Chapter 10

“For in charnel at chircheCherles ben yvel to knowe,Or a knyght from a knave there.”[199]

“For in charnel at chirche

Cherles ben yvel to knowe,

Or a knyght from a knave there.”[199]

And Chaucer even denies the distinction in life:—

“But understond in thine ententThat this is not mine entendement,To clepe no wight in no agesOnely gentle for his linages:Though he be not gentle borne,Than maiest well seine this in sooth,That he is gentle because he dothAs longeth to a gentleman.”[200]

“But understond in thine entent

That this is not mine entendement,

To clepe no wight in no ages

Onely gentle for his linages:

Though he be not gentle borne,

Than maiest well seine this in sooth,

That he is gentle because he doth

As longeth to a gentleman.”[200]

This beautiful testimony, to which the honest heart responds, is from an age when humanity was less regarded than now. Plainly it shows how conduct and character are realities, while other things are but accidents.

Among the Romans degradation ended with life. Slaves were admitted to honorable sepulture, and sometimes slept the last sleep with their masters. The slaves of Augustus and Livia were buried on the famous Appian Way, where their tombs with historic inscriptions have survived the centuries.[201]“Bury him with his niggers,” was the rude order of the Rebel officer, as he flung the precious remains of our admirable Colonel Shaw into the common trench at Fort Wagner, where he fell, mounting the parapets at the head of colored troops. And so was he buried, lovely in death as in life. The intended insult became an honor. In that common trench the young hero rests, symbolizing the great Equality for which he died. No Roman monument, with itsSiste, viator, to the passing traveller, no “labor of an age in pilèd stones,” can match in grandeur that simple burial.

Mr. President, against these conclusions there is but one argument, which, when considered, is nothing but a prejudice, as little rational as what Shylock first calls his “humor” and then “a lodged hate and a certain loathing,” making him seek the pound of flesh nearest the merchant’s heart. The prejudice of color pursues its victim in the long pilgrimage from the cradle to the grave, barring the hotel, excluding from the public conveyance, insulting at the theatre, closing the school, shutting the gates of science, and playing its fantastic tricks even in the church where he kneels and the grave where his dust mingles with the surrounding earth. The God-given color of the African is a constant offence to the disdainful white, who, like the pretentious lord, asking Hotspur for prisoners, can bear nothing sounhandsome “betwixt the wind and his nobility.” This is the whole case. And shall those Equal Rights promised by the great Declaration be sacrificed to a prejudice? Shall that Equality before the Law, which is the best part of citizenship, be denied to those who do not happen to be white? Is this a white man’s government or is it a government of “all men,” as declared by our fathers? Is it a Republic of Equal Laws, or an Oligarchy of the Skin? This is the question now presented.

Once Slavery was justified by color, as now the denial of Equal Rights is justified; and the reason is as little respectable in one case as in the other. The old pretension is curiously illustrated by an incident in the inimitable Autobiography of Franklin. An Ante-revolutionary Governor of Pennsylvania remarked gayly, “that he much admired the idea of Sancho Panza, who, when it was proposed to give him a government, requested it might be a government ofblacks, as then, if he could not agree with his people, he might sell them”; on which a friend said, “Franklin, why do you continue to side with those damned Quakers? Had you not better sell them?” Franklin answered, “The Governor has not yetblackedthem enough.” The Autobiography proceeds to record, that the Governor “labored hard toblackenthe Assembly in all his Messages, but they wiped off his coloring as fast as he laid it on, and placed it in return thick upon his own face, so that, finding he was likely to benegrofiedhimself, he grew tired of the contest and quitted the Government.”[202]To negrofy a man was to degrade him.

Thus in the ambition of Sancho Panza, and in the story of the British governor, was color the badge of Slavery. “Then I can sell them,” said Sancho Panza; and the British governor repeated the saying. This is changed now; but not entirely. At present nobody dares say, “I can sell them”; but the inn, the common conveyance, the theatre, the school, the scientific institute, the church, and the cemetery deny them the equal rights of Freedom.

Color has its curiosities in history. For generations the Roman circus was convulsed by factions known from their liveries aswhiteandred; new factions adoptedgreenandblue; and these latter colors raged with redoubled fury in the hippodrome of Constantinople.[203]Then cameblacksandwhites, Neri and Bianchi, in the political contentions of Italy,[204]where the designation was from the accident of a name. In England the most beautiful of flowers, in two of its colors, became the badge of hostile armies, and the white rose fought against the red. But it has been reserved for our Republic, dedicated to the rights of human nature, to adopt the color of the skin as the sign of separation, and to organize it in law.

Color in the animal kingdom is according to the Law of Nature. The ox of the Roman Campagna is gray. The herds on the banks of the Xanthus were yellow; on the banks of the Clitumnus they were white. In Corsica animals are spotted. The various colors of the human family belong to the same mystery. There are white, yellow, red, and black, with intermediate shades; but no matter what their hue, they are always MEN, gifted with a common manhood and entitled to common rights. Dr. Johnson made short work with the famous paradox of Berkeley, denying the existence of matter. Striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, “I refute itthus,” he exclaimed.[205]And so, in reply to every pretension against the equal rights of all, to every assertion of right founded on the skin, to every denial of right because a man is something else than white, I point to that common manhood which knows no distinction of color, and thus do I refute the whole inhuman, unchristian paradox.

Observe, if you please, how little the word “white” is authorized to play the great part it performs, and how much of an intruder it is in all its appearances. In those two title-deeds, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, there are no words of color, whether white, yellow, red, or black; but here is the fountain out of which all is derived. The Declaration speaks of “all men,” and not of “allwhitemen”; and the Constitution says, “We the people,” and not “We thewhitepeople.” Where, then, is authority for any such discrimination, whether by the nation or any component part? There is no fountain or word for it. The fountain failing, and the word non-existent, the whole pretension is a disgusting usurpation, which is more utterly irrational when it is considered that authority for such an outrage can be found only in positive words, plain and unambiguous in meaning. This was the rule with regard to Slavery, solemnly declared by Lord Mansfield in the famous Somerset case; andit must be the same with regard to this pretension. It cannot be invented, imagined, or implied; it must be found in the very text: and this I assert according to fixed principles of jurisprudence. In its absence, Equality is “the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”[206]

This conclusion is reinforced by the several Constitutional Amendments; but I prefer to dwell on the original text of the Constitution, in presence of which you might as well undertake to make a king as to degrade a fellow-citizen on account of his skin.

There is also, antedating and interpreting the Constitution, the original Common Law, which knew no distinction of color. One of the greatest judges that ever sat in Westminster Hall, Lord Chief-Justice Holt, declared, in sententious judgment, worthy of perpetual memory, “The Common Law takes no notice of Negroes being different from other men.”[207]This was in 1706, seventy years before the Declaration of Independence; so that it was well known to our fathers as part of that Common Law, to which, according to the Continental Congress, the several States were entitled.[208]Had these remarkable words been uttered by any other judge in Westminster Hall, they would have been important; but they are enhanced by the character of their illustrious author, to whom belongs the kindred honor of first declaring from the bench that a slave cannot breathe in England.[209]

Among the ornaments of English law none has a purer fame than Holt, who was emphatically a great judge,—being an example of learning and firmness, of impartiality and mildness, with a constant instinct for justice, and a rare capacity in upholding it. His eminent merits compelled the admiration of his biographer, Lord Campbell, who does not hesitate to say, that, “of all the judges in our annals, Holt has gained the highest reputation, merely by the exercise of judicial functions,”—and then again, in striking words, that “he may be considered as having a genius for magistracy, as much as our Milton had for poetry or our Wilkie for painting.”[210]And this rarest magistrate tells us judicially, that “the Common Law takes no notice of Negroes being different from other men,”—in other words, it makes no discrimination on account of color. This judgment is a torch to illumine the Constitution, while it shows how naturally our fathers in the great Declaration said, “All men,” and not “Allwhitemen,” and in the Constitution said, “We the people,” and not “We thewhitepeople.”

In melancholy contrast with the monumental judgment of the English Chief-Justice are judicial decisions in our own country, especially that masterpiece of elaborate inhumanity, the judgment of our late Chief-Justice in the Dred Scott case. But it is in the States that the word “white” has been made prominent. Such learned debate on the rights of man dependent on complexion would excite a smile, if it did not awaken indignation. There is Ohio, a much-honored State, rejoicing in prosperity, intelligence, and constant liberty; but even this eminent civilization has not saved its Supreme Court from the subtilties of refinement on different shades of human color. In the case ofLakev.Baker et al.,[211]this learned tribunal decided that a child of Negro, Indian, and white blood, but of more than one-half white, was entitled to the benefits of the common-school fund; yet in a later case the same court decided that “children of three-eighths African and five-eighths white blood, but who are distinctly colored, and generally treated and regarded as colored children by the community where they reside, are not,as of right, entitled to admission into the common schools set apart for the instruction of white youths.”[212]Unhappy children! Even five-eighths white blood could not save them, if in their neighborhood they were known as “colored.” But this magic of color showed itself yet more in the precedent ofPolly Grayv.The State of Ohio,—a case of robbery, in the Court of Common Pleas, where the prisoner appearing on inspection “to be of a shade of color between the mulatto and white,” a Negro was admitted to testify against her, and she was convicted; but on grave consideration by the Supreme Court, on appeal, it was decided that the witness was wrongly admitted, and the judgment was reversed; and the decision stands on these words: “A Negro is not an admissible witness against a quadroon on trial charged with a crime”![213]Into this absurdity of injustice was an eminent tribunal conducted by theignis-fatuusof color.

These are specimens only. To what meanness of inquiry has not the judicial mind descended in the enforcement of an odious prejudice? Such decisions are a discredit to Republican Government; and so also is the existing practice of public institutions harmonizing with them. The words of the Gospel are fulfilled, and the Great Republic, “conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,”[214]becomes “like untowhitedsepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men’s bones and of all uncleanness.”[215]Are not such decisions worse than dead men’s bones or any uncleanness? All this seems the more irrational, when we recall the Divine example, and the admonition addressed to the Prophet: “But the Lord said unto Samuel,Look not on his countenance, … for the Lord seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward appearance,but the Lord looketh on the heart.”[216]To the pretension of looking at the skin and measuring its various pigments in the determination of rights, I reply, that the heart, and not the countenance, must be our guide. Not on the skin can we look, though “white” as the coward heart of Macbeth, according to the reproach of his wife,—but on that within, constituting character, which showed itself supremely in Toussaint L’Ouverture, making him, though black as night, a luminous example, and is now manifest in a virtuous and patriotic people asking for their rights. Where justice prevails, all depends on character. Nor can any shade of color be an apology for interference with that consideration to which character is justly entitled.

Thus it stands. The word “white” found no place in the original Common Law; nor did it find any place afterward in our two title-deeds of Constitutional Liberty, each interpreting the other, and being the fountain out of which are derived the rights and duties of the American citizen. Nor, again, did it find place in the Constitutional Amendment expressly defining a “citizen.” How, then, can it become a limitation upon the citizen? By what title can any one say, “I am a white lord”? Every statute and all legislation, whether National or State, must be in complete conformity with the two title-deeds. To these must they be brought as to an unerring touchstone; and it is the same with the State as with the Nation. Strange indeed, if an odious discrimination, without support in the original Common Law or the Constitution, and openly condemned by the Declaration of Independence, can escape judgment by skulking within State lines! Wherever it shows itself, whatever form it takes, it is the same barefaced and insufferable imposture, a mere relic of Slavery, to be treated always with indignant contempt, and trampled out as an unmitigated “humbug.” The word may not be juridical; I should not use it if it were unparliamentary; but I know no term which expresses so well the little foundation for this pretension.

That this should continue to flaunt, now that Slavery is condemned, increases the inconsistency. By the decree against that wrong all semblance of apology was removed. Ceasing to be a slave,the former victim has become not only a man, but a Citizen, admitted alike within the pale of humanity and within the pale of citizenship. As man he is entitled to all the rights of man, and as citizen he becomes a member of our common household, with Equality as the prevailing law. No longer an African, he is an American; no longer a slave, he is a common part of the Republic, owing to it patriotic allegiance in return for the protection of equal laws. By incorporation with the body-politic he becomes a partner in that transcendent unity, so that there can be no injury to him without injury to all. Insult to him is insult to an American citizen. Dishonor to him is dishonor to the Republic itself. Whatever he may have been, he is now the same as ourselves. Our rights are his rights; our equality is his equality; our privileges and immunities are his great freehold. To enjoy his citizenship, people from afar, various in race and complexion, seek our shores, losing here all distinctions of birth,—as into the ocean all rivers flow, losing all trace of origin or color, and there is but one uniform expanse of water, where each particle is like every other particle, and all are subject to the same law. In this citizenship the African is now absorbed.

Not only is he Citizen. There is no office in the Republic, from lowest to highest, executive, judicial, or representative, which is closed against him. The doors of this Chamber swing open, and he sits here the coëqual of any Senator. The doors of the other Chamber also swing open. Nay, Sir, he may be Vice-President, he may be President; but he cannot enter a hotel or public conveyance, or offer his child at the common school, without insult on account of color. Nothing can make this terrible inconsistency more conspicuous. An American citizen, with every office wide open to his honorable ambition, in whom are all the great possibilities of our Republic, who may be anything according to merit, is exposed to a scourge which descends upon the soul as the scourge of Slavery descended upon the flesh.

In ancient times the cry, “I am a Roman citizen,” stayed the scourge of the Lictor; and this cry, with its lesson of immunity, has resounded through the ages, testifying to Roman greatness. Once it was on the lips of Paul, as appears in the familiar narrative:—

“And as they bound him with thongs, Paul said unto the centurion that stood by, Is it lawful for you to scourge a man that is a Roman, and uncondemned?“When the centurion heard that, he went and told the chief captain, saying, Take heed what thou doest; for this man is a Roman.…“And the chief captain also was afraid, after he knew that he was a Roman, and because he had bound him.”[217]

“And as they bound him with thongs, Paul said unto the centurion that stood by, Is it lawful for you to scourge a man that is a Roman, and uncondemned?

“When the centurion heard that, he went and told the chief captain, saying, Take heed what thou doest; for this man is a Roman.

…

“And the chief captain also was afraid, after he knew that he was a Roman, and because he had bound him.”[217]

Will not our “Chief Captain,” will not Senators, take heed what they do, that the scourge may not continue to fall upon a whole race, each one of whom is an American and uncondemned? Is our citizenship a feebler safeguard than that of Rome? Shall the cry, “I am an American citizen,” be raised in vain against perpetual outrage?

In speaking of the citizen as of our household, I adopt a distinction employed by a great teacher in Antiquity. Aristotle, in counsels to his former pupil, Alexander, before his career of Asiatic conquest, enjoined a broad distinction between Greeks and Barbarians. The formerhe was to treat as friends, and of the household; the latter he was to treat as brutes and plants.[218]This is the very distinction between Citizenship and Slavery. The Citizen is of the national household; the Slave is no better than brute or plant. But our brutes and plants are all changed into men; our Barbarians are transformed into Greeks. There is no person among us now, whatever his birth or complexion, who may not claim the great name of Citizen, to be protected not less at home than abroad,—but always, whether at home or abroad, by the National Government, which is the natural guardian of the citizen.

Mr. President, asking you to unite now in an act of justice to a much-oppressed race, which is no payment of that heavy debt accumulated by generations of wrong, I am encouraged by the pending measure of Amnesty, which has the advantage of being recommended in the President’s Annual Message. I regretted, at the time, that the President signalized by his favor the removal of disabilities imposed upon a few thousand Rebels who had struck at the life of the Republic, while he said nothing of cruel disabilities inflicted upon millions of colored fellow-citizens, who had been a main-stay to the national cause. But I took courage when I thought that the generosity proposed could not fail to quicken that sentiment of justice which I now invoke.

Toward those who assailed the Republic in war I have never entertained any sentiment of personal hostility. Never have I sought the punishment of any one; and I rejoice to know that our bloody Rebellion closed without the sacrifice of a single human life by the civil power. But this has not surprised me. Early in the war I predicted it in this Chamber.[219]And yet, while willing to be gentle with former enemies, while anxious not to fail in any lenity or generosity, and while always watching for the moment when all could be restored to our common household with Equality as the prevailing law, there was with me a constant duty, which I could never forget, to fellow-citizens, white and black, who had stood by the Republic; and especially to those large numbers, counted by the million, still suffering under disabilities having their origin in no crime, and more keenly felt than any imposed upon Rebels. Believing that duty to these millions is foremost, and that until they are secured in equal rights we cannot expect the tranquillity which all desire,—nay, Sir, we cannot expect the blessing of Almighty God upon our labors,—I bring forward this measure of justice to the colored race. Such a measure can never be out of order or out of season, being of urgent necessity and unquestionable charity.

There are strong reasons why it should be united with amnesty, especially since the latter is pressed. Each is the removal of disabilities, and each is to operate largely in the same region of country. Nobody sincerely favoring generosity to Rebels should hesitate in justice to the colored race. According to the maxim in Chancery, “Whoso would have equity must do equity.” Therefore Rebels seeking amnesty must be just to colored fellow-citizens seeking equal rights. Doing this equity, theymay expect equity.

Another reason is controlling. Each is a measure of reconciliation, intended to close the issues of the war; but these issues are not closed, unless each is adopted. Their adoption together is better for each, and therefore better for the country, than any separate adoption. Kindred in object, they should be joined together and never put asunder. It is wrong to separate them. Hereafter the Rebels should remember that their restoration was associated with the equal rights of all, contained in the same great statute.

Clearly, between the two the preëminence must be accorded to that for the equal rights of all, as among the virtues justice is above generosity. And this is the more evident, when it is considered, that, according to Abraham Lincoln, the great issue of the war was Human Equality.

In making the motion by which these two measures are associated, I seize the first opportunity since the introduction of my bill, nearly two years ago, of obtaining for it the attention of the Senate. Beyond this is with me a sentiment of duty. In the uncertainties of life, I would not defer for a day the discharge of this immeasurable obligation to fellow-citizens insulted and oppressed; nor would I postpone that much-desired harmony which can be assured only through this act of justice. The opportunity is of infinite value, and I dare not neglect it. My chief regret is that I cannot do more to impress it upon the Senate. I wish I were stronger. I wish I were more able to exhibit the commanding duty. But I can try; and should the attempt fail, I am not without hope that it may bemade in some other form, with increased advantage from this discussion. I trust it will not fail. Earnestly, confidently, I appeal to the Senate for its votes. Let the record be made at last, which shall be the cap-stone of the reconstructed Republic.

I make this appeal for the sake of the Senate, which will rejoice to be relieved from a painful discussion; for the sake of fellow-citizens whom I cannot forget; and for the sake of the Republic, now dishonored through a denial of justice. I make it in the name of the Great Declaration, and also of that Equality before the Law which is the supreme rule of conduct, to the end especially that fellow-citizens may be vindicated in “the pursuit of happiness,” according to the immortal promise, and that the angel Education may not be driven from their doors. I make it also for the sake of peace, so that at last there shall be an end of Slavery, and the rights of the citizen shall be everywhere under the equal safeguard of national law. There is beauty in art, in literature, in science, and in every triumph of intelligence, all of which I covet for my country; but there is a higher beauty still in relieving the poor, in elevating the down-trodden, and being a succor to the oppressed. There is true grandeur in an example of justice, making the rights of all the same as our own, and beating down prejudice, like Satan, under our feet. Humbly do I pray that the Republic may not lose this great prize, or postpone its enjoyment.

Mr. Vickers, of Maryland, on the same day, made an elaborate effort on the position of the South and Amnesty, which he opened by saying:—“It is not my purpose to follow the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr.Sumner] in the remarks which he has made, because his amendment is not only not germane to the subject-matter properly before the Senate, but is so palpably unconstitutional that I consider it unnecessary to make any comment upon it.”January 17th, Mr. Sumner spoke again at length, introducing testimony, being letters, resolutions, and addresses from various parts of the country, and especially from the South, showing the necessity of Congressional action for the protection of Equal Rights, and that such protection was earnestly desired by colored fellow-citizens.At the close he remarked on the importance of equality in the school-room.

Mr. Vickers, of Maryland, on the same day, made an elaborate effort on the position of the South and Amnesty, which he opened by saying:—

“It is not my purpose to follow the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr.Sumner] in the remarks which he has made, because his amendment is not only not germane to the subject-matter properly before the Senate, but is so palpably unconstitutional that I consider it unnecessary to make any comment upon it.”

January 17th, Mr. Sumner spoke again at length, introducing testimony, being letters, resolutions, and addresses from various parts of the country, and especially from the South, showing the necessity of Congressional action for the protection of Equal Rights, and that such protection was earnestly desired by colored fellow-citizens.

At the close he remarked on the importance of equality in the school-room.

One of the most important aspects of the pending measure is its operation on the common school, making it what is implied in its name, a school open to all. The term “common” explains itself. Originally, in England, under the law, it designated outlying land near a village open to all the inhabitants; and the common school is an institution of education open to all. If you make it for a class, it is not a common school, but a separate school,—and, as I have said frequently to-day, and also before in addressing the Senate, a separate school never can be asubstitutefor the common school. The common school has for its badgeEquality. The separate school has for its badgeInequality. The one has open doors for all; the other has open doors only for those of a certain color. That is contrary to the spirit of our institutions, to the promises of the Declaration of Independence, and to all that is secured in the recent Constitutional Amendments. So long as it continues, the great question of the war remains still undecided; for, as I explained the other day, that transcendent issue, as stated by Jefferson Davis, and then again accepted by Abraham Lincoln, was Equality. Only by maintaining Equality will you maintain the great victory of the war.

Here in Washington this very question of separate schools has for some time agitated the community. The colored people have themselves acted. They speak for Equal Rights. I have in my hand a communication to the Senate from the Secretary of the Interior, under date of January 18, 1871, covering a report from the trustees of the colored schools of Washington and Georgetown, in which they make most important and excellent recommendations. How well at last the colored people speak! Who among us can speak better than they in the passages I am about to read?

After reading these passages,[220]which he pronounced “unanswered and unanswerable,” Mr. Sumner proceeded:—

Sir, I bring this testimony to a close. I have adduced letters, resolutions, addresses from various States, showing the sentiments of the colored people. I have adduced them in answer to allegations on this floor that the pending measure of Equal Rights is not needed, that the pending measure is for social equality. Listening to these witnesses, you see how they all insist that it is needed, and that it is in no respect for social equality. It is a measure of strict legal right.

I adduce this testimony also in answer to the allegation, so loftily made in debate the other day, that the colored people are willing to see the former Rebels amnestied, trusting in some indefinite future to obtain their own rights. I said at the time that such an allegation was irrational. I now show you that it is repudiated by the colored people. They do not recognize the Senators who have undertaken to speak for them as their representatives. They insist upon their rights before you play the generous to Rebels. They insist that they shall be saved from indignity when they travel, and when they offer a child at the common school,—that they shall be secured against any such outrage before you remove the disabilities of men who struck at the life of this Republic.

Now, Sir, will you not be just before you are generous? Or if you do not place the rights of the colored people foremost, will you not at least place them side by side with those of former Rebels? Put them both where I seek now to put them, in the same statute,—so that hereafter the Rebels shall know that generosity to them was associated with justice to their colored fellow-citizens,—that they all have a common interest,—that they are linked together in the community of a common citizenship, and in the enjoyment of those liberties promised by the Declaration of Independence and guarantied by the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, followed with remarks chiefly in criticism of the form of the bill, and made several suggestions of amendment. Mr. Sumner stated that his object was “to get this measure in the best shape possible,” and that he should welcome any amendment from any quarter; that he did not feel as strongly as the Senator “the difference between his language and the text,” but that he was anxious to harmonize with him. Mr. Sumner afterwards modified his bill in pursuance of Mr. Frelinghuysen’s suggestions.The debate was continued on different days,—Mr. Sawyer, of South Carolina, Mr. Thurman, of Ohio, Mr. Morrill, of Maine, Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, speaking strongly against the bill of Mr. Sumner. Mr. Sawyer objected to it as an amendment to the Amnesty Bill. Mr. Nye of Nevada, and Mr. Flanagan of Texasspoke for the bill. The latter, after saying that he had read the Constitution for himself, and was “satisfied that the proposed amendment was constitutional,” added other reasons:—“One is, that I discover, that, if we should remain here, as we certainly shall do, for a very considerable period, petitions will come in to such a degree, requiring so much paper, that really the price will be vastly enhanced, and it will thereby become a considerable tax to the Government of the United States; for the Senator is receiving, I might almost say, volumes—I know not what the quantity is; it is immense, however—from all parts of the nation.”And then again:—“Again I am reminded that it is best to try to get rid of the imposing Senator [Mr.Sumner] on that subject, just as the lady answered her admirer. The suitor had been importuning her time and again, and she had invariably declined to accept the proposition. At length, however, being very much annoyed, she concluded to say ‘yes,’ just to get rid of his importunity. I want to go with the Senator to get rid of this matter, [laughter,] because, really, Mr. President, we find his bill here as a breakwater. A concurrent resolution was introduced here for the adjournment of Congress at a particular day. Well, you saw that bill thrust right on it. ‘Stop!’ says he, ‘you must not adjourn until my bill is passed.’ There it was again; here it is now; and we shall continue to have it; and I am for making peace with it by a general surrender at once. [Laughter.] I stop not there, Mr. President; I go further, and I indorse the Senator to the utmost degree in his proposition.”[221]Mr. Morrill, in an elaborate argument, denied point-blank the constitutionality of the bill,—insisting, and repeating with different forms of expression, that “the exercise of this power on the part of Congress would be a palpable invasion of the rights of the people of the States in their purely domestic relations.… This Constitution has given us no such authority and no such power.”[222]January 31st, Mr. Sumner replied to Mr. Morrill.

The debate was continued on different days,—Mr. Sawyer, of South Carolina, Mr. Thurman, of Ohio, Mr. Morrill, of Maine, Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, speaking strongly against the bill of Mr. Sumner. Mr. Sawyer objected to it as an amendment to the Amnesty Bill. Mr. Nye of Nevada, and Mr. Flanagan of Texasspoke for the bill. The latter, after saying that he had read the Constitution for himself, and was “satisfied that the proposed amendment was constitutional,” added other reasons:—

“One is, that I discover, that, if we should remain here, as we certainly shall do, for a very considerable period, petitions will come in to such a degree, requiring so much paper, that really the price will be vastly enhanced, and it will thereby become a considerable tax to the Government of the United States; for the Senator is receiving, I might almost say, volumes—I know not what the quantity is; it is immense, however—from all parts of the nation.”

And then again:—

“Again I am reminded that it is best to try to get rid of the imposing Senator [Mr.Sumner] on that subject, just as the lady answered her admirer. The suitor had been importuning her time and again, and she had invariably declined to accept the proposition. At length, however, being very much annoyed, she concluded to say ‘yes,’ just to get rid of his importunity. I want to go with the Senator to get rid of this matter, [laughter,] because, really, Mr. President, we find his bill here as a breakwater. A concurrent resolution was introduced here for the adjournment of Congress at a particular day. Well, you saw that bill thrust right on it. ‘Stop!’ says he, ‘you must not adjourn until my bill is passed.’ There it was again; here it is now; and we shall continue to have it; and I am for making peace with it by a general surrender at once. [Laughter.] I stop not there, Mr. President; I go further, and I indorse the Senator to the utmost degree in his proposition.”[221]

Mr. Morrill, in an elaborate argument, denied point-blank the constitutionality of the bill,—insisting, and repeating with different forms of expression, that “the exercise of this power on the part of Congress would be a palpable invasion of the rights of the people of the States in their purely domestic relations.… This Constitution has given us no such authority and no such power.”[222]

January 31st, Mr. Sumner replied to Mr. Morrill.

Mr. President, before this debate closes, it seems to me I shall be justified in a brief reply to the most extraordinary, almost eccentric, argument by my excellent friend, the Senator from Maine [Mr.Morrill]. He argued against the constitutionality of the pending amendment,—you all remember with how much ingenuity and earnestness. I shall not follow him in the details of that speech. I shall deal with it somewhat in the general, and part of the time I shall allow others to speak for me.

But before I come upon that branch of the case, I feel that in justice to colored fellow-citizens I ought to see that they have a hearing. Senators whom they helped elect show no zeal for their rights. Sir, they have a title to be heard. They are able; they can speak for themselves; but they are not here to speak. Therefore they can be heard only through their communications. Here is one from a member of the Virginia House of Delegates. It came to my hands yesterday, and is dated “Richmond, January 29, 1872.” I wish the Senate would hear what this member of the Virginia House says on the pending amendment.

The letter, as read by Mr. Sumner, concluded as follows:—“We all, Sir, the whole colored population of Virginia, make this appeal through you to a generous Senate, and pray, for the sake of humanity, justice, and all that is good and great, that equal common rights may be bestowed on a grateful and loyal people before disabilities shall have been stricken from those who struck at the very heart-strings of the Government.”

The letter, as read by Mr. Sumner, concluded as follows:—

“We all, Sir, the whole colored population of Virginia, make this appeal through you to a generous Senate, and pray, for the sake of humanity, justice, and all that is good and great, that equal common rights may be bestowed on a grateful and loyal people before disabilities shall have been stricken from those who struck at the very heart-strings of the Government.”

Can any Senator listen to that appeal and not feel that this Virginian begins to answer the Senator from Maine? He shows an abuse; he testifies to a grievance. Sir, it is the beginning of the argument. My friend seemed almost to ignore it. He did not see the abuse; he did not recognize the grievance.

Mr. Morrill.I certainly did see it, and I certainly recognize it. The only difference between the Senator and myself, so far as the argument is concerned, is one simply of power.

Mr. Sumner.I shall come to that. But first is the point, whether the Senator recognizes the grievance; and here let me tell my excellent friend, that, did he see the grievance as this colored citizen sees it, did he feel it as this colored citizen feels it,—Sir, did he simply see it as I see it,—he would find power enough in the Constitution to apply the remedy. I know the generous heart of the Senator; and I know that he could not hesitate, did he really see this great grievance. He does not see it in its proportions. He does not see how in real character it is such that it can be dealt with only by the National power. I drive that home to the Senator. It is the beginning of the argument in reply to him, that the grievance is such that it can be dealt with adequately only by Congress. Any other mode is inefficient, inadequate, absurd. I begin, therefore, by placing the Senator in that position. Unhappily he does not see the grievance. He has no conception of its vastness, extending everywhere, with ramifications in every State,and requiring one uniform remedy, which, from the nature of the case, can be supplied only by the Nation.

And now I come to the question of power; and here I allow a colored fellow-citizen to be heard in reply to the Senator. I read from a letter of E. A. Fulton, of Arkansas:—

“I have seen and experienced much of the disabilities which rest upon my race and people from the mere accident of color. Grateful to God and the Republicans of this country for our emancipation and the recognition of our citizenship, I am nevertheless deeply impressed with the necessity of furtherlegislation for the perfection of our rights as American citizens.”

This colored citizen is impressed, as the Senator is not, with the necessity of further legislation for the perfection of his rights as an American citizen. He goes on:—

“I am also thoroughly persuaded that this needed legislation should come from the National Congress.”

So he replies to my friend.

“Local or State legislation will necessarily be partial and vacillating. Besides, our experience is to the effect that the local State governments are unreliable for the enforcement or execution of laws for this purpose.“In Arkansas, for example, a statute was enacted by the General Assembly of 1868 for the purpose of securing the equal rights of colored persons upon steamboats, railroads, and public thoroughfares generally. The provisions of the statute were deemed good, if not entirely sufficient; yet to the present time gross indignities continue to be perpetrated upon colored travellers, men and women, while those charged under oath to see the laws faithfully executed look on with seeming heartless indifference while the law remains a dead letter on the statute-book.“With a care and anxiety which one vitally interested alone can feel I have examined and weighed this subject.”

“In Arkansas, for example, a statute was enacted by the General Assembly of 1868 for the purpose of securing the equal rights of colored persons upon steamboats, railroads, and public thoroughfares generally. The provisions of the statute were deemed good, if not entirely sufficient; yet to the present time gross indignities continue to be perpetrated upon colored travellers, men and women, while those charged under oath to see the laws faithfully executed look on with seeming heartless indifference while the law remains a dead letter on the statute-book.

“With a care and anxiety which one vitally interested alone can feel I have examined and weighed this subject.”

Here, Sir, he replies again to my friend. I should like the Senator to notice the sentence:—

“With a care and anxiety which one vitally interested alone can feel”—

as, of course, my friend cannot feel, since he has not that vital interest—

“I have examined and weighed this subject.”

What does he conclude?

“I am fully persuaded that nothing short of national legislation, and national authority for its enforcement, will be found sufficient for the maintenance of our God-given rights as men and women, citizens of this great and free country.”

Mr. Morrill.As my honorable friend emphasizes that particular point, will he be kind enough to say whether he reads that letter as an authority showing that Congress has the power to do what he asks, or whether it is simply an individual opinion that some such legislation is necessary?

Mr. Sumner.I think my friend must know that I do not read the letter as an authority, according to his use of the term. By-and-by I shall come to the authority. I read it as the opinion of a colored citizen—

Mr. Morrill.As to the necessity of legislation?

Mr. Sumner.Who has felt the grievance, and testifies that the remedy can only be through the Nation. There is where he differs from my friend.

Mr. Morrill.It is not necessary to read evidence to me that the colored people think there ought to be legislation by Congress. The question between the Senator and myself is precisely this: What is your authority?

Mr. Sumner.I am coming to that. This is only the beginning.

Mr. Morrill.When you come to that, and make an issue with me, I shall be ready to answer.

Mr. Sumner.I shall come to that in due season, and give the Senator the opportunity he desires. I shall speak to the question of power. Meanwhile I proceed with the letter:—

“I have read with joy your recently presented Supplementary Civil Rights Bill. It meets my hearty approval. In the name of God and down-trodden humanity, I pray you press its enactment to a successful consummation.“Such a law, firmly enforced, coupled with complete amnesty”—

“Such a law, firmly enforced, coupled with complete amnesty”—

You see the point, Mr. President,—“coupled with complete amnesty”—

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