RUMANIA AND ITS LOST TERRITORY: THE BLACK AREA SHOWS THE SOUTHERN PART OF DOBRUDJA, WON FROM THE BULGARS IN THE LAST BALKAN WAR, WHICH RUMANIA IS FORCED TO RETURN TO BULGARIA. THE SHADED AREA—NORTHERN DOBRUDJA—WHICH INCLUDES THE MOUTHS OF THE DANUBE AND RUMANIA'S ONLY ACCESS TO THE BLACK SEA, IS CEDED TO THE CENTRAL POWERS, WHO WILL ADMINISTER IT THROUGH A MIXED COMMISSION. THE SHADING ALONG RUMANIA'S WESTERN BORDER INDICATES THE AUSTRO-GERMANRUMANIA AND ITS LOST TERRITORY: THE BLACK AREA SHOWS THE SOUTHERN PART OF DOBRUDJA, WON FROM THE BULGARS IN THE LAST BALKAN WAR, WHICH RUMANIA IS FORCED TO RETURN TO BULGARIA. THE SHADED AREA—NORTHERN DOBRUDJA—WHICH INCLUDES THE MOUTHS OF THE DANUBE AND RUMANIA'S ONLY ACCESS TO THE BLACK SEA, IS CEDED TO THE CENTRAL POWERS, WHO WILL ADMINISTER IT THROUGH A MIXED COMMISSION. THE SHADING ALONG RUMANIA'S WESTERN BORDER INDICATES THE AUSTRO-GERMAN "RECTIFICATION," WHICH GIVES AUSTRIA ALL THE MOUNTAIN PASSES AND IMPORTANT MINERAL LANDS.
RUMANIA AND ITS LOST TERRITORY: THE BLACK AREA SHOWS THE SOUTHERN PART OF DOBRUDJA, WON FROM THE BULGARS IN THE LAST BALKAN WAR, WHICH RUMANIA IS FORCED TO RETURN TO BULGARIA. THE SHADED AREA—NORTHERN DOBRUDJA—WHICH INCLUDES THE MOUTHS OF THE DANUBE AND RUMANIA'S ONLY ACCESS TO THE BLACK SEA, IS CEDED TO THE CENTRAL POWERS, WHO WILL ADMINISTER IT THROUGH A MIXED COMMISSION. THE SHADING ALONG RUMANIA'S WESTERN BORDER INDICATES THE AUSTRO-GERMAN "RECTIFICATION," WHICH GIVES AUSTRIA ALL THE MOUNTAIN PASSES AND IMPORTANT MINERAL LANDS.
(B) Rumania cedes to the allied powers that portion of Dobrudja up to the Danube north of the new frontier line described under Section A; that is to say, between the confluence of the stream and the Black Sea, to the St. George branch of the river. The Danube frontier between the territory ceded to the allied powers and Rumania will be formed by the river valley. The allied powers and Rumania will undertake to see that Rumania shall receive an assured trade route to the Black Sea, by way of Tchernavoda and Constanza, (Kustendje.)Article XI. says that Rumania agrees that her frontier shall undergo rectification in favor of Austria-Hungary as indicated on the map, and continues:"Two mixed commissions, to be composed of equal numbers of representatives of the powers concerned, are immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty to fix a new frontier line on the spot."Article XII. Property in the ceded regions of Rumania passes without indemnification to the States which acquire these regions. Those States to which the ceded territories fall shall make agreements with Rumania on the following points: First, with regard to the allegiance of the Rumanian inhabitants of these regions and the manner in which they are to be accorded the right of option; secondly, with regard to the property of communes split by the new frontier; thirdly and fourthly, with regard to administrative and juridical matters; fifthly, with regard to the effect of the changes of territory on dioceses.Clause 4 deals with war indemnities, of which Article XIII. declares that the contracting parties mutually renounce indemnificationof their war costs, and special arrangements are to be made for the settlement of damages caused by the war.The fifth clause relates to the evacuation of occupied territories, embodied in Articles XIV. to XXIV., summed up as follows:"The occupied Rumanian territories shall be evacuated at times to be later agreed upon. The strength of the army of occupation shall, apart from the formation employed in economic functions, not surpass six divisions. Until the ratification of the treaty the present occupation administration continues, but immediately after the signature of the treaty the Rumanian Government has the power to supplement the corps of officials by such appointments or dismissals as may seem good to it."Up to the time of evacuation, a civil official of the occupation administration shall always be attached to the Rumanian Ministry in order to facilitate so far as possible the transfer of the civil administration to the Rumanian authorities. The Rumanian authorities must follow the directions which the commanders of the army of occupation consider requisite in the interest of the security of the occupied territory, as well as the security, maintenance, and distribution of their troops.For the present, railways, posts, and telegraphs will remain under military administration, and will, in accordance with proper agreements, be at the disposal of the authorities and population. As a general rule, the Rumanian courts will resume jurisdiction in the occupied territories to their full extent. The allied powers will retain jurisdiction, as well as the power of police supervision, over those belonging to the army of occupation. Punishable acts against the army of occupation will be judged by its military tribunals, and also offenses against the orders of the occupation administration. Persons can only return to the occupied territories in proportion as the Rumanian Government provides for their security and maintenance.The army of occupation's right to requisition is restricted to wheat, peas, beans, fodder, wool, cattle, and meat from the products of 1918, and, further, to timber, oil and oil products, always observing proper regard for an orderly plan of procuring these commodities, as well as satisfying the home needs of Rumania.From the ratification of the treaty onward the army of occupation shall be maintained at the expense of Rumania. A separate agreement will be made with regard to the details of the transfer of the civil administration, as well as with regard to the withdrawal of the regulations of the occupation administration. Money spent by the allied powers in the occupied territories on public works, including industrial undertakings, shall be made good on their transfer. Until the evacuation these undertakings shall remain under the military administration.Clause 6.—Regulations regarding navigation on the Danube.Article XXIV. Rumania shall conclude a new Danube Navigation act with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, regulating the legal position on the Danube from the point where it becomes navigable, with due regard for the prescriptions subsequently set forth under Sections A to D, and on conditions that the prescriptions under Section B shall apply equally for all parties to the Danube act. Negotiations regarding the new Danube Navigation act shall begin at Munich as soon as possible after the ratification of the treaty.The sections follow: (A) Under the name Danube Mouth Commission, the European Danube Commission shall, under conditions subsequently set forth, be maintained as a permanent institution, empowered with the privileges and obligations hitherto appertaining to it for the river from Braila downward, inclusive of this port. The conditions referred to provide, among other things, that the commission shall henceforth only comprise representatives of States situated on the Danube or the European coasts of the Black Sea. The commission's authority extends from Braila downward to the whole of the arms and mouth of the Danube and adjoining parts of the Black Sea.(B.) Rumania guarantees to the ships of the other contracting parties free navigation on the Rumanian Danube, including the harbors. Rumania shall levy no toll on ships or rafts of the contracting parties and their cargoes merely for the navigation of the river. Neither shall Rumania, in the future, levy on the river any tolls, save those permitted by the new Danube Navigation act.Section C provides for the abolition after the ratification of the treaty of the Rumanian ad valorem duty of 1-1/2 per cent. on imports and exports.Articles XXV. and XXVI. deal with Danube questions and provide that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Rumania are entitled to maintain warships on the Danube, which may navigate down stream to the sea and up stream as far as the upper frontier of Austria's territory, but are forbidden intercourse with the shore of another State or to put in there except under force majeure or with the consent of the State.The powers represented on the Danube Mouth Commission are entitled to maintain two light warships each as guard ships at the mouth of the Danube.Article XXVII. provides equal rights for all religious denominations, including Jews and Moslems, in Rumania, including the right to establish private schools.Article XXVIII. provides that diversity of religion does not affect legal, political, or civil rights of the inhabitants, and, pending ratification of the treaty, a decree will beproclaimed giving the full rights of Rumanian subjects to all those, such as Jews, having no nationality.The remaining three articles provide that economic relations shall be regulated by separate treaties, coming into operation at the same time as the peace treaty. The same applies to the exchange of prisoners.
(B) Rumania cedes to the allied powers that portion of Dobrudja up to the Danube north of the new frontier line described under Section A; that is to say, between the confluence of the stream and the Black Sea, to the St. George branch of the river. The Danube frontier between the territory ceded to the allied powers and Rumania will be formed by the river valley. The allied powers and Rumania will undertake to see that Rumania shall receive an assured trade route to the Black Sea, by way of Tchernavoda and Constanza, (Kustendje.)
Article XI. says that Rumania agrees that her frontier shall undergo rectification in favor of Austria-Hungary as indicated on the map, and continues:
"Two mixed commissions, to be composed of equal numbers of representatives of the powers concerned, are immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty to fix a new frontier line on the spot."
Article XII. Property in the ceded regions of Rumania passes without indemnification to the States which acquire these regions. Those States to which the ceded territories fall shall make agreements with Rumania on the following points: First, with regard to the allegiance of the Rumanian inhabitants of these regions and the manner in which they are to be accorded the right of option; secondly, with regard to the property of communes split by the new frontier; thirdly and fourthly, with regard to administrative and juridical matters; fifthly, with regard to the effect of the changes of territory on dioceses.
Clause 4 deals with war indemnities, of which Article XIII. declares that the contracting parties mutually renounce indemnificationof their war costs, and special arrangements are to be made for the settlement of damages caused by the war.
The fifth clause relates to the evacuation of occupied territories, embodied in Articles XIV. to XXIV., summed up as follows:
"The occupied Rumanian territories shall be evacuated at times to be later agreed upon. The strength of the army of occupation shall, apart from the formation employed in economic functions, not surpass six divisions. Until the ratification of the treaty the present occupation administration continues, but immediately after the signature of the treaty the Rumanian Government has the power to supplement the corps of officials by such appointments or dismissals as may seem good to it."
Up to the time of evacuation, a civil official of the occupation administration shall always be attached to the Rumanian Ministry in order to facilitate so far as possible the transfer of the civil administration to the Rumanian authorities. The Rumanian authorities must follow the directions which the commanders of the army of occupation consider requisite in the interest of the security of the occupied territory, as well as the security, maintenance, and distribution of their troops.
For the present, railways, posts, and telegraphs will remain under military administration, and will, in accordance with proper agreements, be at the disposal of the authorities and population. As a general rule, the Rumanian courts will resume jurisdiction in the occupied territories to their full extent. The allied powers will retain jurisdiction, as well as the power of police supervision, over those belonging to the army of occupation. Punishable acts against the army of occupation will be judged by its military tribunals, and also offenses against the orders of the occupation administration. Persons can only return to the occupied territories in proportion as the Rumanian Government provides for their security and maintenance.
The army of occupation's right to requisition is restricted to wheat, peas, beans, fodder, wool, cattle, and meat from the products of 1918, and, further, to timber, oil and oil products, always observing proper regard for an orderly plan of procuring these commodities, as well as satisfying the home needs of Rumania.
From the ratification of the treaty onward the army of occupation shall be maintained at the expense of Rumania. A separate agreement will be made with regard to the details of the transfer of the civil administration, as well as with regard to the withdrawal of the regulations of the occupation administration. Money spent by the allied powers in the occupied territories on public works, including industrial undertakings, shall be made good on their transfer. Until the evacuation these undertakings shall remain under the military administration.
Clause 6.—Regulations regarding navigation on the Danube.
Article XXIV. Rumania shall conclude a new Danube Navigation act with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, regulating the legal position on the Danube from the point where it becomes navigable, with due regard for the prescriptions subsequently set forth under Sections A to D, and on conditions that the prescriptions under Section B shall apply equally for all parties to the Danube act. Negotiations regarding the new Danube Navigation act shall begin at Munich as soon as possible after the ratification of the treaty.
The sections follow: (A) Under the name Danube Mouth Commission, the European Danube Commission shall, under conditions subsequently set forth, be maintained as a permanent institution, empowered with the privileges and obligations hitherto appertaining to it for the river from Braila downward, inclusive of this port. The conditions referred to provide, among other things, that the commission shall henceforth only comprise representatives of States situated on the Danube or the European coasts of the Black Sea. The commission's authority extends from Braila downward to the whole of the arms and mouth of the Danube and adjoining parts of the Black Sea.
(B.) Rumania guarantees to the ships of the other contracting parties free navigation on the Rumanian Danube, including the harbors. Rumania shall levy no toll on ships or rafts of the contracting parties and their cargoes merely for the navigation of the river. Neither shall Rumania, in the future, levy on the river any tolls, save those permitted by the new Danube Navigation act.
Section C provides for the abolition after the ratification of the treaty of the Rumanian ad valorem duty of 1-1/2 per cent. on imports and exports.
Articles XXV. and XXVI. deal with Danube questions and provide that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Rumania are entitled to maintain warships on the Danube, which may navigate down stream to the sea and up stream as far as the upper frontier of Austria's territory, but are forbidden intercourse with the shore of another State or to put in there except under force majeure or with the consent of the State.
The powers represented on the Danube Mouth Commission are entitled to maintain two light warships each as guard ships at the mouth of the Danube.
Article XXVII. provides equal rights for all religious denominations, including Jews and Moslems, in Rumania, including the right to establish private schools.
Article XXVIII. provides that diversity of religion does not affect legal, political, or civil rights of the inhabitants, and, pending ratification of the treaty, a decree will beproclaimed giving the full rights of Rumanian subjects to all those, such as Jews, having no nationality.
The remaining three articles provide that economic relations shall be regulated by separate treaties, coming into operation at the same time as the peace treaty. The same applies to the exchange of prisoners.
Emperor William replied to Chancellor von Hertling's congratulations on the conclusion of peace between Germany and Rumania with this message:
The termination of the state of war in the east fills me also with proud joy and gratitude. Thanks to God's gracious help, the German people, with never-failing patriotism, under brilliant military leadership and with the assistance of strong diplomacy, are fighting step by step for a happy future.I can but convey my thanks on this occasion to you and also to your collaborators. God will help us to pass through the struggle which the hostile attitude of the powers, still under arms against us, has forced us to continue and to conclude it victoriously for the good of Germany and her allies.
The termination of the state of war in the east fills me also with proud joy and gratitude. Thanks to God's gracious help, the German people, with never-failing patriotism, under brilliant military leadership and with the assistance of strong diplomacy, are fighting step by step for a happy future.
I can but convey my thanks on this occasion to you and also to your collaborators. God will help us to pass through the struggle which the hostile attitude of the powers, still under arms against us, has forced us to continue and to conclude it victoriously for the good of Germany and her allies.
Emperor William in a telegram to Dr. Richard von Kühlmann, the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said:
The conclusion of peace with Rumania gives me an opportunity of expressing my joyful satisfaction that peace has now been given to the entire eastern front.May rich blessings descend on the peoples concerned from the resumption of peaceful labor to which they can now devote themselves.I thank you and your collaborators for the work done in loyal co-operation with our allies, and I confer on you as a sign of my appreciation the Order of the Royal Crown of the First Class.
The conclusion of peace with Rumania gives me an opportunity of expressing my joyful satisfaction that peace has now been given to the entire eastern front.
May rich blessings descend on the peoples concerned from the resumption of peaceful labor to which they can now devote themselves.
I thank you and your collaborators for the work done in loyal co-operation with our allies, and I confer on you as a sign of my appreciation the Order of the Royal Crown of the First Class.
Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, during the negotiations with Rumania explained in a public speech that Rumania would be compensated for the loss of territory on the Transylvanian border by taking the southern part of Bessarabia, the Russian province bordering Rumania on the east. The southern part of Bessarabia, however, has few Rumanians, while the northern part is largely populated by them. Subsequent events have apparently changed the Austro-German plans, for the whole of Bessarabia has voted almost unanimously for union with Rumania. The event was officially announced at Washington on April 22 through the Rumanian Charge d'Affaires, N. H. Lahovary, as follows:
On April 9 the National Assembly of Bessarabia voted by 86 against 3 for union of Bessarabia to Rumania. The Rumanian Premier was then at Kishinev (capital of Bessarabia) and took cognizance of the vote amid enthusiastic acclamation and declared this union to be definitive and indissoluble.Bessarabian delegates went to Jassy on April 12 to present the homage of the people of Bessarabia to their Majesties the King and Queen of Rumania. A Te Deum was sung at the cathedral in the presence of the royal family, the Government, and the Bessarabian delegates. The Archbishop of Bessarabia was also there, having taken the place next to the Metropolitan of Moldavia, who celebrated the service.After the ceremony was over a parade of the troops took place, followed by a luncheon given at the royal palace in honor of the Ministers of Bessarabia. His Majesty the King drank to the health of the united Rumanian and Bessarabian people, after witnessing the great historic event accomplished by the will of the people of Bessarabia and proclaiming indissoluble the union of the ancient province of the Moldavian crown to the mother country.
On April 9 the National Assembly of Bessarabia voted by 86 against 3 for union of Bessarabia to Rumania. The Rumanian Premier was then at Kishinev (capital of Bessarabia) and took cognizance of the vote amid enthusiastic acclamation and declared this union to be definitive and indissoluble.
Bessarabian delegates went to Jassy on April 12 to present the homage of the people of Bessarabia to their Majesties the King and Queen of Rumania. A Te Deum was sung at the cathedral in the presence of the royal family, the Government, and the Bessarabian delegates. The Archbishop of Bessarabia was also there, having taken the place next to the Metropolitan of Moldavia, who celebrated the service.
After the ceremony was over a parade of the troops took place, followed by a luncheon given at the royal palace in honor of the Ministers of Bessarabia. His Majesty the King drank to the health of the united Rumanian and Bessarabian people, after witnessing the great historic event accomplished by the will of the people of Bessarabia and proclaiming indissoluble the union of the ancient province of the Moldavian crown to the mother country.
Bessarabia, according to Mr. Lahovary, has about 3,000,000 inhabitants, and more than three-fourths of these are Rumanians. "Bessarabia," he continued, "is one of the richest farm lands of what was formerly Russia. The Bolsheviki ravaged it frightfully during the Winter months, and the country was only saved by the Rumanian troops, who were called in by the Bessarabians. Because of this help the Bolsheviki declared war on Rumania, and there were violent clashes between the Bolshevist brigands and Rumanian troops. Finally the latter ousted the Bolsheviki and succeeded in restoring tranquillity, but only after the Bolsheviki had committed most frightful outrages and pillaged the country. If Rumania was obliged to make peace, it was due directly to the attitude of the Bolsheviki toward Rumania."
Professor of Semitic Languages in the University of Pennsylvania
[From his book, "The War and the Bagdad Railway"]
Germany's project of a railway from Berlin to Bagdad, now rivaled by a new one from Berlin to Bombay via Russia, was one of the chief causes of the war. It dates from 1888, when a syndicate of German and British capital organized the Anatolian Railway, to be built from Haidar Pacha, opposite Constantinople, to Angora—about 360 miles. The German members later bought out the British interests. Further concessions were obtained, but in 1898 a much more ambitious plan was brought forward by the visit of the German Emperor to Sultan Abdul Hamid, and in 1899 the general policy of a line across Asia Minor was announced. This line, however, as a glance at the map will show, did not get beyond Angora; Russia killed that phase of the project. The Bagdad Railway was then organized in 1903, and obtained from Turkey an unprecedented concession running southeastward to the Persian Gulf. Both England and France were offered a minor share in the enterprise, but refused. The Germans thus remained in full control, at the same time obtaining all the French capital they needed through Swiss banks.
The Bagdad Railway has been a nightmare resting heavily on all Europe for eighteen years—ever since the announcement in 1899 of the concession granted to the Anatolian Railway Company. No step ever taken by any European power anywhere has caused so much trouble, given rise to so many complications, and has been such a constant menace to the peace of the world. No European statesman to whom the destinies of his country have been committed has rested easily in the presence of this spectre of the twentieth century. In the last analysis the Bagdad Railway will be found to be the largest single contributing factor in bringing on the war, because through it more than through any other cause the mutual distrust among European powers has been nurtured until the entire atmosphere of international diplomacy became vitiated. The explanation of this remarkable phenomenon, transforming what appeared on the surface to be a magnificent commercial enterprise, with untold possibilities for usefulness, into a veritable curse, an excrescence on the body politic of Europe, is to be sought in the history of the highway through which the railway passes. The control of this highway is the key to the East—the Near and the Farther East as well. Such has been its rôle in the past—such is its significance today. * * *
The most recent events are merely the repetition on a large scale of such as took place thousands of years ago and at frequent intervals since. The weapons have changed, new contestants have arisen to take the place of civilizations that after serving their day faded out of sight, but the issue has ever remained the same. We are confronted by that issue today—the control of the highway that leads to the East. * * * The decisive battlefields for the triumph of democracy are in the West, but the decision for supremacy among European nations lies in the East. The Bagdad Railway is the most recent act in a drama the beginnings of which lie in the remote past. * * *
The course of events in the Near East since the entering wedge, represented by Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, is to be interpreted as the irresistible onslaught of the West to break down the barrier created in 1453. As we survey the successive steps in this onslaught, the struggle between France and England, culminating in the Convention of 1904, which gave France a dominant position in Morocco in return for allowing England a free hand in Egypt, the attempts of France and Russia to hedge in England in India, followed by England and Russia in dividing up their "spheres of influence" in Persia, the commercial and railway concessions secured by England, France, and Russia from Turkey, sinking ever deeper into a slough of desperateweakness, we see how these struggles, conventions, and partnerships all lead up to the dramatic climax—the struggle for the historic highway which is the key to the Near East. Its possession will mean in the future—as it always has in the past—dominion over Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and probably Arabia; and the Near East points its finger directly toward the Farther East. Under the modern symbol of railway control, Asia Minor, true to the genius of its history, once more looms up as a momentous factor in the world history. * * * The murder at Serajevo was merely the match applied to the pile all ready to be kindled. * * *
MAP SHOWING THE COMPLETED AND PROJECTED SECTIONS OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, THE GERMAN ENTERPRISE THAT FIGURED AMONG THE PRIMARY CAUSES OF THE WARMAP SHOWING THE COMPLETED AND PROJECTED SECTIONS OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, THE GERMAN ENTERPRISE THAT FIGURED AMONG THE PRIMARY CAUSES OF THE WAR
MAP SHOWING THE COMPLETED AND PROJECTED SECTIONS OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, THE GERMAN ENTERPRISE THAT FIGURED AMONG THE PRIMARY CAUSES OF THE WAR
Full credit should be given to the German brains in which this project was hatched, and there is no reason to suspect that at the outset the German capitalists who fathered the enterprise were actuated by any other motive than the perfectly legitimate one to create a great avenue of commerce. When, however, the German Government entered the field as the backer and promoter of the scheme the political aspect of the railroad was moved into the foreground, and that aspect has since overshadowed the commercial one.
Had the original plan of the German group to run the Bagdad Railway across Northern Asia Minor from Angora been adhered to, the interior would have been kept free, and it is likely that a favorite English plan (afterward taken up also by the French Government) to run a railway from the Gulf of Alexandretta via Aleppo and the Euphrates to Bagdad might have been carried out. * * * The railway projects of Asia Minor and Syria might have remained purely commercial undertakings of great cultural value. The political aspect of railway plans in the Near East might have been permanently kept in the background.
The stumbling block that prevented the execution of the original plan was—strangely enough—Russia. Her opposition to the northern route brought about the change. Russia had plans of her own in Asia Minor and in the lands to the east beyond. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century Russia, fearing the extension of English power in the Far East, cast her eyes about for securing zones of influence that might bring her into touch with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. She secured the co-operation of France in 1891, and it is both interesting and instructive to note that the Franco-Russian alliance was originally directed against England rather than against Germany. * * * She exacted from Turkey the Black Sea Basin agreement, formally sanctioned in 1900, which reserved to her the right to construct railroads in Northern Asia Minor. * * * At all events, her opposition was strong enough to secure a modification of the plan of the Bagdad Railway in favor of the transverse route, which, as it turned out, gave Germany a tremendous advantage over all rivals, though it also brought on the opposition of England. Russia was not prepared to allow any further advantage to be gained in the East by England. On the whole she still preferred Germany.
[England's opposition to Germany's new railway scheme became acute when it was publicly announced that the road was not to terminate at Bagdad, or even at Basra, but to run on to a point "to be determined" on the Persian Gulf. The Convention of 1902-3 made it evident that Germany had stolen a march on England, and that the prestige of France, too, had suffered. The favor shown to the German syndicate by the Turkish Government was evident. The terms were indeed unprecedented. Says Dr. Jastrow: "No wonder that there were great rejoicings in Germany when they were announced and gnashing of teeth outside of Germany." With the announcement of the 1902-3 concession and the formation of the Bagdad Railway Company as a successor to the old Anatolian Company, the German syndicate did offer English and French capitalists a share in the enterprise, and insisted that the plan was "international." But the "share" thus offered was merely assistance in financing what would remain a German matter—inasmuch as Germany reserved the control in the management's personnel. England and France therefore refused to participate.]
The revelations by Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London at the outbreak of the war, which were printed in the May number ofCurrent History Magazine, produced a profound impression throughout the world, disclosing as they did the part played by the German Imperial Government in starting the war. German officialdom at once attacked Lichnowsky, compelling him to resign his rank and threatening him with trial for treason. On April 27, 1918, the Prussian upper house decided to grant the request of the First State Attorney of District Court No. 1 of Berlin for authorization to undertake criminal proceedings against Prince Lichnowsky. The State Attorney held that Prince Lichnowsky, in communicating to third parties documents or their contents officially intrusted to him by his superiors had infringed the secrecy incumbent on him.
In referring to the prosecution of the Prince, Maximilian Harden, in a May issue of the Zukunft, said:
"I will swear that there are dozens of men sitting there in these dark war hours who have written and said similar things in sharper and more bitter words." Herr Harden asked whether these would meet the same fate if their papers were stolen and exposed in German shop windows. "Many a trusted wife," he said, "must cry out in fear: 'But, you know, Ernst, Adolf, and Klaus have spoken more desperately.'"
The chief theme of Lichnowsky's memorandum, the editor of Die Zukunft asserts, was the danger to Germany of a too-close alliance with Vienna and Budapest, of the flirtation with Poland, and his insistence upon the necessity of friendly relations with a strong Russia. The German outcry against Lichnowsky, however, gave foreign countries the impression that the Prince had made fearfully damaging disclosures of Berlin's guilt. The question of blame, he says, "reflected almost an identical interpretation to that of our White Book, and a cool head would not have made a world sensation out of it." Harden concludes by saying that an ostracized Lichnowsky would become a power; but the Prussian Diet has no sense of humor.
In the MayCurrent History Magazinean abridged version of the first reply of former Foreign Secretary von Jagow to Prince Lichnowsky was printed, but the document is of such importance that a translation in its entirety is herewith given.[4]
Practically coincident with the giving out for publication on March 19, through the semi-official Wolff Telegraph Bureau, of an account of a discussion in the Main Committee of the Reichstag of the memorandum of the former Ambassador at London, together with substantial excerpts from the main chapters of his work, the German Government got in touch with Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the war began, and asked him to write an article calculated to counteract the effect of the Lichnowsky revelations. Herr von Jagow hastened to accede to this request, but he merely made matters worse for the German Government by practically admitting the correctness of Prince Lichnowsky's assertion that England did not want war and that Berlin was aware of this.
Copies of German newspapers received here show that, while the journals of all factions were practically of one mind in reproaching the German Foreign Office for its lack of diplomatic ability, the Pan-German and militarist organs laid special stress upon the implication in the von Jagow article that Germany might have been willing to drop its alliance with Austria if it could have been sure of contracting one with England, and the Liberal and Socialist papers declared that it was no use insisting any longer that Great Britain was guilty of the wholesale bloodshed of the world war, and that now nothing really stood in the way of moving for a peace by agreement.
These comments were so sharp on both sides that Herr von Jagow was soon moved to write another article defending his reply to Prince Lichnowsky and arguing that his statements regarding the Triple Alliance could by no means be interpreted as meaning that he would have been willing to abandon Austria-Hungary in favor of Great Britain. In this article, which was first printed in the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, von Jagow says he cannot understand how these statements can be taken to mean that he was an opponent of the alliance with Austria and was considering a choice between Austria and England. He proceeds to defend his own policy by reference to the fact that Bismarck was not content with the Triple Alliance on the one hand, and the famous "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia on the other hand, but in 1887 deliberately promoted agreements between Austria-Hungary, Italy, and England, with the object of "bringing England into a closer relationship to the Central European league and making her share its burdens." Bismarck's policy relieved Germany of some of her obligations, because "Austria-Hungary, supported by Italy and England, held the balance against Russia."
Then, as The London Times points out, carefully avoiding the history of the present Kaiser's reversal of Bismarck's policy and abandonment of the "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia, von Jagow defends his attempts to make British policy serve Germany's purposes. It was "because of the isolation of the Triple Alliance, which had come about in the course of years," that von Jagow "pursued a rapprochement with England." He did so, "not with any idea of putting England in the place of Austria-Hungary, but in order, by disposing of the Anglo-German antagonism, to move England to a different orientation of her policy." Germany "could not count upon Italy," and wanted other assistance in upholding Austria-Hungary in the Balkans against Russia. Herr von Jagow proceeds:
"The combination of England would have relieved us of the necessity of taking: our stand alone, when the case arose, for Austria-Hungary against Russia. As was effected by the agreements of 1887, a part of our obligations would have been laid upon other shoulders. It is in this sense that I spoke of the possibility of the loosening and the dissolution of old unions which no longer satisfy all the conditions.
"The alliance with Austria-Hungary was the cornerstone of Bismarckian policy, and that it had to remain. The expansion of the alliance into the Triple Alliance, by taking in Italy, was a means of supplementing the Central European grouping of the powers; it was an 'auxiliary structure,' by means of which Bismarck aimed at a further guarantee of peace, especially as he intended thereby to check Italy's Irredentist policy. Threads then ran to England via Italy. These threads gave way later, and this caused a considerable change in the attitude of Italy.
"A friendly attitude on the part of England toward the Triple Alliance—what Professor Hermann Oncken calls the moral extension of the Triple Alliance over the Channel—was the aim of our policy, and in this we were sure of the complete accord of our allies. I never thought that the agreements about Bagdad and the colonies would mean an immediate alteration of England's course in European policy. These agreements were to prepare the way for this change of course. I was under no illusions about the difficulties which would still have to be overcome. But difficulties, and even resistance on the part of public opinion in one's own country, cannot prevent us from following a road that is seen to be right. The league between Germany and Austria-Hungary, supported by friendship with England, would have created a peace bloc of unassailable strength. The increasing Irredentism of Italy, her friction with Austria on the Adriatic, and the Russophile and also Irredentist tendencies of Rumania, would have lost their importance. Then, in given circumstances, the Triple Alliance treaty might have been modified. The union with England would also have secured us against Russian aggression, and the obligations imposed upon us by our alliance would thereby have been diminished.
"The road to this goal was long. The calm development was crossed by the Serajevo murders, and in the fateful hour of August, 1914, the English Government—instead of keeping peace—preferred to join in the war against us. The English Government has probably since then been assailed by serious doubts as to whether its choice was right. In any case, it assumed a considerable share of the guilt for the bloodshed in Europe."
Herr von Jagow then denies that his scheme was inevitably doomed to failure, saying that the policy of England is more liable to adaptation and alteration than the policy of any other country, and that "more far-seeingstatesmen than those who were intrusted with the fortunes of the Island Empire in 1914—think only of the Pitts, Disraelis, and Salisburys—held other views about the orientation of England toward Germany and Russia."
"As matters stand today, attempts to arrive at clearness about the respective parts played by our enemies at the outbreak of the war, and about the greater or less degrees of guilt belonging to each of them, can have only a historical value. England has made the cause of our enemies her own, and so she also shall be made to feel how Germany defends herself against her enemies."
[Copyrighted]
Herr von Jagow's first reply to Prince Lichnowsky, which was printed in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung March 23, 1918, follows:
"So far as it is possible, in general, I shall refrain from taking up the statements concerning the policy obtaining before my administration of the Foreign Office.
"I should like to make the following remarks about the individual points in the article:
"When I was named State Secretary in January, 1913, I regarded a German-English rapprochement as desirable and also believed an agreement attainable on the points where our interests touched or crossed each other. At all events, I wanted to try to work in this sense. A principal point for us was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question—the so-called Bagdad policy—as this had become for us a question of prestige. If England wanted to force us out there it certainly appeared to me that a conflict could hardly be avoided. In Berlin I began, as soon as it was possible to do so, to negotiate over the Bagdad Railroad. We found a favorable disposition on the part of the English Government, and the result was the agreement that was almost complete when the world war broke out.
"At the same time the negotiations over the Portuguese colonies that had been begun by Count Metternich, (as German Ambassador at London,) continued by Baron Marschall, and reopened by Prince Lichnowsky were under way. I intended to carve the way later for further negotiations regarding other—for example, East Asiatic—problems, when what was in my opinion the most important problem, that of the Bagdad Railroad, should be settled, and an atmosphere of more confidence thus created. I also left the naval problem aside, as it would have been difficult to reach an early agreement over that matter, after past experiences.
"I can pass over the development of the Albanian problem, as it occurred before my term of office began. In general, however, I would like to remark that such far-reaching disinterestedness in Balkan questions as Prince Lichnowsky proposes does not seem possible to me. It would have contradicted the essential part of the alliance if we had completely ignored really vital interests of our ally. We, too, had demanded that Austria stand by us at Algeciras, and at that time Italy's attitude had caused serious resentment among us. Russia, although she had no interest at all in Morocco, also stood by France. Finally, it was our task, as the third member of the alliance, to support such measures as would render possible a settlement of the divergent interests of our allies and avoid a conflict between them.
"It further appeared impossible to me not to pursue a 'triple alliance policy' in matters where the interests of the allied powers touched each other. Then Italy would have been driven entirely into line with the Entente in questions of the Orient, and Austria handed over to the mercy of Russia, and the Triple Alliance would thus have really gone to pieces. And we, too, would not have been able to look after our interests in the Orient, if we did not have some support. And even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny that we had to represent great economic interests right there. But today economic interests are no longer to be separated from political interests.
"That the people 'in Petrograd wanted to see the Sultan independent' is an assertion that Prince Lichnowsky will hardly be able to prove; it would contradict every tradition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore, had not had at our command the influence at Constantinople founded by Baron Marschall, it would hardly have been possible for us to defend our economic interests in Turkey in the desired way.
"When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts that we only 'drove Russia, our natural friend and best neighbor, into the arms of France and England through our Oriental and Balkan policy' he is in conflict with the historical facts. Only because Prince Gortschakoff [Russian Premier] was guiding Russian policy toward a rapprochement with a France lusting for revenge was Prince Bismarck induced to enter into the alliance with Austria-Hungary; through the alliance withRumania he barred an advance of Russia toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky condemns the basic principles of Bismarck's policy. Our attempts to draw closer to Russia went to pieces—Björki proves it—or remained ineffective, like the so-called Potsdam agreement. Also, Russia was not always our 'best neighbor.' Under Queen Elizabeth, as at present, she strove for possession of East Prussia to extend her Baltic coasts and to insure her domination of the Baltic. The Petrograd 'window' has gradually widened, so as to take in Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Finland and reach after Aland. Poland was arranged to be a field over which to send troops against us. Pan-Slavism, which was dominating the Russian policy to an ever greater degree, had positive anti-German tendencies.
"And we did not force Russia to drop 'her policy of Asiatic expansion,' but only tried to defend ourselves against her encroachments in European policy and her encircling of our Austro-Hungarian ally.
"Just as little as Sir Edward Grey [British Foreign Secretary] did we want war to come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of our unhappy experience at Algeciras, we agreed to a conference. The credit of an 'attitude of mediation' at the conference should not be denied Sir Edward Grey; but that he 'by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente' is, however, surely saying rather too much. Certainly he often advised yielding in Petrograd (as we did in Vienna) and found 'formulas of agreement,' but in dealing with the other side he represented the Entente, because he, no less than ourselves, neither would, nor could, abandon his associates. That we, on the other hand, 'without exception, represented the standpoint dictated to us from Vienna' is absolutely false. We, like England, played a mediatory rôle, and also in Vienna counseled far more yielding and moderation than Prince Lichnowsky appears to know about, or even to suggest. And then Vienna made several far-reaching concessions, (Dibra, Djakowa.) If Prince Lichnowsky, who always wanted to be wiser than the Foreign Office, and who apparently allowed himself to be strongly influenced by the Entente statesmen, did not know this, he surely ought not to make any false assertions now! If, to be sure, the degree of yielding that was necessary was reached in Vienna, we also naturally had to represent the Austrian standpoint at the conference. Ambassador Szögyeni himself was not one of the extremists; in Vienna they were by no means always satisfied with his attitude. That the Ambassador, with whom I was negotiating almost every day, constantly sounded the refrain of casus foederis is entirely unknown to me. It certainly is true that Prince Lichnowsky for some time past had not been counted as a friend of Austria in Vienna. Still complaints about him came to my ears oftener from the side of Marquis San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] than from the side of Count Berchtold, [Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister.]
"King Nicholas's seizure of Scutari constituted a mockery of the entire conference and a snub to all the powers taking part in it.
"Russia was by no means obliged 'to give way to us all along the line'; on the contrary, she 'advanced the wishes of Serbia' in several ways, Serbia even receiving some cities and strips of territory that could have been regarded as purely Albanian or preponderatingly so. Prince Lichnowsky says that 'the course of the conference was a fresh humiliation for the self-consciousness of Russia' and that there was a feeling of resentment in Russia on that account. It cannot be the task of our policy to satisfy all the unjustified demands of the exaggerated self-consciousness of a power by no means friendly to us, at the cost of our ally. Russia has no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our ally certainly has. If we, as Prince Lichnowsky seems to wish, had flatly taken the same stand as Russia, the result would have been a humiliation for Austria-Hungary and thus a weakening of our group. Prince Lichnowsky seems only anxious that Russia be not humiliated; a humiliation of Austria is apparently a matter of indifference to him.
"When Prince Lichnowsky says that our 'Austrophilie' was not adapted to 'promote Russia's interests in Asia,' I don't exactly understand what this means. Following a disastrous diversion toward East Asia—in the Japanese war we had favored Russia without even being thanked for it!—Russia again took up her policy directed toward the European Orient (the Balkans and Constantinople) with renewed impulse, (the Balkan Alliance, Buchlau, Iswolsky, &c.) [Iswolsky retired as Russian Foreign Minister after Germany forced the Czar to repudiate his Serbian policy in 1909.]
"Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the 'Ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle,' evidently knew how to throw a little sand into the eyes of our Ambassador. He, in contrast to King Constantine and Theototy, always was pro-Entente. His present attitude reveals his feelings as clearly as can be. Herr Danef, however, was entirely inclined toward Petrograd.
"That Count Berchtold displayed certain inclinations toward Bulgaria also in its differences with Rumania is true; that we 'naturally went with him' is, however, entirely false. With our support, King Carol had the satisfaction of the Bucharest peace. [Ended second Balkan war.] If, therefore, in the case of the Bucharest peace, in which we favored the wishes and interests of Rumania,which was allied to us, our policy deviated somewhat from that of Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet certainly did not believe—as Prince Lichnowsky asserts—that it 'could count upon our support in case of its revision.' That Marquis San Giuliano 'is said to have warned us already in the Summer of 1913 from becoming involved in a world war,' because at that time in Austria 'the thought of a campaign against Serbia' had found entrance, is entirely unknown to me. Just as little do I know that Herr von Tschirschky—who certainly was rather pessimistic by nature—is said to have declared in the Spring of 1914 that there soon would be war. Therefore, I was just as ignorant of the 'important happenings' that Prince Lichnowsky here suspects as he was himself! Such events as the English visit to Paris—Sir Edward Grey's first to the Continent—surely must have been known to the Ambassador, and we informed him about the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be sure, he did not want to believe it!
"In the matter of Liman von Sander, [German reorganizer of the Turkish Army,] we made a far-reaching concession to Russia by renouncing the General's power of command over Constantinople. I will admit that this point of the agreement over the military mission was not opportune politically.
"When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of having succeeded in giving the treaty a form corresponding to our wishes, this credit must not be denied him, although it certainly required strong pressure on several occasions to induce him to represent some of our desires with more emphasis.
"When Prince Lichnowsky says that he received the authorization definitely to conclude the treaty, after he previously asserts that 'the treaty was consequently dropped,' this contains a contradiction which we may let the Prince straighten out. Lichnowsky's assertion, however, that we delayed publication because the treaty would have been 'a public success' for him that we begrudged him, is an unheard-of insinuation that can only be explained through his self-centred conception of things. The treaty would have lost its practical and moral effect—one of its main objects was to create a good atmosphere between us and England—if its publication had been greeted with violent attacks upon 'perfidious Albion' in our Anglophobe press and in our Parliament. And there is no doubt that, in view of our internal position at that time, this is what the simultaneous publication of the so-called Windsor Treaty would have caused. And the howl about English perfidy that the internal contradiction between the text of the Windsor Treaty and our treaty would doubtless have called forth would hardly have been stilled in the minds of our public through the assurance of English bona fides.
"With justified precaution, we intended to allow the publication to be made only at the proper moment, when the danger of disapproving criticism was no longer so acute, if possible simultaneously with the announcement of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the point of being concluded. The fact that two great agreements had been concluded between us and England would doubtless have materially favored their reception and made it easier to overlook the aesthetic defects of the Portuguese agreement. It was consideration for the effect of the agreement—with which we wanted to improve our relations with England, not to generate more trouble—that caused our hesitation.
"It is correct that—although in a secondary degree—consideration was also taken of the efforts just then being made to obtain economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, which the publication of the agreement would naturally have made more difficult to realize. These conditions Prince Lichnowsky may not have been able to perceive fully from London, but he should have trusted in our objective judgment and acquiesced in it, instead of replacing his lack of understanding with suspicions and the interjection of personal motives. He certainly would have found our arguments understood by the English statesmen themselves.
"The Ambassador's speeches aroused considerable adverse sentiment in this country. It was necessary for the creation of a better atmosphere, in which alone the rapprochement being worked for could flourish, that confidence in our English policy and in our London Ambassador be spread also among our people at home. Prince Lichnowsky, otherwise so susceptible to public opinion, did not take this motive sufficiently into account, for he saw everything only through his London spectacles. The charges against the attitude of the Foreign Office are too untenable to be bothered with. I would only like to point out that Prince Lichnowsky was not left in ignorance regarding the 'most important things,' in so far as they were of value to his mission. On the contrary, I gave the Ambassador much more general information than used to be the custom. My own experiences as Ambassador induced me to do so. But with Lichnowsky there was the inclination to rely more upon his own impressions and judgment than upon the information and advice of the Central Office. To be sure, I did not always have either the motive or the authority to impart the sources of our news. Here there were quite definite considerations, particularly anxiety regarding the compromising of our sources. The Prince's memorandum furnishes the best justification for the caution exercised in this regard.
"It is not true that in the Foreign Office the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances were not believed.
"At Knopischt, on the occasion of thevisit of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Archduke heir apparent, no plan of an active policy against Serbia was laid down. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was not at all the champion of a policy leading to war for which he has often been taken. During the London conference he advised moderation and the avoidance of war.
"Prince Lichnowsky's 'optimism' was hardly justified, as he has probably convinced himself since through the revelations of the Sukhomlinoff trial. Besides, the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, as said before, he was informed) should have made him more skeptical. Unfortunately, the suspicion voiced by the Imperial Chancellor and the Under Secretary of State was well grounded. How does this agree with the assertion that we, relying upon the reports of Count Pourtalès that 'Russia would not move under any circumstances,' had not thought of the possibility of a war? Furthermore, so far as I can recollect, Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] never made such reports.
"That Austria-Hungary wished to proceed against the constant provocations stirred up by Russia, (Herr von Hartwig,) which reached their climax in the outrage of Serajevo, we had to recognize as justified. In spite of all the former settlements and avoidances of menacing conflicts, Russia did not abandon her policy, which aimed at the complete exclusion of the Austrian influence (and naturally ours also) from the Balkans. The Russian agents, inspired by Petrograd, continued their incitement. It was a question of the prestige and the existence of the Danube Monarchy. It must either put up with the Russo-Serbian machinations, or command a quos ego, even at the risk of war. We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had the intention been to exclude the ultima ratio of the war in general, the alliance should not have been concluded. Besides, it was plain that the Russian military preparations, (for instance, the extension of the railroads and forts in Poland,) for which a France lusting for revenge had lent the money and which would have been completed in a few years, were directed principally against us. But despite all this, despite the fact that the aggressive tendency of the Russian policy was becoming more evident from day to day, the idea of a preventive war was far removed from us. We only decided to declare war on Russia in the face of the Russian mobilization and to prevent a Russian invasion.
"I have not the letters exchanged with the Prince at hand—it was a matter of private letters. Lichnowsky pleaded for the abandonment of Austria. I replied, so far as I remember, that we, aside from our treaty obligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the uncertain friendship of England. If we abandoned our only reliable ally later we would stand entirely isolated, face to face with the Entente. It is likely that I also wrote that 'Russia was constantly becoming more anti-German' and that we must 'just risk it.' Furthermore, it is possible that I, in order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a little and to prevent him from exposing his views also in London, may also have written that there would probably be some 'bluster'; that 'the more firmly we stood by Austria the sooner Russia would yield.' I have said already that our policy was not based upon alleged reports excluding war; certainly at that time I still thought war could be avoided, but, like all of us, I was fully aware of the very serious danger.
"We could not agree to the English proposal of a conference of Ambassadors, for it would doubtless have led to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy, too, was pro-Serb and, with her Balkan interests, stood rather opposed to Austria. The 'intimacy of the Russo-Italian relations' is admitted by Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and only feasible way of escape was a localization of the conflict and an understanding between Vienna and Petrograd. We worked toward that end with all our energy. That we 'insisted upon' the war is an unheard-of assertion which is sufficiently invalidated by the telegrams of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Czar and to King George, published in the White Books—Prince Lichnowsky only cares to tell about 'the really humble telegram of the Czar'—as well as the instruction we sent to Vienna. The worst caricature is formed by the sentence:
"'When Count Berchtold finally decided to come around we answered the Russian mobilization, after Russia had vainly negotiated and waited a whole week, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.'
[In quoting Lichnowsky, Herr von Jagow omits the former's statement that Count Berchtold "hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin."]
"Should we, perhaps, have waited until the mobilized Russian Army was streaming over our borders? The reading of the Sukhomlinov trial has probably given even Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of 'Oh si tacuisses!' On July 5 I was absent from Berlin. The declaration that I was 'shortly thereafter in Vienna' 'in order to talk everything over with Count Berchtold' is false. I returned to Berlin on July 6 from my honeymoon trip and did not leave there until Aug. 15, on the occasion of the shifting of the Great Headquarters. As Secretary of State I was only once in Vienna before the war, in the Spring of 1913.
"Prince Lichnowsky lightly passed over the matter of the confusing dispatch that he sent us on Aug. 1—at present I am not in possession of the exact wording—as a 'misunderstanding' and even seems to want to reproach us because 'in Berlin the news, without first waiting for the conversation,was made the basis of a far-reaching action.' The question of war with England was a matter of minutes, and immediately after the arrival of the dispatch it was decided to make an eleventh-hour attempt to avoid war with France and England. His Majesty sent the well-known telegram to King George. The contents of the Lichnowsky dispatch could not have been understood any other way than we understood it.
"Objectively taken, the statement of Prince Lichnowsky presents such an abundance of inaccuracies and distortions that it is hardly a wonder that his conclusions are also entirely wrong. The reproach that we sent an ultimatum on July 30 to Petrograd merely because of the mobilization of Russia and on July 31 declared war upon the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that not a man should march so long as negotiations were under way, thus willfully destroying the possibility of a peaceful adjustment, has really a grotesque effect. In concluding, the statement seems almost to identify itself with the standpoint of our enemies.
"When the Ambassador makes the accusation that our policy identified itself 'with Turks and Austro-Magyars' and 'subjected itself to the viewpoints of Vienna and Budapest,' he may be suitably answered that he saw things only through London spectacles and from the narrow point of view of his desired rapprochement with England à tout prix. He also appears to have forgotten completely that the Entente was formed much more against us than against Austria.
"I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at an understanding with England, because I was of the opinion that this was the only way for us to escape from the unfavorable position in which we were placed by the unequal division of strength and the weakness of the Triple Alliance. But Russia and France insisted upon war. We were obligated through our treaty with Austria, and our position as a great power was also threatened—hic Rhodus, hic salta. But England, that was not allied in the same way with Russia and that had received far-reaching assurances from us regarding the sparing of France and Belgium, seized the sword.
"In saying this, I by no means share the opinion prevalent among us today that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. But he had allowed himself to become entangled too far in the net of the Franco-Russian policy; he no longer found the way out, and he did not prevent the world war—something that he could have done. Neither was the war popular with the English people; Belgium had to serve as a battle cry.
"'Political marriages for life and death' are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible in international unions. But neither is isolation, under the present condition of affairs in Europe. The history of Europe consists of coalitions that sometimes have led to the avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes to violent clashes. A loosening and dissolving of old alliances that no longer correspond to all conditions is only in order when new constellations are attainable. This was the object of the policy of a rapprochement with England. So long as this policy did not offer reliable guarantees we could not abandon the old guarantees—even with their obligations.
"The Morocco policy had led to a political defeat. In the Bosnian crisis this had been luckily avoided, the same as at the London Conference. A fresh diminution of our prestige was not endurable for our position in Europe and in the world. The prosperity of States, their political and economic successes, are based upon the prestige that they enjoy in the world.
"The personal attacks contained in the work, the unheard-of calumnies and slanders of others, condemn themselves. The ever-recurring suspicion that everything happened only because it was not desired to allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed hopes for personal successes, and has a painful effect.
"In closing, let us draw attention here to what Hermann Oncken has also quoted in his work, 'The Old and New Central Europe,' the memorandum of Prince Bismarck of the year 1879, in which the idea is developed that the German Empire must never dare allow a situation in which it would remain isolated on the European Continent between Russia and France, side by side with a defeated Austria-Hungary that had been left in the lurch by Germany."
In commenting upon Herr von Jagow's reply to Prince Lichnowsky, Georg Bernhard, editor in chief of the Vossische Zeitung, took occasion to re-emphasize his favorite theory of a rapprochement with Russia so as to enable Germany to reduce Great Britain to the level of a second-class power. In a long article, printed on March 31, Herr Bernhard asserted that Prince Lichnowsky had been by no means alone in his policy of seeking agreement with England as Herr von Jagow himself had admitted, and that the German Foreign Office had seemed obsessed with the idea that it was a question of a choice between Austria and England, when, in reality, if the diplomats hadwanted to pursue a good German policy and at the same time be of service to Austria, they should have made it a question of Russia or England and tried to establish good relations with the former under all circumstances. After quoting von Jagow's remark about the inadvisability of abandoning old alliances until new constellations were attainable, Herr Bernhard said:
"We shall not go into the question here if, during this war, which strains all the forces of the alliance to the utmost, a former German Secretary of State should have written such sentences. It is incomprehensible how they came from the pen of a sensible man—and Herr von Jagow is such a one. And it is still more incomprehensible how they were able to escape the attention of the Foreign Office. Fortunately, they can no longer do any harm now, as through our deeds we have demonstrated our loyalty to the Austrians and Hungarians better than it can be done by any amount of talk."
In an earlier editorial Herr Bernhard referred as follows to von Jagow's admission that he did not believe that England had laid all the mines leading to the world war:
"In spite of all experiences, therefore, here is another—almost official—attempt made to represent the war as merely the result of the aggressive desires of France and Russia. As if France (through whose population went a shudder of fear as it saw itself on the edge of the abyss of war) would ever have dared to go to war without knowing that England stood back of her! And were Edward's trips to Paris without any effect upon our diplomats? Has it not also finally become sufficiently well known through the reports of the Belgian Ambassador how France repeatedly tried to escape from the alliance, but was always again forced into the net by Nicolson, [former British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs,] through Edward? The Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, himself admitted in the Reichstag the harmful rôle of King Edward. Only he, as probably did Herr von Jagow also, thought that Edward's death put an end to the policy of encircling. But this policy of encircling—and here is where the mistake entailing serious consequences is made by our diplomats—was not at all merely a personal favorite idea of Edward VII., but the continuation of the traditional English policy toward the strongest Continental power."
Herr Bernhard then asserted that England desired the publication of the proposed Anglo-German treaty regarding the division of the Portuguese colonies into spheres of economic interests so as to make Portugal's eventual support of the Entente all the surer, and continued:
"And Lichnowsky wanted to fall into this trap set by England. It was avoided by the Foreign Office more through instinct than sagacity. And these diplomats have guided Germany's destiny before and during the war! Let us give the warmest thanks to Hindenburg because his sword has now, it is to be hoped, put an end once for all to the continued spinning of plans by such and similar diplomats even during the war."
Theodor Wolff, editor in chief of the Berliner Tageblatt, probably the leading organ of the German business elements and liberal politicians who were opposed to the war from the beginning, and who still hope for a negotiated peace that will facilitate an early resumption of trade relations with Great Britain and the rest of the allies, expressed the hope that the "battle of minds will finally create a clearer atmosphere," and then remarked:
"Only quite incidentally would I like to allow myself to direct the attention of Herr von Jagow to an erroneous expression that appears twice in his reply. Herr von Jagow writes: 'We informed him [Lichnowsky] of the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement,' and in another place: 'The secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement might also have made him a little more skeptical.' Only the day before, on Saturday, it was said in an article of the Norddeutshe Allgemeine Zeitung, also directed against Lichnowsky: 'Negotiations were pending with Russia over a naval agreement that the Prince characteristically passes over in silence.' In reality, although hasty historians also speak without further ceremony of a treaty, it is manifest that no Anglo-Russian agreement existed; there was merely a Russian proposal, and the most that can be said is that 'negotiations were pending.' * * *
"His [von Jagow's] remark, 'It is not true that the Foreign Office did not believe the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances,' is in contradiction with the well-known report of the then English Ambassador, Goschen, which describes into what surprise and consternation Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow were thrown by the news of the English declaration of war."
In beginning his comment upon von Jagow, Herr Wolff threw a little more light upon the way in which Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum "for the family archives" got into more or less general secret circulation in Germany before it was printed by the Swedish Socialist paper Politiken last March, and also described the character of Captain Beerfelde, the member of the German General Staff who, according to some cabled reports, is to be tried for his part in distributing copies of the memorandum.
Herr Wolff said that Prince Lichnowsky had had five or six copies made, of which he had sent one to Wolff, one to Albert Ballin, head of the Hamburg-American line, and another to Arthur von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank. All of these personscarefully hid the "dangerous gift" in the deepest recesses of their writing desks, but a fourth copy went astray and got into hands for which it had not been intended, and from these hands passed into those of still another individual. Then the editor wrote:
"I made the acquaintance some years before the war of the officer who obtained the memorandum 'on loan,' and sent copies of it to State officials and politicians. He belongs to an old noble family, was treated with sympathy by General von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, occupied himself enthusiastically with religious philosophy or theosophy, and was a thoroughly manly but mystic person. * * * After hard war experiences, he felt the longing to serve the dictates of peace with complete devotion, and he surrendered himself to a pacifism which is absolutely incompatible with the uniform.
"Late one evening he visited me in a state of great excitement, and told me that he had manifolded a memorandum by Prince Lichnowsky which had been lent to him, and that, without asking the author, he had sent it to the 'leading men.' It was impossible to convince him by any logic or on any grounds of reason that his action was wrong, senseless, and harmful. He was a Marquis Posa, or, still more, a Horatius Cocles, who, out of love for Rome or for mankind, sprang into the abyss."
The Berlin Vorwärts, the leading organ of the pro-Government Socialists, began its editorial on the von Jagow reply by remarking that the article of the former State Secretary for Foreign Affairs was hardly calculated to convince the reader that Prince Lichnowsky's self-esteem was the only thing that had had a "painful effect" upon the German people in July, 1914, and since that time. It then said that "Herr von Jagow agrees with Lichnowsky upon the decisive point!" quoted what von Jagow had said about his desire for an Anglo-German rapprochement, and continued:
"These words show that, in 1913, the Wilhelmstrasse and the London Embassy were in the complete harmony of common beliefs and intentions. Herr von Jagow, exactly like Lichnowsky, exactly like Bethmann, and exactly like Wilhelm II., believed in the possibility of creating 'an atmosphere of confidence,' as Jagow says, between Germany and England, through a series of agreements, of which those regarding the Bagdad Railroad and Africa were to have been the first."
Vorwärts then proceeded to point out that the Albanian crisis had strengthened this faith instead of weakening it, took up von Jagow's reasons for Germany's refusal to have the proposed Anglo-German agreement on the Portuguese African colonies published, and exclaimed:
"What a fear of Tirpitz! A disturbing of the new relations through his intrigues and the howling of his jingo press was to be avoided through an affectation of secrecy. But three weeks later the war with England was here and the Pan-German sheets welcomed 'the longed-for day!' What had happened in the meantime? Of course, 'perfidious Albion' (even Jagow puts quotation marks on these words) had in the meantime thrown off the mask and revealed her perfidy! Let's hear what—after Lichnowsky—Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in July, 1914, has to say about it!"
Then Vorwärts quoted Jagow's description of how the war began, and went on:
"All that remains of the accusations against the English Government is that it did not prevent the world war, 'although it could have done so.' Now Herr von Jagow also did not prevent the world war, but he must certainly be acquitted of the charge that he could have prevented it. He really could not, and so an emphatic statement of inability is the best excuse for him and his fellow-disputants.
"Let us establish the facts. England did not desire the war; she merely did not prevent it. The war was not popular in England; it also was not popular in Russia and France. But it has become popular. The whole world—right away across the Atlantic and the Pacific—is united in hatred against us. We, however, have for almost four years been inoculated with the view that 'England laid all the mines which caused the war'—a view which the Secretary of State, in accordance with the evidence of the Ambassador, has now declared to be false! It is, however, by this false view that the whole war policy of the German Empire has been directed—from the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, which brought us war with America, down to those Chancellor speeches which say that Belgium must not again become England's area of military concentration.
"If all the parties concerned were convinced that the belief in England's guilt is a fiction, why did they feed this belief, and why did they pursue a policy which was based upon it? They ought rather to have appointed to the Chancellorship Tirpitz, who, perhaps, believes what he says. Instead of that, a policy of fear of Tirpitz has been pursued. Sometimes a policy against Tirpitz has been attempted, but it has always been reversed at decisive moments, out of fear of the nationalistic terror.
"This fear was, perhaps, not entirely unfounded, for agitation is unscrupulous. The older ones among us still remember very well 'an Englishwoman' who was very unpopular in many circles, but this Englishwoman was the mother of the German Kaiser. No doubt there was no more convenient method for the Government to guard the dynasty than for it to take part in, or at least to tolerate, the agitation againstthe English. This was the only way of preventing the agitation from turning ultimately against the wearer of the German imperial crown. But ought such intimate considerations to have been permitted to play a part when the fate of the nations was at stake?
"Let us put an end to this! At this moment we are in a battle which may be decisive and which is going in favor of the empire. But even after this battle we shall possess neither the possibility nor the moral right to treat our opponent according to the principle of 'With thumbs in his eyes and knee on his breast.' Even after the greatest military successes there exists the necessity for political negotiation. It will be easier for us to enter into this negotiation after the poisonous fog of the war lies shall have lifted. Now that Herr von Jagow has cleared up the rôle played by England at the beginning of the war, there is nothing in the way of the fulfillment of the promise made by Bethmann to 'make good the wrong committed against Belgium'!
"If it is perhaps true that everything Wilhelm II., Bethmann, von Jagow, and Lichnowsky thought was true up to three weeks before the outbreak of the war was false, then let the mistake be acknowledged and the conservative Pan-Germans be put openly in the Government, so that they, both within and without, may complete the work of a peace by force. But if this is neither desirable nor possible, then there is nothing left to do but to take a decided step ahead. For the German people cannot be satisfied with the methods of governing exercised before and during the war. * * * The German people can only endure after the war as a peace-loving nation that governs itself."