1st. Every man, from the age of fifteen years, upward, found away from his habitation and not proving a justified motive therefor, will be shot.
2d. Every unoccupied habitation will be burned by the troops.
3d. Every habitation from which does not float awhite flag, as a signal that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes.
"Women that are not living at their own homes, or at the house of their relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguana or Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly."
The second paragraph was flagrantly untrue. Those who had fought against the Spaniards had not been pardoned. On the contrary, they had been put to death. Fearful atrocities had been committed in Havana and elsewhere. To cite only a few instances: The shooting of men, women and children at the Villanuesa Theatre, at the Louvre, and at the sack of Aldama's house.
Valmaseda's proclamation raised a storm of protest from all civilized nations, and the Spaniards, stiff and unbending, never wavered, but the policy embodied in Valmaseda's proclamation remained their tactics until the end of the war.
The United States was especially roused and disgusted. Secretary Fish, in a letter to Mr. Hale, then Minister to Spain, protested "against the infamous proclamation of general, the Count of Valmaseda."
Even a Havanese paper is quoted as declaring that,
"Said proclamation does not even reach what is required by the necessities of war in the most civilized nations."
The revolutionists were victorious in almost every engagement for the first two years, although their losses were by no means inconsiderable.
It has even been acknowledged recently by a representative of Spain to the United States that the greater and better part of the Cubans were in sympathy with the insurrection. This opinion appeared in a statement made by Senor De Lome (whose reputation among Americans is now somewhat unsavory) in the New York Herald of February 23, 1896.
The Cubans were recognized as belligerents by Chili, Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, Columbia and Mexico.
There were two important expeditions of assistance sent to the Cubans in the early part of the war. One was under the command of Rafael Quesada, and, in addition to men, brought arms and ammunition, of which the insurgents were sadly in need. The other was under General Thomas Jordan, a West Point graduate and an ex-officer in the Confederate service. By the way, the South, with its well-known chivalry, has always evinced warm sympathy for the unfortunate Cubans. To their glory be it spoken and remembered!
Quesada managed to reach the interior without resistance. But Jordan, with only one hundred and seventy-five men, but carrying arms and ammunition for two thousand six hundred men, besides several pieces of artillery, was attacked at Camalito and again at El Ramon; he succeeded in repulsing the enemy and reaching his destination.
Soon after, as General Quesada demanded extraordinary powers, he was deposed by the Cuban congress, and General Jordan was appointed commander-in-chief in his stead.
In August, 1870, the United States government offered to Spain their good offices for a settlement of the strife. Mr. Fish, who was then secretary of State, proposed terms for the cession of the island to the Cubans, but the offer was declined. This is only one of the many times when Spain, in her suicidal policy, has refused to listen to reason.
About this time the volunteers expelled General Dulce, and General de Rodas was sent from Spain to replace him with a re-enforcement of thirty thousand men.
General de Rodas, however, remained in command only about six months, he in his turn being replaced by Valmaseda, again at the dictation of the volunteers.
Speaking of these volunteers, who it will be remembered were recruited from Spanish immigrants and who were peculiarly obnoxious to Cubans of all classes, it will not be out of place to relate here an act of wanton cruelty upon their part.
This took place in the autumn of 1871. One of the volunteers had died, and his body had been placed in a public tomb in Havana. Later it was discovered that the tomb had been defaced, by some inscription placed upon it, no more, no less. Suspicion fell upon the students of the university. The volunteers made a complaint and forty-three of the young students were arrested and tried for the misdemeanor. An officer of the regular Spanish army volunteered to defend them, and through his efforts, they were acquitted.
This verdict did not satisfy the volunteers, however.They demanded and obtained from the captain-general, who was a man of weak character, the convening of another court-martial two-thirds of which was to be composed of volunteers. Was there ever such a burlesque of justice? The accusers and the judges were one and the same persons. Of course, there could be but one result. All the prisoners were found guilty and condemned, eight to be shot, and the others to imprisonment and hard labor.
The day after the court-martial (?) fifteen hundred volunteers turned out under arms and executed the eight boys.
This incident filled the whole of the United States with horror and indignation. The action was censured by the Spanish Cortes, but the matter ended there. No attempt whatever was made to punish the offenders.
The insurgents waged an active warfare until the spring of 1871. They had at that time a force of about fifty thousand men, but they were badly armed and poorly supplied with necessities of all sorts. The resources of the Spaniards were infinitely greater. About this time the Cuban soldiers who had been fighting in the district of Camaguey signified a desire to surrender and cease the conflict, provided their lives were spared. The proposition was accepted. Their commander, General Agramonte refused to yield, and he was left with only about thirty-five men who remained loyal to him. He formed a body of cavalry, and continued fighting for some two years longer, when he was killed on the field of battle.
In January, 1873, the Edinburg Review contained a very strong article on the condition of affairs in Cuba, in the course of which it said:
"It is well known that Spain governs Cuba with an iron and blood-stained hand. The former holds the latter deprived of political, civil and religious liberty. Hence the unfortunate Cubans being illegally prosecuted and sent into exile, or executed by military commissions in time of peace; hence their being kept from public meeting, and forbidden to speak or write on affairs of State; hence their remonstrances against the evils that afflict them being looked on as the proceedings of rebels, from the fact that they are bound to keep silence and obey; hence the never-ending plague of hungry officials from Spain, to devour the product of their industry and labor; hence their exclusion from public stations, and want of opportunity to fit themselves for the art of government; hence the restrictions to which public instruction with them is subjected, in order to keep them so ignorant as not to be able to know and enforce their rights in any shape or form whatever; hence the navy and the standing army, which are kept in their country at an enormous expenditure from their own wealth, to make them bend their knees and submit their necks to the iron yoke that disgraces them; hence the grinding taxation under which they labor, and which would make them all perish in misery but for the marvelous fertility of their soil."
In July, 1873, Pieltain, then captain-general, sent an envoy to President Cespedes to offer peace on conditionthat Cuba should remain a state of the Spanish republic, but this offer was declined.
In December of the same year, Cespedes was deposed by the Cuban Congress, and Salvador Cisneros elected in his place. The latter was a scion of the old Spanish nobility who renounced his titles and had his estates confiscated when he joined the revolution. He was and is distinguished for his patriotism, intelligence and nobility of character. It was his daughter, Evangelina Cisneros, who was rescued from the horrors of a Spanish dungeon by Americans, and brought to the United States.
After his retirement, Cespedes was found by the Spaniards, and put to death, according to their usual policy: "Slay and spare not."
The war dragged on, being more a guerrilla warfare than anything else. The losses were heavy on both sides. There is no data from which to obtain the losses of the Cubans, but the records in the War Office at Madrid show the total deaths in the Spanish land forces for the ten years to have been over eighty thousand. Spain had sent to Cuba one hundred and forty-five thousand men, and her best generals, but while they kept the insurgents in check they were unable to subdue them. The condition of the island was deplorable, her trade had greatly decreased and her crops were ruined.
For years there had been a constant waste of men and money, with no perceptible gain on either side.
By 1878, both parties were heartily weary of the struggle and ready to compromise.
General Martinez de Campos was then in command of the Spanish forces, and he opened negotiations with the Cuban leader, Maximo Gomez, the same who was destined later to attain even more prominence. Gomez listened to what was proposed, and after certain deliberations, terms of peace were concluded in February, 1878, by the treaty of El Zanjon.
This treaty guaranteed Cuba representation in the Spanish Cortes, granted a free pardon to all who had taken part directly or indirectly, in the revolution, and permitted all those who wished to do so to leave the island.
At first glance these terms seem fair. But, as we shall see later, Spain in this case as in all others was true to herself, that is, false to every promise she made.
There was one event of the ten years' war which deserves to be treated somewhat in detail, as the universal excitement in the United States caused by the affair for a time appeared to make a war between the United States and Spain inevitable. And the Cubans hoped that this occurrence would lead to the immediate expulsion of the Spaniards from Cuba.
The hopes thus raised, however, were doomed to meet with disappointment, as the diplomatic negotiations opened between the United States and Spain led to a peaceable settlement of the whole difficulty.
The trouble was this: On the 31st of October, 1873, the Virginius, a ship sailing under the American flag, was captured on the high seas, near Jamaica, by the Spanish steamer Tornado, on the ground that it intended to land men and arms in Cuba for the insurgent army.
The Virginius was a steamer which was built in England during the civil war, and was used as a blockade-runner. She was captured and brought to the Washington Navy Yard. There she was sold at auction. The purchaser was one John F. Patterson, who took an oath that he was a citizen of the United States. On the 26th of September, 1870, the Virginius was registered in the custom house of New York.
As all the requisites of the statute were fulfilled in her behalf, she cleared in the usual way for Curacoa, and sailed early in September for that port.
It was discovered a good many years after that Patterson was not the real owner of the vessel, but that, as a matter of fact, the money for her purchase had been furnished by Cuban sympathizers, and that she was virtually controlled by them.
From the day of her clearance in New York, she certainly did not return within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Nevertheless, she preserved her American papers, and whenever she entered foreign ports, she made it a practice to put forth a claim to American nationality, which claim was always recognized by the authorities in those ports.
There is no evidence whatever to show that she committed any overt act, or did anything that was contrary to international law.
She cleared from Kingston, Jamaica, on the 23rd of October, 1873, for Costa Rica.
As President Grant said in his message to Congress, January 5th, 1874, she was under the flag of the United States, and she would appear to have had, as against all powers except the United States, the right to fly that flag and to claim its protection as enjoyed by all regularly documented vessels registered as part of our commercial marine.
Still quoting President Grant, no state of war existed conferring upon a maritime power the right to molestand detain upon the high seas a documented vessel, and it could not be pretended that the Virginius had placed herself without the pale of all law by acts of piracy against the human race. (And yet this very thing is what the Spaniards, without rhyme or reason, did claim. Ever since they have been claiming what was false, as for instance their reports of the victories (!) in the American-Spanish war. By so doing they have made themselves the laughing-stock of nations, for, although they never hesitate to lie, they do not know how to lie with a semblance of truth, which might be, far be it from us to say would be, a saving grace).
If the papers of the Virginius were irregular or fraudulent, and frankly they probably were, the offense was one against the laws of the United States, justifiable only in their tribunals. However, to return to facts, on the morning of the 31st of October, the Virginius was seen cruising near the coast of Cuba. She was chased by the Spanish man-of-war Tornado, captured, and brought into the harbor of Santiago de Cuba on the following day.
One hundred and fifty-five persons were on board, many of whom bore Spanish names. This was made a great point of by the Spanish authorities, although as a matter of fact it proved nothing.
This action was not only in violation of international law, but it was in direct contravention of the provisions of the treaty of 1795.
Mr. E. G. Schmitt was at that time the American vice-consul at Santiago, and he lost no time in demandingthat he should be allowed to see the prisoners, in order to obtain from them information which should enable him to protect those who might be American citizens, and also whatever rights the ship should chance to have.
Mr. Schmitt was treated with the utmost discourtesy by the authorities, who practically told him that they would admit of no interference on his part, and insisted that all on board the Virginius were pirates and would be dealt with as such.
And indeed they were.
The Virginius was brought into Santiago late in the afternoon of the first of November, and a court-martial was convened the next morning to try the prisoners.
Within a week fifty-three men had received the semblance of a trial and had been shot.
Meanwhile England, who even her worst enemies cannot deny, is always on the side of humanity, intervened.
Reports of the barbarous proceedings had reached Jamaica, and H. M. S. Niobe, under the command of Sir Lambton Lorraine, was dispatched to Santiago with instructions to stop the massacre.
The Niobe arrived at Santiago on the eighth, and Lorraine threatened to bombard the town unless the executions were immediately stopped.
This threat evidently frightened the bloodthirsty governor, for no more shooting took place.
It was a noble act on the part of Sir Lambton Lorraine, and the American public appreciated it. On his way home to England, he stopped in New York. It was proposedto tender him a public reception, but this Sir Lambton declined. But by way of telling what a "brick" he was considered, a silver brick from Nevada was presented to him, upon the face of which was inscribed: "Blood is thicker than water. Santiago de Cuba, November, 1873. To Sir Lambton Lorraine, from the Comstock Mines, Virginia City, Nevada, U. S. A."
President Grant, through General Daniel E. Sickles, who then represented the United States at Madrid, directed that a demand should be made upon Spain for the restoration of the Virginius, for the return of the survivors to the protection of the United States, for a salute to the flag, and for the punishment of the offending parties.
When the news of the massacre reached Washington, the Secretary of State telegraphed Minister Sickles:
"Accounts have been received from Havana of the execution of the captain and thirty-six of the crew and eighteen others. If true, General Sickles will protest against the act as brutal and barbarous, and ample reparation will be demanded."
Minister Sickles replied:
"President Castelar received these observations with his usual kindness, and told me confidentially that at seven o'clock in the morning, as soon as he read the telegram from Cuba, and without reference to any international question, for that indeed had not occurred to him, he at once sent a message to the captain-general, admonishing him that the death penalty must not be imposed upon any non-combatant, without the previous approvalof the Cortes, nor upon any person taken in arms against the government without the sanction of the executive."
About that time, a writer of some celebrity, who was also a war correspondent, named Ralph Keeler, mysteriously disappeared. Although it was never proven, there is little doubt but that he was assassinated by the Spaniards.
Then, as now, there was an intense hatred in the Spanish breast against every citizen of the United States.
As Murat Halstead expresses it, there seemed to be a blood madness in the air.
Mr. Halstead, by the way, tells an anecdote of a madman, who seized a rifle with sabre attached and assaulted a young man who had asked him an innocent question. He knocked him down and stabbed him to death with a bayonet, sticking it through him a score of times as he cried:
"Cable my country that I have killed a rebel!"
The murderer was adjudged insane. Further comment is unnecessary.
To return to the controversy over the Virginius between the United States and Spain.
General Sickles, as he had been instructed, made a solemn protest against the barbarities perpetrated at Santiago.
The Spanish Minister of State replied in a rather ill-humored way, and amongst other things, he said that the protest of America was rejected with serene energy.
This somewhat ridiculous expression gave General Sickles a chance to rejoin, which he did, as follows:
"And if at last under the good auspices of Senor Carvajal, with the aid of that serenity that is unmoved by slaughter, and that energy that rejects the voice of humanity, which even the humblest may utter and the most powerful cannot hush, this government is successful in restoring order and peace and liberty where hitherto, and now, all is tumult and conflict and despotism, the fame of the achievement, not confined to Spain, will reach the continents beyond the seas and gladden the hearts of millions who believe that the new world discovered by Columbus is the home of freemen and not that of slaves."
About this time, Spain asked the good offices of England as an intervener, but to his glory be it spoken and to the nation which he represented, Lord Granville declined, "unless on the basis of ample reparation made to the United States."
Spain continued to dilly-dally and evade the question of her responsibility.
On the 25th of November Mr. Fish telegraphed to Minister Sickles:
"If no accommodation is reached by the close of to-morrow, leave. If a proposition is submitted, you will refer it to Washington, and defer action."
This was just after Minister Sickles had informed the authorities at Washington that Lord Granville regarded the reparation demanded as just and moderate.
On the 26th, however, just as the American ministerwas preparing to ask for his passports, close the legation and leave Spain, he received a note from Senor Carvajal which conceded in part the demands of the United States.
This proposition was virtually that the Virginius and the survivors should be given up, but the salute was to be dispensed with, in case Spain satisfied the United States within a certain time that the Virginius had no right to carry the flag.
After considerable correspondence an arrangement was finally arrived at, Spain further agreeing to proceed against those who had offended the sovereignty of the United States, or who had violated their treaty rights.
In his message, President Grant says:
"The surrender of the vessel and the survivors to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the United States was an admission of the principles upon which our demand had been founded. I therefore had no hesitation in agreeing to the arrangement which was moderate and just, and calculated to cement the good relations which have so long existed between Spain and the United States."
The following words, spoken by Secretary Fish to Admiral Polo, in an interview during the progress of the negotiations, are worthy to be quoted:
"I decline to submit to arbitration the question of an indignity to the flag. I am willing to submit all questions which are properly subjects of reference."
On the 16th of December the Virginius, with the American flag flying, was delivered to the United States at Bahia Honda.
The vessel was unseaworthy. Her engines were out oforder and she was leaking badly. On the passage to New York she encountered a severe storm, and, in spite of the efforts of her officers and men, she sank off Cape Fear. The survivors of the massacre were surrendered at Santiago de Cuba on the 18th, and reached New York in safety.
About eighty thousand dollars were paid by Spain as compensation to the families of the American and British victims who perished at Santiago. But no punishment was ever visited upon the governor who ordered the executions. There was a tremendous amount of feeling aroused in the United States over the Virginius affair, and the government was severely criticized and censured for not avenging the inhuman butcheries and the insults to the flag.
But it must be remembered that the government had a very hard task to deal with. There was little or no doubt but that the Virginius, at the time of her capture was intended for an unlawful enterprise, in spite of Captain Fry's words in a letter to his wife just before his execution:
"There is to be a fearful sacrifice of life from the Virginius, and, as I think, a needless one, as the poor people are unconscious of crime and even of their fate up to now. I hope God will forgive me, if I am to blame for it."
The clamor of the American people for revenge was fiery in its intensity, but the government did not yield to it, in which it was right. There has been more than one time in our history when if public opinion had beenallowed to rule, the results would have been fatal; and the very men who were most abused, in the light of future events, have been praised for their wisdom and moderation.
Murat Halstead sums up the whole matter in a clear and just manner. He says in his admirable book, "The Story of Cuba:"
"It is not, we must say, a correct use of words to say that the United States was degraded by the Virginius incident. In proportion as nations are great and dignified, they must at least obey their own laws and treaties. When Grant was President of the United States and Castelar was President of Spain, there was a reckless adventure and shocking massacre, but we were not degraded because we did not indulge in a policy of vengeance."
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to call attention to one very important matter which was the direct result of the Ten Years' War. If the insurgents accomplished nothing else, they may well be proud of this achievement.
Their own freedom they failed to obtain, but they were the cause of freedom being bestowed upon others.
We refer to the manumission of the slaves.
The Spanish slave code, promulgated in 1789, is admitted everywhere to have been very humane in its character. So much so that when Trinidad came into the possession of the English, the anti-slavery party resisted successfully the attempt of the planters of that island to have the Spanish law replaced by the British.
Once again, however, were the words of Spain falsified by her deeds. Spanish diplomacy up to the present day has only been another name for lies. For, notwithstanding the mildness of the code, its provisions were constantly and glaringly violated.
In 1840, a writer, who had personal knowledge of the affairs of Cuba, declared that slavery in Cuba was more destructive to human life, more pernicious to society, degrading to the slave and debasing to the master, more fatal to health and happiness than in any other slave-holding country on the face of the habitable globe.
It was in Cuba that the slaves were subjected to the coarsest fare and the most exhausting and unremitting toil. A portion of their number was even absolutely destroyed every year by the slow torture of overwork and insufficient sleep and rest.
In 1792 the slave population of the island was estimated at eighty-four thousand; in 1817, one hundred and seventy-nine thousand; in 1827, two hundred and eighty-six thousand; in 1843, four hundred and thirty-six thousand; in 1867, three hundred and seventy-nine thousand, five hundred and twenty-three, and in 1873, five hundred thousand, or about one-third of the entire population.
In 1870, two years after the beginning of the war, in which the colored people, both free and slaves, took a prominent part, the Spanish legislature passed an act, providing that every slave who had then passed, or should thereafter pass, the age of sixty should be at once free, and that all yet unborn children of slaves should also be free. The latter, however, were to be maintained at the expense of the proprietors up to their eighteenth year, and during that time to be kept as apprentices at such work as was suitable to their age. Slavery was absolutely abolished in Cuba in 1886. Spain was therefore the last civilized country to cling to this vestige of barbarism, and she probably would not have abandoned it then had she not been impelled to by force and her self-interest.
After the treaty of El Zanjon, it was supposed by the Cubans, and rightly too, had they been dealing with anhonorable opponent and not a trickster, that the condition of Cuba would be greatly improved.
The treaty, in the first place, guaranteed Cuba representation in the Cortes in Madrid. This was kept to the letter, but the spirit was abominably lacking.
The Peninsulars, that is, the Spaniards in Cuba, obtained complete control of the polls, and, by unparalleled frauds, always managed to elect a majority of the deputies. The deputies, purporting to come from Cuba, might just as well have been appointed by the Spanish crown.
In other and plainer words, Cuba had no representation whatever in the Cortes.
The cities of Cuba were hopelessly in debt and they were not able to provide money for any municipal services.
There were no funds to keep up the schools, and in consequence they were closed.
As for hospitals and asylums, they scarcely existed. There was only one asylum for the insane in all the island, and that was wretchedly managed. This asylum was in Havana. Elsewhere, the insane were confined in the cells of jails.
The public debt of Spain was something enormous, and Cuba was forced to pay a part of the interest on this which was out of all proportion.
Perez Castaneda spoke of this in the Spanish Cortes in the following terms:
"The debt of Cuba was created in 1864 by a simple issue of three million dollars, and it now amounts to thefabulous sum of one hundred and seventy-five million dollars. What originated the Cuban debt? The wars of Santo Domingo, of Peru and of Mexico. But are not these matters for the Peninsula? Certainly they are matters for the whole of Spain. Why must Cuba pay that debt?"
Again, Senor Robledo, in a debate at Madrid, after speaking of the fearful abuses existent in the government of Havana, said:
"I do not intend to read the whole of the report; but I must put the House in possession of one fact. To what do these defalcations amount? They amount to twenty-two million, eight hundred and eleven thousand, five hundred and sixteen dollars. Did not the government know this? What has been done?"
In 1895 it was alleged that the custom house frauds in Cuba, since the end of the Ten Years War, amounted to over one hundred millions of dollars. It is enough to make one hold one's breath in horror. And, remember well, there was absolutely no redress for the suffering Cubans by peaceful means.
One more quotation. Rafael de Eslara of Havana, when speaking of the misery of the island, thus summed up the situation:
"Granted the correctness of the points which I have just presented, it seems to be self-evident that a curse is pressing upon Cuba, condemning her to witness her own disintegration, and converting her into a prey for the operation of those swarms of vampires that are so cruelly devouring us, deaf to the voice of conscience, ifthey have any; it will not be rash to venture the assertion that Cuba is undone; there is no salvation possible."
Taxation on all sides was enormous, the two chief products of the island, sugar and tobacco, suffering the most. While other countries gave encouragement to their colonies, Spain did everything she could to discourage her well-beloved "Ever Faithful Isle."
The Cuban planter had to struggle along with a heavy tax on his crop, an enormous duty on his machinery, and an additional duty at the port of destination.
America once rose in wrath against unjust taxation, but her grievances were as nothing in comparison with those of—we had almost written—her sister republic. May the inadvertency prove a prophecy!
To show how the products of Cuba, under this ghastly extortion have declined, we make the following statement, based on the most reliable statistics.
In 1880 Cuba furnished twenty-five per cent. of all the sugar of the world. In 1895 this had declined to ten and a half per cent. In 1889, the export of cigars rated at forty dollars per one thousand amounted to ten millions, nineteen thousand and forty dollars. In 1894 it was five millions, three hundred and sixty-eight thousand, four hundred dollars, a loss of nearly one-half in five years.
Then besides all this, Cuba had to pay the high salaries of the horde of Spanish officials, nothing of which accrued to her advantage.
There can be no doubt but that the treaty of El Zanjon was a cheat, and its administration a gigantic scandal.
Can any fair-minded person think then that the Cubans were wrong, when driven to the wall, oppressed beyond measure, goaded to madness by an inhuman master, they broke out once again into open revolt, determined this time to fight to the death or to obtain their freedom?
Although the natural resources of Cuba are remarkable, as will be demonstrated later, and more than sufficient for all her people, a large number of Cubans have, either of their own free will or by force become exiles.
Besides over forty thousand in the United States, there are a large number in the islands under British control, as well as throughout the West Indies and in the South American republics.
It is perfectly natural that these exiles should feel the deepest interest in their native land, and although Spain has complained frequently of being menaced from beyond her borders, what else could she expect after the way in which she treated these exiled sons of hers? Besides she has had no just cause for grievance, as the right for foreign countries to furnish asylums to political offenders has been recognized from time immemorial, and, unless some overt act be committed, there can be no responsibility on the part of such foreign countries.
Enough perhaps has been said to show that the Cubans had every reason to once again rise in revolt, but in order that there may be no doubt as to the justice of their cause, let us recapitulate:
Spain has invariably drawn from the island all that could be squeezed out of it.
In spite of her protests she has never done anything for Cuba, all her aim being to replenish her own exhausted treasury and to enrich the functionaries of the Spanish government.
While Cuba is a producing country, she has been refused the right to dispose of her produce to other countries except at ruinous rates, in spite of the fact that Spain herself could not begin to consume all that Cuba had to offer. The market of the island, by the way, from the very nature of things, is the United States, and not Spain.
The rules which limit importation have been most rigid. For instance, American flour cannot enter Cuba free of duty, while it enters as a free product into Spain.
Spain has governed Cuba with a most arbitrary hand. The island has had nothing whatever to say as to the management of its own affairs.
The Cubans have purposely been kept in a state of ignorance, the system of education amounting practically to nothing.
The Spaniards have never kept one promise made, but after each promise have increased their oppression and tyranny.
In 1894 Senor Sagasta laid before the Cortes a project for reform in Cuba; but the sense of this project was confused in the extreme; there was little hope that a reform planned with such little method could meet with any degree of successful realization. In fact there was little or no possibility that the abuses under which the island groaned would be removed.
At last patience ceased to be a virtue. The present rising in Cuba was begun toward the close of 1894. The leader was Jose Marti, a poet and orator, who was then in New York. He at the outset, was the very soul of the revolutionary movement, and he held in his hands the threads of the conspiracy.
He was a man of charming and captivating personality, strong in his own convictions and devoted body, heart and soul to the interests of his country.
He was the son of a Spanish colonel and when quite young was condemned, for what reason has never been known, to ten years imprisonment in Havana. Afterwards, he was sentenced to the galleys for life.
When the amnesty was declared, after the Ten Years War, he was given back his freedom, but his resentment still continued and he vowed his life to obtaining the liberty of Cuba.
He went first to Central America, and afterwards took up his residence in the United States.
Everywhere he preached what he considered a holy war. Here and there he gathered together contributions, which he sent to Cuba for the secret purchase of arms and ammunition. He met with many rebuffs and disappointments, but not for one moment did he doubt the justice of his cause or its ultimate success. He was not a visionary man, but there were those even among the ones he had won over by his impassioned words who looked upon him as the victim of hallucinations. That this was not true, the events of the past few years have fully proven.
Marti organized his first expedition in New York, and set sail for Cuba with three vessels, the Lagonda, the Amadis and the Baracoa, containing men and war materials. This expedition was stopped, however, by the United States authorities.
Later, Marti joined Gomez, Cromlet, Cebreco and the Maceo brothers, all of whom had fought in the Ten Years War, at Santo Domingo, which was Gomez' home.
Some description of these men, all of whom have done magnificent work for the freedom of their country, may not be out of place.
Maximo Gomez is about seventy-five years of age, and he may perhaps be termed the "Washington" of the fight for liberty. It will be remembered that he was a leader in the Ten Years War. He is a man of excellent judgment, and, in spite of his years, of marvelous mental and physical activity. No better man could the insurgents have selected as their general-in-chief.
Flor Cromlet was a guerilla of unquestioned valor, who lost his life early in the campaign, but his name will live in the annals of free and independent Cuba. His mother was a mulatto, but his father was a Spaniard.
The Maceo brothers have been particularly distinguished. They were born of colored parents, and were of the type of the mulatto. Both were men of indomitable courage. Antonio Maceo was born at Santiago de Cuba in 1848. At the beginning of the Ten Years War, he was a mule driver, and could neither read nor write. He was one of the first to enlist in the Cuban army, andsoon showed his courage and intelligence. He was rapidly promoted to superior rank and became a terror to the Spanish army. Their one idea seemed to be to capture him, but apparently he possessed a charmed life. During his leisure moments, which it can be imagined were but few, he managed to learn to read and write. He was one of the last combatants to lay down his arms in the former war, and then only because he saw that further struggle would only end in loss of life without the winning of liberty.
He was exiled and then travelled through America, studying constantly and ever endeavoring to improve himself. Here was a poor, obscure, descendant of slaves who by sheer perseverance, of course coupled with natural ability, afterward held the armies of a great nation at bay.
Antonio Maceo was killed in Havana province in 1896, probably through the treachery of one of his followers, and his brother died, but not until both had accomplished wonderful deeds of valor. It is a pity that they could not have lived to see the results of their unselfish patriotism.
Another mulatto who has won fame in the cause of "Free Cuba" is Augustin Cebreco.
The "Marion of Cuba," as he was called, Nestor Aranguren, must not be forgotten. He was at the head of a little band of men, all members of the best Havana families and graduates of the university. He was very much like the "Swamp Fox" of our Revolution in the way he would undertake some daring raid, and thenretreat into the long grass of the Manigua to rest his tired horses and recruit his men. One of his most famous exploits was the capture of a train at the very gates of Havana. Aranguren treated his captives most kindly, with one exception, and in this he was justified. A man named Barrios had often informed against the insurgents, and he was condemned to death. Of him, Aranguren said: "That Cuban must die. I must rid my country of such an unnatural son. Thank God, there are few such traitors!"
The rest were allowed to go free.
To one of the Spaniards who were on the train, Aranguren said:
"If Spain should grant a generous and liberal autonomy, peace is not only possible, but probable; but, if she should persevere in her false colors, she will not regain control of this island, until every true soldier of Cuba is dead, and that will take a long time."
The ill-fated Aranguren died at the age of twenty-four.
It was not until May, 1895, that Marti and the other leaders thought it wise to go to Cuba. When they reached there, they found that the insurgents had already commenced the rebellion and had even gained some ground.
At first the Spanish authorities looked upon the insurrection as a trivial matter, nothing more serious than a negro riot.
They believed that it would be speedily suppressed as Spain had then in the island an army of nineteen thousandmen, besides the fifty thousand volunteers, who could be called on in case of need. But, to make all sure, seven thousand more soldiers were sent over from Spain.
In addition to this, many men, who afterward were among the leaders of the insurgent party expressed their unqualified disapproval of the movement. And in this, they were undoubtedly sincere, as they had not the slightest idea that it could succeed.
The general lack of sympathy and the universal criticism that met the little band of revolutionists unquestionably contributed much toward the relaxation of the vigilance of the government.
But the government was soon to be undeceived. The insurrection became a very serious matter indeed. The insurgents pursued very much the same tactics that they had followed in the Ten Years War, that is, they would seldom risk an open battle, and the Spaniards could gain but little ground against the guerilla methods of their opponents.
The Cubans were very badly equipped; in fact they had scarcely any war material whatever. They began by appropriating indiscriminately any fire arms wherever they could find them, from the repeating rifle to the shot gun with the ramrod. Many of them were armed only with revolvers, and the majority of them had simply the "machete," a knife about nineteen inches in length.
Recruits constantly came to their ranks, however, and it was not long before they numbered over six thousand.
A political crisis now took place in Spain, and the conservative party came into power. Premier Canovas then appointed as governor-general of Cuba, Martinez Campos, who had been so successful, by diplomacy rather than by anything else, in ending the Ten Years War.
He landed at Guantanamo, and before visiting Havana, he issued the most elaborate instructions to every department of the military service, which now had been largely reinforced.
In the early part of the war, a great misfortune befell the Cubans, and that was in the loss of their beloved leader, Jose Marti.
On the 18th of May, a part of the insurgent army camped upon the plains of Dos Rios, where they learned that the enemy was in the neighborhood, in safety, protected by a fort.
The insurgents numbered about seven hundred cavalrymen, under the command of Marti and Gomez.
The next morning they came upon the Spanish outpost. Gomez, who has always shown himself to be a prudent general, thought it would be wiser not to risk a battle, but to continue their route, as the object of the expedition was not skirmishing, but to attempt to penetrate into the Province of Puerto Principe.
But Jose Marti, in his fiery enthusiasm longed to fall upon the enemy; he declared that not to do so would be dishonor. Gomez yielded.
Marti was mounted upon a very spirited horse. He was told that it was unmanageable, but he would not listen to reason. Crying, "Come on, my children!" and"Viva Cuba Libre," he dashed upon the Spanish, followed by his men.
Before this onslaught, the Spaniards retreated, but in good order. Gomez cried to his troops to rally, but Marti, dragged on by his horse which he was unable to control, disappeared among the ranks of the enemy. He received a bullet above the left eye, another in the throat, and several bayonet thrusts in the body.
Led by Gomez, who was heart broken at the fate of his old companion and friend, the insurgents charged upon the Spaniards, but it was of no avail. The latter retained possession of the corpse of the gallant soldier, whose only fault was a too reckless bravery.
And now it is a pleasure to be able to recount one noble act on the part of the Spaniards, perhaps the only one in the whole course of the war.
General Campos, who was a just and honorable man, ordered the body of the illustrious patriot to receive decent burial, and one of the Spanish officers even pronounced a sort of eulogy over the remains.
There was a report that Gomez had also been killed, but this was a mistake. About a mouth afterward he crossed the trocha and entered the province of Puerto Principe, more commonly known as the Camaguey.
The trocha, by the way, was an invention of Campos in the preceding war, and was found to be of great value. It was practically a line of forts extending across the island between the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santa Clara, and it was intended that the insurgents should not be allowed to cross this line. Other trochaswere afterwards erected, but they have not proved of any extraordinary advantage in the present insurrection.
An assembly, composed of representatives of all the bands that were under arms, met and elected the officers of the revolutionary government.
Salvador Cisneros, otherwise known as the Marquis of Santa Lucia, was elected president, the same office he had filled during the Ten Years War.
The other officers were:
Vice-President, Bartolomeo Maso.
Secretary of State, Rafael Portuondo y Tamayo.
Secretary of War, Carlos Roloff.
Secretary of the Treasury, Severo Pina.
General-in-Chief, Maximo Gomez.
Lieutenant-General, Antonio Maceo.
Afterwards, at another election, as officers, according to the Cuban constitution, only serve two years, there were replaced by the following:
President, Bartolomeo Maso. Vice-President, Mendez Capote.
Secretary of State, Andres Moreno de la Torres.
Secretary of War, Jose B. Alemon.
Secretary of the Treasury, Ernesto Fons Sterling.
Maximo Gomez still remained general-in-chief.
Gomez and Campos were now pitted once more against each other, as they had been in the previous war.
Both men issued orders to their respective commands.
Gomez ordered the Cubans to attack the small Spanishoutposts, capture their arms if possible setting at liberty every man who should deliver them up; to cut all railway and telegraph lines; to keep on the defensive and retreat in groups, unless the Cubans were in a position to fight the enemy at great advantage; to destroy Spanish forts and other buildings where any resistance was made by the enemy; to destroy all sugar crops and mills, the owners of which refused to contribute to the Cuban war fund; and, finally to forbid the farmers to send any food to the cities unless upon the payment of certain taxes.
On his part, Campos issued the following commands:
Several regiments to protect the sugar estates; other detachments to be placed along the railroads, and on every train in motion; to attack always, unless the enemy's numbers were three to one; all rebels, except officers, who surrendered, to be allowed to go free and unmolested; convoys of provisions to be sent to such towns as needed them.
Everything was now in readiness for a fierce campaign, and one that threatened to be protracted. It was not long before operations commenced in earnest.
There was one incident which occurred in the early part of the disturbances which caused a certain amount of excitement in the United States, as it was thought that it would prove to be a repetition of the Virginius affair.
On the 8th of March, 1895, the ship Allianca was bound from Colon to New York. She was following the usual track of vessels near the Cuban shore. But, outside the three mile limit, she was fired upon by a Spanish gunboat. President Cleveland declared this to be an unwarrantable interference by Spain with passing American ships. Protest was promptly made by the United States against this act as not being justified by a state of war; nor permissible in respect of a vessel on the usual paths of commerce, nor tolerable in view of the wanton peril occasioned to innocent life and property. This act was disavowed by Spain, with full expression of regret, and with an assurance that there should not be again such just cause for complaint. The offending officer was deposed from his command. All this was eminently satisfactory, and the United States took no further action in the matter.
The chief battle of the campaign, while Campos still remained governor-general, was that fought at Bayamo,in July, 1895. Campos himself commanded in person, and for the first time the Spaniards, ever vain-glorious and self-confident, became aware of the mettle of the men arrayed against them.
The Spanish forces numbered some five thousand men, while the Cubans had not much more than half that number. It was the Spanish strategy, however, to divide their men into detachments, and the Cubans were quick to take advantage of this. The fight was a long and bloody affair, but finally the victory, although not pronounced, remained with the Cubans.
The Spanish forces were more or less demoralized, and their loses were heavy. Thirteen Spanish officers were killed, while the Cubans lost two colonels. The Cubans admitted that fifty of their number were killed or disabled, but they claimed that the loss of the Spaniards was over three hundred.
It is impossible to tell much from the Spanish accounts, as they were far from being complete and were highly colored. It has been the same way in the present war, as witness the laughable "one mule" report, with which all are familiar.
In this engagement, General Santocildes was killed. It is said that Santocildes sacrificed his own life to save that of his friend and superior, Campos.
There are two very different stories told of the attitude of Antonio Maceo toward Campos in this battle. One is to the effect that he did not know that Campos was commanding in person, but when he was told of it the following day, he said:
"Had I known it, I would have sacrificed five hundred more of my men, and I would have taken him dead or alive! Thus with one blow I would have ended the war."
The other is quite different, and has been very generally believed amongst the Cubans. It is to the effect that, during the fight, Maceo recognized Campos, and, pointing him out to his men, ordered them not to harm him, as he was a soldier who made war honorably.
Murat Halstead relates two incidents of the battle of Bayamo, which, however, he declares must be taken with a large grain of salt. One, which comes from an insurgent authority is as follows:
"Campos only saved himself by a ruse. Taking advantage of the Cubans' well-known respect for the wounded, he had himself placed in a covered stretcher, which they allowed to pass, without looking inside the cover. When outside of the Cuban lines he was obliged to walk on foot to Bayamo, through six miles of by-paths, under cover of the darkness, only accompanied by a colored guide."
The other tells that a son of Campos, who was a lieutenant, was captured, but released with a friendly message to his father, who of course, was expected to follow so admirable an example.
Whether these anecdotes are true or not, one thing is certain. After the battle, Maceo collected the wounded, whom the Spaniards left upon the field in their retreat, and treated them in the most humane manner possible. He wrote to Campos the following letter:
"To His Excellency, the General Martinez Campos:
"Dear Sir—Anxious to give careful and efficient attendance to the wounded Spanish soldiers that your troops left behind on the battle-field, I have ordered that they be lodged in the houses of the Cuban families that live nearest to the battle-ground, until you send for them.
"With my assurance that the forces you may send to escort them back will not meet any hostile demonstrations from my soldiers, I have the honor to be, sir,
"Yours respectfully,"Antonio Maceo."
While Maceo was thus maneuvering in the eastern part of the island, the general-in-chief, Maximo Gomez, was fighting in Camaguey. The population in the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba had risen almost to a man, and the movement was well under way in the province of Santa Clara.
Several encounters took place, the most important being the attack upon the little city of Cascorro, which Gomez succeeded in capturing. He found there a large quantity of arms and ammunition, of which the Cubans were greatly in need.
Gomez proved himself quite as magnanimous as Maceo. The wounded were all cared for to the best of his ability, and the prisoners were returned to the Spanish leaders. This example, however, seems to have been utterly lost upon the Spaniards.
The insurgent forces, under Gomez, were at this time divided into six portions, operating in the six provinces,and commanded by Antonio Maceo, Aguerre, Lacret, Carillo, Suarez and Jose Maceo. Suarez was afterwards cashiered for cowardice, and replaced by Garcia.
In August, 1895, Maceo joined his chief at a place called Jimaguaya, where Gomez had called to him a large proportion of the Cuban forces, which numbered at that time about thirty thousand.
And against these undisciplined soldiers was arrayed a regular army of over eighty-five thousand men, not counting the armed volunteers.
The odds were terribly against the Cubans, but Gomez and Maceo were confident of success.
It should be mentioned here that there were quite a number of women fighting under Maceo, and these women did heroic service. In fact, the Cuban women have given innumerable proofs of their devotion, body and soul, to the cause of "Cuba Libre."
Gomez' objective point was Havana, and between Jimaguaya and Havana, there were over fifty thousand Spanish soldiers.
When Gomez started, he had about twelve thousand men, which he divided into three columns. He was quite well aware that the fighting must be of the guerilla stamp. In fact, it was the only species of warfare possible.
He therefore instructed his lieutenants to have recourse to strategy, to foil the enemy at every point. The one object was to reach Havana.
"In the event of a forced battle," he said finally, "overthrow them! Pass over them and on to Havana!"
The march was begun, the instructions being followed to the letter. Actual combat was everywhere avoided. The Spanish papers constantly had reports like this: "After a few shots the rebels ran away." They did not understand that this was exactly Gomez' tactics, and he was succeeding, too.
Every day the insurgents advanced further and further west. At the end of a fortnight they reached the trocha of Jaruco, which had been constructed in the centre of the island. This trocha was occupied by a large and important Spanish force.
Gomez ordered Maceo to make a feigned attack upon the northern portion of the trocha. The Spaniards rushed there in a body, and Gomez, who had counted upon this very thing, crossed the southern part, which was left unprotected, without striking a blow.
As soon as Maceo knew that Gomez had passed over in safety, he immediately disappeared with his men, and soon after managed to rejoin his chief.
It was a very clever ruse, and Campos, whose headquarters were then in Santa Clara realized that he had been outgeneralled. He ordered a hurried march to Cienfuegos, and there took command.
The evasive movements of the insurgents continued, and again and again was Campos outflanked.
With but little difficulty the Cubans crossed two other trochas, and finally entered the Province of Matanzas, which Campos had felt positive could never be invaded; the Spaniards meanwhile constantly retreating, nearer and nearer to the capital.
At last, Campos determined to force an open conflict. He told his lieutenants where they were to meet him.
This was in December, 1895.
Campos lay in wait for Maceo's forces at a point between Coliseo and Lumidero.
It seemed at first as if the insurgents were caught in a trap, and would be forced to accept a battle in the open, which could not fail to be disastrous to them.
But a happy thought came to Maceo, and, in connection with this plan, he issued his orders.
Suddenly, the cane-fields which surrounded the camp of the Spaniards burst into flame, and on each side was a great blazing plain. Campos knew that he had once more been foiled, and he gave the order to retreat at once.
This battle, if battle it can be called, had important results. It enabled Gomez to reach Jovellanos, a city which commanded the railroad lines of Cardenas, Matanzas and Havana. These lines Gomez destroyed as well as every sugar plantation upon his route.
As to the destruction of the sugar fields and the reason therefor, we shall have something to say later on.
Campos, completely outwitted and vanquished in his attempts to stop the onward progress of the insurgents, now fell back upon Havana, which he reached Christmas Day.
His reception in the capital was anything but a pleasant one. The Spaniards there had clamored from the very beginning for revenge without mercy, and they looked upon the successive checks which the army hadreceived as little less than criminal. They demanded of the governor-general the reason for his repeated defeats, and even threatened him personally.
There were three political parties in Cuba, the Conservatives, the Reformists and the Autonomists. Campos met the leaders of these parties in an interview, and asked for their opinions. The consultation was very unsatisfactory, and as a result Campos proposed his resignation to which the ministry made no objection.
Shortly after, his resignation was sent in and accepted. He sailed for Spain the 17th of January, his place being temporarily filled by General Sabas Marin.
In spite of Martinez Campos' failure to subdue the insurrection, nothing but the greatest sympathy and respect can be felt for him, at least out of Spain, where, speaking in a general manner, humanity has no place, and gratitude is an unknown quantity.
Campos' services to his country had been great, including, as they did, the pacification of Cuba in the Ten Years War, the quelling of a revolt in Spain itself, and the restoration and support of the Spanish monarchy. At an advanced age, when he should have been enjoying a well deserved rest, he was sent away to fight a difficult war, and to risk the tarnishing of his laurels as a military commander.
All praise to Martinez Campos for his pure patriotism, his unswerving rectitude, his magnanimity and his exalted ideas of honor! This praise even the enemies of his country cannot refuse to him.
No greater contrast to Campos could possibly be imagined than his successor, General Valeriano Weyler, known, and with the utmost justice, throughout Cuba and the United States as "The Butcher."
During his official life in Cuba, he proved again and again the truth of his reputation for relentless cruelty.
There is no doubt that during former wars he committed the most atrocious crimes.
It is not claimed that he ever showed any brilliant qualifications as a military leader, and it was precisely because he lacked the characteristics of General Campos, that Spain appointed him governor-general, hoping that his severity (no, severity is too mild a word, his savage brutality) would accomplish what Campos had failed to do.
In the light of events following his appointment, events which filled the whole civilized world with indignation and horror, it has been pretended by Spain that her ministry specially instructed him to "moderate his ardor."
Moderate his ardor, indeed! Granted that he obeyed instructions, if, indeed such instructions ever existed, just think for a moment what would have happened if he had not!
It is very hard to write in a temperate vein when Weyler is the subject. But where is the case for the plaintiff? Where are their defenders, when Nero, Caligula or Judas is in question?
Let us now contemplate a pen picture of "The Butcher," painted by Mr. Elbert Rappleye, a very clever American newspaper correspondent:
"General Weyler is one of those men who creates a first impression, the first sight of whom can never be effaced from the mind, by whose presence the most careless observer is impressed instantly, and yet, taken altogether, he is a man in whom the elements of greatness are concealed under a cloak of impenetrable obscurity. Inferior physically, unsoldierly in bearing, exhibiting no trace of refined sensibilities nor pleasure in the gentle associations that others live for, or at least seek as diversions, he is nevertheless the embodiment of mental acuteness, crafty, unscrupulous, fearless and of indomitable perseverance.
"Campos was fat, good-natured, wise, philosophical, slow in his mental processes, clear in his judgment, emphatic in his opinions, outspoken and withal, lovable, humane, conservative, constructive, progressive, with but one object ever before him, the glorification of Spain as a motherland and a figure among peaceful, enlightened nations. Weyler is lean, diminutive, shriveled, ambitious for immortality, irrespective of its odor, a master of diplomacy, the slave of Spain for the glory of sitting at the right of her throne, unlovable, unloving, exalted."
After telling of how he was admitted to Weyler's presence, Mr. Rappleye continues his vivid description.
"And what a picture! A little man. An apparition of blacks—black eyes, black hair, black beard, dark—exceedingly dark—complexion; a plain black attire. He was alone and was standing facing the door I entered. He had taken a position in the very centre of the room, and seemed lost in its immense depths. His eyes, far apart, bright, alert and striking, took me in at a glance. His face seemed to run to chin, his lower jaw protruding far beyond any ordinary indication of firmness, persistence or will power. His forehead is neither high nor receding; neither is it that of a thoughtful or philosophic man. His ears are set far back; and what is called the region of intellect, in which are those mental attributes that might be defined as powers of observation, calculation, judgment and execution, is strongly developed."
Mrs. Kate Masterson, another American journalist, was, we believe, the only one, except Mr. Rappleye, who obtained an interview with Weyler.
Among other things that he said, Mrs. Masterson reports the following:
"I have shut out the Spanish and Cuban papers from the field as well as the American. In the last war the correspondents created much jealousy by what they wrote. They praised one and rebuked the other. They are a nuisance."
"I have no time to pay attention to stories. Some of them are true and some of them are not."
"The Spanish columns attend to their prisoners just as well as any other country in times of war." An obviously false statement, by the way. "War is war. You cannot make it otherwise, try as you will."
True to a certain extent, General Weyler, but not from your point of view. There are certain humanitarian principles, of which you seem to be ignorant that can be practiced in time of war as well as in time of peace.
Weyler declared to Mrs. Masterson that women, if combatants, would be treated just the same as men. As a matter of fact, whether combatants or non-combatants, he treated them worse than men.
He sneered at the Cuban leaders, at Maceo for being a mulatto, and for having, as he asseverated, no military instruction. And at Gomez, whom he declared was not a brave soldier and had never distinguished himself in any way.
It has always been the policy of the Spaniards to belittle the Cubans, sneering at them as being generaled by negroes, half breeds and illiterate to a degree. Beyond the fact that this is contemptibly false, they do not stop to think how they are dishonoring their own troops which have made such little headway against them.
When the Spaniards have forced the insurgents to surrender in all the revolts that have taken place, it has been mainly through false representations and lying promises, promise that they knew, when they made them, were never intended to be carried out.
Weyler's character may perhaps be best understoodfrom his own following egotistical statement, which is well-authenticated:
"I care not for America, England, or any other country, but only for the treaties we have with them. They are the law. I know I am merciless, but mercy has no place in war, I know the reputation which has been built up for me. I care not what is said about me unless it is a lie so grave as to occasion alarm. I am not a politician. I am Weyler."
Contrast with these utterances, the words of Maximo Gomez, the grand old man of Cuba, in his instructions to his men:
"Do not risk your life unnecessarily. You have only one and can best serve your country by saving it. Dead men cannot fire guns. Keep your head cool, your machete warm, and we will yet free Cuba."
Gomez, by the way, at one time, served under Weyler, the former a captain, the latter as a colonel. The noble Cuban leader certainly did not obtain his views of modern warfare from his then superior officer.
When Weyler arrived in Cuba he had at his command at least one hundred and twenty thousand regulars, fifty thousand volunteers and a large naval coast guard. Rather a formidable force to subdue what has been characterized as a handful of bandits.
His policy from the beginning was one of extermination, and he made war upon those who were not in arms against Spain as well as those who were, upon women and children as well as upon men.
Although Weyler did not begin what may be calledactive operations until November (he arrived in February), still he persecuted by every means in his power the pacificos, that is, those who did not take arms for or against either side.
He conceived what General Fitzhugh Lee calls "the brilliant idea" of ruining the farmers so that they should not be able to give any aid to the insurgents.
Read carefully the text of his famous reconcentrado order, which brought misery, ruin and death to the peaceable inhabitants of the island:
"I, Don Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marquis of Tenerife, Governor-General, Captain-General of this island and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, etc., etc., hereby order and command:
"1. That all inhabitants of the country districts, or those who reside outside the lines of fortifications of the towns, shall within a delay of eight days enter the towns which are occupied by the troops. Any individual found outside the lines in the country at the expiration of this period shall be considered a rebel and shall be dealt with as such.
"2. The transport of food from the towns, and the carrying of food from one place to another by sea or by land, without the permission of the military authorities of the place of departure, is absolutely forbidden. Those who infringe upon the order will be tried and punished as aiders and abettors of the rebellion.
"3. The owners of cattle must drive their herds to the towns, or the immediate vicinity of the towns, for which purposes proper escorts will be given them.
"4. When the period of eight days, which shall be reckoned in each district from the day of the publication of this proclamation in the country town of the district, shall have expired, all insurgents who may present themselves will be placed under my orders for the purpose of designating a place in which they may reside. The furnishing of news concerning the enemy, which can be availed of with advantage, will serve as a recommendation to them; also, when the presentation is made with firearms in their possession, and when, and more especially, when the insurgents present themselves in numbers.
Valeriano Weyler."
Was there ever a more damnable—there is no other word for it—a more damnable proclamation issued?
And the result? Words can scarcely do justice to it. It was the death-sentence of thousands and thousands of innocent people, the large majority of whom were women and children.
The peasant farmers, with their families, were only allowed to bring with them what they could carry on their backs, when they were forced to leave all that they had in the world, and remove to the places of "concentration," where it was impossible for them to make a living.
Before leaving they saw their houses and crops burned, and their live stock, be it much or little, that they possessed, confiscated.