It has now become manifest that it was by combat of man against man that the Romans gained their empire: therefore it was by right that they gained it, and this is the principal thesis of the present book. Up to this point we have proved our thesis by arguments which mostly rest on principles of reason; we must now make our point clear by arguments based on the principles of the Christian faith.
XII.—For it is they who profess to be zealous for the faith of Christ who have chiefly "raged together," and "imagined a vain thing" against the Roman empire; men who have no compassion on the poor of Christ, whom they not only defraud as to the revenues of the Church; but the very patrimonies of the Church are daily seized upon; and the Church is made poor, while making a show of justice they yet refuse to allow the minister of justice to fulfil his office.
Nor does this impoverishment happen without the judgment of God. For their possessions do not afford help to the poor, to whom belongs as their patrimony the wealth of the Church; and these possessions are held without gratitude to the empire which gives them. Let these possessions go back to whence they came. They came well; their return isevil: for they were well given, and they are mischievously held. What shall we say to shepherds like these? What shall we say when the substance of the Church is wasted, while the private estates of their own kindred are enlarged? But perchance it is better to proceed with what is set before us; and in religious silence to wait for our Saviour's help.
I say, then, that if the Roman empire did not exist by right, Christ in being born presupposed and sanctioned an unjust thing. But the consequent is false; therefore the contradictory of the antecedent is true; for it is always true of contradictory propositions, that if one is false the other is true. It is not needful to prove the falsity of the consequent to a true believer: for, if he be faithful, he will grant it to be false; and if he be not faithful, then this reasoning is not for him.
I prove the consequence thus: wherever a man of his own free choice carries out a public order, he countenances and persuades by his act the justice of that order; and seeing that acts are more forcible to persuade than words (as Aristotle holds in the tenth book of hisEthics),[273]therefore by this he persuades us more than if it were merely an approval in words. But Christ, as Luke who writes His story,says, willed to be born of the Virgin Mary under an edict of Roman authority, so that in that unexampled census of mankind, the Son of God, made man, might be counted as man: and this was to carry out that edict. Perhaps it is even more religious to suppose that it was of God that the decree issued through Cæsar, so that He who had been such long years expected among men should Himself enroll himself with mortal man.
Therefore Christ, by His action, enforced the justice of the edict of Augustus, who then wielded the Roman power. And since to issue a just edict implies jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that He who showed that He thought an edict just, must also have showed that He thought the jurisdiction under which it was issued just; but unless it existed by right it were unjust.
And it must be noted that the force of the argument taken to destroy the consequent, though the argument partly holds from its form, shows its force in the second figure, if it be reduced as a syllogism, just as the argument based on the assumption of the antecedent is in the first figure. The reduction is made thus: all that is unjust is persuaded to men unjustly; Christ did not persuade us unjustly; therefore He did not persuade us to do unjust things. From the assumption of the antecedent thus: all injusticeis persuaded to men unjustly: Christ persuaded a certain injustice to man, therefore He persuaded unjustly.
XIII.—And if the Roman empire did not exist by right, the sin of Adam was not punished in Christ. This is false, therefore its contradictory is true. The falsehood of the consequent is seen thus. Since by the sin of Adam we were all sinners, as the Apostle says:—"Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned,"—then, if Christ had not made satisfaction for Adam's sin by his death, we should still by our depraved nature be the children of wrath. But this is not so, for Paul, speaking of the Father in his Epistle to the Ephesians, says: "Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the good pleasure of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace, wherein He hath made us accepted in the beloved, in whom we have redemption by His blood, the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of His grace, wherein He has abounded towards us." And Christ Himself, suffering in Himself the punishment, says in St. John: "It is finished;" for where a thing is finished, naught remains to be done.
It is convenient that it should be understood that punishment is not merely penalty inflicted onhim who has done wrong, but that penalty inflicted by one who has penal jurisdiction. And therefore a penalty should not be called punishment, but rather injury, except where it is inflicted by the sentence of a regular judge.[274]Therefore the Israelites said unto Moses: "Who made thee a judge over us?"
If, therefore, Christ had not suffered by the sentence of a regular judge, the penalty would not properly have been punishment; and none could be a regular judge who had not jurisdiction over all mankind; for all mankind was punished in the flesh of Christ, who "hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows," as saith the Prophet Isaiah. And if the Roman empire had not existed by right, Tiberius Cæsar, whose vicar was Pontius Pilate, would not have had jurisdiction over all mankind. It was for this reason that Herod, not knowing what he did, like Caiaphas, when he spoke truly of the decree of heaven, sent Christ to Pilate to be judged, as Luke relates in his gospel. For Herod was not the vicegerent of Tiberius, under the standard of the eagle, or the standard of the Senate; but only a king, with one particular kingdom given him by Tiberius, and ruling the kingdom committed to his charge under Tiberius.
Let them cease, then, to insult the Roman empire, who pretend that they are the sons of the Church; when they see that Christ, the bridegroom of the Church, sanctioned the Roman empire at the beginning and at the end of His warfare on earth. And now I think that I have made it sufficiently clear that it was by right that the Romans acquired to themselves the empire of the world.
Oh happy people, oh Ausonia, how glorious hadst thou been, if either he, that weakener of thine empire, had never been born, or if his own pious intention had never deceived him?[275]
I.—"He hath shut the lions' mouths and they have not hurt me, forasmuch as before Him justice was found in me."[276]At the beginning of this work I proposed to examine into three questions, according as the subject-matter would permit me. Concerning the two first questions our inquiry, as I think, has been sufficiently accomplished in the preceding books. It remains to treat of the third question; and, perchance, it may arouse a certain amount of indignation against me, for the truth of it cannot appear without causing shame to certain men. But seeing that truth from its changeless throne appeals to me—that Solomon too, entering on the forest of his proverbs, teaches me in his own person "to meditate on truth, to hate the wicked;"[277]seeing that the Philosopher, my instructor in morals, bids me, for the sake of truth, to put aside what is dearest;[278]I will, therefore, take confidence from the words of Daniel in which the power of God, the shield of the defenders of truth, is set forth, and, according tothe exhortation of St. Paul, "putting on the breast-plate of faith," and in the heat of that coal which one of the seraphim had taken from off the altar, and laid on the lips of Isaiah, I will enter on the present contest, and, by the arm of Him who delivered us by His blood from the powers of darkness, drive out from the lists the wicked and the liar, in the sight of all the world. Why should I fear, when the Spirit, which is co-eternal with the Father and the Son, saith by the mouth of David: "The righteous shall be had in everlasting remembrance, he shall not be afraid of evil tidings"?[279]
The present question, then, concerning which we have to inquire, is between two great luminaries, the Roman Pontiff and the Roman Prince: and the question is, does the authority of the Roman Monarch, who, as we have proved in the second book, is the monarch of the world, depend immediately on God, or on some minister or vicar of God; by whom I understand the successor of Peter, who truly has the keys of the kingdom of heaven?
II.—For this, as for the former questions, we must take some principle, on the strength of which we may fashion the arguments of the truth which is to be expounded. For what does it profit to labour, evenin speaking truth, unless we start from a principle? For the principle alone is the root of all the propositions which are the means of proof.
Let us, therefore, start from the irrefragable truth that that which is repugnant to the intention of nature, is against the will of God. For if this were not true its contradictory would not be false; namely, that what is repugnant to the intention of nature is not against God's will, and if this be not false neither are the consequences thereof false. For it is impossible in consequences which are necessary, that the consequent should be false, unless the antecedent were false also.
But if a thing is not "against the will" it must either be willed or simply "not willed," just as "not to hate" means "to love," or "not to love;" for "not to love" does not mean "to hate," and "not to will" does not mean "to will not," as is self-evident. But if this is not false, neither will this proposition be false; "God wills what He does not will," than which a greater contradiction does not exist.
I prove that what I say is true as follows: It is manifest that God wills the end of nature; otherwise the motions of heaven would be of none effect, and this we may not say. If God willed that the end should be hindered, He would will also that the hindering power should gain its end, otherwise Hiswill would be of none effect. And since the end of the hindering power is the non-existence of what it hinders, it would follow that God wills the non-existence of the end of nature which He is said to will.
For if God did not will that the end should be hindered, in so far as He did not will it, it would follow as a consequence to His not willing it, that He cared nought about the hindering power, neither whether it existed, nor whether it did not. But he who cares not for the hindering power, cares not for the thing which can be hindered, and consequently has no wish for it; and when a man has no wish for a thing he wills it not. Therefore, if the end of nature can be hindered, as it can, it follows of necessity that God wills not the end of nature, and we reach our previous conclusion, that God wills what He does not will. Our principle is therefore most true, seeing that from its contradictions such absurd results follow.
III.—At the outset we must note in reference to this third question, that the truth of the first question had to be made manifest rather to remove ignorance than to end a dispute. In the second question we sought equally to remove ignorance and to end a dispute. For there are many things of which we are ignorant, but concerning which we do not quarrel.In geometry we know not how to square the circle, but we do not quarrel on that point. The theologian does not know the number of the angels, but he does not quarrel about the number. The Egyptian is ignorant of the political system of the Scythians, but he does not therefore quarrel concerning it.[280]But the truth in this third question provokes so much quarrelling that, whereas in other matters ignorance is commonly the cause of quarrelling, here quarrelling is the cause of ignorance. For this always happens where men are hurried by their wishes past what they see by their reason; in this evil bias they lay aside the light of reason, and being dragged on blindly by their desires, they obstinately deny that they are blind. And, therefore, it often follows not only that falsehood has its own inheritance, but that many men issue forth from their own bounds and stray through the foreign camp, where they understand nothing, and no man understands them; and so they provoke some to anger, and some to scorn, and not a few to laughter.
Now three classes of men chiefly strive against the truth which we are trying to prove.
First, the Chief Pontiff, Vicar of our Lord Jesus Christ and the successor of Peter, to whom we owe,not indeed all that we owe to Christ, but all that we owe to Peter, contradicts this truth, urged it may be by zeal for the keys; and also other pastors of the Christian sheepfolds, and others whom I believe to be only led by zeal for our mother, the Church. These all, perchance from zeal and not from pride, withstand the truth which I am about to prove.
But there are certain others in whom obstinate greed has extinguished the light of reason, who are of their father the devil, and yet pretend to be sons of the Church. They not only stir up quarrels in this question, but they hate the name of the most sacred office of Prince, and would shamelessly deny the principles which we have laid down for this and the previous questions.
There is also a third class called Decretalists,[281]utterly without knowledge or skill in philosophy or theology, who, relying entirely on their Decretals (which doubtless, I think, should be venerated), and hoping, I believe, that these Decretals will prevail, disparage the power of the Empire. And no wonder, for I have heard one of them, speaking of these Decretals, assert shamelessly that the traditions of the Church are the foundation of the faith. May this wickedness be taken away from the thoughtsof men by those who, antecedently to the traditions of the Church, have believed in Christ the Son of God, whether to come, or present, or as having already suffered; and who from their faith have hoped, and from their hope have kindled into love, and who, burning with love, will, the world doubts not, be made co-heirs with Him.
And that such arguers may be excluded once for all from the present debate, it must be noted that part of Scripture wasbeforethe Church, that part of it camewiththe Church, and partafterthe Church.
Beforethe Church were the Old and the New Testament—the covenant which the Psalmist says was "commanded for ever," of which the Church speaks to her Bridegroom, saying: "Draw me after thee."[282]
Withthe Church came those venerable chief Councils, with which no faithful Christian doubts but that Christ was present. For we have His own words to His disciples when He was about to ascend into heaven: "Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world," to which Matthew testifies. There are also the writings[283]of the doctors, Augustine and others, of whom, if any doubt that they were aided by the Holy Spirit, either he has never beheld theirfruit, or if he has beheld, he has never tasted thereof.
Afterthe Church are the traditions which they call Decretals, which, although they are to be venerated for their apostolical authority, yet we must not doubt that they are to be held inferior to fundamental Scripture, seeing that Christ rebuked the Pharisees for this very thing; for when they had asked: "Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition of the elders?" (for they neglected the washing of hands), He answered them, as Matthew testifies: "Why do ye also transgress the commandment of God by your tradition?" Thus He intimates plainly that tradition was to have a lower place.
But if the traditions of the Church areafterthe Church, it follows that the Church had not its authority from traditions, but rather traditions from the Church; and, therefore, the men of whom we speak, seeing that they have nought but traditions, must be excluded from the debate. For those who seek after this truth must proceed in their inquiry from those things from which flows the authority of the Church.
Further, we must exclude others who boast themselves to be white sheep in the flock of the Lord, when they have the plumage of crows. These are the children of wickedness, who, that they may be able to follow their evil ways, put shame on their mother,drive out their brethren, and when they have done all will allow none to judge them. Why should we seek to reason with these, when they are led astray by their evil desires, and so cannot see even our first principle?
Therefore there remains the controversy only with the other sort of men who are influenced by a certain kind of zeal for their mother the Church, and yet know not the truth which is sought for. With these men, therefore—strong in the reverence which a dutiful son owes to his father, which a dutiful son owes to his mother, dutiful to Christ, dutiful to the Church, dutiful to the Chief Shepherd, dutiful to all who profess the religion of Christ—I begin in this book the contest for the maintenance of the truth.
IV.—Those men to whom all our subsequent reasoning is addressed, when they assert that the authority of the Empire depends on the authority of the Church, as the inferior workman depends on the architect, are moved to take this view by many arguments, some of which they draw from Holy Scripture, and some also from the acts of the Supreme Pontiff and of the Emperor himself. Moreover, they strive to have some proof of reason.
For in the first place they say that God, according to the book of Genesis, made two great lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light torule the night; this they understand to be an allegory, for that the lights are the two powers,[284]the spiritual and the temporal. And then they maintain that as the moon, which is the lesser light, only has light so far as she receives it from the sun, so the temporal power only has authority as it receives authority from the spiritual power.
For the disposing of these, and of other like arguments, we must remember the Philosopher's words in his book on Sophistry, "the overthrow of an argument is the pointing out of the mistake."[285]
Error may arise in two ways, either in the matter, or in the form of an argument; either, that is, by assuming to be true what is false, or by transgressing the laws of the syllogism. The Philosopher raised objections to the arguments of Parmenides and Melissus on both of these grounds, saying that they accepted what was false, and that they did not argue correctly.[286]I use "false" in a large sense, as including the inconceivable,[287]that which in matters admitting only of probability has the nature of falseness. If the error is in the form of an argument, he who wishes to destroy the error must do so by showing that the laws of the syllogism have been transgressed. If the error is in the matter, it is because something hasbeen assumed which is either false in itself, or false in relation to that particular instance. If the assumption is false in itself, the argument must be destroyed by destroying the assumption; if it is false only in that particular instance, we must draw a distinction between the falseness in that particular instance and its general truth.
Having noted these things, to make it more clear how we destroy this and the further fallacies of our adversaries, we must remark that there are two ways in which error may arise concerning the mystical sense, either by seeking it where it is not, or by accepting it in a sense other than its real sense.
On account of the first of these ways, Augustine says, in his workOf the City of God,[288]that we must not think that all things, of which we are told, have a special meaning; for it is on account of that which means something, that that also which means nothing is woven into a story. It is only with the ploughshare that we turn up the earth; but the other parts of the plough are also necessary.
On account of the second way in which error touching the interpretation of mysteries may arise, Augustine, in his book "concerning Christian doctrine," speaking of those who wish to find in Scripture something other than he who wrote the Scripture meant,[289]says, that such "are misled in the same way as a man who leaves the straight path, and then arrives at the end of the path by a long circuit." And he adds: "It ought to be shown that this is a mistake, lest through the habit of going out of the way, the man be driven to going into cross or wrong ways." And then he intimates why such precautions must be taken in interpreting Scripture. "Faith will falter, if the authority of Scripture be not sure." But I say that if these things happen from ignorance, we must pardon those who do them, when we have carefully reproved them, as we pardon those who imagine a lion in the clouds, and are afraid. But if they are done purposely, we must deal with those who err thus, as we do with tyrants, who instead of following the laws of the state for the public good, try to pervert them for their own advantage.
Oh worst of crimes, even though a man commit it in his dreams, to turn to ill use the purpose of the Eternal Spirit. Such an one does not sin against Moses, or David, or Job, or Matthew, or Paul, but against the Eternal Spirit that speaketh in them. For though the reporters of the words of God are many, yet there is one only that tells them what to write, even God,who has deigned to unfold to us His will through the pens of many writers.
Having thus first noted these things, I will proceed, as I said above, to destroy the argument of those who say that the two great lights are typical of the two great powers on earth: for on this type rests the whole strength of their argument. It can be shown in two ways that this interpretation cannot be upheld. First, seeing that these two kinds of power are, in a sense, accidents of men, God would thus appear to have used a perverted order, by producing the accidents, before the essence to which they belong existed; and it is ridiculous to say this of God. For the two great lights were created on the fourth day, while man was not created till the sixth day, as is evident in the text of Scripture.
Secondly, seeing that these two kinds of rule are to guide men to certain ends, as we shall see, it follows that if man had remained in the state of innocence in which God created him, he would not have needed such means of guidance. These kinds of rule, then, are remedies against the weakness of sin. Since, then, man was not a sinner on the fourth day, for he did not then even exist, it would have been idle to make remedies for his sin, and this would be contrary to the goodness of God. For he would be a sorry physician who would make a plaster foran abscess which was to be, before the man was born. It cannot, therefore, be said that God made these two kinds of rule on the fourth day, and therefore the meaning of Moses cannot have been what these men pretend.
We may also be more tolerant, and overthrow this falsehood by drawing a distinction. This way of distinction is a gentler way of treating an adversary, for so his arguments are not made to appear consciously false, as is the case when we utterly overthrow him. I say then that, although the moon has not light of its own abundantly, unless it receives it from the sun, yet it does not therefore follow that the moon is from the sun. Therefore be it known that the being, and the power, and the working of the moon are all different things. For its being, the moon in no way depends on the sun, nor for its power, nor for its working, considered in itself. Its motion comes from its proper mover, its influence is from its own rays. For it has a certain light of its own, which is manifest at the time of an eclipse; though for its better and more powerful working it receives from the sun an abundant light, which enables it to work more powerfully.
Therefore I say that the temporal power does not receive its being from the spiritual power, nor its power which is its authority, nor its workingconsidered in itself. Yet it is good that the temporal power should receive from the spiritual the means of working more effectively by the light of the grace which the benediction of the Supreme Pontiff bestows on it both in heaven and on earth. Therefore we may see that the argument of these men erred in its form, because the predicate of the conclusion is not the predicate of the major premiss. The argument runs thus: The moon receives her light from the sun, which is the spiritual power. The temporal power is the moon. Therefore the temporal power receives authority from the spiritual power. "Light" is the predicate of the major premiss, "authority" the predicate of the conclusion; which two things we have seen to be very different in their subject and in their idea.
V.—They draw another argument from the text of Moses, saying that the types of these two powers sprang from the loins of Jacob, for that they are prefigured in Levi and Judah, whereof one was founder of the spiritual power, and the other of the temporal. From this they argue: the Church has the same relation to the Empire that Levi had to Judah. Levi preceded Judah in his birth, therefore the Church precedes the Empire in authority.
This error is easily overthrown. For when they say that Levi and Judah, the sons of Jacob, are thetypes of spiritual and temporal power, I could show this argument, too, to be wholly false; but I will grant it to be true. Then they infer, as Levi came first in birth, so does the Church come first in authority. But, as in the previous argument, the predicates of the conclusion and of the major premiss are different: authority and birth are different things, both in their subject and in their idea; and therefore there is an error in the form of the argument. The argument is as follows: A precedes B in C; D and E stand in the same relation as A and B; therefore D precedes E in F. But then F and C are different things. And if it is objected that F follows from C, that is, authority from priority of birth, and that the effect is properly substituted for the cause, as if "animal" were used in an argument for men, the objection is bad. For there are many men, who were born before others, who not only do not precede those others in authority, but even come after them: as is plain where we find a bishop younger than his archpresbyters. Therefore their objection appears to err in that it assumes as a cause that which is none.
VI.—Again, from the first book of Kings they take the election and the deposition of Saul; and they say that Saul, an enthroned king, was deposed by Samuel, who, by God's command, acted in thestead of God, as appears from the text of Scripture. From this they argue that, as that Vicar of God had authority to give temporal power, and to take it away and bestow it on another, so now the Vicar of God, the bishop of the universal Church, has authority to give the sceptre of temporal power, and to take it away, and even to give it to another. And if this were so, it would follow without doubt that the authority of the Empire is dependent on the Church, as they say.
But we may answer and destroy this argument, by which they say that Samuel was the Vicar of God: for it was not as Vicar of God that he acted, but as a special delegate for this purpose, or as a messenger bearing the express command of his Lord. For it is clear that what God commanded him, that only he did, and that only he said.
Therefore we must recognise that it is one thing to be another's vicar, and that it is another to be his messenger or minister, just as it is one thing to be a doctor, and another to be an interpreter. For a vicar is one to whom is committed jurisdiction with law or with arbitrary power, and therefore within the bounds of the jurisdiction which is committed to him, he may act by law or by his arbitrary power without the knowledge of his lord. It is not so with a mere messenger, in so far as he is a messenger; butas the mallet acts only by the strength of the smith, so the messenger acts only by the authority of him that sent him. Although, then, God did this by His messenger Samuel, it does not follow that the Vicar of God may do the same. For there are many things which God has done and still does, and yet will do through angels, which the Vicar of God, the successor of Peter, might not do.
Therefore we may see that they argue from the whole to a part, thus: Men can hear and see, therefore the eye can hear and see: which does not hold. Were the argument negative, it would be good: for instance, man cannot fly, therefore man's arm cannot fly. And, in the same way, God cannot, by his messenger, cause what is not to have been,[290]as Agathon says; therefore neither can his Vicar.
VII.—Further, they use the offering of the wise men from the text of Matthew, saying that Christ accepted from them both frankincense and gold, to signify that He was lord and ruler both of things temporal and of things spiritual; and from this they infer that the Vicar of Christ is also lord and ruler both of things temporal and of things spiritual; and that consequently he has authority over both.
To this I answer, that I acknowledge that Matthew'swords and meaning are both as they say, but that the inference which they attempt to draw therefrom fails, because it fails in the terms of the argument. Their syllogism runs thus: God is the lord both of things temporal and of things spiritual, the holy Pontiff is the Vicar of God; therefore he is lord both of things temporal and of things spiritual. Both of these propositions are true, but the middle term in them is different, andfourterms are introduced, by which the form of the syllogism is not kept, as is plain from what is said of "the syllogism simply."[291]For "God" is the subject of the major premiss, and "the Vicar of God" is the predicate of the minor; and these are not the same.
And if anyone raises the objection that the Vicar of God is equal in power to God, his objection is idle; for no vicar, whether human or divine, can be equal in power to the master whose vicar he is, which is at once obvious. We know that the successor of Peter had not equal authority with God, at least in the works of nature; he could not make a clod of earth fall upwards, nor fire to burn in a downward direction, by virtue of the office committed to him. Nor could all things be committed to him by God; for God could not commit to any the power ofcreation, and of baptism, as is clearly proved, notwithstanding what[292]the Master says in his fourth book.
We know also that the vicar of a mortal man is not equal in authority to the man whose vicar he is, so far as he is his vicar; for none can give away what is not his. The authority of a prince does not belong to a prince, except for him to use it; for no prince can give to himself authority. He can indeed receive authority, and give it up, but he cannot create it in another man, for it does not belong to a prince to create another prince. And if this is so, it is manifest that no prince can substitute for himself a vicar equal to himself in authority respecting all things, and therefore the objection to our argument has no weight.
VIII.—They also bring forward that saying in Matthew of Christ to Peter: "Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven;" which also, from the text of Matthew and John, they allow to have been in like manner said to all the Apostles. From this they argue that it has been granted by God to the successor of Peter to be able to bind and to loose all things; hencethey infer that he can loose the laws and decrees of the Empire, and also bind laws and decrees for the temporal power; and, if this were so, this conclusion would rightly follow.
But we must draw a distinction touching their major premiss. Their syllogism is in this form. Peter could loose and bind all things; the successor of Peter can do whatever Peter could do; therefore the successor of Peter can bind and can loose all things: whence they conclude that he can bind and can loose the decrees and the authority of the Empire.
Now I admit the minor premiss; but touching the major premiss I draw a distinction. The universal "everything" which is included in "whatever" is not distributed beyond the extent of the distributed term. If I say "all animals run," "all" is distributed so as to include everything which comes under the class "animal." But if I say "all men run," then "all" is only distributed so as to include every individual in the class "man;" and when I say "every grammarian runs," then is the distribution even more limited.
Therefore we must always look to see what it is that is to be included in the word "all," and when we know the nature and extent of the distributed term, it will easily be seen how far the distribution extends. Therefore, when it is said "whatsoever thou shalt bind," if "whatsoever" bore an unlimitedsense, they would speak truly, and the power of the Pope would extend even beyond what they say; for he might then divorce a wife from her husband, and marry her to another while her first husband was yet alive, which he can in no wise do. He might even absolve me when impenitent, which God Himself cannot do.
Therefore it is manifest that the distribution of the term in question is not absolute, but in reference to something. What this is will be sufficiently clear if we consider what power was granted to Peter. Christ said to Peter: "To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven"—that is, "I will make thee the doorkeeper of the kingdom of heaven." And then He adds: "Whatsoever," which is to say "all that"—to wit, all that has reference to this duty—"thou shalt have power to bind and to loose." And thus the universal which is implied in "whatsoever" has only a limited distribution, referring to the office of the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And in this sense the proposition of our opponents is true, but, taken absolutely, it is manifestly false. I say, then, that although the successor of Peter has power to bind and to loose, as belongs to him to whom the office of Peter was committed, yet it does not therefore follow that he has power to bind and to loose the decrees of the Empire, as our opponents say, unless they furtherprove that to do so belongs to the office of the keys, which we shall shortly show is not the case.
IX.—They further take the words in Luke which Peter spake to Christ, saying: "Behold, here are two swords;" and they understood that by these two swords the two kinds of rule were foretold. And since Peter said "here," where he was, which is to say, "with him," they argue that the authority of the two kinds of rule rests with the successor of Peter.
We must answer by showing that the interpretation, on which the argument rests, is wrong. They say that the two swords of which Peter spake mean the two kinds of rule which we have spoken of; but this we wholly deny, for then Peter's answer would not be according to the meaning of the words of Christ; and also we say that Peter made, as was his wont, a hasty answer, touching only the outside of things.
It will be manifest that such an answer as our opponents allege would not be according to the meaning of the words of Christ, if the preceding words, and the reason of them, be considered. Observe, then, that these words were spoken on the day of the feast, for a little before Luke writes thus: "Then came the day of unleavened bread, when the Passover must be killed;" and at this feast Christ had spoken of His Passion, which was at hand, in which it wasnecessary for Him to be separated from His disciples. Observe, too, that when these words were spoken the twelve were assembled together, and therefore, shortly after the words which we have just quoted, Luke says: "And when the hour was come He sat down, and the twelve Apostles with Him." And continuing His discourse with them, He came to this: "When I sent you, without purse, and scrip, and shoes, lacked ye anything? And they said, Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip; and he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment, and buy one." From these words the purpose of Christ is sufficiently manifest; for He did not say: "Buy, or get for yourselves, two swords," but rather "twelve swords," seeing that He spake unto twelve disciples: "He that hath not, let him buy," so that each should have one. And He said this to admonish them of the persecution and scorn that they should suffer, as though He would say: "As long as I was with you men received you gladly, but now you will be driven away; therefore of necessity ye must prepare for yourselves those things which formerly I forbade you to have." And therefore if the answer of Peter bore the meaning which our opponents assign to it, it would have been no answer to the words of Christ; and Christ would have rebuked him foranswering foolishly, as He often did rebuke him. But Christ did not rebuke him, but was satisfied, saying unto him: "It is enough," as though He would say: "I speak because of the necessity; but if each one of you cannot possess a sword, two are enough."
And that it was Peter's wont to speak in a shallow manner is proved by his hasty and thoughtless forwardness, to which he was led not only by the sincerity of his faith, but also, I believe, by the natural purity and simplicity of his character. All the Evangelists bear testimony to this forwardness.
Matthew writes that when Jesus had asked His disciples: "Whom say ye that I am?" Peter answered before them all and said: "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God." He writes also that when Christ was saying to His disciples that he must go up to Jerusalem and suffer many things, Peter took Him and began to rebuke Him, saying: "Be it far from Thee, Lord; this shall not be unto Thee." But Christ turned and rebuked him, and said: "Get thee behind me, Satan." Matthew also writes that in the Mount of Transfiguration, on the sight of Christ, and of Moses and Elias, and of the two sons of Zebedee, Peter said: "Lord, it is good for us to be here; if Thou wilt, let us make here three tabernacles, one for Thee, one for Moses, and one for Elias." He also writes that when the disciples were in a ship, in thenight, and Christ went unto them walking on the sea, then Peter said unto Him: "Lord, if it be Thou, bid me come unto Thee on the water." And when Christ foretold that all His disciples should be offended because of Him, Peter answered and said: "Though all men shall be offended because of Thee, yet will I never be offended;" and then: "Though I should die with Thee, yet will I not deny Thee." And to this saying Mark bears witness also. And Luke writes that Peter had said to Christ, a little before the words touching the swords which we have quoted: "Lord, I am ready to go with Thee, both into prison and to death." And John says of him, that, when Christ wished to wash his feet, Peter answered and said: "Lord, dost Thou wash my feet?" and then: "Thou shalt never wash my feet." The same Evangelist tells us that it was Peter who smote the High Priest's servant with a sword, and the other Evangelists also bear witness to this thing. He tells us also how Peter entered the sepulchre at once, when he saw the other disciple waiting outside, and how, when Christ was on the shore after the resurrection, when Peter had heard that it was the Lord, he girt his fisher's coat unto him (for he was naked) and did cast himself into the sea. Lastly, John tells that when Peter saw John, he said unto Jesus: "Lord, and what shall this man do?"
It is a pleasure to have pursued this point about our Chief Shepherd,[293]in praise of his purity of spirit; but from what I have said it is plain that when he spake of the two swords, he answered the words of Christ with no second meaning.
But if we are to receive these words of Christ and of Peter typically, they must not be explained as our adversaries explain them; but they must be referred to that sword of which Matthew writes: "Think not that I am come to send peace on the earth; I come not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father," &c. And this comes to pass not only in words, but also in fact. And therefore Luke speaks to Theophilus of all "that Jesus began both to do and to teach." It was a sword of that kind that Christ commanded them to buy; and Peter said that it was already doubly there. For they were ready both for words and for deeds, by which they should accomplish what Christ said that He had come to do by the sword.
X.—Certain persons say further that the Emperor Constantine, having been cleansed from leprosy by the intercession of Sylvester, then the Supreme Pontiff, gave unto the Church the seat of Empire which wasRome, together with many other dignities belonging to the Empire.[294]Hence they argue that no man can take unto himself these dignities unless he receive them from the Church, whose they are said to be. From this it would rightly follow, that one authority depends on the other, as they maintain.
The arguments which seemed to have their roots in the Divine words, have been stated and disproved. It remains to state and disprove those which are grounded on Roman history and in the reason of mankind. The first of these is the one which we have mentioned, in which the syllogism runs as follows: No one has a right to those things which belong to the Church, unless he has them from the Church; and this we grant. The government of Rome belongs to the Church; therefore no one has a right to it unless it be given him by the Church. The minor premiss is proved by the facts concerning Constantine, which we have touched on.
This minor premiss then will I destroy; and as for their proof, I say that it proves nothing. For the dignity of the Empire was what Constantine could not alienate, nor the Church receive. And when they insist, I prove my words as follows: No man on the strength of the office which is committed to him, maydo aught that is contrary to that office; for so one and the same man, viewed as one man, would be contrary to himself, which is impossible. But to divide the Empire is contrary to the office committed to the Emperor; for his office is to hold mankind in all things subject to one will: as may be easily seen from the first book of this treatise. Therefore it is not permitted to the Emperor to divide the Empire. If, therefore, as they say, any dignities had been alienated by Constantine, and had passed to the Church, the "coat without seam"—which even they, who pierced Christ, the true God, with a spear, dared not rend—would have been rent.[295]
Further, just as the Church has its foundation, so has the Empire its foundation. The foundation of the Church is Christ, as Paul says in his first Epistle to the Corinthians: "For other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ."[296]He is the rock on which the Church is built; but the foundation of the Empire is human right. Now I say that, as the Church may not go contrary to its foundation—but must always rest on its foundation, as the words of the Canticles say: "Whois she that cometh up from the desert, abounding in delights, leaning on her beloved?"[297]—in the same way I say that the Empire may not do aught that transgresses human right. But were the Empire to destroy itself, it would so transgress human right. Therefore the Empire may not destroy itself. Since then to divide the Empire would be to destroy it, because the Empire consists in one single universal Monarchy, it is manifest that he who exercises the authority of the Empire may not destroy it, and from what we have said before, it is manifest that to destroy the Empire is contrary to human right.
Moreover, all jurisdiction is prior in time to the judge who has it; for it is the judge who is ordained for the jurisdiction, not the jurisdiction for the judge. But the Empire is a jurisdiction, comprehending within itself all temporal jurisdiction: therefore it is prior to the judge who has it, who is the Emperor. For it is the Emperor who is ordained for the Empire, and not contrariwise. Therefore it is clear that the Emperor, in so far as he is Emperor, cannot alter the Empire; for it is to the Empire that he owes his being. I say then that he who is said to have conferred on the Church the authority in question either was Emperor, or he was not. If he was not,it is plain that he had no power to give away any part of the Empire. Nor could he, if he was Emperor, in so far as he was Emperor, for such a gift would be a diminishing of his jurisdiction.
Further, if one Emperor were able to cut off a certain portion of the jurisdiction of the Empire, so could another; and since temporal jurisdiction is finite, and since all that is finite is taken away by finite diminutions, it would follow that it is possible for the first of all jurisdictions to be annihilated, which is absurd.
Further, since he that gives is in the position of an agent, and he to whom a thing is given in that of a patient, as the Philosopher holds in the fourth book to Nicomachus,[298]therefore, that a gift may be given, we require not only the fit qualification of the giver, but also of the receiver; for the acts of the agent are completed in a patient who is qualified.[299]But the Church was altogether unqualified to receive temporal things; for there is an express command, forbidding her so to do, which Matthew gives thus: "Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses." For though we find in Luke a relaxation of the command in regard to certain matters, yet I have not anywhere been able to find that the Church afterthat prohibition had licence given her to possess gold and silver. If therefore the Church was unable to receive temporal power, even granting that Constantine was able to give it, yet the gift was impossible; for the receiver was disqualified. It is therefore plain that neither could the Church receive in the way of possession, nor could Constantine give in the way of alienation; though it is true that the Emperor, as protector of the Church, could allot to the Church a patrimony and other things, if he did not impair his supreme lordship, the unity of which does not allow division. And the Vicar of God could receive such things, not to possess them, but as a steward to dispense the fruits of them to the poor of Christ, on behalf of the Church, as we know the Apostles did.
XI.—Our adversaries further say that the Pope Hadrian[300]summoned Charles the Great to his own assistance[301]and to that of the Church, on account of the wrongs suffered from the Lombards in the time of their king Desiderius, and that Charles received from that Pope the imperial dignity, notwithstanding that Michael was emperor at Constantinople. And therefore they say that all the Roman emperors who succeeded Charles were themselves the "advocates" of the Church, and ought by the Church to becalled to their office. From which would follow that dependence of the Empire on the Church which they wish to prove.
But to overset their argument, I reply that what they say is nought; for a usurpation of right does not make right; and if it were so, it might be proved in the same way that the Church is dependent on the Empire; for the Emperor Otto restored the Pope Leo, and deposed Benedict, leading him into exile to Saxony.[302]
XII.—But fromreasonthey thus argue: they take the principle laid down in the tenth book of "Philosophia Prima,"[303]saying that all things which belong to one genus are to be brought under one head, which is the standard and measure of all that come under that genus. But all men belong to one genus: therefore they are to be brought under one head, as the standard and measure of them all. But the Supreme Pontiff and the Emperor are men; therefore if the preceding reasoning be true, they must be brought under one head. And since the Pope cannot come under any other man, the result is that the Emperor, together with all other men, must be brought under the Pope, as the measure and rule of all; and then, what those who argue thus desire follows.
To overset this argument, I answer that they are right when they say that all the individuals of one genus ought to be brought under one head, as their measure; and that they are again right when they say that all men belong to one genus, and that they are also right when they argue from these truths that all men should be brought under one head, taken from the genus man, as their measure and type. But when they obtain the further conclusion concerning the Pope and the Emperor, they fall into a fallacy touching accidental attributes.
That this thing may be understood, it must be clearly known that to be a man is one thing, and to be a pope or an emperor is another; just as to be a man is different from being a father or a ruler. A man is that which exists by its essential form, which gives it its genus and species, and by which it comes under the category of substance. But a father is that which exists by an accidental form, that is, one which stands in a certain relation which gives it a certain genus and species, and through which it comes under the category of relation. If this were not so, all things would come under the category of substance, seeing that no accidental form can exist by itself, without the support of an existing substance; and this is not so. Seeing, therefore, that the Pope and the Emperor are what they areby virtue of certain relations: for they owe their existence to the Papacy and the Empire, which are both relations, one coming within the sphere of fatherhood, and the other within that of rule; it manifestly follows that both the Pope and the Emperor, in so far as they are Pope and Emperor, must come under the category of relation; and therefore that they must be brought under some head of that genus.
I say then that there is one standard under which they are to be brought, as men; and another under which they come, as Pope and Emperor. For in so far as they are men, they have to be brought under the best man, whoever he be, who is the measure and the ideal of all mankind; under him, that is, who is most one in his kind,[304]as may be gathered from the last book to Nicomachus.[305]When, however, two things are relative, it is evident that they must either be reciprocally brought under each other, if they are alternately superior, or if by the nature of their relation they belong to connected species; or else they must be brought under some third thing, as their common unity. But the first of these suppositions is impossible: for then both would be predicable of both, which cannot be. We cannot say that the Emperor is the Pope, or the Pope theEmperor. Nor again can it be said that they are connected in species, for the idea of the Pope is quite other than the idea of the Emperor, in so far as they are Pope and Emperor. Therefore they must be reduced to some single thing above them.
Now it must be understood that the relative is to the relative as the relation to the relation. If, therefore, the Papacy and the Empire, seeing that they are relations of paramount superiority, have to be carried back to some higher point of superiority from which they, with the features which make them different,[306]branch off, the Pope and Emperor, being relative to one another, must be brought back to some one unity in which the higher point of superiority, without this characteristic difference, is found. And this will be either God, to whom all things unite in looking up, or something below God, which is higher in the scale of superiority, while differing from the simple and absolute superiority of God. Thus it is evident that the Pope and the Emperor, in so far as they are men, have to be brought under some one head; while, in so far as they are Pope and Emperor, they have to be brought under another head, and so far is clear, as regards the argument from reason.
XIII.—We have now stated and put on one sidethose erroneous reasonings on which they, who assert that the authority of the Roman Emperor depends on the Pope of Rome, do most chiefly rely. We have now to go back and show forth the truth in this third question, which we proposed in the beginning to examine. The truth will appear plainly enough if I start in my inquiry from the principle which I laid down, and then show that the authority of the Empire springs immediately from the head of all being, who is God. This truth will be made manifest, either if it be shown that the authority of the Empire does not spring from the authority of the Church; for there is no argument concerning any other authority. Or again, if it be shown by direct proof that the authority of the Empire springs immediately from God.
We prove that the authority of the Church is not the cause of the authority of the Empire in the following manner. Nothing can be the cause of power in another thing when that other thing has all its power, while the first either does not exist, or else has no power of action.[307]But the Empire had its power while the Church was either not existing at all, or else had no power of acting. Therefore the Church is not the cause of the power of the Empire, and therefore not of its authority either, for powerand authority mean the same thing. Let A be the Church, B the Empire, C the authority or power of the Empire. If C is in B while A does not exist, A cannot be the cause of C being in B, for it is impossible for an effect to exist before its cause. Further, if C is in B while A does not act, it cannot be that A is the cause of C being in B; for, to produce an effect, it is necessary that the cause, especially the efficient cause of which we are speaking, should have been at work first. The major premiss of this argument is self-evident, and the minor premiss is confirmed by Christ and the Church. Christ confirms it by His birth and His death, as we have said; the Church confirms it in the words which Paul spake to Festus in the Acts of the Apostles: "I stand at Cæsar's judgment-seat, where I ought to be judged," and by the words which an angel of God spake to Paul a little afterwards: "Fear not, Paul; thou must be brought before Cæsar;" and again by Paul's words to the Jews of Italy: "But when the Jews spake against it, I was constrained to appeal unto Cæsar; not that I had aught to accuse my nation of," but "to deliver my soul from death." But if Cæsar had not at that time had the authority to judge in temporal matters, Christ would not have argued thus; nor would the angel have brought these words; nor would he, who spake of himself as "having a desire to departand to be with Christ," have made an appeal to a judge not having authority.[308]
And if Constantine had not had the authority over the patronage of the Church, those things which he allotted from the Empire he could not have had the right to allot; and so the Church would be using this gift against right; whereas God wills that offerings should be pure, as is commanded in Leviticus: "No meat offering that ye shall bring unto the Lord shall be made with leaven." And though this command appears to regard those who offer, nevertheless it also regards those who receive an offering. For it is folly to suppose that God wishes to be received that which He forbids to be offered, for in the same book there is a command to the Levites: "Ye shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping thing that creepeth; neither shall ye make yourselves unclean with them, that ye shall be defiled thereby."[309]But to say that the Church so misuses the patrimony assigned to her is very unseemly; therefore the premiss from which this conclusion followed is false.
XIV.—Again, if the Church had power to bestow authority on the Roman Prince, she would have iteither from God, or from herself, or from some Emperor, or from the universal consent of mankind, or at least of the majority of mankind. There is no other crevice by which this power could flow down to the Church. But she has it not from any of these sources; therefore she has it not at all.
It is manifest that she has it from none of these sources; for if she had received it from God, she would have received it either by the divine or by the natural law: because what is received from nature is received from God; though the converse of this is not true. But this power is not received by the natural law; for nature lays down no law, save for the effects of nature, for God cannot fail in power, where he brings anything into being without the aid of secondary agents. Since therefore the Church is not an effect of nature, but of God who said: "Upon this rock I will build my Church," and elsewhere: "I have finished the work which Thou gavest me to do," it is manifest that nature did not give the Church this law.
Nor was this power bestowed by the divine law; for the whole of the divine law is contained in the bosom of the Old or of the New Testament, and I cannot find therein that any thought or care for worldly matters was commanded, either to the early or to the latter priesthood. Nay, I find rathersuch care taken away from the priests of the Old Testament by the express command of God to Moses,[310]and from the priests of the New Testament by the express command of Christ to His disciples.[311]But it could not be that this care was taken away from them, if the authority of the temporal power flowed from the priesthood; for at least in giving the authority there would be an anxious watchfulness of forethought, and afterwards continued precaution, lest he to whom authority had been given should leave the straight way.
Then it is quite plain that the Church did not receive this power from herself; for nothing can give what it has not. Therefore all that does anything, must be such in its doing, as that which it intends to do, as is stated in the book "of Simple Being."[312]But it is plain that if the Church gave to herself this power, she had it not before she gave it. Thus she would have given what she had not, which is impossible.
But it is sufficiently manifest from what we have previously made evident that the Church has received not this power from any Emperor.
And further, that she had it not from the consent of all, or even of the greater part of mankind, whocan doubt? seeing that not only all the inhabitants of Asia and Africa, but even the greater number of Europeans, hold the thought in abhorrence. It is mere weariness to adduce proofs in matters which are so plain.
XV.—Again, that which is contrary to the nature of a thing cannot be counted as one of its essential powers; for the essential powers of each individual follow on its nature, in order to gain its end. But the power to grant authority in that which is the realm of our mortal state is contrary to the nature of the Church.[313]Therefore it is not in the number of its essential powers. For the proof of the minor premiss we must know that the nature of the Church means the form [or essence][314]of the Church. For although men use the word nature not only of the form of a thing, but also of its matter, nevertheless, it is of the form that they use it more properly, as is proved in the book "of Natural Learning."[315]But the [essence or] form of the Church is nothing else than the life of Christ, as it is contained both in His sayings and in His deeds. For His life was the example and ideal of the militant Church, especially of its pastors, and above all of its chief pastor, to whom it belongs tofeed the sheep and the lambs of Christ. And therefore when Christ left His life unto men for an example He said in John's Gospel: "I have given you an example that ye should do as I have done to you." And He said unto Peter specially, after that He had committed unto him the office of shepherd, the words which John also reports: "Peter, follow me." But Christ denied before Pilate that His rule was of this sort, saying: "My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now is my kingdom not from hence."[316]
But this saying must not be understood to mean that Christ, who is God, is not the lord of this kingdom, for the Psalmist says: "The sea is His, and He made it, and His hands formed the dry land."[317]We must understand it to mean that, asthe pattern of the Church, He had not the care of this kingdom. It is as if a golden seal were to speak of itself, and say: "I am not the standard for such and such a class of things;" for in so far as it is gold, this saying is untrue, seeing that gold is the standard of all metals; but it is true in so far as it is a sign capable of being received by impression.
It belongs, then, to the very form of the Churchalways to speak the same, always to think the same; and to do the opposite of this is evidently contrary to its essential form—that is to say, to its nature. And from this it may be collected that the power of bestowing authority on this kingdom is contrary to the nature of the Church; for contrariety which is in thought or word follows from contrariety which is in the thing thought and the thing said; just as truth and falsehood in speech come from the being or the not-being of the thing, as we learn from the doctrine of theCategories. It has then become manifest enough by means of the preceding arguments, by which the contention of our opponents has been shown to lead to an absurd result, that the authority of the Empire is not in any way dependent on the authority of the Church.
XVI.—Although it has been proved in the preceding chapter that the authority of the Empire has not its cause in the authority of the Supreme Pontiff; for we have shown that this argument led to absurd results; yet it has not been entirely shown that the authority of the Empire depends directly upon God, except as a result from our argument. For it is a consequence that, if the authority comes not from the vicar of God, it must come from God Himself. And therefore, for the complete determination of the question proposed, we have to provedirectly that the emperor or monarch of the world stands in an immediate relation to the King of the universe, who is God.
For the better comprehending of this, it must be recognised that man alone, of all created things, holds a position midway between things corruptible and things incorruptible; and therefore[318]philosophers rightly liken him to a dividing line between two hemispheres. For man consists of two essential parts, namely, the soul and the body. If he be considered in relation to his body only, he is corruptible; but if he be considered in relation to his soul only, he is incorruptible. And therefore the Philosopher spoke well concerning the incorruptible soul when he said in the second book "of the Soul:" "It is this alone which may be separated, as being eternal, from the corruptible."[319]
If, therefore, man holds this position midway between the corruptible and the incorruptible, since every middle nature partakes of both extremes, man must share something of each nature. And since every nature is ordained to gain some final end, it follows that for man there is a double end. For ashe alone of all beings participates both in the corruptible and the incorruptible, so he alone of all beings is ordained to gain two ends, whereby one is his end in so far as he is corruptible, and the other in so far as he is incorruptible.