Footnotes

Mr. Rusk(of Texas) [interrupting]. Will the honorable Senator allow me to interrupt him?Mr. Sumner.Certainly.Mr. Rusk.I ask him to point out the words in this bill where Slavery is mentioned.

Mr. Rusk(of Texas) [interrupting]. Will the honorable Senator allow me to interrupt him?

Mr. Sumner.Certainly.

Mr. Rusk.I ask him to point out the words in this bill where Slavery is mentioned.

Mr. Sumner.I am glad the Senator from Texas asks the question, for it brings attention at once to the true character of this bill. I know its language well, and also its plausible title. On its face it purports to be "a bill to protect officers and other persons acting under the authority of the United States"; and it provides for the transfer of certain proceedings from State Courts to the Circuit Courts of the United States. And yet, Sir, by the admission of this whole debate, stretching from noon to midnight, it is a bill to bolster up the Fugitive Slave Act.

Mr. Rusk.I have not listened to the debate, but I ask the Senator to point out in the bill the place where Slavery is mentioned. If the Constitution and laws appoint officers, and require them to discharge duties, will he abandon them to the mob?

Mr. Sumner.The Senator asks me to point out any place in this bill where "Slavery" is mentioned. Why, Sir, this is quite unnecessary. I might ask the Senatorto point out any place in the Constitution of the United States where "Slavery" is mentioned, or where the word "slave" can be found, and he could not do it.

Mr. Rusk.That is evading the question. I asked the Senator to point out in the bill the clause where Slavery is mentioned. The bill proposes to protect officers of the United States, whom you appoint, in discharging their duties. If they are to be left unprotected, repeal your law.

Mr. Sumner.I respond to the Senator with all my heart, "Repeal your law." Yes, Sir, repeal the Fugitive Act, which now requires the support of supplementary legislation. Remove this ground of offence. And before I sit down, I hope to make that very motion. Meanwhile I evade no question propounded by the honorable Senator; but I do not consider it necessary to show that "Slavery" is mentioned in the bill. It may not be found there in name; but Slavery is the very soul of the bill.

[Mr.Ruskrose.]

Mr. Sumner.The Senator has interrupted me several times; he may do it more; but perhaps he had better let me go on.

Mr. Rusk.I understand the Senator; but I make no boast of that sort.

Mr. Sumner.Very well. At last I am allowed to proceed. Of the bill in question I have little to say. Its technical character has been exposed by various Senators, and especially by my valued friend from Ohio [Mr.Chase] who opened this debate. Suffice it to say, that it is an intrusive and offensive encroachment on State Rights, calculated to subvert the power of States inthe protection of the citizen. This consideration alone would be ample to secure its rejection, if the attachment to State Rights, so often avowed by Senators, were not utterly lost in stronger attachment to Slavery. But on these things, although well worthy of attention, I do not dwell. Objectionable as the bill may be on this ground, it becomes much more so when regarded as an effort to bolster up the Fugitive Slave Act.

Of this Act it is difficult to speak with moderation. Conceived in defiance of the Constitution, and in utter disregard of every sentiment of justice and humanity, it should be treated as an outlaw. It may have the form of legislation, but it lacks every essential element of law. I have so often exposed its character on this floor, that I shall be brief now.

There is an argument against it which has especial importance at this moment, when the Fugitive Act is made the occasion of new assault on State Rights.This very Act is an assumption by Congress of power not delegated to it under the Constitution, and an infraction of rights secured to the States.You will mark, if you please, the double aspect of this proposition, in asserting not only an assumption of power by Congress, but an infraction of State Rights. And this proposition, I venture to say, defies answer or cavil. Show me, Sir, if you can, the clause, sentence, or word in the Constitution which gives to Congress any power to legislate on this subject. I challenge honorable Senators to produce it. I fearlessly assert that it cannot be found. The obligations imposed by the "fugitive" clause,whatever they may be,[171]rest upon States, and not upon Congress.I do not now undertake to say what these obligations are,—but simply, that, whether much or little, they rest upon States. And this interpretation is sustained by the practice of Congress on another kindred question. The associate clause touching "privileges of citizens" is never made a source of power. It will be in the recollection of the Senate, that, during the last session, the Senator from Louisiana [Mr.Benjamin], in answer to a question from me, openly admitted that there were laws of the Southern States, bearing hard upon colored citizens of the North, which were unconstitutional; but when I pressed the honorable Senator with the question, whether he would introduce or sustain a bill to carry out the clause of the Constitution securing to these citizens their rights, he declined to answer.

Mr. Benjamin.I think, Mr. President, I have a right to set the record straight upon that point. I rose in the Senate on the occasion referred to, as will be perfectly well recollected by every Senator present, and put a respectful question to the Senator from Massachusetts. Instead of a reply to my question, he put a question to me, which I answered, and then I put my question. Instead of replying to that, he again put a question to me. Considering that as an absolute evasion of the question which I put to him, I declined having anything further to say in the discussion.

Mr. Sumner.The Senator from Louisiana will pardon me, if I suggest that there is an incontrovertible fact which shows that the evasion was on his part. The record testifies not only that he did not reply, but that I was cut off from replying by efforts and votes of himself and his friends. Let him consult the "Congressional Globe," and he will find it all there.[172]I can conceive that it might be embarrassing for him to reply, since, had he declined to carry out the clause in question, it would be awkward, at least, to vindicate the Fugitive Slave Act, which is derived from an identical clause in the Constitution. And yet there are Senators on this floor, who, careless of the flagrant inconsistency, vindicate the exercise of power by Congress under the "fugitive" clause, while their own States at home deny any power of Congress under the associate clause, on the "privileges of citizens," assume to themselves complete right to determine the obligations of this clause, and then, in practical illustration of their assumption, ruthlessly sell into Slavery colored citizens of the North.

Mr. Butler[interrupting]. Does the Senator allude to my State?Mr. Rusk.No,—to mine.Mr. Butler.If he means South Carolina, I will reply to him.

Mr. Butler[interrupting]. Does the Senator allude to my State?

Mr. Rusk.No,—to mine.

Mr. Butler.If he means South Carolina, I will reply to him.

Mr. Sumner.I do allude to South Carolina, and also to other Southern States,—but especially to South Carolina. If I allude to these States, it is not to bring up and array the hardships of individual instances, but simply to show the position occupied by them on a constitutional question, identical with that in the Fugitive Act. And now, at the risk of repetition, if I can have your attention for a brief moment, without interruption, I will endeavor to state anew this argument.

The rules of interpretation, applicable to the clause of the Constitution securing to "the citizens of each Stateall privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States," are equally applicable to its associate clause, forming part of the same section, in the same article, and providing that "persons held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." Of this there can be no doubt.

If one of these clauses is regarded as a compact between the States, to be carried out by them respectively, according to their interpretation of its obligations, without intervention of Congress, then the other must be so regarded; nor can any legislative power be asserted of Congress under one clause which is denied under the other. This proposition cannot be questioned. Now mark the consequences.

Congress, in abstaining from all exercise of power under the first clause, when required to protect the liberty of colored citizens, while assuming power under the second clause, in order to obtain the surrender of fugitive slaves, shows an inconsistency, which becomes more monstrous when it is considered that in the one case the general and commanding interests of Liberty are neglected, while in the other the peculiar and subordinate interests of Slavery are carefully assured; and such an exercise of power is an alarming evidence of that influence of Slavery in the National Government which has increased, is increasing, and ought to be overthrown.

Looking more precisely at these two clauses, we arrive at the true conclusion. According to express words of the Constitution, in the Tenth Amendment, "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"; and since no powers are delegated to the United States in the clause relating to "privileges and immunities of citizens," or in the associate clause of the same section, relating to the surrender of "persons held to service or labor," therefore all legislation by Congress, under either clause, must be an assumption of undelegated powers, and an infraction of rights secured to the States respectively, or to the people: and such, I have already said, is the Fugitive Slave Act.

I might go further, and, by the example of South Carolina, vindicate to Massachusetts, and every other State, the right to put such interpretation upon the "fugitive" clause as it shall think proper. The Legislature of South Carolina, in a series of resolutions adopted in 1844, asserts the following proposition:—

"Resolved, That free negroes and persons of color are not citizens of the United Stateswithin the meaning of the Constitution, which confers upon the citizens of one State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."[173]

Here is a distinct assumption of right to determine thepersonsto whom certain words of the Constitution are applicable. Now nothing can be clearer than this: If South Carolina may determine for itself whether the clause relating to the "privileges and immunities of citizens" be applicable tocolored citizensof the several States, and may solemnly deny its applicability, then may Massachusetts, and every other State, determine for itself whether the other clause, relating to the surrenderof "persons held to service or labor," be really applicable tofugitive slaves, and may solemnly deny its applicability.

Mr. President, I have said enough to show the usurpation by Congress under the "fugitive" clause of the Constitution, and to warn you against abetting this usurpation. But I have left untouched those other outrages, many and great, which enter into the existing Fugitive Slave Act, among which are the denial of trial by jury, the denial of the writ ofHabeas Corpus, the authorization of judgment onex parteevidence without the safeguard of cross-examination, and the surrender of the great question of Human Freedom to be determined by a mere Commissioner, who, according to the requirement of the Constitution, is grossly incompetent to any such service. I have also left untouched the hateful character of this enactment, as a barefaced subversion of every principle of humanity and justice. And now, Sir, we are asked to lend ourselves anew to this enormity, worthy only of indignant condemnation; we are asked to impart new life to this pretended law, this false Act of Congress, this counterfeit enactment, this monstrosity of legislation, which draws no life from the Constitution, as it clearly draws no life from that Supreme Law which is the essential fountain of life to every human law.

Sir, the bill before you may have the approval of Congress; and in yet other ways you may seek to sustain the Fugitive Slave Act. But it will be in vain. You undertake what no legislation can accomplish. Courts may come forward, and lend it their sanction. All this, too, will be in vain. I respect the learning of judges; I reverence the virtue, more than learning, bywhich their lives are often adorned. Nor learning, nor virtue, when, with mistaken force, bent to this purpose, can avail. I assert confidently, Sir, and ask the Senate to note my assertion, that there is no court, howsoever endowed with judicial qualities or surrounded by public confidence, which is strong enough to lift this Act into permanent consideration or respect. It may seem for a moment to accomplish the feat. Its decision may be enforced, amidst tears and agonies. A fellow-man may be reduced anew to slavery. But all will be in vain. This Act cannot be upheld. Anything so entirely vile, so absolutely atrocious, would drag an angel down. Sir, it must drag down every court or judge venturing to sustain it.

And yet, Sir, in zeal for this enormity, Senators announce their purpose to break down the recent legislation of States, calculated to shield the liberty of the citizen. "It is difficult," says Burke, "to frame an indictment against a whole people." But here in the Senate, where are convened the jealous representatives of the States, we hear whole States arraigned, as if already guilty of crime. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr.Benjamin], in plaintive tones sets forth the ground of proceeding, and more than one State is summoned to judgment. It would be easy to show, by critical inquiry, that this whole charge is without just foundation, and that all the legislation so much condemned is as clearly defensible under the Constitution as it is meritorious in purpose.

Sir, the only crime of these States is, that Liberty is placed before Slavery. Follow the charge, point by point, and this is apparent. In securing to every person claimed as slave the protection of trial by jury and theHabeasCorpus, they simply provide safeguards strictly within the province of every State, and rendered necessary by the usurpation of the Fugitive Act. In securing the aid of counsel to every person claimed as slave, they but perform a kindly duty, which no phrase or word in the Constitution can be tortured to condemn. In visiting with severe penalties every malicious effort to reduce a fellow-man to slavery, they respond to the best feelings of the human heart. In prohibiting the use of county jails and buildings as barracoons and slave-pens,—in prohibiting all public officers, holding the commission of the State, in any capacity, whether as Chief Justice or Justice of the Peace, whether as Governor or Constable, from any service as slave-hunter,—in prohibiting thevolunteer militiaof the State, in its organized form, from any such service, the States simply exercise a power under the Constitution, recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States even while upholding Slavery in the fatalPriggcase, byPOSITIVE PROHIBITION, to withdraw its own officers from this offensive business.

For myself, let me say that I look with no pleasure on any possibility of conflict between the two jurisdictions of State and Nation; but I trust, that, if the interests of Freedom so require, the States will not hesitate. From the beginning of this controversy, I have sought, as I still seek, to awaken another influence, which, without the possibility of conflict, will be mightier than any Act of Congress or the sword of the National Government: I mean an enlightened, generous, humane, Christian public opinion, which shall blast with contempt, indignation, and abhorrence all who, in whatever form or under whatever name, undertake to be agents inenslaving a fellow-man. Sir, such an opinion you cannot bind or subdue. Against its subtile, pervasive influence your legislation and the decrees of courts will be powerless. Already in Massachusetts, I am proud to believe, it begins to prevail; and the Fugitive Act there will soon be a dead letter.

Mr. President, since things are so, it were well to remove this Act from our statute-book, that it may no longer exist as an occasion of ill-will and a point of conflict. Let the North be relieved from this usurpation, and the first step will be taken towards permanent harmony. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr.Benjamin] has proclaimed anew to-night, what he has before declared on this floor, "that Slavery is a subject with which the Federal Government has nothing to do." I thank him for teaching the Senate that word. True, most true, Sir, ours is a Government of Freedom, having nothing to do with Slavery. This is the doctrine which I have ever maintained, and am happy to find recognized in form, if not in reality, by the Senator from Louisiana. The Senator then proceeded to declare that "all that the South asks is to be let alone." This request is moderate. And I say, for the North, that all we ask is to be let alone. Yes, Sir, let us alone. Do not involve us in the support of Slavery. Hug the viper to your bosoms, if you perversely will, within your own States, until it stings you to a generous remorse, but do not compel us to hug it too; for this, I assure you, we can never do.

The Senator from Louisiana, with these professions on his lips, proceeds to ask, doubtless with complete sincerity, but in strange forgetfulness of our country's history: "Did we ever bring this subject into Congress?" Yes, Sir, that was his inquiry,—as if there was any moment, from the earliest days of the Republic, when the supporters of Slavery ceased to bring this subject into Congress. Almost from the beginning it has been here, through the exercise ofusurped power, nowhere given under the Constitution: for I am glad to believe that the Constitution of my country contains no words out of which Slavery, or the power to support Slavery, can be derived; and this conclusion, I doubt not, will yet be affirmed by the courts. And yet the honorable Senator asks, "Did we ever bring this subject into Congress?" The answer shall be plain and explicit. Sir, you brought Slavery into Congress, when, shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, you sanctioned it in the District of Columbia, within the national jurisdiction, and adopted that barbarous slave code, still extant on your statute-book, which the Senator from Connecticut [Mr.Gillette] so eloquently exposed to-night. You brought Slavery into Congress, when, at the same period, you accepted the cession of territories from North Carolina and Georgia, now constituting States of the Union, with conditions in favor of Slavery, and thus began to sanction Slavery in territories within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. You brought Slavery into Congress, when, at different times, you usurped a power, not given by the Constitution, over fugitive slaves, and by most offensive legislation thrust your arms into distant Northern homes. You brought Slavery into Congress, when, by express legislation, you regulated the coastwise slave-trade, and thus threw the national shield over a traffic on the coast of the United States which on the coast of Congo you justly brand as "piracy." You brought Slavery intoCongress, when, from time to time, you sought to introduce new States with slaveholding Constitutions into the National Union. And, permit me to say, Sir, you brought Slavery into Congress, when you called upon us, as you have done even at this very session, to pay for slaves, and thus, in defiance of a cardinal principle of the Constitution, pressed the National Government to recognize property in man. And yet the Senator from Louisiana, with strange simplicity, says that the South only asks to be let alone. Sir, the honorable Senator borrows the language of the North, which, at each of these usurpations, exclaims, "Let us alone!" And let me say, frankly, that peace can never prevail until you do let us alone,—until this subject of Slavery is banished from Congress by the triumph of Freedom,—until Slavery is driven from its usurped foothold, and Freedom is madenationalinstead ofsectional,—and until the National Government is brought back to the precise position it occupied on the day that Washington took his first oath as President of the United States, when there was no Fugitive Act, and the national flag, as it floated over the national territory within the jurisdiction of Congress, nowhere covered a single slave.

And now, Sir, as an effort in the true direction of the Constitution, in the hope of beginning the divorce of the National Government from Slavery, and to remove all occasion for the proposed measure under consideration, I shall close these remarks with a motion to repeal the Fugitive Act. Twice already, since I have had the honor of a seat in this chamber, I have pressed that question to a vote, and I mean to press it again to-night. After the protracted discussion involving the character of this enactment, such a motion belongs logically to this occasion, and fitly closes its proceedings.

At a former session, on introducing this proposition, I discussed it at length, in an argument which I fearlessly assert never has been answered, and now, in this debate, I have already touched upon various objections. There are yet other things which might be urged. I might exhibit abuses which have occurred under the Fugitive Act,—the number of free persons it has doomed to Slavery, the riots it has provoked, the brutal conduct of its officers, the distress it has scattered, the derangement of business it has caused,—interfering even with the administration of justice, changing courthouses into barracks and barracoons, and filling streets with armed men, amidst which law is silent. All these things I might expose. But in these hurried moments I forbear. Suffice it to say, that the proposition to repeal the existing Fugitive Act stands on fundamental principles which no debate or opposition can shake.

There are considerations belonging to the present period which give new strength to this proposition. Public Opinion, which, under a popular government, makes and unmakes laws, and which for a time was passive and acquiescent, now lifts itself everywhere in the States where the Act is sought to be enforced, and demands a change. Already three States, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Michigan, by formal resolutions presented to the Senate, have concurred in this demand. Tribunals of law are joining at last with the people. The Superior Court of Cincinnati has denied the power of Congress over this subject. And now, almost while I speak, comes the solemn judgment of the SupremeCourt of Wisconsin, delivered after elaborate argument, on successive occasions, before a single judge, and then before the whole bench, declaring this Act a violation of the Constitution. In response to public opinion, broad and general, if not universal, at the North, swelling alike from village and city, from seaboard and lake,—judicially attested, legislatively declared, and represented also by numerous petitions from good men without distinction of party,—in response to this Public Opinion, as well as in obedience to my own fixed convictions, I deem it my duty not to lose this opportunity of pressing the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act once more upon the Senate. I move, Sir, to strike out all after the enacting clause in the pending bill, and insert instead these words:—

"That the Act of Congress, approved September 18, 1850, usually known as the 'Fugitive Slave Act,' be, and the same is hereby, repealed."

And on this motion I ask the yeas and nays.

On taking his seat, Mr. Sumner was followed by Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, when the following passage occurred.

Mr. Butler.Mr. President, I have no idea of irritating sectional differences. If gentlemen have the opinions which it seems the gentleman from Massachusetts entertains, be it so. I assure him I do not intend to bandy words with him. He talks as if he was disposed to maintain the Constitution of the United States; but if I were to put to him a question now, I would ask him one which he, perhaps, would not answer me honestly.Mr. Sumner.I will answer any question.Mr. Butler.Then I ask you honestly now, whether, all laws of Congress being put out of the question, you wouldrecommend to Massachusetts to pass a law to deliver up fugitives from slavery?Mr. Sumner.The Senator asks me a question, and I answer, frankly, that no temptation, no inducement, would draw me in any way to sanction the return of any man to slavery. Others will speak for themselves. In this respect I speak for myself.Mr. Butler.I do not rise now at all to question the right of the gentleman from Massachusetts to hold his seat, under the obligation of the Constitution of the United States, with the opinions which he has expressed; but, if I understand him, he means, that, whether this law or that law or any other law prevails, he disregards the obligations of the Constitution of the United States.Mr. Sumner.Not at all. That I never said. I recognize the obligations of the Constitution.Mr. Butler.He says he recognizes the obligations of the Constitution of the United States. I see, I know he is not a tactician, and I shall not take advantage of the infirmity of a man who does not know half his time exactly what he is about. [Laughter.] But, Sir, I will ask that gentleman one question: If it devolved upon him as a representative of Massachusetts, all Federal laws being put out of the way, would he recommend any law for the delivery of a fugitive slave under the Constitution of the United States?Mr. Sumner.Never.Mr. Butler.I knew that. Now, Sir, I have got exactly what is the truth, and what I intend shall go forth to the Southern States.... When the gentleman talks in the way he does, I choose to rebuke him. Any man who comes up here with a philanthropy inconsistent with what is practical justice and liberty, I do not say that I scorn him,—I use no such word,—but by heavens[174]....

Mr. Sumner.I will answer any question.

Mr. Butler.Then I ask you honestly now, whether, all laws of Congress being put out of the question, you wouldrecommend to Massachusetts to pass a law to deliver up fugitives from slavery?

Mr. Sumner.The Senator asks me a question, and I answer, frankly, that no temptation, no inducement, would draw me in any way to sanction the return of any man to slavery. Others will speak for themselves. In this respect I speak for myself.

Mr. Butler.I do not rise now at all to question the right of the gentleman from Massachusetts to hold his seat, under the obligation of the Constitution of the United States, with the opinions which he has expressed; but, if I understand him, he means, that, whether this law or that law or any other law prevails, he disregards the obligations of the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. Sumner.Not at all. That I never said. I recognize the obligations of the Constitution.

Mr. Butler.He says he recognizes the obligations of the Constitution of the United States. I see, I know he is not a tactician, and I shall not take advantage of the infirmity of a man who does not know half his time exactly what he is about. [Laughter.] But, Sir, I will ask that gentleman one question: If it devolved upon him as a representative of Massachusetts, all Federal laws being put out of the way, would he recommend any law for the delivery of a fugitive slave under the Constitution of the United States?

Mr. Sumner.Never.

Mr. Butler.I knew that. Now, Sir, I have got exactly what is the truth, and what I intend shall go forth to the Southern States.... When the gentleman talks in the way he does, I choose to rebuke him. Any man who comes up here with a philanthropy inconsistent with what is practical justice and liberty, I do not say that I scorn him,—I use no such word,—but by heavens[174]....

The question, being taken by yeas and nays on the amendment offered by Mr. Sumner, resulted,—yeas 9, nays 30,—as follows.Yeas.—Messrs. Brainerd, Chase, Cooper, Fessenden, Gillette, Seward, Sumner, Wade, and Wilson,—9.Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Badger, Bayard, Bell, Benjamin, Bright, Brown, Butler, Clay, Dawson, Douglas, Fitzpatrick, Geyer, Gwin, Hunter, Jones, of Iowa, Jones, of Tennessee, Mallory, Mason, Morton, Pearce, Pettit, Rusk, Sebastian, Shields, Slidell, Thomson, of New Jersey, Toucey, Weller, and Wright,—30.So the amendment was rejected.

The question, being taken by yeas and nays on the amendment offered by Mr. Sumner, resulted,—yeas 9, nays 30,—as follows.

Yeas.—Messrs. Brainerd, Chase, Cooper, Fessenden, Gillette, Seward, Sumner, Wade, and Wilson,—9.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Badger, Bayard, Bell, Benjamin, Bright, Brown, Butler, Clay, Dawson, Douglas, Fitzpatrick, Geyer, Gwin, Hunter, Jones, of Iowa, Jones, of Tennessee, Mallory, Mason, Morton, Pearce, Pettit, Rusk, Sebastian, Shields, Slidell, Thomson, of New Jersey, Toucey, Weller, and Wright,—30.

So the amendment was rejected.

[1]Mr. Downing was accidentally drowned in the Hudson River.

[2]The members of this Convention were not required to have their domiciles in the places which they represented. Mr. Sumner sat as member for Marshfield, by which place he was chosen while absent from the State.

[3]Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33.

[4]Chiracv.Chirac, 2 Wheaton, 269.

[5]Gibbonsv.Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 198.

[6]Madison's Debates, August 23, 1787.

[7]Blackstone, Commentaries, I. 412, 413.

[8]Priggv.Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 636.

[9]Ibid., 624.

[10]Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, Vol. I. pp. 30, 39. Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay, Appendix, p. 713. Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay, Vol. I. pp. 116-118.

[11]Charters and General Laws of Massachusetts Bay, Appendix, pp. 796, 797.

[12]From the original MS. in the Massachusetts Archives, Vol. 156.

[13]Result of the Convention of Delegates holden at Ipswich, in the County of Essex, who were deputed to take into Consideration the Constitution and Form of Government proposed by the Convention of the State of Massachusetts Bay, (Newburyport, 1778,) pp. 29, 30. See also Memoir of Theophilus Parsons, by his Son, Appendix, pp. 359-402, where this remarkable paper will be found.

[14]Result, p. 33.

[15]Result, pp. 49-51.

[16]Query XIII.

[17]Notes on Virginia, Appendix, No. II.: Works, Vol. VIII., p. 443.

[18]Madison's Debates, July 14, 1787, Vol. II. p. 1102.

[19]Seeante, Vol. II. p. 331.

[20]Thoughts on Government: Works, Vol. IV. pp. 195, 205. Essex Result, p. 29.

[21]Journal of the Convention, p. 219.

[22]Debates, etc., in the Convention to revise the Constitution of Massachusetts, 1820-21, p. 136c.Story's Miscellaneous Writings, p. 518.

[23]Julius, Nordamerikas Sittliche Zustände, Band I. p. 92.

[24]According to the old rule,Tres faciunt collegium.

[25]Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay, Vol. I. pp. 118, 250, 254.

[26]Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, Vol. II. p. 77.

[27]The House for many years numbered upwards of five hundred members,—in 1835, '36, and '37 swelling to the truly "enormous and unwieldy size" of 615, 619, and 635; and even under the greatly reduced apportionment established by the Amendment of 1840, the numbers in the two years (1851 and 1852) preceding the present Convention were no less than 396 and 402. See Gifford and Stowe's Manual for the General Court, (Boston, 1860,) p. 130.

[28]Preamble to the Body of Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony, 1641: Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc., 3d Ser. Vol. VIII. p. 216. See also General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony, revised and reprinted by Order of the General Court, 1672, p. 1.

[29]The Preamble in combination with the first Article of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties was adopted as the Preamble to the Connecticut Code of 1650. See Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, edited by J.H. Trumbull, (Hartford, 1850,) p. 509; and compare with Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc.,ut supra.

[30]Proceedings of the Congress at New York, p. 5. Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts, Vol. III., Appendix, p. 479.

[31]Journals of Congress, October 14, 1774, Vol. I. p. 28.

[32]See, on this subject, a paper entitled "The Extinction of Slavery in Massachusetts," by Emory Washburn: Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc., 4th Ser. Vol. IV. pp. 333-346.

[33]Essex Result, p. 4.

[34]Journal of the Convention, pp. 22, 23.

[35]This was the testimony of the late Rev. Charles Lowell, who had received it from his father, Hon. John Lowell, a member of the Convention, in whose family was a tradition that the latter obtained the insertion of the words "all men are born free and equal," for this declared purpose. See,ut supra, Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc., 4th Ser. Vol. IV. p. 340.

[36]Observations on the Reconstruction of Government in Massachusetts during the Revolution: Works of John Adams, Vol. IV. pp. 215, 216.

[37]Namely, Articles 1, 2, 4-10, 12-18, 20, 26, 30. The Virginia Bill of Rights consists of sixteen Articles, three of which (the 5th, 6th, and 8th) are divided in the Massachusetts Declaration, constituting respectively the substance of Articles 30 and 8, 9 and 10, 12 and 13.

[38]Our Abolitionists and Free-Soilers were Separatists.

[39]Like the Republican party.—whose triumph is here foreshadowed.

[40]This masque, entitledCœlum Britannicum, was performed at Whitehall, February 18, 1633.

[41]Martin Koszta, Hungarian by birth, who had made the preliminary declaration of citizenship, and had a protection from the United States Consul at Smyrna, was, July 2, 1853, surrendered by an Austrian man-of-war in the harbor of Smyrna at the demand of a man-of-war of the United States.

[42]As the volumes of the Annals of Congress covering the proceedings on the Missouri Compromise were not published when this speech was made, Mr. Sumner was obliged to rely upon the National Intelligencer and Niles's Register. In the present edition references are made to the Annals of Congress.

[43]Secretary of State and Minister to England under President Jackson, and a second time Minister to England under President Polk.

[44]Annals of Congress, 15th Cong. 2d Sess., Feb. 17, 1819, Vol. II. col. 1228.

[45]Ibid., 1235.

[46]See Niles's Weekly Register, Vol. XVII.passim.

[47]Annals of Congress, 16th Cong. 1st Sess., I. 802.

[48]Ibid., 803.

[49]Annals of Congress,ut supra, I. 940, 941, January 26, 1820.

[50]January 21 and 24, 1820: Annals of Congress,ut supra, I. 232, 236.

[51]Ibid., I. 389-417, February 15, 1820. Wheaton's Life of Pinkney, Appendix, pp. 573-612.

[52]The eminent Judge Story, who was then in Washington, mentions these conditions in a private letter, under date of February 27, 1820, as follows: "There is a great deal of heat and irritation, but most probably a compromise will take place, admitting Missouri into the Union without the restriction, and imposing it on all the other Territories."—Letter to Stephen White, Esq.: Life and Letters of Story, Vol. I. pp. 362, 363.

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