BELLIGERENT INTERVENTION IN DOMINICA.

“It is also important that we should have full and accurate information in regard to the views of the Dominican people of all parties in regard to annexation to the United States, or the sale or lease of the Bay of Samana, or of territory adjacent thereto.”[42]

No invitation from the island appears,—not a word even from any of its people. The beginning is in the letter of the Secretary; and here we see how “a man-of-war” formed part of the first stage. A mere inquiry is inaugurated by “a man-of-war.” Nor was it to stop at a single place; it was to visit the several ports of the Dominican Republic.

The Secretary of the Navy obeyed. Orders were given, and under date of June 29, 1869, Rear-Admiral Hoff reports that the Nipsic, with an armament of one 11-inch and two 9-inch guns, “is to visit all the ports of the Dominican Republic.”[43]Here again is a revelation, foreshadowing the future; all the ports are to be visited by this powerful war-ship. Why? To what just end? If for negotiation, then was force,force,FORCEour earliest, as it has been since our constant plenipotentiary. Already we discern the contrast with Old Spain.

The loss of a screw occurred to prevent this war-breathing perambulation. The Nipsic did not go beyond Port-au-Prince; but Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge, in his report, under date of July 14, 1869, lets drop an honest judgment, which causes regret that he did not visit the whole island. Thus he wrote:—

“While my short stay in the island will not permit me to speak with authority, it is my individual opinion, that, if the United States should annex Haytion the representation of a party, it would be found an elephant both costly in money and lives.”[44]

The whole case is opened when we are warned against annexion “on the representation of a party.”

Still the scheme proceeded. On the 17th July, 1869, General Babcock sailed from New York for San Domingo, as special agent of the State Department. The records of the Department, so far as communicated to the Senate, show no authority to open negotiations of any kind, much less to treat for the acquisition of this half-island. His instructions, which are dated July 13, 1869, are simply to make certain inquiries;[45]but, under the same date, the Secretary of the Navy addresses a letter to Commander Owen, of the Seminole, with an armament of one 11-inch gun and four 32-pounders, of 4,200 pounds, in which he says:—

“You will remain at Samana, or on the coast of San Domingo, while General Babcock is there,and give him the moral support of your guns.”[46]

The phrase of the Secretary is at least curious. And who is General Babcock, that on his visit the Navy is to be at his back? Nothing on this head is said. All that we know from the record is that he was to make certain inquiries, and in this business “guns” play a part. To be sure, it was their “moralsupport” he was to have; but they were nevertheless “guns.” Thus in all times has lawless force sought to disguise itself. Before any negotiation was begun, while only a few interrogatories were ordered by the State Department,under which this missionary acted, “the moral support of guns” was ordered by the Navy Department. Here, Sir, permit me to say, is the first sign of war, being an undoubted usurpation, whether by President or Secretary. War is hostile force, and here it is ordered. But this is only a squint, compared with the open declaration which ensued. And here again we witness the contrast with Old Spain.

But the “guns” of the Seminole were not enough to support the missionary in his inquiries. The Navy Department, under date of August 23, 1869, telegraphed to the commandant at Key West:—

“Direct a vessel to proceed without a moment’s delay to San Domingo City,to be placed at the disposal of General Babcock while on that coast. If not at San Domingo City, to find him.”[47]

Here is nothing less than the terrible earnestness of war itself. Accordingly, the Tuscarora was dispatched; and the missionary finds himself changed to a commodore. Again the contrast with Old Spain!

How many days the Tuscarora took to reach the coast does not appear; but on the 4th September the famous protocol was executed by Orville E. Babcock, entitling himself “Aide-de-Camp to his Excellency, General Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America,” where, besides stipulating the annexion of Dominica to the United States in consideration of $1,500,000, it is further provided that“his Excellency, General Grant, President of the United States, promises, privately, to use all his influence in order that the idea of annexing the Dominican Republic to the United States may acquire such a degree of popularity among members of Congress as will be necessary for its accomplishment.”[48]Such was the work which needed so suddenly—“without a moment’s delay”—a second war-ship besides the Seminole, which was already ordered to lend “themoralsupport of its guns.” How unlike that boast of Old Spain, that there was not a Spanish bottom in those waters!

Returning to Washington with his protocol, the missionary was now sent back with instructions to negotiate two treaties,—one for the annexion of the half-island, and the other for the lease of the Bay of Samana. By the Constitution ambassadors and other public ministers are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; but our missionary held no such commission. How the business sped appears from the State Department. The Report of the Navy Department shows how it was sustained by force. By a letter under date of December 3, 1869, on board the ship Albany, off San Domingo, addressed to Lieutenant-Commander Bunce on board the Nantasket, the missionary, after announcing the conclusion of a treaty for the lease of Samana and other purposes, imparts this important information:—

“In this negotiation the President has guarantied to the Dominican Republic protection from all foreign interposition during the time specified in the treaties for submitting the same to the people of the Dominican Republic.”

Of the absolute futility and nullity of this Presidential guaranty until after the ratification of the treaties Ishall speak hereafter. Meanwhile we behold the missionary changed to plenipotentiary:—

“For this purpose the honorable Secretary of the Navy was directed to placethree armed vessels in this harbor, subject to my instruction.”

Why three armed vessels? For what purpose? How unlike the boast of Old Spain! What follows reveals the menace of war:—

“I shall raise the United States flag on shore, and shall leave a small guard with it.”

Here is nothing less than military occupation. Besides war-ships in the waters, the flag is to be raised on shore, and soldiers of the United States are to be left with it. Again the contrast with Old Spain, boasting not only that there was not a single Spanish “bottom” on the coast, but not a single Spanish soldier on the land. Then follows an order to make war:—

“Should you find any foreign intervention intended,you will use all your forceto carry out to the letter the guaranties given in the treaties.”

Nothing could be stronger. Here is war. Then comes a direct menace by the young plenipotentiary, launched at the neighboring Black Republic:—

“The Dominican Republic fears trouble from the Haytian border, about Jacmel. You will please inform the people, in case you are satisfied there is an intended intervention, that such intervention, direct or indirect, will be regarded as an unfriendly act toward the United States,and take such steps as you think necessary.”[49]

The Dominican Republic fears trouble, or in other words the usurper Baez trembles for his power, and therefore the guns of our Navy are to be pointed at Hayti. Again, how little like Old Spain! And this was the way in which our negotiation began. We have heard of an “armedneutrality,” and of an “armedpeace”; but here is anarmednegotiation.

The force employed in the negotiation naturally fructified in other force. Violence follows violence in new forms. Armed negotiation was changed to armed intervention, being an act of war,—all of which is placed beyond question. There is repetition and reduplication of testimony.

The swiftness of war appears in the telegram dated at the Navy Department January 29, 1870, addressed to Rear-Admiral Poor, at Key West. Here is this painful dispatch:—

“Proceed at once with the Severn and Dictator to Port-au-Prince; communicate with our Consul there, and inform the present Haytian authorities that this Government is determined to protect the present Dominican Governmentwith all its power. You will then proceed to Dominica, and use your force to give the most ample protection to the Dominican Governmentagainst any Power attempting to interfere with it. Visit Samana Bay and the capital,and see the United States power and authority secure there.There must be no failure in this matter.If the Haytians attack the Dominicans with their ships,destroy or capture them. See that there is a proper force at both San Domingo City and Samana.“If Admiral Poor is not at Key West, this dispatch must be forwarded to him without delay.”[50]

“If Admiral Poor is not at Key West, this dispatch must be forwarded to him without delay.”[50]

“Proceed at once.” Mark the warlike energy. What then? Inform the Haytian Government “that this Government is determined to protect the present Dominican Government [the usurper Baez] withall its power.” Strong words, and vast in scope! Not only the whole Navy of the United States, but all the power of our Republic is promised to the usurper. At Dominica, where the Admiral is to go next, he is directed to use his force “to give the most ample protection to the Dominican Government [the usurper Baez]against any Power attempting to interfere with it.” Then comes a new direction. At Samana and the City of San Domingo “see the United States power and authority secure there.” Here is nothing less than military occupation. Pray, by what title? Mark again the warlike energy. And then giving to the war a new character, the Admiral is told: “If the Haytians attack the Dominicans with their ships,destroy or capture them.” Such is this many-shotted dispatch, which is like a mitrailleuse in death-dealing missives.

This belligerent intervention in the affairs of another country, with a declaration of war against the Black Republic, all without any authority from Congress, or any sanction under the Constitution, was followed by a dispatch dated January 31, 1870, to Lieutenant-Commander Allen, of the Swatara, with an armament of six 32-pounders, 4,500 pounds, and one 11-inch gun, where is the breath of war. After hurrying the ship off to the City of San Domingo, the dispatch says:—

“If you find, when you get there, that the Dominican Government require any assistance against the enemies of that Republic,you will not hesitate to give it to them.”[51]

What is this but war, at the call of the usurper Baez, against the enemies of his Government, whether domestic or foreign? Let the usurper cry out, and our flag is engaged. Our cannon must fire, it may be upon Dominicans rising against the usurper, or it may be upon Haytians warring on the usurper for their rights, or it may be upon some other foreign power claiming rights. The order is peremptory, leaving no discretion. The assistance must be rendered. “You will not hesitate to give it to them”: so says the order. On which I observe, This is war.

This was not enough. The Navy Department, by still another order, dated February 9, 1870, addressed to Commodore Green, of the ship Congress, with an armament of fourteen 9-inch guns and two 60-pounder rifles, enforces this same conduct. After mentioning the treaty, the order says:—

“While that treaty is pending, the Government of the United States has agreed to afford countenance and assistance to the Dominican peopleagainst their enemies now in the island and in revolution against the lawfully constituted Government, and you will use the force at your command to resist any attempts by the enemies of the Dominican Republic to invade the Dominican territory,by land or sea, so far as your power can reach them.”[52]

Here again is belligerent intervention in Dominica, with a declaration of war against the Black Republic, included under the head “enemies of the Dominican Republic,” or perhaps it is a case of “running amuck,” according to Malay example, for the sake of the usurper Baez.

Thus much for the orders putting in motion the powers of war. I have set them forth in their precise words. Soon I shall show wherein they offend International Law and the Constitution. Meanwhile the case is not complete without showing what was done under these orders. Already the State Department has testified. The Navy Department testifies in harmony with the State Department. And here the record may be seen under two heads,—first, belligerent intervention in Dominica, and, secondly, belligerent intervention in Hayti.

In Dominica there was constant promise of protection and constant appeal for it, with recurring incidents, showing the dependence of the usurper upon our naval force. And here I proceed according to the order of dates.

Rear-Admiral Poor, of the flag-ship Severn, reports from the City of San Domingo, under date of March 12, 1870, that the President—meaning the usurper Baez—informed him that he was obliged to keep a considerable force against Cabral and Luperon, and then added, “If annexation was delayed, it would be absolutely necessary for him to call upon the United States Government for pecuniary aid.”[53]Not content with our guns, the usurper wanted our dollars. Next Lieutenant-Commander Bunce, under date of March 21, 1870, reports from Puerto Plata that “the authorities think that the excitement has not yet passed, and thatthe presence of a man-of-war here for a time will have a great moral effect.”[54]The man-of-war becomes a preacher. The same officer, under date of March 24, 1870, reports a speech of his own at Puerto Plata, that Rear-Admiral Poor “had a heavy squadron about the island, and would drive him [Luperon] out,—probably, in doing so,destroying the town and all the property in it.”[55]And this was followed, March 26, 1870, by formal notice from Lieutenant-Commander Bunce to the British Vice-Consul at Puerto Plata, in these terms:—

“As to my objects here, one of them certainly is, and I desire to accomplish it as plainly as possible, to inform the foreign residents here, that, if any such league or party is formed among them, and, with or without their aid, Luperon, Cabral, or any others hostile to the Dominican Government, should get possession of this port,the naval forces of the United States would retake it, and, in so doing, the foreign residents, as the largest property-holders, as well as the most interested in the business of the port, would be the greatest sufferers.”[56]

Here is the menace of war. The naval forces of the United States will retake a port.

Meanwhile the work of protection proceeds. Rear-Admiral Poor reports, under date of May 7, 1870:—

“Upon my arrival there [at San Domingo City], I found it necessary,properly to protect the Dominican Government, to dispatch one of the sloops I found there to the northwest portion of the island and the other to Puerto Plata, intending, as soon as able to do so, to dispatch one to Samana Bay and to station the other off San Domingo City.”[57]

Here is belligerent protection at four different points.

Meanwhile the treaty for annexion, and also the treaty for the lease of Samana, had both expired by lapse of time March 29, 1870, while the treaty for annexion was rejected by solemn vote June 30, 1870,—so that no treaty remained even as apology for the illegitimate protection which had been continued at such cost to the country. But this made no difference in the aid supplied by our Navy. Nor was the Administration here unadvised with regard to the constant dependence of the usurper. Commodore Green reports from off San Domingo City, under date of July 21, 1870:—

“I am inclined to the opinion that a withdrawal of the protection of the United States, and of the prospect of annexation at some future time, would instantly lead to a revolution, headed by Cabral, who would be supported by the enemies of the present Government, and assisted by the Haytians.”[58]

This is followed by a report from Lieutenant-Commander Allen at Samana Bay, under date of August 28, 1870, announcing that he has received a communication from “his Excellency, President Baez, requesting the presence of a vessel on the north side of the island, on account of an intended invasion by Cabral.”[59]In the communication, which is inclosed, the usurper says that he “deems the presence of a ship-of-war in the Bay of Manzanillo of immediate importance.”[60]Cabral, it appears, was near this place. Other points are mentioned to be visited.

Then follow other reports from Commander Irwin of the Yantic, with inclosures from Baez, where the dependenceof the usurper is confessed. In a letter from the Executive Mansion at San Domingo City, under date of August 30, 1870, he desires Commander Irwin to “proceed to Tortuguero de Azua for a few hours, for the purpose of transporting to this city the rest of the Dominican battalion Restauracion, as it is thought convenient by the Government.”[61]Upon which Commander Irwin, under date of September 3, 1870, remarks:—

“The President was anxious to add to the force at his disposal in the City of San Domingo,as he feared an outbreak.… I acceded to his request, … and on the 2d instant landed sixty-five officers and men that we had brought from Azua.”[62]

Here is a confession, showing again the part played by our Navy. War-ships of the United States dance attendance on the usurper, and save him from the outbreak of the people.

Then, again, under date of September 2, 1870, the usurper declares “the necessity at present of a man-of-war in this port, and that none would be more convenient than the Yanticfor the facility of entering the river Ozama, owing to her size.”[63]Thus not merely on the coasts, but in a river, was our Navy invoked.

But this was not enough. Under date of October 8, 1870, the usurper writes from the Executive Residence “to reiterate the necessity of the vessels now in that bay [Samana] coming to these southern coasts.”[64]And as late as January 8, 1871, Rear-Admiral Lee reports from off San Domingo City, that delay in accomplishingannexion has, among other things, “risk of insurrection,”[65]—thus attesting the dependence of the usurper upon our power. Such is the uniform story, where the cry of the usurper is like the refrain of a ballad.

The constant intervention in Dominica was supplemented by that other intervention in Hayti, when an American admiral threatened war to the Black Republic. Shame and indignation rise as we read the record. Already we know it from the State Department. Rear-Admiral Poor, under date of February 12, 1870, reports to the Navy Department his achievement. After announcing that the Severn, with an armament of fourteen 9-inch guns and one 60-pounder rifle, and the Dictator, with an armament of two 15-inch guns, arrived at Port-au-Prince the 9th instant, he narrates his call on the Provisional President of Hayti, and how, after communicating the pendency of negotiations and the determination of the Government of the United States “with its whole power” to prevent any interference on the part of the Haytian or any other Government with that of the Dominicans, (meaning the usurper Baez,) he launched this declaration:—

“Therefore, if any attack should be made upon the Dominicans [meaning the usurper Baez] during the said negotiations, under the Haytian or any other flag, it would be regarded as an act of hostility to the United States flag, and would provoke hostility in return.”

Such was his language in the Executive Mansion of the President. The Rear-Admiral reports the dignified reply of the President and Secretary of State, who said:—

“That, ‘while they were aware of their weakness, they knew their rights, and would maintain them and their dignity as far as they were able, and that they must be allowed to be the judges of their own policy,’—or words to that effect.”[66]

Such words ought to have been to the Rear-Admiral more than a broadside. How poor were his great guns against this simple reproof! The Black Republic spoke well. The Rear-Admiral adds, that he learned afterward, unofficially, “that the authorities were displeased with what they considered a menace on the part of the United States, accompanied with force.” And was it not natural that they should be displeased?

All this is bad enough from the official record; but I am enabled from another source, semi-official in character, to show yet more precisely what occurred. I have a minute account drawn up by the gentleman who acted as interpreter on the occasion. The Rear-Admiral could not speak French; the President could not speak English. Instead of waiting upon the Secretary of State and making his communication to this functionary, he went at once to the Executive Mansion, with the officers of his vessel and other persons, when, after announcing to the President that he came to pay a friendly visit, he said, that, “as a sailor, he would take the same opportunity to communicate instructions received from his Government.”

The President, justly surprised, said that he was notaware that the Rear-Admiral had any official communication to make, otherwise the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would have been present, being the proper party to receive it. The Secretary of State and other members of the Provisional Government were sent for, when the Rear-Admiral proceeded to make the communication already reported, and at the same time pointing to his great war-ships in the outside harbor, plainly visible from the Executive Mansion, remarked, that it could be seen he had power enough to enforce his communication, and that besides he was expecting other forces (and in fact two other war-ships soon arrived, one of them a monitor); and then he announced, that, “if any vessels under Haytian or other flags were found in Dominican waters,he would sink or capture them.” Brave Rear-Admiral! The interpreter, from whose account I am drawing, says that the President felt very sorry and humiliated by this language, especially when the Rear-Admiral referred to the strong forces under his command, and he proceeded to reply:—

“That Hayti, having the knowledge of her feebleness and of her dignity, had taken note of the communication made in the name of the United States; that, under present circumstances, the Government of Hayti would not interfere in the internal affairs of San Domingo, but the Government could not prevent the sympathies of the Haytian people to be with the Dominican patriots fighting against annexation.”

Who will not say that in this transaction the Black Republic appears better than the Rear-Admiral?

Such is the testimony, establishing beyond question the two propositions, first, that the usurper Baez was maintained in power by our Navy to enable him to carry out the sale of his country, and, secondly, that further to assure this sale the neighbor Republic of Hayti was violently menaced,—all this being in breach of Public Law, International and Constitutional.

In considering how far this conduct is a violation of International Law and of the Constitution of the United States, I begin with the former.

International Law is to nations what the National Constitution is to our coëqual States: it is the rule by which they are governed. As among us every State and also every citizen has an interest in upholding the National Constitution, so has every nation and also every citizen an interest in upholding International Law. As well disobey the former as the latter. You cannot do so in either case without disturbing the foundations of peace and tranquillity. To insist upon the recognition of International Law is to uphold civilization in one of its essential securities. To vindicate International Law is a constant duty, which is most eminent according to the rights in jeopardy.

Foremost among admitted principles of International Law is the axiom, that all nations are equal, without distinction of population, size, or power. Nor does International Law know any distinction of color. As anatural consequence, whatever is the rule for one is the rule for all; nor can we do to a thinly-peopled, small, weak, or black nation what we would not do to a populous, large, strong, or white nation,—nor what that nation might not do to us. “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” is the plain law for all nations, as for all men. The equality of nations is the first principle of International Law, as the equality of men is the first principle in our Declaration of Independence; and you may as well assail the one as the other. As all men are equal before the Law, so are all nations.

This simple statement is enough; but since this commanding principle has been practically set aside in the operations of our Navy, I proceed to show how it is illustrated by the authorities.

The equality of nations, like the equality of men, was recognized tardily, under the growing influence of civilization. Not to the earlier writers, not even to the wonderful Grotius, whose instinct for truth was so divine, do we repair for the elucidation of this undoubted rule. Our Swiss teacher, Vattel, prompted, perhaps, by the experience of his own country, surrounded by more powerful neighbors, was the first to make it stand forth in its present character. His words, which are as remarkable for picturesque force as for juridical accuracy, state the whole case:—

“Nations composed of men, and considered as so many free persons living together in the state of Nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from Nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom. By a necessary consequence of that equality, whatever is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for any other, and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally so in the other.”[67]

Later authorities have followed this statement, with some slight variety of expression, but with no diminution of its force. One of the earliest to reproduce it was Sir William Scott, in one of his masterly judgments, lending to it the vivid beauty of his style:—

“A fundamental principle of Public Law is the perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct states. Relative magnitude creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility, whether permanent or casual, gives no additional right to the more powerful neighbor; and any advantage seized upon that ground is mere usurpation. This is the great foundation of Public Law, which it mainly concerns the peace of mankind, both in their politic and private capacities, to preserve inviolate.”[68]

The German Heffter states the rule more simply, but with equal force:—

“Nations, being sovereign or independent of each other, treat together on a footing of complete equality. The most feeble state has the same political rights as the strongest. In other terms, each state exercises in their plenitude the rights which result from its political existence and from its participation in international association.”[69]

The latest English writers testify likewise. Here are the words of Phillimore:—

“The natural equality of states is the necessary companion of their independence,—that primitive cardinal right upon which the science of International Law is mainly built.… They are entitled, in their intercourse with other states, to all the rights incident to a natural equality. No other state is entitled to encroach upon this equality by arrogating to itself peculiar privileges or prerogatives as to the manner of their mutual intercourse.”[70]

Twiss follows Phillimore, but gives to the rule a fresh statement:—

“The independence of a nation is absolute, and not subject to qualification; so that nations, in respect of their intercourse under the Common Law, are peers or equals.… Power and weakness do not in this respect give rise to any distinction.… It results from this equality, that whatever is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for another, and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally unjustifiable in the other.”[71]

In our own country, Chancellor Kent, a great authority, gives the rule with perfect clearness and simplicity:—

“Nations are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to claim equal consideration for their rights, whatever may be their relative dimensions or strength, or however greatly they may differ in government, religion, or manners. This perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct states is a fundamental principle of Public Law.”[72]

General Halleck, whose work is not surpassed by any other in practical value, while quoting especially Vattel and Sir William Scott, says with much sententiousness:—

“All sovereign states, without respect to their relative power, are, in the eye of International Law, equal, being endowed with the same natural rights, bound by the same duties, and subject to the same obligations.”[73]

Thus does each authority reflect the others, while the whole together present the Equality of Nations as a guiding principle not to be neglected or dishonored.

The record already considered shows how this principle has been openly defied by our Government in the treatment of the Black Republic,—first, in the menace of war by Rear-Admiral Poor, and, secondly, in the manner of the menace,—being in substance and in form. In both respects the Admiral did what he would not have done to a powerful nation, what he would not have done to any white nation, and what we should never allow any nation to do to us.

Hayti was weak, and the gallant Admiral, rowing ashore, pushed to the Executive Mansion, where, after what he called “a friendly visit,” he struck at the independence of the Black Republic, pointing from the windows of the Executive Mansion to his powerful armament, and threatening to employ it against the Haytian capital or in sinking Haytian ships. For the present I consider this unprecedented insolence only so far as it was an offence against the Equality of Nations, and here it may be tried easily. Think you that we should have done this thing to England, France, or Spain? Think you that any foreign power could have done it to us? But if right in us toward Hayti, it would be right in us toward England, France, or Spain; and it would be right in any foreign power toward us. If it were rightin us toward Hayti, then might England, France, Spain, or Hayti herself do the same to us. Imagine a foreign fleet anchored off Alexandria, while the admiral, pulling ashore in his boat, hurries to the Executive Mansion, and then, after announcing a friendly visit, points to his war-ships visible from the windows, and menaces their thunder. Or to be more precise, suppose the Haytian Navy to return the compliment here in the Potomac. But just in proportion as we condemn any foreign fleet, including the Haytian Navy, doing this thing, do we condemn ourselves. The case is clear. We did not treat Hayti as our peer. The great principle of the Equality of Nations was openly set at nought.

To extenuate this plain outrage, I have heard it said, that, in our relations with Hayti, we are not bound by the same rules of conduct applicable to other nations. So I have heard; and this, indeed, is the only possible defence for the outrage. As in other days it was proclaimed that a black man had no rights which a white man was bound to respect, so this defence assumes the same thing of the Black Republic. But at last the black man has obtained Equal Rights; and so, I insist, has the Black Republic. As well deny the one as the other. By an Act of Congress, drawn by myself and approved by Abraham Lincoln in the session of 1862, diplomatic relations were established between the United States and Hayti, and the President was expressly authorized to appoint diplomatic representatives there. At first we were represented by a Commissioner and Consul-General; now it is by a Minister Resident and Consul-General. Thus, by Act of Congress and the appointment of a Minister, have we recognized the Equal Rights of Hayti in the Family of Nations, and placedthe Black Republic under the safeguard of that great axiom of International Law which makes it impossible for us to do unto her what we would not allow her to do unto us. In harmony with the United States, the “Almanach de Gotha,” where is the authentic, if not official, list of nations entitled to Equal Rights, contains the name of Hayti. Thus is the Black Republic enrolled as an equal; and yet have we struck at this equality. How often have I pleaded that all men are equal before the Law! And now I plead that all nations are equal before the Law, without distinction of color.

From one violation of International Law I pass to another. The proceedings already detailed show belligerent intervention, contrary to International Law. Here my statement will be brief.

According to all the best authorities, in harmony with reason, no nation has a right to interfere by belligerent intervention in the internal affairs of another, and especially to take part in a civil feud, except under conditions which are wanting here; nor has it a right to interfere by belligerent intervention between two independent nations. The general rule imposed by modern civilization isNon-Intervention; but this rule is little more than a scientific expression of that saying of Philip de Comines, the famous minister of Louis the Eleventh, “Our Lord God does not wish that one nation should play the devil with another.” Not to occupy time with authorities, I content myself with some ofour own country, which are clear and explicit, and I begin with George Washington, who wrote to Lafayette, under date of December 25, 1798:—

“No Government ought to interfere with the internal concerns of another,except for the security of what is due to themselves.”[74]

Wheaton lays down the same rule substantially, when he says:—

“Non-Interference is the general rule, to which cases of justifiable interference form exceptions,limited by the necessity of each particular case.”[75]

Thus does Wheaton, like Washington, found intervention in the necessity of the case. Evidently neither thought of founding it on a scheme for the acquisition of foreign territory.

In harmony with Washington and Wheaton, I cite General Halleck, in his excellent work:—

“Wars of intervention are to be justified or condemned accordingly as they are or are not undertakenstrictly as the means of self-defence, and self-protection against the aggrandizements of others, and without reference to treaty obligations; for, if wrong in themselves, the stipulations of a treaty cannot make them right.”[76]

Then again Halleck says, in words applicable to the present case:—

“The invitation of one party to a civil war can afford no right of foreign interference, as against the other party. The same reasoning holds good with respect to armed intervention, whether between belligerent states or between belligerent parties in the same state.”[77]

Armed Intervention, or, as I would say, Belligerent Intervention, is thus defined by Halleck:—

“Armed intervention consistsin threatened or actual force, employed or to be employed by one state in regulating or determining the conduct or affairs of another. Such an employment of force is virtuallya war, and must be justified or condemned upon the same general principles as other wars.”[78]

Applying these principles to existing facts already set forth, it is easy to see that the belligerent intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of Dominica, maintaining the usurper Baez in power, especially against Cabral, was contrary to acknowledged principles of International Law, and that the belligerent intervention between Dominica and Hayti was of the same character. Imagine our Navy playing the fantastic tricks on the coast of France which it played on the coasts of San Domingo, and then, still further, imagine it entering the ports of France as it entered the ports of Hayti, and you will see how utterly indefensible was its conduct. In the capital of Hayti it committed an act of war hardly less flagrant than that of England at the bombardment of Copenhagen. Happily blood was not shed, but there was an act of war. Here I refer to the authorities already cited, and challenge contradiction.

To vindicate these things, whether in Dominica or in Hayti, you must discard all acknowledged principles of International Law, and join those who, regardless ofrights, rely upon arms. Grotius reminds us of Achilles, as described by Horace:—

Back to Index Next