4437harde—hard4445haþ—MS. haþe4446whiche—which4450wille—wilwhiche—which þat4451haþ—MS. haþe4453stedfast—stydefast4454-55þinge—thing4455on—of4456þilk—thilke4458whiche—which4459knot—knotte4461come—comynhaþ—MS. haþe4464hyd—MS. hydde, C. hidde4466 [nat]—from C.4467-8 [but——yporueyid]—from C.4471þinges—thing4477haþ—MS. haþe4480-82soþe—soth4486soþe—sooth4487soþe—soth4488soþe—sooth4489soþe comeþ—sooth comth[þe]—from C.4490comune—MS. comme, C. comune4493come—comyn4494to—omitted4494-95purueid—MS. purueide, C. purueyid4498 [.s.]—from C.4499fredome—freedom4500wille—wil4501 [certes]—from C.4504purueiþ—MS. purueiþe[the]—from C.4506bitiden—bytyddensom tyme—whilom4509o—aself—selue4510þinge—thing4511þilk[e]—thilke4513þinge—thing4514last[e]—laste4515nys—is4518it—hit4519 [byforn]—from C.4522fals—false4523 [nat]—from C.ben—MS. by, C. ben4524þan[as]it is—MS. þan it is be4527 [be]—from C.4529whiche—which4534mouþe—Mowth4536shulle—shullynwit[e]—wite4538don—MS. done, C. y-doon4543moche—mochelworþe—worth4549haþ—MS. haþe4550whiche—which4551mankynde—man-kynd4554 [this]—from C.4555grauntid—ygraunted4558medes of—Meedes to4560haþ—MS. haþe4562alþer worste whiche—alderworst which4563nowe—MS. newe, C. nowalþer moste iuste—alder moost Iustmoste—most4565-67good[e]—goode4566wille—wil[ne]—from C.4571wiþoute—with-owten4573þouȝt—thoght4574yledd—MS. yledde, C. yled4575comeþ—comth4577done—doon4578mak[er]e—makere4579auȝt[e]—owhte4584whiche—which4588preis—prysryȝtfulnesse—Rihtwessenesse4589deserue—desseruyn4590deuyne—MS. deuynes, C. dyuyne4590-93whiche—which4591grete—gret4593 [men]—from C.speken—speke4595þilk—thilke4596emprenten—impetrent4597 [nat]—from C.[hope]—from C.4601whiche—which4602byforne—by-fornTHE UNKNOWN CANNOT BE DESIRED.[The .3de. Metur.]QUE NAM DISCORSWhatSay what discordant cause looses the bonds of things?discordable cause haþ to-rentandvnioigned þebyndyng or þe alliaunce of þinges. þat is to seyneþe coniuncciounof godandof man.What power doth make these two great truths (i. e.Providence and Free-will) contend, which when separate are plain and clear, but united appear dark and perplexed?¶ whiche godhaþ establissed so grete bataile bitwixenþise two soþefast4608or verray þinges. þat is to sein bytwixen þe purueaunceof godandfre wille. þat þei ben synguleranddiuided. ne þat þei ne wolen nat ben medeled necoupled to-gidre. but þer nis no discorde to [tho] verray4612þinges. but þei cleuen certeyne al wey to hem self.The mind of man encumbered by the earthly body, can never, with her cloudy sight, discover the subtle and close bonds of things.butþe þouȝt of man confoundedandouerþrowen by þe dirkemembris of þe body ne may nat by fir of his dirk[ed]lokynge. þat is to seyn by þe vigourof hys insyȝt while4616þe soule is in þe body knowen þe þinne subtil knyttyngesof þinges.But why does man burn with ardour to learn the hidden notes of truth?¶ But wherfore eschaufiþ it so by sogrete loue to fynden þilke note[s] of soþe y-couered. (glosa)þat is to sein wherfore eschaufiþ þe þouȝt of man by so4620grete desir to knowen þilke notificaciouns þat ben yhiddvndir þe couertours of soþe.Why gropes he for he knows not what? None seek to know what is known.woot it ouȝt þilke þingesþat it anguissous desireþ to knowe. as who seiþ nay.¶ For no man ne trauaileþ forto witen þinges þat he woot.4624andþerfore þe texte seiþ þus. ¶ [Glosa] Si enimanimaignorat istas subtiles connexiones. responde. vndeestquod desiderat scire cumnil ignotumpossit desiderare.¶ But who traua[i]leþ to wyten þinges y-knowe.If he knows them not, what does he so blindly seek?and yif4628þat he ne knoweþ hem nat. what sekiþ þilke blyndeþouȝt.Who wishes for things he hath never known?what is he þat desireþ any þinge of whiche hewoot ryȝt nat. as who seiþ who so desiriþ any þingnedis som what he knoweþ of it. or ellys he ne couþe4632nat desire it. or who may folwen þinges þat ne ben natywistOr if he seek, where shall he find them? Or if he find, how shall he be sure that he has found what he sought for?¶ and þouȝ [þat] he seke þo þinges where shalhe fyndenhem. what wyȝt þat is al vnknowyngeandignoraunt may knowe þe forme þat is yfounde.The pure soul that sees the divine thought, knows all the secret chains of things.¶ But4636whan þe soule byholdeþandseeþ þe heye þouȝt. þat isto seyn god. þan knoweþ it to-gidre þe sommeandþesingularites. þat is to seyn þe principlesandeuerycheby hym self.Yet, though now hidden in its fleshly members, it hath some remembrance of its pure state—it retains the sums of things, but has lost their particulars.¶ But now while þe soule is hidd in þe4640cloudeandin þe derknesse of þe membris of þe body.it ne haþ nat al forȝeten it selfe. but it wiþholdeþ þesomme of þingesandlesiþ þe singularites.He who seeks truth is not in either circumstance (i. e.seeking for what he knows or knows not), he knoweth not all things, nor hath he wholly forgotten all.þan who soþat sekeþ soþenesse. he nis in neiþernouþir habit. for4644he not nat alle ne he ne haþ nat alle for-ȝeten.But he ponders on what he knows, that he may add those things that he hath forgotten to those that he retains.¶ Butȝitte hym remembriþ þe somme of þinges þat he wiþholdeþandaxeþ counseilandtretiþ depelyche þingesysein byforne. [Glosa] þat is to sein þe grete somme in4648hys mynde. [textus] so þat he mowe adden þe partiesþat he haþ forȝeten. to þilke þat he haþ wiþholden.4605haþ—MS. haþe4606seyne—seyn4607whiche—which4608haþ—MS. haþegrete—gretsoþefast—soothfast4610wille—wil4612discorde—discord[tho]—from C.4613cleuen—clyuen4615dirk[ed]—derkyd4616while—whil4617knowen—knowe4619-21grete—gretnote[s]—notes4619soþe—soth4621yhidd—MS. yhidde, C. Ihyd4622soþe—soothþinges—thing4625 [Glosa]—from C.4630þinge—thingwhiche—which4631woot—notnat—nawht4632couþe—kowde4634 [þat]—from C.where—wher4635what—MS. þat, C. whatvnknowynge—vnkunnynge4639eueryche—euerych4640while—whilþe—MS. þe þehidd—MS. hidde, C. hidde4641derknesse—derkenesse4642haþ—MS. haþeselfe—self4644nouþir habit—nother habite4645alle(both)—alhaþ—MS. haþe4648 [Glosa]—from C.4649 [textus]—from C.4650haþ(both)—MS. haþeANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS AGAINST PROVIDENCE.[The 4theprose.]TAMEN ILLA UETUS INQUIT HEC EST.Þanne seideP.This is the old objection against Providence, so ably handled by Cicero in hisBook of Divination; and you yourself have anxiously discussed it.she. þis is quod she þe olde questiounofþe purueaunce of god.andmarcus tulius whan he4652deuided[e] þe deuinaciouns. þat is to sein in hys bookeþat he wroot of deuinaciouns. he moeued[e] gretly þisquestioun.andþou þi self hast souȝt it mochelandouterlyandlong[e].But neither of you have offered a satisfactory solution of the difficulty.but ȝit ne haþ it nat ben determined4656ne yspedd fermelyanddiligently of any of yow.The cause of this mystery is that the human understanding cannot conceive the simplicity of the divine prescience, for if it were possible to comprehend this, every difficulty would at once disappear.¶ And þe cause of þis derkenesseand[of this] difficulteis for þat þe moeuynge of þe resounof mankynde nemay nat moeuento. þat is to sein applien or ioygnen to4660þe simplicite of þe deuyne prescience. ¶ þe whichesymplicite of þe deuyne prescience ȝif þat men [myhtenthinken it in any manere/ þat is to seyn / þat yif men] myȝteþinkenandcomprehenden þe þinges as god seeþ hem.4664þan ne sholde þer dwellen outerly no doute.I shall, therefore, try to explain and solve this difficult question.þe whicheresounandcause of difficulte I shal assaie at þe lasteto shewenandto speden.[* fol. 36b.]¶ whan I haue *firste[yspendyd /and] ansewered to þo resouns by whiche þou4668art ymoeued.I ask, then, why you do not approve the reasoning of such as think—that Prescience does not obstruct the liberty of the will, because it is not the necessitating cause of future events?¶ For I axe whi þou wenest þat þilk[e]resouns of hem þat assoilen þis questiounne ben natspedeful ynouȝ ne sufficient þe whiche soluciounor þewhiche resounfor þat it demiþ þat þe prescience nis nat4672cause of necessite to þinges to comen. þan ne weneþ itnat þat fredom of wille be distourbed or ylett by prescience.NECESSITY AND PRESCIENCE.Do you draw an argument of the necessity of future events, from any other topic than this,—that those things which are foreknown must of necessity happen?for ne drawest þou nat argumentes from ellyswhere of þe necessite of þinges to comen. As who seiþ4676any oþer wey þan þus. but þat þilke þinge[s] þat þe presciencewoot byforn [ne] mowen nat vnbitide. þat is toseyn þat þei moten bitide.If divine prescience imposes no necessity upon future things, must not the issue of things be voluntary, and man’s will free and unconstrained?¶ But þan yif þat presciencene putteþ no necessite to þinges to comen. as þou þi self4680hast confessed itandbyknowen a litel herbyforne. ¶ whatcause [or what] is it. as who seiþ þere may no cause be.by whiche þat þe endes (exitus) uoluntarie of þingesmyȝten be constreyned to certeyne bitydyng.For argument sake let us suppose there is no prescience, would, then, the events which proceed from free-will alone be under the power of necessity?¶ For4684by grace of possessioun. so þat þou mowe þe better vndirstondeþis þat folweþ. ¶ I pose (inpossibile) þatþer ne be no prescience. þan axe I quod she in asmoche as apperteniþ to þat. sholde þan þinges þat4688comen of frewille ben constreined to bytiden bynecessite.B.No.Boicius. nay quod I.P.Let us, then, admit Prescience, but that it imposes no necessity on what is to happen; the freedom of the will would still remain entire and absolute.þan aȝeinward quodshe. I suppose þat þere be prescience but þat ne putteþno necessite to þinges. þan trowe I þat þilk self fredom4692of wille shal dwellenal hoolandabsolutandvnbounden.But although Prescience, you may say, is not the necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily happen, and hence it follows that, although there were no prescience, future events would still be an inevitable necessity.but þou wolt sein þat al be it so þat presciencenis nat cause of þe necessite of bitidynge to þinges tocomen. ¶ Algates ȝitte it is a signe þat þe þinges ben4696to bytiden by necessite. by þis manere þan al þouȝ þeprescience ne hadde neuer yben. ȝit algate or at þelest[e] wey. it is certeyne þing þat þe endysandþebitydynges of þinges to comensholde ben necessarie.4700For the sign of a thing is not really the thing itself, but only points out what the individual is.¶ For euery sygne sheweþandsignifieþ oonly what þeþing is ¶ but it ne makiþ nat þe þing þat it signifieþ.Wherefore, it must be first proved that everything happens by necessity before we can conclude that prescience is a sign of that necessity.¶ For whiche it byhoueþ firste to shewen þat no þingne bitidiþ [þat it ne bytydith] by necessite. so þat it4704may apere þat þe prescience is signe of þis necessiteFor if there be no necessity, prescience cannot be the sign of that which has no existence.¶ or ellys yif þere nere no necessite. certys þilke presciencene myȝt[e] nat ben signe of þinge þat nis nat.NOT ALL THINGS CONTROLLED BY NECESSITY.The assertion that nothing happens but by necessity, must be proved by arguments drawn from causes connected and agreeing with this necessity, and not from signs or foreign causes.¶ But certys it is nowe certeyne þat þe preue of þis4708susteniþ by stedfast resounne shal nat ben ladd neproued by signes ne by argumentys ytaken fro wiþ oute.but by causes couenableandnecessarie ¶ But þoumayst sein how may it be þat þe þinges ne bitiden nat4712þat ben ypurueyed to comen. but certys ryȝt as wetrowen þat þo þinges whiche þat þe purueaunce woot byfornto comen. ne ben nat to bitiden. but [þat] ne sholdewe nat demen. but raþer al þouȝ [þat] þei schal bitiden.4716ȝit ne haue þei no necessite of hire kynde to bitiden.andþis maist þou lyȝtly aperceyuenby þis þat I shalseyn.We see many things when they are done before our eyes; such as a charioteer driving his chariot, and other things of like nature.but we seen many þinges whan þei ben don byfornoure eyen ryȝt as men seen þe karter worken in þe4720tournyngeandin attempryng or in adressyng of hyskartes or chariottes. ¶ and by þis manere as who seiþmayst þou vnderstonde of alle manere oþir werkemen.Now, is there any necessity which compels these things to be done?¶ Is þere þanne any necessite as who seiþ in oure lokynge4724[þat] constreineþ or compelliþ any of þilke þingesto ben don so.B.No. For if all things were moved by compulsion—the efforts of art would be vain and fruitless.b. nay quod I ¶ For in ydelandinveyne were alle þe effect of crafte yif þat alle þingesweren moeued by constreynynge. þat is to seyn by constreynynge4728of oure eyen or of oure syȝt.P.The things, then, which are done are under no necessity that they should be done; then first before they were done, they were under no necessity of coming to pass; wherefore some things happen, the event of which is unconstrained by necessity.P.þise þingusþan quod she þat whan men don hem ne han nonnecessite þat men don hem. eke þo same þinges first orþei be don. þei ben to comen wiþ out necessite. for whi4732þer ben somme þinges to bytide of whiche þe endys[* fol. 37.]andþe bitidynges of hem ben absolut *andquit of allenecessite.These things therefore, although foreknown, have free events: for as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity upon things which are now done, so neither does the foreknowledge of futurities necessitate the things which are to come.for certys I ne trowe nat þat any man wolde seynþis. þat þo þinges þat men don now þat þei ne weren4736to bitiden. first or þei were ydon ¶ and þilk sameþinges al þouȝ þat men haddenywyst hem by-forn.ȝitte þei han fre bitidynges. for ryȝt as science ofþinges present ne bryngeþ in no necessite to þinges4740[þat men doon // Ryht so the prescience of thinges tocomen ne bryngeth in no necessite to thinges] to bytidenBut you may doubt whether there can be any certain prescience of things, of which the event is not necessitated: for here there seems to be an evident contradiction.but þou mayst seyn þat of þilke same it is ydouted. aswheþer þat of þilke þinges þat ne han non endesand4744bytidynges necessaryes yif þer-of may ben any prescienceTHE NATURE OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE.If things are foreknown, you may contend they must necessarily happen; and if their event is not necessary, they cannot be foreseen, because true knowledge can comprehend nothing but what is absolutely certain.¶ For certys þei seme to discorde. for þouwenest þat yif þat þinges ben yseyn byforn þat necessitefolweþ hem. and yif (etputas) necessite faileþ hem þei ne4748myȝten nat ben wist byforn.andþat no þinge ne mayben comprehendid by science but certeyne.And if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as certain, this knowledge is nothing more than a false opinion.andyif þoþinges þat ne han no certeyne bytidynges ben ypurueiedas certeyn.For it is very remote from true knowledge to judge of things otherwise than they really are.it sholde ben dirkenesse of oppiniounnat4752soþefastnesse of science [andþou weenyst þat it be diuersefro the hoolnesse of science / þat any man sholde demea thing to ben oother weys thanne it is it self].The cause of this error is that men imagine that their knowledge is wholly derived from the nature of the things known, whereas it is quite the reverse.and þecause of þis errour is. þat of alle þe þinges þat euery4756wyȝt haþ yknowe. þei wenen þat þo þinges ben y-knoweal oonly by þe strengþeandby þe nature of þe þingesþat ben ywyst or yknowe.andit is al þe contrarie. foralle þat euere is yknowe.Things are not known from their inherent properties, but by the faculties of the observer.it is raþer comprehendidand4760yknowennat after his strengeþandhys nature. but afterþe faculte þat is to seyn þe powerand[the] nature ofhem þat knowen.The roundness of a body affects the sight in one way, and the touch in another.andfor þat þis shal mowe shewen bya short ensample þe same roundenes of a body .O. oþer4764weyes þe syȝt of þe eye knoweþ it.andoþer weyes þetouching.The eye, from afar, darts its rays upon the object, and by beholding it comprehends its form.þe lokynge by castynge of his bemes waiteþandseeþ fro afer alle þe body to-gider wiþ oute mouyngeof it self.But the object is not distinguished by the touch unless the hand comes in contact with it and feels it all round.but þe touchinge cliuiþandconioigneþ to þe4768rounde body (orbi)andmoueþ abouten þe environynge.andcomprehendiþ by parties þe roundenesse.SENSE, REASON, AND INTELLIGENCE.Man himself is surveyed in divers ways—by the senses, by the imagination, by reason, and by the intelligence (of the Deity).¶ and þe man hym self oþer weies wyt byholdiþ hym.andoþerweyes ymaginaciounandoþer weyes resoun.and4772oþer weyes intelligence.The senses take note of his material figure—the imagination considers the form alone, exclusive of the matter.¶ For þe wit comprehendiþfro wiþ outen furþe þe figure of þe body of þe man. þatis establissed in þe matere subiect. But þe ymaginacioun[comprehendith only the figurewithowte the matere/4776Reason transcends the imaginations, and examining existences in general discovers the particular species, but the eye of Intelligence soars still higher; for, going beyond the bounds of what is general, it surveys thesimple formsthemselves, by its own pure and subtle thought:Resounsurmounteth ymaginacioun]andcomprehendeþby an vniuersel lokynge þe commune spece (speciem)þat is in þe singuler peces. ¶ But þe eye of intelligenceis heyȝer for it sourmounteþ þe envirounynge of þe4780vniuersiteandlookeþ ouer þat by pure subtilite of þouȝt.in which this is chiefly to be considered, that the higher power of perception embraces the lower; but the inferior cannot attain to the energy of the superior:þilk same symple forme of man þat is perdurably in þedeuyne þouȝt. in whiche þis auȝt[e] gretely to ben consideredþat þe heyest strengþe to comprehenden þinges4784enbraceþandconteyneþ þe lower[e] strengþe [but thelowerestrengthe ne arysith nat in no manereto heyerestrengthe].for the senses cannot go beyond the perception of matter; the imagination cannot comprehend existences in general, nor can the reason conceive the simple form.for wit ne may no þinge comprehende oute ofmatere. ne þe ymagynaciounne lokeþ nat þe vniuerseles4788speces. ne resounne takeþ nat þe symple forme. so asintelligence takeþ it.But the Intelligence looking down (as from above) and having conceived the form, discerns all things that are below it, and comprehends what does not fall within the reach of the other faculties of the mind.but þe intelligence þat lokeþ alabouen whan it haþ comprehendid þe forme it knoweþanddemeþ alle þe þinges þat benvndir þat forme. but4792she knoweþ hemvndir þilke manere in þe whiche itcomprehendiþ þilke same symple forme þat ne mayneuer be knowen to non of þat oþer. þat is to seyn tonon of þo þre forseide strengþes of þe soule.Without the aid of those faculties Intelligence comprehends thingsformally(i. e.by beholding their simple forms) by one effort of mind.for it4796knoweþ þe vniuersite of resounandþe figure of þe ymaginacioun.andþe sensible material conseiued.andþouwenest þat it be diuerse fro þe hoolnesse of science. þatany man sholde deme a þing to ben oþerweyes þan it is4800it selfandþe cause of þis errouretc’.vt supra. by wit.Reason, without the aid of Imagination and Sense, in considering things in general, comprehends all imaginable and sensible things.ne it ne vseþ nat nor of resounne of ymaginaciounneof wit wiþ oute forþe but it byholdeþ alle þinges so as Ishal seye. by a strok of þouȝt formely wiþ oute discours4804or collacioun¶ Certys resounwhan it lokeþ any þingvniuersel it ne vseþ nat of ymaginaciounnor of witandalgates ȝit [it] comprendiþ þe þinges ymaginableandsensible.For instance, reason defines her general conceptions thus:—[* fol. 37b.]for resounis she þat *diffinisseþ þe vniuersel4808of hir conseite ryȝt þus.Man is a rational two-footed animal, which, though it be a general idea, yet every one knows that man thus defined is perceived both by the imagination and the senses, notwithstanding that in this instance reason does not make use of imagination or the senses, but of her own rational conception.¶ Man is a resonable t[w]o-footidbeest. and how so þat þis knowynge [is] vniuersel.ȝit nys þer no wyȝt þat ne woot wel. þat a manis [a thing]ymaginableandsensible ¶ and þis same considereþ wel4812resoun. but þat nis nat by ymaginacioun. nor by witte.but it lokiþ it by [a] resonable concepcioun.The imagination also, although it derives its power of seeing and forming figures from the senses, yet in the absence and without the use of the senses it considers and comprehends all sensible things by its own imaginative power.¶ Also ymaginaciounal be it so. þat it takeþ of wit þe bygynyngusto seenandto formen þe figures. algates al þouȝ þat wit4816ne ware not present. ȝit it envirouniþandcomprehendiþalle þinges sensible. nat by resounsensible of demynge.but by resounymaginatif.Do not you see that men attain to the knowledge of things more by their own faculties, than by the inherent property of things?¶ sest þou nat þan þat alleþe þinges in knowynge vsen more of hir faculte or of hir4820power. þan þei don of [the] faculte or of power of þingesþat ben yknowen.Nor is it unreasonable that it should be so—for since every judgment is the act of the person judging; every one must needs do his own work by the help of his own faculties, and not by the aid of foreign power.ne þat nis no wronge. for so as eueryiugement is þe dede or þe doynge of hym þat demeþ. Itbyhoueþ þat euery wyȝt performe þe werkeandhys entencioun4824nat of forein power;but of hys propre power.4653deuided[e]—deuynedebooke—book4654moeued[e]—moeuede4655souȝt—I-sowht4656long[e]—longehaþ—MS. haþe4657yspedd—MS. yspedde, C. Ispedfermely—MS. feruently, C. fermely4658derkenesse—dirknesse[of this]—from C.4662-3 [myhten——men]—from C.4663myȝte—myhten4667firste—fyrst4668 [yspendyd and]—from C.þo—thewhiche—which4669art—MS. arteþilk[e]—thilke4671spedeful—spedful4672whiche—which4674wille—wyl4677þinge[s]—thinges4683whiche—which4685better—betere4688moche—mochel4689frewille—free wyl4691þat ne—þat is ne4692þat—MS. þanþilk self—thilke selue4693wille—wil4699lest[e]—leeste4700sholde—sholden4703whiche—whichfirste—fyrst4704 [þat——bytydith]—from C.4707myȝt[e]—myhteþinge—thing4708nowe—now4709susteniþ—ysustenydstedfast—stydefastladd—MS. ladde, C. lad4714whiche—which4715 [þat]—from C.sholde—sholden4716demen—MS. denyen[þat]—from C.4717necessite—MS. necessites4721hys—hise4725 [þat]—from C.4727veyne—veynalle—alcrafte—craft4729þise—MS. þise þise, C. the4732wiþ out—with-owte4733bytide—bytydenwhiche—which4737were—weerenydon—MS. ydone, C. I-doonþilk—thilke4741-2 [þat——thinges]—from C.4744endes—issues4746seme—semyndiscorde—discorden4749þat—yif4753-5 [and——self]—from C.4757haþ—MS. haþe4760alle—al4763mowe—mowen4764roundenes—Rowndnesse4765syȝt—sihte4767alle—al4769abouten—abowte4770roundenesse—Rowndnesse4774fro wiþ outen furþe—withowte forth4776-7 [comprehendith——ymaginacioun]—from C.4777comprehendeþ—MS. comprehendynge4778an—omitted4780heyȝer—heyere4783whiche—whichauȝt[e]—owhte4784heyest—heyiste4785lower[e]—lowere4785-7 [but——strengthe]—from C.4787wit—witteoute—owt4791haþ—MS. haþe4793whiche—which4795-6non—none4796strengþes—thinges4798-4801and þou——vt supra—omitted4805collacioun—MS. callacioun, C. collacioun4806wit—witte4810 [is]—from C.4813witte—wit4821don—MS. done, C. doon[the]—from C.4822yknowen—Iknowe]no wronge—nat wrong4824werke—werk4825forein—foreyneHOW OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OUTWARD THINGS IS GAINED.[The 4theMetur.]QUONDAM PORTICUS ATTULIT.ÞE porche þatFallacious and obscure was the lore of the Stoics,is to sein a gate of þe toune of athenisþer as philosophres hadde hir congregaciounto dispoyten.andþilke porche brouȝt[e] somtyme olde men ful4828derke in hire sentences. þat is to sein philosophers þathyȝten stoiciens.who taught that images of things obvious to the senses were imprinted on the mind by external objects, and that the soul is at first like a mirror or a clean parchment, free from figures and letters.þat wenden þat ymages [and] sensibilitesþat is to sein sensible ymaginaciouns. or ellys ymaginaciounof sensible þinges wereninprentid in to soules4832fro bodies wiþ oute forþe. ¶ As who seiþ þat þilkestoiciens wenden þat þe soule hadde ben naked of itself. as a mirour or a clene parchemyn. so þat allefygures mosten [fyrst] comen fro þinges fro wiþ oute in to4836soules.andben inprentid in to soules.Textus.Ryȝtas we ben wont some tyme by a swift poyntel to ficchenlettres emprentid in þe smoþenesse or in þe plainesse ofþe table of wex. or in parchemyn þat ne haþ no figure4840[ne] note in it.But if the mind is passive in receiving the impressions of outward objects, whence proceeds the knowledge by which the mind comprehends all things?Glosa.But now arguiþ boece aȝeins þatoppiniounandseiþ þus. but yif þe þriuyng soule nevnplitiþ no þing. þat is to sein ne doþ no þing by hyspropre moeuynges. but suffriþandlieþ subgit to þe4844figuresandto þe notes of bodyes wiþ oute forþe.andȝeldeþ ymages ydelandveyne in þe manere of amirour. whennes þriueþ þan or whennes comeþ þanþilke knowyng in oure soule. þat discerniþandbyholdeþ4848alle þinges.Whence its force to conceive individual existences, to separate those things when known, to unite divided things, and to choose and change its path, soaring to the highest and descending to the lowest things—and returning to itself, to confute false things by the true?and whennes is þilke strengþe þatbyholdeþ þe syngulere þinges. or whennes is þe strengþeþat dyuydeþ þinges yknowe.andþilke strengþe þatgadereþ to-gidre þe þinges deuided.andþe strengþe þat4852cheseþ hys entrechaunged wey for som tyme it heueþvp þe heued. þat is to sein þat it heueþ vp þe entenciounto ryȝt heye þinges.andsom tyme it discendiþ into ryȝt lowe þinges.andwhan it retourniþ in to hym4856self. it repreuiþanddestroieþ þe false þinges by þetrewe þinges.This cause is more efficacious and powerful to see and to know things, than that cause which receives the characters impressed like servile matter.¶ Certys þis strengþe is cause moreefficientandmochel more myȝty to seenandto knoweþinges. þan þilke cause þat suffriþ and resceyueþ þe4860notesandþe figures inpressed in manere of matereYet the sense in the living body excites and moves the mental powers; as when the light striking the eyes causes them to see, or as the voice rushing into the ear excites hearing.algatesþe passiounþat is to seyn þe suffraunce or þe witinþe quik[e] body goþ byforne excityngeandmoeuyngþe strengþes of þe þouȝte. ryȝt so as whan þat4864clerenesse smyteþ þe eyenandmoeuiþ hem to seen. orryȝt so as voys or soune hurtliþ to þe eresandcommoeuiþhem to herkne.Then is the force of thought excited; it calls forth the images within itself, and adds to them the outward forms, blending external images with the counterparts concealed within.þan is þe strengþe of þe þouȝtymoeuidandexcitidandclepeþ furþe þe semblable4868moeuynges þe speces þat it halt wiþ inne it self.andaddiþ þo speces to þe notesandto þe þinges wiþ outforþe.andmedeleþ þe ymages of þinges wiþ out forþeto þe forme[s] yhid wiþ inne hym self.48724827hadde—haddendispoyten—desputen4828brouȝt[e]—browhte4830 [and]—from C.4837inprentid—aprentyd4838some tyme—somtymeswift—swyfte4840haþ—MS. haþe4843vnplitiþ—vnpleytethdoþ—MS. doþe4845þe—tho4863quik[e]—qwykegoþ—MS. goþe4864þouȝte—thoght4865clerenesse—cleernesse4866soune—sown4868furþe—forth4870out—owte4871out forþe—owte forth4872forme[s]—formesyhid—I-hiddeINTELLIGENCE A DIVINE ATTRIBUTE.[The .5.theprose.]QUOD SI IN CORPORIBUSSENCIENDIS.[* fol. 38.]*QUESTIO.But whatAlthough there are in objects certain qualities which strike externally upon the senses, and put their instruments in motion; although the passive impression upon the body precedes the action of the mind,[yif] þat in bodies to benfeelid þat isto sein in þe takynge of knowelechinge of bodylyþinges. and al be it so þat þe qualites of bodies þat benobiect fro wiþ oute forþe moeuenandentalenten þe instrumentes4876of þe wittes.and although the former rouses the latter to action, yet if in the perception of bodily things, the soul is not by the impression of external things made to know these things, but by its own power judgeth of these bodily impressions,and al be it so þat þe passiounof þe body þat is to seyn þe witte [or the] suffraunce[goth to-forn the strengthe of the workynge corage / thewhich passiounor suffraunce] clepiþ furþe þe dede of4880þe þouȝt in hym self.andmoeueþandexiteþ in þismene while þe formes þat resten wiþ in forþe. and yifþat insensible bodies as I haue seid oure corage nis natytauȝt or enprentid by passiounto knowe þise þinges.4884but demiþandknoweþ of hys owen strengþe þe passiounor suffraunce subiect to þe body.how much more shall those pure spiritual beings (as God or angels) discern things by an act of their understanding alone, without the aid of impressions from external objects?Moche more þan þooþinges þat ben absolutandquit fram alle talentȝ oraffecciouns of bodies. as god or hys aungels ne folwen4888nat in discernynge þinges obiect from wiþ oute forþe.but þei accomplissenandspeden þe dede of hir þouȝtFor this reason, then, there are several sorts of knowing distributed among various beings.by þis resoun.¶ þan þere comen many manere knowyngesto dyuerseanddifferyng substaunces.For sense (or sensation) destitute of all other knowledge is allotted to those creatures that have no motion, as shell-fish.for þe wit4892of þe body þe whiche witte is nakedanddespoyled ofalle oþer knowynges. þilke witte comeþ to bestes þat nemowen nat moeuen hem self here ne þere. as oystresandmusclesandoþer swiche shelle fysshe of þe see.4896þat cliuenandben norissed to roches.But imagination is given to such brutes capable of motion, and having in some degree the power of desiring or refusing.but þe ymaginaciouncomeþ to remuable bestes þat semento han talentto fleen or to desiren any þinge.Reason, however, is the attribute of man alone, as Intelligence is that of God.but resounis al only toþe lynage of mankynde ryȝt as intelligence is oonly þe4900deuyne nature.Hence His (i. e. God’s) knowledge exceeds all other, comprehending both what belongs to His own nature, and what is comprehended by all inferior creatures.of whiche it folweþ þat þilke knowyngis more worþe þan [th]is[e] oþer. syn it knoweþ by hyspropre nature nat only hys subiect. as who seiþ it neknoweþ nat al oonly þat apperteiniþ proprely to hys4904knowynge. but it knoweþ þe subgitȝ of alle oþer knowynges.THE POWERS OF SENSE AND IMAGINATION.But how shall it be then, if sense and imagination oppose reason, affirming that the general idea of things, which reason thinks it so perfectly sees, is nothing?but how shal it þan be yif þat witandymaginaciounstryuen aȝeins resonyngeandsein þat of þilkevniuersel þinges. þat resounweneþ to seen þat it nis4908ryȝt nauȝt.For what falls under the cognisance of the senses andimaginationcannot be general.for witandymaginaciounseyn þat þat. þatis sensible or ymaginable it ne may nat ben vniuersel.þan is eiþer þe iugement of resoun[soth]. ne þatþer nis no þinge sensible. or ellys for þat resounwoot4912wel þat many þinges ben subiect to witandto ymaginacioun.þan is þe consepciounof resounveynandfalswhiche þat lookeþandcomprehendiþ. þat þat issensibleandsynguler as uniuersele.But if reason should answer to this—that in her idea of what is general she comprehends whatever is sensible and imaginable; but as to the senses and imagination, they cannot attain to the knowledge of what is general, since their knowledge is confined to material figures; and therefore in all real knowledge of things we must give the greatest credit to that faculty which has a more steadfast and perfect judgment of things.and ȝif þat resoun4916wolde answeren aȝein to þise two þat is to sein to witandto ymaginacioun.andsein þat soþely she hir self.þat is to seyn þat resounlokeþandcomprehendiþ byresounof vniuersalite. boþe þat þat is sensibleandþat4920þat is ymaginable.andþat þilke two þat is to seyn witandymaginaciounne mowennat strecchen ne enhaunsenhem self to knowynge of vniuersalite for þatþe knowyng of hem ne may exceden nor sourmounten4924þe bodyly figure[s] ¶ Certys of þe knowyng of þingesmen auȝten raþer ȝeue credence to þe more stedfastandto þe more perfit iugement.In a controversy of this kind ought not we, who possess faculties of reason, &c., to side with reason and espouse her cause?In þis manere stryuyngeþan we þat han strengþe of resonyngeandof ymaginynge4928andof wit þat is to seyn by resounandby ymaginaciounandby wit. [and] we sholde raþer preise þe causeof resoun. as who seiþ þan þe cause of wit or ymaginacioun.REASON SHOULD SUBMIT TO INTELLIGENCE.The case is entirely similar when human reason thinks the Divine Intelligence cannot behold future events in any other way than she herself is capable of perceiving them.semblable þinge is it þat þe resounof mankynde4932ne weneþ nat þat þe deuyne intelligence byholdeþ orknoweþ þinges to comen. but ryȝt as þe resounof mankyndeknoweþ hem.For thus you argue:—for þou arguistandseist þus.What things are not necessitated cannot be foreknown; therefore there is no prescience of these things, for, if there were, everything would be fixed by an absolute necessity.þat yif it ne seme nat to men þat somme þinges han certeyne4936andnecessarie bytidynges. þei ne mowen nat ben wistbyforn certeynely to bytiden. þannis [ther] no prescienceof þilke þinges.andyif we trowen þat prescienceben in þise þinges. þan is þer no þinge þat it ne4940bitidiþ by necessite.If it were possible to enjoy the intelligence of the Deity, we should then deem it right that sense and imagination should yield to reason, and also judge it proper that human reason should submit to the Divine Intelligence.but certys yif we myȝtenhan þe[* fol. 38b.]iugement of þe deuyne þouȝt as we *ben parsoners ofresoun. ryȝt so as we han demed. it byhoueþ þat ymaginaciounandwit ben byneþe resoun. ryȝt so wolde4944we demenþat it were ryȝtful þing þat mans resounauȝt[e] to summitten it selfandto ben byneþe þe deuyneþouȝt.Let us, therefore, strive to elevate ourselves to the height of the supreme intelligence—there shall reason see what she cannot discover in herself; and that is in what manner the prescience of God sees and defines all things; although they have no certain event; and she will see that this is no mere conjecture, but rather simple, supreme, and unlimited knowledge.for whiche þat yif we mowen. as who seiþ.þat yif þat we mowenI conseil[e] þat we enhanse vs in4948to þe heyȝt of þilke souereyne intelligence. for þere shalresounwel seen þat þat it ne may nat by-holden in itself. and certys þat is þis in what manere þe prescienceof god seeþ alle þinges certeinsanddifinissed al þouȝ þei4952ne han no certein issues or by-tydynges. ne þis is nonoppiniounbut it is raþer þe simplicite of þe souereynscience þat nis nat enclosed nor yshet wiþinne no boundes.
4437harde—hard4445haþ—MS. haþe4446whiche—which4450wille—wilwhiche—which þat4451haþ—MS. haþe4453stedfast—stydefast4454-55þinge—thing4455on—of4456þilk—thilke4458whiche—which4459knot—knotte4461come—comynhaþ—MS. haþe4464hyd—MS. hydde, C. hidde4466 [nat]—from C.4467-8 [but——yporueyid]—from C.4471þinges—thing4477haþ—MS. haþe4480-82soþe—soth4486soþe—sooth4487soþe—soth4488soþe—sooth4489soþe comeþ—sooth comth[þe]—from C.4490comune—MS. comme, C. comune4493come—comyn4494to—omitted4494-95purueid—MS. purueide, C. purueyid4498 [.s.]—from C.4499fredome—freedom4500wille—wil4501 [certes]—from C.4504purueiþ—MS. purueiþe[the]—from C.4506bitiden—bytyddensom tyme—whilom4509o—aself—selue4510þinge—thing4511þilk[e]—thilke4513þinge—thing4514last[e]—laste4515nys—is4518it—hit4519 [byforn]—from C.4522fals—false4523 [nat]—from C.ben—MS. by, C. ben4524þan[as]it is—MS. þan it is be4527 [be]—from C.4529whiche—which4534mouþe—Mowth4536shulle—shullynwit[e]—wite4538don—MS. done, C. y-doon4543moche—mochelworþe—worth4549haþ—MS. haþe4550whiche—which4551mankynde—man-kynd4554 [this]—from C.4555grauntid—ygraunted4558medes of—Meedes to4560haþ—MS. haþe4562alþer worste whiche—alderworst which4563nowe—MS. newe, C. nowalþer moste iuste—alder moost Iustmoste—most4565-67good[e]—goode4566wille—wil[ne]—from C.4571wiþoute—with-owten4573þouȝt—thoght4574yledd—MS. yledde, C. yled4575comeþ—comth4577done—doon4578mak[er]e—makere4579auȝt[e]—owhte4584whiche—which4588preis—prysryȝtfulnesse—Rihtwessenesse4589deserue—desseruyn4590deuyne—MS. deuynes, C. dyuyne4590-93whiche—which4591grete—gret4593 [men]—from C.speken—speke4595þilk—thilke4596emprenten—impetrent4597 [nat]—from C.[hope]—from C.4601whiche—which4602byforne—by-forn
4437harde—hard
4445haþ—MS. haþe
4446whiche—which
4450wille—wilwhiche—which þat
4451haþ—MS. haþe
4453stedfast—stydefast
4454-55þinge—thing
4455on—of
4456þilk—thilke
4458whiche—which
4459knot—knotte
4461come—comynhaþ—MS. haþe
4464hyd—MS. hydde, C. hidde
4466 [nat]—from C.
4467-8 [but——yporueyid]—from C.
4471þinges—thing
4477haþ—MS. haþe
4480-82soþe—soth
4486soþe—sooth
4487soþe—soth
4488soþe—sooth
4489soþe comeþ—sooth comth[þe]—from C.
4490comune—MS. comme, C. comune
4493come—comyn
4494to—omitted
4494-95purueid—MS. purueide, C. purueyid
4498 [.s.]—from C.
4499fredome—freedom
4500wille—wil
4501 [certes]—from C.
4504purueiþ—MS. purueiþe[the]—from C.
4506bitiden—bytyddensom tyme—whilom
4509o—aself—selue
4510þinge—thing
4511þilk[e]—thilke
4513þinge—thing
4514last[e]—laste
4515nys—is
4518it—hit
4519 [byforn]—from C.
4522fals—false
4523 [nat]—from C.ben—MS. by, C. ben
4524þan[as]it is—MS. þan it is be
4527 [be]—from C.
4529whiche—which
4534mouþe—Mowth
4536shulle—shullynwit[e]—wite
4538don—MS. done, C. y-doon
4543moche—mochelworþe—worth
4549haþ—MS. haþe
4550whiche—which
4551mankynde—man-kynd
4554 [this]—from C.
4555grauntid—ygraunted
4558medes of—Meedes to
4560haþ—MS. haþe
4562alþer worste whiche—alderworst which
4563nowe—MS. newe, C. nowalþer moste iuste—alder moost Iustmoste—most
4565-67good[e]—goode
4566wille—wil[ne]—from C.
4571wiþoute—with-owten
4573þouȝt—thoght
4574yledd—MS. yledde, C. yled
4575comeþ—comth
4577done—doon
4578mak[er]e—makere
4579auȝt[e]—owhte
4584whiche—which
4588preis—prysryȝtfulnesse—Rihtwessenesse
4589deserue—desseruyn
4590deuyne—MS. deuynes, C. dyuyne
4590-93whiche—which
4591grete—gret
4593 [men]—from C.speken—speke
4595þilk—thilke
4596emprenten—impetrent
4597 [nat]—from C.[hope]—from C.
4601whiche—which
4602byforne—by-forn
THE UNKNOWN CANNOT BE DESIRED.
WhatSay what discordant cause looses the bonds of things?discordable cause haþ to-rentandvnioigned þebyndyng or þe alliaunce of þinges. þat is to seyneþe coniuncciounof godandof man.What power doth make these two great truths (i. e.Providence and Free-will) contend, which when separate are plain and clear, but united appear dark and perplexed?¶ whiche godhaþ establissed so grete bataile bitwixenþise two soþefast4608or verray þinges. þat is to sein bytwixen þe purueaunceof godandfre wille. þat þei ben synguleranddiuided. ne þat þei ne wolen nat ben medeled necoupled to-gidre. but þer nis no discorde to [tho] verray4612þinges. but þei cleuen certeyne al wey to hem self.The mind of man encumbered by the earthly body, can never, with her cloudy sight, discover the subtle and close bonds of things.butþe þouȝt of man confoundedandouerþrowen by þe dirkemembris of þe body ne may nat by fir of his dirk[ed]lokynge. þat is to seyn by þe vigourof hys insyȝt while4616þe soule is in þe body knowen þe þinne subtil knyttyngesof þinges.But why does man burn with ardour to learn the hidden notes of truth?¶ But wherfore eschaufiþ it so by sogrete loue to fynden þilke note[s] of soþe y-couered. (glosa)þat is to sein wherfore eschaufiþ þe þouȝt of man by so4620grete desir to knowen þilke notificaciouns þat ben yhiddvndir þe couertours of soþe.Why gropes he for he knows not what? None seek to know what is known.woot it ouȝt þilke þingesþat it anguissous desireþ to knowe. as who seiþ nay.¶ For no man ne trauaileþ forto witen þinges þat he woot.4624andþerfore þe texte seiþ þus. ¶ [Glosa] Si enimanimaignorat istas subtiles connexiones. responde. vndeestquod desiderat scire cumnil ignotumpossit desiderare.¶ But who traua[i]leþ to wyten þinges y-knowe.If he knows them not, what does he so blindly seek?and yif4628þat he ne knoweþ hem nat. what sekiþ þilke blyndeþouȝt.Who wishes for things he hath never known?what is he þat desireþ any þinge of whiche hewoot ryȝt nat. as who seiþ who so desiriþ any þingnedis som what he knoweþ of it. or ellys he ne couþe4632nat desire it. or who may folwen þinges þat ne ben natywistOr if he seek, where shall he find them? Or if he find, how shall he be sure that he has found what he sought for?¶ and þouȝ [þat] he seke þo þinges where shalhe fyndenhem. what wyȝt þat is al vnknowyngeandignoraunt may knowe þe forme þat is yfounde.The pure soul that sees the divine thought, knows all the secret chains of things.¶ But4636whan þe soule byholdeþandseeþ þe heye þouȝt. þat isto seyn god. þan knoweþ it to-gidre þe sommeandþesingularites. þat is to seyn þe principlesandeuerycheby hym self.Yet, though now hidden in its fleshly members, it hath some remembrance of its pure state—it retains the sums of things, but has lost their particulars.¶ But now while þe soule is hidd in þe4640cloudeandin þe derknesse of þe membris of þe body.it ne haþ nat al forȝeten it selfe. but it wiþholdeþ þesomme of þingesandlesiþ þe singularites.He who seeks truth is not in either circumstance (i. e.seeking for what he knows or knows not), he knoweth not all things, nor hath he wholly forgotten all.þan who soþat sekeþ soþenesse. he nis in neiþernouþir habit. for4644he not nat alle ne he ne haþ nat alle for-ȝeten.But he ponders on what he knows, that he may add those things that he hath forgotten to those that he retains.¶ Butȝitte hym remembriþ þe somme of þinges þat he wiþholdeþandaxeþ counseilandtretiþ depelyche þingesysein byforne. [Glosa] þat is to sein þe grete somme in4648hys mynde. [textus] so þat he mowe adden þe partiesþat he haþ forȝeten. to þilke þat he haþ wiþholden.
4605haþ—MS. haþe4606seyne—seyn4607whiche—which4608haþ—MS. haþegrete—gretsoþefast—soothfast4610wille—wil4612discorde—discord[tho]—from C.4613cleuen—clyuen4615dirk[ed]—derkyd4616while—whil4617knowen—knowe4619-21grete—gretnote[s]—notes4619soþe—soth4621yhidd—MS. yhidde, C. Ihyd4622soþe—soothþinges—thing4625 [Glosa]—from C.4630þinge—thingwhiche—which4631woot—notnat—nawht4632couþe—kowde4634 [þat]—from C.where—wher4635what—MS. þat, C. whatvnknowynge—vnkunnynge4639eueryche—euerych4640while—whilþe—MS. þe þehidd—MS. hidde, C. hidde4641derknesse—derkenesse4642haþ—MS. haþeselfe—self4644nouþir habit—nother habite4645alle(both)—alhaþ—MS. haþe4648 [Glosa]—from C.4649 [textus]—from C.4650haþ(both)—MS. haþe
4605haþ—MS. haþe
4606seyne—seyn
4607whiche—which
4608haþ—MS. haþegrete—gretsoþefast—soothfast
4610wille—wil
4612discorde—discord[tho]—from C.
4613cleuen—clyuen
4615dirk[ed]—derkyd
4616while—whil
4617knowen—knowe
4619-21grete—gretnote[s]—notes
4619soþe—soth
4621yhidd—MS. yhidde, C. Ihyd
4622soþe—soothþinges—thing
4625 [Glosa]—from C.
4630þinge—thingwhiche—which
4631woot—notnat—nawht
4632couþe—kowde
4634 [þat]—from C.where—wher
4635what—MS. þat, C. whatvnknowynge—vnkunnynge
4639eueryche—euerych
4640while—whilþe—MS. þe þehidd—MS. hidde, C. hidde
4641derknesse—derkenesse
4642haþ—MS. haþeselfe—self
4644nouþir habit—nother habite
4645alle(both)—alhaþ—MS. haþe
4648 [Glosa]—from C.
4649 [textus]—from C.
4650haþ(both)—MS. haþe
ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS AGAINST PROVIDENCE.
Þanne seideP.This is the old objection against Providence, so ably handled by Cicero in hisBook of Divination; and you yourself have anxiously discussed it.she. þis is quod she þe olde questiounofþe purueaunce of god.andmarcus tulius whan he4652deuided[e] þe deuinaciouns. þat is to sein in hys bookeþat he wroot of deuinaciouns. he moeued[e] gretly þisquestioun.andþou þi self hast souȝt it mochelandouterlyandlong[e].But neither of you have offered a satisfactory solution of the difficulty.but ȝit ne haþ it nat ben determined4656ne yspedd fermelyanddiligently of any of yow.The cause of this mystery is that the human understanding cannot conceive the simplicity of the divine prescience, for if it were possible to comprehend this, every difficulty would at once disappear.¶ And þe cause of þis derkenesseand[of this] difficulteis for þat þe moeuynge of þe resounof mankynde nemay nat moeuento. þat is to sein applien or ioygnen to4660þe simplicite of þe deuyne prescience. ¶ þe whichesymplicite of þe deuyne prescience ȝif þat men [myhtenthinken it in any manere/ þat is to seyn / þat yif men] myȝteþinkenandcomprehenden þe þinges as god seeþ hem.4664þan ne sholde þer dwellen outerly no doute.I shall, therefore, try to explain and solve this difficult question.þe whicheresounandcause of difficulte I shal assaie at þe lasteto shewenandto speden.[* fol. 36b.]¶ whan I haue *firste[yspendyd /and] ansewered to þo resouns by whiche þou4668art ymoeued.I ask, then, why you do not approve the reasoning of such as think—that Prescience does not obstruct the liberty of the will, because it is not the necessitating cause of future events?¶ For I axe whi þou wenest þat þilk[e]resouns of hem þat assoilen þis questiounne ben natspedeful ynouȝ ne sufficient þe whiche soluciounor þewhiche resounfor þat it demiþ þat þe prescience nis nat4672cause of necessite to þinges to comen. þan ne weneþ itnat þat fredom of wille be distourbed or ylett by prescience.
NECESSITY AND PRESCIENCE.
Do you draw an argument of the necessity of future events, from any other topic than this,—that those things which are foreknown must of necessity happen?for ne drawest þou nat argumentes from ellyswhere of þe necessite of þinges to comen. As who seiþ4676any oþer wey þan þus. but þat þilke þinge[s] þat þe presciencewoot byforn [ne] mowen nat vnbitide. þat is toseyn þat þei moten bitide.If divine prescience imposes no necessity upon future things, must not the issue of things be voluntary, and man’s will free and unconstrained?¶ But þan yif þat presciencene putteþ no necessite to þinges to comen. as þou þi self4680hast confessed itandbyknowen a litel herbyforne. ¶ whatcause [or what] is it. as who seiþ þere may no cause be.by whiche þat þe endes (exitus) uoluntarie of þingesmyȝten be constreyned to certeyne bitydyng.For argument sake let us suppose there is no prescience, would, then, the events which proceed from free-will alone be under the power of necessity?¶ For4684by grace of possessioun. so þat þou mowe þe better vndirstondeþis þat folweþ. ¶ I pose (inpossibile) þatþer ne be no prescience. þan axe I quod she in asmoche as apperteniþ to þat. sholde þan þinges þat4688comen of frewille ben constreined to bytiden bynecessite.B.No.Boicius. nay quod I.P.Let us, then, admit Prescience, but that it imposes no necessity on what is to happen; the freedom of the will would still remain entire and absolute.þan aȝeinward quodshe. I suppose þat þere be prescience but þat ne putteþno necessite to þinges. þan trowe I þat þilk self fredom4692of wille shal dwellenal hoolandabsolutandvnbounden.But although Prescience, you may say, is not the necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily happen, and hence it follows that, although there were no prescience, future events would still be an inevitable necessity.but þou wolt sein þat al be it so þat presciencenis nat cause of þe necessite of bitidynge to þinges tocomen. ¶ Algates ȝitte it is a signe þat þe þinges ben4696to bytiden by necessite. by þis manere þan al þouȝ þeprescience ne hadde neuer yben. ȝit algate or at þelest[e] wey. it is certeyne þing þat þe endysandþebitydynges of þinges to comensholde ben necessarie.4700
For the sign of a thing is not really the thing itself, but only points out what the individual is.¶ For euery sygne sheweþandsignifieþ oonly what þeþing is ¶ but it ne makiþ nat þe þing þat it signifieþ.Wherefore, it must be first proved that everything happens by necessity before we can conclude that prescience is a sign of that necessity.¶ For whiche it byhoueþ firste to shewen þat no þingne bitidiþ [þat it ne bytydith] by necessite. so þat it4704may apere þat þe prescience is signe of þis necessiteFor if there be no necessity, prescience cannot be the sign of that which has no existence.¶ or ellys yif þere nere no necessite. certys þilke presciencene myȝt[e] nat ben signe of þinge þat nis nat.
NOT ALL THINGS CONTROLLED BY NECESSITY.
The assertion that nothing happens but by necessity, must be proved by arguments drawn from causes connected and agreeing with this necessity, and not from signs or foreign causes.¶ But certys it is nowe certeyne þat þe preue of þis4708susteniþ by stedfast resounne shal nat ben ladd neproued by signes ne by argumentys ytaken fro wiþ oute.but by causes couenableandnecessarie ¶ But þoumayst sein how may it be þat þe þinges ne bitiden nat4712þat ben ypurueyed to comen. but certys ryȝt as wetrowen þat þo þinges whiche þat þe purueaunce woot byfornto comen. ne ben nat to bitiden. but [þat] ne sholdewe nat demen. but raþer al þouȝ [þat] þei schal bitiden.4716ȝit ne haue þei no necessite of hire kynde to bitiden.andþis maist þou lyȝtly aperceyuenby þis þat I shalseyn.We see many things when they are done before our eyes; such as a charioteer driving his chariot, and other things of like nature.but we seen many þinges whan þei ben don byfornoure eyen ryȝt as men seen þe karter worken in þe4720tournyngeandin attempryng or in adressyng of hyskartes or chariottes. ¶ and by þis manere as who seiþmayst þou vnderstonde of alle manere oþir werkemen.Now, is there any necessity which compels these things to be done?¶ Is þere þanne any necessite as who seiþ in oure lokynge4724[þat] constreineþ or compelliþ any of þilke þingesto ben don so.B.No. For if all things were moved by compulsion—the efforts of art would be vain and fruitless.b. nay quod I ¶ For in ydelandinveyne were alle þe effect of crafte yif þat alle þingesweren moeued by constreynynge. þat is to seyn by constreynynge4728of oure eyen or of oure syȝt.P.The things, then, which are done are under no necessity that they should be done; then first before they were done, they were under no necessity of coming to pass; wherefore some things happen, the event of which is unconstrained by necessity.P.þise þingusþan quod she þat whan men don hem ne han nonnecessite þat men don hem. eke þo same þinges first orþei be don. þei ben to comen wiþ out necessite. for whi4732þer ben somme þinges to bytide of whiche þe endys[* fol. 37.]andþe bitidynges of hem ben absolut *andquit of allenecessite.These things therefore, although foreknown, have free events: for as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity upon things which are now done, so neither does the foreknowledge of futurities necessitate the things which are to come.for certys I ne trowe nat þat any man wolde seynþis. þat þo þinges þat men don now þat þei ne weren4736to bitiden. first or þei were ydon ¶ and þilk sameþinges al þouȝ þat men haddenywyst hem by-forn.ȝitte þei han fre bitidynges. for ryȝt as science ofþinges present ne bryngeþ in no necessite to þinges4740[þat men doon // Ryht so the prescience of thinges tocomen ne bryngeth in no necessite to thinges] to bytidenBut you may doubt whether there can be any certain prescience of things, of which the event is not necessitated: for here there seems to be an evident contradiction.but þou mayst seyn þat of þilke same it is ydouted. aswheþer þat of þilke þinges þat ne han non endesand4744bytidynges necessaryes yif þer-of may ben any prescience
THE NATURE OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE.
If things are foreknown, you may contend they must necessarily happen; and if their event is not necessary, they cannot be foreseen, because true knowledge can comprehend nothing but what is absolutely certain.¶ For certys þei seme to discorde. for þouwenest þat yif þat þinges ben yseyn byforn þat necessitefolweþ hem. and yif (etputas) necessite faileþ hem þei ne4748myȝten nat ben wist byforn.andþat no þinge ne mayben comprehendid by science but certeyne.And if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as certain, this knowledge is nothing more than a false opinion.andyif þoþinges þat ne han no certeyne bytidynges ben ypurueiedas certeyn.For it is very remote from true knowledge to judge of things otherwise than they really are.it sholde ben dirkenesse of oppiniounnat4752soþefastnesse of science [andþou weenyst þat it be diuersefro the hoolnesse of science / þat any man sholde demea thing to ben oother weys thanne it is it self].The cause of this error is that men imagine that their knowledge is wholly derived from the nature of the things known, whereas it is quite the reverse.and þecause of þis errour is. þat of alle þe þinges þat euery4756wyȝt haþ yknowe. þei wenen þat þo þinges ben y-knoweal oonly by þe strengþeandby þe nature of þe þingesþat ben ywyst or yknowe.andit is al þe contrarie. foralle þat euere is yknowe.Things are not known from their inherent properties, but by the faculties of the observer.it is raþer comprehendidand4760yknowennat after his strengeþandhys nature. but afterþe faculte þat is to seyn þe powerand[the] nature ofhem þat knowen.The roundness of a body affects the sight in one way, and the touch in another.andfor þat þis shal mowe shewen bya short ensample þe same roundenes of a body .O. oþer4764weyes þe syȝt of þe eye knoweþ it.andoþer weyes þetouching.The eye, from afar, darts its rays upon the object, and by beholding it comprehends its form.þe lokynge by castynge of his bemes waiteþandseeþ fro afer alle þe body to-gider wiþ oute mouyngeof it self.But the object is not distinguished by the touch unless the hand comes in contact with it and feels it all round.but þe touchinge cliuiþandconioigneþ to þe4768rounde body (orbi)andmoueþ abouten þe environynge.andcomprehendiþ by parties þe roundenesse.
SENSE, REASON, AND INTELLIGENCE.
Man himself is surveyed in divers ways—by the senses, by the imagination, by reason, and by the intelligence (of the Deity).¶ and þe man hym self oþer weies wyt byholdiþ hym.andoþerweyes ymaginaciounandoþer weyes resoun.and4772oþer weyes intelligence.The senses take note of his material figure—the imagination considers the form alone, exclusive of the matter.¶ For þe wit comprehendiþfro wiþ outen furþe þe figure of þe body of þe man. þatis establissed in þe matere subiect. But þe ymaginacioun[comprehendith only the figurewithowte the matere/4776
Reason transcends the imaginations, and examining existences in general discovers the particular species, but the eye of Intelligence soars still higher; for, going beyond the bounds of what is general, it surveys thesimple formsthemselves, by its own pure and subtle thought:Resounsurmounteth ymaginacioun]andcomprehendeþby an vniuersel lokynge þe commune spece (speciem)þat is in þe singuler peces. ¶ But þe eye of intelligenceis heyȝer for it sourmounteþ þe envirounynge of þe4780vniuersiteandlookeþ ouer þat by pure subtilite of þouȝt.
in which this is chiefly to be considered, that the higher power of perception embraces the lower; but the inferior cannot attain to the energy of the superior:þilk same symple forme of man þat is perdurably in þedeuyne þouȝt. in whiche þis auȝt[e] gretely to ben consideredþat þe heyest strengþe to comprehenden þinges4784enbraceþandconteyneþ þe lower[e] strengþe [but thelowerestrengthe ne arysith nat in no manereto heyerestrengthe].for the senses cannot go beyond the perception of matter; the imagination cannot comprehend existences in general, nor can the reason conceive the simple form.for wit ne may no þinge comprehende oute ofmatere. ne þe ymagynaciounne lokeþ nat þe vniuerseles4788speces. ne resounne takeþ nat þe symple forme. so asintelligence takeþ it.But the Intelligence looking down (as from above) and having conceived the form, discerns all things that are below it, and comprehends what does not fall within the reach of the other faculties of the mind.but þe intelligence þat lokeþ alabouen whan it haþ comprehendid þe forme it knoweþanddemeþ alle þe þinges þat benvndir þat forme. but4792she knoweþ hemvndir þilke manere in þe whiche itcomprehendiþ þilke same symple forme þat ne mayneuer be knowen to non of þat oþer. þat is to seyn tonon of þo þre forseide strengþes of þe soule.Without the aid of those faculties Intelligence comprehends thingsformally(i. e.by beholding their simple forms) by one effort of mind.for it4796knoweþ þe vniuersite of resounandþe figure of þe ymaginacioun.andþe sensible material conseiued.andþouwenest þat it be diuerse fro þe hoolnesse of science. þatany man sholde deme a þing to ben oþerweyes þan it is4800it selfandþe cause of þis errouretc’.vt supra. by wit.Reason, without the aid of Imagination and Sense, in considering things in general, comprehends all imaginable and sensible things.ne it ne vseþ nat nor of resounne of ymaginaciounneof wit wiþ oute forþe but it byholdeþ alle þinges so as Ishal seye. by a strok of þouȝt formely wiþ oute discours4804or collacioun¶ Certys resounwhan it lokeþ any þingvniuersel it ne vseþ nat of ymaginaciounnor of witandalgates ȝit [it] comprendiþ þe þinges ymaginableandsensible.For instance, reason defines her general conceptions thus:—[* fol. 37b.]for resounis she þat *diffinisseþ þe vniuersel4808of hir conseite ryȝt þus.Man is a rational two-footed animal, which, though it be a general idea, yet every one knows that man thus defined is perceived both by the imagination and the senses, notwithstanding that in this instance reason does not make use of imagination or the senses, but of her own rational conception.¶ Man is a resonable t[w]o-footidbeest. and how so þat þis knowynge [is] vniuersel.ȝit nys þer no wyȝt þat ne woot wel. þat a manis [a thing]ymaginableandsensible ¶ and þis same considereþ wel4812resoun. but þat nis nat by ymaginacioun. nor by witte.but it lokiþ it by [a] resonable concepcioun.
The imagination also, although it derives its power of seeing and forming figures from the senses, yet in the absence and without the use of the senses it considers and comprehends all sensible things by its own imaginative power.¶ Also ymaginaciounal be it so. þat it takeþ of wit þe bygynyngusto seenandto formen þe figures. algates al þouȝ þat wit4816ne ware not present. ȝit it envirouniþandcomprehendiþalle þinges sensible. nat by resounsensible of demynge.but by resounymaginatif.Do not you see that men attain to the knowledge of things more by their own faculties, than by the inherent property of things?¶ sest þou nat þan þat alleþe þinges in knowynge vsen more of hir faculte or of hir4820power. þan þei don of [the] faculte or of power of þingesþat ben yknowen.Nor is it unreasonable that it should be so—for since every judgment is the act of the person judging; every one must needs do his own work by the help of his own faculties, and not by the aid of foreign power.ne þat nis no wronge. for so as eueryiugement is þe dede or þe doynge of hym þat demeþ. Itbyhoueþ þat euery wyȝt performe þe werkeandhys entencioun4824nat of forein power;but of hys propre power.
4653deuided[e]—deuynedebooke—book4654moeued[e]—moeuede4655souȝt—I-sowht4656long[e]—longehaþ—MS. haþe4657yspedd—MS. yspedde, C. Ispedfermely—MS. feruently, C. fermely4658derkenesse—dirknesse[of this]—from C.4662-3 [myhten——men]—from C.4663myȝte—myhten4667firste—fyrst4668 [yspendyd and]—from C.þo—thewhiche—which4669art—MS. arteþilk[e]—thilke4671spedeful—spedful4672whiche—which4674wille—wyl4677þinge[s]—thinges4683whiche—which4685better—betere4688moche—mochel4689frewille—free wyl4691þat ne—þat is ne4692þat—MS. þanþilk self—thilke selue4693wille—wil4699lest[e]—leeste4700sholde—sholden4703whiche—whichfirste—fyrst4704 [þat——bytydith]—from C.4707myȝt[e]—myhteþinge—thing4708nowe—now4709susteniþ—ysustenydstedfast—stydefastladd—MS. ladde, C. lad4714whiche—which4715 [þat]—from C.sholde—sholden4716demen—MS. denyen[þat]—from C.4717necessite—MS. necessites4721hys—hise4725 [þat]—from C.4727veyne—veynalle—alcrafte—craft4729þise—MS. þise þise, C. the4732wiþ out—with-owte4733bytide—bytydenwhiche—which4737were—weerenydon—MS. ydone, C. I-doonþilk—thilke4741-2 [þat——thinges]—from C.4744endes—issues4746seme—semyndiscorde—discorden4749þat—yif4753-5 [and——self]—from C.4757haþ—MS. haþe4760alle—al4763mowe—mowen4764roundenes—Rowndnesse4765syȝt—sihte4767alle—al4769abouten—abowte4770roundenesse—Rowndnesse4774fro wiþ outen furþe—withowte forth4776-7 [comprehendith——ymaginacioun]—from C.4777comprehendeþ—MS. comprehendynge4778an—omitted4780heyȝer—heyere4783whiche—whichauȝt[e]—owhte4784heyest—heyiste4785lower[e]—lowere4785-7 [but——strengthe]—from C.4787wit—witteoute—owt4791haþ—MS. haþe4793whiche—which4795-6non—none4796strengþes—thinges4798-4801and þou——vt supra—omitted4805collacioun—MS. callacioun, C. collacioun4806wit—witte4810 [is]—from C.4813witte—wit4821don—MS. done, C. doon[the]—from C.4822yknowen—Iknowe]no wronge—nat wrong4824werke—werk4825forein—foreyne
4653deuided[e]—deuynedebooke—book
4654moeued[e]—moeuede
4655souȝt—I-sowht
4656long[e]—longehaþ—MS. haþe
4657yspedd—MS. yspedde, C. Ispedfermely—MS. feruently, C. fermely
4658derkenesse—dirknesse[of this]—from C.
4662-3 [myhten——men]—from C.
4663myȝte—myhten
4667firste—fyrst
4668 [yspendyd and]—from C.þo—thewhiche—which
4669art—MS. arteþilk[e]—thilke
4671spedeful—spedful
4672whiche—which
4674wille—wyl
4677þinge[s]—thinges
4683whiche—which
4685better—betere
4688moche—mochel
4689frewille—free wyl
4691þat ne—þat is ne
4692þat—MS. þanþilk self—thilke selue
4693wille—wil
4699lest[e]—leeste
4700sholde—sholden
4703whiche—whichfirste—fyrst
4704 [þat——bytydith]—from C.
4707myȝt[e]—myhteþinge—thing
4708nowe—now
4709susteniþ—ysustenydstedfast—stydefastladd—MS. ladde, C. lad
4714whiche—which
4715 [þat]—from C.sholde—sholden
4716demen—MS. denyen[þat]—from C.
4717necessite—MS. necessites
4721hys—hise
4725 [þat]—from C.
4727veyne—veynalle—alcrafte—craft
4729þise—MS. þise þise, C. the
4732wiþ out—with-owte
4733bytide—bytydenwhiche—which
4737were—weerenydon—MS. ydone, C. I-doonþilk—thilke
4741-2 [þat——thinges]—from C.
4744endes—issues
4746seme—semyndiscorde—discorden
4749þat—yif
4753-5 [and——self]—from C.
4757haþ—MS. haþe
4760alle—al
4763mowe—mowen
4764roundenes—Rowndnesse
4765syȝt—sihte
4767alle—al
4769abouten—abowte
4770roundenesse—Rowndnesse
4774fro wiþ outen furþe—withowte forth
4776-7 [comprehendith——ymaginacioun]—from C.
4777comprehendeþ—MS. comprehendynge
4778an—omitted
4780heyȝer—heyere
4783whiche—whichauȝt[e]—owhte
4784heyest—heyiste
4785lower[e]—lowere
4785-7 [but——strengthe]—from C.
4787wit—witteoute—owt
4791haþ—MS. haþe
4793whiche—which
4795-6non—none
4796strengþes—thinges
4798-4801and þou——vt supra—omitted
4805collacioun—MS. callacioun, C. collacioun
4806wit—witte
4810 [is]—from C.
4813witte—wit
4821don—MS. done, C. doon[the]—from C.
4822yknowen—Iknowe]no wronge—nat wrong
4824werke—werk
4825forein—foreyne
HOW OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OUTWARD THINGS IS GAINED.
ÞE porche þatFallacious and obscure was the lore of the Stoics,is to sein a gate of þe toune of athenisþer as philosophres hadde hir congregaciounto dispoyten.andþilke porche brouȝt[e] somtyme olde men ful4828derke in hire sentences. þat is to sein philosophers þathyȝten stoiciens.who taught that images of things obvious to the senses were imprinted on the mind by external objects, and that the soul is at first like a mirror or a clean parchment, free from figures and letters.þat wenden þat ymages [and] sensibilitesþat is to sein sensible ymaginaciouns. or ellys ymaginaciounof sensible þinges wereninprentid in to soules4832fro bodies wiþ oute forþe. ¶ As who seiþ þat þilkestoiciens wenden þat þe soule hadde ben naked of itself. as a mirour or a clene parchemyn. so þat allefygures mosten [fyrst] comen fro þinges fro wiþ oute in to4836soules.andben inprentid in to soules.Textus.Ryȝtas we ben wont some tyme by a swift poyntel to ficchenlettres emprentid in þe smoþenesse or in þe plainesse ofþe table of wex. or in parchemyn þat ne haþ no figure4840[ne] note in it.But if the mind is passive in receiving the impressions of outward objects, whence proceeds the knowledge by which the mind comprehends all things?Glosa.But now arguiþ boece aȝeins þatoppiniounandseiþ þus. but yif þe þriuyng soule nevnplitiþ no þing. þat is to sein ne doþ no þing by hyspropre moeuynges. but suffriþandlieþ subgit to þe4844figuresandto þe notes of bodyes wiþ oute forþe.andȝeldeþ ymages ydelandveyne in þe manere of amirour. whennes þriueþ þan or whennes comeþ þanþilke knowyng in oure soule. þat discerniþandbyholdeþ4848alle þinges.Whence its force to conceive individual existences, to separate those things when known, to unite divided things, and to choose and change its path, soaring to the highest and descending to the lowest things—and returning to itself, to confute false things by the true?and whennes is þilke strengþe þatbyholdeþ þe syngulere þinges. or whennes is þe strengþeþat dyuydeþ þinges yknowe.andþilke strengþe þatgadereþ to-gidre þe þinges deuided.andþe strengþe þat4852cheseþ hys entrechaunged wey for som tyme it heueþvp þe heued. þat is to sein þat it heueþ vp þe entenciounto ryȝt heye þinges.andsom tyme it discendiþ into ryȝt lowe þinges.andwhan it retourniþ in to hym4856self. it repreuiþanddestroieþ þe false þinges by þetrewe þinges.This cause is more efficacious and powerful to see and to know things, than that cause which receives the characters impressed like servile matter.¶ Certys þis strengþe is cause moreefficientandmochel more myȝty to seenandto knoweþinges. þan þilke cause þat suffriþ and resceyueþ þe4860notesandþe figures inpressed in manere of matereYet the sense in the living body excites and moves the mental powers; as when the light striking the eyes causes them to see, or as the voice rushing into the ear excites hearing.algatesþe passiounþat is to seyn þe suffraunce or þe witinþe quik[e] body goþ byforne excityngeandmoeuyngþe strengþes of þe þouȝte. ryȝt so as whan þat4864clerenesse smyteþ þe eyenandmoeuiþ hem to seen. orryȝt so as voys or soune hurtliþ to þe eresandcommoeuiþhem to herkne.Then is the force of thought excited; it calls forth the images within itself, and adds to them the outward forms, blending external images with the counterparts concealed within.þan is þe strengþe of þe þouȝtymoeuidandexcitidandclepeþ furþe þe semblable4868moeuynges þe speces þat it halt wiþ inne it self.andaddiþ þo speces to þe notesandto þe þinges wiþ outforþe.andmedeleþ þe ymages of þinges wiþ out forþeto þe forme[s] yhid wiþ inne hym self.4872
4827hadde—haddendispoyten—desputen4828brouȝt[e]—browhte4830 [and]—from C.4837inprentid—aprentyd4838some tyme—somtymeswift—swyfte4840haþ—MS. haþe4843vnplitiþ—vnpleytethdoþ—MS. doþe4845þe—tho4863quik[e]—qwykegoþ—MS. goþe4864þouȝte—thoght4865clerenesse—cleernesse4866soune—sown4868furþe—forth4870out—owte4871out forþe—owte forth4872forme[s]—formesyhid—I-hidde
4827hadde—haddendispoyten—desputen
4828brouȝt[e]—browhte
4830 [and]—from C.
4837inprentid—aprentyd
4838some tyme—somtymeswift—swyfte
4840haþ—MS. haþe
4843vnplitiþ—vnpleytethdoþ—MS. doþe
4845þe—tho
4863quik[e]—qwykegoþ—MS. goþe
4864þouȝte—thoght
4865clerenesse—cleernesse
4866soune—sown
4868furþe—forth
4870out—owte
4871out forþe—owte forth
4872forme[s]—formesyhid—I-hidde
INTELLIGENCE A DIVINE ATTRIBUTE.
But whatAlthough there are in objects certain qualities which strike externally upon the senses, and put their instruments in motion; although the passive impression upon the body precedes the action of the mind,[yif] þat in bodies to benfeelid þat isto sein in þe takynge of knowelechinge of bodylyþinges. and al be it so þat þe qualites of bodies þat benobiect fro wiþ oute forþe moeuenandentalenten þe instrumentes4876of þe wittes.and although the former rouses the latter to action, yet if in the perception of bodily things, the soul is not by the impression of external things made to know these things, but by its own power judgeth of these bodily impressions,and al be it so þat þe passiounof þe body þat is to seyn þe witte [or the] suffraunce[goth to-forn the strengthe of the workynge corage / thewhich passiounor suffraunce] clepiþ furþe þe dede of4880þe þouȝt in hym self.andmoeueþandexiteþ in þismene while þe formes þat resten wiþ in forþe. and yifþat insensible bodies as I haue seid oure corage nis natytauȝt or enprentid by passiounto knowe þise þinges.4884but demiþandknoweþ of hys owen strengþe þe passiounor suffraunce subiect to þe body.how much more shall those pure spiritual beings (as God or angels) discern things by an act of their understanding alone, without the aid of impressions from external objects?Moche more þan þooþinges þat ben absolutandquit fram alle talentȝ oraffecciouns of bodies. as god or hys aungels ne folwen4888nat in discernynge þinges obiect from wiþ oute forþe.but þei accomplissenandspeden þe dede of hir þouȝtFor this reason, then, there are several sorts of knowing distributed among various beings.by þis resoun.¶ þan þere comen many manere knowyngesto dyuerseanddifferyng substaunces.For sense (or sensation) destitute of all other knowledge is allotted to those creatures that have no motion, as shell-fish.for þe wit4892of þe body þe whiche witte is nakedanddespoyled ofalle oþer knowynges. þilke witte comeþ to bestes þat nemowen nat moeuen hem self here ne þere. as oystresandmusclesandoþer swiche shelle fysshe of þe see.4896þat cliuenandben norissed to roches.But imagination is given to such brutes capable of motion, and having in some degree the power of desiring or refusing.but þe ymaginaciouncomeþ to remuable bestes þat semento han talentto fleen or to desiren any þinge.Reason, however, is the attribute of man alone, as Intelligence is that of God.but resounis al only toþe lynage of mankynde ryȝt as intelligence is oonly þe4900deuyne nature.Hence His (i. e. God’s) knowledge exceeds all other, comprehending both what belongs to His own nature, and what is comprehended by all inferior creatures.of whiche it folweþ þat þilke knowyngis more worþe þan [th]is[e] oþer. syn it knoweþ by hyspropre nature nat only hys subiect. as who seiþ it neknoweþ nat al oonly þat apperteiniþ proprely to hys4904knowynge. but it knoweþ þe subgitȝ of alle oþer knowynges.
THE POWERS OF SENSE AND IMAGINATION.
But how shall it be then, if sense and imagination oppose reason, affirming that the general idea of things, which reason thinks it so perfectly sees, is nothing?but how shal it þan be yif þat witandymaginaciounstryuen aȝeins resonyngeandsein þat of þilkevniuersel þinges. þat resounweneþ to seen þat it nis4908ryȝt nauȝt.For what falls under the cognisance of the senses andimaginationcannot be general.for witandymaginaciounseyn þat þat. þatis sensible or ymaginable it ne may nat ben vniuersel.þan is eiþer þe iugement of resoun[soth]. ne þatþer nis no þinge sensible. or ellys for þat resounwoot4912wel þat many þinges ben subiect to witandto ymaginacioun.þan is þe consepciounof resounveynandfalswhiche þat lookeþandcomprehendiþ. þat þat issensibleandsynguler as uniuersele.But if reason should answer to this—that in her idea of what is general she comprehends whatever is sensible and imaginable; but as to the senses and imagination, they cannot attain to the knowledge of what is general, since their knowledge is confined to material figures; and therefore in all real knowledge of things we must give the greatest credit to that faculty which has a more steadfast and perfect judgment of things.and ȝif þat resoun4916wolde answeren aȝein to þise two þat is to sein to witandto ymaginacioun.andsein þat soþely she hir self.þat is to seyn þat resounlokeþandcomprehendiþ byresounof vniuersalite. boþe þat þat is sensibleandþat4920þat is ymaginable.andþat þilke two þat is to seyn witandymaginaciounne mowennat strecchen ne enhaunsenhem self to knowynge of vniuersalite for þatþe knowyng of hem ne may exceden nor sourmounten4924þe bodyly figure[s] ¶ Certys of þe knowyng of þingesmen auȝten raþer ȝeue credence to þe more stedfastandto þe more perfit iugement.In a controversy of this kind ought not we, who possess faculties of reason, &c., to side with reason and espouse her cause?In þis manere stryuyngeþan we þat han strengþe of resonyngeandof ymaginynge4928andof wit þat is to seyn by resounandby ymaginaciounandby wit. [and] we sholde raþer preise þe causeof resoun. as who seiþ þan þe cause of wit or ymaginacioun.
REASON SHOULD SUBMIT TO INTELLIGENCE.
The case is entirely similar when human reason thinks the Divine Intelligence cannot behold future events in any other way than she herself is capable of perceiving them.semblable þinge is it þat þe resounof mankynde4932ne weneþ nat þat þe deuyne intelligence byholdeþ orknoweþ þinges to comen. but ryȝt as þe resounof mankyndeknoweþ hem.For thus you argue:—for þou arguistandseist þus.
What things are not necessitated cannot be foreknown; therefore there is no prescience of these things, for, if there were, everything would be fixed by an absolute necessity.þat yif it ne seme nat to men þat somme þinges han certeyne4936andnecessarie bytidynges. þei ne mowen nat ben wistbyforn certeynely to bytiden. þannis [ther] no prescienceof þilke þinges.andyif we trowen þat prescienceben in þise þinges. þan is þer no þinge þat it ne4940bitidiþ by necessite.If it were possible to enjoy the intelligence of the Deity, we should then deem it right that sense and imagination should yield to reason, and also judge it proper that human reason should submit to the Divine Intelligence.but certys yif we myȝtenhan þe[* fol. 38b.]iugement of þe deuyne þouȝt as we *ben parsoners ofresoun. ryȝt so as we han demed. it byhoueþ þat ymaginaciounandwit ben byneþe resoun. ryȝt so wolde4944we demenþat it were ryȝtful þing þat mans resounauȝt[e] to summitten it selfandto ben byneþe þe deuyneþouȝt.Let us, therefore, strive to elevate ourselves to the height of the supreme intelligence—there shall reason see what she cannot discover in herself; and that is in what manner the prescience of God sees and defines all things; although they have no certain event; and she will see that this is no mere conjecture, but rather simple, supreme, and unlimited knowledge.for whiche þat yif we mowen. as who seiþ.þat yif þat we mowenI conseil[e] þat we enhanse vs in4948to þe heyȝt of þilke souereyne intelligence. for þere shalresounwel seen þat þat it ne may nat by-holden in itself. and certys þat is þis in what manere þe prescienceof god seeþ alle þinges certeinsanddifinissed al þouȝ þei4952ne han no certein issues or by-tydynges. ne þis is nonoppiniounbut it is raþer þe simplicite of þe souereynscience þat nis nat enclosed nor yshet wiþinne no boundes.