WILHELMSTRASSE INTRIGUES
The treaty was practically complete at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. A conversation then took place in Berlin under the Presidency of the Imperial Chancellor, (Herr von Bethmann Hollweg,) in which I took part, and at which special wishes were laid down. On my return to London I succeeded, with the help of my Counselor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, who was working upon the details of the treaty with Mr. Parker, in putting through our last proposals also. It was possible for the whole treaty to be initialed by Sir Edward Grey and myself in August, 1913, before I went on leave. Now, however, new difficulties were to arise, which prevented the signature, and it was only a year later, shortly before the outbreak of war, that I was able to obtain authorization for the final settlement. Signature, however, never took place.
Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign only if the treaty was published, together with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899; England has no other secret treaties, and it is contrary to her existing principles that she should conceal binding agreements. He said, however, that he was ready to take account of our wishes concerning the time and manner of publication, provided that publication took place within one year, at latest, after the signature. In the [Berlin] Foreign Office, however, where my London successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage, [thereference is apparently to Herr von Stumm,] who played the part of Herr von Holstein, was claiming the London Embassy for himself, it was stated that the publication would imperil our interests in the colonies, because the Portuguese would show their gratitude by giving us no more concessions. The accuracy of this excuse is illuminated by the fact that the old treaty was most probably just as much long known to the Portuguese as our new agreements must have been, in view of the intimacy of relations between Portugal and England; it was illuminated also by the fact that, in view of the influence which England possesses at Lisbon, the Portuguese Government is completely powerless in face of an Anglo-German understanding.
WRECKING THE TREATY
Consequently, it was necessary to find another excuse for wrecking the treaty. It was said that the publication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded in the time of Prince Hohenlohe, and which was merely a renewal of the treaty of Charles II., which had never lapsed, might imperil the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as being a proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy! On this I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and other similar treaties—namely, that we desired to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions!
In spite of repeated conversations with Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister made ever fresh proposals concerning publication, the [Berlin] Foreign Office remained obstinate, and finally agreed with Sir Edward Goschen [British Ambassador in Berlin] that everything should remain as it was before. So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages, the result of more than one year's work, had collapsed because it would have been a public success for me.
When in the Spring of 1914 I happened, at a dinner in the embassy, at which Mr. Harcourt [then Colonial Secretary] was present, to mention the matter, the Colonial Secretary said that he was embarrassed and did not know how to behave. He said that the present state of affairs was intolerable, because he [Mr. Harcourt] wanted to respect our rights, but, on the other hand, was in doubt as to whether he should follow the old treaty or the new. He said that it was therefore extremely desirable to clear matters up, and to bring to a conclusion an affair which had been hanging on for so long.
"A DISASTROUS MISTAKE"
When I reported to this effect I received a rude and excited order, telling me to refrain from any further interference in the matter.
I now regret that I did not go to Berlin in order to offer his Majesty my resignation, and that I still did not lose my belief in the possibility of an agreement between me and the leading [German] personages. That was a disastrous mistake, which was to be tragically avenged some months later.
Slight though was the extent to which I then still possessed the good-will of the Imperial Chancellor—because he feared that I was aiming at his office—I must do him the justice to say that at the end of June, 1914, in our last conversation before the outbreak of war, he gave his consent to the signature and publication. Nevertheless, it required further repeated suggestions on my part, which were supported by Dr. Solf, [German Colonial Secretary,] in order at last to obtain official consent at the end of July. Then the Serbian crisis was already threatening the peace of Europe, and so the completion of the treaty had to be postponed. The treaty is now one of the victims of the war.
BAGDAD RAILWAY TREATY
[This portion is translated from the Stockholm Politiken of March 26.]
[This portion is translated from the Stockholm Politiken of March 26.]
At the same time, while the African agreement was under discussion, I was negotiating, with the effective co-operation of Herr von Kühlmann, the so-called Bagdad Railway Treaty. This aimed, in fact, at the division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided in consideration of the Sultan's rights. Sir EdwardGrey declared repeatedly that there was no agreement between England and France aiming at a division of Asia Minor.
In the presence of the Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions in connection with the German treaty were settled mainly in accordance with the wishes of the Ottoman Bank. The greatest concession Sir Edward Grey made me personally was the continuation of the line to Basra. We had not insisted on this terminus in order to establish connection with Alexandretta. Hitherto Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. The shipping on the Shatt el Arab was to be in the hands of an international commission. We also obtained a share in the harbor works at Basra, and even acquired shipping rights on the Tigris, hitherto the monopoly of the firm of Lynch.
By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became our zone of interest, whereby the whole British rights, the question of shipping on the Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments were left untouched, as well as all the district of Bagdad and the Anatolian railways.
The British economic territories included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the French Syria, and the Russian Armenia. Had both treaties been concluded and published, an agreement would have been reached with England which would have finally ended all doubt of the possibility of an Anglo-German co-operation.
GERMAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT
Most difficult of all, there remained the question of the fleet. It was never quite rightly judged. The creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the Continent's most important military power into its most important naval power had at least to be recognized by England as uncomfortable. This presumably cannot be doubted. To maintain the necessary lead and not to become dependent, to preserve the supremacy of the sea, which Britain must have in order not to go down, she had to undertake preparations and expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. A threat against the British world position was made in that our policy allowed the possibility of warlike development to appear. This possibility was obviously near during the Morocco crisis and the Bosnian question.
People had become reconciled to our fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to the British and constituted one of the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England's joining hands with Russia and France. On account of our fleet alone, however, England would have drawn the sword as little as on account of our trade, which it is pretended called forth her jealousy and ultimately brought about war.
From the beginning I adopted the standpoint that in spite of the fleet it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and reapprochement if we did not propose new votes of credit, and, above all, if we carried out an indisputable peace policy. I also avoided all mention of the fleet, and between me and Sir Edward Grey the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one occasion at a Cabinet meeting: "The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me."
UNDERSTANDING POSSIBLE.
During my term of office the then First Lord, Mr. Churchill, raised the question of a so-called naval holiday, and proposed, for financial reasons as much as on account of the pacifist inclinations of his party, a one year's pause in armaments. Officially the suggestion was not supported by Sir Edward Grey. He never spoke of it to me, but Mr. Churchill spoke to me on repeated occasions.
I am convinced that his initiative was honest, cunning in general not being part of the Englishman's constitution. It would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill to secure economies for the country and to lighten the burden of armament, which was weighing heavily on the people.
I maintain that it would have been difficult to support his intention. How about the workmen employed for this purpose? How about the technical personnel? Our naval program was settled, and it would be difficult to alter it. Nor, on the other hand, did we intend exceeding it. But he pointed out that the means spent on portentous armaments could equally be used for other purposes. I maintain that such expenditure would have benefited home industries.
NO TRADE JEALOUSY
I also succeeded, in conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, in keeping away that subject without raising suspicion, although it came up in Parliament, and preventing the Government's proposal from being made. But it was Mr. Churchill's and the Government's favorite idea that by supporting his initiative in the matter of large ships we should give proof of our good-will and considerably strengthen and increase the tendency on the part of the Government to get in closer contact with us. But, as I have said, it was possible in spite of our fleet and without naval holidays to come to an understanding.
In that spirit I had carried out my mission from the beginning, and had even succeeded in realizing my program when the war broke out and destroyed everything.
Trade jealousy, so much talked about among us, rests on faulty judgment of circumstances. It is a fact that Germany's progress as a trading country after the war of 1870 and during the following decades threatened the interests of British trade circles, constituting a form of monopoly with its industry and export houses. But the growing interchange of merchandise with Germany, which was first on the list of all European exporting countries, a fact I always referred to in my public speeches, had allowed the desire to mature to preserve good relations with England's best client and business friend, and had gradually suppressed all other thoughts and motives. The Englishman, as a matter of fact, adapts himself to circumstances and does not tilt against windmills. In commercial circles I found the greatest good-will and desire to further our common economic interests.
AMIABLY RECEIVED
In other circles I had a most amiable reception, and enjoyed the cordial good-will of the Court, society, and the Government. No one there interested himself in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even the French representative, in spite of the imposing personality and political success of the last named. Only the German and American Ambassadors attracted public attention.
In order to get in touch with the most important business circles I accepted invitations from the United Chambers of Commerce, the London and Bradford Chambers, and those of the great cities of Newcastle and Liverpool. I had a hearty reception everywhere. Glasgow and Edinburgh had also invited me, and I promised them visits. People who did not understand English conditions and did not appreciate the value of public dinners, and others who disliked my success, reproached me with having done harm by my speeches. I, on the contrary, believe that my public appearances and my discussion of common economic interests contributed considerably toward the improvement of conditions, apart from the fact that it would have been impolitic and impolite to refuse invitations.
In other circles I had a most amiable reception and enjoyed the cordial good-will of the Court, society, and the Government.
INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN
The King, very amiable and well meaning and possessed of sound understanding and common sense, was invariably well disposed toward me and desired honestly to facilitate my mission. In spite of the small amount of power which the British Constitution gives the Crown, the King can, by virtue of his position, greatly influence the tone both of society and the Government. The Crown is the apex of society from which thetone emanates. Society, which is overwhelmingly Unionist, is largely occupied by ladies connected with politics. It is represented in the Lords and the Commons, consequently also in the Cabinet.
The Englishman either belongs to society or ought to belong to it. His aim is, and always will be, to be a distinguished man and a gentleman, and even men of modest origin, such as Mr. Asquith, prefer to be in society, with its elegant women.
British gentlemen of both parties enjoy the same education, go to the same colleges and university, and engage in the same sports—golf, cricket, lawn tennis, and polo. All have played cricket and football in their youth, all have the same habits, and all spend the week-end in the country. No social cleavage divides the parties, only political cleavage. To some extent of late years the politicians in the two camps have avoided one another in society. Not even on the ground of a neutral mission could the two camps be amalgamated, for since the Home Rule and Veto bills the Unionists have despised the Radicals. A few months after my arrival the King and Queen dined with me, and Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner in order not to be together with Sir Edward Grey. But there is no opposition from difference in caste and education as in France. There are not two worlds, but the same world, and their opinion of a foreigner is common and not without influence on his political standing, whether a Lansdowne or an Asquith is at the helm.
POLITICS AND SOCIETY
The difference of caste no longer exists in England since the time of the Stuarts and since the Whig oligarchy (in contradistinction to the Tory county families) allowed the bourgeoisie in the towns to rise in society. There is greater difference in political opinions on constitutional or Church questions than on financial or political questions. Aristocrats who have joined the popular party, Radicals such as Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, and Crewe, are most hated by the Unionist aristocracy. None of these gentlemen have I ever met in great aristocratic houses, only in the houses of party friends.
We were received in London with open arms and both parties outdid one another in amiability.
It would be a mistake to undervalue social connections in view of the close connection in England between society and politics, even though the majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the Government. Between an Asquith and a Devonshire there is no such deep cleft as between a Briand and a Duc de Doudeauville, for example. In times of political tension they do not foregather. They belong to two separate social groups, but are part of the same society, if on different levels, the centre of which is the Court. They have friends and habits in common, they are often related or connected. A phenomenon like Lloyd George, a man of the people, a small solicitor and a self-made man, is an exception. Even John Burns, a Socialist Labor leader and a self-taught man, seeks society relations. On the ground of a general striving to be considered gentlemen of social weight and position such men must not be undervalued.
In no place, consequently, is an envoy's social circle of greater consequence than in England. A hospitable house with friendly guests is worth more than the profoundest scientific knowledge, and a learned man of insignificant appearance and too small means would, in spite of all his learning, acquire no influence. The Briton hates a bore and a pedant. He loves a good fellow.
SIR EDWARD GREY'S SOCIALISM
Sir Edward Grey's influence in all questions of foreign policy was almost unlimited. True, he used to say on important occasions: "I must lay that before the Cabinet"; but it is equally true that the latter invariably took his view. Although he did not know foreign countries and, with the exception of one short visit to Paris, had never left England, he was closely informed on all important questions, owing to many years' Parliamentary experience and natural grasp. He understood French without speaking it. Elected at an early age to Parliament,he began immediately to occupy himself with foreign affairs. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office under Lord Rosebery, he became in 1906 Secretary of State under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and filled the post for ten years.
Sprung from an old North of England family of landowners, from whom the statesman, Earl Grey, is also descended, he joined the left wing of his party and sympathized with the Socialists and pacifists. He can be called a Socialist in the ideal sense, for he applied his theories even in private life, which is characterized by great simplicity and unpretentiousness, although he is possessed of considerable means. All display is foreign to him. He had a small residence in London and never gave dinners, except officially, at the Foreign Office on the King's birthday.
SIMPLE MODE OF LIFE
If, exceptionally, he asked a few guests to his house, it was to a simple dinner or luncheon in a small circle with parlor maids for service. The week-ends he spent regularly in the country, like his colleagues, but not at large country house parties. He lives mostly in his cottage in the New Forest, taking long walks, and is passionately fond of nature and ornithology. Or he journeyed to his property in the north and tamed squirrels. In his youth he was a noted cricket and tennis player. His chief sport is now salmon and trout fishing in the Scotch lakes with Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. Once, when spending his week-ends with Lord Glenconner, he came thirty miles on a bicycle and returned in the same way. His simple, upright manner insured him the esteem even of his opponents, who were more easily to be found in home than in foreign political circles.
Lies and intrigue were foreign to his nature. His wife, whom he loved and from whom he was never separated, died as the result of an accident to the carriage driven by him. As is known, one brother was killed by a lion.
Wordsworth was his favorite poet, and he could quote him by the hour. His British calm did not lack a sense of humor. When breakfasting with us and the children and he heard their German conversation, he would say, "I cannot help admiring the way they talk German," and laughed at his joke. This is the man who was called "the Liar Grey" and the "originator of the world war."
ASQUITH AND HIS FAMILY
Asquith is a man of quite different mold. A jovial, sociable fellow, a friend of the ladies, especially young and beautiful ones, he loves cheery surroundings and a good cook, and is supported by a cheery young wife. He was formerly a well-known lawyer, with a large income and many years' Parliamentary experience. Later he was known as a Minister under Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend Grey, and friendly to an understanding with Germany. He treated all questions with an experienced business man's calm and certainty, and enjoyed good health and excellent nerves, steeled by assiduous golf.
His daughters went to a German boarding school and speak fluent German. We quickly became good friends with him and his family, and were guests at his little house on the Thames.
He only rarely occupied himself with foreign affairs. When important questions cropped up, with him lay the ultimate decision. During the critical days of July Asquith often came to warn us, and he was ultimately in despair over the tragic turn of events. On Aug. 2, when I saw Asquith in order to make a final attempt, he was completely broken, and, although quite calm, tears ran down his face.
NICOLSON AND TYRRELL
Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir William Tyrrell had the greatest influence in the Foreign Office. The former was not our friend, but his attitude toward me was consistently correct and obliging. Our personal relations were of the best. Neither did he wish for war, but when we [moved?] against France he undoubtedly worked for immediate intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague, and was in constanttouch with him, and was destined to succeed Lord Bertie in Paris. As is known, Sir Arthur was formerly Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and had concluded the treaty of 1907 which enabled Russia to turn again to the West and the Near East.
Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, had far greater influence than the Permanent Under Secretary of State. This unusually intelligent man had been at a school in Germany, and had then entered the Diplomatic Service, but he was abroad only a short time. At first he belonged to the modern anti-German school of young English diplomats, but later he became a determined supporter of an understanding. To this aim and object he even influenced Sir Edward Grey, with whom he was very intimate. After the outbreak of war he left the department, and went to the Home Office, probably in consequence of criticism of him for his Germanophile leanings.
CABALS AGAINST LICHNOWSKY
The rage of certain gentlemen over my success in London and the position I had achieved was indescribable. Schemes were set on foot to impede my carrying out my duties, I was left in complete ignorance of most important things, and had to confine myself to sending in unimportant and dull reports. Secret reports from agents about things of which I could know nothing without spies and necessary funds were never available for me, and it was only in the last days of July, 1914, that I heard accidentally from the Naval Attaché of the secret Anglo-French agreement for joint action of the two fleets in case of war. Soon after my arrival I became convinced that in no circumstances need we fear a British attack or British support of a foreign attack, but that under all conditions England would protect France. I advanced this opinion in repeated reports with detailed reasoning and insistence, but without gaining credence, although Lord Haldane's refusing of the formula of neutrality and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis were clear indications. In addition, the above-mentioned secret agreements were known to the department. I repeatedly urged that England, as a commercial State, would suffer greatly in any war between the European great powers, and would therefore prevent such a war by all available means; but, on the other hand, in the interest of the European balance of power, and to prevent Germany's overlordship, would never tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. Lord Haldane told me this shortly after my arrival. All influential people spoke in the same way.
THE ARCHDUKE'S DEATH
At the end of June I went to Kiel by the royal orders a few weeks after I had received the honorary degree of Doctor at Oxford, an honor no German Ambassador since Herr von Bunsen had received. On board the Meteor we received the news of the death of the Archduke, the heir to the throne. His Majesty complained that his attempts to win the noble Archduke over to his ideas were thereby rendered fruitless. How far plans for an active policy against Serbia had already been made at Konopischt I am not in a position to judge. As I was not informed about intentions and events in Vienna I attached no further importance to the matter. I could only observe that the feeling of relief outweighed the other feelings of the Austrian aristocrats. One of the guests on board the Meteor was the Austrian Count Felix Thun. In spite of glorious weather seasickness had kept him to his cabin. After receiving the news he became well. Shock or joy had cured him.
On reaching Berlin I visited the Chancellor, and said I considered the situation of our foreign policy very satisfactory, as we were on better terms with England than we had been for a long time. In France a pacifist Government was at the helm. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not seem to share my optimism, and complained of the Russian armaments. I tried to calm him, and pointed out especially that Russia had absolutely no interest in attacking us, and that such an attack would not receive Anglo-French support, as both countries, England and France, desiredpeace. Then I called on Dr. Zimmermann, who represented von Jagow, and learned from him that Russia was about to mobilize 900,000 new troops. From his manner of speaking he was evidently annoyed with Russia, who was everywhere in our way. There was also the question of the difficulties of commercial politics. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was working eagerly for war. But I learned that Herr von Tschirschky had received a rebuff for having reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia.
AUSTRIA'S WAR PLOT
On my return journey from Silesia I only remained a few hours in Berlin, but I heard there that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia to put an end to this intolerable situation. Unfortunately I undervalued the importance of the information. I thought nothing would come of it, and that it would be easy to settle the matter if Russia threatened. I now regret that I did not stop in Berlin, and at once declare that I could not agree to such a policy.
I have since learned that the inquiries and appeals from Vienna won unconditional assent from all the influential men at a decisive consultation at Potsdam on July 5, with the addition that it would not matter if war with Russia resulted. This is what was stated, anyhow, in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London. Shortly afterward Herr von Jagow arrived in Vienna to discuss the whole question with Count Berchtold.
Subsequently, I received instructions to work to obtain a friendly attitude on the part of the English press, if Austria dealt Serbia a deathblow, and by my influence to prevent so far as possible public opinion from becoming opposed to Austria. Remembering England's attitude during the annexation crisis, when public opinion sympathized with Serbian rights to Bosnia and her kindly favoring of national movements in the time of Lord Byron and that of Garibaldi, one thing and another indicated so strongly the improbability of British support of the proposed punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers, that I felt bound to issue a serious warning. I also sent a warning against the whole project, which I characterized as adventurous and dangerous, and advised moderation being urged on the Austrians, as I did not believe in the localization of the conflict.
JAGOW'S MISTAKEN BLUFF
Herr von Jagow answered that Russia was not ready, that there would be some fuss, but that the more firmly we held to Austria the sooner would Russia give way. Austria, he said, had already accused us of flabbiness, (flaumacherei,) and so we must not get into a mess. Opinion in Russia, he added, was becoming more and more pro-German, so we must just take the risks. In view of this attitude, which, as I subsequently found out, was the result of Count Pourtalès's reports that Russia would in no circumstances move, and caused us to urge Count Berchtold to the greatest possible energy, I hoped for salvation in English intervention, as I knew Sir Edward Grey's influence with St. Petersburg in the direction of peace could prevail. I availed myself, therefore, of my good relations with the British Foreign Minister to beg him confidentially to advise moderation on the part of Russia in case Austria, as appeared probable, should demand satisfaction from the Serbians.
In the beginning the attitude of the English press toward the Austrians was quiet and friendly, as the murder was condemned. Little by little, however, voices increased in number insisting that, however necessary the punishment of a crime might be, no elaboration of it for a political purpose could be justified. Austria was urgently called upon to act with moderation. The whole world outside Berlin and Vienna understood that it meant war, and world war. The British fleet, which happened to be assembled for review, was not demobilized.
GERMANY FORCES WAR
The Serbian answer corresponded with British efforts, for actually M. Pashitch had accepted all but two points, about which he was prepared to negotiate. Had England and Russia wanted war in orderto fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been given, and the unspeakable note would have remained unanswered. Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian answer with me, and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of the Belgrade Government. We even discussed his proposal for intervention, which should insure an interpretation of these two points acceptable to both parties. With Sir Edward Grey presiding, M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and I were to meet, and it would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the points under discussion, which were mainly concerned with the part to be taken by Austrian officials in the inquiries at Belgrade. With good-will all could have been cleared up in two or three sittings, and a simple acknowledgment of the British proposal would have brought about a détente and further improved our relations with England. I therefore urged it forcibly, as otherwise a world war stood at our gates.
In vain. It would be, I was told, wounding to Austria's dignity, nor would we mix ourselves up in that Serbian matter. We left it to our allies. I was to work for the localization of the conflict. It naturally only needed a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it would have been!
INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS
After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer [from Berlin] than that it was an enormous "concession" on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory.
Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation which she would not stand.
The impression became ever stronger that we desired war in all circumstances. Otherwise our attitude in a question which, after all, did not directly concern us was unintelligible. The urgent appeals and definite declarations of M. Sazonoff, [Russian Foreign Minister,] later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] and of Bollati, [Italian Ambassador in Berlin,] my urgent advice—it was all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred.
The more I pressed, the less willing they were to alter their course, if only because I was not to have the success of saving peace in the company of Sir Edward Grey.
So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his well-known warning. I replied that I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister said to me repeatedly: "If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."
GREY STILL SOUGHT PEACE
After that events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered the Russian mobilization—after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain—with our ultimatum and declaration of war.
Sir Edward Grey still looked for new ways of escape. In the morning of Aug. 1, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Should we remain neutral if France did the same? I understood him to mean that we should then be ready to spare France, but his meaning was that we should remain absolutely neutral—neutral therefore even toward Russia. That was the well-known misunderstanding. Sir Edward had given me an appointment for the afternoon, but as he was then at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, after Sir W. Tyrrell had hurried straight to him. But in the afternoon he spoke no longer of anything but Belgian neutrality, and of the possibility that we and Franceshould face one another armed, without attacking one another.
Thus there was no proposal whatever, but a question without any obligation, because our conversation, as I have already explained, was to take place soon afterward. In Berlin, however—without waiting for the conversation—this news was used as the foundation for a far-reaching act. Then came Poincaré's letter, Bonar Law's letter, and the telegram from the King of the Belgians. The hesitating members of the Cabinet were converted, with the exception of three members, who resigned.
PEACE HOPES DESTROYED
Up to the last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the part of England. My French colleague also felt himself by no means secure, as I learned from a private source. As late as Aug. 1 the King replied evasively to the French President. But in the telegram from Berlin, which announced the threatening danger of war, England was already mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, one already reckoned upon war with England.
Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on Aug. 5 at his house. I had gone there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said to me that he would always be ready to mediate, and, "We don't want to crush Germany." Unfortunately, this confidential conversation was published. Thereby Herr von Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of reaching peace via England.
Our departure was thoroughly dignified and calm. Before we left, the King had sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to me, to express his regret at my departure and that he could not see me personally. Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family lamented our going. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the embassy to say good-bye.
A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honor was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy.
At the railway station in London Count Mensdorff [Austrian Ambassador] appeared with his staff. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain in London. But to the English he said that it was not Austria, but we, who had wanted the war.
A BITTER RETROSPECT
When now, after two years, I realize everything in retrospect, I say to myself that I realized too late that there was no place for me in a system which for years has lived only on tradition and routine, and which tolerates only representatives who report what one wants to read. Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment are combated, want of ability and of character are extolled and esteemed, but successes arouse hostility and uneasiness.
I had abandoned opposition to our mad Triple Alliance policy, because I saw that it was useless and that my warnings were represented as Austrophobia and an idée fixe. In a policy which is not mere gymnastics, or playing with documents, but the conduct of the business of the firm, there is no such thing as likes and dislikes; there is nothing but the interest of the community; but a policy which is based merely upon Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must end in hostility to Russia, and ultimately lead to a catastrophe.
In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We should have had to send to Petersburg a representative who, at any rate, reached the average standard of political ability, and we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired neither to dominate the Starits nor to throttle the Serbs. M. Sazonoff was saying to us: "Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français," and M. Cambon [French Ambassador in Berlin] said to Herr von Jagow: "Vous n'avez [pas] besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout."
We needed neither alliances nor wars, but merely treaties which would protect us and others, and which would guarantee us an economic development for whichthere had been no precedent in history. And if Russia had been relieved of trouble in the west, she would have been able to turn again to the east, and then the Anglo-Russian antagonism would have arisen automatically without our interference—and the Russo-Japanese antagonism no less than the Anglo-Russian.
We could also have approached the question of limitation of armaments, and should have had no further need to bother about the confusions of Austria. Austria-Hungary would then become the vassal of the German Empire—without an alliance, and, above all, without sentimental services on our part, leading ultimately to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interests demanded exactly the contrary.
I had to support in London a policy which I knew to be fallacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.
ARRIVAL AT BERLIN
On my arrival in Berlin I saw at once that I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe of which our Government had made itself guilty in opposition to my advice and my warnings.
The report was persistently circulated by official quarters that I had let myself be deceived by Sir Edward Grey, because if he had not wanted war Russia would not have mobilized. Count Pourtalès, whose reports could be relied upon, was to be spared, if only because of his family connections. He was said to have behaved "splendidly," and he was enthusiastically praised, while I was all the more sharply blamed.
"What has Russia got to do with Serbia?" this statesman said to me after eight years of official activity in Petersburg. It was made out that the whole business was a perfidious British trick which I had not understood. In the Foreign Office I was told that in 1916 it would in any case have come to war. But then Russia would have been "ready," and so it was better now.
As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation:
1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference.
2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply.
3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march—so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.
In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world war.
GERMANY'S WAR SPIRIT
Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent threatening of our neighbors? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Were these people not right who prophesied that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi dominated the German people—the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil; that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers and the caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values—notthe civilian gentleman; that the love of dueling, which inspires our youth at the universities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had not the events at Zabern and the Parliamentary debates on that case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are valued among us, when questions of military power are on the other side?
Cramb, a historian who has since died, an admirer of Germany, put the German point of view into the words of Euphorion:
Träumt Ihr den Friedenstag?Träume, wer träumen mag!Krieg ist das Losungswort!Sieg, und so klingt es fort.
Militarism, really a school for the nation and an instrument of policy, makes policy into the instrument of military power, if the patriarchal absolutism of a soldier-kingdom renders possible an attitude which would not be permitted by a democracy which had disengaged itself from military-junker influences.
That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialization, and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Germany, will be achieved.
JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE
Today, after two years of the war, there can be no further doubt that we cannot hope for an unconditional victory over Russians, English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, and that we cannot reckon upon the overthrow of our enemies. But we can reach a compromised peace only upon the basis of the evacuation of the occupied territories, the possession of which in any case signifies for us a burden and weakness and the peril of new wars. Consequently, everything should be avoided which hinders a change of course on the part of those enemy groups which might perhaps still be won over to the idea of compromise—the British Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. Even from this point of view our Polish project is just as objectionable as any interference with Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens—to say nothing of the mad submarine war scheme.
Our future lies upon the water. True, but it therefore does not lie in Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. That is a reversion to the Holy Roman Empire, to the aberrations of the Hohenstaufens and Hapsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not the policy of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes.
Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into the past, a revolt from the future, from imperialism, from world policy. Central Europe is mediaevalism; Berlin-Bagdad is a cul de sac, and not a road into the open, to unlimited possibilities, and to the world mission of the German people.
I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other State; I am only an enemy of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert us from our aims, and to bring us on to the sloping plane of Continental policy. It was not German policy, but Austrian dynastic policy. The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard the alliance as a shield, under whose protection they could make excursions at pleasure into the East.