“You have already done your worst towards the American mercantile marine. What with the high rate of insurance, what with these captures, and what with the rapid transfer of tonnage to British capitalists, you have virtually made valueless that vast property. Why, if you had gone and helped the Confederates by bombarding all the accessible seaport towns of America, a few lives might have been lost, which, as it is, have not been sacrificed; but you could hardly have done more injury in the way of destroying property than you have done by these few cruisers.”[75]
“You have already done your worst towards the American mercantile marine. What with the high rate of insurance, what with these captures, and what with the rapid transfer of tonnage to British capitalists, you have virtually made valueless that vast property. Why, if you had gone and helped the Confederates by bombarding all the accessible seaport towns of America, a few lives might have been lost, which, as it is, have not been sacrificed; but you could hardly have done more injury in the way of destroying property than you have done by these few cruisers.”[75]
With that clearness of vision which he possessed in such rare degree, this statesman saw that England had “virtually made valueless a vast property,” as much as if this power had “bombarded all the accessible seaport towns of America.”
So strong and complete is this statement, that any further citation seems superfluous; but I cannot forbear adducing a pointed remark in the same debate, by that able gentleman, Mr. William E. Forster:—
“There could not,” said he, “be a stronger illustration of the damage which had been done to the American trade by these cruisers than the fact, that, so completely was the American flag driven from the ocean, the Georgia, on her second cruise, did not meet a single American vessel in six weeks, though she saw no less than seventy vessels in a very few days.”[76]
“There could not,” said he, “be a stronger illustration of the damage which had been done to the American trade by these cruisers than the fact, that, so completely was the American flag driven from the ocean, the Georgia, on her second cruise, did not meet a single American vessel in six weeks, though she saw no less than seventy vessels in a very few days.”[76]
This is most suggestive. So entirely was our commerce driven from the ocean, that for six weeks not an American vessel was seen!
Another Englishman, in an elaborate pamphlet, bears similar testimony. I refer to the pamphlet of Mr. Edge, published in London by Ridgway in 1863, and entitled “The Destruction of the American Carrying-Trade.” After setting forth at length the destruction of our commerce by British pirates, this writer thus foreshadows the damages:—
“Were we,” says he, “the sufferers, we should certainly demand compensation for the loss of the property captured or destroyed, for the interest of the capital invested in the vessels and their cargoes, and, maybe, a fair compensation in addition for all and any injury accruing to our business interests from the depredations upon our shipping.The remuneration may reach a high figure in the present case; but it would be a simple act of justice, and might prevent an incomparably greater loss in the future.”[77]
“Were we,” says he, “the sufferers, we should certainly demand compensation for the loss of the property captured or destroyed, for the interest of the capital invested in the vessels and their cargoes, and, maybe, a fair compensation in addition for all and any injury accruing to our business interests from the depredations upon our shipping.The remuneration may reach a high figure in the present case; but it would be a simple act of justice, and might prevent an incomparably greater loss in the future.”[77]
Here we have the damages assessed by an Englishman, who, while contemplating remuneration at a high figure, recognizes it as “a simple act of justice.”
Such is the candid and explicit testimony of Englishmen, pointing the way to the proper rule of damages. How to authenticate the extent of national loss with reasonable certainty is not without difficulty; but it cannot be doubted that such a loss occurred. It is folly to question it. The loss may be seen in various circumstances: as, in the rise of insurance on all American vessels; the fate of the carrying-trade, which was one of the great resources of our country; the diminution ofour tonnage, with the corresponding increase of British tonnage; the falling off in our exports and imports, with due allowance for our abnormal currency and the diversion of war. These are some of the elements; and here again we have British testimony. Mr. W. E. Forster, in the speech already quoted, announces that “the carrying-trade of the United States was transferred to British merchants”;[78]and Mr. Cobden, with his characteristic mastery of details, shows, that, according to an official document laid on the table of Parliament, American shipping had been transferred to English capitalists as follows: in 1858, 33 vessels, 12,684 tons; 1859, 49 vessels, 21,308 tons; 1860, 41 vessels, 13,638 tons; 1861, 126 vessels, 71,673 tons; 1862, 135 vessels, 64,578 tons; and 1863, 348 vessels, 252,579 tons; and he adds, “I am told that this operation is now going on as fast as ever”; and this circumstance he declares to be “themost serious aspectof the question of our relations with America.”[79]But this “most serious aspect” is left untouched by the pending treaty.
Our own official documents are in harmony with these English authorities. For instance, I have before me now the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1868, with an appendix by Mr. Nimmo, on shipbuilding in our country. From this Report it appears that in the New England States, during the year 1855, the most prosperous year of American shipbuilding, 305 ships and barks and 173 schooners were built, with an aggregate tonnage of 326,429 tons, while during the last year only 58 ships and barks and 213 schooners were built,with an aggregate tonnage of 98,697 tons.[80]I add a further statement from the same Report:—
“During the ten years from 1852 to 1862 the aggregate tonnage of American vessels entered at seaports of the United States from foreign countries was 30,225,475 tons, and the aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,699,192 tons, while during the five years from 1863 to 1868 the aggregate tonnage of American vessels entered was 9,299,877 tons, and the aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,116,427 tons,—showing that American tonnage in our foreign trade had fallen from two hundred and five to sixty-six per cent. of foreign tonnage in the same trade. Stated in other terms, during the decade from 1852 to 1862 sixty-seven per cent. of the total tonnage entered from foreign countries was in American vessels, and during the five years from 1863 to 1868 only thirty-nine per cent. of the aggregate tonnage entered from foreign countries was in American vessels,—a relative falling off of nearly one half.”[81]
“During the ten years from 1852 to 1862 the aggregate tonnage of American vessels entered at seaports of the United States from foreign countries was 30,225,475 tons, and the aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,699,192 tons, while during the five years from 1863 to 1868 the aggregate tonnage of American vessels entered was 9,299,877 tons, and the aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,116,427 tons,—showing that American tonnage in our foreign trade had fallen from two hundred and five to sixty-six per cent. of foreign tonnage in the same trade. Stated in other terms, during the decade from 1852 to 1862 sixty-seven per cent. of the total tonnage entered from foreign countries was in American vessels, and during the five years from 1863 to 1868 only thirty-nine per cent. of the aggregate tonnage entered from foreign countries was in American vessels,—a relative falling off of nearly one half.”[81]
It is not easy to say how much of this change, which has become chronic, may be referred to British pirates; but it cannot be doubted that they contributed largely to produce it. They began the influences under which this change has continued.
There is another document which bears directly upon the present question. I refer to the interesting Report of Mr. Morse, our consul at London, made during the last year, and published by the Secretary of State. After a minute inquiry, the Report shows that on the breaking out of the Rebellion in 1861 the entire tonnage of the United States, coasting and registered, was5,539,813 tons, of which 2,642,628 tons were registered and employed in foreign trade, and that at the close of the Rebellion in 1865, notwithstanding an increase in coasting tonnage, our registered tonnage had fallen to 1,602,528 tons, being a loss during the four years of more than a million tons, amounting to about forty per cent. of our foreign commerce. During the same four years the total tonnage of the British empire rose from 5,895,369 tons to 7,322,604 tons, the increase being especially in the foreign trade. The Report proceeds to say that as to the cause of the decrease in America and the corresponding increase in the British empire “there can be no room for question or doubt.” Here is the precise testimony from one who at his official post in London watched this unprecedented drama, with the outstretched ocean as a theatre, and British pirates as the performers:—
“Conceding to the Rebels the belligerent rights of the sea, when they had not a solitary war-ship afloat, in dock, or in the process of construction, and when they had no power to protect or dispose of prizes, made their sea-rovers, when they appeared, the instruments of terror and destruction to our commerce. From the appearance of the first corsair in pursuit of their ships, American merchants had to pay not only the marine, but the war risk also, on their ships. After the burning of one or two ships with their neutral cargoes, the ship-owner had to pay the war risk on the cargo his ship had on freight, as well as on the ship. Even then, for safety, the preference was, as a matter of course, always given to neutral vessels, and American ships could rarely find employment on these hard terms as long as there were good neutral ships in the freight markets. Under such circumstances there was no course left for our merchant ship-owners but to take such profitless business as was occasionally offered them, let their ships lie idle at their moorings or in dock with large expense and deterioration constantly going on, to sell them outright when they could do so without ruinous sacrifice, or put them under foreign flags for protection.”[82]
“Conceding to the Rebels the belligerent rights of the sea, when they had not a solitary war-ship afloat, in dock, or in the process of construction, and when they had no power to protect or dispose of prizes, made their sea-rovers, when they appeared, the instruments of terror and destruction to our commerce. From the appearance of the first corsair in pursuit of their ships, American merchants had to pay not only the marine, but the war risk also, on their ships. After the burning of one or two ships with their neutral cargoes, the ship-owner had to pay the war risk on the cargo his ship had on freight, as well as on the ship. Even then, for safety, the preference was, as a matter of course, always given to neutral vessels, and American ships could rarely find employment on these hard terms as long as there were good neutral ships in the freight markets. Under such circumstances there was no course left for our merchant ship-owners but to take such profitless business as was occasionally offered them, let their ships lie idle at their moorings or in dock with large expense and deterioration constantly going on, to sell them outright when they could do so without ruinous sacrifice, or put them under foreign flags for protection.”[82]
Beyond the actual loss in the national tonnage, there was a further loss in the arrest of our natural increase in this branch of industry, which an intelligent statistician puts at five per cent. annually, making in 1866 a total loss on this account of 1,384,953 tons, which must be added to 1,229,035 tons actually lost.[83]The same statistician, after estimating the value of a ton at forty dollars gold, and making allowance for old and new ships, puts the sum-total of national loss on this account at $110,000,000. Of course this is only an item in our bill.
To these authorities I add that of the National Board of Trade, which, in a recent report on American Shipping, after setting forth the diminution of our sailing tonnage, says that it is nearly all to be traced to the war on the ocean; and the result is summed up in the words, that, “while the tonnage of the nation was rapidly disappearingby the ravages of the Rebel cruisersand by sales abroad, in addition to the usual loss by the perils of the sea, there was no construction of new vessels going forward to counteract the decline even in part.”[84]Such is the various testimony, all tending to one conclusion.
This is what I have to say for the present onnational lossesthrough the destruction of commerce. These are large enough; but there is another chapter, where they are larger far: I refer, of course, to the national losses caused by the prolongation of the war, and traceable directly to England. Pardon me, if I confess the regret with which I touch this prodigious item; for I know well the depth of feeling which it is calculated to stir. But I cannot hesitate. It belongs to the case. No candid person, who studies this eventful period, can doubt that the Rebellion was originally encouraged by hope of support from England,—that it was strengthened at once by the concession of belligerent rights on the ocean,—that it was fed to the end by British supplies,—that it was encouraged by every well-stored British ship that was able to defy our blockade,—that it was quickened into frantic life with every report from the British pirates, flaming anew with every burning ship; nor can it be doubted that without British intervention the Rebellion would have soon succumbed under the well-directed efforts of the National Government. Not weeks or months, but years, were added in this way to our war, so full of costly sacrifice. The subsidies which in other times England contributed to Continental wars were less effective than the aid and comfort which she contributed to the Rebellion. It cannot be said too often that thenaval baseof the Rebellion was not in America, but in England. The blockade-runners and the pirate ships were all English. England was the fruitful parent, and these were the “hell-hounds,” pictured by Milton in his description of Sin, which, “when they list, would creep into her womb and kennel there.” Mr. Cobden boldly said in the House of Commons that England made warfrom her shores on the United States, with “an amount of damage to that country greater than would be produced by many ordinary wars.”[85]According to this testimony, the conduct of England was war; but it must not be forgotten that this war was carried on at our sole cost. The United States paid for a war waged by England upon the National Unity.
There was one form that this war assumed which was incessant, most vexatious, and costly, besides being in itself a positive alliance with the Rebellion. It was that of blockade-runners, openly equipped and supplied by England under the shelter of that baleful Proclamation. Constantly leaving English ports, they stole across the ocean, and then broke the blockade. These active agents of the Rebellion could be counteracted only by a network of vessels stretching along the coast, at great cost to the country. Here is another distinct item, the amount of which may be determined at the Navy Department.
The sacrifice of precious life is beyond human compensation; but there may be an approximate estimate of the national loss in treasure. Everybody can make the calculation. I content myself with calling attention to the elements which enter into it. Besides the blockade, there was the prolongation of the war. The Rebellion was suppressed at a cost of more than four thousand million dollars, a considerable portion of which has been already paid, leaving twenty-five hundred millions as a national debt to burden the people. If, through British intervention, the war was doubled in duration, or in any way extended, as cannot be doubted, then is Englandjustly responsible for the additional expenditure to which our country was doomed; and whatever may be the final settlement of these great accounts, such must be the judgment in any chancery which consults the simple equity of the case.
This plain statement, without one word of exaggeration or aggravation, is enough to exhibit the magnitude of the national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade. They stand before us mountain-high, with a base broad as the Nation, and a mass stupendous as the Rebellion itself. It will be for a wise statesmanship to determine how this fearful accumulation, like Ossa upon Pelion, shall be removed out of sight, so that it shall no longer overshadow the two countries.
Perhaps I ought to anticipate an objection from the other side, to the effect that these national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade, are indirect and remote, so as not to be a just ground of claim. This is expressed at the Common Law by the rule that “damages must be for the natural and proximate consequence of an act.”[86]To this excuse the answer is explicit. The damages suffered by the United States are twofold, individual and national, being in each case direct and proximate, although in the one case individuals suffered, and in the other case the nation. It is easy to see that there may be occasions, where, overtopping all individual damages, are damages suffered by the nation, so thatreparation to individuals would be insufficient. Nor can the claim of the nation be questioned simply because it is large, or because the evidence with regard to it is different from that in the case of an individual. In each case the damage must be proved by the best possible evidence, and this is all that law or reason can require. In the case of the nation the evidence is historic; and this is enough. Impartial history will record the national losses from British intervention, and it is only reasonable that the evidence of these losses should not be excluded from judgment. Because the case is without precedent, because no nation ever before received such injury from a friendly power, this can be no reason why the question should not be considered on the evidence.
Even the rule of the Common Law furnishes no impediment; for our damages are the natural consequence of what was done. But the rule of the Roman Law, which is the rule of International Law, is broader than that of the Common Law. The measure of damages, according to the Digest, is, “Whatever may have been lost or might have been gained,”—Quantum mihi abest, quantumque lucrari potui;[87]and this same rule seems to prevail in the French Law, borrowed from the Roman Law.[88]This rule opens the door to ample reparation for all damages, whether individual or national.
There is another rule of the Common Law, in harmony with strict justice, which is applicable in the case. I find it in the law relating toNuisances, which provides that there may be two distinct proceedings,—first, in behalf of individuals, and, secondly, in behalfof the community. Obviously, reparation to individuals does not supersede reparation to the community. The proceeding in the one case is by action at law, and in the other by indictment. The reason assigned by Blackstone for the latter is, “Because, the damage being common to all the king’s subjects, no one can assign his particular proportion of it.”[89]But this is the very case with regard to damages sustained by the nation.
A familiar authority furnishes an additional illustration, which is precisely in point:—
“No person, natural or corporate, can have an action for apublic nuisance, or punish it,—but only the king, in his public capacity of supreme governor andpaterfamiliasof the kingdom. Yet this rule admits of one exception: where a private person suffers some extraordinary damage beyond the rest of the king’s subjects.”[90]
“No person, natural or corporate, can have an action for apublic nuisance, or punish it,—but only the king, in his public capacity of supreme governor andpaterfamiliasof the kingdom. Yet this rule admits of one exception: where a private person suffers some extraordinary damage beyond the rest of the king’s subjects.”[90]
Applying this rule to the present case, the way is clear. Every British pirate wasa public nuisance, involving the British Government, which must respond in damages, not only to the individuals who have suffered, but also to the National Government, acting aspaterfamiliasfor the common good of all the people.
Thus by an analogy of the Common Law in the case of a Public Nuisance, also by the strict rule of the Roman Law, which enters so largely into International Law, and even by the rule of the Common Law relating to Damages, all losses, whether individual or national, are the just subject of claim. It is not I who say this; it is the Law. The colossal sum-total may be seen notonly in the losses of individuals, but in those national losses caused by the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, and the expense of the blockade, all of which may be charged directly to England:—
“illud ab unoCorpore, et ex una pendebat origine bellum.”[91]
“illud ab unoCorpore, et ex una pendebat origine bellum.”[91]
“illud ab uno
Corpore, et ex una pendebat origine bellum.”[91]
Three times is this liability fixed: first, by the concession of ocean belligerency, opening to the Rebels ship-yards, foundries, and manufactories, and giving to them a flag on the ocean; secondly, by the organization of hostile expeditions, which, by admissions in Parliament, were nothing less than piratical war on the United States with England as the naval base; and, thirdly, by welcome, hospitality, and supplies extended to these pirate ships in ports of the British empire. Show either of these, and the liability of England is complete; show the three, and this power is bound by a triple cord.
Mr. President, in concluding these remarks, I desire to say that I am no volunteer. For several years I have carefully avoided saying anything on this most irritating question, being anxious that negotiations should be left undisturbed to secure a settlement which could be accepted by a deeply injured nation. The submission of the pending treaty to the judgment of the Senate left me no alternative. It became my duty to consider it carefully in committee, and to review the whole subject. If I failed to find what we had a right to expect, and if the just claims of our country assumed unexpected proportions,it was not because I would bear hard on England, but because I wish most sincerely to remove all possibility of strife between our two countries; and it is evident that this can be done only by first ascertaining the nature and extent of difference. In this spirit I have spoken to-day. If the case against England is strong, and if our claims are unprecedented in magnitude, it is only because the conduct of this power at a trying period was most unfriendly, and the injurious consequences of this conduct were on a scale corresponding to the theatre of action. Life and property were both swallowed up, leaving behind a deep-seated sense of enormous wrong, as yet unatoned and even unacknowledged, which is one of the chief factors in the problem now presented to the statesmen of both countries. The attempt to close this great international debate without a complete settlement is little short of puerile.
With the lapse of time and with minuter consideration the case against England becomes more grave, not only from the questions of international responsibility which it involves, but from better comprehension of the damages, which are seen now in their true proportions. During the war, and for some time thereafter, it was impossible to state them. The mass of a mountain cannot be measured at its base; the observer must occupy a certain distance; and this rule of perspective is justly applicable to damages which are vast beyond precedent.
A few dates will show the progress of the controversy, and how the case enlarged. Going as far back as 20th November, 1862, we find our Minister in London, Mr. Adams, calling for redress from the British Governmenton account of the Alabama.[92]This was the mild beginning. On the 23d October, 1863, in another communication, the same Minister suggested to the British Government any “fair and equitable form of conventional arbitrament or reference.”[93]This proposition slumbered in the British Foreign Office for nearly two years, during which the Alabama was pursuing her piratical career, when, on the 30th August, 1865, it was awakened by Lord Russell only to be knocked down in these words:—
“In your letter of the 23d of October, 1863, you were pleased to say that the Government of the United States is ready to agree to any form of arbitration.… Her Majesty’s Government must, therefore, decline either to make reparation and compensation for the captures made by the Alabama, or to refer the question to any foreign state.”[94]
“In your letter of the 23d of October, 1863, you were pleased to say that the Government of the United States is ready to agree to any form of arbitration.… Her Majesty’s Government must, therefore, decline either to make reparation and compensation for the captures made by the Alabama, or to refer the question to any foreign state.”[94]
Such was our repulse from England, having at least the merit of frankness, if nothing else. On the 17th October, 1865, our Minister informed Lord Russell that the United States had finally resolved to make no effort for arbitration.[95]Again the whole question slumbered until 27th August, 1866, when Mr. Seward presented a list of individual claims on account of the pirate Alabama and other Rebel cruisers.[96]From that time negotiation has continued, with ups and downs, until at last the pending treaty was signed. Had the early overtures of our Government been promptly accepted, or had therebeen at any time a just recognition of the wrong done, I doubt not that this great question would have been settled; but the rejection of our very moderate propositions, and the protracted delay, which afforded an opportunity to review the case in its different bearings, have awakened the people to the magnitude of the interests involved. If our demands are larger now than at our first call, it is not the only time in history when such a rise has occurred. The story of the Sibyl is repeated, and England is the Roman king.
Shall these claims be liquidated and cancelled promptly, or allowed to slumber until called into activity by some future exigency? There are many among us, who, taking counsel of a sense of national wrong, would leave them to rest without settlement, so as to furnish a precedent for retaliation in kind, should England find herself at war. There are many in England, who, taking counsel of a perverse political bigotry, have spurned them absolutely; and there are others, who, invoking the point of honor, assert that England cannot entertain them without compromising her honor. Thus there is peril from both sides. It is not difficult to imagine one of our countrymen saying, with Shakespeare’s Jew, “The villany you teach me I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the instruction”; nor is it difficult to imagine an Englishman firm in his conceit that no apology can be made and nothing paid. I cannot sympathize with either side. Be the claims more or less, they are honestly presented, with the conviction that they are just; and they should be considered candidly, so that they shall no longer lower, like a cloud ready to burst, upon two nations, which, according to their inclinations, can do each other such infinite injuryor such infinite good. I know it is sometimes said that war between us must come sooner or later. I do not believe it. But if it must come, let it be later, and then I am sure it will never come. Meanwhile good men must unite to make it impossible.
Again I say, this debate is not of my seeking. It is not tempting; for it compels criticism of a foreign power with which I would have more than peace, more even than concord. But it cannot be avoided. The truth must be told,—not in anger, but in sadness. England has done to the United States an injury most difficult to measure. Considering when it was done and in what complicity, it is truly unaccountable. At a great epoch of history, not less momentous than that of the French Revolution or that of the Reformation, when Civilization was fighting a last battle with Slavery, England gave her name, her influence, her material resources to the wicked cause, and flung a sword into the scale with Slavery. Here was a portentous mistake. Strange that the land of Wilberforce, after spending millions for Emancipation, after proclaiming everywhere the truths of Liberty, and ascending to glorious primacy in the sublime movement for the Universal Abolition of Slavery, could do this thing! Like every departure from the rule of justice and good neighborhood, her conduct was pernicious in proportion to the scale of operations, affecting individuals, corporations, communities, and the nation itself. And yet down to this day there is no acknowledgment of this wrong,—not a single word. Such a generous expression would be the beginning of a just settlement, and the best assurance of that harmony between two great and kindred nations which all must desire.
Remarks in the Senate, April 21, 1869.
The Senate having under consideration a resolution requesting from the heads of Departments “information of the names, age, and compensation of all inferior officers, clerks, and employés in their respective Departments at Washington, showing from what States they were respectively appointed,” &c., Mr. Abbott, of North Carolina, moved the following addition:—“Resolved further, That in the opinion of the Senate the distribution of the official patronage of the Government not embraced in local offices in the States should be made as nearly equal among all the States, according to their representation and population, as may be practicable; and that to confine such patronage to particular States or sections, either wholly or partially, is both unjust and injudicious.”On the latter resolution Mr. Sumner spoke as follows:—
The Senate having under consideration a resolution requesting from the heads of Departments “information of the names, age, and compensation of all inferior officers, clerks, and employés in their respective Departments at Washington, showing from what States they were respectively appointed,” &c., Mr. Abbott, of North Carolina, moved the following addition:—
“Resolved further, That in the opinion of the Senate the distribution of the official patronage of the Government not embraced in local offices in the States should be made as nearly equal among all the States, according to their representation and population, as may be practicable; and that to confine such patronage to particular States or sections, either wholly or partially, is both unjust and injudicious.”
“Resolved further, That in the opinion of the Senate the distribution of the official patronage of the Government not embraced in local offices in the States should be made as nearly equal among all the States, according to their representation and population, as may be practicable; and that to confine such patronage to particular States or sections, either wholly or partially, is both unjust and injudicious.”
On the latter resolution Mr. Sumner spoke as follows:—
MR. PRESIDENT,—If I have rightly read the history of my country, there was before Vicksburg an army commanded by three generals from Ohio,—General Grant, General Sherman, and General McPherson. Now, if I rightly understand the proposition of the Senator from North Carolina, he would require that the generals in command of our Army should be taken geographically,—not according to their merits, not according to their capacity to defend this Republic and to maintain with honor its flag, but simply according to the place of their residence,—and no three generals should be in command from one State. Do I understand the Senator aright?
Mr. Abbott.My amendment reads, “as far as practicable.”
Mr. Abbott.My amendment reads, “as far as practicable.”
Mr. Sumner.Very well,—“as far as practicable.” I would inquire of my friend whether fitness for office or service in other departments of the Government does not depend upon capacity, talent, preparation, as much as in the Army? I ask the Senator if it is not so?
Mr. Abbott.The purpose of this amendment was not to override all such considerations; it was to give an expression of the sense of the Senate that States should not be ignored in the distribution of this sort of patronage. Nothing in it prevents three generals from Ohio being in the command of one army, or the appointment of three Cabinet officers from Ohio; but it is simply to express the sense of the Senate that these things ought to be done with something like fairness and justice, as between the different States.
Mr. Abbott.The purpose of this amendment was not to override all such considerations; it was to give an expression of the sense of the Senate that States should not be ignored in the distribution of this sort of patronage. Nothing in it prevents three generals from Ohio being in the command of one army, or the appointment of three Cabinet officers from Ohio; but it is simply to express the sense of the Senate that these things ought to be done with something like fairness and justice, as between the different States.
Mr. Sumner.I take it there is no Senator who does not accept the general idea of the Senator from North Carolina, that all things should be done in fairness, and that all parts of the country, every portion of this great Republic, should be treated with equal respect and honor. That is clear. But first and foremost above all is the public service: that must be maintained; it must not be sacrificed; and how can it be maintained, unless you advance to prominent posts in this service those who are the most meritorious, and who can best discharge the duties of the post?
I merely throw out this remark, and call attention to this point, that Senators may see to what this proposition tends. If it were fully carried out, it would reduce the public service of this country to one dead level. Men would go into it merely because they livedin certain places, not because they had a fitness for the posts to which they were advanced. Perhaps I am mistaken, but I see no reason why there should be three Ohio generals in command before Vicksburg, and not three Ohio citizens in eminent civil service. To my mind the attainments and the talents required in civil service are as well worthy to be recognized as those that are required in military service, and I see no reason for a rule that shall allow talent to be taken without any reference to geographical limit in the military service which is not equally applicable to the civil service.
Now, as to our friends who have recently come into this Chamber, I beg them to understand, that, so far as I am concerned, there is no disposition to deny or to begrudge them anything to which, according to geographical proportions, they may be entitled; but I beg them to consider that time is an essential element of this transition through which we are passing.
Mr. Fessenden.Will my friend allow me to make a suggestion to him?Mr. Sumner.Certainly.Mr. Fessenden.I merely wish to allude to the notorious fact that for half a century before the Rebellion the proportion of persons in civil office in the Departments in Washington from the Southern States was very nearly, if not quite, two to one to those from all the other States. They had the control, and had pretty much all the offices, for years and years.
Mr. Fessenden.Will my friend allow me to make a suggestion to him?
Mr. Sumner.Certainly.
Mr. Fessenden.I merely wish to allude to the notorious fact that for half a century before the Rebellion the proportion of persons in civil office in the Departments in Washington from the Southern States was very nearly, if not quite, two to one to those from all the other States. They had the control, and had pretty much all the offices, for years and years.
Mr. Sumner.We are now in a process of transition, and I was observing that time is an essential element in that process. What the Senator from North Carolinaaims at cannot be accomplished at once. The change cannot be made instantly. The men are not presented from the States lately in rebellion in sufficient numbers, in sufficient proportion, with competency for these posts. I know that there are gentlemen there fit to grace many of these posts, but I know also that there is not relatively the same proportion of persons fit for the civil service as there is in the other parts of the country; and our friends from the South, it seems to me, must take this into consideration kindly, and wait yet a little longer.
Speech at the Republican State Convention in Worcester, Massachusetts, September 22, 1869.
Mr. Sumner was selected as President of the Convention. On taking the chair he spoke as follows:—
Mr. Sumner was selected as President of the Convention. On taking the chair he spoke as follows:—
Fellow-citizens of Massachusetts:—
While thanking you for the honor conferred upon me, I make haste to say that in my judgment Massachusetts has one duty, at the coming election, to which all local interests and local questions must be postponed, as on its just performance all else depends; and this commanding duty is, to keep the Commonwealth, now as aforetime, an example to our country and a bulwark of Human Rights. Such was Massachusetts in those earlier days, when, on the continent of Europe, the name of “Bostonians” was given to our countrymen in arms against the mother country,[97]making this designation embrace all,—and when, in the British Parliament, the great orator, Edmund Burke, exclaimed, “The cause of Boston is become the cause of all America; every part of America is united in support of Boston; … you have made Boston the Lord Mayor of America.”[98]I quote these words from the Parliamentary Debates. But Boston was at thattime Massachusetts, and it was her stand for Liberty that made her name the synonym for all. And permit me to add, that, in choosing a presiding officer entirely removed from local issues, I find assurance of your readiness to unite with me in thatNational Causewhich concerns not Massachusetts only, but every part of America, and concerns also our place and name as a nation.
The enemy here in Massachusetts would be glad to divert attention from the unassailable principles of the Republican Party; they would be glad to make you forget that support we owe to a Republican Administration,—also that support we owe to the measures of Reconstruction, and our constant abiding persistence for all essential safeguards not yet completely established. These they would hand over to oblivion, hoping on some local appeal to disorganize our forces, or, perhaps, obtain power to be wielded against the National Cause. Massachusetts cannot afford to occupy an uncertain position. Therefore I begin by asking you to think of our country, our whole country,—in other words, ofNational Affairs at Home and Abroad.
It is now four years since I had the honor of presiding at our annual Convention, and I do not forget how at that time I endeavored to remind you of this same National Cause, then in fearful peril.[99]The war of armies was ended; no longer was fellow-citizen arrayed against fellow-citizen; on each side the trumpet was hushed, the banner furled. But the defection of Andrew Johnson had then begun, and out of that defection the Rebellion assumed new life, with new purposesand new hopes. If it did not spring forth once more fully armed, it did spring forth filled with hate and diabolism towards all who loved the Union, whether white or black. There were exceptions, I know; but they were not enough to change the rule. And straightway the new apparition, acting in conjunction with the Northern Democracy, aboriginal allies of the Rebellion, planned the capture of the National Government. Its representatives came up to Washington. Then was the time for a few decisive words in the name of the Republic, on which for four years they had waged bloody war. The great dramatist, who has words for every occasion, anticipated this, when he said,—
“Return thee, therefore, with a flood of tears,And wash away thy country’s stained spots.”
“Return thee, therefore, with a flood of tears,And wash away thy country’s stained spots.”
“Return thee, therefore, with a flood of tears,
And wash away thy country’s stained spots.”
Such a mood would have been the beginning of peace. How easy to see that these men should have been admonished frankly and kindly to return home, there to plant, plough, sow, reap, buy, sell, and be prosperous, but not to expect any place in the copartnership of government until there was completest security for all! Instead of this, they were sent back plotting how to obtain ascendency at home as the stepping-stone to ascendency in the nation. Such was the condition of things in the autumn of 1865, when, sounding the alarm from this very platform, I insisted upon irreversible guaranties against the Rebellion, and especially on security to the national freedman and the national creditor. It was upon security that I then insisted,—believing, that, though the war of armies was ended, this was a just object of national care, all contained in the famous time-honored postulate of war,Security for the Future, without which peace is no better than armistice.
To that security one thing is needed,—simply this: All men must be safe in their rights, so that affairs, whether of government or business, shall have a free and natural course. But there are two special classes still in jeopardy, as in the autumn of 1865,—the National Freedman and the National Creditor,—each a creditor of the nation and entitled to protection, each under the guardianship of the public faith; and behind these are faithful Unionists, now suffering terribly from the growing reaction.
For the protection of the national freedman a Constitutional Amendment is presented for ratification, placing his right to vote under the perpetual safeguard of the nation; but I am obliged to remind you that this Amendment has not yet obtained the requisite number of States, nor can I say surely when it will. The Democratic Party is arrayed against it, and the Rebel interest unites with the Democracy. Naturally they go together. They are old cronies. Here let me say frankly that I have never ceased to regret,—I do now most profoundly regret,—that Congress, in its plenary powers under the Constitution, especially in its great unquestionable power to guaranty a republican government in the States, did not summarily settle this whole question, so that it should no longer disturb the country. It was for Congress to fix the definition of a republican government; nor need it go further than our own Declaration of Independence, where is a definition from which there is no appeal. There it is, as it came from our fathers, in lofty, self-evident truth; and Congress should have applied it. Or it might have gone to the speech of Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg, whereagain is the same great definition. There was also a decisive precedent. As Congress made a Civil Rights Law, so should it have made a Political Rights Law. In each case the power is identical. If it can be done in the one, it can be done in the other. To my mind nothing is clearer. Thus far Congress has thought otherwise. There remains, then, the slow process of Constitutional Amendment, to which the country must be rallied.
But this is not enough. No mere text of Constitution or Law is sufficient. Behind these must be a prevailing Public Opinion and a sympathetic Administration. Both are needed. The Administration must reinforce Public Opinion, and Public Opinion must reinforce the Administration. Such is all experience. Without these the strongest text and most cunning in its requirements is only a phantom, it may be of terror, as was the case with the Fugitive Slave Bill,—but not a living letter. It is not practically obeyed; sometimes it is evaded, sometimes openly set at nought. And now it is my duty to warn you that the national freedman still needs your care. His ancient master is already in the field conspiring against him. That traditional experience, that infinite audacity, that insensibility to Human Rights, which so long upheld Slavery, are aroused anew. No longer able to hold him as slave, the ancient master means to hold him as dependant, and to keep him in his service, personal and political,—thus substituting a new bondage for the old. Unhappily, he finds at the North a political party which the Rebellion has not weaned from that unnatural Southern breast whence it drew its primitive nutriment; and thispolitical party now fraternizes in the dismal work by which peace is postponed: for until the national freedman is safe in Equal Rights there can be no peace. You may call it peace, but I tell you it is not peace. It is peace only in name. Who does not feel that he treads still on smothered fires? Who does not feel his feet burn as he moves over the treacherous ashes? If I wished any new motive for opposition to the Democracy, I should find it in this hostile alliance. Because I am for peace so that this whole people may be at work, because I desire tranquillity so that all may be happy, because I seek reconciliation so that there shall be completest harmony, therefore I oppose the Democracy and now denounce it as Disturber of the National Peace.
The information from the South is most painful. Old Rebels are crawling from hiding-places to resume their former rule; and what a rule! Such as might be expected from the representatives of Slavery. It is the rule of misrule, where the “Ku-Klux-Klan” takes the place of missionary and schoolmaster. Murder is unloosed. The national freedman is the victim; and so is the Unionist. Not one of these States where intimidation, with death in its train, does not play its part. Take that whole Southern tier from Georgia to Texas, and add to it Tennessee, and, I fear, North Carolina and Virginia also,—for the crime is contagious,—and there is small justice for those to whom you owe so much. That these things should occur under Andrew Johnson was natural; that Reconstruction should encounter difficulties after his defection was natural. Andrew Johnson is now out of the way, and in his place a patriot President. Public Opinion must come to his support inthis necessary work. There is but one thing these disturbers feel; it is power; and this they must be made to feel: I mean the power of an awakened people, directed by a Republican Administration, vigorously, constantly, surely, so that there shall be no rest for the wicked.
If I could forget the course of the Democracy on these things,—as I cannot,—there is still another chapter for exposure; and the more it is seen, the worse it appears. It is that standing menace of Repudiation, by which the national credit at home and abroad suffers so much, and our taxes are so largely increased. It will not do to say that no National Convention has yet announced this dishonesty. I charge it upon the Party. A party which repudiates the fundamental principles of the Declaration of Independence, which repudiates Equality before the Law, which repudiates the self-evident truth that government is founded only on the consent of the governed, which repudiates what is most precious and good in our recent history, and whose chiefs are now engaged in cunning assault upon the national creditor, is a party of Repudiation. This is its just designation. A Democrat is a Repudiator. What is Slavery itself but an enormous wholesale repudiation of all rights, all truths, and all decencies? How easy for a party accepting this degradation to repudiate pecuniary obligations! These are small, compared with the other. Naturally the Democracy is once more in conjunction with the old Slave-Masters. The Repudiation Gospel according to Mr. Pendleton is now preaching in Ohio; and nothing is more certain than that the triumph of the Democracy would be a fatalblow not only at the national freedman, but also at the national creditor. There would be repudiation for each.
The word “Repudiation,” in its present sense, is not old. It first appeared in Mississippi, a Democratic State intensely devoted to Slavery. If the thing were known before, never before did it assume the same hardihood of name. It was in 1841 that a Mississippi Governor, in a Message to the Legislature, used this word with regard to certain State bonds, and thus began that policy by which Mississippi was first dishonored and then kept poor: for capital was naturally shy of such a State. Constantly, from that time, Mississippi had this “bad eminence”; nor is the State more known as the home of Jefferson Davis than as the home of Repudiation. Unhappily, the nation suffered also; and even now, as I understand, it is argued in Europe, to our discredit, that, because Mississippi repudiated, the nation may repudiate also. If I refer to this example, it is because I would illustrate the mischief of the Democratic policy and summon Mississippi to tardy justice. A regenerated State cannot afford to bear the burden of Repudiation; nor can the nation and the sisterhood of States forget misconduct so injurious to all.
I have pleasure, at this point, in reference to an early effort in the “North American Review,” by an able lawyer, for a time an ornament of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hon. B. R. Curtis, who, after reviewing the misconduct of Mississippi, argues most persuasively, that, where a State repudiates its obligations, to the detriment of foreigners, there is a remedy through the National Government. This suggestion is important for Mississippi now. But the article contains anotherwarning, applicable to the nation at the present hour, which I quote:—