INTUITIONS, OR MORAL ACTS, NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER; THAT IS, PARTLY RIGHT AND PARTLY WRONG.
Weare now prepared to consider the question, whether each moral act, or exercise, is not always of a character purely unmixed? In other words, whether every such act, or intention, is not always perfectly right or perfectly wrong I would here be understood to speak of single acts, or intuitions, in distinction from a series, which continues through some definite period, as an hour or a day. Such series of acts may, of course, be of a mixed character; that is, it may be made up of individual acts, some of which are right and some wrong. But the question is, can distinct, opposite, and contradictory elements, such as sin and holiness, right and wrong, selfishness and benevolence, enter into one and the same act No one will pretend that an individual is virtuous at all, unless heintendsobedience to the moral law. The question is, can an individual intend to obey and to disobey the law, in one and the same act? On this question I remark,
1. That the principle established in the last Chapter really settles the question. No one, to my knowledge, pretends, that, as far as sincerity is concerned, the same moral act can be of a mixed character. Very few, if any, will be guilty of the folly of maintaining, that an individual can sincerely intend to obey and to disobey the law at one and the same time. When such act is contemplated in this point of light, it is almost universally admitted that it cannot be of a mixed character. But then another test is applied—that of intensity. It is conceivable, at least, it is said, that the intention might possess a higher degree of intensity than it does possess. It is, therefore, pronounced defective. On the same supposition, every moral act in existence might be pronounced defective. For we can, at least, conceive, that it might possess a higher degree of intensity. It has been abundantly established in the last Chapter, however, that there is no such test of moral actions as this, a test authorized either by reason or revelation. Sincerity is the only standard by which to determine the character and deserts of all moral acts and states. In the light of this standard, it is intuitively evident, that no one act can combine such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and holiness, right and wrong, an intention to obey and to disobey the moral law.
2. The opinions and reasonings of distinguished philosophers and theologians on the subject may be adduced in confirmation of the doctrine under consideration. Let it be borne in mind, that if the same act embraces such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and holiness, it must be, in reality, opposed to itself, one element constituting the act, being in harmony with the law, and in opposition to the other element which is opposed to the law.
Now the remark of Edwards upon this subject demands our special attention. “It is absurd,” he says, “to suppose the same individual Will to oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time.” Does not the common sense of the race affirm the truth of this statement Sin and holiness cannot enter into the same act, unless it embraces a serious intention to obey and not to obey the moral law at the same time. Is not this, in the language of Edwards, as “absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time.”
Equally conclusive is the argument of Kant upon the same subject. Having shown that mankind are divided into two classes, the morally good and the morally evil; that the distinguishing characteristic of the former is, that they have adopted the Moral law as their maxim, that is, that it is their serious intention to comply with all the claims of the law; and of the latter, that they have not adopted the law as their maxim; he adds, “The sentiment of mankind is, therefore, never indifferent relatively to the law, and he never can be neither good nor evil.” Then follows the paragraph to which special attention is invited. “In like manner, mankind cannot be, in some points of character, morally good, while he is, at the same time, in others evil; for, is he in any point good, then the moral law is his maxim (that is, it is his serious intention to obey the law in the length and breadth of its claims); but is he likewise, at the same time, in some points bad, then quoad [as to] these, the Moral law is not his maxim, (that is, in these particulars, it is his intention not to obey the law). But since the law is one and universal, and as it commands in one act of life, so in all, then the maxim referring to it would be, at the same time universal and particular, which is a contradiction;” (that is, it would be his intention to obey the law universally, and at the same time, not to obey it in certain particulars, one of the most palpable contradictions conceivable.) To my mind the above argument has all the force of demonstration. Let it be borne in mind, that no man is morally good at all, unless it is his intention to obey the Moral law universally. This being his intention, the law has no higher claims upon him. Its full demands are, and must be, met in that intention. For what can the law require more, than that the voluntary powers shall be in full harmony with its demands, which is always true, when there is a sincere intention to obey the law universally. Now, with this intention, there can be nothing in the individual morally evil; unless there is, at the same time, an intention not to obey the law in certain particulars; that is, not to obey it universally. A mixed moral act, or intention, therefore, is possible, only on this condition, that it shall embrace these two contradictory elements—a serious determination to obey the law universally, and a determination equally decisive, at the same time, to disobey it in certain particulars; that is, not to obey it universally. I leave it with the advocates of the doctrine of Mixed Moral Action to dispose of this difficulty as they can.
3. If we could conceive of a moral act of a mixed character, the Moral law could not recognize it as holy at all. It presents but one scale by which to determine the character of moral acts, the command requiring us to love with all the heart. It knows such acts only as conformed, or not conformed, to this command. The mixed action, if it could exist, would, in the light of the Moral law, be placed among the not-conformed, just as much as those which are exclusively sinful. The Moral law does not present two scales, according to one of which actions are classed as conformed or not-conformed, and according to the other, as partly conformed and partly not-conformed. Such a scale as this last is unknown in the circle of revealed truth. The Moral law presents us but one scale. Those acts which are in full conformity to its demands, it puts down as holy. Those not thus conformed, it puts down as sinful; as holy or sinful is the only light in which actions stand according to the law.
4. Mixed actions, if they could exist, are as positively prohibited by the law, and must therefore be placed under the category of total disobedience, just as much as those which are in themselves entirely sinful. While the law requires us to love withallthe heart, it positively prohibits everything short of this. The individual, therefore, who puts forth an act of a mixed character, puts forth an act as totally and positively prohibited as the man who puts forth a totally sinful one. Both alike must be placed under the category of total disobedience. A father requires his two sons to go to the distance of ten rods, and positively prohibits their stopping short of the distance required. One determines to go nine rods, and there to stop. The other determines not to move at all. One has put forth an act of total disobedience just as much as the other. So of all moral acts which stop short of loving with all the heart.
5. A moral act of a mixed character cannot possibly proceed from that regard to moral obligation which is an essential condition of the existence of any degree of virtue at all. Virtue, in no degree, can exist, except from a sacred regard to moral obligation. The individual who thus regards moral obligation in one degree, will regard it equally in all degrees. The individual, therefore, who, from such regard, yields to the claims of the law at all, will and must conform to the full measure of its demands. He cannot be in voluntary opposition to any one demand of that law. A mixed moral act, then, cannot possibly proceed from that regard to moral obligation which is the essential condition of holiness in any degree. This leads me to remark,
6. That a moral act of a mixed character, if it could exist, could arise from none other than the most purely selfish and wicked intention conceivable. Three positions, we will suppose, are before the mind—a state of perfect conformity to the law, a state of total disobedience, and a third state combining the elements of obedience and disobedience. By a voluntary act of moral election, an individual places himself in the last state, in distinction from each of the others. What must have been his intention in so doing? He cannot have acted from a regard to moral rectitude. In that case, he would have elected the state of total obedience. His intention must have been to secure, at the same time, the reward of holiness and the “pleasures of sin”—a most selfish and wicked state surely. The supposition of a moral act, that is, intention combining the elements of holiness and sin—is as great an absurdity as the supposition, that a circle has become a square, without losing any of its properties as a circle.
7. I remark again that the doctrine of mixed moral action is contradicted by the express teachings of inspiration. “Whosoever cometh after me,” says Christ, “and forsaketh notallthat he hath, he cannot be my disciple.” The Bible knows men only as the disciples, or not disciples, of Christ. All who really comply with the condition above named are His disciples. All others, however near their compliance, are not His disciples, any more than those who have not conformed in any degree. If an individual has really conformed to this condition, he has surely done his entire duty. He has loved with all his heart. What other meaning can we attach to the phrase, “forsaketh all that he hath?” All persons who have not complied with this principle are declared to be wholly without the circle of discipleship. What is this, but a positive assertion, that a moral action of a mixed character is an impossibility?
Again. “No man can serve two masters.” “Ye cannot serve God and mammon.” Let us suppose that we can put forth intentions of a mixed character—intentions partly sinful and partly holy. So far as they are in harmony with the law, we serve God. So far as they are not in harmony with the law, we serve Mammon. Now, if all our moral exercises can be of a mixed character, then it is true that, at every period of our lives, we can serve God and Mammon. The service which we can render also to each, may be in every conceivable degree. We may render, for example, ninety-nine degrees of service to God and one to Mammon, or ninety-nine to Mammon and one to God. Or our service may be equally divided between the two. Can we conceive of a greater absurdity than this?
What also is the meaning of such declarations as this, “no fountain can send forth both sweet water and bitter,” if the heart of man may exercise intentions combining such elements as sin and holiness? Declarations of a similar kind abound in the Bible. They are surely without meaning, if the doctrine of Mixed Moral Actions is true.
8. Finally. It may be questioned whether the whole range of error presents a dogma of more pernicious tendency than the doctrine of Mixed Moral Actions. It teaches moral agents that they may be selfish in all their moral exercises, and yet have enough of moral purity mingled with them to secure acceptance with the “Judge of all the earth.” A man who has adopted such a principle will almost never, whatever his course of life may be, seem to himself to be destitute of real virtue. He will always seem to himself to possess enough of it, to render his acceptance with God certain. The kind of virtue which can mingle itself with selfishness and sin in individual intentions or moral acts, may be possessed, in different degrees, by the worst men on earth. If this be assumed as real holiness—that holiness which will stand the ordeal of eternity, who will, who should conceive himself destitute of a title to heaven? Here is the fatal rock on which myriads of minds are wrecked for ever. Let it ever be borne in mind, that the same fountain cannot, at the same time and place, “send forth both sweet water and bitter.” “Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.”
Two or three objections to the doctrine above established demand a passing notice here.
1. It is said that the mind may act under the influence of a great variety of motives at one and the same time. The same intention, therefore, may be the result of different and opposite motives, and as a consequence, combine the elements of good and evil. In reply, I remark, that when the Will is in harmony with the Moral law, it respects the good and rejects the bad, alike inallthe motives presented. The opposite is true when it is not in harmony with the law. The same regard or disregard for moral obligation which will induce an individual to reject the evil and choose the good, or to make an opposite choice, in respect to one motive, will induce the same in respect to all other motives present at the same time. A mixed moral act can no more result from a combination of motives, than different and opposite motions can result in the same body at the same time, from forces acting upon it from different directions.
2. It is said that we are conscious of loving our friends, and serving God, with greater strength and intensity at one time than at another. Yet our love, in all such instances, is real. Love, therefore, may be real, and yet be greatly defective—that is, it may be real, and embrace elements morally wrong. It is true, that love may exist in different degrees, as far as the action of the Sensibility is concerned. It is not so, however, with love in the form of intention—intention in harmony with moral obligation, the only form of love demanded by the moral law. Such intention, in view of the same degrees of light, and under the same identical influences, cannot possess different degrees of intensity. The Will always yields, when it really does yield at all to moral obligation, with all the intensity it is, for the time being, capable of, or the nature of the case demands.
3. On this theory, it is said, an individual may become perfectly good and perfectly bad, for any indefinite number of instances, in any definite period of time. This consequence, to say nothing of what is likely to take place in fact, does, as far as possibility is concerned, follow from this theory. But let us contemplate it, for a moment, in the light of an example or two. An individual, from regard to moral obligation, maintains perfect integrity of character, up to a given period of time. Then, under the influence of temptation, he tells a deliberate falsehood. Did his previous integrity so fuse itself into that lie, as to make it partly good and partly bad?—as to make it anything else than atotalfalsehood? Did the prior goodness of David make his acts of adultery and murder partly good and partly bad? Let the advocate of mixed moral action extract the elements of moral goodness from these acts if he can. He can just as well find these elements here, as in any other acts of disobedience to the Moral law. “The righteousness of the righteous cannot save him” from total sinfulness, any more than from condemnation “in the day of his transgression.”
RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY, IN ALL ACTS OR STATES, MORALLY RIGHT OR WRONG.
TheWill, sustaining the relation it does to the Intelligence and Sensibility, must yield itself to the control of one or the other of these departments of our nature. In all acts and states morally right, the Will is in harmony with the Intelligence, from respect to moral obligation or duty; and all the desires and propensities, all the impulses of the Sensibility, are held in strict subordination. In all acts morally wrong, the Will is controlled by the Sensibility, irrespective of the dictates of the Intelligence. Impulse, and not a regard to the just, the right, the true and the good, is the law of its action. In all such cases, as the impulses which control the Will are various, the external forms through which the internal acts, or intentions, will manifest themselves, will be equally diversified. Yet thespringof action is in all instances one and the same, impulse instead of a regard to duty. Virtue does not consist in being controlled byamiable, instead ofdissocialandmalignimpulses, and in a consequent exterior of a corresponding beauty and loveliness. It consists in a voluntary harmony of intention with the just, the right, the true and the good from a sacred respect to moral obligation, instead of being controlled by mere impulse of any kind whatever. On the principle above illustrated, I remark:
1. That the real distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and those who are not, now becomes apparent. It does not consist, in all instances, in the mere exteriorformof action, but in thespringorintentionfrom which all such action proceeds. In most persons, and in all, at different periods, the amiable and social propensities predominate over the dissocial and malign. Hence much of the exterior will be characterized by much that is truly beautiful and lovely. In many, also, the impulsive power of conscience—that department of the Sensibility which is correlated to the idea of right and wrong, and impels to obedience to the Moral law—is strongly developed, and may consequently take its turn in controlling the Will. In all such instances, there will be the external forms of real virtue. It is one thing, however, to put on the exterior of virtue from mere impulse, and quite another, to do the same thing from an internal respect and sacred regard for duty.
How many individuals, who may be now wearing the fairest forms of virtue, will find within them, as soon as present impulses are supplanted by the strong action of others, in opposition to rectitude, no maxims of Will, in harmony with the law of goodness, to resist and subject such impulses. Their conduct is in conformity to the requirements of virtue, not from any internal intention to be in universal harmony with moral obligation, but simply because, for the time being, the strongest impulse happens to be in that direction. No individual, it should ever be kept in mind, makes any approach to real virtue, whatever impulses he may be controlled by, till, by a sealing act of moral election, the Will is placed in harmony with the universal law of duty, and all external action of a moral character proceeds from this internal, all-controlling intention. Here we find the broad and fundamental distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and those who are not.
2. We are also prepared to explain the real difference betweenSelfishnessandBenevolence. The latter expresses and comprehends all the forms of real virtue of every kind and degree. The former comprehends and expresses the forms of vice or sin. Benevolence consists in the full harmony of the Will or intention with the just, the right, the true, and the good, from a regard to moral obligation. Selfishness consists in voluntary subjection toimpulse, irrespective of such obligation. Whenever self-gratification is the law of action, there is pure selfishness, whatever the character or direction of the impulse may be. Selfishness has sometimes been very incorrectly defined, as a supreme regard to our own interest or happiness. If this is a correct definition, the drunkard is not selfish at all; for he sacrifices his present and future happiness, to gratify a beastly appetite, and destroys present peace in the act of self-gratification. If selfishness, however, consists in mere subjection to impulse, how supreme his selfishness at once appears! A mother who does not act from moral obligation, when under the strong influence of maternal affection, appears most distinguished in her assiduous care of her offspring. Now let this affection be crossed by some plain question of duty, so that she must violate the latter, or subject the former, and how soon will selfishness manifest itself, in the triumph of impulse over duty! A gift is not more effectual in blinding the eyes, than natural affection uncontrolled by a regard to moral obligation. Men are just as selfish, that is, as perfectly subject to the law of self-gratification, when under the influence of the social and amiable propensities, as when under that of the dissocial and malign, when, in both instances alike, impulse is the law of action. Moral agents were made, and are required to be, social and amiable, from higher principles than mere impulse.
3. I notice a mistake of fundamental importance into which many appear to have fallen, in judging of the moral character of individuals. As we have seen, when the Will is wholly controlled by the Sensibility irrespective of moral obligation, the impulsive department of conscience takes its turn, among the other propensities, in controlling the action of the voluntary power. Now because, in all such instances, there are the exterior forms of virtue, together with an apparently sincere internal regard for the same, the presence of real virtue is consequently inferred. Now before such a conclusion can be authorized, one question needs to be determined, thespringfrom which such apparent virtues originate. They may arise from that regard to moral obligation which constitutes real virtue. Or they may be the result purely of excited Sensibility, which, in such instances happens to be in the direction of the forms of virtue.
4. Another very frequent mistake bearing upon moral character deserves a passing notice here. Men sometimes manifest, and doubtless with a consciousness of inward sincerity, a very high regard for some one or more particular principles of virtue, while they manifest an equal disregard of all other principles. Every real reform, for example, has its basis in some great principle of morality. Men often advocate, with great zeal, such reforms, together with the principle on which they rest. They talk of virtue, when called to defend that principle, of a regard to moral obligation, together with the necessity of self-sacrifice at the shrine of duty, as if respect for universal rectitude commanded the entire powers of their being. Yet but a slight observation will most clearly evince, that their regard for the right, the true, and the good, is wholly circumscribed by this one principle. Still, such persons are very likely to regard themselves as virtuous in a very high degree. In reality, however, they have not made the first approach to real virtue. Their respect for this one principle, together with its specific applications, has its spring in some other department of their nature, than a regard for what is right in itself. Otherwise their respect for what is right, would be co-extensive with the entire range of moral obligation.
In preceding chapters, the great truth has been fully established, that the Moral law addresses its commands and prohibitions to the Will only, and that moral obligation is predicable only of the action of the voluntary power, other states being required, only as their existence and character are conditioned on the right exercise of that power. From this, it undeniably follows, that the Moral law, in all the length and breadth of its requirements, finds its entire fulfilment within the sphere of the Will. A question of great importance here presents itself: By what test shall we determine whether the Will is, or is not, in full harmony with the law? In the investigation of this question, we may perhaps be thought to be intruding somewhat into the domain of Moral Philosophy. Reasons of great importance, in the judgment of the writer, however, demand its introduction here.
The Moral law is presented to us through two comprehensive precepts. Yet, a moment’s reflection will convince us that both these precepts have their basis in one common principle, and are, in reality, the enunciation of that one principle. The identical reason why we are bound to love God with all the heart, requires us to love our neighbors as ourselves. So the subject is presented by our Saviour himself. After speaking of the first and great commandment, He adds, “the second is like unto it,” that is, it rests upon the same principle as the first.
Now the question is, What is this great principle, obedience to which implies a full discharge of all obligation, actual and conceivable; the principle which comprehends all other principles of the Moral law, and of which each particular precept is only the enunciation of this one common principle in its endlessly diversified applications? This principle has been announced in forms somewhat different, by different philosophers. I will present two or three of these forms. The first that I notice is this.
It shall be the serious intention of all moral agents to esteem and treat all persons, interests, and objects according to their perceived intrinsic and relative importance, and out of respect for their intrinsic worth, or in obedience to the idea of duty, or moral obligation.
Every one will readily apprehend, that the above is a correct enunciation of the principle under consideration. It expresses the fundamental reason why obedience to each and every moral principle is binding upon us. The reason and only reason why we are bound to love God withall the heart, is the intrinsic and relative importance of the object presented to the mind in the contemplation of the Infinite and Perfect. The reason why we are bound to love our neighbor as ourselves, is the fact, that his rights and interests are apprehended, as of the same value and sacredness as our own. In the intention under consideration, all obligation, actual and conceivable, is really met. God will occupy his appropriate place in the heart, and the creature his. No real right or interest will be dis-esteemed, and each will intentionally command that attention and regard which its intrinsic and relative importance demands. Every moral agent is under obligation infinite ever to be under the supreme control of such an intention, and no such agent can be under obligation to be or to do anything more than this.
The same principle has been announced in a form somewhat different by Kant, to wit: “So act that thy maxim of Will (intention) might become law in a system of universal moral obligation”—that is, let your controlling intention be always such, that all Intelligents may properly be required ever to be under the supreme control of the same intention.
By Cousin, the same principle is thus announced: “The moral principle being universal, the sign, the external type by which a resolution may be recognized as conformed to this principle, is the impossibility of not erecting the immediate motive (intention) of the particular act or resolution, into a maxim of universal legislation”—that is, we cannot but affirm that every moral agent in existence is bound to act from the same motive or intention.
It will readily be perceived, that each of these forms is really identical with that above announced and illustrated. It is only when we are conscious of the supreme control of the intention, to esteem and treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and relative importance, from respect to the idea of duty, that, in conformity with the principle as announced by Kant, our maxim of Will might become law in a system of universal legislation. When we are conscious of the control of such an intention, it is impossible for us not to affirm, according to the principle, as announced by Cousin, that all Intelligents are bound always to be under the control of the same intention. Two or three suggestions will close what I have to say on this point.
1. We notice the fundamental mistake of many philosophers and divines in treating of moral exercises, or states of mind. Such exercises are very commonly represented as consisting wholly in excited states of the Sensibility. Thus Dr. Brown represents all moral exercises and states as consisting in emotions of a given character. One of the most distinguished Professors of Theology in this country laid down this proposition, as the basis of a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy, that “everything right or wrong in a moral agent, consists exclusively of right or wrongfeelings”—feelings as distinguished from volitions as phenomena of Will. Now precisely the reverse of the above proposition is true, to wit: thatnothingright or wrong, in a moral agent, consists in any states of the Sensibility irrespective of the action of the Will. Who would dare to say, when he has particular emotions, desires, or involuntary feelings, that the Moral law has no further claim upon him, that all its demands are fully met in those feelings? Who would dare to affirm, when he has any particular emotions, that all moral agents in existence are bound to have those identical feelings? If the demands of the Moral law are fully met in any states of the Sensibility—which would be true, if everything right or wrong, in moral agents, consists of right or wrong feelings—then all moral agents, at all times, and under all circumstances, are bound to have these same feelings. For what the law demands, at one time, it demands at all times. All the foundations of moral obligation are swept away by the theory under consideration.
2. We are now prepared to state distinctly thenatureof thatlovewhich is the “fulfilling of the law.” It does not, as all admit, consist in the mere external act. Nor does it consist, for reasons equally obvious and universally admitted, in any mereconvictionsof the Intelligence. For reasons above assigned, it does not consist in any states of the Sensibility. No man, when he is conscious of such feelings, can affirm that all Intelligents are bound, under all circumstances, to have the same feelings that he now has. This would be true, if the love under consideration consists of such feelings. But when, from, a regard to the idea of duty, the whole being is voluntarily consecrated to the promotion, in the highest degree, of universal good and when, in the pursuit of this end, there is a serious intention to esteem and treat all beings and interests according to their intrinsic and relative importance;hereis the love which is the fulfilling of the law. Here is the intention by which all intelligents, in reference to all interests and objects, are, at all times, bound to be controlled, and which must be imposed, as universal law, upon such Intelligents in every system of righteous moral legislation. Here is the intention, in the exercise of which all obligation is fully met. Here, consequently, is that love which is the fulfilling of the law. In a subsequent Chapter, my design is to show that this is the view of the subject presented in the Scriptures of truth. I now present it merely as a necessary truth of the universal Intelligence.
3. We now perceive clearly in what consists the real identity of moral character, in all Intelligents of true moral rectitude. Their occupations, forms of external deportment, and their internal convictions and feelings, may be endlessly diversified. Yet one omnipresent, all-controlling intention, an intention which is ever one and identical, directs all their moral movements. It is the intention, in the promotion of the highest good of universal being, to esteem and treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and relative importance, from regard to moral obligation. Thus moral virtue, in all Intelligents possessed of it, is perfectly one and identical. In this sense only are all moral agents capable of perfect identity of character. They cannot all have, at all times, or perhaps at any time, precisely the same thoughts and feelings. But they can all have, at all times, one and the same intention. The omnipresent influence and control of the intention above illustrated, constitutes a perfect identity of character in God and all beings morally pure in existence. For this reason, the supreme control of this intention implies, in all moral agents alike, a perfect fulfilment of the law, a full discharge of all obligation of every kind.
THE ELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX PHENOMENA.
Everyperception, every judgment, every thought, which appears within the entire sphere of the Intelligence; every sensation, every emotion, every desire, all the states of the Sensibility, present objects for the action of the Will in one direction or another. The sphere of the Will’s activity, therefore, is as extensive as the vast and almost boundless range of the Intelligence and Sensibility both. Now while all the phenomena of these two last named faculties are, in themselves, wholly destitute of moral character, the action of the Will, in the direction of such phenomena, constitutescomplexstates of mind, which have a positive moral character. In all instances, themoralandvoluntaryelements are one and identical. As the distinction under consideration has been overlooked by the great mass of philosophers and theologians, and as very great errors have thereby arisen, not only in philosophy, but in theology and morals both, I will dwell at more length upon the subject than I otherwise should have done. My remarks will be confined to the action of the Will in the direction of thenatural propensitiesandreligious affections.
1. In respect to the action of the Will in the direction of the natural propensities, such as the appetites, the love of esteem, of power, &c., I would remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are commonly explained as simple feelings or states of the Sensibility. In presenting this subject in a proper light, the following explanations are deemed necessary. When any physical power operates upon any of the organs of sense, or when any thought is present in the Intelligence, the state of the Sensibility immediately and necessarily resulting is called asensationoremotion. When any feeling arises impelling the Will to seek or avoid the object of that sensation or emotion, this impulsive state of the Sensibility is called adesire. When the Will concurs with the desire, a complex state of mind results, called awish. Wish is distinguished from Desire in this, that in the former, the desire is cherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the desire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a prohibited object, the action of the Will, in concurrence with the desire, constitutes a wish morally wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a required direction, and the Will, from a respect to the idea of duty, concurs with the desire, a wish arises which is morally virtuous. This principle holds true in regard to the action of all the propensities. The excitement of the propensity, as a state of the Sensibility, constitutes desire—a feeling in itself destitute of all moral qualities. The action of the Will in concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, constitutes a complex state of mind morally right or wrong.
Anger, for example, as prohibited by the moral law, is not a merefeelingof displeasure awakened by some injury, real or supposed, perpetrated by another. This state, on the other hand, consists in the surrendering of the Will to the control of that feeling, and thus acting from malign impulse. Pride also is not the meredesireof esteem. It consists in voluntary subjection to that propensity, seeking esteem and admiration as the great end of existence. Ambition, too, is not mere desire of power, but the voluntary surrendering of our being to the control of that propensity. The same, I repeat, holds true in respect to all the propensities. No mere excitement of the Sensibility, irrespective of the action of the Will, has any moral character. In the action of the Will in respect to such states—action which must arise in some direction under such circumstances—moral guilt, or praiseworthiness, arises.
I might here adduce other cases in illustration of the same principle; as, for example, the fact that intemperance in food and drink does not consist, as a moral act or state, in the mere strength of the appetite—that is, in the degree in which it is excited in the presence of its appropriate objects. Nor does it consist in mere excess in the quantity partaken of—excess considered as an external act. It consists, on the other hand, in the surrendering of the voluntary power to the control of the appetite. The excess referred to is theconsequentandindexof such voluntary subjection. The above examples, however, are abundantly sufficient to illustrate the principle.
2. We will now contemplate the element of the Will in those complex phenomena denominatedreligious affections. The position which I here assume is this, that whatever in such affections is morally right and praiseworthy, that which is directly referred to, where such affections are required of us, is the voluntary element to be found in them. The voluntary element is directly required. Other elements are required only on the ground that their existence is conditioned upon, and necessarily results from, that of the voluntary element. This must be admitted, or we must deny the position established in the last Chapter, to wit: that all the requirements of the Moral law are fully met in the right action of the Will.
My object now is to show, that this is the light in which the subject is really presented in the Scriptures. I will cite, as examples, the three cardinal virtues of Christianity, Repentance, Love, and Faith. The question is, Are these virtues or affections, presented in the Bible as mere convictions of the Intelligence, or states of the Sensibility? Are they not, on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of mind, or as acts of Will? Are not the commands requiring them fully met in such acts?
In regard to Repentance, I would remark, that the term is scarcely used at all in the Old Testament. Other terms and phrases are there employed to express the same thing; as for example, “Turn ye;” “Let the wicked forsake his way;” “Let him turn unto the Lord;” “He that confesseth and forsaketh his sins shall find mercy,” &c. In all such passages repentance is most clearly presented as consisting exclusively of voluntary acts or intentions. The commands requiring it are, therefore, fully met in such acts. In the New Testament this virtue is distinguished from Godly Sorrow, the state of the Sensibility which accompanies its exercise. As distinguished from the action of the Sensibility, what can it be, but a voluntary state, as presented in the Old Testament? When the mind places itself in voluntary harmony with those convictions and feelings which attend a consciousness of sin as committed against God and man, this is the repentance recognized and required as such in the Bible. It does not consist in the mereconvictionof sin; for then the worst of men, and even devils, would be truly repentant. Nor does it consist in the states of the Sensibility which attend such convictions; else Repentance would be Godly Sorrow, from which the Bible, as stated above, definitely distinguishes it. It must consist in a voluntary act, in which, in accordance with those convictions and feelings, the mind turns from sin to holiness, from selfishness to benevolence, from the paths of disobedience to the service of God.
A single passage will distinctly set before us the nature ofLoveas required in the Bible—that love which comprehends all other virtues, and the exercise of which is the “fulfilling of the law.” “Hereby,” says the sacred writer, “we perceive the love of God.” The phrase “of God” is not found in the original. The passage, as it there stands, reads thus: “By this we knowlove;” that is, we know the nature of the love which the Scriptures require, when they affirm, that “love is the fulfilling of the law.” What is that in which, according to the express teaching of inspiration, we learn the nature of this love? “Because he laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” In the act of “laying down his life for us,” we are here told, that the love required of us is embodied and revealed. What is the nature of this love? I answer,
1. It is not a conviction of the Intelligence, nor any excited state of the Sensibility. No such thing is here referred to.
2. It does and must consist exclusively in a voluntary act, or intention. “He laid down his life for us.” What is this but a voluntary act? Yet this is love, the “love which is the fulfilling of the law.”
3. As an act of Will, love must consist exclusively in a voluntary devotion of our entire powers to one end, the highest good of universal being, from a regard to the idea of duty. “He laid down his life for us.” “Weoughtto lay down our lives for the brethren.” In each particular here presented, a universal principle is expressed and revealed. Christ “laid down his life for us,” because he was in a state of voluntary consecration to the good of universal being. The particular act was put forth, as a means to this end. In a voluntary consecration to the same end, and as a means to this end, it is declared, that “we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” When, therefore, the Scriptures require love of us, they do not demand the existence of particular convictions of the Intelligence, nor certain states of the Sensibility. They require the voluntary consecration of our entire being and interests to the great end of universal good. In this act of consecration, and in the employment of all our powers and interests, under the control of this one intention, we fulfil the Law. We fully discharge all obligations, actual and conceivable, that are devolved upon us. The exercise of love, like that of repentance, is attended with particular convictions and feelings. These feelings are indirectly required in the precepts demanding love, and required, because when the latter does exist, the former will of course exist.
But little need be said in explanation of the nature of Faith. It is everywhere presented in the Bible, as synonymous withtrust, reposing confidence, committing our interests to God as to a “faithful Creator.” Now Trust is undeniably a voluntary state of mind. “I know,” says Paul, “in whom I have believed,” that is, exercised faith, “that he is able to keep that which I havecommittedto him against that day.” Here the act of committing to the care of another, which can be nothing else than an act of Will, is presented as synonymous with Faith. Faith, then, does not consist in conviction, nor in any excited feelings. It is a voluntary act,entrustingour interests to God as to a faithful Creator. The principle above established must apply to all religious affections of every kind.
Few truths are of greater practical moment than that illustrated in the preceding section. My object, now, is to apply it to the elucidation of certain important questions which require elucidation.
1. We see why it is, that, while no mere external action, no state of the Intelligence or Sensibility, has any moral character in itself, irrespective of the action of the Will, still such acts and states are specifically and formally required or prohibited in the Bible. In such precepts theeffectis put for thecause. These acts and states are required, or prohibited, as the natural and necessary results of right or wrong intentions. The thing really referred to, in such commands and prohibitions, is not the acts or states specified, but thecauseof such acts and states, to wit: the right or wrong action of the Will. Suppose, that a certain loathsome disease of the body would necessarily result from certain intentions, or acts of Will. Now God might prohibit the intention which causes that disease, in either of two ways. He might specify the intention and directly prohibit that; or he might prohibit the same thing, in such a form as this: Thou shalt not have this disease. Every one will perceive that, in both prohibitions, the same thing, precisely, would be referred to and intended, to wit: the intention which sustains to the evil designed to be prevented, the relation of a cause. The same principle, precisely, holds true in respect to all external actions and states of the Intelligence and Sensibility, which are specifically required or prohibited.
2. We also distinctly perceive the ground of our responsibility for the existence of external actions, and internal convictions and feelings. Whatever effects, external or internal, necessarily result, and are or may be known to result, from the right or wrong action of the Will, we may properly be held responsible for. Now, all external actions and internal convictions and feelings which are required of or prohibited to us, sustain precisely this relation to the right or wrong action of the Will. The intention being given, the effect follows as a consequence. For this reason we are held responsible for the effect.
3. We now notice thepower of controlwhich the Will has over the feelings.
(1.) In one respect its control is unlimited. It may yield itself to the control of the feelings, or wholly withhold its concurrence.
(2.) In respect to all feelings, especially those which impel to violent or unlawful action, the Will may exert a direct influence which will either greatly modify, or totally suppress the feeling. For example, when there is an inflexible purpose of Will not to yield to angry feelings, if they should arise, and to suppress them, as soon as they appear, feelings of a violent character will not result to any great extent, whatever provocations the mind may be subject to. The same holds true of almost all feelings of every kind. Whenever they appear, if they are directly and strongly willed down, they will either be greatly modified, or totally disappear.
(3.) Over the action and states of the Sensibility the Will may exert an indirect influence which is all-powerful. If, for example, the Will is in full harmony with the infinite, the eternal, the just, the right, the true and the good, the Intelligence will, of course, be occupied with “whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely and of good report,” and the Sensibility, continually acted upon by such objects, will mirror forth, in pure emotions and desires, the pure thoughts of the Intelligence, and the hallowed purposes of the Will. The Sensibility will be wholly isolated from all feelings gross and sensual. On the other hand, let the Will be yielded to the control of impure and sensual impulse, and how gross and impure the thoughts and feelings will become. In yielding, or refusing to yield, to the supreme control of the law of Goodness, the Will really, though indirectly, determines the action of the Intelligence and Sensibility both.
(4.) To present the whole subject in a proper light, a fixed law of theaffectionsdemands special attention. A husband, for example, has pledged to his wife, not only kind intentions, but the exclusive control of those peculiar affections which constitute the basis of the marriage union. Let him cherish a proper regard for the sacredness of that pledge, and the wife will so completely and exclusively fill and command her appropriate sphere in the affections, that, under no circumstances whatever, will there be a tendency towards any other individual. The same holds true of every department of the affections, not only in respect to those which connect us with the creature, but also with the Creator. The affections the Will may control by a fixed and changeless law.
Such being the relation of the Will to the Sensibility, while it is true that there is nothing right or wrong in any feelings, irrespective of the action of the Will, still the presence of feelings impure and sensual, may be a certain indication of the wrong action of the voluntary power. In such a light their presence should always be regarded.
4. In the preceding Section it has been fully shown, that love, repentance, faith, and all other religious exercises, are, in their fundamental and characteristic elements, phenomena of the Will. We will now, for a few moments, contemplate the relations of these different exercises to one another, especially the relation ofFaithto other exercises of a kindred character. While it is true, as has been demonstrated in a preceding Chapter, that the Will cannot at the same time put forth intentions of a contradictory character, such as sin and holiness, it is equally true, that it may simultaneously put forth acts of a homogeneous character. In view of our obligations to yield implicit obedience to God, we may purpose such obedience. In view of the fact, that, in the Gospel, grace is proffered to perfect us in our obedience, at the same time that we purpose obedience with all the heart, we may exercise implicit trust, or faith for “grace whereby we may serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear.” Now, such is our condition as sinners, that without a revelation of this grace, we should never purpose obedience in the first instance. Without the continued influence of that grace, this purpose would not subsequently be perfected and perpetuated. The purpose is first formed in reliance upon Divine grace; and but for this grace and consequent reliance, would never have been formed. In consequence of the influence of this grace relied upon, and received by faith, this same purpose is afterwards perfected and perpetuated. Thus, we see, that the purpose of obedience is really conditioned for its existence and perpetuity upon the act of reliance upon Divine grace. The same holds true of the relation of Faith to all acts or intentions morally right or holy. One act of Will, in itself perfectly pure, is really conditioned upon another in itself equally pure. This is the doctrine of Moral Purification, or Sanctification by faith, a doctrine which is no less true, as a fact in philosophy, than as a revealed truth of inspiration.