PRINCIPLE

“I adhere to those universal laws which all the elements obey; these, for me are sufficient.”

Singularly enough, it seemingly has escaped the notice of the great in warfare, owing to the subtle mathematical construction of the Chess-board, its peculiar relations to the moves of the Chess-pieces, and of the latter to each other, that:

I.The functions of all three terms contained in a Strategic Syllogism may be combined in a single chess Pawn, and, that:

II.All three functions are contemplated in and should be expressed by every movement of every Chess-piece; and every move upon the Chess-board is weak and unscientific, to the extent that it disregards either of these obligations.

Those advantages in position, which are denoted by the plus signs of the Strategic Syllogism, have their material manifestation upon the surface of the earth by Corps d’armee, and by Pieces which are equivalents of these latter, upon the Chess-board.

Thesign +A in the Strategic Syllogismdenotes the superior Strategic Front. That point whose occupation by a kindred piece demonstrates such superiority in position is termed theKey of Position. The kindred Corps occupying such point constitutes aCorps en Line, and is termed theFirst Strategic Elemental.

Thesign +S in the Strategic Syllogismdenotes thelarger numberof pawn altitudes open to the kindred promotable factors. Those points occupied by such kindred promotable factors are termedLogistic Origins. The kindred Corps which occupy such points constituteCorps en Routeand collectively are termed theSecond Strategic Elemental. The objective of Corps en Route always is the Kindred Logistic Horizon.

Thesign +M in the Strategic Syllogismdenotes that theshortestopen pawn altitude is occupied by a kindred promotable factor. Such kindred promotable factor is termed theCorps en Touch, and the point occupied by such Corps is termed thePoint of Proximity. The Objective of such Corps always is a designated Point of Junction in the Kindred Logistic Horizon, and such Corps constitutes theThird Strategic Elemental.

In Warfare it is imperative that each of these Strategic Elementals be represented by one or more Corps d’armee. But it is a second peculiarity of the Chessic mechanism that a single Chessic Corps d’armee may represent in itself, one, two or three Strategic Elementals and thus constitute even the entireStrategic Ensemble.

Hence, in Chess play, the Strategic Ensemble may be either single, double, or triple, viz.:

A Single Strategic Ensemble consists either of:

ADouble Strategic Ensembleconsists of either:

ATriple Strategic Ensembleconsists of:

The relative positional advantage expressed by the plus signs of the Strategic Syllogism decreases as the number of plus signs in the Strategic Syllogism exceeds the number of corresponding Strategic Elementals.

Failure to observe the amalgamation of the duties of the three Grand Columns in each and every move upon the Chess-board, and to note that the tangible and material expression of these powers and advantages may be expressed either by three, by two, or even by a single Chessic Corps d’armee, has caused doubt of the exactanalogy between Chess and War; and hence a like doubt of the utility of Chess-play.

Recognizing the truth of the foregoing, the Asiatic conqueror, Tamerlane, sought to rectify this discrepancy between the mechanism of Chess and that of War, by increasing the size of the Chess-board to one hundred and forty-four squares, and the number of pieces to forty-eight.

By this innovation the geometric harmony existing between the Dynamic and the Static surfaces of the Chess-board was destroyed; and this without substituting therefor another like condition of mathematic perfection. Ultimately, this remedy was abandoned, a fate which sooner or later, has overtaken all attempts to improve that superlative intellectual exercise of which says Voltaire:

“Of all games, Chess does most honor to the human mind.”

The reason why the scheme devised by Tamerlane did not satisfy even himself, and why all attempted alterations in the machinery of Chess prove unacceptable in practice, is due to the present perfect adaptation of the Board and the Pieces for exemplifying the processes of Strategetic Art.

Any change in the construction of the Chess-board and the Chess-pieces, to be effective, must largely increase the number of Chessmen, correspondingly increase the number of squares, and equally so, increase the number of moves permitted to each player at his turn to play.

That is to say: Such innovation to be correct must permit each player at his turn to play to move one of the Corps d’armee contained in the Column of Attack, a second in the Column of Support, and a third in the Column of Manoeuvre. Necessarily, the number of pieces must be increased in order to provide Corpsd’armee for the make-up of each Grand Column, and obviously, the Board must be sufficiently enlarged to accommodate not merely this increased mass, but also to permit full scope for the increased number of possible movements.

The student thus readily will perceive, that it is only one step from such an elaboration of Chess, to an army and the theatre of actual campaigning.

Perfection in Position is attained whenever the kindred army is acting or is posted as a unit, while the hostile army is not so posted nor able so to act.

“Frontal attacks are to be avoided, and the preference always is to be given to the assault of a single wing, with your center and remaining wing held back; because if your attack is successful you equally destroy the enemy without the risk of being routed if you fail.”—Frederic the Great.

At Leuctra and Mantinea, Epaminondas won by the oblique or Strategic order of battle. Alexander the Great won by the same order at Issus and the Haspades. Cyrus won at Thymbra and Hannibal won at Trebia, Thrasymene, Cannae and Herdonea, by the three sides of an octagon or enveloping formation. Caesar won by the oblique order at Pharsaleus.

Gustavus Adolphus won at Leipsic by acting from the Tactical Center and Turenne and Prince Eugene gained their victories by the same means.

Frederic the Great won at Hohenfriedberg, Sohr, Rosbach, Leuthern, Zorndorf and Leignitz by the oblique order and at Torgau by acting from the tactical center.

Washington won at Trenton and Princeton acting by three contiguous sides of an octagon.

Bonaparte won at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcola, Rivoli, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram and Ligny, by acting from the tactical center. Never did he attack by the oblique order of battle.

Von Moltke’s victories all were won by acting in strict accord with the system laid down for the use of the Prussian army by Frederic the Great.

The most magnificent illustration both of the proper and of the improper use of the Column of Support is found in that Grand Operation executed by the Roman consuls, Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius, whereby the Carthagenian Army under Hasdrubal was destroyed at the river Metaurus 207 B.C.

Hannibal, with the main Carthagenian army, posted in the south of Italy near Canusium, was observed by Nero and his troops; while in the west, Hasdrubal, observed by Livius was slowly advancing southward to form a junction with his brother, a most unscientific procedure.

Livius permitted Hasdrubal to penetrate into Italy to a point a few miles south of the Metaurus River; whereupon Nero, taking 7,000 of his best troops, by a rapid march of 200 miles united with Livius; and the two consuls at once falling upon Hasdrubal utterly annihilated the Carthagenian army. Nero returned at all speed and the first news of his march and of the death blow to the Carthagenian projects against Rome was furnished by the sight of his brother’s head, which Nero cast into Hannibal’s camp from a military machine.

The true method for uniting the Columns of Supportto a Column of Attack is thus shown by Gustavus Adolphus:

“We encamped about Nuremberg the middle of June, the army after so many detachments was not above 11,000 infantry and 8,000 horse and dragoons. The King posted his army in the suburbs and drew intrenchments around the circumference so that he begirt the whole city with his army. His works were large, the ditch deep, planked by innumerable bastions, ravelins, horn-works, forts, redoubts, batteries and palisades, the incessant labor of 8000 men for fourteen days.“On the 30th of June the Imperialists, joined to the Bavarian army arrived and sat down 60,000 strong, between the city and the friendly states; in order to intercept the King’s provisions and to starve him out.“The King had three great detachments and several smaller ones, acting abroad, reducing to his power the castles and towns of the adjacent countries and these he did not hasten to join him until their work was done.“The two chief armies had now lain for five or six weeks in sight of each other and the King thinking all was ready, ordered his generals to join him. Gustavus Horn was on the Moselle, Chancellor Oxenstern about Mentz and Cologne and Dukes William and Bernard and Gen. Bannia in Bavaria.“Our friends were not backward in obeying the King’s command, and having drawn together their forces from various parts andALLjoined the chancellor Oxenstern, they set out in full march for Nuremburg, where they arrived Aug. 21, being 30,000 old soldiers commanded by officers of the greatest conduct and experience in the world.”

“On the 30th of June the Imperialists, joined to the Bavarian army arrived and sat down 60,000 strong, between the city and the friendly states; in order to intercept the King’s provisions and to starve him out.

“The King had three great detachments and several smaller ones, acting abroad, reducing to his power the castles and towns of the adjacent countries and these he did not hasten to join him until their work was done.

“The two chief armies had now lain for five or six weeks in sight of each other and the King thinking all was ready, ordered his generals to join him. Gustavus Horn was on the Moselle, Chancellor Oxenstern about Mentz and Cologne and Dukes William and Bernard and Gen. Bannia in Bavaria.

“Our friends were not backward in obeying the King’s command, and having drawn together their forces from various parts andALLjoined the chancellor Oxenstern, they set out in full march for Nuremburg, where they arrived Aug. 21, being 30,000 old soldiers commanded by officers of the greatest conduct and experience in the world.”

Only once, at the battle of Torgau, (Nov. 5, 1760) did Frederick the Great rely upon the co-operation of his Columns of Support for victory.

As the result, his Column of Attack of 25,000 men fought the entire battle and was so ruined by the fire and sabres of 90,000 enemies and 400 pieces of artillery that, as the sun went down the King charged at the head of two battalions, his sole remaining troops. At this moment Gen. Zeithen, with the Column of Support, of 22,000 men occupied Siptka Hill, the tactical key of the battlefield, and fired a salvo of artillery to inform the King of their presence. The astonished Austrians turned and fled; the King’s charge broke their line of battle and Frederic grasped a victory, “for which” says Napoleon, “he was indebted to Fortune and the only one in which he displayed no talent.”

This comment of course is not true. Frederic displayed magnificent talent that day, by holding in check a force of thrice his numbers and so shattering it by his incessant attacks that it crumbled to pieces before the mere presence and at sight of his fresh and vigorous Column of Support. Had Napoleon displayed such talent in the personal conduct of battles during 1813, 1814 and 1815 it is possible that he would have terminated his career at some other place than at St. Helena.

The experience, however, was enough to fully satisfy Frederic, and never again did he attempt a Logistic battle.

The capture of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown is perhaps the nearest approach to the achievement of Nero and Livius in the annals of the military art. Decoyed by the retrograde movements of Gen. Greene, the British army was deluded into taking up a position at Yorktown, having the unfordable James River in rear, and within striking distance of the main American army under Washington about New York City.

Lafayette was ordered to reinforce Greene; Countd’Esting was induced to bring the French fleet from the West Indies to Chesapeake Bay to prevent the rescue of Cornwallis by British coming by the ocean, and Count Rochambeau was requested to join Washington with the French army then in Rhode Island.

All this took time, but everything was executed like clockwork. The French fleet arrived in the Chesapeake; the next day came a British fleet to rescue the Earl’s army. In the naval fight which ensued, the British were driven to sea and so damaged as to compel their return to New York. By a swift march, Washington, with his Continentals and the French, joined Greene and Lafayette, and two of his redoubts being taken by storm, Lord Cornwallis surrendered. This victory established the independence of the American Colonies.

The Logistic Battle,i.e., the combination of the Columns of Attack and of Support was first favorite with Napoleon and to his partiality for this particular form of the tactical offensive was due both the spectacular successes and the annihilating catastrophes which mark his astonishing career.

The retrieving of his lost battle of Marengo, by the fortuitous arrival of Dessaix column, seems to have impressed Napoleon to the extent that he ever after preferred to win by such process, rather than by any other.

The first attempt to put his new hypothesis into practice was at Jena. Single handed his column of attack destroyed the Prussian main body, while Davoust with the column of manoeuvre held in check over three times his numbers.

The French Column of Support under Bernadotte did not arrive in season to fire a shot.

At Eylau, the French Column of Support under Davoust was four hours in advancing six miles against the opposition of the Russian general Doctoroff. The second French Column of Support under Ney did not reach the field until the battle was over.

In the retreat from Russia, the French Column of Support under the Duke of Belluno was driven from its position at Smolensko, thus permitting the Russians under Kutosof to occupy the Strategic center, which disaster cost Napoleon 30,000 men in clearing his communications.

In 1813, the Column of Support under Ney at Bautzen was misdirected and the battle rendered indecisive by its lack of co-operation with the French Column of Attack.

In 1814, Napoleon conformed to the Art by acting in three columns, but yielding to his besetting military sin, he joined his Column of Support to his Column of Attack and through the open space thus created in the French Strategetic Front, Blucher advanced triumphantly to Paris.

In the Waterloo campaign, Napoleon properly began with three Grand Columns. At the battle of Ligny, his Column of Support arrived upon Blucher’s left flank and then without firing a shot, wheeled about and marched away.

At Waterloo, by uniting his Columns of Attack and of Support prematurely, Napoleon permitted Blucher to penetrate the French Strategetic Front and to win in the same manner and as decisively as he did at Paris.

Von Moltke won the battle of Sadowa by the arrival of the Prussian Column of Support, commanded by Prince Frederic William. But in the interim, the German main army was driven in several miles by the Austrians, and Prince Bismark’s first white hairs date from that day.

“A small body of brave and expert men, skillfully handled and favored by the ground, easily may render difficult the advance of a large army.”—Frederic the Great.

At the river Metaurus, the Roman Consul Livius gave a fine example of the duties of a Column of Manoeuvre which are slowly and securely to retreat before an advancing enemy and never to be induced into a pitched battle until the arrival of the kindred main body.

Frederic the Great made great use of Columns of Manoeuvre. In the Seven Years War he constantly maintained such a column against the armies of each State with whom Prussia was at war; while himself and his brother Henry operated as Columns of Attack.

In the Revolutionary War, Washington maintained a Column of Manoeuvre against the British in RhodeIsland, another against the British in the south and a third against the hostile Indian tribes of the southwest.

Napoleon constantly used Columns of Manoeuvre in all his campaigns; notably at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcole, Rivoli, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, in 1812, 1813, 1814 and at Ligny and Waterloo in 1815.

PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS

“It is necessary exactly to weigh the means we possess in opposition to the enemy in order to determine beforehand which must ultimately predominated.”—Frederic the Great.

Those elemental quantities whose comparative values are determined by Grand Reconnaissance and which are termed: Organization, Topography, Mobility, Numbers, Time, and Position, collectively constitute Prime Strategetic Means whose proper employment is the basis of every true Prime Strategetic Process.

That relative advantage in Numbers expressed by the larger aggregate of Chess-pieces is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by additional geometric and sub-geometric symbols.

Excess or deficiency in Numbers determines the policy of Campaign. The policy of the inferior force is:

Hence, the policy of Campaign of that army superior in Numbers, is:

Incessantly to proffer battles which:

All else being equal the advantage of Numbers is decisive of victory in battle and Campaign.

Things being unequal, the advantage in Numbers may be nullified by adverse advantages in Organization, Topography, Mobility, Time and Position.

Victory resulting from advantage in Numbers is achieved by simultaneously attacking two or more Tactical Keys from a Kindred Strategic Key and two or more Kindred Points of Command.

Thatrelative advantage in Mobilityexpressed by the situation of the Strategic Front upon the Strategetic Center is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Kindred Chess-pieces posted upon that great centraldiagonal which extends towards the Objective Plane. Such advantage determines those points which should be occupied in the proper development of the front so posted; and consequently designates the direction and location of that battlefield upon which the kindred army may concentrate in overwhelming force, despite all possible resistance by the enemy.

Thatrelative advantage in Organizationexpressed by superior potential totality, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the geometric and sub-geometric symbols of those Chess-pieces possessed of the superior potential complement. Such symbols taken in combination, describe that field of battle most favorable for the execution of those Major Tactical evolutions which appertain to the Chess-pieces of superior organization.

Thatrelative defensive advantage in Topographyexpressed by inaccessibility to hostile attack is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Corps of Position, posted upon points of different color to that occupied by the adverse Bishop; and this advantage designates those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be occupied with the maximum of security.

Thatrelative offensive advantage in Topographyexpressed by accessibility to kindred attack is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Corps of Position posted upon points of the same color as that occupied by the kindred Bishop; and this advantage designates those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be attacked with the maximum facility.

Thatrelative advantage in Position with the Column of Attack, expressed:

Thatrelative advantage in Position with the Column of Support, expressed by superior facilities for occupying with the Kindred Promotable Factors their corresponding Points of Junction in the Kindred Logistic Horizon, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the larger number of Pawn Altitudes which either are open, or may be opened, despite all possible resistance by the enemy; and such advantage designates those adverse Points of Impenetrability and Points of Resistance to the march of the Kindred Promotable Factors, which it is necessary to nullify.

Thatrelative advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvre, expressed by the security of the Kindred and the exposure of the adverse Strategetic Rear to attack by the Kindred Column of Support, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the occupation by a Kindred Promotable Factor of the Point of Proximity; and such advantage indicates that the advance with all possible celerity of such Promotable Factor and Point of Proximity toward the corresponding Point of Junction is a dominating influence in the existing situation.

From the advantage in Position appertaining to the three Grand Columns is deduced the character of the Grand Battle properly in sequence.

Advantage in Position with the Column of Attackindicates the opportunity, all else being equal, to engage in a victorious Strategic Grand Battle against the hostile Formation in Mass, or in a Tactical Grand Battle against the hostile Formation by Wings.

Advantage in Position with the Column of Supportindicates the opportunity to engage effectively in a series of minor battles, as though having the advantage in Numbers.

Advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvreindicates the opportunity to engage in a victorious Logistic Grand Battle against the adverse Formation by Grand Columns.

Thatrelative advantage in Timeexpressed by restrictions of the adversary’s choice of movements at his turn to play, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Feints operated by Kindred Chess-pieces against adverse vital points; and such advantage of the Initiative dictates the next move of the opposing army.

Theadvantage of the Initiativedetermines which of the adverse corps d’armee may and may not move.

The material expression of this advantage always is a Feint by a Kindred Corps against a vital point eitheroccupied or unoccupied, which necessitates that upon his next move, the enemy either evacuate, support, cover or sustain the post so menaced.

Such feint, therefore, restricts the move of the enemy to those of his corps as are able to obviate the threatened loss and proportionately reduces the immediate activity of his army.

“It is only the force brought into action that avails in battles and campaigns—the rest does not count.”—Napoleon.

The distance which separates opposing Corps d’armee always modifies the values of the Prime Strategetic Means.

Hence in the making of Grand Reconnaissance, it is next in sequence to determine whether the Chess-pieces are:

Corps d’armee arein Contactwith each other whenever their logistic radii intersect; or, their radii offensive and the corresponding adverse radii defensive are opposed to each other.

Corps d’armee arein Presencewhenever the posts which they occupy are contained within the same Strategic front, the same Strategetic Horizon, or are in communication with their corresponding posts of mobilization, development, or manoeuvre.

Corps d’armee areat Distancewhen the posts which they occupy are not in communication with Kindred Corps d’armee posted upon the strategic front adopted, or with posts of mobilization or development contained within the corresponding Primary Base of Operations, or, within the True Strategetic Horizon.

Every Campaign, whether upon the surface of the Earth or upon the Chess-board is decided and usually is terminated by a Grand Battle.

Those movements of opposing Grand Columns, whereby such decisive conflict is brought about under circumstances which ensure victory, by reason of superior advantages in Strategetic Means, are termed Grand Manoeuvres; and a proper series of Grand Manoeuvres, combined with their corresponding feints, strategems, ambuscades and minor battles, the whole terminated by a resulting Grand Battle, is termed a Grand Operation.

Those processes of Grand Manoeuvre, which produce an opportunity to victoriously engage in battle, are the most subtle and difficult known to the Strategetic Art.

Successful application of these processes in practice depends wholly upon proper use of the MEANS at hand and the doing of the utmost that can be done in the TIME available.

Nothing can be more repugnant to high art in Strategetics than those crudities termed in the specious mouthings of pretentious mediocrity “waiting moves,” “delayed strokes,” “defensive-offensives,” “masterly inactivities,” and the like.

“Time past is gone and cannot be regained; time future is not and may never be; time present is” and with it Opportunity, which an instant later may be gone.

The gain of but “a foot of ground and a minute of time” would have saved the French army at Rosbach and have cost Frederic the Great one of his most lustrous victories and perhaps his army and his crown.

In Strategetics there is but a single method whereby Opportunity may be availed of, and that is by so augmenting kindred advantages and so depreciating adverse advantages as to acquire for the kindred army that particular advantage of Strategetic means which in the given situation is the proper basis of the Strategetic movement next in sequence.

The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse army at Distance, is the advantage in MOBILITY.

The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army acting in the formation by Grand Columns, and the object of such Grand Manoeuvre always is, by superior celerity of movement, to occupy:

Obviously, the united Kindred Columns of Attack and of Support always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in Numbers as compared with the adverse main body.

The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse Grand Column in Presence, is the advantage in POSITION.

The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army acting in the Formation by Wings, and the object of such Grand Manoeuvre always is, by availing to the uttermost of its situation upon the Tactical Center,i.e., upon the area midway between the adverse Wings thus isolated from each other; to act in overwhelming Numbers, first against one and then against the other hostile bodies.

The chief requisite for success when acting offensively against an adverse Grand Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee, in Contact, is the advantage in NUMBERS.

The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army has an overwhelming superiority in Numbers in contact, and at least the equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.

In this circumstance, the object of such Grand Battle always is:

Obviously, the concentration of the entire kindred army against a single adverse wing always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in Numbers.

In making such attack obliquely against a single adverse wing, the center and remaining wing of the kindred army must not engage until the kindred Van and Corps of Position of the attacking wing first have formed thecenterof three sides of an octagon; of which the Kindred Corps of Evolution will form thefarthestside and the Kindred Center and left wing Corps d’armee will form thenearestand latest constructed side.

The chief requisite for success when acting defensively against a Grand Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee is the advantage in TOPOGRAPHY.

The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army, decidedly inferior in Numbers in the aggregate, has the advantage in Topography and equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.

In this case the object is to support both flanks of the inferior army upon impassable natural barriers, strengthening both wings at the expense of the center, both in quantity and in quality of troops.

If the Tactical Defensive be selected, the center should retire before the oncoming of the hostile army in order to enclose it between the Kindred Wings, which will then overwhelm it by superior Numbers, while the natural barriers on the flanks being impassable will prevent the remaining hostile corps from participating in the battle otherwise than as spectators.

Should the Tactical Offensive be selected, that kindred wing best adapted for attack should engage supported by all kindred Corps of Evolution, while advancing the Kindred Center in reserve and holding the remaining wing refused and in observation.

All else being equal, relative advantage in either branch of Prime Strategetic Means is sufficient to ensure victory in battle, and the proper use of such advantage for securing victory is outlined thus:

Utilize advantage in Prime Strategetic Means to obtain the superiority in Numbers at the Point of Contact in an Offensive Battle; and to nullify the adverse superiority in Numbers at the point of contact in a Defensive Battle.

Between War and Chess there is a seeming incongruity, which is the basis of that doubt of the utility of Chess-play, so commonly held by laymen, and which fallacy few, even among proficients, are competent to combat.

This doubt most frequently is voiced by the query:

If Chess and War are analagous, why was not Napoleon a Master Chess-player and Morphy a great military Commander?

This query readily is answered in the words of Frederic the Great, viz.:

“To be possessed of talent is not sufficient. Opportunity to display such talent and to its full extent is necessary. All depends on the time in which we live.”

The Strategetic talent possessed in common by Morphy and Napoleon, in both was brought to perfection by long and expert training.

But circumstances placed the twelve year old Napoleon in the midst of soldiers and in an era of war, while circumstances placed the twelve year old Morphy in the midst of Chess-players and in an era of Peace.

Napoleon was educated a General; Morphy was educated a lawyer.

To develop his self-evident and superlative Strategetic talent, Napoleon’s education was of the best; to develop his self-evident and superlative Strategetic talent, Morphy’s education was of the worst.

Napoleon succeeded as a General; Morphy failed as a lawyer.

The innate capability of Napoleon for Strategetics was developed in the direction of Warfare; the innate capability of Morphy for Strategetics was developed in the direction of Chess-play.

In War, Napoleon is superlative; in Chess, Morphy is superlative.

Educated in the law, Napoleon might have proved like Morphy a non-entity; educated in Chess, Napoleon might have proved like Morphy a phenomenon.

Educated in War, Morphy might have rivalled Napoleon.

For the Chess-play of Morphy displays that perfect comprehension of Strategetics, to which none but the great Captains in warfare have attained.

Perfection in Strategetics consists in exactly interpreting in battle and campaign, the System of Warfare invented by Epaminondas.

Those able to do this in War have achieved greatness, and the great at Chess-play are those who best have imitated that exactness with which Morphy employed this system on the Chess-board.

To those who imagine that Strategetic talent, as exemplified in Warfare, is different from Strategetic talent as exemplified in Chess-play, the following may afford matter for reflection.

“Frederic the Great was one of the finest Chess-players that Germany ever produced.”—Wilhelm Steinitz.

PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITIONSECTION ONE

In the consideration of every Strategetic Situation possible in Warfare, or in Chess-play, the initial process always is a Grand Reconnaissance.

Grand Reconnaissance is that exact scrutiny of existing conditions, whereby is determined the relative advantages and disadvantages possessed by the opposing armies in:

TheFirst Phasein the demonstration of every Prime Strategetic Proposition consists:

The making of Grand Reconnaissance is a special privilege which exclusively appertains to the advantage inTime. It always should be made by the Commander-in-chief of that army which is able to put itself in motion, while the opposing army must remain stationary, and it never should be confounded with the advance of the Cavalry Corps, nor confused with the work of scouts and spies; all of which are matters entirely separate and distinct from Grand Reconnaissance.

In the Grand Reconnaissance of any given Strategetic Situation the element of Numbersprimarilyis to be considered, for the reason that the basic fact of the Science of Strategetics is:

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