Chapter 11

“It serves, yet reigns as King;It lives, yet ’s death; it pleases, full of paine.Monster! ah, who, who can thy beeing faigne,Thou shapelesse shape, live death, paine pleasing, servile raigne?”[214]

“It serves, yet reigns as King;

It lives, yet ’s death; it pleases, full of paine.

Monster! ah, who, who can thy beeing faigne,

Thou shapelesse shape, live death, paine pleasing, servile raigne?”[214]

It is true, there can be no such thing as property in man: and here I begin to answer the questions propounded by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr.Davis]. If this pretension is recognized anywhere, it is only another instance of custom, which is so powerful as to render the idolater insensible to the wickedness of idolatry, and the cannibal insensible to the brutality of cannibalism. To argue against such a pretension seems to be vain; for the pretension exists in open defiance of reason as well as of humanity. It will not yield to argument; nor will it yield to persuasion. It must be encountered by authority. It was not the planters in the British islands or in the French islands who organized emancipation, but the distant governments across the sea, far removed from local prejudice, whichat last forbade the outrage. Had these planters been left to themselves, they would have clung to the pretension, as men among us still cling to it. In making this declaration against the idea of property in man, I say nothing new. An honored predecessor of the Senator from Maryland [Mr.Kennedy], whose fame as a statesman was eclipsed, perhaps, by his more remarkable fame as a lawyer,—I mean William Pinkney, and it is among the recollections of my youth that I heard Chief Justice Marshall call him the undoubted head of the American bar,—in a speech before the Maryland House of Delegates, spoke as statesman and lawyer, when he said:—

“Sir, by the eternal principles of natural justice no master in the State has a right to hold his slave in bondage for a single hour.”[215]

And Henry Brougham spoke not only as statesman and lawyer, but as orator also, when, in the British Parliament, he uttered these memorable words:—

“Tell me not of rights, talk not of the property of the planter in his slaves. I deny the right, I acknowledge not the property. The principles, the feelings, of our common nature rise in rebellion against it. Be the appeal made to the understanding or to the heart, the sentence is the same that rejects it. In vain you tell me of laws that sanction such a claim. There is a law above all the enactments of human codes,—the same throughout the world, the same in all times: … it is the law written on the heart of man by the finger of his Maker; and by that law, unchangeable and eternal, while men despise fraud and loathe rapine and abhor blood, they will reject with indignation thewild and guilty fantasy that man can hold property in man.”[216]

It has been sometimes said that the finest sentence of the English language is that famous description of Law with which Hooker closes the first book of his “Ecclesiastical Polity”; but I cannot doubt that this wonderful denunciation of an irrational and inhuman pretension will be remembered hereafter with higher praise; for it gathers into surpassing eloquence the waking and immitigable instincts of Universal Man.

If I enter now into analysis of Slavery, and say familiar things, it is because such exposition is an essential link in the present inquiry. Looking carefully at Slavery as it is, we find that it is not merely a single gross pretension, utterly inadmissible, but an aggregation of gross pretensions, all and each utterly inadmissible. They are five in number: first, the pretension of property in man; secondly, the denial of the marriage relation,—for slaves are “coupled” only, and not married; thirdly, the denial of the paternal relation; fourthly, the denial of instruction; and, fifthly, the appropriation of all the labor of the slave and its fruits by the master. Such are the five essential elements which we find in Slavery; and this fivefold barbarism, so utterly indefensible in every point, is maintained for the single purpose of compelling labor without wages. Of course such a pretension is founded in force, and nothing else. It begins with the kidnapper in Guinea or Congo, traverses the sea with the pirate slave-trader in his crowded hold, and is continued here by virtue of laws representing and embodying the same brutal force that prevailed in the kidnapperand the pirate slave-trader. Slavery, wherever it exists, is the triumph of force, sometimes in the strong arm of an individual, and sometimes in the strong arm of law, but in principle always the same. Depending upon force, he is master who happens to be stronger,—so that, if the slave were stronger, he would be master, and the master would be slave. Beyond all doubt, according to reason and justice, every slave possesses the same right to enslave his master that his master possesses to enslave him. If this simple statement of unquestionable principles needed confirmation, it would be found in the solemn judgments of courts. Here, for instance, are the often quoted words of Mr. Justice McLean, of the Supreme Court of the United States: “Slavery is admitted by almost all who have examined the subject to be founded in wrong, in oppression, inpoweragainstright.”[217]And here are the words of the Supreme Court of North Carolina: “Such services [of a slave] can only be expected from one who has no will of his own, who surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of another. Such obedience is the consequence only ofuncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect.”[218]And the Supreme Court of the United States, by the lips of Chief Justice Marshall, has openly declared, in a famous case, read the other day by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr.Davis], that “Slavery has its origin inforce.”[219]Thus does it appear by most authoritative words, that this monstrous Barbarism is derived not from reason, or nature, or justice, or goodness,but fromforce, and nothing else.

Here in the national capital, under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, theforcewhich now maintains this unnatural system is supplied by Congress. Without Congress the “uncontrolled authority” of the master would cease. Without Congress the master would not be master, nor would the slave be slave. Congress, then, in existing legislation, is the power behind, which enslaves our fellow-men. Therefore does it behoove Congress, by proper, instant action, to relieve itself of this painful responsibility.

The responsibility becomes more painful, when it is considered that Slavery exists at the national capital absolutely without support of any kind in the Constitution: and here again I answer the Senator from Kentucky [Mr.Davis]. Nor is this all. Situated within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitution, where State rights cannot prevail, it exists in open defiance of most cherished principles. Let the Constitution be rightly interpreted by a just tribunal, and Slavery must cease here at once. The decision of a court would be as potent as an Act of Congress. And now, as I confidently assert this conclusion, which bears so directly on the present question, pardon me, if I express the satisfaction with which I recur to an earlier period, shortly after I entered the Senate, when, vindicating the principle now accepted, but then disowned, thatFreedom and not Slavery is National, I insisted upon its application to Slavery everywhere within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitution, and declared that Congress might as well undertake to make a king as to make a slave.[220]That argument has never been answered; it cannot beanswered. Nor can I forget that this same conclusion, having such important bearings, was maintained by Mr. Chase, while a member of this body, in that masterly effort where he unfolded the relations of the National Government to Slavery,[221]and also by the late Horace Mann, in a most eloquent and exhaustive speech in the other House, where no point is left untouched to show that Slavery in the national capital is anoutlaw.[222]Among all the speeches in the protracted discussion of Slavery, I know none more worthy of profound study than those two, so different in character and yet so harmonious in result. If authority could add to irresistible argument, it would be found in the well-known opinion of the late Mr. Justice McLean, in a published letter, declaring the constitutional impossibility of Slavery in the National Territories, because, in the absence of express power under the Constitution to establish or recognize Slavery, there was nothing for the breath of Slavery, as respiration could not exist where there was no atmosphere. The learned judge was right, and his illustration was felicitous. Although applied at the time only to the Territories, it is of equal force everywhere within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress; for within such jurisdiction there is no atmosphere in which Slavery can live.

If this question were less important, I should not occupy time with its discussion. But we may learn to detest Slavery still more, when we see how completely it instals itself here in utter disregard of the Constitution, compelling Congress ignobly to do its bidding.The bare existence of such a barbarous injustice in the metropolis of a Republic gloriously declaring that “all men are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” is a mockery which may excite surprise; but when we bring it to the touchstone of the Constitution, and consider the action of Congress, surprise is deepened into indignation.

How, Sir, was this foothold secured? When and by what process did the National Government, solemnly pledged to Freedom, undertake to maintain the Slave-Master here in the exercise of thatforce, or “unrestrained power” which swings the lash, fastens the chain, robs the wages, sells the child, and tears the wife from the husband? A brief inquiry will show historically how it occurred: and here again I answer the Senator from Kentucky.

The sessions of the Revolutionary Congress were held, according to the exigencies of war or the convenience of members, at Philadelphia, Baltimore, Lancaster, York, Princeton, Annapolis, Trenton, and New York. An insult at Philadelphia from a band of mutineers caused an adjournment to Princeton, in 1783, which was followed by the discussion, from time to time, of the question of a permanent seat of government. On the 7th of October, 1783, a motion was made by Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, “That buildings for the use of Congress be erected on the banks of the Delaware, near Trenton, or of the Potomac, near Georgetown, provided a suitable district can be procured on one of the rivers as aforesaid for a federal town, and that the right of soil, and an exclusive or such other jurisdiction as Congress may direct, shall be vested in the United States.”[223]Thusdid the first proposition of a national capital within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress proceed from a representative of Massachusetts. The subject of Slavery at that time attracted little attention; but at a later day, in the Constitutional Convention, this same honored representative showed the nature of the jurisdiction which he would claim, according to the following record: “Mr. Gerry thought we had nothing to do with the conduct of the States as to slaves,but ought to be careful not to give any sanction to it.”[224]In these words will be found our own cherished principle,Freedom National, Slavery Sectional, expressed with homely and sententious simplicity. There is something grateful and most suggestive in the language employed, “we ought to be careful not to give any sanction to it.” In the first Congress under the Constitution, the same representative, during the debate on the Slave-Trade, gave further expression to this same conviction, when he said that “he highly commended the part the Society of Friends had taken; it was the cause of humanity they had interested themselves in.”[225]

The proposition of Mr. Gerry in reference to a national capital, after assuming various forms, subsided. But in 1785 three commissioners were appointed “to lay out a district of not less than two nor exceeding three miles square, on the banks of either side of the Delaware, not more than eight miles above or below the lower falls thereof, for a federal town.”[226]At the Congress which met at New York two years later,unsuccessful efforts were made to substitute the Potomac for the Delaware. The commissioners, though appointed, never entered upon their business. At last, by the adoption of the Constitution, the subject was presented in a new form, under the following clause: “The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States.” From the records of the Convention it does not appear that this clause occasioned debate. But it broke out in the earliest Congress. Virginia and Maryland, each, by acts of their respective Legislatures, tendered the ten miles square, while similar propositions were made by citizens of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. After long and animated discussion, Germantown, in Pennsylvania, was on the point of being adopted, when the subject was postponed till the next session. Havre de Grace and Wright’s Ferry, both on the Susquehanna, Baltimore, on the Patapsco, and Connogocheague, on the Potomac, divided opinions. In the course of the debate, Mr. Gerry, who had first proposed the Potomac, now opposed it. He pronounced it highly unreasonable to fix the seat of government where nine States out of the thirteen would be to the northward, and adverted to the sacrifice the Northern States were ready to make in going as far south as Baltimore. An agreement seemed impossible, when the South suddenly achieved one of those political triumphs by which its predominance in the National Government was established.

Pending at this time was the great and trying proposition to assume the State debts, which, being at firstdefeated through Southern votes, was at last carried by a “compromise,” according to which the seat of government was placed on the Potomac, thus settling the much vexed question. Mr. Jefferson, in a familiar account, thus sketches the “compromise.”

“It was observed that this pill [the assumption of the State debts] would be peculiarly bitter to the Southern States,and that some concomitant measure should be adopted to sweeten it a little to them. There had before been propositions to fix the seat of government either at Philadelphia or at Georgetown on the Potomac, and it was thought that by giving it to Philadelphia for ten years, and to Georgetown permanently afterwards, this might, as an anodyne, calm in some degree the ferment which might be excited by the other measure alone. So two of the Potomac members (White and Lee, but White with a revulsion of stomach almost convulsive) agreed to change their votes, and Hamilton undertook to carry the other point.”[227]

Such was one of the earliest victories of Slavery in the name of “Compromise.” It is difficult to estimate the evil consequences thus entailed upon the country.

The bill establishing the seat of government, having already passed the Senate, was adopted by the House of Representatives, after vehement debate and many calls of the yeas and nays, by a vote of thirty-two to twenty-nine, on the 9th of July, 1790. A district of territory, not exceeding ten miles square, on the river Potomac, was accepted for the permanent seat of the Government of the United States: “Provided, nevertheless, that the operation of the laws of the State within such district shall not be affected by this acceptance, until the time fixed for the removal of the Government thereto,anduntil Congress shall otherwise by law provide.”[228]Here, it will be seen, was a positive saving of the laws of the States for a limited period, so far as Congress had power to save them, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitution; but there was also complete recognition of the power of Congress to change these laws, and an implied promise to assume the “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever” contemplated by the Constitution.

In response to this Act of Congress, Maryland, by formal act, ceded the territory now constituting the District of Columbia “in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil as of persons residing or to reside thereon,”—provided that the jurisdiction of Maryland “shall not cease or determine,until Congress shall by law provide for the government thereof.”[229]

In pursuance of this contract between the United States of the one part and Maryland of the other part, expressed in solemn statutes, the present seat of government was occupied in November, 1800, when Congress proceeded to assume that complete jurisdiction conferred in the Constitution, by enacting, on the 27th of February, 1801, “that the laws of the State of Maryland,as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the said District which was ceded by that State to the United States, and by them accepted for the permanent seat of government.”[230]Thus at one stroke all existing laws of Maryland were adopted by Congress in gross, and from that time forward became the laws of the United States at the national capital. Although known historically as laws of Maryland, they ceased at onceto be laws of that State, for they draw their vitality from Congress alone, under the Constitution of the United States, as completely as if every statute had been solemnly reënacted. And now we see precisely how Slavery obtained its foothold.

Among the statutes of Maryland thus solemnly reënacted in gross was the following, originally passed as early as 1715, in colonial days.

“All negroes and other slaves already imported or hereafter to be imported into this province, and all children now born or hereafter to be born of such negroes and slaves, shall be slaves during their natural lives.”[231]

Slavery cannot exist without barbarous laws in its support. Maryland, accordingly, in the spirit of Slavery, added other provisions, also reënacted by Congress in the same general bundle, of which the following is an example.

“No negro or mulatto slave, free negro or mulatto born of a white woman, during his time of servitude by law, …shall be admitted and received as good and valid evidence in law, in any matteror thing whatsoever depending before any court of record or before any magistrate within this province,wherein any Christian white person is concerned.”[232]

At a later day the following kindred provision was added, in season to be reënacted by Congress in the same code.

“No slave manumitted agreeably to the laws of this State … shall be entitled … to give evidence against any white person, or shall be recorded as competent evidence tomanumit any slave petitioning for freedom.”[233]

And such is the law for Slavery at the national capital.

It will be observed that the original statute which undertakes to create Slavery in Maryland does not attaint the blood beyond two generations. It is confined to “all negroes and other slaves,” and their “children,” “during their natural lives.” These are slaves, but none others, unless a familiar rule of interpretation is reversed, and such words are extended rather than restrained. And yet it is by virtue of this colonial statute, with all its ancillary barbarism, adopted by Congress, that slaves are still held at the national capital. It is true that at the time of its adoption there were few slaves here to whom it was applicable. For ten years previous, the present area of Washington, according to received tradition, contained hardly five hundred inhabitants, all told, and these were for the most part laborers distributed in houses merely for temporary accommodation. But all these musty, antediluvian, wicked statutes, of which you have seen a specimen, took their place at once in the national legislation, and under their supposed authority slaves multiplied, and Slavery became a national institution. And it now continues only by virtue of this Slave Code borrowed from early colonial days, which, though flagrantly inconsistent with the Constitution, has never yet been repudiated by Court or Congress.

I have said that this Slave Code, even assuming it applicable to slaves beyond the “natural lives” of two generations, is flagrantly inconsistent with the Constitution.On this point the argument is so plain that it may be shown like a diagram.

Under the Constitution, Congress has “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever” at the national capital. The cession by Maryland was without condition, and the acceptance by Congress was also without condition; so that the territory fell at once within this exclusive jurisdiction. But Congress can exercise no power except in conformity with the Constitution. Its exclusive jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever is controlled and limited by the Constitution, out of which it is derived. Now, looking at the Constitution, we find, first, that there are no words authorizing Congress to establish or recognize Slavery, and, secondly, that there are positive words which prohibit Congress from the exercise of any such power. The argument, therefore, is twofold: first, from the absence of authority, and, secondly, from positive prohibition.

Of course, a barbarism like Slavery, having its origin in force and nothing else, can have no legal or constitutional support except from positive sanction. It can spring from no doubtful phrase. It must be declared by unambiguous words, incapable of a double sense. Here I repeat an argument which I have presented before, when on other occasions arraigning the pretensions of Slavery under the Constitution, but which, so long as Slavery claims immunity, cannot be allowed to drop out of sight. It begins with the great words of Lord Mansfield, who, in the memorable case of Somerset, said: “The state of Slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only bypositive law.… It is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it butpositive law.”[234]This principle has been adopted by tribunals even in slaveholding States.[235]But I do not stop to dwell on these authorities. Even the language, “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,” cannot be made to sanction Slavery. It wants those positive words, leaving nothing to implication, which are obviously required, especially when we consider the professed object of the Constitution, as declared in its Preamble, to “establish justice and secure the blessings of liberty.” There is no power in the Constitution to make a king, or, thank God, to make a slave; and the absence of all such power is hardly more clear in one case than in the other. The wordkingnowhere occurs in the Constitution, nor does the wordslave. But if there be no such power, then all Acts of Congress sustaining Slavery at the national capital must be unconstitutional and void. The stream cannot rise higher than the fountain head; nay, more,nothing can come out of nothing; and if there be nothing in the Constitution authorizing Congress to make a slave, there can be nothing valid in any subordinate legislation. It is a pretension which has thus far prevailed simply because Slavery predominated over Congress and courts.

To all who insist that Congress may sustain Slavery in the national capital I put the question, Where in the Constitution is the power found? If you cannot show where, do not assert the power. So hideous an effrontery must be authorized in unmistakable words. But where are the words? In what article, clause, or line? They cannot be found. I challenge their production. Insult not human nature by pretending thatits most cherished rights can be sacrificed without solemn authority. Remember that every presumption and every leaning must be in favor of Freedom and against Slavery. Remember, too, that no nice interpretation, no strained construction, no fancied deduction, can suffice to sanction the enslavement of our fellow-men. And do not degrade the Constitution by foisting upon its blameless text the idea of property in man. It is not there; and if you think you see it there, it is simply because you make the Constitution a reflection of yourself.

A single illustration will show the absurdity of this pretension. If, under the clause giving to Congress “exclusive legislation” at the national capital, Slavery may be established, and under these words Congress is empowered to create slaves instead of citizens, then, under the same words, it may do the same thing in the “forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings” belonging to the United States, wherever situated, for these are all placed within the same “exclusive legislation.” The extensive navy-yard at Charlestown, in the very shadow of Bunker Hill, may be filled with slaves, with enforced toil to take the place of that cheerful, well-paid labor whose busy hum is the best music of the place. Such an act, however consistent with slaveholding tyranny, would not be regarded as constitutional at Bunker Hill.

If there were any doubt on this point, and the absence of all authority were not perfectly clear, the prohibitions of the Constitution would settle the question. It is true that Congress has “exclusive legislation” within the District; but the prohibitions to grant titles of nobility, to passex post factolaws, to pass bills of attainder, and to establish religion, are unquestionablelimitations of this power. There is also another limitation, equally unquestionable. It is found in an Amendment proposed by the First Congress, on the recommendation of several States, as follows:—

“Nopersonshall be deprived of life,liberty, or property, withoutdue process of law.”

This prohibition, according to the Supreme Court, is obligatory on Congress.[236]It is also applicable to all claimed as slaves; for, in the eye of the Constitution, every human being within its sphere, whether Caucasian, Indian, or African, from the President to the slave, is aperson. Of this there is no question. But a remarkable incident of history confirms the conclusion. As originally recommended by Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, this proposition was restricted to thefreeman. Its language was,—

“Nofreemanought to be deprived of his life,liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”[237]

Of course, if the wordfreemanhad been adopted, this clause would be restricted in its effective power. Deliberately rejecting this limitation, the authors of the Amendment recorded their purpose that noperson, within the national jurisdiction, of whatever character, shall be deprived oflibertywithout due process of law. The latter words are borrowed from Magna Charta, and they mean without due presentment, indictment, or other judicial proceedings. But Congress, undertaking to support Slavery at the national capital, enacts thatpersonsmay be deprived of liberty there withoutany presentment, indictment, or other judicial proceedings. Therefore everypersonnow detained as a slave in the national capital is detained in violation of the Constitution. Not only is his liberty taken without due process of law, but, since he is tyrannically despoiled of all the fruits of his industry, his property also is taken without due process of law. You talk sometimes of guaranties of the Constitution. Here is an unmistakable guaranty, and I hold you to it.

Bringing the argument together, the conclusion may be briefly stated. The five-headed barbarism of Slavery, beginning in violence, can have no legal or constitutional existence, unless through positive words expressly authorizing it. As no such positive words are found in the Constitution, all legislation by Congress supporting Slavery must be unconstitutional and void, while it is made still further impossible by positive words of prohibition guarding the liberty of everypersonwithin the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.

A court properly inspired, and ready to assume that just responsibility which dignifies judicial tribunals, would at once declare Slavery impossible at the national capital, and set every slave free,—as Lord Mansfield declared Slavery impossible in England, and set every slave free. The two cases are parallel; but, alas! the court is wanting here. The legality of Slavery in England was affirmed in professional opinions by the ablest lawyers; it was also affirmed on the bench. England was a Slave State, and even its newspapers were disfigured with advertisements for the sale of human beings, while the merchants of London, backed by great names in the law, sustained the outrage. Then appeared Granville Sharp, the philanthropist, who,pained by the sight of Slavery, and especially shocked by the brutality of a slave-hunt in the streets of London, was aroused to question its constitutionality in England. For two years he devoted himself to anxious study of the British Constitution in all its multifarious records. His conclusion is expressed in these precise words: “The wordslaves, or anything that can justify the enslaving of others, is not to be found there, God be thanked!”[238]Thus encouraged, he persevered. By his generous exertions the negro Somerset, claimed as a slave by a Virginia gentleman then in London, was defended, and the Court of King’s Bench compelled to that immortal judgment by which Slavery was forever expelled from England, and the early boast of the British Constitution became a practical verity. More than fourteen thousand persons, held as slaves on British soil—four times as many as are now found in the national capital—became instantly free, without price or ransom.

The good work that our courts thus far decline remains to be done by Congress. Slavery, which is a scandalous anomaly and anachronism here, must be made to disappear from the national capital,—if not in one way, then in another. A judgment of court would be simply on the question of constitutional right, without regard to policy. But there is no consideration of right or of policy, from the loftiest principle to the humblest expediency, which may not properly enter into the conclusion of Congress. The former might be the triumph of the magistrate,—the latter must be that of the statesman. But whether from magistrate or from statesman, it will constitute an epoch inhistory.

But the question is asked, Shall we vote money for this purpose? I cannot hesitate. Two considerations are with me prevailing. First, the relation of master and slave at the national capital has from the beginning been established and maintained by Congress everywhere in sight, and even directly under its own eyes. The master held the slave; but Congress, with strong arm, stood behind the master, looking on and sustaining. Not a dollar of wages has been taken, not a child stolen, not a wife torn from her husband, without the hand of Congress. If not partnership, there is complicity on the part of Congress, through which the whole country has become responsible for the manifold wrong. Though always protesting against its continuance, and laboring earnestly for its removal, yet gladly do I accept my share of the prospective burden. And, secondly, even if not all involved in the manifold wrong, nothing is clearer than that the mode proposed is the gentlest, quietest, and surest in which the beneficent change can be accomplished. It is therefore the most practical. It recognizes Slavery as an existing fact, and provides for its removal. And when I think of the unquestionable good we seek, of all its great advantages, of the national capital redeemed, of the national character elevated, and of the righteous example we shall set, and when I think, still further, that, according to a rule alike of jurisprudence and morals,Liberty is priceless, I cannot hesitate at any appropriation within our means by which all these things of incalculable value can be promptly secured.

As I find no reason of policy adverse to such appropriation, so do I find no objection in the Constitution. I am aware that it is sometimes asked, Where in the Constitution is the power to make such appropriation? But nothing is clearer than that, under the words conferring “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,” Congress may create freemen, although it may not create slaves. And of course it may exercise all the powers necessary to this end, whether by a simple act of emancipation or a vote of money. If there could be any doubt on this point, it would be removed, when we reflect that the abolition of Slavery, with all the natural incidents of such an act, has been constantly recognized as within the sphere of legislation. It was so regarded by Washington, who, in a generous letter to Lafayette, dated May 10, 1786, said: “It certainly might and assuredly ought to be effected, and that, too, bylegislativeauthority.”[239]Through legislative authority Slavery has been abolished in State after State of our Union, and also in foreign countries. I have yet to learn that the power of Congress for this purpose at the national capital is less complete than that of any other legislative body within its own jurisdiction.

But, while not doubting the power of Congress in any of its incidents, I prefer to consider the money we pay as in the nature ofransomrather thancompensation, so that Freedom shall beacquiredrather thanpurchased; and I place it at once under the sanction of that commanding charity proclaimed by prophets and enjoined by apostles, which all history recognizes and the Constitution cannot impair. From time immemorial every Government has undertaken to ransom fromcaptivity, and sometimes a whole people has felt the general resources well bestowed in the ransom of its prince. Religion and humanity have both concurred in this duty as more than usually sacred. “The ransom of captives is a great and excellent office of justice,” exclaims one of the early Fathers. And the pious St. Ambrose insisted upon breaking up even the sacred vessels of the Church, saying: “The ornament of the sacraments is the redemption of captives.”

Among the most beautiful incidents of the early Church is that of St. Ambrose. There had been hesitation, but the divine Emancipationist broke forth: “What! you will not sell the vessels of gold, and you leave for sale the living vessels of the Lord! The ornament of the sacraments is the redemption of captives. Let the cup ransom from the enemy him whom the blood ransoms from sin.”[240]Happily, this spirit prevailed. At the report of Christians compelled to wear out their days as captives in Algiers, Tunis, or Morocco, or, it might be, among the Moors of Spain or the merchants of Genoa and Venice, it assumed practical form. Two Frenchmen, Jean de Matha and Pierre Nolasque, born on the coast of the Mediterranean, conceived the idea of a special order vowed to the redemption of Christian slaves. The first founded, in 1199, the order of the Holy Trinity, known often as Mathurins; the second, acting under the patronage of Spain, founded the order of Our Lady of Mercy. Upon both these orders Bishops and Popes bestowed approbation and encouragement, while, for more than six centuries, they devoted themselves to this Christian charity, often, according to the vow assumed, giving themselves as hostagesfor the ransomed captive. It is related, that, in 1655, the Order of Mercy in Algiers alone ransomed more than twelve thousand slaves, leaving in pledge a large number of its members, faithful to the vow, “In Saracenorum potestate in pignus, si necesse fuerit ad redemptionem Christi fidelium, detentus manebo.” Thus did these pious fathers give not only money, but themselves.[241]

The duty thus commended has been exercised by the United States under important circumstances, with the coöperation of the best names of our history, so as to be beyond question. The instance may not be familiar, but it is decisive, while, from beginning to end, it is full of instruction.

Who has not heard of the Barbary States, and of the pretension put forth by them to enslave white Christians? Algiers was the chief seat of this enormity, which, through the insensibility or incapacity of Christian States, was allowed to continue for generations. Good men and great men were degraded to be captives, while many, neglected by fortune, perished in barbarous Slavery. Even in our colonial days, there were Americans whose fate, while in the hands of these slave-masters, excited general sympathy. Only by ransom was their freedom obtained. Perhaps no condition was more calculated to arouse indignant rage. And yet the disposition so common to palliate Slavery in the National Capital showed itself with regard to Slavery in Algiers; and, indeed, the same arguments to soften public opinion have been employed in the two instances. The parallel is so complete, that I require all your trust to believe that what I read is not an apology for Slaveryhere. Thus, a member of a diplomatic mission from England, who visited Morocco in 1785, says of the Slavery which he saw: “It is very slightly inflicted”; and “as to any labor undergone, it does not deserve the name.”[242]And another earlier traveller, after describing the comfortable condition of the white slaves, adds, in words to which we are accustomed: “I am sure we saw several captives who lived much better in Barbary than ever they did in their own country.… Whatever money in charity was ever sent them by their friends in Europe was their own.… And yet this is called insupportable slavery among Turks and Moors! But we found this, as well as many other things in this country, strangely misrepresented.”[243]A more recent French writer asserts, with a vehemence to which we are habituated from the partisans of Slavery among us, that the white slaves at Algiers were not exposed to the miseries which they represented; that they were well clad and well fed,much better than the free Christians there; that special care was bestowed upon those who became ill; and that some were allowed such privileges as to become indifferent to freedom, and even to prefer Algiers to their own country.[244]Believe me, Sir, in stating these things I simply follow history; and I refer to the volume and page or chapter of the authorities which I quote, that the careful inquirer may see that they relate to Slavery abroad, and not to Slavery at home. If I continue to unfold this strange, eventful story, it will be to exhibitthe direct and constant intervention of Congress for the ransom of slaves; but the story itself is an argumentagainst Slavery, pertinent to the present occasion, which I am not unwilling to adopt.

Scarcely was national independence established, when we were aroused to fresh efforts for the protection of enslaved citizens. Within three years no less than ten American vessels were seized. At one time an apprehension prevailed that Dr. Franklin, on his way home from France, had been captured. “We are waiting,” said one of his French correspondents, “with the greatest impatience to hear from you. The newspapers have given us anxiety on your account, for some of them insist that you have been taken by the Algerines, while others pretend that you are at Morocco, enduring your slavery with all the patience of a philosopher.”[245]Though this apprehension happily proved without foundation, it soon became known that other Americans, less distinguished, but entitled to all the privileges of new-born citizenship, were suffering in cruel captivity. At once the sentiments of the people were enlisted in their behalf. Newspapers pleaded, while the corsairs were denounced sometimes as “infernal crews,” and sometimes as “human harpies.” But it was through the stories of victims who had succeeded in escaping from bondage that the people were most aroused. As these fugitive slaves touched our shores, they were welcomed with outspoken sympathy. Glimpses opened through them into the dread regions of Slavery gave a harrowing reality to all that conjecture or imagination had pictured. True, indeed, it was that our own white brethren, entitled like ourselves to all the rights of manhood, were degraded in unquestioning obedience to an arbitrarytaskmaster, sold at the auction-block, worked like beasts of the field, and galled by the manacle and lash. As the national power seemed yet inadequate to compel their liberation, it was attempted by ransom.

Generous efforts at Algiers were organized under the direction of our minister at Paris, and the famousSociety of Redemption, having its origin in the thirteenth century, offered aid. Our agents were blandly entertained by the great slave-dealer, the Dey, who informed them that he was familiar with the exploits of Washington, and, as he never expected to set eyes on this hero of Freedom, expressed a hope, that, through Congress, he might receive a full-length portrait of him, to be displayed in the palace at Algiers. Amidst such professions the Dey still clung to his American slaves, holding them at prices beyond the means of the agents, who were not authorized to exceed two hundred dollars a head,—being not unlike in amount that proposed in the present bill; and I beg to call the attention of the Senator from Maine [Mr.Morrill], who has the bill in charge, to the parallel.

Their redemption engaged the attention of the National Government early after the adoption of the Constitution. It was first brought before Congress by petition, of which we find the following record.

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