It can not be denied that, so far as it goes, this conception of the Deity is admirable, worthy, and just. Viewed from a Christian stand-point, we at once concede that it is essentially defective. There is no clear and distinct recognition of God as Creator and Governor of the universe; he is chiefly regarded as the Life of the universe--the Intellect, the Energy--that which gives excellence, and perfection, and gladness to the whole system of things. The Theology of Aristotle is, in fact, metaphysical rather than practical. He does not contemplate the Deity as a moral Governor. Whilst Plato speaks of "being made like God through becoming just and holy," Aristotle asserts that "all moral virtues are totally unworthy of being ascribed to God."753He is not the God of providence. He dwells alone, supremely indifferent to human cares, and interests, and sorrows. He takes no cognizance of individual men, and holds no intercourse with man. The God of Aristotle is not a being that meets and satisfies the wants of the human heart, however well it may meet the demands of the reason.
Footnote 753:(return)"Ethics," bk. x. ch. viii.
Morality has no basis in the Divine nature, no eternal type in the perfections and government of God, and no supports and aids from above. The theology of Aristotle foreshadows the character of the
ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS.
We do not find in Aristotle any distinct recognition of an eternal and immutable morality, an absolute right, which has its foundation in the nature of God. Plato had taught that there was "an absolute Good, above and beyond all existence in dignity and power;" which is, in fact, "the cause of all existence and all knowledge," and which is God; that all other things are good in proportion as they "partake of this absolute Good;" and that all men are so far good as they "resemble God." But with this position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the doctrine of Plato in the following words--"Some have thought that, besides all these manifold goods upon earth, there is someabsolute good, which is the cause to all these of their being good"--he proceeds to criticise that idea, and concludes his argument by saying--"we must dismiss the idea at present, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, or transcendental and absolute, it obviously can never be realized nor possessed by man; whereas something of this latter kind is what we are inquiring after." He follows up these remarks by saying that "Perhaps the knowledge of the idea may be regarded by some as useful, as a pattern (παράδειγµα) by which to judge of relative good." Against this he argues that "There is no trace of the arts making use of any such conception; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general, all pursue their vocations without respect to theabsolute good, nor is it easy to see how they would be benefited by apprehending it."754The good after which Aristotle would inquire is, therefore, arelative good, since the knowledge of the absolute good can not possibly be realized.
Footnote 754:(return)"Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi.
Instead, therefore, of seeking to attain to "a transcendentaland absolute good "--a fundamental idea of right, which may be useful as a paradigm by which we may judge of relative good, he addresses himself solely to the question, "what is good for man"--what is the good attainable in action? And having identified the Chief Good with the final and perfect end of all action, the great question of theEthicsis, "What is the end of human action?" (τί ἐστι τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος).755
Footnote 755:(return)"Ethics," bk. i. ch. xiii.
Now an end or final cause implies an intelligence--implies a mind to perceive and desire it. This is distinctly recognized by Aristotle. The question, therefore, naturally arises--is that end fixed for man by a higher intelligence, and does it exist for man both as an idea and as an ideal? Can man, first, intellectually apprehend the idea, and then consciously strive after its realization? Is it the duty of man to aim at fulfilling the purposes of his Creator? To this it may be answered that Aristotle is not at all explicit as to God's moral government of the world. "Moral government," in the now common acceptation of the term, has no place in the system of Aristotle, and the idea of "duty" is scarcely recognized. He considers "the good" chiefly in relation to the constitution and natural condition of man. "It is" says he, "the end towards which nature tends." As physical things strive unconsciously after the end of their existence, so man strives after the good attainable in life. Socrates had identified virtue and knowledge, he had taught that "virtue is a Science." Aristotle contended that virtue is an art, like music and architecture, which must be attained by exercise. It is not purely intellectual, it is the bloom of the physical, which has become ethical. As the flower of the field, obeying the laws of its organization, springs up, blooms, and attains its own peculiar perfection, so there is an instinctive desire (ὄρεξις) in the soul which at first unconsciously yearns after the good, and subsequently the good is sought with full moral intent and insight. Aristotle assumes that the desires or instincts of man are so framed as to imply the existence of this end (τέλος).756And he asserts that man can onlyrealize it in the sphere of his own proper functions, and in accordance with the laws of his own proper nature and its harmonious development.757It is not, then, through instruction, or through the perfection of knowledge, that man is to attain the good, but through exercise and habit (ἔθος). By practice of moral acts we become virtuous, just as by practice of building and of music, we become architects and musicians; for the habit, which is the ground of moral character, is only a fruit of oft-repeated moral acts. Hence it is by these three things--nature, habit, reason--that men become good.
Footnote 756:(return)Ibid, bk. i. ch. ii.
Footnote 757:(return)"Ethics," bk. i. ch. vii.
Aristotle's question, therefore, is,What is the chief good for man as man? not what is his chief good as a spiritual and an immortal being? or what is his chief good as a being related to and dependent upon God? And the conclusion at which he arrives is, that it isthe absolute satisfaction of our whole nature--that which men are agreed in callinghappiness. This happiness, however, is not mere sensual pleasure. The brute shares this in common with man, therefore it can not constitute the happiness of man. Human happiness must express the completeness of rational existence. And inasmuch as intelligence is essential activity, as the soul is theentelechyof the body, therefore the happiness of man can not consist in a mere passive condition. It must, therefore, consist inperfect activityin well-doing, and especially in contemplative thought,758or as Aristotle defines it--"It is a perfect practical activity in a perfect life."759His conception of the chief good has thus two sides, one internal, that which exists in and for the consciousness--a "complete and perfect life," the other external and practical. The latter, however, is a means to the former. That completeand perfect life is the complete satisfaction and perfection of our rational nature. It is a state of peace which is the crown of exertion. It is the realization of the divine in man, and constitutes the absolute and all-sufficient happiness.760A good action is thus an End-in-itself (τέλειον τέλος) inasmuch as it secures theperfectionof our nature; it is that for the sake of which our moral faculties before existed, hence bringing an inward pleasure and satisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest and fully acquiesce; something which can be pronounced beautiful, fitting, honorable, and perfect.
Footnote 758:(return)"If it be true to say that happiness consists in doing well, a life of action must be best both for the state and the individual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of action implies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts which are concerned with the results of action; but far rather we must consider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have theirend in themselves, and which are for their own sake."--"Politics," bk. vii. ch. iii.
Footnote 759:(return)"Ethics," bk. i. ch. x.
Footnote 760:(return)"Ethics," bk. x. ch. viii.
From what has been already stated, it will be seen that the Aristotelian conception ofVirtueis not conformity to an absolute and immutable standard of right. It is defined by him asthe observation of the right mean (µεσότης) in action--that is, the right mean relatively to ourselves. "Virtue is a habit deliberately choosing, existing as a mean (µέσον) which refers to us, and is defined by reason, and as a prudent man would define it; and it is a mean between two evils, the one consisting in excess, the other in defect; and further, it is a mean, in that one of these falls short of, and the other exceeds, what is right both in passions and actions; and that virtue both finds and chooses the mean."761The perfection of an action thus consists in its containing the right degree--the true mean between too much, and too little. The law of the µεσότης is illustrated by the following examples: Man has a fixed relation to pleasure and pain. In relation to pain, the true mean is found in neither fearing it nor courting it, and this isfortitude. In relation to pleasure, the true mean stands between greediness and indifference; this istemperance. The true mean between prodigality and narrowness isliberality; between simplicity and cunning isprudence; between suffering wrong and doing wrong isjustice. Extending this law to certain qualifications of temper, speech, and manners, you have the portrait of a graceful Grecian gentleman. Virtue is thusproportion, grace, harmony, beauty in action.
Footnote 761:(return)Ibid, bk. ii. ch. vi.
It will at once be seen that this classification has no stable foundation. It furnishes no ultimate standard of right. Themeanis a wavering line. It differs under different circumstances and relations, and in different times and places. That mean which is sufficient for one individual is insufficient for another. The virtue of a man, of a slave, and of a child, is respectively different. There are as many virtues as there are circumstances in life; and as men are ever entering into new relations, in which it is difficult to determine the correct method of action, the separate virtues can not be limited to any definite number.
Imperfect as the ethical system of Aristotle may appear to us who live in Christian times, it must be admitted that his writings abound with just and pure sentiments. His science of Ethics is adiscipline of human character in order to human happiness. And whilst it must be admitted that it is directed solely to the improvement of man in the present life, he aims to build that improvement on pure and noble principles, and seeks to elevate man to the highest perfection of which he could conceive. "And no greater praise can be given to a work of heathen morality than to say, as may be said of the ethical writings of Aristotle, that they contain nothing which a Christian may dispense with, no precept of life which is not an element of Christian character; and that they only fail in elevating the heart and the mind to objects which it needed Divine Wisdom to reveal."762
Footnote 762:(return)Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Aristotle."
Philosophy, after the time of Aristotle, takes a new direction. In the pre-Socratic schools, we have seen it was mainly a philosophy of nature; in the Socratic school it was characterized as a philosophy of mind; and now in the post-Socratic schools it becomes a philosophy of life--a moral philosophy. Instead of aiming at the knowledge of real Being--of the permanent, unchangeable, eternal principles which underlie all phenomena, it was now content to aim, chiefly, at individual happiness. The primary question now discussed, as of the most vital importance, is, What is the ultimate standard by which, amid all the diversities of human conduct and opinion, we may determine what is right and good in individual and social life?
This remarkable change in the course of philosophic inquiry was mainly due--
1st.To the altered circumstances of the times. An age of civil disturbance and political intrigue succeeded the Alexandrian period. The different states of Greece lost their independence, and became gradually subject to a foreign yoke. Handed over from one domination to another, in the struggles of Alexander's lieutenants, they endeavored to reconquer their independence by forming themselves into confederations, but were powerless to unite in the defense of a common cause. The Achæan and Etolian leagues were weakened by internal discords; and it was in vain that Sparta tried to recover her ancient liberties.
Divided amongst themselves, the smaller states invoked the aid of dangerous allies--at one time appealing to Macedon, at another to Egypt. In this way they prepared for the total ruin of Greek liberty, which was destined to be extinguished by Rome.763
Footnote 763:(return)Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," pp. 136-140.
During this period of hopeless turmoil and social disorder, all lofty pursuits and all great principles were lost sight of and abandoned. The philosophic movement followed the downward course of society, and men became chiefly concerned for their personal interest and safety. The wars of the Succession almost obliterated the idea of society, and philosophy was mainly directed to the securing of personal happiness; it became, in fact, "the art of making one's self happy." The sad reverses to which the Grecian mind had been subjected produced a feeling of exhaustion and indifference, which soon reflected itself in the philosophy of the age.
2d. In connection with the altered circumstances of the age, we must also take account ofthe apparent failure of the Socratic method to solve the problem of Being.
The teaching of Aristotle had fostered the suspicion that the dialectic method was a failure, and thus prepared the way for a return to sensualism. He had taught that individuals alone have a real existence, and that the "essence" of things is not to be sought in the elements of unity and generality, or in theidea, as Plato taught, but in the elements of diversity and speciality. And furthermore, in opposition to Plato, he had taught his disciples to attach themselves to sensation, as the source of all knowledge. As the direct consequence of this teaching, we find his immediate successors, Dicearchus and Straton, deliberately setting aside "the god of philosophy," affirming "that adivinitywas unnecessary to the explanation of the existence and order of the universe." Stimulated by the social degeneracy of the times, the characteristic skepticism of the Greek intellect bursts forth anew. As the skepticism of the Sophists marked the close of the first period of philosophy,so the skepticism of Pyrrhonism marked the close of the second. The new skepticism arrayed Aristotle against Plato as the earlier skeptics arrayed atomism against the doctrine of the Eleatics. They naturally said: "We have been seeking a long time; what have we gained? Have we obtained any thing certain and determinate? Plato says we have. But Aristotle and Plato do not agree. May not our opinion be as good as theirs? What a diversity of opinions have been presented during the past three hundred years! One may be as good as another, or they may be all alike untrue!" Timon and Pyrrhon declared that, of each thing, it might be said to be, and not to be; and that, consequently, we should cease tormenting ourselves, and seek to obtain anabsolute calm, which they dignified with the name ofataraxie. Beholding the overthrow and disgrace of their country, surrounded by examples of pusillanimity and corruption, and infected with the spirit of the times themselves, they wrote this maxim: "Nothing is infamous; nothing is in itself just; laws and customs alone constitute what is justice and what is iniquity." Having reached this extreme, nothing can be too absurd, and they cap the climax by saying, "We assert nothing; no, not even that we assert nothing!"
And yet there must some function, undoubtedly, remain for the "wise man" (σοφός).
Reason was given for some purpose. Philosophy must have some end. And inasmuch as it is not to determine speculative questions, it must be to determine practical questions. May it not teach men toactrather than tothink? The philosopher, the schools, the disciples, survive the darkening flood of skepticism.
Three centuries before Christ, the Peripatetic and Platonic schools are succeeded by two other schools, which inherit their importance, and which, in other forms, and by an under-current, perpetuate the disputes of the Peripatetics and Platonists, namely, the Epicureans and Stoics. With Aristotle and Plato, philosophy embraced in its circle nature, humanity, and God;but now, in the systems of Epicurus and Zeno, moral philosophy is placed in the foreground, and assumes the chief, the overshadowing pre-eminence. The conduct of life--morality--is now the grand subject of inquiry, and the great theme of discourse.
In dealing withmoralstwo opposite methods of inquiry were possible:
1.To judge of the quality of actions by theirRESULTS.
2.To search for the quality of actions in the actions them selves.
Utility, which in its last analysis isPleasure, is the test of right, in the first method; an assumed or discoveredLaw of Nature, in the second. If the world were perfect, and the balance of the human faculties undisturbed, it is evident that both systems would give identical results. As it is, there is a tendency to error on each side, which is fully developed in the rival schools of the Epicureans and Stoics, who practically divided the suffrages of the mass of educated men until the coming of Christ.
EPICUREANS.
Epicurus was born B.C. 342, and died B.C. 270. He purchased a Garden within the city, and commenced, at thirty-six years of age, to teach philosophy. The Platonists had their academic Grove: the Aristotelians walked in the Lyceum: the Stoics occupied the Porch: the Epicureans had their Garden, where they lived a tranquil life, and seem to have had a community of goods.
There is not one of all the various founders of the ancient philosophical schools whose memory was cherished with so much veneration by his disciples as that of Epicurus. For several centuries after his death, his portrait was treated by them with all the honors of a sacred relic: it was carried about with them in their journeys, it was hung up in their schools, it was preserved with reverence in their private chambers; his birthday was celebrated with sacrifices and other religiousobservances, and a special festival in his honor was held every month.
So much honor having been paid to the memory of Epicurus, we naturally expect that his works would have been preserved with religious care. He was one of the most prolific of the ancient Greek writers. Diogenes calls him "a most voluminous writer," and estimates the number of works composed by him at no less than three hundred, the principal of which he enumerates.764But out of all this prodigious collection, not a single book has reached us in a complete, or at least an independent form. Three letters, which contain some outlines of his philosophy, are preserved by Diogenes, who has also embodied his "Fundamental Maxims"--forty-four propositions, containing a summary of his ethical system. These, with part of his work "On Nature," found during the last century among the Greek MSS. recovered at Herculaneum, constitute all that has survived the general wreck.
Footnote 764:(return)Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xvi., xvii.
We are thus left to depend mainly on his disciples and successors for any general account of his system. And of the earliest and most immediate of these the writings have perished.765Our sole original authority is Diogenes Laertius, who was unquestionably an Epicurean. The sketch of Epicurus which is given in his "Lives" is evidently a "labor of love." Among all the systems of ancient philosophy described by him, there is none of whose general character he has given so skillful and so elaborate an analysis. And even as regards the particulars of the system, nothing could be more complete than Laertius's account of his physical speculations. Additional light is also furnished by the philosophic poem of Lucretius "On the Nature of Things," which was written to advocate thephysical theory of Epicurus. These are the chief sources of our information.
Footnote 765:(return)Some fragments of the writings of Metrodorus, Phædrus, Polystratus, and Philodemus, have been found among the Herculanean Papyri, and published in Europe, which are said to throw some additional light on the doctrines of Epicurus. See article on "Herculanean Papyri," in Edinburgh Review, October, 1862.
It is said of Epicurus that he loved to hearken to the stories of the indifference and apathy of Pyrrhon, and that, in these qualities, he aspired to imitate him. But Epicurus was not, like Pyrrhon, a skeptic; on the contrary, he was the most imperious dogmatist. No man ever showed so little respect for the opinions of his predecessors, or so much confidence in his own. He was fond of boasting that he had made his own philosophy--hewas a "self-taught" man! Now "Epicurus might be perfectly honest in saying he had read very little, and had worked out the conclusions in his own mind, but he was a copyist, nevertheless; few men more entirely so."766His psychology was certainly borrowed from the Ionian school. From thence he had derived his fundamental maxim, that "sensation is the source of all knowledge, and the standard of all truth." His physics were copied from Democritus. With both, "atoms are the first principle of all things." And in Ethics he had learned from Aristotle, that if an absolute good is not the end of a practical life,happinessmust be its end.767All that is fundamental in the system of Epicurus was borrowed from his predecessors, and there is little that can be called new in his teaching.
Footnote 766:(return)Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 236.
Footnote 767:(return)"Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi.
The grand object of philosophy, according to Epicurus,is the attainment of a happy life. "Philosophy," says he, "is the power by which reason conducts men to happiness." Truth is a merely relative thing, a variable quantity; and therefore the pursuit of truth for its own sake is superfluous and useless. There is no such thing as absolute, unchangeable right: no action is intrinsically right or wrong. "We choose the virtues, not on their own account, but for the sake of pleasure, just as we seek the skill of the physician for the sake of health."768That which is nominally right in morals, that which is relatively goodin human conduct, is, therefore, to be determined by the effects upon ourselves; that which is agreeable--pleasurable, is right; that which is disagreeable--painful, is wrong. "The virtues are connate with living pleasantly."769Pleasure (ἡδονή), then, is the great end to be sought in human action. "Pleasure is the chief good, the beginning and end of living happily."770
Footnote 768:(return)"Fundamental Maxims," preserved in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxx.
Footnote 769:(return)"Epicurus to Menæceus," in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxvii.
Footnote 770:(return)Id., ib.
The proof which Epicurus offers in support of his doctrine, "that pleasure is the chief good," is truly characteristic. "All animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended with pain, by their natural instincts, and without the employment of reason. Therefore we, also, of our own inclination, flee from pain."771"All men like pleasure and dislike pain; they naturally shun the latter and pursue the former." "If happiness is present, we have every thing, and when it is absent, we do every thing with a view to possess it."772Virtue thus consists in man's doing deliberately what the animals do instinctively--that is, choose pleasure and avoid pain.
Footnote 771:(return)Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxix.
Footnote 772:(return)Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxvii.
"Every kind of pleasure" is, in the estimation of Epicurus, "alike good," and alike proper. "If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies [supernatural powers], and death and pain,... we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain, or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter."773Whilst, however, all pleasures of the body, as well as the mind, are equal in dignity, and alike good, they differ in intensity, in duration, and, especially, in their consequences. He therefore divides pleasure into two classes; and in this, as Cousin remarks, is found the only element of originality in his philosophy. These two kinds of pleasure are:
1.The pleasure of movement, excitement, energy(ἡδονὴ ἐν κινήσει).774This is the most lively pleasure; it supposes the greatest development of physical and mental power. "Joy and cheerfulness are beheld in motion and energy." But it is not the most enduring pleasure, and it is not the most perfect. It is accompanied by uneasiness; it "brings with it many perturbations," and it yields some bitter fruits.
Footnote 773:(return)"Fundamental Maxims," No. 9, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxxi.
Footnote 774:(return)Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxviii.
2.The second kind of pleasure is the pleasure of repose, tranquillity, impassibility(ἡδονὴ καταστηµατική). This is a state, a "condition," rather than a motion. It is "the freedom of the body from pain, and the soul from confusion."775This is perfect and unmixed happiness--the happiness of God; and he who attains it "will be like a god among men." "The storm of the soul is at an end, and body and soul are perfected."
Now, whilst "no pleasure is intrinsically bad,"776prudence (φρόνησις), or practical wisdom, would teach us to choose the highest and most perfect happiness. Morality is therefore the application of reason to the conduct of life, and virtue is wisdom. The office of reason is to "determine our choices"--to take account of the duration of pleasures, to estimate their consequences, and to regard the happiness of a whole lifetime, and not the enjoyment of a single hour. Without wisdom men will choose the momentary excitements of passion, and follow after agitating pleasures, which are succeeded by pain; they will consequently lose "tranquillity of mind." "It is not possible," says Epicurus, "to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly."777The difference, then, between the philosopher and the ordinary man is this--that while both seek pleasure, the former knows how to forego certain indulgences which cause pain and vexation hereafter, whereas the ordinary man seeks only immediate enjoyment. Epicurus does not dispense with virtue, but he simply employs it as a means to an end, namely, the securing of happiness.778
Footnote 775:(return)Id., ib.
Footnote 776:(return)"Fundamental Maxims," No. 7.
Footnote 777:(return)Ibid., No. 5.
Footnote 778:(return)Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," p. 141.
Social morality is, like private morality, founded uponutility.As nothing is intrinsically right or wrong in private life, so nothing is intrinsically just or unjust in social life. "Justice has no independent existence: it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining any injury. Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this character only because there is joined with it the fear of not escaping those who are appointed to punish actions marked with this character."779Society is thus a contract--an agreement to promote each other's happiness. And inasmuch as the happiness of the individual depends in a great degree upon the general happiness, the essence of his ethical system, in its political aspects, is contained in inculcating "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."
If you ask Epicurus what a man shall do when it is clearly his immediate interest to violate the social contract, he would answer, that if your general interest is secured by always observing it, you must make momentary sacrifices for the sake of future good. But "when, in consequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced just does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which was just... ceases to be just the moment it ceases to be useful."780So that self-interest is still the basis of all virtue. And if, by the performance of duty, you are exposed to great suffering, and especially to death, you are perfectly justified in the violation of any and all contracts. Such is the social morality of Epicurus.
With coarse and energetic minds the doctrine of Epicurus would inevitably lead to the grossest sensuality and crime; with men whose temperament was more apathetic, or whose tastes were more pure, it would develop a refined selfishness-- a perfect egoism, which Epicurus has adorned with the name "tranquillity of mind--impassibility," (ἀταραξία).781
Footnote 779:(return)"Fundamental Maxims," Nos. 35, 36.
Footnote 780:(return)Ibid., No. 41.
Footnote 781:(return)It is scarcely necessary to discuss the question whether, by making pleasure the standard of right, Epicurus intended to encourage what is usually called sensuality. He earnestly protested against any such unfavorable interpretation of his doctrine:--"When we say that pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and the soul from confusion" ("Epicurus to Menæceus," in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," bk. x. ch. xxvii.). The most obvious tendency of this doctrine is to extreme selfishness, rather than extreme sensuality--a selfishness which prefers one's own comfort and case to every other consideration.As to the personal character of Epicurus, opinions have been divided both in ancient and modern times. By some the garden has been called a "sty." Epicurus has been branded as a libertine, and the name "Epicurean" has, in almost all languages, become the synonym of sensualism. Diogenes Laertius repels all the imputations which are cast upon the moral character of his favorite author, and ascribes them to the malignity and falsehood of the Stoics. "The most modern criticism seems rather inclined to revert to the vulgar opinion respecting him, rejecting, certainly with good reason, the fanatical panegyrics of some French and English writers of the last century. Upon the whole, we are inclined to believe that Epicurus was an apathetic, decorous, formal man, who was able, without much difficulty, to cultivate a measured and even habit of mind, who may have occasionally indulged in sensual gratifications to prove that he thought them lawful, but who generally preferred, as a matter of taste, the exercises of the intellect to the more violent forms of self-indulgence. And this life, it seems to us, would be most consistent with his opinions. To avoid commotion, to make the stream of life flow on as easily as possible, was clearly the aim of his philosophy."-- Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 236.
As to the personal character of Epicurus, opinions have been divided both in ancient and modern times. By some the garden has been called a "sty." Epicurus has been branded as a libertine, and the name "Epicurean" has, in almost all languages, become the synonym of sensualism. Diogenes Laertius repels all the imputations which are cast upon the moral character of his favorite author, and ascribes them to the malignity and falsehood of the Stoics. "The most modern criticism seems rather inclined to revert to the vulgar opinion respecting him, rejecting, certainly with good reason, the fanatical panegyrics of some French and English writers of the last century. Upon the whole, we are inclined to believe that Epicurus was an apathetic, decorous, formal man, who was able, without much difficulty, to cultivate a measured and even habit of mind, who may have occasionally indulged in sensual gratifications to prove that he thought them lawful, but who generally preferred, as a matter of taste, the exercises of the intellect to the more violent forms of self-indulgence. And this life, it seems to us, would be most consistent with his opinions. To avoid commotion, to make the stream of life flow on as easily as possible, was clearly the aim of his philosophy."-- Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 236.
To secure this highest kind of happiness--this pure impassivity, it was necessary to get rid of all superstitious fears of death, of supernatural beings, and of a future retribution.782The chief causes of man's misery are his illusions, his superstitions, and his prejudices. "That which principally contributes to trouble the spirit of men, is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beings imperishable and happy (i.e.,that they are gods), and that then our thoughts and actions are contrary to the will of those superior beings; they also, being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity of evils, they fear the insensibility of death, as though that could affect them...." "The real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being emancipated from all these things."783And this emancipation is to be secured by the study of philosophy--that is, of that philosophy which explains every thing on natural or physical principles, and excludes all supernatural powers.
Footnote 782:(return)Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. 1. 100-118.
Footnote 783:(return)Epicurus to Herodotus, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," p. 453 (Bohn's edition).
That ignorance which occasions man's misery is two-fold, (i.)Ignorance of the external world, which leads to superstition.All unexplained phenomena are ascribed to unseen, supernatural powers; often to malignant powers, which take pleasure in tormenting man; sometimes to a Supreme and Righteous Power, which rewards and punishes men for their good or evil conduct. Hence a knowledge of Physics, particularly the physics which Democritus taught, was needful to deliver men from false hopes and false fears.784(ii.)Ignorance of the nature of man, of his faculties, powers, and the sources and limits of his knowledge, from whence arise illusions, prejudices, and errors. Hence the need of Psychology to ascertain the real grounds of human knowledge, to explain the origin of man's illusions, to exhibit the groundlessness of his fears, and lead him to a just conception of the nature and end of his existence.
Footnote 784:(return)"The study of physics contributes more than any thing else to the tranquillity and happiness of life."--Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," bk. x. ch. xxiv. "For thus it is thatfearrestrains all men, because they observe many things effected on the earth and in heaven, of which effects they can by no means see the causes, and therefore think that they are wrought by adivinepower. For which reasons, when we have clearly seen thatnothing can be produced from nothing, we shall have a more accurate perception of that of which we are in search, and shall understand whence each individual thing is generated, and how all things are done without the agency of the gods."--Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 145-150.
Physics and Psychology are thus the only studies which Epicurus would tolerate as "conducive to the happiness of man." The pursuit of truth for its own sake was useless. Dialectics, which distinguish the true from the false, the good from the bad, onà priorigrounds, must be banished as an unnecessary toil, which yields no enjoyment. Theology must be cancelled entirely, because it fosters superstitious fears. The idea of God's taking knowledge of, disapproving, condemning, punishing the evil conduct of men, is an unpleasant thought. Physics and Psychology are the most useful, because the most "agreeable," the most "comfortable" sciences.