Chapter 6

If we turn from this narrower tactical point of view to the formations on a large scale where échelon is to be found—namely, the divisions—here too the examination leads to no more favourable conclusions. I ask myself, when and under what circumstances will such a formation be advisable?

During the approach to the battle of encounter it is, as I have endeavoured to prove, quite superfluous, and may even operate to our disadvantage. In this case, when total uncertainty reigns as to whether the combat will be carried out mounted or dismounted, or both, there can be no question of any stereotyped tactical formation, either of units as a whole or of smaller bodies within them. Here, as we have seen, the battle will generally develop gradually, and the fighting-line be fed from depth, until the necessary information as to the enemy has been gained and the decisive attack can be embarked upon. Under such circumstances the brigades advance according to the tasks allotted them, and make their dispositions as circumstances dictate. The depth that will be necessary can obviously not be laid down, and can be attained by échelon neither inthe division nor in its subdivisions. If the division should advance under such circumstances in close formation écheloned within itself, the unnecessary danger would be run of offering an ideal target to the enemy's artillery (which must always be taken into consideration), and at the same time of hampering movement where circumstances demand the greatest freedom in all directions.

If, on the other hand, the enemy's dispositions are known before a collision occurs, the Regulations themselves (426, see p. 172) allow that échelon formation is superfluous, and that the advance may be made in the deployed formation desired, brigades being on the same frontage, if the country and the character of the adversary offer the probability of a charge.

And will it be different in the battle of all arms? In that case, if the army cavalry advances from the wing of the army with the intention of attacking the enemy's flank, what need will it have of échelon formations? It is known that an attack must be made under any circumstances. Further information as to the comparative strength of the enemy cannot and must not be waited for. All available forces will be engaged in order to wrest a victory, and must from the beginning be so disposed that the enemy will be compelled as far as possible to conform to our movements, and that we may prepare the most favourable deployment for attack in the manner discussed above. Must we, then, advance with the division in close formation, écheloned within itself, in order to afford the greatest possible target for the enemy's artillery? Are we to choose the pusillanimous formation of the defensive échelon, that we may perhaps be obliged to approach and to deploy under the enemy's eyes, incapable in this unwieldy formation of turning the ground to account?I cannot think that this is practical and believe that modern artillery fire of itself suffices to make the écheloned division an impossibility and to banish it for ever from the battlefield.

It must be added that should the unexpected appearance of the enemy on a flank make it necessary,rearwardéchelon is much easier to assume from a formation of brigades on the same front than is the line or attack formation from rearward échelon. It is only necessary for that part of the line which is to be écheloned to halt or decrease the pace, and the échelon is soon formed. To push forward units from depth while on the move means, on the other hand, a considerable and indeed unnecessary expenditure of force.

VII. FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT

As the brigades in a modern division must, on account of the effect of artillery fire, be disposed according to completely different principles from those of the past, so, too, must the formations adopted by the various groups be chosen to suit modern conditions.

Our new Regulations lay down that, if the cavalry, after its preliminary deployment, has to cross an extensive fire-zone, the subordinate leaders are to choose such formations for their units as will minimise the effect of the hostile fire, and that, for this purpose, the configuration of the ground must be turned to the best advantage, even though it should involve temporary departure from prescribed intervals.

I do not consider these instructions, which, in contradiction to the general principles of the Regulations, give free play to the initiative of all subordinate leaders, are sufficiently definite. They appear to try to avoid giving a distinct designation to this manner ofadvance. Before the publication of the Regulations it was known as "extended formation." As such I have characterised it in my brochure, "Reflections on the New Cavalry Regulations," published in 1908, and it is to be regretted that this title was not maintained in the Regulations, and with it also the real essence of the whole formation. This would, I think, have made the matter clearer. I hold it to be of great importance that the adoption of such formations should be ordered by higher authority, as otherwise there must be a danger of the troops getting out of hand.

In adopting these extensions it is not only a question of ground actually under artillery fire, but also of areas during the crossing of which fire may be expected, to which, of course, the troops should not be exposed. Whether such is the case or not, the cavalry commander, who is observing and receiving intelligence as the troops hurry forward, is alone in a position to judge, and not each subordinate leader. For this reason alone, unity of action is absolutely necessary. So is it also from another point of view. I need scarcely enlarge on the picture of what would occur if each subordinate commander, each squadron leader, according to his individual judgment, were to suddenly regulate the pace and formation of his own volition, while it would be a matter of difficulty to maintain proper control of the troops if it were left to the squadron leaders to regain alignment in their own time.

It is therefore imperative, to my mind, that such extensions should not be left to the discretion of the squadron leader, but ordered by superior authority. Instructions as to pace should be given at the same time, and the area indicated where troops are to regain the formation ordered and decrease the pace. Theseare points that have escaped the notice of the Regulations. Orders must also be given as to whether several lines will eventually be formed. These will then generally have to follow each other at shrapnel distance. Only the choice of formation and line of advance must be left to the subordinate leaders, as they alone are in a position to judge of the local effect of the hostile fire.

If such dispositions are to be made, all commanders, down to squadron leaders, must be instructed in time, so that they may have already adopted the necessary formation on reaching the dangerous zone. They must at the same time be informed, in so far as can be ascertained, from which direction artillery fire—for this alone can be in question—is to be expected.

Should the artillery fire come from the front, column of route will often be a suitable formation. It affords but a small frontage of target, and facilitates use of the ground. If the artillery fire is expected from a flank, the adoption of a single-rank line will often commend itself. In any case, in the larger formations, distances and intervals must be adjusted so that one and the same burst of shrapnel will not strike two squadrons at once.

As the Regulations do not touch on these points, I do not see how a proper understanding of them can be awakened and cultivated in the troops, imperative though this may be.

As a rule it will be by no means sufficient to adopt formations for minimising the effect of artillery fire only in special cases where such fire is to be expected. The great range of modern guns, and their capabilities of indirect fire induced by improved means of observation, and the possibility of bringing fire to bear on large unseen targets with the aid of the map, make itabsolutely necessary, when entering within possible effective range of artillery, to adopt formations which will offer no favourable mark. If this tends on the one hand, as already remarked, to a premature deployment, it forces us, on the other, to adopt formations which can cross country easily and afford no easy target for the artillery.

I have already shown in a former work[50]how well the double column[51]answers this purpose, and in what a comprehensive manner the principle of independent squadron columns allows of elaboration, to procure for the cavalry the greatest imaginable freedom of movement.

The Regulations do not agree with these views. They hold fast to the principle that deployment must always be in line, and not in a succession of lines, and that before this deployment the squadron columns hitherto employed will generally be replaced by some other formation.

The above remain the chief formations for movement and deployment of the cavalry. The employment of the "regimental mass and brigade mass"[52]has been limited, but the Regulations give us nothing in their place. Nor, on the other hand, is the flexibility of the double column particularly emphasised; its use, indeed, is in a certain sense limited. I see such limitation in the fact that the trumpet-call "Double column!" has been abolished. As, on the other hand, the call "Form regimental mass!" has been retained, it does not appear as if the use of double column is to be further developed, or allowed to replace the regimental and brigade mass on the field of battle.

It is further laid down that the regimental mass is to be used when beyond the range of the enemy's fire, the brigade mass when concealed by the ground, even on the battlefield. A deployment is even allowed for from the brigade in mass towards the flank, and that by a wheel of the head of the columns. This presupposes that such a column can be used in a flank movement, which I regard as an impossibility. A deployment from regimental mass to squadron columns is also provided for. In view of the great effective range of the modern gun, I cannot think that movements in such close formation right up to the moment of deployment can go unpunished upon a modern battlefield.

All these instructions contained in the Regulations, and many others that take effect in the same sense, cannot be regarded as practical. They lead us to fear that the regimental and brigade masses, in spite of all modern conditions, will retain more or less their old importance. They will serve as a pretext for many a hidebound drill enthusiast, of which, alas! there are still many among us. Upon the battlefields of the future, however, we will no longer dare to appear in such formations, but only widely deployed and in thin columns, in such dispositions indeed as will allow of a rapid adoption of the attack formation, such as we have discussed in detail above. I can only hope that these views will, in the not too far distant future, come to be more generally recognised and will find their way into the Regulations.

Finally, I would once again draw attention to theidea of the "vanguard."[53]It receives but a passing mention in the Regulations, and no explanation of what is thereby meant. My opinion is that it is indispensable to all flank movements, and mustcontinuallybe used, especially in the offensive. It should therefore be provided for by regulation in all deployments, and the troops should be fully conversant with its use.

For the rest, the present Regulations, in spite of all actual progress made, can only be designated as provisional, and give rise to the hope that it will be found possible to re-edit them soon, above all as regards the stereotyped parts, so that, fully prepared and up to date, we may go forth with confidence to meet the events of any future war.

VIII. THE VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT

Having in the last chapter endeavoured to elaborate tactical principles, and to give practical hints, I will now shortly deal with the duties of the various units, and endeavour to form an impression of the performances that may be expected of them in the fight.

When asquadron, acting independently in reconnaissance, as advanced guard, flank guard, or divisional cavalry, finds itself obliged to attack, it will, as a rule, employ its whole force simultaneously, whether it charges in line, knee to knee, or uses a troop in single rank as first line. If a troop has been thrown forward as advanced guard, it must quickly clear the front, and endeavour to join the squadron, so as to strengthen it before the collision, and not to become prematurely involved in a disadvantageous fight.

The squadron is generally too weak to carry out an offensive fight on foot. There is also no means ofguarding the led horses but by patrols. If they should become isolated during the attack, there will be a danger of losing them, especially in hostile country. A squadron must therefore only determine on a dismounted attack when such action is absolutely unavoidable. For dispersing hostile patrols or armed inhabitants, about a troop dismounted will generally suffice, where there is no opportunity of surprising them in the charge, or of enveloping them. A defensive fight on foot must not be undertaken by a single squadron unless absolutely necessary, or which the led horses can be disposed in a safe place in the immediate neighbourhood, where the flanks cannot be turned, or where the arrival of reinforcements can be relied upon.

A squadron attacking knee to knee is stronger than a numerically superior enemy who charges in looser formation and is not armed with the lance.

Theregimentof four or five squadrons is numerically too weak a body to be able of itself to carry out the larger strategical missions. It will therefore operate in more or less close co-operation with other troops, and will seldom be called upon to fight independently. It may, however, find itself for a time obliged to rely upon its own fighting strength, whether acting as divisional cavalry, as advanced guard, or as a detachment from a larger force of cavalry.

If a fight is in immediate prospect, column of troops must first be formed from column of route, and a broader front, which will allow of a rapid assumption of the attack formation, must then be adopted according to the ground.

In the charge against cavalry the regiment should only on rare occasions deploy all its squadrons into line, but must, whenever practicable, detail one squadron to follow in second line, and another in forward échelon, to protect the more exposed flank and to turn that of the enemy.

It will also be possible for the regiment to operate dismounted against weaker hostile detachments. If relative strength allows, at least a squadron should be detached to guard the led horses and to carry out reconnaissance duties. In the defence on foot, with ample ammunition and every available rifle in the firing-line, the regiment represents a formidable fighting force, even when obliged to detach one, or even two squadrons, for reconnaissance and for the protection of the flanks and the led horses.

In the fight of smaller bodies of all arms, a regiment will frequently be able to intervene in a most effective manner by a timely charge, from which considerable results may often be expected, especially during pursuit of a retreating and shaken enemy. In such cases the formation of lines for attack will frequently be superfluous, and a broad enveloping formation may be adopted.

Thebrigadeof two regiments is numerically too weak of itself to carry out strategical missions, and to be able to engage in the independent actions they demand. The heavy drains on its strength which such missions generally entail will usually weaken the fighting power so much that the brigade will no longer be in a condition to engage an opponent of any strength who may have to be dealt with by mounted or dismounted action, or the two in combination.

At the same time, circumstances may lead to a brigade beingforcedto carry out an independent rôle. It will then have to reconnoitre with great care, so that it may only embark on a decisive encounter with a full knowledge of the situation. Otherwise, in viewof its small offensive power, it will run a great risk of suffering defeat, especially when dismounted.

In the defence on foot, on the other hand, a brigade may be regarded as an important factor of strength, capable of successfully resisting an enemy of considerable superiority, as long as its flanks are protected and the led horses do not require too large an escort.

On approaching the enemy, the brigade must form column of troops from column of route in good time and the regiments must be deployed on the frontage and in the formations demanded by the situation. In such cases a reserve must always be detailed. The allotment of different rôles in the fight to the various regiments or groups will form the framework for the tactical deployment. In all attacks the brigade or its component parts must always adopt the formation in lines. Where there is blind ground to a flank, a forward échelon must be formed which will co-operate concentrically in the charge. In the attack on foot, too, it will often be advantageous to échelon detachments forward under due protection, in order to envelop the enemy's position.

In the combat of detachments of all arms, and especially in pursuit, considerable performances must be expected of a brigade. A timely charge or the employment of its fire power in an effective direction may bring about a decision.

Thedivisionof six regiments, under circumstances where its full strength can be employed in the charge, represents, even against troops using the rifle, a very considerable fighting power, which can, if judiciously handled and launched at the right moment, have a decisive effect, even in a battle of armies.

In independent missions it must be remembered that a complete regiment of four squadrons with 15 filesper troop will represent 400 rifles at most. In war, however, this figure will never be reached. Wastage on the march and the provision of the necessary detachments and patrols, weaken squadrons very considerably. We must further remember that in every great battle a mounted reserve will always have to be detailed, while, in addition to this, detachments such as reconnoitring squadrons, escorts to transport, reporting centres, and signal stations, will generally fail to rejoin in time for the battle. Thus the division will seldom actually be able to reckon on more than 1,000 to 1,500 rifles in the firing-line.

Even counting on the co-operation of artillery and machine-guns, which the enemy will also have at his disposal, this represents no great offensive strength. It is therefore necessary to be quite clear in our minds that only weak detachments can be attacked with prospect of success.

A cavalry division is greatly handicapped by these circumstances in carrying out the rôle which may be assigned to it in the course of operations. The resistance of a body of equal strength where circumstances demand a dismounted attack can thus never be overcome.

Mounted, however, it is quite another matter. A well-trained German cavalry division, handled according to sound tactical principles and schooled to charge in close formation, may attack even a stronger enemy regardless of consequences.

Should the task at issue demand a larger force, several divisions must be united in acavalry corps. In the battle of all arms such a corps, either by the charge or by employment of its fire power, may aim at decisive results. For the conduct of independent strategic missions fire power is an important factor. As in thiscase the number of men detached, etc., will be divided between the divisions, a strength of 3,500 rifles can at times be reached in a corps of two divisions.

For the division, as for the corps, the framework of the tactical deployment depends upon the commander's tactical plan, as too does the allotment of duties in the fight to the various units, divisions, brigades, and regiments, or to the tactical groups, advanced guard, main body, reserve, etc., and any attempt at retaining the command in one hand is obviously out of the question. Stress has already been laid on the necessity for early deployment, and once this is effected, the various subdivisions of the force must take their own independent measures for carrying out the rôles that devolve upon them.

On the other hand, neither in the fight of the independent cavalry nor in the great battle should a unit be allowed to become isolated in the combat. The necessary combination must always be preserved. United action, however, is only possible if subordinate leaders never lose sight of the general purpose of the fight, and continually bear in mind the necessary interchangeable relations of the various tactical methods.

In war it will seldom be possible either to undertake or to carry out the very best course of action, but will generally be unnecessary, for we may certainly count on numerous errors and vacillations on the part of the enemy, especially in the case of cavalry warfare.

It is of far greater importance that any plan once undertaken should be energetically carried through to a conclusion.

Success in war is first and foremost a matter of character and will. The indomitable will to conquer carries with it a considerable guarantee of success.

The determination to win, cost what it may, is therefore the first and greatest quality required of a cavalry leader—and the offensive is the weapon with which he can best enforce his will.

FOOTNOTES:[12]"By reason of its firearms, cavalry is capable also ofdismounted action. It is thus in a position—and especially so when supported by horse artillery and machine-guns—to offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it refrain from attack, should the situation require it. It will often have to combine dismounted with mounted action."[13]"In combination with the cavalry combat, thefire effect of the carbinemay be employed on occasions. Thus the occupation ofpoints-d'appuiby portions of the advanced guard may often provide favourable and, at times, indispensable preliminaries to the deployment of a division. The support of carbine fire may be possible and useful even during contact."[14]"The Crisis of the Confederacy," by Cecil Battine.[15]"By reason of its firearms, cavalry is capable also ofdismounted action. It is thus in a position—and especially so when supported by horse artillery and machine-guns—to offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it shrink from attacking, should the situation require it. It will often have to combine dismounted with mounted action."[16]"Cavalry will often be obliged to clear the way for further activity by means of dismountedattack. Attempts also on the hostile lines of communication (such as the capture of railway stations or magazines, the destruction of important engineering works, or the capture of isolated posts, etc.) will certainly involve such attacks. On the battle field, however, dismounted cavalry will rarely be pushed forward."[17]"Cavalry must endeavour to bring dismounted attacks to a conclusion with theutmost rapidity, so that they may regain their mobility at the earliest possible moment. It may also be of importance to bring the encounter to a decision before the arrival of hostile reinforcements."[18]"Bügelfühling," as against "Knie an Knie" (knee to knee).—Trans.[19]As a rule, the squadronattacks cavalryas a single unit in line. The shock must be affected with the maximum momentum in two well-defined, well-closed ranks. Cohesion is above all things necessary for decisive results. Every man must realize this, must maintain his place in the ranks, and must keep close touch with his neighbour."The two squadron flank guides will hold the squadron in towards the centre. Small gaps in the front rank may be filled by closing in, larger gaps by moving up the rear rank files."[20]"When attackingcavalry, the regiments will, as a rule, be employed in a line formation side by side; this will prevent their personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary depth will be supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in this case, it is usually in the form of échelons. If the situation demands it, even single squadrons can follow in column formation."The employment of several lines may be useful on occasions when the situation demands rapid action from the leading regiment, and circumstances will not permit of the rear regiments taking ground to a flank."[21]The German cavalry use two paces at the gallop, 500 and 700 paces per minute, the pace being 80 cm. (32 in.), thus 14½ and 20½ miles per hour.—Trans.[22]"A squadron must seek success againstinfantry, artillery, and machine-gunsby means of surprise and flank attacks. If a frontal attack is necessary, the zone of fire is best passed by increasing the pace. The gallop will be resorted to early in the advance, and the pace increased in the vicinity of the enemy. Breathing spaces can be obtained under cover of theterrain. As, in these cases, momentum of impact is not so important, it will be sufficient if collision takes place at a rapid gallop."In order to minimize loss, it is advisable to let the advanced portions of the squadron, or even the whole, adopt single rank formation with wide intervals. By this means the hostile fire may be broken up, and, on occasions, the dust raised by the troops in open order may facilitate the attack of the portion of the squadron remaining in close order."If it is a question of simultaneous attacks, either on a single enemy from several directions, or on several distinct units of the hostile force, action by single troops may be advisable."Hostile skirmishing lines will be ridden through, if there are other detachments behind them to be attacked. Any form of attack may be employed against shaken, yielding infantry. Skirmishing lines are best pursued in open order, which formation permits of the most effective employment of cavalry weapons."If, during an attack, a squadron breaks into a battery or machine-gun detachment, a portion of the men will be employed against the personnel, a portion against the limbers. Captured guns or machine-guns should be carried off; but, if this is impossible, they will be made unserviceable, or, at any rate, incapable of movement. Led horses should also be made the objective in attacks on dismounted cavalry. "The principles laid down for action against cavalry can be applied,mutatis mutandis, in the matters of pursuit,mêlée, and rally.""Such attacks are carried out in accordance with the principles of para. 113."The strength of a regiment renders it impossible to attack the objective in several lines. The officer commanding will give orders as to whether the front line is to be in single rank, and as to whether the rear lines are to be in a similar formation or in closed double rank."In attacking infantry, the lines must not be at too great a distance from one another. In attacking artillery, the distance between lines is determined by the effective area of the burst of shrapnel (300 metres = 330 yds)."[23]i.e.with insufficient men to lead them.—Trans.[24]"Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments considerable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a surprise appearance combined with an unexpected and simultaneous opening of fire. By means of skillful use of ground and by reason of their mobility, they can rapidly disappear and escape hostile fire action, as soon as they have obtained the desired results.""As many carbines as possible must open fire simultaneously. The leader must do his best to select such ground for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand.""Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to produce the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of the cavalry may be limited to protecting the artillery while taking up a position, whence it can suddenly open a rapid fire on the enemy."[25]"At the command: 'Dismount for dismounted action!' the squadron dismounts. If the carbines are not already slung across the back, they will be taken from the buckets."When double rank has been formed, the horse holders will take charge of the horses. The horse holder of either rank is the left flank file of each section (excepting the left flank guide). If there is only one man in the rear rank of the left flank section of the troop, he will hand over his horse to his front rank horse holder; or, if the latter is already in charge of four horses, to his neighbour. The horses in charge of a horse holder will be linked. Officers' horses are held by trumpeters."Lances are laid on the ground—if in line, in the front of the ranks; if in column, on the flanks—in such a manner that they cannot be damaged by the horses."In the absence of a contrary order, the sergeant-major and the left flank guides will remain with the led horses, in addition to the horse holders."[26]"The led horses will remain in the original troop formation. Their leader must keep himself informed of the course of the encounter, he must remember to keep off hostile patrols by means of single sentries, and he must facilitate the rapid remounting of the dismounted men by placing the horses in orderly formation, with the troops and ranks separated."[27]"If, with due regard to the tactical situation, it can be done without risk, the squadron leader is at liberty, when employingeither method of dismounting, to increase the number of his dismounted men by decreasing the number of his horse-holders."[28]If I lay down that the deployment in the case of infantry columns marching towards each other should begin at 8,500 yards, and in the cavalry only at 6,000 yards, the reason is that the mounted arm effects the necessary deployment much more quickly. The depth of the column, also, is not such a decisive factor as in the case of infantry.[29]"Exterior lines." The author uses an expression familiar to soldiers. In popular language the meaning is to gain a front wide enough to deliver a converging attack, and work round upon one or both of the enemy's flanks, from outside of them.—Editor's Note.[30]"An attack in which troops are sent gradually into action in small detachments, one after the other, is not in accordance with the spirit of cavalry combat. A force large enough for the attainment of the objective must, therefore, be employed from the very commencement of the engagement. But not a man more! No squadron must be allowed to deal a blow in the air. Conversely, it is wrong to commence an engagement with insufficient force, and thus to leave the enemy with initial success."[31]"Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of battle of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the strength and intentions of the enemy renders necessary such échelon formations as will preserve freedom of action."[32]"I get into action and then I see."[33]"If, on emerging from a defile, the enemy is not so close as to necessitate an immediate attack with any available forces, adeployment at the haltoffers certain advantages. It saves space towards the front, and gains time—a matter of some moment in a critical situation. On the other hand, it must be remembered that an immediate employment and advance inspires the troops with enthusiasm. A deployment at the halt may also take place when the intention is to make a surprise attack from a concealed position."[34]"Duringoperations, the army cavalry must seek to gain the earliest possible insight into the situation and dispositions of the enemy. It must endeavour, not only to drive the hostile cavalry from the field, but also to press back advanced detachments of all arms, or to break through and push forward to the vicinity of the main body. Cavalry screen duties, also, may provide fighting for the army cavalry.[35]"The leader must select a station from which, while keeping his own troops well in hand, he can obtain a good view of the surrounding country, of the enemy, and of the progress of the battle. He will either observe himself, or by means of officers sent out to observing stations. These latter must maintain constant communication with him."Personal observation is always the best, and is essential in the case of offensive action against cavalry."[36]"As a general principle, amounted reservewill be detailed."In special cases, the leader may detail adismounted reserve, which he can make use of at points where, during the course of the battle, the enemy's weakness is disclosed, or which are recognized as decisive objectives for the attack. It is often advisable only to detail such a force, when it is required, from the troops which have remained mounted."[37]"The mounted reservecontinues the tactical reconnaissance and undertakes the protection of the led horses. It will also assume the offensive against a flank of the hostile position, whenever it is possible to combine it with the above duties. When fighting dismounted cavalry, it endeavours to drive the hostile mounted reserve from the field, and to capture the led horses."[38]"Rasch vorwärts."[39]"Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments considerable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a surprise appearance combined with an unexpected and simultaneous opening of fire. By means of skilful use of ground, and by reason of their mobility, they can rapidly disappear and escape hostile fire action, as soon as they have obtained the desired results.""As many carbines as possible must open fire simultaneously. The leader must do his best to select such ground for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand.""Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to produce the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of the cavalry may be limited to protecting the artillery while taking up a position, whence it can suddenly open a rapid fire on the enemy."[40]"Cavalry in Future Wars," Part I, chap. v.[41]According to the French General Staff history, this cavalry met a battalion of the 25th Regiment of the 6th Corps, as well as the 3rd Chasseur Battalion and a battalion of the 27th Regiment of the 2nd Corps. At all events, the attack met, not retiring, but unshaken troops.[42]Five German miles = 23 English miles.[43]"Should the issue of the battle prove unfavourable, the cavalry must strain every nerve to facilitate theretreatof the other arms. It is just in such cases that they must assume a relentless offensive. Repeated attacks on the flanks of the pursuing troops will produce the best results."Even temporary relief for the retreating infantry and a short gain in time may avert utter defeat. The cavalry which effects this will, though it gains no victory, retain the honours of the day."[44]Échelon formations are those in which lines or bodies of troops are placed not directly in rear of each other, but with the second line to the right or left of the first and the next similarly placed—"like steps of stairs"—hence the name. "Échelon" means literally a "step" or the "rung of a ladder."—Editor's Note.[45]"As a rule, a single regiment attacks in line. It may, or may not, be in échelon. Only on exceptional occasions should one of the squadrons follow as a second line."The officer commanding will bring the directing squadron into the direction of the attack. The squadrons, each in close formation, must be led so as to ensure combined action."The échelons will envelop the hostile flank or ward off the enemy's flank attacks; they can also be used to prolong the front of the regiment, or they can turn against portions of the enemy which have broken through.""When attackingcavalry, the regiments will, as a rule, be employed in a line formation side by side; this will prevent their personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary depth will be supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in this case, it is usually in the form of échelons.If the situation demands, even single squadrons can follow in column formation."The employment of several lines may be useful on occasions when the situation demands rapid action from the leading regiment, and circumstances will not permit of the rear regiments taking ground to a flank."[46]"When advancing to attackcavalry, the divisional commander will, as a rule, order the brigades intoéchelon formation.Brigades will make independent arrangements as regards formation in depth and for flank protection."As soon as the divisional commander has decided to attack, he will arrange for the employment of the artillery and machine-guns; he will give the brigades their attack orders; if necessary, he will give the directing brigade the line of attack; and he will detach his reserve."The further execution of the attack will rest with the brigade commanders.""Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of battles of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the strength and intentions of the enemy renders necessary such échelon formations as will preserve freedom of action.""The formation of the échelonwill vary according to the objective and to local conditions."Should no certain information as to the advance and formation of the enemy be forthcoming, a double échelon is possibly the best. But, should a flank rest on impassable, or on very open, country, which is, however, covered by the fire of friendly artillery, only single échelon is necessary. Échelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the advanced guard situation. The above cases are given merely as examples."As the situation is gradually cleared up, the flexibility of échelon formations renders it easy to attain the formation in which the attack will be delivered."[47]"Should it be possible to ascertain the hostile dispositions with approximate certainty, the cavalry leader can have his front rank units in line from the start, and deployed on the frontage upon which he intends to attack. The advantage thus gained, if combined with rapidity of movement, will often render it possible to deliver an enveloping attack during the hostile deployment."[48]" ... for greater changes of front,e.g.to the complete flank, it will generally be necessary to re-form the division."[49]"Échelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the advanced guard situation."[50]"Reflections on the New Cavalry Regulations."[51]Two squadrons abreast in squadron-column at six paces' interval, followed by two more at troop-frontage distance. When there is a fifth squadron, it follows in the same formation in rear of the left.—Trans.[52]"Regiments-und Brigadekolonnen."[53]"Tetenschutz."

FOOTNOTES:

[12]"By reason of its firearms, cavalry is capable also ofdismounted action. It is thus in a position—and especially so when supported by horse artillery and machine-guns—to offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it refrain from attack, should the situation require it. It will often have to combine dismounted with mounted action."

[13]"In combination with the cavalry combat, thefire effect of the carbinemay be employed on occasions. Thus the occupation ofpoints-d'appuiby portions of the advanced guard may often provide favourable and, at times, indispensable preliminaries to the deployment of a division. The support of carbine fire may be possible and useful even during contact."

[14]"The Crisis of the Confederacy," by Cecil Battine.

[15]"By reason of its firearms, cavalry is capable also ofdismounted action. It is thus in a position—and especially so when supported by horse artillery and machine-guns—to offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it shrink from attacking, should the situation require it. It will often have to combine dismounted with mounted action."

[16]"Cavalry will often be obliged to clear the way for further activity by means of dismountedattack. Attempts also on the hostile lines of communication (such as the capture of railway stations or magazines, the destruction of important engineering works, or the capture of isolated posts, etc.) will certainly involve such attacks. On the battle field, however, dismounted cavalry will rarely be pushed forward."

[17]"Cavalry must endeavour to bring dismounted attacks to a conclusion with theutmost rapidity, so that they may regain their mobility at the earliest possible moment. It may also be of importance to bring the encounter to a decision before the arrival of hostile reinforcements."

[18]"Bügelfühling," as against "Knie an Knie" (knee to knee).—Trans.

[19]As a rule, the squadronattacks cavalryas a single unit in line. The shock must be affected with the maximum momentum in two well-defined, well-closed ranks. Cohesion is above all things necessary for decisive results. Every man must realize this, must maintain his place in the ranks, and must keep close touch with his neighbour."The two squadron flank guides will hold the squadron in towards the centre. Small gaps in the front rank may be filled by closing in, larger gaps by moving up the rear rank files."

"The two squadron flank guides will hold the squadron in towards the centre. Small gaps in the front rank may be filled by closing in, larger gaps by moving up the rear rank files."

[20]"When attackingcavalry, the regiments will, as a rule, be employed in a line formation side by side; this will prevent their personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary depth will be supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in this case, it is usually in the form of échelons. If the situation demands it, even single squadrons can follow in column formation."The employment of several lines may be useful on occasions when the situation demands rapid action from the leading regiment, and circumstances will not permit of the rear regiments taking ground to a flank."

"The employment of several lines may be useful on occasions when the situation demands rapid action from the leading regiment, and circumstances will not permit of the rear regiments taking ground to a flank."

[21]The German cavalry use two paces at the gallop, 500 and 700 paces per minute, the pace being 80 cm. (32 in.), thus 14½ and 20½ miles per hour.—Trans.

[22]"A squadron must seek success againstinfantry, artillery, and machine-gunsby means of surprise and flank attacks. If a frontal attack is necessary, the zone of fire is best passed by increasing the pace. The gallop will be resorted to early in the advance, and the pace increased in the vicinity of the enemy. Breathing spaces can be obtained under cover of theterrain. As, in these cases, momentum of impact is not so important, it will be sufficient if collision takes place at a rapid gallop."In order to minimize loss, it is advisable to let the advanced portions of the squadron, or even the whole, adopt single rank formation with wide intervals. By this means the hostile fire may be broken up, and, on occasions, the dust raised by the troops in open order may facilitate the attack of the portion of the squadron remaining in close order."If it is a question of simultaneous attacks, either on a single enemy from several directions, or on several distinct units of the hostile force, action by single troops may be advisable."Hostile skirmishing lines will be ridden through, if there are other detachments behind them to be attacked. Any form of attack may be employed against shaken, yielding infantry. Skirmishing lines are best pursued in open order, which formation permits of the most effective employment of cavalry weapons."If, during an attack, a squadron breaks into a battery or machine-gun detachment, a portion of the men will be employed against the personnel, a portion against the limbers. Captured guns or machine-guns should be carried off; but, if this is impossible, they will be made unserviceable, or, at any rate, incapable of movement. Led horses should also be made the objective in attacks on dismounted cavalry. "The principles laid down for action against cavalry can be applied,mutatis mutandis, in the matters of pursuit,mêlée, and rally.""Such attacks are carried out in accordance with the principles of para. 113."The strength of a regiment renders it impossible to attack the objective in several lines. The officer commanding will give orders as to whether the front line is to be in single rank, and as to whether the rear lines are to be in a similar formation or in closed double rank."In attacking infantry, the lines must not be at too great a distance from one another. In attacking artillery, the distance between lines is determined by the effective area of the burst of shrapnel (300 metres = 330 yds)."

"In order to minimize loss, it is advisable to let the advanced portions of the squadron, or even the whole, adopt single rank formation with wide intervals. By this means the hostile fire may be broken up, and, on occasions, the dust raised by the troops in open order may facilitate the attack of the portion of the squadron remaining in close order.

"If it is a question of simultaneous attacks, either on a single enemy from several directions, or on several distinct units of the hostile force, action by single troops may be advisable.

"Hostile skirmishing lines will be ridden through, if there are other detachments behind them to be attacked. Any form of attack may be employed against shaken, yielding infantry. Skirmishing lines are best pursued in open order, which formation permits of the most effective employment of cavalry weapons.

"If, during an attack, a squadron breaks into a battery or machine-gun detachment, a portion of the men will be employed against the personnel, a portion against the limbers. Captured guns or machine-guns should be carried off; but, if this is impossible, they will be made unserviceable, or, at any rate, incapable of movement. Led horses should also be made the objective in attacks on dismounted cavalry. "The principles laid down for action against cavalry can be applied,mutatis mutandis, in the matters of pursuit,mêlée, and rally."

"Such attacks are carried out in accordance with the principles of para. 113.

"The strength of a regiment renders it impossible to attack the objective in several lines. The officer commanding will give orders as to whether the front line is to be in single rank, and as to whether the rear lines are to be in a similar formation or in closed double rank.

"In attacking infantry, the lines must not be at too great a distance from one another. In attacking artillery, the distance between lines is determined by the effective area of the burst of shrapnel (300 metres = 330 yds)."

[23]i.e.with insufficient men to lead them.—Trans.

[24]"Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments considerable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a surprise appearance combined with an unexpected and simultaneous opening of fire. By means of skillful use of ground and by reason of their mobility, they can rapidly disappear and escape hostile fire action, as soon as they have obtained the desired results.""As many carbines as possible must open fire simultaneously. The leader must do his best to select such ground for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand.""Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to produce the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of the cavalry may be limited to protecting the artillery while taking up a position, whence it can suddenly open a rapid fire on the enemy."

"As many carbines as possible must open fire simultaneously. The leader must do his best to select such ground for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand."

"Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to produce the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of the cavalry may be limited to protecting the artillery while taking up a position, whence it can suddenly open a rapid fire on the enemy."

[25]"At the command: 'Dismount for dismounted action!' the squadron dismounts. If the carbines are not already slung across the back, they will be taken from the buckets."When double rank has been formed, the horse holders will take charge of the horses. The horse holder of either rank is the left flank file of each section (excepting the left flank guide). If there is only one man in the rear rank of the left flank section of the troop, he will hand over his horse to his front rank horse holder; or, if the latter is already in charge of four horses, to his neighbour. The horses in charge of a horse holder will be linked. Officers' horses are held by trumpeters."Lances are laid on the ground—if in line, in the front of the ranks; if in column, on the flanks—in such a manner that they cannot be damaged by the horses."In the absence of a contrary order, the sergeant-major and the left flank guides will remain with the led horses, in addition to the horse holders."

[25]"At the command: 'Dismount for dismounted action!' the squadron dismounts. If the carbines are not already slung across the back, they will be taken from the buckets.

"When double rank has been formed, the horse holders will take charge of the horses. The horse holder of either rank is the left flank file of each section (excepting the left flank guide). If there is only one man in the rear rank of the left flank section of the troop, he will hand over his horse to his front rank horse holder; or, if the latter is already in charge of four horses, to his neighbour. The horses in charge of a horse holder will be linked. Officers' horses are held by trumpeters.

"Lances are laid on the ground—if in line, in the front of the ranks; if in column, on the flanks—in such a manner that they cannot be damaged by the horses.

"In the absence of a contrary order, the sergeant-major and the left flank guides will remain with the led horses, in addition to the horse holders."

[26]"The led horses will remain in the original troop formation. Their leader must keep himself informed of the course of the encounter, he must remember to keep off hostile patrols by means of single sentries, and he must facilitate the rapid remounting of the dismounted men by placing the horses in orderly formation, with the troops and ranks separated."

[27]"If, with due regard to the tactical situation, it can be done without risk, the squadron leader is at liberty, when employingeither method of dismounting, to increase the number of his dismounted men by decreasing the number of his horse-holders."

[28]If I lay down that the deployment in the case of infantry columns marching towards each other should begin at 8,500 yards, and in the cavalry only at 6,000 yards, the reason is that the mounted arm effects the necessary deployment much more quickly. The depth of the column, also, is not such a decisive factor as in the case of infantry.

[29]"Exterior lines." The author uses an expression familiar to soldiers. In popular language the meaning is to gain a front wide enough to deliver a converging attack, and work round upon one or both of the enemy's flanks, from outside of them.—Editor's Note.

[30]"An attack in which troops are sent gradually into action in small detachments, one after the other, is not in accordance with the spirit of cavalry combat. A force large enough for the attainment of the objective must, therefore, be employed from the very commencement of the engagement. But not a man more! No squadron must be allowed to deal a blow in the air. Conversely, it is wrong to commence an engagement with insufficient force, and thus to leave the enemy with initial success."

[31]"Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of battle of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the strength and intentions of the enemy renders necessary such échelon formations as will preserve freedom of action."

[32]"I get into action and then I see."

[33]"If, on emerging from a defile, the enemy is not so close as to necessitate an immediate attack with any available forces, adeployment at the haltoffers certain advantages. It saves space towards the front, and gains time—a matter of some moment in a critical situation. On the other hand, it must be remembered that an immediate employment and advance inspires the troops with enthusiasm. A deployment at the halt may also take place when the intention is to make a surprise attack from a concealed position."

[34]"Duringoperations, the army cavalry must seek to gain the earliest possible insight into the situation and dispositions of the enemy. It must endeavour, not only to drive the hostile cavalry from the field, but also to press back advanced detachments of all arms, or to break through and push forward to the vicinity of the main body. Cavalry screen duties, also, may provide fighting for the army cavalry.

[35]"The leader must select a station from which, while keeping his own troops well in hand, he can obtain a good view of the surrounding country, of the enemy, and of the progress of the battle. He will either observe himself, or by means of officers sent out to observing stations. These latter must maintain constant communication with him."Personal observation is always the best, and is essential in the case of offensive action against cavalry."

"Personal observation is always the best, and is essential in the case of offensive action against cavalry."

[36]"As a general principle, amounted reservewill be detailed."In special cases, the leader may detail adismounted reserve, which he can make use of at points where, during the course of the battle, the enemy's weakness is disclosed, or which are recognized as decisive objectives for the attack. It is often advisable only to detail such a force, when it is required, from the troops which have remained mounted."

[36]"As a general principle, amounted reservewill be detailed.

"In special cases, the leader may detail adismounted reserve, which he can make use of at points where, during the course of the battle, the enemy's weakness is disclosed, or which are recognized as decisive objectives for the attack. It is often advisable only to detail such a force, when it is required, from the troops which have remained mounted."

[37]"The mounted reservecontinues the tactical reconnaissance and undertakes the protection of the led horses. It will also assume the offensive against a flank of the hostile position, whenever it is possible to combine it with the above duties. When fighting dismounted cavalry, it endeavours to drive the hostile mounted reserve from the field, and to capture the led horses."

[38]"Rasch vorwärts."

[39]"Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments considerable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a surprise appearance combined with an unexpected and simultaneous opening of fire. By means of skilful use of ground, and by reason of their mobility, they can rapidly disappear and escape hostile fire action, as soon as they have obtained the desired results.""As many carbines as possible must open fire simultaneously. The leader must do his best to select such ground for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand.""Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to produce the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of the cavalry may be limited to protecting the artillery while taking up a position, whence it can suddenly open a rapid fire on the enemy."

"As many carbines as possible must open fire simultaneously. The leader must do his best to select such ground for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand."

[40]"Cavalry in Future Wars," Part I, chap. v.

[41]According to the French General Staff history, this cavalry met a battalion of the 25th Regiment of the 6th Corps, as well as the 3rd Chasseur Battalion and a battalion of the 27th Regiment of the 2nd Corps. At all events, the attack met, not retiring, but unshaken troops.

[42]Five German miles = 23 English miles.

[43]"Should the issue of the battle prove unfavourable, the cavalry must strain every nerve to facilitate theretreatof the other arms. It is just in such cases that they must assume a relentless offensive. Repeated attacks on the flanks of the pursuing troops will produce the best results."Even temporary relief for the retreating infantry and a short gain in time may avert utter defeat. The cavalry which effects this will, though it gains no victory, retain the honours of the day."

"Even temporary relief for the retreating infantry and a short gain in time may avert utter defeat. The cavalry which effects this will, though it gains no victory, retain the honours of the day."

[44]Échelon formations are those in which lines or bodies of troops are placed not directly in rear of each other, but with the second line to the right or left of the first and the next similarly placed—"like steps of stairs"—hence the name. "Échelon" means literally a "step" or the "rung of a ladder."—Editor's Note.

[45]"As a rule, a single regiment attacks in line. It may, or may not, be in échelon. Only on exceptional occasions should one of the squadrons follow as a second line."The officer commanding will bring the directing squadron into the direction of the attack. The squadrons, each in close formation, must be led so as to ensure combined action."The échelons will envelop the hostile flank or ward off the enemy's flank attacks; they can also be used to prolong the front of the regiment, or they can turn against portions of the enemy which have broken through.""When attackingcavalry, the regiments will, as a rule, be employed in a line formation side by side; this will prevent their personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary depth will be supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in this case, it is usually in the form of échelons.If the situation demands, even single squadrons can follow in column formation."The employment of several lines may be useful on occasions when the situation demands rapid action from the leading regiment, and circumstances will not permit of the rear regiments taking ground to a flank."

[45]"As a rule, a single regiment attacks in line. It may, or may not, be in échelon. Only on exceptional occasions should one of the squadrons follow as a second line.

"The officer commanding will bring the directing squadron into the direction of the attack. The squadrons, each in close formation, must be led so as to ensure combined action.

"The échelons will envelop the hostile flank or ward off the enemy's flank attacks; they can also be used to prolong the front of the regiment, or they can turn against portions of the enemy which have broken through."

"When attackingcavalry, the regiments will, as a rule, be employed in a line formation side by side; this will prevent their personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary depth will be supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in this case, it is usually in the form of échelons.If the situation demands, even single squadrons can follow in column formation.

[46]"When advancing to attackcavalry, the divisional commander will, as a rule, order the brigades intoéchelon formation.Brigades will make independent arrangements as regards formation in depth and for flank protection."As soon as the divisional commander has decided to attack, he will arrange for the employment of the artillery and machine-guns; he will give the brigades their attack orders; if necessary, he will give the directing brigade the line of attack; and he will detach his reserve."The further execution of the attack will rest with the brigade commanders.""Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of battles of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the strength and intentions of the enemy renders necessary such échelon formations as will preserve freedom of action.""The formation of the échelonwill vary according to the objective and to local conditions."Should no certain information as to the advance and formation of the enemy be forthcoming, a double échelon is possibly the best. But, should a flank rest on impassable, or on very open, country, which is, however, covered by the fire of friendly artillery, only single échelon is necessary. Échelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the advanced guard situation. The above cases are given merely as examples."As the situation is gradually cleared up, the flexibility of échelon formations renders it easy to attain the formation in which the attack will be delivered."

"As soon as the divisional commander has decided to attack, he will arrange for the employment of the artillery and machine-guns; he will give the brigades their attack orders; if necessary, he will give the directing brigade the line of attack; and he will detach his reserve.

"The further execution of the attack will rest with the brigade commanders."

"Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of battles of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the strength and intentions of the enemy renders necessary such échelon formations as will preserve freedom of action."

"The formation of the échelonwill vary according to the objective and to local conditions.

"Should no certain information as to the advance and formation of the enemy be forthcoming, a double échelon is possibly the best. But, should a flank rest on impassable, or on very open, country, which is, however, covered by the fire of friendly artillery, only single échelon is necessary. Échelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the advanced guard situation. The above cases are given merely as examples.

"As the situation is gradually cleared up, the flexibility of échelon formations renders it easy to attain the formation in which the attack will be delivered."

[47]"Should it be possible to ascertain the hostile dispositions with approximate certainty, the cavalry leader can have his front rank units in line from the start, and deployed on the frontage upon which he intends to attack. The advantage thus gained, if combined with rapidity of movement, will often render it possible to deliver an enveloping attack during the hostile deployment."

[48]" ... for greater changes of front,e.g.to the complete flank, it will generally be necessary to re-form the division."

[49]"Échelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the advanced guard situation."

[50]"Reflections on the New Cavalry Regulations."

[51]Two squadrons abreast in squadron-column at six paces' interval, followed by two more at troop-frontage distance. When there is a fifth squadron, it follows in the same formation in rear of the left.—Trans.

[52]"Regiments-und Brigadekolonnen."

[53]"Tetenschutz."

APPENDIX

CAVALRY AT PEACE MANŒUVRES

If manœuvres are to be of real value to the cavalry, care must be taken to demand nothing of the troops but what would be required of them in war. This is most apparent in outpost duty, where demands are made on the outpost cavalry, especially in regard to reconnaissance, that in nowise correspond to the teachings of the "Field Service Manual"; and this is the more unfortunate, as the economy of strength demanded in the "Manual" is absolutely necessary if the divisional cavalry, in particular, is to be prevented from failing soon after the commencement of a war.

The duties of outpost cavalry are limited to watching a strip of country to the front, and possibly on the flank, of the line of infantry outposts, and to carry messages between the different sections of the latter.

Standing patrols are the most useful for observation work. In the case of an enemy close at hand, they should be in touch with him, and should, if there be no close reconnaissance patrols, watch his flanks as well; however, with proper dispositions this should be unnecessary. The standing patrols would, in any case, have to be in a position to detect and report any advance on the part of the enemy's outposts and any movement of the enemy denoting an advance or retirement. If the enemy, however, is so far away as to be out of touch with the cavalry cordon, reconnaissance work beyond this line should be carried out by those portions of the divisional cavalry that arenotassigned to outpost duty. If, on the other hand, the outposts on either side are in close touch, reconnaissance to the front should be carried out by infantry patrols. It may, however, be advisable under certain conditions to let weak mounted patrols follow such infantry patrols to covered positions for carrying messages, or to employ them dismounted in the place of the infantry.

If these arrangements are not strictly adhered to, it very easily happens, during manœuvres, that reconnaissance work is carried out by the reconnaissance patrols in the daytime, but at night by the outpost cavalry. In the morning the latter is then scattered in all directions and cannot be collected again. Such dispositions are also entirely opposed to the teachings of the "Field Service Manual," and are unsuited to conditions of real warfare.

In time of war the reconnaissance patrols naturally continue their work of observation during the night, and consequently they need not be relieved by patrols of the outpost cavalry. In peace time, on the other hand, it is still considered remarkable if the patrols remain in touch with the enemy at night, and those that do so have been dubbed "sticky patrols." Those, also, which should really be in touch with the enemy throughout the night usually get under cover, and have been known to spend a comfortable night in excellent quarters.

In making arrangements with regard to outpost cavalry, attention should be paid to reducing the distance which messages have to be carried. In this respect, horses are not always sufficiently considered. When outpost companies are pushed out far to the flank, it would usually be well to observe the instructions of the "Field Service Manual," and to detail small detachments of cavalry to the companies for their independent use, as this will prevent considerable waste of strength. It will often be necessary, on the other hand, to protect unsupported flanks of a line of infantry outposts by special detachments of the divisional cavalry that do not form part of the outpost cavalry. Such detachments would, if possible, find housing for themselves and be self-protecting, though they might, under certain circumstances, be given a small force of infantry for local security.

It is most important that the outpost cavalry should be concentrated in good time in the morning before the commencement of the march or of the engagement, and that they should retire informedorder on the divisional cavalry. This requires careful preparation and instructions; some practical method must be found which will overcome thedifficulties that now present themselves. The various squadron commanders must act in conjunction with the officers commanding the outposts. All the higher officers, and those directing the manœuvres, must, however, always keep this matter in mind, so that the present system, which offers such serious disadvantages, may not become so customary as to be carried on in time of war.

Having examined the flaws still to be found in our outpost system, and which are likely to adversely affect the arm in war, we find, on turning to the sphere of reconnaissance, that such defects are even more prevalent.

The arrangements that are usually made in this matter often draw on the strength of the cavalry in a manner quite out of proportion to the demands of actual war, and weaken the squadrons to such an extent as almost to destroy their fighting value. The weak point is, in the main, as follows:

It is usual for every order given by a commanding officer to direct that a reconnaissance should be carried out, even though the previous order may have given instructions for one in the same direction. The cavalry obeys these orders, and sends out fresh patrols each time the order is repeated. As the patrols are always told to keep in touch with the enemy, and as, on account of peace conditions that obtain, nobody thinks of relieving them, they collect in one direction, whilst the squadron becomes weaker and weaker.

I consider that every effort should be made to combat this bad habit. Care should be taken not to send out unnecessary patrols, and to call in, from time to time, those that have been sent out, or where necessary, to relieve them. I believe that this would be possible if the following rules were observed.

If an order has been given which entails a reconnaissance in a certain direction, it is unnecessary that this should be repeated in a subsequent order. Other directions rather, which are indicated by reason of the altered conditions, should be brought to notice, and reference made to the reconnaissance already despatched. Under no circumstances, however, should a cavalry commander be induced, on receiving instructions to reconnoitre in a certain direction, to send a patrol to a point where he knows his patrols to be already in touch with the enemy. The necessary economy of strength can only be effected by leaving the commandof the patrol serviceentirely in the hands of the cavalry commander, who must be responsible to his superior officer for the carrying out of the reconnaissance work entrusted to him. The superior officer should only interfere if he discovers obvious mistakes, or if other circumstances render such a step absolutely necessary. He must, for his part, see that orderlies and reporting patrols that come in remain with his staff, and that they are sent back to the squadron when opportunity offers, so as to be available for fighting purposes. This should be made a standing order at manœuvres.

All patrols that are sent out must receive definite orders as to how far they are to advance in any given direction, how long they are to reconnoitre in that direction, and when they are to return. If, at the expiration of such a period, renewed reconnaissance is found necessary in the same direction, relieving patrols should be despatched in good time,i.e.before the first patrols have returned; and these fresh patrols should, if possible, meet the returning ones, in order to exchange notes regarding the enemy. For this purpose the outward and homeward routes of the patrols should be prearranged as far as circumstances permit.

In manœuvres, when one officer takes over command from another, he must inquire as to the arrangements made for reconnaissance work, and must take measures accordingly.

When a fresh squadron is sent out on reconnaissance, due notice must be given to the squadron to be relieved. The two officers commanding must act in conjunction, so that the officer being relieved can draw in his patrols and the relieving patrols of the new squadron be sent out in good time.

It should also be remembered that, in time of war, close reconnaissance would gradually develop from distant reconnaissance, and would not, as a rule, require any fresh dispositions such as are usually found necessary at manœuvres.

During all exercises, especially when a long advance is being made and distant patrols are not actually sent out, the commanding officers should be furnished by the directing staff with such information as these patrols would in all probability have obtained. They should also be told which of the distant patrols may be assumed to be in touch with the enemy, and which have either returned or been captured or wiped out. The distant patrols, which are to be in touch with the enemy, might with advantage be despatched by the directing staff, before the manœuvre commences, in time to procure quarters and receive instructions as to the situation. The troops should, of course, be informed of the despatch of these patrols, and all further reconnaissance will be furnished by the cavalry commander. Every cavalry detachment must also know exactly what area it is to reconnoitre, and what reconnaissances have been, or are assumed to have been, carried out by neighbouring detachments.

It is a mistake to indicate the direction in which a near reconnaissance should be made, without limiting the distance of it. It is the duty of the distant reconnaissance to locate an opponent who is advancing from a distance. As long as the enemy is under the observation of the distant patrols, the close reconnaissance should not be pushed forward to meet him, but should be advanced from one position to the next, within definite limits. When these limits have been reached, the close patrols should be drawn in by the squadrons furnishing them, and fresh patrols be despatched to the next position.

It would also be well if the directing staff were to lessen the work by stopping and sending back to their units such patrols as, by reason of their direction, cannot possibly come in contact with the enemy; or it may even suffice, for the purposes of the manœuvre, to assume the despatch of patrols in such directions. They might also be given sealed orders, only to be opened at a certain place, containing the data necessary for negative reports and instructions regarding their return to their unit.

I believe that if such methods were adopted, and if the patrol leaders confined themselves to sending such reports as would be sent in real war, which would include a clear and concise statement regarding the configuration of the country, it would be possible to avoid the unwarrantable weakening of the squadrons now in vogue, which does not even produce a correspondingly efficient service of communication. It is, however, true that the art of sending a few, but good reports, and of sending them at the right time requires, in the leader of the patrol, sound tactical judgment, and a training that is nowadays but seldom obtained.

Senior officers also are often to blame for the frequency of reports. Appointed to a command at manœuvres, they want to know every detail about the enemy, and the exact minute in which an advance or a movement is made. Every little detachment must be reported, and the slightest movement watched. The result is that they encourage patrols, not only to send as many detailed reports as possible, but, if necessary, to obtain the information in a manner incompatible with service conditions. This is a deep-seated evil that is to be seen at all manœuvres, and one that commanders should consistently endeavour to eradicate.

Such procedure reacts upon the commanding officers themselves by exercising a harmful influence on their individual training. If everything is known about the strength, the line of advance, and the distance of the enemy, generalship descends to the level of the solution of an arithmetical problem, decisions of the commanding officers being based on complete and established data. What a difference is there in actual warfare! But meagre information is available regarding the enemy, and decisions must, as a rule, be based on a certain knowledge of one's own plans and a rough idea of the numbers, intentions, and fighting strength of the enemy. In the former case, decisions of commanding officers are the result of calculation; in the latter—i.e.in actual warfare—they are a matter for military skill, or the intuition of genius, which is a very different thing. These are the decisions that officers should be encouraged and trained to make; but, unless the malpractices that have crept into the reconnaissance work are rooted out, this valuable training for actual warfare is likely to be lost.

But all that is only by the way. We are now discussing the cavalry and not the generals, and I should like to point out the great importance of training units themselves to report in a manner suited to service conditions,i.e.to report only important matters, and theseat the right time, so that the commanding officer may receive information regarding the enemy in time to make the necessary dispositions, while at the same time the reconnoitring detachments need not unduly weaken themselves by the too frequent despatch of messages. On the field of battle reports could be carried by individual horsemen instead of by patrols, but of these only a limited number should be drawn from the squadron,as it is not possible to rely on their return.They mustalso be taught only to take reports to such places as they could actually reach in war. At manœuvres and other exercises they are often to be seen riding about behind the firing-line in the most exposed places, having apparently no idea of the dangers which they would run in real warfare. This habit, acquired in peace, may in time of war entail the loss of many riders, horses, and reports.

The best means of counteracting these bad habits is to tell the despatch-riders exactly where to go, and to prevail on the officers concerned to remain in certain fixed places, as in real warfare, instead of moving about on the field of battle, even within the zone of the enemy's fire. It is true that, by moving about and exposing themselves, commanders can get a better idea of the engagement, and can make dispositions more rapidly and better than they could from the rear; but, at the same time, such procedure spoils their own training by removing difficulties that would exist in time of war. Making suitable dispositions from the rear, with hardly anything but reports to go by, is quite a different matter from conducting the fight from the front, where a clear view of the situation can be got.

As regards reconnaissance and screening, the principles evolved in the chapter on these subjects hold good for the conduct of cavalry at manœuvres.

First of all, we must see whether the cavalry attached to the different divisions should, according to its strength, be only classed as divisional cavalry, or whether its total strength is such as to entitle it to be considered as army cavalry.

Units detailed to act as divisional cavalry should not move about independently in the manœuvre area, as this would be in opposition to the essence of their duties, nor should they, on the other hand, remain tied to the infantry, as they unfortunately so often do. They must learn to advance from point to point, to reconnoitre by areas, to observe from a distance with glasses, to judge correctly which flank is of most importance for reconnaissance, and, finally, to occupy during the engagement such ground that may be valuable or essential for successful reconnaissance. Regiments and squadrons detailed as army cavalry should, on the other hand, act according to the principles involved.

When army cavalry is taking part in manœuvres, the leaders should be recommended to include in the exercises reconnaissance and screening problems on a large scale. This can generally be done. Then the merging of the distant into the close and battle reconnaissance should be practised, the gradual withdrawal of reconnoitring squadrons on the approach of the enemy, the evacuation of the areas allotted to them, and the independent action necessitated by the fresh conditions. This stage is instructive, not only for the reconnoitring squadrons and patrols, but also for the cavalry division itself. They will have to decide on which flank of the troops in rear to concentrate, and in this matter must act in conjunction with any divisional cavalry there may be; at the same time, they must take into account the ground and the general strategical situation. The final decision will, as a rule, have to be made after duly weighing many varied and often conflicting considerations.

If a general engagement of all arms should result, it is important, even though the ground should not be suitable for a charge, that the best use should, in any case, be made of the fighting value of the troops. Nothing is more incorrect and more opposed to the principles of warfare than an attitude of inactivity in anticipation of the possibility of an attack. If écheloned forward on the flank of the force, the cavalry should make every endeavour to develop an attack against the flank or rear of the enemy by fire or shock action, and to threaten and harass his artillery. The heavy artillery of the field army will often afford a suitable object of attack, more so, perhaps, in manœuvres than in actual warfare. It is undoubtedly wrong, whatever the conditions may be, to remain inactive and watch the other arms struggling for the palm of victory. "Activité! activité! activité!" cried Napoleon to his generals, and this, too, should be our first demand from our cavalry leaders.

It would also be a useful exercise if pursuits could occasionally be arranged for at manœuvres, so that the cavalry may learn how to initiate them in good time, and to push them home with energy. The difficulties of pursuits, and the principles to be observed in their conduct, are dealt with elsewhere.

If the cavalry endeavours to carry out the tasks I have sketched above, and at the same time effects the necessaryeconomy of strength, it will reap benefits from manœuvres that will materially assist its training for war, provided the antiquated ideas that still prevail are discarded.

LARGER RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES

Under this head I should like to draw attention to the importance of frequent practice in screening. In a war of operations, which includes the encounters resulting from strategical concentration, the functions of screening are, in my opinion, most important. The American War of Secession showed in a surprising manner what could be done in this respect. Stuart's screening of the left wheel of the Confederate army, after the battle of Chancellorsville, for instance, was a masterpiece, and the reconnaissance carried out by Mosby's Scouts during the same period was equally brilliant. I would recommend the study of these features of the war, as they are remarkably suited to the present day, in spite of the great change in conditions.

Our cavalry keep, as a rule, but little in touch with such matters. The new "Field Service Manual" introduces the idea of offensive and defensive screens, but the cavalry lack experience in them. Offensive screening is usually accepted, it appears, at all events, at the outset, as being somewhat similar to reconnaissance duties. Real screening is but seldom practised, as operations only last a short time, and usually end with a cavalry encounter, entailing a lapse into the usual set piece.

With regard to these exercises, I would point out that defensive screening, combined with natural obstacles, and possibly with the assistance of the other arms, is much more effective than the offensive method, and therefore deserves more attention, and, further, that there is a considerable difference between a reconnaissance and an offensive screen.

In a reconnaissance an advance is made in the direction which the army commander considers to be most important, and it is left to the enemy's cavalry to oppose this advance. In offensive screening, on the other hand, the enemy must be found before he can be attacked and beaten. An advance would naturally not be risked in a direction that would avoid the enemy's cavalry, and thereby afford it the opportunityof approach against the main army. This should be prevented at all costs. An advance must consequently not be made until information has been obtained from patrols or scouts regarding the position and the line of advance of the enemy's cavalry. Then a determined attack should be made on the cavalry, the force being concentrated as much as possible for this purpose. It is only after this attack has been successfully carried out that the real screening work begins.

The two main points that should be observed when carrying out such exercises are therefore: (1) no advance should be made until the enemy's line of advance has been discovered; and (2) the forces should be distributed, after the defeat of the enemy, on a broad front, in accordance with the requirements of the screening duties, while the enemy's beaten cavalry must be carefully watched, to prevent its further activity.

With regard to defensive screening, it is necessary above all, first, to occupy with sufficient strength all passages over the natural obstacle that has been selected, and to effect a tactical disposition of the forces that will enable them to do a maximum of work with the expenditure of a minimum of strength, making the greatest possible use of field entrenchments; secondly, to so dispose the reserves that they will be quickly available to strengthen any threatened point; and lastly, to arrange a system of communication along the whole screening-line, employing any suitable technical appliances in such a manner that the system will continue to operate even though the enemy's patrol should break through the line. It must be possible also to communicate quickly and safely to the troops in rear, so that any detachments of the enemy that might break through the line may be intercepted. The cavalry telegraph, in fact any kind of telegraph, is the least sure method of communication, particularly in the enemy's country, owing to the ease with which it can be cut. There must, at any rate, be other means of rapid communication besides the telegraph, such as flag signals or the light-signal.

In screening work, balloons are often very useful for discovering the direction in which the enemy is advancing; they are more suited to stationary work, especially behind a protected area, than to active operations. The reconnaissance and the action of the cavalry could then be based on the information received from the balloons. It will, unfortunately, seldom happen during such manœuvres that a balloon is available, but all the necessary technical appliances for communication should certainly be at hand.

The value of all these exercises, especially in the case of reconnaissance, is largely dependent on the manner in which the enemy is represented. The best plan is, of course, to place real troops at their full strength opposite to one another, but this is scarcely practicable, on account of the expense entailed. Even the Imperial Manœuvres do not faithfully represent modern armies and distances, but only reproduce portions of great operations on a reduced scale. The fact of the matter is that it is impossible, in time of peace, to set on foot anything approaching the number of men, or to cover anything like the extent of country, necessary to at all correspond with the conditions of modern warfare. The only feasible plan is to indicate columns of the army, and even large bodies of cavalry, by flagged troops; but it is well to place real troops at the head of these columns, so that they may form the vanguard and may send out the full number of patrols and outposts, at all events to the front. The reconnoitring organs would thus, at any rate to the front, be confronted by an enemy disposed as in real warfare. I need hardly say thatbothsides should send out these reconnoitring detachments, as far as possible at full strength; no advantage can possibly be derived from the exercises if this is not done.

It is also very important to put the divisional cavalry into the field, where possible at full strength, as the difficulties that beset the reconnoitring patrols will only then become apparent. This divisional cavalry need only send out a limited number of these patrols, as they are, as a rule, not absolutely necessary in such exercises, but the work ofscreeningshould receive careful attention. The division should therefore be surrounded by a screen ofsecurity patrols, and all points from which the enemy's patrols might observe the columns should be occupied. If these columns are on the march, the security patrols should advance in "bonds successifs," together with the divisional cavalry, from one line of observation to the next, and thus prevent any possible reconnaissance on the part of the enemy.If the ground on the line of advance is suited to defensive screening, this method should be adopted, and all the enemy's patrols and despatch-riders seen should be hunted down. When the hostile reconnoitring patrols have been driven back behind their own screens or outposts, measures should be taken to prevent their re-issue. If the enemy's patrols endeavour to remain for the night in the vicinity of the troops they wish to keep under observation, they should, if possible, be attacked and captured. When operations are being carried on in friendly country, it will be well to ensure the co-operation of the inhabitants in obtaining information regarding the movements of the enemy's troops. There are always old soldiers to be found among the civil population, who would interest themselves in the matter if called upon by the local magistrates to assist, and who would certainly do their utmost to help their own countrymen and to hamper the enemy. Care should, of course, be taken not to go too far in this direction, as unfortunate consequences might possibly result.

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