"And now had Phœbus in the lapOf Thetis taken out his nap,And, like a lobster boiled, the mornFrom black to red began to turn."
"And now had Phœbus in the lapOf Thetis taken out his nap,And, like a lobster boiled, the mornFrom black to red began to turn."
"And now had Phœbus in the lap
Of Thetis taken out his nap,
And, like a lobster boiled, the morn
From black to red began to turn."
The sublime ideas connected with the sun, and the classical associations united with the name of Thetis, would not naturally have recalled the idea of so insignificant an animal, nor the changes produced in cooking it, and these connections violate the ordinary laws of association.
Emotions of the ludicrous are also produced by the sudden conception of some association in ideas which has never before been discovered. Thus, if ideas have been united in the mind on some other principle of association than that of resemblance, the sudden discovery of some unexpected resemblance will produce mirth. This is the foundation of the merriment produced bypuns, where theideaswhich the words represent would never have been united by the principles of association, but the union of these ideas is effected on the principle of resemblance between thesoundsof the words which recall these ideas. When the mind suddenly perceives this unexpected foundation for the union of ideas that in all other respects are incongruous, an emotion of the ludicrous is produced. This is also the foundation of the pleasure which is felt in the use of alliteration in poetry, where a resemblance is discovered in the initial sound of words that recall ideas which in all other respects are incongruous.
All minds enjoy the excitement of this class of emotions, but some much more than others.Laughter, which is the effect of this class of emotions, is enjoyed more or less by all mankind, and is regarded as not only an agreeable, but as a healthful exercise.
A briefreference has been made to those susceptibilities which are the subject of this chapter. These, from their importance, are entitled to a more enlarged consideration.
Before proceeding, however, it is desirable to refer to the uses of the termmoral, inasmuch as it often is employed with a vague comprehension of its signification. In its widest sense it signifieswhatever relates to the regulation of mind by motivesin distinction from those influences that produce involuntary results.
In a more limited sense, it signifieswhatever relates to the regulation of mind in reference to the rules of right and wrong.
In the preceding pages it has been assumed that the grand object for which the Creator formed mind and all things is to producethe greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil, and that this design is so impressed on the human mind that the needless destruction of happiness is felt to bewrong—that is, contrary or unfitted to the design of all things; while all that tends to promote happiness is felt to be right, or consistent with this plan.
In order to a more clear view of this part of the subject, it is important to inquire as to the manner in which the ideas ofrightandwrongseem to originate.
The young child first notices that certain actionsof its own are regarded with smiles and tones of love and approval, while other acts occasion frowns and tones of displeasure.
Next, it perceives that whatever gives pleasure to itself and to others is calledgoodandright, while whatever causes unpleasant feelings is calledbadandwrong. Moreover, it notices that there is a right and wrong way to hold its spoon, to use its playthings, to put on its clothes, and to do multitudes of other things. It thus perceives, more and more, that there is someruleto regulate the use and action of all things, both animate and inanimate, and that such rules always have reference to some plan or design.
As its faculties develop and its observation enlarges, the general impression is secured thatallplans and contrivances of men are designed to promote enjoyment or to prevent discomfort, and are called good and right just so far as this is done. At the same time, all that tend to discomfort or pain are called bad and wrong.
In all the works of nature around, too, every thing that promotes enjoyment is called good and right, and the opposite is called evil and wrong.
At last there is a resulting feeling that the great design of all things is to secure good and prevent evil, and that whatever is opposed to this is wrong, and unfitted to the object for which all things exist. The question whether this impression is owing solely to observation or partly to mental constitution is waived as of little practical consequence.
But, in the experience of infancy and childhood, thelaw of sacrificeis speedily developed. It is perceivedthat much of the good to be gained, if sought to excess, occasions pain, so that there must be a certain amount of self-denial practiced, which, to the young novice, sometimes involves disappointment and discomfort. It is also seen that frequently two or more enjoyments are offered which are incompatible, so that one must be relinquished to gain the other. It is perceived, also, that there is a constant calculation going on as to which will be thebest—that is, which will securethe most good with the least evil. And the child is constantly instructed that it must avoid excess, and must give up what is of less value to secure the greater good. All this training involvessacrificeswhich are more or less painful, so that a young child will sometimes cry as it voluntarily gives up one kind of pleasure as the only mode of securing what is preferred.
It is perceived, also, that there is a constantbalancingof good and evil, so that a given amount of enjoyment cancels or repays for a certain amount of evil. When a great amount of enjoyment is purchased by a small degree of labor or trouble, thecompound resultis deemed a good, and called right; on the contrary, when the evil involved exceeds a given amount in comparison to the good, the compound result is called evil and wrong.
Thus is generated the impression that there is a law of sacrifice instituted requiring the greatest possible good with the least possible evil, and that this is the great design of all things.
The impression is, not merely that we are to seek enjoyment and avoid pain, but that we are to seek thegreatest possiblegood with theleast possibleevil, andthat in doing this we are to obey the law of sacrifice and suffering, by which the greatest possible goodis to be boughtby a certain amount of evilvoluntarilyassumed.
In regard to this great law of sacrifice, the highest part of it is discerned in the earliest experiences of life. The young child very soon perceives that its mother and its other friends are constantly making sacrifices for its own good, and bearing inconveniences and trouble for the good of those around. And those who perform such acts of benevolent self-sacrifice are praised, and their conduct is called good and right.Voluntary suffering to promote the welfare of othersis discerned to be the highest kind of good and right conduct in the estimation of all.
The first feature, then, in our moral nature is thatimpression of the great design of our Creatorwhich furnishes us the means of deciding on the rectitude of all voluntary action.
The second feature of our moral constitution is what is ordinarily called thesense of justice. It is that susceptibility which is excited at the view of the conduct of others asvoluntarycauses of good or evil.
In all cases where free agents act to promote happiness, an emotion of approval arises, together with a desire of reward to the author of the good. On the contrary, when there is a voluntary destruction of happiness, there is an emotion of disapproval and a desire for retributive pain on the author of the wrong.
These emotions are instinctive, and not at all regulated by reason in their inception. When an evil is done, an instant desire is feltto discover the cause;and when it is found, an instant desire is feltto inflict some penalty. So irrational is this impulse, that children will exhibit anger and deal blows on inanimate objects that cause pain. Even mature minds are sometimes conscious of this impulse.
It is the office of the intellect to judge whether the deed was a voluntary one, whether the agent intended the mischief, and whether a penalty will be of any use. The impulse to punish is never preceded by any such calculations.
That this impulse is an implanted part of our constitution, and not the result of reason and experience, is seen in the delight manifested by young children in the narration of the nursery tale where the cruel uncle who murdered the Babes in the Wood receives the retributions of Heaven.
Another feature in this sense of justice is theproportiondemanded between the evil done and the penalty inflicted. That this also is instinctive, and not the result of reason, is seen in the nursery, where children will approve of slight penalties for slight offenses, and severe ones for great ones, but will revolt from any very great disproportion between the wrong act and its penalty. As a general rule, both in the nursery and in the great family of mature minds, the greater the wrong done, the stronger the desire for a penalty, and the more severe the punishment demanded.
Another very important point of consideration is the universal feeling of mankind that thenatural penaltiesfor wrong-doing arenot sufficient, and that it is an act of love as well as of justice to add to these penalties. Thus the parent who forbids his child to eatgreen fruit will not trust to the results of the natural penalty, but restrain by the fear of the immediate and more easily conceived penalty of chastisement.
So, in the great family of man, the natural penalties for theft are not deemed sufficient, but severe penalties for the protection of property are added.
This particular is the foundation of certain distinctions that are of great importance, which will now be pointed out.
We find the terms "rewardandpunishment" used in two different relations. In the first and widest sense they signify not only the penalties of human law, but thosenatural consequenceswhich, by the constitution of nature, inevitably follow certain courses of conduct.
Thus an indolent man is said to receive poverty as a punishment, and it is in this sense that his children are said to be punished for the faults of their father.
The violations of natural law are punished without any reference to the question whether the evil-doer intended the wrong, or whether he sinned in ignorance, or whether this ignorance was involuntary and unavoidable. The question of the justice or injustice of such natural penalties involves the great question of the right and wrong of the system of the universe. Is it just and right for the Creator to make a system in which all free agents shall be thus led to obedience to its laws by penalties as well as rewards, by fear as well as by hope? This question will not be discussed here.
Most discussions as tojustrewards and penalties ordinarily relate to theaddedpenalties by which parents,teachers, and magistrates enforce obedience to natural or to statute law.
In these questions reference is always had to theprobable resultsof such rewards and penalties in securing obedience. If experience has shown that certain penalties do secure obedience to wise and good laws, either of nature or of human enactment, then they are considered just. If they do not, they are counted unwise and unjust.
So, if certain penalties are needlessly severe—that is to say, if a less penalty will secure equal obedience, then this also decides so severe a penalty to be unjust.
In deciding on the rectitude of the penalties of human enactments, it is always assumed to be unjust to punish for any lack of knowledge and obedience when the subject hadno powerto know and to obey. Ifa choice to obeywill not secure the act required of a free agent, then a penalty inflicted for disobedience is always regarded as unjust. The only seeming exception to this is the case where a person, by voluntary means, has deprived himself of ability to obey. But in such cases the punishment is felt to be right, not because he does not obey when he has no power, but because he has voluntarily deprived himself of this power. And he is punished for destroying his ability to obey, and not for violating the law.
These things in human laws, then, are always demanded to make a penalty appearjustto the moral sense of mankind, namely, that the subject have power to obey, and that he has opportunity to know the law, and is not ignorant by any voluntary and improper neglect.
In all questions of justice, therefore, it is important to discriminate between those penalties that are inherent as a part of the great system of the universe, and for which the Creator alone is the responsible cause, and those which result from voluntary institutions of which men are the authors.
In connection with this subject, it is important to recognize the distinction that exists in regard to two classes of right and wrong actions. The first class includes those which are wrong in their nature and in all supposable cases, such, for example, as the wanton infliction of needless pain, or the breach of plighted faith, or the returning of love and kindness with ungrateful treatment. In all possible suppositions, the mind revolts from such actions as wrong and deserving of penalties. It is this class of actions which, without any reasoning, the mind never fails to disapprove, and to desire should be visited with retributive penalties.
The other class of right and wrong acts derive their estimate solely from the circumstances in which they occur. For example, a man is angry and beats a little child. Now the question whether his feelings and action are right or wrong depends entirely on circumstances. If the child has done no evil and the person knew it, his feelings and actions are wrong. But if the person is a father correcting his child for some heinous fault and with only a suitable degree of anger, then the feeling and action are right.
There is another mode of estimating conduct by which the same act may have two opposite characters, according to therelationin which it is regarded. For example, a good parent may give wrong medicine tohis child, or punish an innocent one, believing him to be guilty.
In such cases the act is right as it respects the motive or intention, and wrong as it respects the nature of the action. It is sometimes the case that a man may do a right action with a bad motive, and a wrong action with a good motive.
Thus the same act is right in one relation, and wrong in another. It is important that this distinction should be borne in mind.
The next feature in our moral constitution is the susceptibility which is excited by the intellectual judgment of our own feelings and conduct as either right or wrong.
In case we decide them to be right, we experience an emotion of self-approval which is very delightful; but if we decide that they are wrong, we experience an immediate penalty in a painful emotion calledremorse. This emotion is always proportioned to the amount of evil done, and the consciousness that it was done knowingly and intentionally. No suffering is more keen than the highest emotions of this kind, while their pangs are often enduring and unappeasable. Sometimes there is an attending desire to inflict retribution on one's self as a mode of alleviating this distress.
This susceptibility is usually denominatedconscience. Sometimes this word is used to include both the intellectual judgment of our conduct as right or wrong, and the consequent emotions of approval or remorse; sometimes it refers to the susceptibility alone. Either use is correct, as in the connection in which itis employed the distinction can ordinarily be easily made.
This analysis of our moral constitution furnishes means for a clear definition of such terms asobligated,ought,ought not, and the like.
A person is obligated or ought to do a thing when he has the intellect to perceive that it is right, and the moral susceptibilities just described. When he is destitute either of the intellect or of these susceptibilities, he ceases to be a moral and accountable being. He can no longer be made to feel any moral obligations.
Itis thepower of choicewhich raises man to the dignity of an intellectual and moral being. Without this principle, he would be a creature of mere impulses and instincts. He would possess susceptibilities of happiness to be excited, and intellect to devise and discover the modes of securing enjoyment; but without governing principle, the soul would be led captive with each successive desire, or be the sport of chances whenever conflicting desires were awakened.
He who formed man in his own perfect image left not his work without this balance-power to regulate the complicated springs of so wonderful an existence. Man is now not only the image of his Creator as lord of this lower world, but is, like him, the lord and master of his own powers.
It has been shown that the constitution, both of mind and of the world, is such that it is impossible in the nature of things to gain every object which is the cause of enjoyment. There is a constant succession of selections to be made between different modes of securing happiness. A lesser good is given up for a greater, or some good relinquished altogether to avoid some consequent pain. Often, also, some painful state of mind is sought as the means of securing some future good, or of avoiding some greater evil. Thus men endure want, fatigue, and famine to purchase wealth.Thus the nauseous draught will be swallowed to avoid the pains of sickness; and thus the pleasures of domestic affection will be sacrificed to obtain honor and fame. The whole course of life is a constant succession of such decisions between different modes of securing happiness and of avoiding pain.
In noticing the operation of mind, it will be seen that there is a foundation for two classes of volitions or acts of choice, which may be denominatedspecificandgeneric.
Aspecific volitionis one that secures some particular act, such as the moving of the arm or turning of the head. Such volitions are ordinarily consequent on some more general purpose of the mind, which they aid in accomplishing, and which is, therefore, denominated ageneric volition. For example, a man chooses to make a certain journey: this is the generic volition, and, in order to carry it out, he performs a great variety of acts, each one of which aids in carrying out the generic decision. These specific acts of will, which tend to accomplish a more general purpose, may also be calledsubordinate, because they are controlled by a generic volition.
It can be seen that the generic volitions may themselves become subordinate to a still more comprehensive purpose. Thus the man may decide to make a journey, which is a generic volition in reference to all acts subordinate to this end. But this journey may be a subordinate part of a more general purpose to make a fortune or to secure some other important end.
It is frequently the case that a generic purpose, which relates to objects that require a long time and many complicated operations, exists when the mind seems almost unconscious of its power. For example, a man may form a generic purpose to enter a profession for which years will be required to prepare. And while his whole course of action is regulated by this decision, he engages in pursuits entirely foreign to it and which seem to engross his whole attention. These pursuits may sometimes be such as are antagonistic to his grand purpose, so as at least to imperil or retard its accomplishment. And yet this strong and quiet purpose remains, and is eventually carried out.
It is the case, also, that a generic volition may be formed to be performed at some particular time and place, and then the mind becomes entirely unconscious of it till the appointed period and circumstances occur. Then the decision becomes dominant, and controls all other purposes.
Thus a man may decide that, at a specified hour, he will stop his studies and perform certain gymnastic exercises. This volition is forgotten until the hour arrives, and then it recurs and is carried out.
This phenomenon sometimes occurs in sleep. Some persons, in watching with the sick, will determine to wake at given hours to administer medicines; then they will sleep soundly till the appointed time comes, when they will waken and perform the predetermined actions.
In regard to thecommencementof a generic purpose, we find that sometimes it is so distinct and definite as to be the subject of consciousness and memory. Forexample, a spendthrift, in some moment of suffering and despondency, may form a determination to commence a systematic course of thrift and economy, and may actually carry it out through all his future life. Such cases are often to be found on record or in everyday life.
In other cases, this quiet, hidden, but controlling purpose seems to be formed by unconscious and imperceptible influences, so that the mind can not revert to the specific time or manner when it originated. For example, a child who is trained from early life to speak the truth, can never revert to any particular moment when this generic purpose originated.
It is sometimes the case, also, that a person will contemplate some generic volition before it occurs, while the process of its final formation seems almost beyond the power of scrutiny. For example, a man may be urged to relinquish one employment and engage in another. He reflects, consults, and is entirely uncertain how he shall decide. As time passes, he gradually inclines toward the proposed change, until, finally, he finds his determination fixed, he scarcely knows when or how.
Thus it appears that generic volitions commence sometimes so instantaneously and obviously that the time and influences connected with them can be recognized. In other cases, the decision seems to be a gradual one, while in some instances the process can be traced, and in others it is entirely unnoticed or forgotten.
It is in reference to such generic purposes that themoral characterof men is estimated. An honest manis one who has a fixed purpose to act honestly in all circumstances. A truthful man is one who has such a purpose to speak the truth at all times.
In such cases, the degree in which such a purpose controls all others is the measure of a man's moral character in the estimate of society.
The history of mankind shows a great diversity of moral character dependent on such generic volitions. Some men possess firm and reliable moral principles in certain directions, while they are very destitute of them in others.
Thus it will be seen that some have formed a very decided purpose in regard to honesty in business affairs, who yet are miserable victims to intemperance. Others have cultivated a principle calledhonor, that restrains them from certain actions regarded as mean, and yet they may be frequenters of gambling saloons and other haunts of vice.
In the religious world, too, it is the case that some who are very firm and decided on all points of religious observances and in the cultivation of devotional emotions, are guilty of very mean actions, such as some worldly men of honor would not practice at the sacrifice of a right hand.
It becomes, then, a most interesting subject of inquiry as to thecauseswhich decide these diversities of moral purposes, and also the causes which operate to give them more or less control over other principles.
But, preliminary to this, it is necessary to securesome discriminating accuracy in regard to the signification of the wordcausein its various uses.
This term, in its widest sense, signifies "that without which a change will not take place, and with which it will take place." This is the leading idea which is included in every use of the word.
But there is a foundation for three classes of causes which may be denominatedproducing causes, occasional causes, anddeciding causes.
Aproducing causeis that which produces a change by the constitution of nature, so that in the given circumstances there is no power to do otherwise.
Occasional causesare those circumstances which are indispensable to the action of producing causes.
Thus, when fire is applied to your powder, the fire is the producing cause of the explosion, while the act of contact between the fire and powder is the occasional cause.
In regard to the action of mind in volition, the mind itself is the producing cause, while excited desires and objects to excite those desires are the occasional causes. Or, in other words, mind is the producing cause of its own volitions, and motives are the occasional causes.
But inasmuch as mind always has the power to choose ineitherof two or more directions, the question arises as tothe causes which decide the direction of volitions, and which may be calleddeciding causes. Whenever it is asked, "Whydid a person choose to do thus?" the meaning is, What were the causes that influenced him to decide thus?
Now these causes are ascertained, as all others are, by experience. Men are always stating to each other, as well as noticing in their own experience, the causes which decide their determinations.
First, in certain cases, where two or more objects are presented, of which only one can be taken, the cause assigned for the direction of the choice may be thatone excited a stronger desire than the other. A vast proportion of human volitions are decided simply by the fact that one object seems a greater good or excites a stronger desire than any other, and is thus the strongest motive.
But there are other cases where, of the objects presented, one excites the strongest desire, while the judgment perceives that another will secure agreater good on the whole. For example, in case of a sick person, there may be placed a favorite drink that excites a very strong desire, and beside it may stand a nauseous medicine. In this case, the invalid may feel the strongest desire for the drink, and yet choose the medicine as the greater good in its final results.
In such cases, what decides the direction of a volition is the judgment of the mind, that the object chosen, though it does not excite the strongest desire, is still the greater good.
Another deciding cause of volition is the nature of theconstitutional susceptibilities. For example, when it is asked why did a man forsake domestic life and become a soldier, the deciding cause may be that he had a strong constitutional love of the excitement and glory connected with that profession, and but little susceptibility for the quiet enjoyments of domestic life.
It is sometimes the case that a child, from its birth, seems to possess a natural love for truth, so that instructions on that point are scarcely needed. In another case, in the same family, and under exactly the same training, will be found a child who has the contrary propensity, so that it costs years of careful training to form a principle of veracity. The same constitutional variety will be found in reference to other virtues.
Another deciding cause of volition arethe habits. The existence of ahabit of obedience, for example, will induce the formation of virtuous purposes that would never have existed but for this. A child who began life with strong propensities to certain faults, by a wise and careful training may secure habits that are fully equal in power to the same constitutional traits in another child. Often, in the result, it can not be seen whether the generic purpose to be truthful, for example, resulted mainly from natural constitution or from the formation of habits.
The will itself also is more or less regulated by this principle. When a child is trained constantly to submit to fixed rules, the will acquires increased ease and facility in doing it. On the contrary, a mind that is never controlled grows more and more averse to yielding to any regulating principle.
Another deciding cause of volition is sucha combination of circumstancesas excites one class of desires, while other sensibilities have no appropriate objects to stimulate them.
For example, it may be asked, Why did a man choose to drink and gamble? The cause assigned may be thepresence of liquor and of tempting companions, and the want of objects to excite higher susceptibilities. He had no wise friends, no business, and no higher sources of enjoyment immediately around him.
Another deciding cause of volition is the existence ofprinciple or generic purpose. For example, it may be asked, Why did a man choose to give up his liberty and property when he could have secured them by false testimony? The answer may be that he was a truthful man or a virtuous man—that is, he had formed a strong generic purpose to speak the truth or to act right on all occasions.
Another deciding cause of volition is the existence of love and gratitude toward other minds, and the reflex influence of such minds in the bestowal of their love, sympathy, teachings, and example.
This is the most powerful of all the influences which secure and sustain generic volitions, as will be illustrated more at large in future pages.
The next inquiry relates to the causes which regulate thepowerof generic volition.
Among those causes, the most prominent is that natural force of will which is strictly constitutional. Some minds are formed by the Creator with great energy and great pertinacity of will, so that when a purpose is formed, all subordinate volitions needful to carry out this purpose seem easily controlled. Other minds, on the contrary, possess a naturally feeble will, so that no generic volition has a strong and steady control, but is constantly interrupted in its power oversubordinate volitions, or is easily changed by conflicting desires.
In one case the person is denominated a man of firm purpose or a man of a strong will. In the other case he is called a man of yielding temperament or a weak character.
The remaining causes that give strength to a generic purpose are most of those that have been enumerated as causes of thedirectionof volition, ordeciding causes. These are the constitutional susceptibilities—the habits—the surrounding circumstances—the existence of love and gratitude toward other minds, and the reflex influence of such minds in the bestowal of their love, sympathy, teachings, and example.
In all this variety of influences that decide those generic volitions which are the foundation of moral character, it must be remembered that in every case the mind has the power to choose that which the judgment decides to be the greatest good on the whole for itself and for the commonwealth.
In this connection, it is important to secure exact ideas of what is meant when one mind is spoken of asthe causeof the volitions of another mind.
Of course, in this relation, no mind can be theproducingcause of volition in any mind but itself. It must be, then, either asoccasionalor asdecidingcauses that we can influence other minds.
The only mode by which we can regulate the volitions of other minds is bythe employment of motives to stimulate desire, or by changing the constitutional susceptibilities.
In the first case, men have power to so combine circumstances of temptation as to affect the most excitable and powerful sensibilities, or they can remove those objects and influences that sustain moral principle, or by a long course of training they can form habits and induce principles. The combinations of motive influences that one mind can bring to bear on another, as temptations to right or wrong action, are almost infinite.
The other mode is bychanging the constitutional susceptibilities. This can sometimes be effected to a certain degree by education and the formation of habits. It can be still more directly effected through the physical organization. For example, a child may be trained to use coffee, tea, alcohol, or tobacco, till the nervous system is shattered, and then a placid temper becomes excitable, a generous nature grows sour and selfish, an active nature becomes indolent, and multitudes of other disastrous changes are the result.
These are the only two modes in which one mind is ever regarded as the cause of right or wrong volition in other minds.
The most important of all the voluntary phenomena is the fact that, while there can be a multitude of these quiet and hidden generic purposes in the mind, it is also possible to formonewhich shall be the dominant or controlling one, to which all the other volitions, both generic and specific, shall become subordinate. In common parlance, this would be called theruling passion. It may also be called theruling purposeorcontrolling principle. This consists in the permanent choice of some one mode of securing happiness as thechief endor grand object of life.
We have set forth on preceding pages the chief sources of happiness and of suffering to the human mind. Now in the history of our race we find that each one of these modes of enjoyment have been selected by different individuals as the chief end of their existence—as the mode of seeking enjoyment, to which they sacrifice every other. Some persons have chosen the pleasures of eating, drinking, and the other grosser enjoyments of sense. Others have chosen those more elevated and refined pleasures that come indirectly from the senses in the emotions of taste.
Others have devoted themselves to intellectual enjoyments as their chief resource for happiness. Others have selected the exercise of physical and moral power, as in the case of conquerors and physical heroes, or of those who have sought to control by moral power, as rulers and statesmen.
Others have made the attainment of the esteem, admiration, and love of their fellow-creatures their chief end. Others, still, have devoted themselves to the promotion of happiness around them as their chief interest. Others have devoted themselves to the service of God, or what they conceived to be such, and sometimes by the most miserable life of asceticism and self-torture.
Others have made it their main object in life to obey the laws of rectitude and virtue.
In all these cases, themoral characterof the person, in the view of all observers, has been decided by thisdominant volition, and exactly in proportion to the supremacy with which it hasactually controlledall other purposes.
Some minds seem to have no chief end of life. Their existence is a succession of small purposes, each of which has its turn in controlling the life. Others have a strong, defined, and all-controlling principle.
Now experience shows that both of these classes are capable, the one offormingand the other ofchangingsuch a purpose. For example, in a time of peace and ease there is little to excite the mind strongly; but let a crisis come where fortune, reputation, and life are at stake, and men and women are obliged to form generic decisions involving all they hold dear, and many minds that have no controlling purpose immediately originate one, while those whose former ruling aims were in one direction change them entirely to another.
This shows how it is that days of peril create heroes, statesmen, and strong men and women. The hour of danger calls all the energies of the soul into action. Great purposes are formed with the strongest desire and emotion. Instantly the whole current of thought, and all the co-existing desires and emotions, are conformed to these purposes.
The experience of mankind proves that a dominant generic purpose mayextend to a whole life, and actually control all other generic and specific volitions.
We will now consider some of the modes by which the will controls the intellect, desires, and emotions.
We have seen, in previous pages, the influence which desire and emotion exert in making both our perceptions and conceptions more vivid. Whatever purpose or aim in life becomes an object of strong desire, is always distinctly and vividly conceived, while all less interesting objects are more faint and indistinct.
We have also seen that whenever any conception arises it always brings connected objects, according to certain laws of association, forming a new and complex picture.
Whenever the mind is under the influence of a controlling purpose, the object of pursuit is alwaysmore interestingthan any other. This interest always fastens on those particulars in any mental combination that are connected with the ruling purpose and seem fitted to promote it, making them more vivid. Around these selected objects their past associated ideas begin to cluster, forming other complex pictures. In all these combinations, those ideas most consonant with the leading interest of the mind become most vivid, and the others fade away.
The grand method, then, forregulating the thoughtsis by the generic decisions of the mind as to the modes of seeking enjoyment.
In regard to the power of the mind over its own desires and emotions, it is very clear that these sensibilitiescan not be regulated by direct specific volitions. Let any person try to produce love, fear, joy, hope, or gratitude by simply choosing to have them arise, and it is soon perceived that no such power exists.
But there areindirectmodes by which the mind can control its susceptibilities. The first method is by directing attention to those objects of thought which are fitted to call forth such emotions. For example, if we wish to awaken the emotion of fear, we can place ourselves in circumstances of danger, or call up ideas of horror and distress. If we wish to call forth emotions of gratitude, we can direct attention to acts of kindness to ourselves calculated to awaken such feelings. If we wish to excite desire for any object, we can direct attention to those qualities in that object that are calculated to excite desire. In all these cases the mind can, by an act of will,direct its attentionto subjects calculated to excite emotion and desire.
The other mode of regulating the desires and emotions is bythe direction of our generic volitions. For example, let a man of business, who has never had any interest in commerce, decide to invest all his property in foreign trade. As soon as this is done, the name of the ship that bears his all can never be heard or seen but it excites some emotion. A storm, that before would go unnoticed, awakens fear; the prices in the commercial markets, before unheeded, now awaken fear or afford pleasure. And thus multitudes of varied desires and emotions are called into existence by this one generic volition.
One result of a purpose to deny an importunate propensity is frequently seen in the immediate or gradualdiminution of that desire. For example, if a person is satisfied that a certain article of food is injurious, and resolves ontotal abstinence, it will be found that the desire for it is very much reduced, far more so than when the effort is to diminish the indulgence.
When a generic purpose is formed that involves great interests, it is impossible to prevent the desires and emotions from running consonant with this purpose. The only mode of changing this current is to give up this generic purpose and form another. Thus, if a man has devoted his whole time and energies to money-making, it is impossible for him to prevent his thoughts and feelings from running in that direction. He must give up this as his chief end, and take a nobler object, if he would elevate the whole course of his mental action.
These are the principal phenomena of the grand mental faculty which is the controlling power of the mind, and on the regulation of which all its other powers are dependent.
Wehave shown that a belief in the reality of the existence, both of mind and of matter, ascauses, is one of the implanted principles of mind. Some philosophers have claimed that there is nothing in existence but mind, and that all that is called matter is simplyideasof things in the mind itself, for which there is no corresponding reality. Others have claimed just the opposite: that there is no such existence as an immaterial spirit, but that soul is the brain, or some other very fine organization of matter.
In both cases, the assumptions not only have no evidence to sustain them, but are contrary to the common sense or reason of all mankind, and never can be really believed.
Whenperceptionsare called into existence by the agency of the senses, we can not help believing that thingsare as they appear to us, unless we have some evidence of deception either from disordered sensation or some other cause.
But in regard to ourconceptionswe have two classes. One class is attended with the belief that they correspond with realities, or the things they represent. The other class is not attended with this belief. For example, we can conceive of a house of a color, form, and details such as we never saw, and this conception is not attended with any belief of the reality of suchan existence; but when we conceive of the home of our childhood, this conception is attended with a belief of the reality of the thing conceived.
This illustration furnishes the means of defining "truth" as "the reality of things." Weconceivethe truth when our conceptions represent correctly the reality of things, and webelievethe truth when we feel this correspondence to exist. We believe falsehood when we have a conception attended by a feeling that it represents the reality of things when it does not.
All our comfort, success, and happiness depend uponbelieving the truth; for just so far as our belief or faith varies from the reality of things, we shall meet with mistakes, disappointment, and sorrow.
Our beneficent Creator has so formed our minds and our bodies that, in their natural, healthy state, ourperceptionscorrespond with the reality of things uniformly, while, as before stated, our belief or faith also thus corresponds.
It is very rarely the case that disease or other causes prevent this uniform correct perception and belief in regard to all things that come within the reach of our own senses.
It is only in regard to that knowledge that we gain from theexperience and testimonyof others, or from theprocess of reasoning, that we become liable to a false belief.
Men often impart their conceptions of things to us, and we find that they do not correspond with realities.
We also, by a process of reasoning, often come to conceptions of things, and a belief in them, which we find to be false.
Evidencemay be defined as all those causes which tend to producecorrectideas of truth or the reality of things.
Inasmuch as we find by experience that human testimony and the process of reasoning do not uniformly conduct us to right conceptions of realities, we find that there are different degrees of belief according to the nature of the evidence presented.
The highest kind of evidence is intuitive knowledge, which is a uniform result of the constitution of mind and its inevitable circumstances. This is calledintuitive knowledgeorintuitive belief.
All other evidence is gained byexperienceor byreasoning. The experience of other minds we gain by testimony. This is called theevidence of testimony.
Belief differs in degrees according to the nature and amount of evidence perceived. The highest kind of evidence produces what is calledcertainty. It is the kind which is felt in reference to the intuitive truths. There are all degrees of faith, from the highest certainty to entire incredulity or unbelief.
This fact lays the foundation for a distinction in practical matters which it is very important to recognize. It is often the case that there is an amount of evidence that produces a conviction which rests in the mind, but does not produce its appropriatepracticalresult. For example, a man in feeble health has read enough on the subject to be convinced that a daily bath in cool water would tend to restore strength, and yet the belief does not secure the practice. But on a review of the books which produced the conviction, or on hearing some lecturer on health, the conviction becomesmore powerful, and leads to a corresponding practice.
Now, in reference to the fact that there are multitudes of convictions which are inoperative, which, if vividly realized, would become principles of action, there is a distinction made, in common parlance, between a dead or ideal faith, and a living or practical faith. Still more is this distinction recognized in matters of religion, as will be hereafter shown.
The question whether faith or belief is under the control of the will, or whether it is necessary and inevitable, is one of very great importance both in regard to our happiness and our obligations.
If belief is not under the control of the will, it must be because either the mind has not the power of directing its attention to evidence, or because it is so made that, when it perceives the truth, it can not distinguish it from falsehood.
In regard to the first alternative, the control which the mind has over its own train of thought has been definitely pointed out and described in the articles on attention and on the will. It appears thatthe willis the regulating principle, which governs all mental operations by selecting the modes of happiness which the intellect shall be employed in securing. Whatever mode of present or of general happiness is selected, immediately all conceptions which the judgment discerns as having a fitness for accomplishing this object become vivid and distinct, and recall their associate conceptions. Thus it is the choice of any mode of enjoyment by the will which determines the train of thought.
When, therefore, any question is brought up which demands attention to evidence, if the mind has some desire to gratify, and the intellect discerns that the conviction of this truth will interfere with this chosen plan of happiness, the will refuses attention to what is not in consonance with the leading desire of the mind. Where conviction of any truth is foreseen to interfere with some plan of enjoyment already chosen, the only way by which attention can be secured is by exhibiting some evil that will follow inattention which will more than counterbalance the good to be gained. In this case, the mind may choose to attend, and run the hazard of losing the particular mode of enjoyment sought in order to avoid the threatened evil from inattention to evidence.
This is the method men pursue in all their intercourse with each other. They find that their fellow-men are unwilling to believe what is contrary to their own wishes and plans. But when they determine that belief shall be secured, they contrive various modes to make it appear either for their pleasure or their interest to attend to evidence, or else they exhibit some evil as the consequence of neglecting attention.
The only mode by which mankind are induced to give their thoughts to the concerns of an invisible world is by awakening their hopes of future good to be secured, or by stimulating their fears of future evils. It thus appears, from the laws and operations of the mind of which every person is conscious, and also from the conduct and recorded experience of mankind, that the mindhasthe power of directing its attention to evidence.
The other alternative which would establish the principle that belief is not under the control of the will is, that truth, when seen by the mind, can not be distinguished from falsehood. But this, it can be seen, involves a denial of the principles of reason and common sense. It is saying that the mind may have the evidence of the senses, memory, and all the other principles included in the laws of reason, and yet not believe it; for every process of reasoning is, in fact, exhibiting evidence either of the senses, memory, or experience, that a certain truth is included under a primary truth.
The only position which can be assumed without denying the principles of reason and common sense is, that belief, according to the laws of mind, is exactly according to theamountof evidenceto which the mind gives its attention.
In order to belief, then, two things are necessary, viz.,evidence, and thechoice of the mind to attendto this evidence. When both of these are attained, the belief of truth and the rejection of falsehood are inevitable.
The influence which the will and desires have upon our belief accounts for the great variety of opinions among mankind on almost every subject of duty and of happiness.
There are two ways in which the desires and wishes regulate belief. In the first place, by preventingattentionto the subject which would lead to the belief of truths that are inconsistent with the leading desires of the mind. This, in a great measure, will account for the great variety of religious belief. Religion is asubject which is felt to be inconsistent with the leading desires of most persons who are interested in the pursuit of other enjoyments than those resulting from obedience to God in the discharge of the duties of benevolence and piety. It is a subject, therefore, which receives so little examination that opinions in regard to it are adopted with trifling attention.
The second cause of variety of belief is the effect whichdesirehas in making vivid those conceptions which most agree with the leading purpose of the mind. When the mind decides to examine the evidence on any subject, if the decision involves questions which have a bearing on some favorite purpose, all those arguments which are most consonant with the desires appear vivid and clear, and those which are contrary to the wishes are fainter and less regarded. This is a fact which universal experience demonstrates. Men always fasten on evidence which favors their own wishes, and but faintly conceive the evidence which is opposed. This is a cause which operates most powerfully in regard to religious truths whenever they interfere with the leading desires.
This view of the subject exhibits the importance of having the mind directed to proper objects; for if the mind is earnestly engaged in the pursuit of duty, it will be pleased with every development of truth, for truth and duty are never found to interfere.Truthis another name for "things as they are," and it is always the duty and happiness of man to regulate his conduct by seeing things as they are, rather than by seeing them in false relations. That man is best prepared to discover truth who is most sincerely desirousto obtain it, and to regulate his feelings, words, and conduct by its dictates.
There is nothing more obvious, from experience and observation, than that menfeeltheir ability to control their belief, and realize both their own obligations and those of their fellow-men on this subject. They know that every man must act according to his belief of right and wrong, and thus that the fulfillment of every duty depends upon the nature of our belief. And the more important are the interests involved in any question, the more men perceive their obligations to seek for evidence, and obtain the knowledge necessary to enable them to judge correctly.
The estimation of guilt among mankind, in reference to wrong belief, is always proportioned to the interests involved and the opportunities for obtaining knowledge. In the minute affairs of life, where but little evil is done from false judgments, but little blame is attached to a man for believing wrong. Neither is a man severely judged if the necessary knowledge was inaccessible or very difficult to be obtained.
But where a man has great interests committed to his keeping, and has sufficient opportunity for obtaining evidence of truth, the severest condemnation awaits him who, through inattention or prejudice, hazards vast interests by an incorrect belief. If an agent has the charge of great investments, and through negligence, or indolence, or prejudice ruins his employer, his sincere belief is no protection from severe condemnation. If the physician has the health and life of a valued member of the community and the object of many affections intrusted to his skill, and from negligenceand inattention destroys the life he was appointed to save, his sincere belief is but a small palliation of his guilt. If a judge has the fortune and life of his fellow-citizens intrusted to his judicial knowledge and integrity, and, through want of care and attention, is guilty of flagrant injustice and evil, the plea of wrong belief will not protect him from the impeachment and just indignation which await such delinquencies.
There is no point where men are more tenacious of the obligations of their fellow-creatures than on the subject of belief. If they find themselves calumniated, unjustly dealt with, and treated with contempt and scorn from prejudice or want of attention, the reality of belief is little palliation of the guilt of those who thus render them injustice. They feel the obligations of their fellow-men toknow the truthin all that relates to their interests, honor, and good name; and often there is scarcely any thing which it is so difficult to forgive as the simple crime of wrong belief.
The only modes by which men attempt to justify themselves for guilt of this nature are to show either that the matter was of small consequence, or that the means of learning its importance and of obtaining the other necessary information was not within reach.
It may be laid down, then, as a long-established axiom in regard to this subject, that men estimate the guilt of wrong belief in all matters relating to the welfare of mankind in exact proportion to the value of the interests involved, and to the opportunities enjoyed for obtaining information.
Inasmuch as all our success and happiness depends upon our belief of the truth, we have two of the principlesof reason and common sense to guide us. The first is, that we are to consider that to be right which hasthe balanceof evidence in its favor; and the second is, that nothing is to be assumed as true unless there issomeevidence that it is so.