on both sides. If the American people were appealed to as the hon. member for Rochdale appealed to the Emperor of the French in favour of the French treaty, he believed that similar earnestness and tact could bring about an arrangement. The Government at Washington would thereby set an example to all countries having long frontier lines, and a precedent would be established of inestimable value to the world. What could be more deplorable than to substitute for neutrality and the operation of the Reciprocity Treaty an armed frontier and practical non-intercourse? He had before stated, from much personal observation on the spot, that border feeling and jealousy had hardly an existence as between the people of our possessions, and of the United States; but so soon as rival fortresses, frowned at each other on both sides of the line, and an armed truce were, so to speak, established, all the feelings and prejudices of separate nationality would grow up in abundance. The free exchanges of industry would, perhaps, be at the same time arrested, and war itself might not be impossible. The Reciprocity Treaty practically made the people of the United States and of the British North American possessions, each living under a totally different form of government, one for all purposes of trade and intercourse. Why should they be separated? But unfortunately our Government did not appreciate the value of, or they did not appear disposed to undertake, negociations. Instead of endeavouring to come to some friendly understanding first, they came down to the House and asked for a vote of money, enough to change the aspect of discussion with the United States, but not enough to effectually protect from danger. They would spend money first, he supposed, and then negotiate; they would allow some great evil to happen, and remonstrate afterwards. The difficulties in Canada might have been avoided by previous precaution. The threatened notice to put an end to the treaty, which grew out of those difficulties, might have been avoided by a renewal of the engagement two years ago. But the Government had done nothing. They had been—how many months?—without a Minister at Washington at the most critical period of our relations with the United States. Now it was proposed to send out a gentleman of many attainments, but who certainly was not of the first order of diplomatists. Was he gone? [Mr. BRIGHT: They say he goes to-morrow.] His hon. friend the member for Birmingham said he was to leave to-morrow. Hitherto all the interests of this country had been left in the hands of Mr. Burnley, who, if only from his position, was not able to meet on equal terms the able men of whom Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet was composed. Ever since the 17th December a vexatious system of passports and consular regulations as to merchandize had been in force. These regulations were probably in force now. They had seriously impeded trade, produced uncertainty and alarm, and great losses to individuals. They had also created great exasperation; yet during all this time we had no ambassador at Washington. Since he entered the House, a letter, by the mail just in, had been placed in his hands, and he would, with the permission of the House, read an extract from it. The writer, under date Portland, March 11th, says:—'Some eighteen passengers, per "Belgian," arrived here without passports for Canada. The United States Government, by order of General Dix, has detained them, and sent a squad of soldiers to guard them on board the "Belgian." At this time of writing they are still in custody, one of them being a clergyman. Only fancy, United States soldiers taking charge of an English ship and English subjects! This is carrying the matter with a high hand.' Now, he did not believe that the Government of the United States had purposely and of malice aforethought committed this outrage, nor did he speak of it to increase irritation; but did it not show how wrong the Government had been in leaving the interests of this country so long without representation? What, in fact, was the use of an embassy at all if our ambassador was not at his post? The Embassy at Washington was now the most important of our diplomatic establishments abroad. We ought to place there the ablest man we could find, regardless of all party or personal considerations. The people of the United States knew our own estimate of our own officials well, and they took it as a slight if we did not send to Washington a man of the first rank as a diplomatist. He would appeal to the noble lord at the head of the Government to consider the suggestion he had ventured to make, and not to allow the country to embark, without any attempt at negociation, in an expenditure of which this was but the first beginning if the policy of it should be forced upon the House. Our fellow-subjects in Canada ought to be assured that, if an unjust war broke out, this country would stand by them at all hazards; but that assurance was quite consistent with the attempt which, he hoped, would be made after all, to neutralize the frontier and the lakes and to re-establish the Reciprocity Treaty. The House would, he felt assured, do nothing to raise up bitter feelings between the British Provinces and the United States, nor to alienate still further two peoples of common origin, who, for the sake of civilization itself, ought, as far as possible, to be one and united in the interests of commerce and of peace."
"Lord PALMERSTON: Sir, this is not a Canadian question, it is not a local question, it is an Imperial question. It is a question which affects the position and character, the honour, the interests, and the duties of this great country; and I hold it to be of the utmost importance to the character of the nation in a case like this, and when the great majority of the House seem to be of the same opinion, that it should not go forth to the world that there has been a difference of opinion on this motion; but that it should be seen to have been accepted by a unanimous House of Commons. Sir, there are one or two points with regard to which I think it right to express my dissent from some doctrines which have been laid down. Many gentlemen have argued this question as if there was a general impression and belief that war with the United States was imminent, and that this proposal of ours was for the purpose of meeting a sudden danger which we apprehended to be hanging over us. Now, I think there is no danger of war with America. Nothing that has recently passed indicates any hostile disposition on the part of the United States towards us; and, therefore, I do not base this motion on the ground that we expect war to take place between this country and America. But is it necessary that when you propose to put a country in a state of defence you should show that war with some powerful neighbour is imminent and likely soon to take place? Why, the whole practice of mankind is founded on an entirely different assumption. Every country which is able to do so fortifies its frontier if its neighbour is a powerful state, which might, if it thought fit, attack it. But it is said that you cannot defend Canada. Now, I utterly deny that proposition. I think that is assuming a conclusion which no man is entitled to assume. Does the example even of the war now going on tend to justify that conclusion? The territory of the Confederates is vast and extensive; have they attempted to defend every portion of that territory? They have fortified certain important points, and those important points, although the rest of the country may have been overrun, have resisted attack—some of them even to this day and others for three or four years of the contest. Look at Richmond; is Richmond taken? Has not Richmond been attacked for a great length of time? And what are its defences? Why, chiefly earthworks, with a force behind them; and, though that force is inferior in numbers to the force which threatens it, it has hitherto remained in Confederate hands. The mere occupation of territory by an army that traverses through it without reducing its fortresses is no conquest. The conquest is limited to the ground that the invading army occupies, and when that army passes to another part of the country its conquest passes away with it. But all countries fortify particular points, and when those points are secure they trust that the general bulk of the territory is safe from any permanent occupation or conquest by any enemy who may attack it. It is urged that Canada has an extended frontier; but are no other States similarly placed in that respect? What country has the largest frontier? What is the extent of our own frontier? Why, the whole coast of the United Kingdom; and we might as well say that it would be necessary for the security of this country that we should line our whole coast with defensive works because we may be attacked at any point of that great and extensive frontier. I maintain, therefore, that there is nothing that has passed—nothing that is now passing—between the Government of the United States and our Government which justifies any man in saying that the relations between the two countries are likely, as far as present circumstances go, to assume a character of hostility leading to war. But, then, the hon. member for Birmingham says that any danger which might threaten Canada and our North American Provinces must arise from political disputes between England and the United States. And, therefore, the hon. gentleman says the Canadians will find that their best security is, not in fortifications or in British support, but in separating themselves from Great Britain. Now, in the first place, that happens not to be the wish or inclination of the Canadians. The Canadians are most anxious to maintain the connection with this country. They are proud of that connection; they think it for their interest; they are willing to make every exertion that their population and resources enable them to achieve, and, in conjunction with the efforts of this country, to preserve that connection, and prevent themselves from being absorbed by a neighbouring power. Is it not, therefore, alike the duty and interest of this country, for the sake of that reputation which is the power and strength of a nation, when we find the Canadas and our other Provinces desirous of maintaining the connection, to do that which we may have the means of doing in assisting them to maintain that connection and remain united with Great Britain? But, sir, is it true that the only danger which a smaller colonial state runs from a more powerful and larger neighbour arises from quarrels that may exist between the Mother Country and the foreign state? I say that is a total fallacy. Suppose these provinces separated from this country—suppose them erected into a monarchy, a republic, or any other form, of Government, are there not motives that might lead a stronger neighbour to pick a quarrel with that smaller state with a view to its annexation? Is there nothing like territorial ambition pervading the policy of great military states? The example of the world should teach us that as far as the danger of invasion and annexation is concerned, that danger would be increased to Canada by a separation from Great Britain, and when she is deprived of the protection that the military power and resources of this country may afford. If these American Provinces should desire to separate, we should not adopt the maxim that fell unconsciously from the hon. member for Birmingham, who maintained that the North was right in suppressing the rebellion of the South; we will not adopt his maxim, and think that we have a right to suppress the rebellion of the North American Provinces. We should take a different line, no doubt, and if these Provinces felt themselves strong enough to stand upon their own ground, and if they should desire no longer to maintain their connection with us, we should say, 'God speed you and give you the means to maintain yourselves as a nation!' That has not happened; but, on the contrary, they much dislike the notion of annexation to their neighbours and cling to their connection with this country. And I say that it will be disgraceful to this country—it would lower us in the eyes of the world—it would weaken our power and leave consequences injurious to our position in the world if, while they desire to maintain their connection with us, we did not do what we could to assist them in maintaining their position. I think that the Government are perfectly right in proposing this vote to the House. We are of opinion that all those examples which my right hon. friend behind me (Mr. Lowe) has adduced are not applicable. We all know that in winter the snow is so deep in Canada that if an army should march it could only be in one beaten track, and that it would be impossible to carry on siege operations in winter. We know that warlike operations must be limited to the summer months, and we think that we can, by the fortifications now proposed—some to be made by the Canadians and some by this country—put Canada into such a state of defence that, with the exertions of her own population, and assisted by the military force of this country, she will be able to defend herself from attack. My right hon. friend the member for Calne argued in a manner somewhat inconsistent with himself, for what did he say? He says that you cannot defend Canada because the United States can bring a military force into the field much superior to that which you can oppose to them. Yet the right hon. gentleman says we ought to defend Canada. You ought not to relinquish the connection, he says, but you should defend Canada elsewhere. Where? Why, as you are not able to cope with the United States in Canada, where you have a large army, and where you can join your forces to those of the Canadians, you should send an expedition and attack the people of the United States in their own homes and in the centre of their own resources, where they can bring a larger force to repel our invasion. If we are unable to defend Canada, we shall not have much better prospects of success if we land an army to attack New York or any other important city."
Intended Route for a Pacific Railway in 1863.
The result of mature consideration, reasoning carefully upon all the facts I had collected, was, that, at that time, 1863, the best route for a Railway to the Pacific was, to commence at Halifax, to strike across to the Grand Trunk Railway at Riviere du Loup, 106 miles east of Quebec, then to follow the Grand Trunk system to Sarnia; to extend that system to Chicago; to use, under a treaty of neutralization, the United States lines from Chicago to St. Paul; to build a line from St. Paul to Fort Garry (Winnipeg) by English and American capital, and then to extend the line to the Tete Jaune Pass, there to meet a Railway through British Columbia starting from the Pacific. A large part of this route has been completed. For instance, an "Intercolonial" Railway— constructed so as to serve many local, but no grand through, purposes; constructed to satisfy local interests, or, probably, local political needs—has been built. The Grand Trunk extension from Detroit to Chicago, an excellent Railway, has been completed, thanks to the indomitable efforts of Mr. Hickson, the Managing Director of the Grand Trunk. A line from St. Paul to Winnipeg has also been opened; but the route of the line from Winnipeg to the Pacific has been deviated from, and, to save distance, the Kicking Horse and Beaver River Passes have been chosen. I think needless cost has been incurred, and that future maintenance will be greater than it need have been.
The British Columbian Railway has been constructed from Fort Moody toKamloops, and is now part of the Canadian Pacific.
It seemed to me, at that time, that the route of the Ottawa Valley, Lake Nipissing, and round by the head of Lake Superior, was a great project of the future; and that to accomplish so great a work, in such a country, the policy was to utilize existing outlays of capital, filling in vacant spaces rather than duplicating what we had got.
It seemed to me, also, that the use of existing railways in the United States was not only economical, but politic: and I knew that, at that time, the Government of the North would have made every reasonable advance to meet England in affairs of mutual interest. There was every desire, at that juncture, to work cordially with our Queen and her people. For example, the passing of the Slave Trade Bill, modelled on English legislation, in, I think, 1863, through both Houses of Congress at Washington, with hardly a hostile expression.Aproposof this Bill, Mr. Charles Sumner told me, in 1865, at his house at Boston, the following story. "The Bill for putting down the slave trade in association with England and the other anti-slave trade countries passed so quickly as to astonish its friends. Charles Sumner, on the final question being put, 'that the Bill do pass'—as we should put it at home—immediately ran across to Mr. Seward, opened the door of Mr. Seward's private office, without knocking, and found Mr. Seward asleep. He awoke him by calling out, 'Seward, Seward, the Bill is passed: the Bill is passed.' Seward gradually opened his eyes, stared under his bushy eyebrows, and said, 'Then what in —— has become of the "great democratic party?"'"
Again, it was the fault of our own Government at home that the Reciprocity Treaty, nearly expiring, was not renewed. Our Government did nothing. It was the "masterly inactivity" of Lord Granville, and other Whigs, which has done so much harm to the prestige and power of our Empire. Opportunities are everything—they are the statesman's chances. In this case the chance was lost. However, I had every reason to believe that Mr. Seward would have been willing to agree to the use of United States lines up to St. Paul (which he once predicted would become the centre, or "hub," of the United States) and through Minnesota to the boundary of the Hudson's Bay territory,—under a treaty of international neutralization. There were, it is true, difficulties at home. The authorities, at home, did not know what was to be the end of the Civil War. They did not know the country to be passed through. They doubted if there was any precedent. I quoted the treaty, of years before, between England, the United States, and other countries, for the neutralization of a railway, if made, across Honduras, and other analogous cases. But I failed to bring about any official action at that time. I think, in looking back for twenty-three years, I have nothing to modify as respects this. Had my proposals been carried out millions sterling would have been saved; throughout railway communication to the Pacific might have been secured fifteen years sooner; and a friendly agreement with the United States for a great common object would, no doubt, have led to many more equally friendly agreements.
As respects neutralization, I, unconsciously, put a spoke into my own wheel, and I was not aware of it until I had a conversation with Mr. Bright a good while afterwards. Had I known of the grievance at the time I would have gone right off to Washington and explained all about it. The facts were these:—
I was at Quebec in July, 1863. At that time, and previously, and after, there was a tall, long-legged, short-bodied, sallow-faced, sunken-eyed man, whose name, if he had reported it correctly, was Ogden. He was called "consul" for the United States at Quebec. He reported, I was told, direct to Mr. Seward at Washington. He was, in fact, the sort of diplomatist whose duties, as he apprehended them, were those of a spy. He was a person disagreeable to look at, as in his odd-coloured trousers, short waistcoat, and dark green dress-coat, with brass buttons, he went elbowing about amongst the ladies and gentlemen promenading the public walk, which commands so beautiful a view over the St. Lawrence, called the "Platform." Phrenology would have condemned him. Phrenology and Physiognomy combined, would have hung him, on the certain verdict of any intelligent jury.
One day, as I was preparing to go West, a deputation from the "Stadacona" Club of Quebec, of which I was a member, asked me to take the chair at a private dinner proposed to be given at the club to Mr. Vallandigham, the democratic leader of Ohio, who had come across country from Halifax, on his way homeward—through, free, Canada—after his seizure in bed, in Ohio, and deportation across the Northern frontier into the land of secession. It appeared that Mr. Vallandigham, not being a secessionist, merely desiring an honourable peace between North and South, which he had ably advocated, had gone on to Nassau, thence to Halifax, thence to Quebec: where he was.
I at first declined the honour. But I was much pressed. I was told that leading citizens of Quebec and members of the late Canadian Government would attend. That the dinner was merely hospitality to a refugee landed upon our shores in distress; and that my presidency would take away any suspicion that there was the slightestarriere-penseein the matter. I concurred. The dinner took place. Not a word was said of the great pending contest, unless some words of Mr. Vallandigham, apologizing for the poverty of his dress, might be so construed. He said: "Mr. Chairman, I must apologize for my costume. I can only explain that I am standing in the clothes I was allowed to put on, after being taken out of my own bed, in my own house, without warning and without warrant, and I have not had the means to re-clothe myself."
The dinner was certainly about as non-political and as innocent as any such assembly could be. Mr. Vallandigham left for Niagara the same night. I saw him into the train. He declined a friendly loan; but he accepted a free passage to Niagara, where, later on, I spent two or three pleasant and interesting days in his society; our little party being Governor Dallas, of the Hudson's Bay Company, D'Arcy McGee, Dr. Mackay, who had acted as correspondent of the "Times," Professor Hind, my son, Mr. Watkin, and myself. The "consul" had, no doubt, misrepresented our proceedings.
Now this is the whole story. I never after this got any answers to letters to Mr. Seward; and, as stated above, I never knew of the grievance till spoken to by Mr. Bright, who had received a letter of complaint of me from somebody at Washington.
Letters from Sir George E. Cartier—Question of Honors.
The "Act for the Union of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the government thereof, and for purposes connected therewith," received the Royal Assent on the 29th of March, 1867.
The following letters may be of some interest to the friends of the late Sir George Etienne Cartier, and to mine:
"W. P. HOTEL, LONDON,"30 April, 1867.
"My DEAR MR. WATKIN,
"I leave to-morrow forLiverpoolon my way toCanada. Allow me, before my departure, to convey to you personally and for 'Canada' the most sincere and grateful thanks for all the kindnesses you have bestowed, on me since mysojourn inLondon, and for all the political services you have rendered to 'Canada' in having soefficiently helpedthe carrying of thegreat confederation measure. I hope that before long we will see you again in Canada, and rest assured that we will be delighted to demonstrate to youour gratefulness.
"Be kind enough to present my best respects to Mrs. Watkin, and to ask her to accept from me the within-enclosed photograph taken at 'Naples,' which I think is very good.
"Good bye, my dear Mr. Watkin, and believe me,"Yours very truly,"GEO. ET. CARTIER."E. W. WATKIN, Esq., M.P."
When the Act for Confederation had been passed, and while some of the delegates were still in England, a notification was made of honors intended to be conferred by Her Majesty on some of those who had devoted anxious hours of labour to the great cause of Union. In my case, my name was mentioned for knighthood, while the names of Mr. Cartier and Mr. Galt were named for the honor of "C. B.," and Mr. Langevin's name appeared to be entirely omitted. When, how, or by whom, the leader of the great French-speaking section of the Canadian people was placed, thus, in a position inferior to that of the leader of Upper Canada, who was made "K. C. B.," I do not care, now, to inquire. But I felt at the time, and I feel now, that it would have been unjust— unselfish and earnest as my services had been—to give to a man like Mr. Cartier, an honor inferior to that which common report had attributed to me. I felt, also, that the proposal would be treated as a slight to the Catholic and French-speaking people. I did all in my, limited, power to represent the mistake and the danger to the leaders of the Government, at home; and, as will be shown in the next Chapter, I wrote to Mr. Disraeli on this serious question on the 3rd August, 1867.
"MONTREAL, "23rd August, 1867.
"I thank you very much for your kind letters. Really you are too good toespouse, as it were, my cause respecting thehonors conferredin Canada. There is no doubt that——is the cause of all theevilin the matter of thehonors conferred. Someother partiesare also not exempt from blame. I have not as yet received a reply to my letter declining theC. B. ship. I presume I shall have it very soon. I have to tell you that I will make throughoutallLower Canada thebest electoral campaignI have ever made. TheRougeswill not elect 10 members out of the 65allottedtoLowerCanada.HoltonandDorion, theleadersof the Rouge Party, will very likely be defeated. I went to Chateaugay on Monday last to attend a meeting against Holton. I gave it to him as he deserved. I will tell you inconfidencethatGait and myselfthrough the large majority I will have in Lower Canada, will be stronger than ever. Mrs. Cartier and my girls are at Rimouska. I will deliver them your kind messages as soon as I see them. My kindest regards to Mrs. Watkin, and believe me,
"My dear Mr. Watkin,"Yours very truly,"GEO. ET. CARTIER.
"E. W. WATKIN, Esq, M.P.,"London."
"MONTREAL,"22_nd September_, 1867.
"Accept my most sincere thanks for your such unappreciable kindness in having made common cause with me in reference to the late distribution of honors in Canada. I do really think, and I am convinced, that you have allowed your good heart to go too far in having declined the honor and distinction offered to you, and which you so well deserved in every respect. I hope thatmy matterwill not stand in the way of you having your public and political services in England, as well as in Canada, sooner or later fully recognized, and well rewarded by a proper and suitable distinction. I hope so, for your own sake as well as for that of Mrs. Watkin and your son and amiable daughter. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has written you a very nice letter, indeed. With regard to mymatter, would you imagine that the Duke of Buckingham has written aconfidential noteto Lord Monck, telling to this latter that therebeing no precedentfor a resignation of the C. B., the only way to have my wishes carried out would be by theQueendirecting byorderin the Gazette my name to be struck out from the Order, which proceeding, the Duke adds, would beconstruedbyoutsidersanduninitiatedthat it was formisconduct. Lord Monck having communicated to me the substance of the Duke's communication, I have asked Lord Monck to obtain from the Duke leave to communicate to me the substance of his note inno confidentialmanner, in order that I may reply to it. I do really think that the intention is tofrightenme, in order to induce me to withdraw my letter asking leave to resign the C. B. That Iwill not do, and when the Duke's communication is under myeyesinno confidential manner, I will send such a reply that will make people understand theinjury doneto me, and theslightso absurdlyofferedto amillionofgood and loyalFrench Canadians. As a matter of course, all that I say to you in this letter isstrictlyin confidence to you.
"Mrs. Cartier and myself have had the pleasure, yesterday, to have the company atdinnerof your friends Mr. and Mrs. Sidebottom. They are really a very nice couple, and we thank you for having given us the opportunity of making their acquaintance. Be kind enough to present on my behalf, and on that of Mrs. Cartier and my daughters, our best respects and regards to Mrs. Watkin, and to believe me, my dear Mr. Watkin,
"Your devoted friend,"GEO. ET. CARTIER.
"E. W. WATKIN, Esq., M.P., London."
"OTTAWA, "24_th November_, 1867.
"I am so much thankful to you for your kind wish of the 10th of October last. I do appreciate with gratefulness your so kind expression of feelings towards me. I enclose you an extract of the 'Montreal Gazette,' giving the report of a debate which took place in our House some few days ago respecting the 'C.B.' matter, and also an 'extract' of the same paper, containing some editorial remarks on the same subject. I like to keep youau courantof that matter, since you are so good as to take interest in it. I took great care not to take any part in the debate. I have not as yet got a copy of the Duke of Buckingham's letter. I will follow your advice with regard to any answer to it on my part. I will never forget your disinterestedness in this question of 'honor' and nothing will be more agreeable to me than to act in such a way, whenever the opportunity will offer itself, as to show by reciprocal action my thanks and my feelings.
"'The Grand Trunk Act' will be read a second time to-morrow (Monday). Mrs. Cartier and my girls are here for a few days. We were all sorry to hear that your son had an attack of fever. We all hope that he got over it, and that he is well again. Be kind enough to present to Mrs. Watkin and your dear son our best regards and kindest remembrance. I regret very much the retirement of 'Galt' from our government. You will have heard that I have replaced him byRose. I could not do better under any circumstances.
"Believe me, my dear Mr. Watkin,"Yours very truly,"GEO. ET. CARTIER.
"E. W. WATKIN, Esq., M.P.,"London, England."
"QUEBEC,"15_th February_, 1868.
"I am very grateful to you for your three kind letters of the 2nd, 13th, and 15th January last. Be good enough to excuse me if I have not sooner acknowledged their receipt.
"I am in Quebec since a couple of weeks, attending the 'Local Parliament,' of which I am a member. Things are going on very well. I got elected to the 'Local Parliament' in order to help myfriends, the 'Local Ministers' to carry on the 'Local Government' and I must say they are doing it very well. The 'Quebec Legislature' carries this 'business' better than does the 'Ontario Legislature.' I will leave for Ottawa on the 17th instant, to be there on the 20th to attend theCouncil Meetingfor deciding on therouteof theIntercolonial Railway.
"I felt so sorry to hear that your dear son was so long unwell. I hope that by this time he is himself again.
"I gave to Mrs. Cartier and my daughters your kind message of good wishes for them and myself during this present year. We are all thankful to you. Have the goodness to accept in return from them and myself for you, Mrs. Watkin, and your dear son and daughter, our best wishes for the prosperity and happiness of you all.
"I must say, my dear Mr. Watkin, that with regard to the C. B. matter, you do really take too much trouble and interest for me. I am very thankful to you for it, and also to Mr. Baring and Lord Wharncliffe. If you have occasion tointimateto them my thankfulness, if any opportunity for so doing should offer itself to you, you would oblige me very much.
"Really it was too kind of Lord Wharncliffe to have brought that delicate matter before Lord Derby, and to have written you about it. I thank you for the enclosures you have made to me of what Lord Wharncliffe had written to you about the C. B.
"I have now to tell you something which happened about that subject since my last to you.
"You very likely must have seen or heard of the 'notification,' published in the 'London Gazette' at the end of the month ofDecember last, about thehonors distributedin Canada in connection with the 'Confederation.' In that 'notification' you must have seen that the names of 'myself and Galt' are omitted, and it was stated in thatnotificationthat it must be 'substituted' for the 'one' published on the 9th of July last, in which Galt's name and minewere insertedas C. B. Now, you must recollect that some months ago I wrote you about a 'confidential communication' of the Duke of Buckingham to Lord Monck, in order that it should be intimated to me and Gait, that there was no precedent of a resignation of the Order of the Bath, and that the only way left for thecarrying outof Galt's wishes and mine would be by 'an order of Her Majesty ordering our names to be struck off the roll.' The communication of the Duke having been made to me in aconfidential manner, I had no opportunity to answer it. I had written to Lord Monck to ask the Duke's leave for communicating to me in no confidential manner the despatch of the Duke, in order to give me an opportunity to answer it. I never had anyanswerfrom LordMonckto that request. To my great surprise, at the end of December last, I received from Lord Monck a note, accompanied by the copy of a despatch from the Duke, informing me that amode had been foundto meet my wishes and those of Galt, which consisted in the publication in the 'London Gazette' of a 'notification' omitting our names, and such notification to be substituted for the former one of July last.