"The faith which can not stand unless buttressed by contradictions is built upon the sand. The profoundest faith is faith in the unity of truth. If there is found any conflict in the results of a right reason, no appeal to practical interests, or traditionary authority, or intuitional or theological faith, can stay the flood of skepticism."--ABBOT.
In the previous chapter we have considered the answers to this question which are given by the Idealistic and Materialistic schools; it devolves upon us now to review (iii.) the position of the school ofNatural RealismorNatural Dualism, at the head of which stands Sir William Hamilton.
It is admitted by this school that philosophic knowledge is "the knowledge of effects as dependent on their causes,"278and "of qualities as inherent in substances."279
Footnote 278:(return)"Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 58.
Footnote 279:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 138.
1.As to Events and Causes.--"Events do not occur isolated, apart, by themselves; they occur and are conceived by us only in connection. Our observation affords us no example of a phenomenon which is not an effect; nay, our thought can not even realize to itself the possibility of a phenomenon without a cause. By the necessity we are under of thinking some cause for every phenomenon, and by our original ignorance of what particular causes belong to what particular effects, it is rendered impossible for us to acquiesce in the mere knowledge of the fact of the phenomenon; on the contrary, we are determined, we are necessitated to regard each phenomenon asonly partially known until we discover the causeson which it depends for its existence.280Philosophic knowledge is thus, in its widestacceptation, the knowledge of effects as dependent on causes. Now what does this imply? In the first place, as every cause to which we can ascend is only an effect, it follows that it is the scope, that is, the aim, of philosophy to trace up the series of effects and causes until we arrive atcauses which are not in themselves effects,"281--that is, to ultimate and final causes. And then, finally, "Philosophy, as the knowledge of effects in their causes, necessarily tends, not towards a plurality of ultimate or final causes, but towardsonealone."282
Footnote 280:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 56.
Footnote 281:(return)"Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 58.
Footnote 282:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 60.
2.As to Qualities and Substance, or Phenomena and Reality.--As phenomena appear only in conjunction, we are compelled, by the constitution of our nature, to think them conjoined in and by something; and as they are phenomena, we can not think them phenomena of nothing, but must regard them as properties or qualities of something.283Now that which manifests its qualities--in other words, that in which the appearing causes inhere, that to which they belong--is called theirsubject, orsubstance, orsubstratum.284The subject of one grand series of phenomena (as,e.g., extension, solidity, figure, etc.) is calledmatter, ormaterial substance. The subject of the other grand series of phenomena (as,e.g., thought, feeling, volition, etc.) is termedmind, ormental substance. We may, therefore, lay it down as an undisputed truth that consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a primitive duality--a knowledge of theegoin relation and contrast to thenon-ego, and a knowledge of thenon-egoin relation and contrast to theego285Natural Dualism thus establishes the existence of two worlds ofmindandmatteron the immediate knowledge we possess of both series of phenomena; whilst the Cosmothetic Idealists discredit the veracity of consciousness as to our immediate knowledge of material phenomena, and, consequently, ourimmediate knowledge of the existence of matter.286
Footnote 283:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.
Footnote 284:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.
Footnote 285:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 292.
Footnote 286:(return)Ibid., vol. i. pp. 292, 295.
The obvious doctrine of the above quotations is, that wehave an immediate knowledge of the "existenceof matter" as well as of "thephenomenaof matter;" that is, we know "substance" as immediately and directly as we know "qualities." Phenomena are known only as inherent in substance; substance is known only as manifesting its qualities. We never know qualities without knowing substance, and we can never know substance without knowing qualities. Both are known in one concrete act; substance is known quite as much as quality; quality is known no more than substance. That we have a direct, immediate, presentative "face to face" knowledge of matter and mind in every act of consciousness is asserted again and again by Hamilton, in his "Philosophy of Perception."287In the course of the discussion he starts the question, "Is the knowledge of mind and matter equally immediate?" His answer to this question may be condensed in the following sentences. In regard to the immediate knowledge ofmindthere is no difficulty; it is admitted to be direct and immediate. The problem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive perception of the qualities ofmatter. Now, says Hamilton, "if we interrogate consciousness concerning the point in question, the response is categorical and clear. In the simplest act of perception I am conscious ofmyselfas a perceivingsubject, and of an externalrealityas the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same indivisible amount of intuition."288Again he says, "I have frequently asserted that in perception we are conscious of the external object, immediately andin itself." "If, then, the veracity of consciousness be unconditionally admitted--if the intuitive knowledge of matter and mind, and the consequent reality of their antithesis, be taken as truths," the doctrine of Natural Realism is established, and, "without any hypothesis or demonstration, thereality of mindand thereality of matter."289
Footnote 287:(return)Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, part ii.
Footnote 288:(return)Ibid., p. 181.
Footnote 289:(return)Ibid., pp. 34, 182.
Now, after these explicit statements that we have an intuitive knowledge of matter and mind--a direct and immediateconsciousness of self as a real, "self-subsisting entity," and a knowledge of "an external reality, immediately andin itself," it seems unaccountably strange that Hamilton should assert "that all human knowledge, consequently all human philosophy, is only of the Relative or Phenomenal;"290and that "of existence absolutely and in itself we know nothing."291Whilst teaching that the proper sphere and aim of philosophy is to trace secondary causes up to ultimate or first causes, and that itnecessarily tendstowards one First and Ultimate Cause, he at the same time asserts that "first causes do not lie within the reach of philosophy,"292and that it can never attain to the knowledge of the First Cause.293"The Infinite God can not, by us, be comprehended, conceived, or thought."294God, as First Cause, as infinite, as unconditioned, as eternal, is to us absolutely "The Unknown." The science of Real Being--of Beingin se--of self-subsisting entities, is declared to be impossible. All science is only of the phenomenal, the conditioned, the relative. Ontology is a delusive dream. Thus, after pages of explanations and qualifications, of affirmations and denials, we find Hamilton virtually assuming the same position as Comte and Mill--all human knowledge is necessarily confined to phenomena.
Footnote 290:(return)"Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 136.
Footnote 291:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 138.
Footnote 292:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 58.
Footnote 293:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 60.
Footnote 294:(return)Ibid., vol. ii. p. 375.
It has been supposed that the chief glory of Sir William Hamilton rested upon his able exposition and defense of the doctrine of Natural Realism. There are, however, indications in his writings that he regarded "the Philosophy of the Conditioned" as his grand achievement. The Law of the Conditioned had "not been generalized by any previous philosopher;" and, in laying down that law, he felt that he had made a new and important contribution to speculative thought.
The principles upon which this philosophy is based are:
1.The Relativity of all Human Knowledge.--Existence is not cognized absolutely and in itself, but only under special modes which are related to our faculties, and, in fact, determined bythese faculties themselves. All knowledge, therefore, isrelative--that is, it is of phenomena only, and of phenomena "under modifications determined by our own faculties." Now, as the Absolute is that which exists out of all relation either to phenomena or to our faculties of knowledge, it can not possibly beknown.
2.The Conditionality of all Thinking.--Thought necessarily supposes conditions. "To think is to condition; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought. As the eagle can not out-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he is supported, so the mind can not transcend the sphere of limitation within and through which the possibility of thought is realized. Thought is only of the conditioned, because, as we have said, to think is to condition."295Now the Infinite is the unlimited, the unconditioned, and as such can not possibly bethought.
3.The notion of the Infinite--the Absolute, as entertained by man, is a mere "negation of thought."--By this Hamilton does not mean that the idea of the Infinite is a negative idea. "The Infinite and the Absolute areonlythe names of two counterimbecilitiesof the human mind"296--that is, a mental inability to conceive an absolute limitation, or an infinite illimitation; an absolute commencement, or an infinite non-commencement. In other words, of the absolute and infinite we have no conception at all, and, consequently, no knowledge.297
The grand law which Hamilton generalizes from the above is, "that the conceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable." Or, again, "The conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or poles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or contradictory of the other."298This is the celebrated "Law of the Conditioned."
Footnote 295:(return)"Discussions," p. 21.
Footnote 296:(return)Ibid., p. 28.
Footnote 297:(return)"Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. pp. 368, 373.
Footnote 298:(return)Ibid., vol. ii. p. 373.
In attempting a brief criticism of "the Philosophy of the Conditioned," we may commence by inquiring:
I.What is the real import and significance of the doctrine "that all human knowledge is only of the relative or phenomenal?"
Hamilton calls this "the great axiom" of philosophy. That we may distinctly comprehend its meaning, and understand its bearing on the subject under discussion, we must ascertain the sense in which he uses the words "phenomenal" and "relative." The importance of an exact terminology is fully appreciated by our author; and accordingly, in three Lectures (VIII., IX., X.), he has given a full explication of the terms most commonly employed in philosophic discussions. Here the word "phenomenon" is set down as the necessary "correlative" of the word "subject" or "substance." "These terms can not be explained apart, for each is correlative of the other, each can be comprehended only in and through its correlative. The term 'subject' is used to denote the unknown (?) basis which lies under the variousphenomenaor properties of which we become aware, whether in our external or internal experience."299"The term 'relative' isopposedto the term 'absolute;' therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I virtually assert that we know nothing absolutely, that is,in and for itself, and without relation to us and our faculties."300Now, in the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, "the absolute" is defined as "that which is aloof from relation"--"that which is out of all relation."301Theabsolutecan not, therefore, be "the correlative" of the conditioned--can not stand in any relation to the phenomenal. Thesubject,however, is the necessary correlative of the phenomenal, and, consequently, the subject and the absolute are not identical. Furthermore, Hamilton tells us the subjectmay be comprehendedin and through its correlative--the phenomenon; but the absolute, being aloof from all relation, can not be comprehended or conceived at all. "The subject" and "the absolute" are, therefore, not synonymous terms; and, if they are not synonymous, then their antithetical terms, "phenomenal" and "relative," can not be synonymous.
Footnote 299:(return)"Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 148.
Footnote 300:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.
Footnote 301:(return)"Discussions," p. 21.
It is manifest, however, that Hamilton does employ these terms as synonymous, and this we apprehend is the first false step in his philosophy of the conditioned. "All our knowledge is of the relativeorphenomenal." Throughout the whole of Lectures VIII. and IX., in which he explains the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, these terms are used as precisely analogous. Now, in opposition to this, we maintain that the relative is not always the phenomenal. A thing may be "in relation" and yet not be a phenomenon. "The subject or substance" may be, and really is, on the admission of Hamilton himself,correlatedto the phenomenon. The ego, "the conscioussubject"302as a "self-subsisting entity" is necessarily related to the phenomena of thought, feeling, etc.; but no one would repudiate the idea that the conscious subject is a mere phenomenon, or "series of phenomena," with more indignation than Hamilton. Notwithstanding the contradictory assertion, "that thesubjectis unknown," he still teaches, with equal positiveness, "that in every act of perception I am conscious of self, as a perceivingsubject."And still more explicitly he says: "As clearly as I am conscious of existing, so clearly am I conscious, at every moment of my existence, that the conscious Ego is not itself a mere modification [a phenomenon], nor a series of modifications [phenomena], but that it is itself different from all its modifications, and aself-subsisting entity."303Again: "Thought is possible only in and through the consciousness of Self. The Self, the I, is recognized in every act of intelligence as thesubjectto which the act belongs. It is I that perceive, I that imagine, I that remember, etc.; these special modes are all only the phenomena of the I."304We are, therefore, conscious of thesubjectin the most immediate, and direct, and intuitive manner, and the subject of which we are conscious can not be "unknown." We regret that so distinguished a philosophy should deal in such palpable contradictions; but it is the inevitable consequence of violating thatfundamental principle of philosophy on which Hamilton so frequently and earnestly insists, viz., "that the testimony of consciousness must be accepted in all its integrity".
Footnote 302:(return)Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton (edited by O.W. Wight), p. 181.
Footnote 303:(return)"Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 373.
Footnote 304:(return)Ibid., vol. i. p. 166.
It is thus obvious that, with proper qualifications, we may admitthe relativity of human knowledge, and yet at the same time reject the doctrine of Hamilton,that all human knowledge is only of the phenomenal.
"The relativity of human knowledge," like most other phrases into which the word "relative" enters, is vague, and admits of a variety of meanings. If by this phrase is meant "that we can not know objects except as related to our faculties, or as our faculties are related to them," we accept the statement, but regard it as a mere truism leading to no consequences, and hardly worth stating in words. It is simply another way of saying that, in order to an object's being known, it must come within the range of our intellectual vision, and that we can only know as much as we are capable of knowing. Or, if by this phrase is meant "that we can only know things by and through the phenomena they present," we admit this also, for we can no more know substances apart from their properties, than we can know qualities apart from the substances in which they inhere. Substances can be known only in and through their phenomena. Take away the properties, and the thing has no longer any existence. Eliminate extension, form, density, etc., from matter, and what have you left? "The thing in itself," apart from its qualities, is nothing. Or, again, if by the relativity of knowledge is meant "that all consciousness, all thought are relative," we accept this statement also. To conceive, to reflect, to know, is to deal with difference and relation; the relation of subject and object; the relation of objects among themselves; the relation of phenomena to reality, of becoming to being. The reason of man is unquestionably correlated to that which is beyond phenomena; it is able to apprehend the necessary relation between phenomena and being, extension and space, succession and time, event and cause, the finite and the infinite. We may thus admit therelativecharacter of human thought, and at the same time deny that it is an ontological disqualification.305
It is not, however, in any of these precise forms that Hamilton holds the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. He assumes a middle place between Reid and Kant, and endeavors to blend the subjective idealism of the latter with the realism of the former. "He identifies thephenomenonof the German with thequalityof the British philosophy,"306and asserts, as a regulative law of thought, that the quality implies the substance, and the phenomenon the noumenon, but makes the substratum or noumenon (the object in itself) unknown and unknowable. The "phenomenon" of Kant was, however, something essentially different from the "quality" of Reid. In the philosophy of Kant,phenomenonmeans an object as we envisage or represent it to ourselves, in opposition to thenoumenon, or a thing as it is in itself. The phenomenon is composed, in part, of subjective elements supplied by the mind itself; as regards intuition, the forms of space and time; as regards thought, the categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. To perceive a thing in itself would be to perceive it neither in space nor in time. To think a thing in itself would be not to think it under any of the categories. The phenomenal is thus the product of the inherent laws of our own constitution, and, as such, is the sum and limit of all our knowledge.307
Footnote 305:(return)Martineau's "Essays," p. 234.
Footnote 306:(return)M'Cosh's "Defense of Fundamental Truth," p. 106.
Footnote 307:(return)Mansel's "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant," pp. 21, 22.
This, in its main features, is evidently the doctrine propounded by Hamilton. The special modes in which existence is cognizable" are presented to, and known by, the mindunder modifications determined by the faculties themselves."308This doctrine he illustrates by the following supposition: "Suppose the total object of consciousness in perception is=12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, the material sense 3,and the mind 3; this may enable you to form some rude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception."309The conclusion at which Hamilton arrives, therefore, is that things are not known to us as they exist, but simply as they appear, and as our minds are capable of perceiving them.
Footnote 308:(return)Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 148.
Footnote 309:(return)Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 129; and also vol. i. p. 147.
Let us test the validity of this majestic deliverance. No man is justified in making this assertion unless, 1. He knows things as they exist; 2. He knows things not only as they exist but as they appear; 3. He is able to compare things as they exist with the same things as they appear. Now, inasmuch as Sir William Hamilton affirms we do not know things as they exist, but only as they appear, how can he know that there is any difference between things as they exist and as they appear? What is this "thing in itself" about which Hamilton has so much to say, and yet about which he professes to know nothing? We readily understand what is meant by thething; it is the object as existing--a substance manifesting certain characteristic qualities. But what is meant byin itself? There can be noin itselfbesides or beyond thething. If Hamilton means that "the thing itself" is the thing apart from all relation, and devoid of all properties or qualities, we do not acknowledge any such thing. A thing apart from all relation, and devoid of all qualities, is simply pure nothing, if such a solecism may be permitted. With such a definition of Beingin se, the logic of Hegel is invincible, "Being and Nothing are identical."
And now, if "the thing in itself" be, as Hamilton says it is, absolutelyunknown, how can he affirm or deny any thing in regard to it? By what right does he prejudge a hidden reality, and give or refuse its predicates; as, for example, that it is conditioned or unconditioned, in relation or aloof from relation, finite or infinite? Is it not plain that, in declaring a thing in its inmost nature or essence to be inscrutable, it is assumed to be partiallyknown? And it is obvious, notwithstanding some unguarded expressions to the contrary, that Hamilton doesregard "the thing in itself" as partially known. "The external reality" is, at least, six elements out of twelve in the "total object of consciousness."310The primary qualities of matter are known as in the things themselves; "they develop themselves with rigid necessity out of the simple datum ofsubstance occupying space."311"The Primary Qualities are apprehended as they are in bodies"--"they are the attributes ofbody as body," and as such "are known immediately in themselves,"312as well as mediately by their effects upon us. So that we not only know by direct consciousness certain properties of things as they exist in things themselves, but we can also deduce them in anà priorimanner. "The bare notion of matter being given, the Primary Qualities may be deducedà priori; they being, in fact, only evolutions of the conditions which that notion necessarily implies." If, then, we know the qualities of things as "in the things themselves," "the things themselves" must also be, at least, partially known; and Hamilton can not consistently assert the relativity ofallknowledge. Even if it be granted that our cognitions of objects are only in part dependent on the objects themselves, and in part on elements superadded by our organism, or by our minds, it can not warrant the assertion that all our knowledge, but only the part so added, is relative. "The admixture of the relative element not only does not take away the absolute character of the remainder, but does not even (if our author is right) prevent us from recognizing it. The confusion, according to him, is not inextricable. It is for us 'to analyze and distinguish what elements,' in an 'act of knowledge,' are contributed by the object, and what by the organs or by the mind."313
Footnote 310:(return)"Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 129.
Footnote 311:(return)Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, p. 357.
Footnote 312:(return)Ibid., pp. 377, 378.
Footnote 313:(return)Mill's "Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. p. 44.
Admitting the relative character of human thought as a psychological fact, Mr. Martineau has conclusively shown that this law, instead of visiting us with disability to transcend phenomena,operates as a revelation of what exists beyond. "The finitebody cut out before our visual perception, or embraced by the hands, lies as an island in the emptiness around, and without comparative reference to this can not be represented: the same experience which gives us the definite object gives us also the infinite space; and both terms--the limited appearance and the unlimited ground--are apprehended with equal certitude and clearness, and furnished with names equally susceptible of distinct use in predication and reasoning. The transient successions, for instance, the strokes of a clock, which we count, present themselves to us as dotted out upon a line of permanent duration; of which, without them, we should have no apprehension, but which as their condition, is unreservedly known."314
"What we have said with regard to space and time applies equally tο the case of Causation. Here, too, the finite offered to perception introduces to an Infinite supplied by thought. As a definite body reveals also the space around, and an interrupted succession exhibits the uniform time beneath, so does the passing phenomenon demand for itself a power beneath. The space, and time, and power, not being part of the thing perceived, but its conditions, are guaranteed to us, therefore, on the warrant, not of sense, but of intellect."315
"We conclude, then, on reviewing these examples of Space, and Time, and Causation, that ontological ideas introducing us to certain fixed entities belong no less to our knowledge than scientific ideas of phenomenal disposition and succession."316In these instances of relation between a phenomenon given in perception and an entity as a logical condition, the correlatives are on a perfect equality of intellectual validity, and the relative character of human thought is not an ontological disqualification, but a cognitive power.
Footnote 314:(return)"Essays," pp. 193,194.
Footnote 315:(return)Ibid., p. 197.
Footnote 316:(return)Ibid., p. 195.
There is a thread of fallacy running through the whole of Hamilton's reasonings, consequent upon a false definition of the Absolute at the outset. The Absolute is defined asthat which exists in and by itself, aloof from and out of all relation. An absolute, as thus defined, does not and can not exist; it isa pure abstraction, and, in fact, a pure non-entity. "The Absolute expresses perfect independence both in being and in action, and is applicable to God as self-existent."317It may mean the absence of allnecessaryrelation, but it does not mean the absence ofallrelation. If God can notvoluntarilycall a finite existence into being, and thus stand in the relation of cause, He is certainly under the severest limitation. But surely that is not a limit which substitutes choice for necessity. To be unable to know God out of all relation--that is, apart from his attributes, apart from his created universe, is not felt by us to be any privation at all. A God without attributes, and out of all relations, is for us no God at all. God as a being of unlimited perfection, as infinitely wise and good, as the unconditioned cause of all finite being, and, consequently, as voluntarily related to nature and humanity, we can and do know; this is the living and true God. The God of a false philosophy is not the true God; the pure abstractions of Hegel and Hamilton are negations, and not realities.
2. We proceed to consider the second fundamental principle of Hamilton's philosophy of the conditioned, viz., that "conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought," and that thought necessarily imposes conditions on its object.
"Thought," says Hamilton, "can not transcend consciousness: consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and an object known only in correlation, andmutually limiting each other"318Thought necessarily supposes conditions; "to think is simply to condition," that is, to predicate limits; and as the infinite is the unlimited, it can not be thought. The very attempt to think the infinite renders it finite; therefore there can be no infinitein thought, and, consequently, the infinite can not be known.
Footnote 317:(return)Calderwood's "Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 179.
Footnote 318:(return)"Discussions," p. 21.
If by "the infinite in thought" is here meant the infinite compassed or contained in thought, we readily grant that thefinite can not contain the infinite; it is a simple truism which no one has ever been so foolish as to deny. Even Cousin is not so unwise as to assert the absolutely comprehensibility of God. "In order absolutely to comprehend the Infinite, it is necessary to have an infinite power of comprehension, and this is not granted to us."319A finite mind can not have "an infinite thought." But it by no means follows that, because we can not have infinite thought, we can have no clear and definite thought of or concerning the Infinite. We have a precise and definite idea of infinitude; we can define the idea; we can set it apart without danger of being confounded with another, and we can reason concerning it. There is nothing we more certainly and intuitively know than that space is infinite, and yet we can not comprehend or grasp within the compass of our thought the infinite space. We can not form animageof infinite space, can not traverse it in perception, or represent it by any combination of numbers; but we can have thethoughtof it as an idea of Reason, and can argue concerning it with precision and accuracy.320Hamilton has an idea of the Infinite; he defines it; he reasons concerning it; he says "we must believe in the infinity of God." But how can he define the Infinite unless he possesses some knowledge, however limited, of the infinite Being? How can he believe in the infinity of God if he has no definite idea of infinitude? He can not reason about, can not affirm or deny any thing concerning, that of which he knows absolutely nothing.
Footnote 319:(return)"Lectures on History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 104.
Footnote 320:(return)"To form animageof any infinitude--be it of time or space [or power]; to go mentally through it by successive steps of representation--is indeed impossible; not less so than to traverse it in our finite perception and experience. But to have thethoughtof it as an idea of the reason, not of the phantasy, and assign that thought a constituent place in valid beliefs and consistent reasonings, appears to us as not only possible, but inevitable."--Martineau's "Essays," p. 205.
The grand logical barrier which Hamilton perpetually interposes to all possible cognition of Godas infiniteis, that to think is to condition--to limit; and as the Infinite is the unconditioned, the unlimited, therefore "the Infinite can not bethought." We grant at once that all human thought is limited and finite, but, at the same time, we emphatically deny that the limitation of our thought imposes any conditions or limits upon the object of thought. No such affirmation can be consistently made, except on the Hegelian hypothesis that "Thought and Being are identical;" and this is a maxim which Hamilton himself repudiates. Our thought does not create, neither does it impose conditions upon, any thing.
There is a lurking sophism in the whole phraseology of Hamilton in regard to this subject. He is perpetually talking about "thinking a thing"--"thinking the Infinite." Now we do not think a thing, but we thinkoforconcerninga thing. We do not think a man, neither does our thought impose any conditions upon the man, so that he must be as our thought conceives or represents him; but our thought is of the man, concerning or about the man, and is only so far true and valid as it conforms to the objective reality. And so we do not "think the Infinite;" that is, our thought neither contains nor conditions the Infinite Being, but our thoughts areaboutthe Infinite One; and if we do not think of Him as a being of infinite perfection, our thought is neither worthy, nor just, nor true.321
Footnote 321:(return)Calderwood's "Philosophy of the Infinite," pp. 255, 256.
But we are told the law of all thought and of all being is determination; consequently, negation of some quality or some potentiality; whereas the Infinite is "the One and the All" (τὸ Ἕν καὶ Πῦν),322or, as Dr. Mansel, the disciple and annotator of Hamilton, affirms, "the sum of all reality," and "the sum of all possible modes of being."323The Infinite, as thus defined, must include in itself all being, and all modes of being, actual and possible, not even excepting evil. And this, let it be observed, Dr. Mansel has the hardihood to affirm. "If the Absolute and the Infinite is an object of human conception at all, this, and none other, is the conception required."324"The Infinite Whole," as thus defined, can not be thought, and thereforeit is argued the Infinite God can not be known. Such a doctrine shocks our moral sense, and we shrink from the thought of an Infinite which includes evil. There is certainly a moral impropriety, if not a logical impossibility, in such a conception of God.
Footnote 322:(return)Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," Appendix, vol. ii. p. 531.
Footnote 323:(return)"Limits of Religious Thought," p. 76.
Footnote 324:(return)Ibid.
The fallacy of this reasoning consists in confounding asupposedQuantitative Infinite withtheQualitative Infinite--the totality of existence with the infinitely perfect One. "Qualitative infinity is a secondary predicate; that is, the attribute of an attribute, and is expressed by the adverbinfinitelyrather than the adjectiveinfinite. For instance, it is a strict use of language to say, that space is infinite, but it is an elliptical use of language to say, God is infinite. Precision of language would require us to say, God is infinitely good, wise, and great; or God is good, and his goodness is infinite. The distinction may seem trivial, but it is based upon an important difference between the infinity of space and time on the one hand, and the infinity of God on the other. Neither philosophy nor theology can afford to disregard the difference. Quantitative Infinity is illimitation byquantity. Qualitative Infinity is illimitation bydegree. Quantity and degree alike imply finitude, and are categories of the finite alone. The danger of arguing from the former kind of infinitude to the latter can not be overstated. God alone possesses Qualitative Infinity, which is strictly synonymous withabsolute perfection; and the neglect of the distinction between this and Quantitative Infinity, leads irresistibly to pantheistic and materialistic notions. Spinozism is possible only by the elevation of 'infinite extension' to the dignity of a divine attribute. Dr. Samuel Clarke's identification of God's immensity with space has been shown by Martin to ultimate in Pantheism. From ratiocinations concerning the incomprehensibility of infinite space and time, Hamilton and Mansel pass at once to conclusions concerning the incomprehensibility of God. The inconsequence of all such arguments is absolute; and if philosophy tolerates the transference of spatial or temporal analogies to the nature of God, she must reconcile herselfto the negation of his personality and spirituality."325An Infinite Being, quite remote from the notion ofquantity, may and does exist; which, on the one hand, does not include finite existence, and, on the other hand, does not render the finite impossible to thought. Without contradiction they may coexist, and be correlated.
The thought will have already suggested itself to the mind of the reader that for Hamilton to assert that the Infinite, as thus defined (the One and the All), is absolutely unknown, is certainly the greatest absurdity, for in that case nothing can be known. This Infinite must be at least partially known, or all human knowledge is reduced to zero. To the all-inclusive Infinite every thing affirmative belongs, not only to be, but to be known. To claim it for being, yet deny it to thought, is thus impossible. The Infinite, which includes all real existence, is certainly possible to cognition.
The whole argument as regards the conditionating nature of all thought is condensed into four words by Spinoza--"Omnis determinatio est negatio;" all determination is negation. Nothing can be more arbitrary or more fallacious than this principle. It arises from the confusion of two things essentially different--the limits of a being, andits determinate and distinguishing characteristics. The limit of a being is its imperfection; the determination of a being is its perfection. The less a thing is determined, the more it sinks in the scale of being; the most determinate being is the most perfect being. "In this sense God is the only being absolutely determined. For there must be something indetermined in all finite beings, since they have all imperfect powers which tend towards their development after an indefinite manner. God alone, the complete Being in whom all powers are actualized, escapes by His own perfection from all progress, and development, and indetermination."326
Footnote 325:(return)North American Review, October, 1864, article, "The Conditioned and the Unconditioned," pp. 422, 423. See also Young's "Province of Reason," p. 72; and Calderwood's "Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 183.
Footnote 326:(return)Saisset, "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. p. 71.