Chapter VI.
NO JUST ANALOGY IN THE PRECEDENTS ADDUCED BY GOVERNMENT.
A thousand precedents would never justify a bad measure—it may therefore be deemed superfluous to offer a remark on this head; but as Mr. Canning has argued, that whatever is adopted in one colony can safely be introduced into all the rest, and as this maxim has been taken for granted by many persons willing to save themselves the trouble of thinking, it is necessary to enter into some explanation.
When the order in council for negro treatment was sent out to Trinidad, great objections were offered, both generally, and to the individual clauses which constitute compulsory manumission.
It is not necessary here to inquire how often that order has been altered, or the reasons why the colonists of Trinidad have been constrained to submit to the authority imposed upon them. We have only to show that the case of that island differs from that of the other British colonies.
Trinidad was originally a Spanish colony; its laws were framed previously to the abolition of the slave-trade, and have continued unaltered since the cession of the island to Great Britain.
Now it is apparent that, when fresh slaves can be procured, compulsory manumission is not so objectionable; because the place of those who purchase their freedom can be immediately filled up by others.
It has consequently been considered that, while the slave-trade was in active operation in the Spanish colonies, the practice of manumission was encouraged, as increasing the means of preventing insurrection.
But it is surely unfair to hold up to the imitation of another colony the enactments and usages introduced by one whose laws were adapted to a state of things so different; and to require that the provisions of a code adapted to the existence of the slave-trade, should be engrafted upon other codes framed since its abolition.
The order in council for Trinidad has not affected the principle of the Spanish law, or rather the practice in the Spanish colonies, which allows a slave to enfranchise himself by purchase. But the British law in our settlements gives no such right whatever to a slave.
According to those codes, the interest of an owner in his slave is that of a fee-simple absolute:he purchased upon that tenure, he has continued to hold upon the same, and cannot be deprived of that legal title without a direct violation of property.
In Trinidad it is otherwise: a person purchasing a slave in that colony, knows beforehand that he acquires only a precarious title in such a slave, which depends on the ability of the slave to purchase himself.
Nor has sufficient time yet elapsed to make known the great difference in the working of the measure that must take place now that the slave-trade has ceased, contrasted with the period when it was in active prosecution.
It ought also to be stated, that the hardship and evils of the law in Trinidad, even subsequent to the abolition of the slave-trade, had not been so much felt, from the nature of its laws not being generally known in this country: consequently, there was no extraneous excitement upon the subject given to the minds of the negroes.
But now, when this excitement has been given, the brief experience already afforded, tends strongly to corroborate the arguments we have advanced; and it is credibly asserted, that the Secretary for the Colonies has received representations and appeals, proving evils to have proceeded from the operation of this law.
Among these evils, theft is shown to have increased;and the proceedings before the local magistrates are said to evince a progressive demoralization amongst the negroes.
It is further known, that instances have occurred where the sum assessed by the appraisers, as the price of manumission, has been higher than the negro was able, or considered himself entitled, to pay; and the being sent back under these circumstances has visibly produced in him a sullenness and discontent exactly as has been described, and in all probability as injurious to the interests of his master, as if he had obtained his discharge at his own valuation.
From these circumstances, it is apparent that there is no analogy between the case of Trinidad and that of the other British Colonies, and that thus far no proper precedent is established.
In regard to this colony, the measure has been but recently introduced, and without the spontaneous concurrence of its inhabitants. It was established there by the force of arbitrary authority. There was no adequate court or power, similar in constitution and functions to the Assemblies in the other islands, to resist its promulgation; and the threat conveyed in the despatch of Earl Bathurst to theGovernor, thus amounted to an imperative mandate for the adoption of the measure as law in the colony.
Is this a precedent?
The case of Berbice is still more flagrant. This colony possessed, a short time back, a council composed of persons having property at stake. Before the enactments relating to the slaves in that colony were brought forward, this council was dismissed, and another arbitrarily appointed, consisting of persons having no interest in the cultivation of the colony.
It was previously declared, that the new laws relating to the slaves, in whatever way they might be finally settled, should not be carried into operation at Berbice, unless the same measures were at the same time adopted in Demerara. In the latter colony, all the measures relating to amelioration were received, and compulsory manumission alone rejected; but in Berbice, the new council, so appointed and so composed, passed the latter measure contrary to the wish of every proprietor in the colony.
It ought moreover to be stated that, before the new laws were promulgated in Demerara, they were sent home to Lord Bathurst for confirmation,upon which his Lordship observes,—“The King has been graciously pleased to approve the decision that you adopted, of referring the draft of the Act to his Majesty, for his consideration, instead of immediately promulgating it as a law in the colony.”
But how does the new Council of Berbice act? The most important of all the new measures they carry at once into effect; that is to say, they allow no opportunity for parties in England to carry remonstrance or explanation to the foot of the throne.
Again, let us ask, is this a precedent? What is the meaning of the term? does it not warrant the inference, in this case, that some assembly, composed of parties interested, have given their concurrence? But how marked is the difference between a council composed of persons possessing little or no property in slaves, and a court where several of the members hold large plantations, and are deeply interested in the permanent prosperity of their colony.
The possession of this large stake by the members, and the circumstance of having delegated interests to represent, peculiarly conduce to safe and practicable legislation. Such circumstances present a security against precipitancy,—prompt to a careful and minute consideration of all local peculiarities,—and procure for every public measure a full and patient examination of all its relations,both direct and contingent, before it is permitted to be put in execution.
And further, in respect to any one of these West India cases, has there elapsed a time sufficient to enable us to estimate the policy of the experiment, and still less to pronounce upon its fitness for the whole of our West Indian possessions?
How this colony should be referred to as a precedent it is difficult to explain. Its climate differs materially from that of the West Indies. In the latter, the evils apprehended from giving freedom to the slaves arise from the impossibility of procuring free labourers to supply their place. It is but a very short time since emigration from this country to the Cape of Good Hope was greatly encouraged; and it is ascertained, by experience, that Europeans can work without injury or inconvenience in that climate.
Thus the supply of voluntary labourers not only existing, but increasing in that colony, the inducements to perpetuate slavery must progressively expire, and slaves may consequently be freed without injury to the property of their owners, or danger to the public safety.
From this obvious difference in physical circumstances between the West India colonies and theCape of Good Hope, there is no just analogy between the two; and though compulsory manumission may be enacted in the one, it cannot, therefore, be taken as a model for imitation to the other.
This straining after inapplicable precedent clearly indicates deficiency of argument.
No enactment containing inherently a principle of evil, even though acceded to willingly, or acquiesced in passively, by individual bodies, should ever be set up by a wise government as an example for general adoption.
It has been more than once remarked in Parliament, by persons of high character, that the precedent generally existing throughout the Spanish colonies served as a sufficient ground for the measure.
But there are two points which should never be omitted in reflecting on the question:
I. As to the opportunity of procuring other labourers.
II. The difference of amount sunk in fixed capital, between the Spanish colonies and those of Great Britain.
In regard to the first, fresh labourers can be procured in the Spanish colonies, but cannot in the British; and in regard to the second, there must surely be some difference in the working of a measure when the amount of capital to be withdrawn varies in the proportion of 20,000l.in the one case, to a few hundreds in the other.