ORGANIZATION

“Mere hope of attaining their desires, coupled with ignorance of the processes necessary to their accomplishment, is the common delusion and the certain destruction of the inexperienced.”—Plato.

“Mere hope of attaining their desires, coupled with ignorance of the processes necessary to their accomplishment, is the common delusion and the certain destruction of the inexperienced.”—Plato.

ORGANIZATION“To employ in warfare an uninstructed people is to destroy the nation.”—Chinese Saying.Antiochus, King of Syria, reviewing his immense but untrained and undisciplined army at Ephesus, asked of Hannibal, “if they were not enough for the Romans.”“Yes,” replied the great Carthagenian, “enough to glut the bloodthirstiness, even of the Romans.”“A man in the vigor of life and capable of sustaining the heaviest fatigues, but untrained in warfare, is fitted not to bear arms, but to bear baggage.”—Timoleon.

ORGANIZATION

“To employ in warfare an uninstructed people is to destroy the nation.”—Chinese Saying.

“To employ in warfare an uninstructed people is to destroy the nation.”—Chinese Saying.

Antiochus, King of Syria, reviewing his immense but untrained and undisciplined army at Ephesus, asked of Hannibal, “if they were not enough for the Romans.”“Yes,” replied the great Carthagenian, “enough to glut the bloodthirstiness, even of the Romans.”

Antiochus, King of Syria, reviewing his immense but untrained and undisciplined army at Ephesus, asked of Hannibal, “if they were not enough for the Romans.”

“Yes,” replied the great Carthagenian, “enough to glut the bloodthirstiness, even of the Romans.”

“A man in the vigor of life and capable of sustaining the heaviest fatigues, but untrained in warfare, is fitted not to bear arms, but to bear baggage.”—Timoleon.

“A man in the vigor of life and capable of sustaining the heaviest fatigues, but untrained in warfare, is fitted not to bear arms, but to bear baggage.”—Timoleon.

“The chief distinction between an army and a mob is the good order and discipline of the former and the disorderly behavior of the latter.”—Washington.

“The chief distinction between an army and a mob is the good order and discipline of the former and the disorderly behavior of the latter.”—Washington.

“It is the duty of the commander-in-chief frequently to assemble the most prudent and experienced of his generals and to consult with them as to the state of his own and of the enemies’ troops.“He must examine which army has the better weapons, which is the better trained and disciplined; superior in condition and most resolute in emergencies.“He must note whether himself or the adversary has the superior infantry, cavalry or artillery, and particularly must he discern any marked lack in quantity and quality of men or horses, and any difference in equipment of those corps which necessarily will be or because of such reason, advantageously may be opposed to each other.“Advantages in Organization determine the field of battle to be preferred, which latter should be selected with the view of profiting to the uttermost by the use of specially equipped corps, to whom the enemy is not able to oppose similar troops.“If a general finds himself superior to his enemy he must use all means to bring on an engagement, but if he sees himself inferior, he must avoid battle and endeavorto succeed by surprises, stratagems and ambuscades; which last skillfully managed often have gained the victory over foemen superior in numbers and in strength.”—Vergetius.

“It is the duty of the commander-in-chief frequently to assemble the most prudent and experienced of his generals and to consult with them as to the state of his own and of the enemies’ troops.

“He must examine which army has the better weapons, which is the better trained and disciplined; superior in condition and most resolute in emergencies.

“He must note whether himself or the adversary has the superior infantry, cavalry or artillery, and particularly must he discern any marked lack in quantity and quality of men or horses, and any difference in equipment of those corps which necessarily will be or because of such reason, advantageously may be opposed to each other.

“Advantages in Organization determine the field of battle to be preferred, which latter should be selected with the view of profiting to the uttermost by the use of specially equipped corps, to whom the enemy is not able to oppose similar troops.

“If a general finds himself superior to his enemy he must use all means to bring on an engagement, but if he sees himself inferior, he must avoid battle and endeavorto succeed by surprises, stratagems and ambuscades; which last skillfully managed often have gained the victory over foemen superior in numbers and in strength.”—Vergetius.

Advantage in Organization consists in having one or more Corps d’armee which in equipment or in composition are so superior to the hostile corps to which they may become opposed, as entails to them exceptional facilities for the execution of those major tactical evolutions that appertain to any tactical area made up of corresponding geometric or sub-geometric symbols.

Advantage in Organization determines the choice of a prospective battlefield; and the latter always should be composed of those tactical areas which permit of the fullest exercise of the powers peculiar to kindred corps d’armee.

Every corps d’armee thus especially equipped should be constantly and energetically employed in the prospective battle; and usually it will eventuate as the Prime Tactical Factor in the decisive Major Tactical evolution.

Notions most mistaken prevail in regard to the Pawns and Pieces of the Chessboard.

To suppose that the Chessmenper semay be utilized to typify the different arms of the military service is a fallacy.

Many unfamiliar with the technicalities of Strategetic Science delude themselves that the Pawns, on account of their slow and limited movements properly are to be regarded as Infantry; that the Knights because toppedby horses’ heads thereby qualify as light Cavalry; the Bishops, for reasons unknown, often are held to represent Artillery; the Rooks, because of their swift, direct and far-reaching movements are thought to duplicate heavy Cavalry; while the Queen, in most of these unsophisticated philosophies, is supposed to constitute a Reserve.

Nothing can be further from the truth than such assumptions.

As a fundamental of military organization applied to Chessplay, each Chesspiece typifies in itself a complete Corps d’armee. Each of these Chessic corps d’armee is equal to every other in strength, but all differ, more or less, in construction and in facilities, essential to the performance of diverse and particular duties.

Thus it is that while every Chesspiece represents a perfectly appointed and equally powerful body of troops, these corps d’armee in Chessplay as in scientific warfare are not duplicates, except to others of their own class. Each of these corps d’armee is made up of Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery in correct proportion to the service they are to perform and such proportions are determined not by simple arithmetic, but by those deployments, developments, evolutions, and manoeuvres, which such corps d’armee is constructed promptly and efficiently to execute.

The Chessmen, therefore, do not as individuals represent either infantry, cavalry or artillery.

But in the same manner as the movements of troops over the surface of the earth, exemplify the attributes of the three kindred grand columns in the greater logistics of a campaign; so do those peculiarities which appertain to the moves of the different Chesspieces exemplify the action of the three chief arms of the military service; either singly or in combination against given points in given times, in the evolutions of the battlefield, viz.:

The march of:

is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an unoccupied adjacent point.

The march of:

is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an unoccupied point,notan adjacent point.

TheCharge of Infantryis indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an occupied adjacent point; posting itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located.

TheCharge of Cavalryis indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an occupied pointnotan adjacent point; posting itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located.

Offensive Fire Effect.Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its post upon an adjacent occupied point.

Defensive Fire Effect.Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an adjacent unoccupied point.

Offensive Fire Effect.Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its post upon an occupied point not an adjacent point.

Defensive Fire Effect.Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an unoccupied point not an adjacent point.

TheCorps d’armee of the Chessboardare divided into two classes: viz.:

“The Pawns are the soul of Chess; upon their good or bad arrangement depends the gain or loss of the game.”—Philidor.

“The Pawns are the soul of Chess; upon their good or bad arrangement depends the gain or loss of the game.”—Philidor.

The eight Pawns, by reason of their limited movements, their inability to move backward and the peculiarity of their offensive and defensive powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to perform those functions which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of Position.

Each Corps of Position has its particular and designated Point of Mobilization and of Development, which differ with the various Strategic Fronts.

Upon each Corps of Position devolves the duties of maintaining itself as a consistent integer of the established, or projected kindred Pawn Integral; as a possible kindred Promotable Factor and as a Point of Impenetrability upon the altitude of an opposing Pawn.

Corps of Position take their individual appelation from their posts in a given formation, viz.:

The above formations by Corps of Position are described and illustrated in detail in preceding text-books by the author, entitled:

The normal use of Corps of Position is limited to Lines of Mobilization, of Development and to the Simple Line of Manoeuvre.

“Every man in Alexander’s army is so well trained and obedient that at a single word of command, officers and soldiers make any movement and execute any evolution in the art of warfare.“Only such troops as themselves can check their career and oppose their bravery and expertness.”—Caridemus.

“Every man in Alexander’s army is so well trained and obedient that at a single word of command, officers and soldiers make any movement and execute any evolution in the art of warfare.

“Only such troops as themselves can check their career and oppose their bravery and expertness.”—Caridemus.

The eight Pieces, by reason of their ability to move in all directions, the scope of their movements and the peculiar exercises of their offensive and defensive powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to perform those functions which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of Evolution.

Corps of Evolutionacting offensively, take their individual appelations from the points which constitute their objective in the true Strategetic Horizon, viz.:

Corps of Evolutionacting defensively, take their individual appelations from the particular duties they are required to perform, viz.:

The normal use of Corps of Evolution is limited to Lines of Manoeuvre. When acting on a Simple Line of Manoeuvre, a Corps of Evolution may deploy on the corresponding Line of Mobilization; but it has nothing in common with the Line of Development, which latter appertains exclusively to Corps of Position.

Any corps d’armee, whether of Position or of Evolution may be utilized upon a Line of Operations.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the King marches as infantry, cavalry and artillery; but it attacks as infantry exclusively and never as cavalry or artillery.

Although every situation upon the Chessboard contemplates the presence of both Kings, either, or neither, or both, may, or may not be present in any given Strategetic Horizon.

Whenever the King is present in a given Strategetic Horizon the effect of his co-operation is mathematically outlined, thus:

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Queen marches and attacks as infantry, cavalry and artillery.

Either, neither, or both Queens may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of her co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.:

At her maximum of efficiency the Queen occupies the common vertex of one or more unequal triangles, whose aggregate area is from a minimum of 21 to a maximum of 27 points. Her offensive power is equally valid against all of these points; but her defensive power is valid for the support from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five points.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Rook marches and attacks as infantry, cavalry and artillery.

From one to four Rooks may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.:

At her maximum of efficiency, the Rook occupies the common angle of four quadrilaterals, whose aggregate area always is 14 points. The Offensive Power of the Rook is equally valid against all these points, but his defensive power is valid for the support of only two points.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Bishop marches and attacks as infantry, cavalry and artillery.

From one to four Bishops may be present in any Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.:

At its maximum of efficiency, the Bishop occupies the common vertex of four unequal triangles, having a maximum of 13 and a minimum of 9 points. His offensive power is valid against all of these points but his defensive power is valid only for the support of two points.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Knight marches and attacks as cavalry and artillery.

From one to four Knights may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.:

At its maximum of efficiency, the Knight occupies the centre of an octagon of two points radius, having a minimum of two points and a maximum of eight points area. His offensive power is equally valid against all of these eight points, but his defensive power is valid for the support of only one point.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Pawn at its normal post marches as infantry and cavalry. Should an adverse corps, however, take post within the kindred side of the Chessboard; that Pawn upon whose altitude the adverse Piece appears, at once loses its equestrian attributes and marches and attacks exclusively as infantry.

Located at any other point than at its normal post, the Pawn is composed exclusively of infantry and never acts either as cavalry or artillery.

From one to eight Pawns may be present in any Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined as follows:

At its maximum of efficiency the Pawn occupies the vertex of a triangle of two points. Its offensive power is equally valid against both of these points; but its defensive power is valid for the support of only one point.

Subjoined is a table of the potential complements of the Chesspieces.

The student clearly should understand that this table does not indicate prowess, but relates exclusively to normal facilities for bringing force into action.

The relative advantage in Organization possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following, viz.:

1. Above a line, set down in order those abbreviations which properly designate the White corps d’armee present in a given Strategetic Situation; and below the line, set down those abbreviations which in like manner designate the Black corps d’armee, viz.:

2. Cancel all like symbols and resolve the unlike symbols remaining, into their respective Potential complements, viz.:

3. Subtract the lesser Potential total from the greater and the difference will be the relative advantage in Organization.

4. To utilize the relative advantage in Organization select a battlefield in which the Strategic Key, the Tactical Keys and the Points of Command of the True Strategetic Horizon are situated upon the perimeters of those geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the corps d’armee whose superior potentiality is established by Section 2.

5. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Organization, occupy the necessary posts upon the battlefield selected in such a manner that the kindred decisive points are situatednotupon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols appertaining to the adverse corps d’armee of superior potentiality; while the adverse decisive pointsaresituated upon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the kindred corps d’armee of inferior potentiality.

“Men habituated to luxury cannot contend with an army accustomed to fatigue and inured to want.”—Caesar.

“Men habituated to luxury cannot contend with an army accustomed to fatigue and inured to want.”—Caesar.

“That wing with which you propose to engage the enemy should be composed of your best troops.”—Epaminondas.

“That wing with which you propose to engage the enemy should be composed of your best troops.”—Epaminondas.

TheSacred Bandof the Thebans was composed of men selected for valor and character. Epaminondas called themComradesand by honorable rewards and distinctions induced them to bear without murmur the hardest fatigues and to confront with intrepidity the greatest dangers.

At Leuctra (371 B.C.) and again at Mantinea (362 B.C.) the right wing of the Lacedaemonian Army, composed exclusively of Spartans and for six hundred years invincible, was overthrown and destroyed by the Sacred Band led by Epaminondas.

This formidable body of Theban warriors was massacred by Alexander the Great at the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.)

TheMacedonian Phalanxwas devised by Philip, King of Macedon. It was made up of heavy infantry accoutred with cuirass, helmet, greaves, and shield. The principal weapon was a pike twenty-four feet long.

The Phalanx had a front of two hundred and fifty-six files and a depth of sixteen ranks. A file of sixteen men was termed Lochos; two files were called Dilochie; fourfiles made a Tetrarchie; eight files a Taxiarchie and thirty-two of the last constituted a simple Phalanx of 4096 men. A grand Phalanx had a front of one thousand and twenty-four files and a depth of sixteen ranks. It was made up of four simple Phalanxes and contained 16,384 men.

With this formation of his infantry, Alexander the Great, when eighteen years of age, destroyed the Allied Athenian—Theban—Boeotian army at Chaeronea, the hosts of Persia at the river Grancius (334 B.C.) at Issus (333 B.C.) and Arbela (331 B.C.) and conquered Porus, King of India at the Hydaspes (326 B.C.).

TheSpanish Heavy CavalryandNubian Infantryof Hannibal was a reproduction of that Macedonian organization whereby Alexander the Great had conquered the world.

With this formation Hannibal maintained himself for fifteen years in the richest provinces of Italy and destroyed seven Roman armies, at the Trebia (218 B.C.) at Lake Trasymenus (217 B.C.) at Cannae (216 B.C.) and at Herdonea (212 B.C.) at Herdonea (210 B.C.) at Locri (208 B.C.) and at Apulia (208 B.C.).

At Zama (202 B.C.) Hannibal’s effacement as a military factor was directly due to his lack of that organization which had been the instrument of his previous successes; a circumstance thus commented on by the victorious Roman commander, Scipio Africanus;

“Hitherto I have been opposed by an army without a general; now they send against me a General without an army.”

“Hitherto I have been opposed by an army without a general; now they send against me a General without an army.”

TheTenth Legionof Caesar was the quintessence of that perfection in elementary tactics devised by the Romans to accord with the use of artillery.

The fundamentals of minor tactics as elucidated by Epaminondas and exploited by Alexander the Great and Hannibal are unchanged in the Legion, but by subdivision of the simple Phalanx into ten Cohorts, a necessary and maximum gain in mobility was effected.

The Roman Legion consisted of 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry, divided into the Militarain Cohort of 1105 heavy foot, 132 Cuirassiers and nine ordinary Cohorts, each containing 555 heavy foot and 66 Cuirassiers. The Legion was drawn up in three lines; the first of which was termed Principes, the second Hastati, and the third Triarii. The infantry were protected by helmet, cuirass, greaves and shield; their arms were a long sword, a short sword, five javelins and two large spears.

With this formation Caesar over-run Spain, Gaul, Germany, Britain, Africa, Greece, and Italy. The Scots alone withstood him and the ruins of a triple line of Roman entrenchments extending from the North to the Irish Seas to this day mark the southern boundary of the Scottish Highlands and the northern limit of Roman dominion.

At Pharseleus, Pompey made the inexplicable blunder of placing his best troops in his right wing, which was covered by the river Enipeus and inferior troops on his left wing which was in the air. By its first charge, the Tenth Legion destroyed the latter, outflanked the entire Pompeian army, drove it backward into the river and single handed won for Caesar undisputed dominion of the Earth.

TheScots Volunteersof Gustavus Adolphus consisted of two brigades aggregating about 12,000 foot, made up of Scottish gentlemen who for various reasons were attracted to the Continental Wars.

At Leipsic, (Sept. 7, 1631) 20,000 Saxons, constituting one-half of the allied Protestant army, were routed atthe first charge, put to flight and never seen again. Tilly’s victorious right wing then turned upon the flank of the King’s army. Three regiments of the Scots Volunteers on foot held in check in open field 12,000 of the best infantry and cavalry in Europe, until Gustavus had destroyed the Austrian main body and hastened to their aid with the Swedish heavy cavalry.

The Castle of Oppenheim was garrisoned by 800 Spanish infantry. Gustavus drew up 2,000 Swedes to escalade the place. Thirty Scots Volunteers, looking on observed that the Spaniards, intently watching the King had neglected to guard the opposite side of the fortress. Beckoning to their aid about a hundred of their comrades, they scaled the wall, captured the garrison and opened the gates to the king. Gustavus entered on foot, hat in hand. “My brave Scots,” said he, “you carry in your scabbards, the key to every castle in Europe.”

TheVan-Guardof Frederic the Great is the perfect adaptation of the minor tactics of Epaminondas to gunpowder. This choice body was made up of the best troops in the army divided into infantry, cuirassiers, dragoons and light artillery.

The Van-Guard, a miniature army in itself, always marched between the main body and the enemy; it always led in the attack, followed by that wing containing the best soldiers, in two lines; and supported by the heavy cavalry on that flank.

At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) the Prussian Van-Guard, composed of 4,800 infantry, 2,500 cavalry and 30 guns, annihilated 70,000 French regular troops, by evolutions so rapidly executed that the Prussian main army was unable to overtake either pursuers or pursued and had no part in the battle, other than as highly interested spectators.

TheContinentalsof the Revolutionary army under Washington were made up of troops enlisted for the war and trained by Baron von Steuben, a Major-General in the Prussian service, who had served throughout the Seven Years War under Frederic the Great.

The Continentals, without firing a shot, carried by assault, Stony Point (July 16, 1779), Paulus Hook (July 20, 1779) and the British intrenchments at Yorktown (Oct. 19, 1781). Of these troops, the Baron von Steuben writes:

“I am satisfied with having shown to those who understand the Art of Warfare, an American army worthy of their approbation; officers who know their profession and who would do honor to any army in Europe; an infantry such as England has never brought into the field, soldiers temperate, well-drilled and obedient and the equal of any in the world.”

“I am satisfied with having shown to those who understand the Art of Warfare, an American army worthy of their approbation; officers who know their profession and who would do honor to any army in Europe; an infantry such as England has never brought into the field, soldiers temperate, well-drilled and obedient and the equal of any in the world.”

TheConsular Guardwas the reproduction of the Van Guard of Frederic the Great, but its sphere of action was strangely restricted by Bonaparte, who, instead of placing his best troops in the front of his army, as is the practice of all other of the Great Captains; subordinated their functions to that of a reserve and to personal attendance upon himself.

This Corps d’elite was but once notably in action; at Marengo (June 14, 1800) it undoubtedly saved the day for France, by maintaining the battle until the arrival of Gen. Desaix and his division.

TheImperial Guardof Napoleon was the development of the Consular Guard of Bonaparte. Under the Empire the Guard became an independent army, consisting of light and heavy infantry, horse and field artillery,cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars and chasseurs, and composed of the best troops in the French service.

The functions of this fine body, like that of its prototype, was limited to the duties of a reserve and to attendance upon the person of the Emperor; and perhaps next to announcement of victory, Napoleon’s favorite bulletin always read, “The Imperial Guard was not engaged.”

Many were the unavailing remonstrances made by his advisors against this policy, which judged by the practice of the great masters of warfare, is putting the cart before the horse; and seemingly is that speck of cloud in Napoleon’s political sky, which properly may be deemed a precursor of St. Helena.

At Austerlitz (Dec. 2, 1805), the cuirassiers of the French Imperial Guard routed a like body of Russian cavalry. At Eylau (Nov. 7, 1807) the Guard, as at Marengo again saved the day, after the corps d’armee of Soult and Angereau had been destroyed, by maintaining the battle until the arrival of Ney and Davoust. In the retreat from Russia (1812) the Guard then numbering 64,000 men was nearly destroyed. What was left of it won at Ligny (June 16, 1815), Napoleon’s last victory and at Waterloo (June 18, 1815), one of its two surviving divisions covered the flight of the French army, while the other escorted Napoleon in safety to Paris.

TheRoyal Prussian Guard, under Von Moltke, was organized and utilized in accord with the teachings of Frederic the Great.

Its most notable achievement occurred in the campaign of 1870. The right flank of the French having been turned by the battle of Woerth (Aug. 4, 1870) and Marshal MacMahon’s army being driven to the westward,it became the paramount object of Von Moltke to seize the country in rear of Metz and thus prevent the retreat of Marshall Bazine across the Moselle River.

The Royal Prussian Guard out-marching both friends and enemies first reached the Nancy road (Aug. 18, 1870) and until the German corps reached the battlefield this body of picked troops successfully withstood the assault of nearly the entire French army. In the first half-hour the Guard lost 8,000 men.

As the result of all this, Marshal Bazine with 150,000 men was forced back into and taken in the intrenched camp at Metz; and the Emperor Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon and a second French army of 140,000 men was captured at Sedan (Sept. 1, 1870), in an attempt to rescue Marshal Bazine.

“I must tell you beforehand this will be a bloody touch. Tilly has a great army of old lads with iron faces that dare look an enemy in the eye; they are confident of victory, have never been beaten and do not know what it means to fly. Tilly tells his men he will beat me and the old man is as likely to do it as to say it.”—Gustavus Adolphus.

“I must tell you beforehand this will be a bloody touch. Tilly has a great army of old lads with iron faces that dare look an enemy in the eye; they are confident of victory, have never been beaten and do not know what it means to fly. Tilly tells his men he will beat me and the old man is as likely to do it as to say it.”—Gustavus Adolphus.

“Tilly’s men were rugged, surly fellows; their faces mangled by wounds and scars had an air of hardy courage. I observed of them that their clothes were always dirty, their armor rusty from winter storms and bruised by musket-balls, their weapons sharp and bright. They were used to camp in the open fields and to sleep in the frosts and rain. The horses like the men were strong and hardy and knew by rote their exercises. Both men and animals so well understood the trade of arms that a general command was sufficient; every man was fit to command the whole, and all evolutions were performed in order and with readiness, at a note of the trumpet or a motion of their banners.“The 7th of Sept. (1631) before sunrise, the Swedish army marched from Dieben to a large field about a mile from Leipsic, where we found old Tilly’s army in full battalia in admirable order, which made a show both glorious and terrible.“Tilly, like a fair gamester, had taken up but one side of the plain, and left the other side clear and all the avenues open to the King’s approach, nor did he stir to the charge until the Swedish army was fully drawn up and was advancing toward him. He had with him 44,000 old soldiers and a better army I believe never was so soundly beaten.…“Then was made a most dreadful slaughter, and yet there was no flying. Tilly’s men might be killed or knocked down, but no man turned his back, nor would give an inch of ground, save as they were marched, wheeled, or retreated by their officers.… About six o’clock the field was cleared of the enemy except at one place on the King’s front, where some of them rallied; and though they knew that all was lost, they would take no quarter, but fought it out to the last man, being found dead the next day in rank and file as they were drawn up.”

“Tilly’s men were rugged, surly fellows; their faces mangled by wounds and scars had an air of hardy courage. I observed of them that their clothes were always dirty, their armor rusty from winter storms and bruised by musket-balls, their weapons sharp and bright. They were used to camp in the open fields and to sleep in the frosts and rain. The horses like the men were strong and hardy and knew by rote their exercises. Both men and animals so well understood the trade of arms that a general command was sufficient; every man was fit to command the whole, and all evolutions were performed in order and with readiness, at a note of the trumpet or a motion of their banners.

“The 7th of Sept. (1631) before sunrise, the Swedish army marched from Dieben to a large field about a mile from Leipsic, where we found old Tilly’s army in full battalia in admirable order, which made a show both glorious and terrible.

“Tilly, like a fair gamester, had taken up but one side of the plain, and left the other side clear and all the avenues open to the King’s approach, nor did he stir to the charge until the Swedish army was fully drawn up and was advancing toward him. He had with him 44,000 old soldiers and a better army I believe never was so soundly beaten.…

“Then was made a most dreadful slaughter, and yet there was no flying. Tilly’s men might be killed or knocked down, but no man turned his back, nor would give an inch of ground, save as they were marched, wheeled, or retreated by their officers.… About six o’clock the field was cleared of the enemy except at one place on the King’s front, where some of them rallied; and though they knew that all was lost, they would take no quarter, but fought it out to the last man, being found dead the next day in rank and file as they were drawn up.”

Perfection in Organization is attained when troops instantly and intelligently act according to order and execute with exactness and precision any and every prescribed evolution.

Perfection in Organization is attained when troops instantly and intelligently act according to order and execute with exactness and precision any and every prescribed evolution.

TOPOGRAPHY“Let us not consider where we shall give battle, but where we may gain the victory.”—Phocion.“There can be no discretion in a movement which forsakes the advantage in ground.”—Gustavus Adolphus.“That battlefield is best which is adapted to the full use of the chief constituents of your army and unfavorable to the mass of the enemy.”—Napoleon.

TOPOGRAPHY

“Let us not consider where we shall give battle, but where we may gain the victory.”—Phocion.

“Let us not consider where we shall give battle, but where we may gain the victory.”—Phocion.

“There can be no discretion in a movement which forsakes the advantage in ground.”—Gustavus Adolphus.

“There can be no discretion in a movement which forsakes the advantage in ground.”—Gustavus Adolphus.

“That battlefield is best which is adapted to the full use of the chief constituents of your army and unfavorable to the mass of the enemy.”—Napoleon.

“That battlefield is best which is adapted to the full use of the chief constituents of your army and unfavorable to the mass of the enemy.”—Napoleon.

“The ground is the CHESSBOARD of we cannibals; and it is the selection and use made of it, that decides the knowledge or the ignorance of those by whom it is occupied.”—Frederic the Great.

“The ground is the CHESSBOARD of we cannibals; and it is the selection and use made of it, that decides the knowledge or the ignorance of those by whom it is occupied.”—Frederic the Great.

The highest use of Topography consists in reducing a superior adverse force to the inferior force, by minimizing the radius of action of the hostile Corps d’armee.

This is effected by so posting the kindred corps that in the resulting Strategetic Horizons, impassable natural barriers are presented to the march of hostile corps toward their respective objectives.

On the surface of the earth such natural barriers are formed by mountains, rivers, lakes, swamps, forests, deserts, the ocean, and the boundaries of neutral States.

On the Chess-board these topographical conditions are typified by peculiarities and limitations in the movements of the Chess-pieces, viz.:

These limitations and impediments to the movements of the Chess-pieces, are equivalent in Chess-play to obstacles interposed by Nature to the march of troops over the surface of the earth.

Prefect Generalship, in its calculations, so combines these insurmountable barriers with the relative positions of the contending armies, that the kindred army becomes at every vital point the superior force.

This effect is produced by merely causing rivers and mountains to take the place of kindred Corps d’armee.

It is only by the study of Chessic topography that the tremendous problems solved by the chess player become manifest:

Instead of calculations limited to one visible and unchangeable Chess-board of sixty-four squares, the divinations of the Chess-master comprehend and harmonize as many invisible Chess-boards as there are Chess-pieces contained in the Topographical Zone.

Furthermore, all these surfaces differ to the extent and in conformity to that particular sensible horizon, appertaining to the Chess-piece from which it emanates.

The enormous difficulties of Chess-play, like those of warfare, arise from the necessity of combining in a single composite topographical horizon, all those differing, sensible horizons which appertain, not merely to the kindred, but also to the hostile corps; and to do this in such a manner, as to minimize the hostile powers for offence and defence, by debarring one or more of the hostile pieces from the true Strategetic Horizon.

To divide up the enemy’s force, by making natural barriers take the place of troops, is the basis of those processes which dominate Grand Manoeuvres.

Of all the deductions of Chess-play and of warfare, such combinations of Strategy and Topography are the most subtle and intangible. The highest talent is required in its interpretation, and mastery of it, more than of any other branch of Strategetics, proclaims the great Captain at war, or at chess.

From the view-point of theKing, the surface of the Chess-board takes on the topographical aspect of a vast expanse of open, level country.

This vista is void of insurmountable natural obstacles, other than the sides and extremities. The latter collectively may be regarded, for strategical purposes, either as the Ocean, or the boundaries of neutral States.

To the King, this vast territory is accessible in all directions. At his pleasure he may move to and occupy either of the sixty-four squares of the Chess-board, in a minimum of one and in a maximum of seven moves. The only obstacles to his march are distance and the opposition of an enemy.

The Strategical weakness of the Topographical Horizonpeculiar to the King arises from its always taking on and maintaining the physical form of a plain. Consequently it is vulnerable to attack from all sides and what is far worse, it readily is commanded and from a superior topographical post, by every adverse piece, except the King and Pawn.

Thus, the hostile Queen, without being attacked in return, may enfilade the King along all verticals, horizontals and diagonals; the Rooks, along all verticals and horizontals; the Bishops, along all diagonals of like color; and the Knights along all obliques.

From the view-point of theQueen, the surface of the Chess-board takes on the topographical aspect of a series of wide, straight valleys separated by high, impassable mountain ranges, unfordable rivers, and impenetrable forests and morasses. These valleys, which number never less than three, nor more than eight, in the same group, are of varying length and always converge upon and unite with each other at the point occupied by the Queen.

These valleys contained in the Queen’s topographical horizon may be classified, viz.:

Class I, consists of those groups made up of three valleys.

Class II, of those groups made up of five valleys.

Class III, of those groups made up of eight valleys of lesser area; and

Class IV, of those groups made up of eight valleys of greater area.

Groups of the first class always have an area of twenty points; those of the second have an area of twenty-three points; those of the third have an area of twenty-fivepoints, and those of the fourth have an area of twenty-seven points. Such areas always are exclusive of that point upon which the Queen is posted.

Although impassable natural barriers restrict the movement of the Queen to less than one-half of the Topographical Zone, these obstacles always are intersected by long stretches of open country formed by intervening valleys.

Hence, the march of this most mobile of the Chesspieces always is open either in three, five, or eight directions, and it always is possible for her, unless impeded by the interference of kindred or hostile corps, to reach any desired point on the Chess-board in two moves.

The weakness peculiar to the Topographical Horizon which appertains to the Queen, originates in the fact that it never commands the origins of obliques. Consequently, every post of the Queen, is open to unopposed attack by the hostile Knights.

From the view-point of theRook, the surface of the Chess-board takes on a topographical aspect which varies with the post occupied.

Placed at either R1 or R8 the Rook occupies the central point of a great valley, 15 points in length, which winds around the slope of an immense and inaccessible mountain range. This latter, in extent, includes the remainder of the Topographical Zone.

With the Rook placed at R2 or R7, this great mountain wall becomes pierced by a long valley running at right angles to the first, but the area open to the movement of the Rook is not increased.

Placed at Kt2, B3, K4, or Q4, the Rook becomes enclosed amid impassable natural barriers. But althoughin such cases it always occupies the point of union of four easily traversed although unequal valleys, its area of movement is neither increased nor diminished, remaining always at fourteen points open to occupation.

Unless impeded by the presence of kindred or adverse corps on its logistic radii, the Rook always may move either in two, three, or four directions, and it may reach any desired point on the Chess-board in two moves.

The weakness peculiar to the Topographical Horizon of the Rook lies in the fact that it never commands the origins of diagonals or obliques. Hence it is open to unopposed attack along the first from adverse Queen, King, Bishops and Pawns, and along the second from adverse Knights.

From the view-point of theBishop, the surface of the Chess-board takes on a topographical aspect most forbidding.

To this Chess-piece at least one-half of the Topographical Zone is inaccessible, and under any circumstances his movements are limited to the thirty-two squares of his own color.

Thus, the Topographical Horizon of the Bishop takes the form of a broken country, dotted with high hills, deep lakes, impenetrable swamps, and thick woodlands. But between these obstacles thus set about by Nature, run level valleys, varied in extent and easy of access. This fact so modifies this harshest of all sensible horizons as to make the Bishop next in activity to the Rook.

Within its limited sphere of action, the Bishop may move in either one or four directions with a minimum of nine and a maximum of fourteen points open to his occupation. Unimpeded by other corps blocking hisroute of march, the Bishop may reach any desired point of his own color on the chess board in two moves.

The weakness peculiar to the topographical horizon of the Bishop is its liability to unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals by the hostile King, Queen and Rooks; and along obliques by the hostile Knights.

From the view-point of theKnight, the surface of the Chess-board takes on the aspect of a densely wooded and entirely undeveloped country; made up of a profusion of ponds, rivulets, swamps, etc., none of which are impassable although sufficient to impede progress.

Unless interfered with by kindred or hostile corps, or the limitations of the Chess-board, the Knight always may move either in two, four, six, or eight directions. It may reach any desired point in a minimum of one and a maximum of six moves, and may occupy the sixty-four squares of the Chess-board in the same number of marches.

The weakness of the topographical horizon of the Knight lies in the fact that it never commands adjacent points, nor any of those distant, other than the termini of its own obliques. Hence it is open to unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals from the adverse King, Queen and Rooks, and along diagonals from the adverse King, Queen, Bishop and Pawns.

From the point of view of thePawn, the surface of the Chess-board takes on the topographical aspect of a country which as it is entered, constantly becomes wilder and more rugged.

The march of the Pawn always is along a valley situated between impracticable natural barriers, and the possible movements of the Pawn always decrease as the distance traveled increases.

Unhindered by either kindred or hostile corps, the Pawn may reach any point of junction in the kindred Logistic Horizon, which is contained within its altitude, in a minimum of five and in a maximum of six moves. It may march only in one direction, except in capturing, when it may acquire the option of acting in three directions.

The weakness of the topographical horizon of the Pawn originates in its inability to command the adjacent country. Therefore, it is exposed to unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals by the hostile King, Queen and Rooks; along diagonals by the adverse King, Queen and Bishops, and along obliques by the adverse Knights.

That normal and visible surface of theChess-boardtermed the Topographical Zone is bounded by four great natural barriers, impassable to any Chess-piece.

The two sides of the zone may be held to typify either the Ocean or the boundaries of neutral States. The two extremities of the Chess-board while holding the previously announced relation to Chess-pieces contained in the Topographical Zone, also holds another and radically different relation to those Chess-piecesnotcontained in the Topographical Zone, viz.:

In the latter case, the two extremities of the chessboard are to be regarded as two great mountain ranges,each of which is pierced by eight defiles, the latter being the sixteen points of junction contained in the kindred and adverse logistic horizons.

In the arena thus formed by these four great natural barriers, two hostile armies composed of the thirty-two Chess-pieces, are contending for the mastery.

Meanwhile, beyond these great mountain ranges, are advancing to the aid of the combatants, two other armies, represented by the power of promotion possessed by the Pawns. Each of these two hypothetical armies is assailing the outer slope of that range of mountains which lies in the rear of the hostile force. Its effort is to pass one of the eight defiles and by occupying a Point of Junction in the kindred Logistic Horizon, to gain entrance into the Topographical Zone. Then in the array of a Queen, or some other kindred piece, it purposes to attack decisively, the adverse Strategetic Rear.

To oppose the attack of this hypothetical hostile army, whose movements always are typified by the advance of the adverse Pawns, is the duty of the kindred column of manoeuvre.

Primarily this labor falls upon the kindred Pawns. Upon each Pawn devolves the duty of guarding that defile situated directly on its front, by maintaining itself as a Point of Impenetrability between the corresponding hostile pawn and the kindred Strategic Rear.

Conversely, a second duty devolves upon each Pawn; and as an integer of the Column of Support, it continually must threaten and whenever opportunity is presented it decisively must assault the defile on its front, for the purpose of penetrating to the kindred logistic horizon and becoming promoted to such kindred piece, as by attacking the adverse Determinate Force in flank, in rear, or in both, may decide the victory in favor of the kindred army.

Every variety of topography has peculiar requirements for its attack and its defence; and situations even though but little different from each other, nevertheless must be treated according to their particular nature.

In order to acquire the habit of selecting at a glance the correct posts for an army and of making proper dispositions of the kindred corps with rapidity and precision, topography should be studied with great attention, for most frequently it happens that circumstances do not allow time to do these things with deliberation.

Acting either offensively or defensively, one never should proceed in such a way as to allow the enemy the advantage of ground;

That is to say: Kindred corps never should be exposed to unopposed adverse radii of offence, when the effect of such exposure is the loss of kindred material, or of time much better to be employed, than in making a necessary and servile retreat from an untenable post.

On the contrary, every kindred topographical advantage should unhesitatingly be availed of; and particular attention continually should be paid to advancing the kindred corps to points offensive where they cannot be successfully attacked.

Pains always must be taken to select advantageous ground. Indifferent posts must never be occupied from sheer indolence or from over-confidence in the strength of the kindred, or the weakness of the adverse army.

Particularly must one beware of permitting the enemy to retain advantages in topography; always and at once he should be dislodged from posts whose continued occupation may facilitate his giving an unforeseen and often a fatal blow.

The full importance of topography perhaps is best expressed in the following dictum by the great Frederic:

“Whenever a general and decisive topographical advantage is presented, one has merely to avail of this, without troubling about anything further.”

The relative advantage in Topography possessed by one army over an opposing army, always can be determined by the following, viz.:

1. If the principal adverse Corps of Position are situated upon points of a given color, and if the principal Kindred Corps of Position are situated upon pointsnotof the given color, then:

That army which has themoreCorps of Evolution able to act against points of the given color, and theequalityin Corps of Evolution able to act against points of the opposite color, has the relative advantage in Topography.

2. To utilize the relative advantage in Topography, construct a position in which the kindred Corps of Position necessary to be defended shall occupy a point upon the sub-geometric symbol of a kindred Corps of Evolution; which point shall be a Tactical Key of a True Strategetic Horizon of which the kindred Corps of Evolution is the Corps of the Centre and of which either the adverse King or an undefendable adverse piece is the second Tactical Key.

3. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Topography, eliminate that adverse Corps d’armee which is able to act simultaneously by its geometric symbol against the principal Kindred Corps of Position upon a givencolor; and by its sub-geometric symbol against points of opposite color.

Perfection in Defensive Topography is attained whenever the ground occupied nullifies hostile advantages in Time, Organization, Mobility, Numbers and Position.

Perfection in Offensive Topography is attained whenever the ground occupied accentuates the kindred advantages in Time, Organization, Mobility, Numbers and Position.

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