APPENDIX IV

It has been made very clear by my colleagues that the present shameful condition of many of our American cities is due in large measure to the peculiar form of the government patterned after a scheme which is adapted to a sovereign government like the state or nation. The Negative demand an isolation which history shows, so far as our American cities are concerned, leads to a complete confusion of functions, with a consequent loss of responsibility. Knowing the inadequacy of the scheme they then demanded municipal home rule; but we have shown that the Affirmative are thoroughly committed to municipal home rule which under the commission form alone can be safely intrusted to cities. State interference in city government is the child of the form of government for which our friends of the Negative are sponsors. Thus far the gentlemen have failed to disprove the points which we have presented that the theory of checks and balances when applied to American cities has failed; that the plan of concentrating municipal authority under one head as advocated by the commission plan is in complete harmony with modern industrial and social development, and that the plan is superior from a legislative standpoint. It shall be my purpose to show that it is superior from the standpoint of administration. We believe this because the commission lends itself to the application of business methods. The plan provides for a comparatively small body of men who meet in daily session and who give their whole time to the work of governing the city. At present, too often the real business of the officials is anything else. They give their spare time to the city and we have seen the results. Honorable judges, we claim that there is a special virtue in the very smallness of the number inasmuch as they are properly paid, devote all their time to their work, and are made in fact governors of the city. They have a great deal of work to do and they do it, while under our present systems the councilmen have comparatively little to do and they fail to do that little efficiently.The reason why this small body can administer with dispatch and efficiency is seen at a glance. Each commissioner is the head of a department for which he is personally responsible. He is not hindered as is the executive at present by an inefficient and meddling council which has more power, often, than the executive himself. He knows the laws for he has helped to make them. It is his business to see that they are executed, and if they are not, he cannot escape blame. He cannot plead ignorance, lack of responsibility, or lack of power as do present administrative officers.Moreover, this body is admirably constituted for effective carrying out of city business. It is larger than the single headed executive and possesses, therefore, a division of work which makes the administration far more effective. At the same time it is smaller than the old council and for that reason is more efficient in enacting the city's peculiar kind of legislation. In actual practice, and that seems to be the real test of city government, both administration and legislation are accomplished with accuracy and dispatch. For instance, every spring for the last decade carloads of "dagoes" with their dirt and disease have come to Cedar Rapids. Every year protests have gone up to both mayor and council, but without result. Cedar Rapids has adopted a commission form of government. Last spring when the "dagoes" came the same complaints went up as usual, that because of their insanitary methods these people carried with them filth and disease. But the petitioners did not go to the city council which met once in two weeks, nor were they referred to a committee which met less often. They went directly to the commissioners who had charge of the city health and in less than twenty-four hours the "dagoes" had been notified to either clean up or leave, and they left the city. But, say the opponents of this plan, this could have been done under the old system. To be sure, but the burning fact remains that in spite of the protests of the people, it was not done.In Houston the government was both inefficient and dishonest. For years the annual expenditures had exceeded the income a hundred thousand dollars. The city adopted a commission form and a four hundred thousand dollar floating debt was paid off in one year out of the ordinary income of the city. At the same time the city's taxes were reduced ten per cent. In the health department alone there is a saving of from $100 to $150 per month, while a combination in the operation of the garbage crematory and pumping station saves the city $6,000 annually. These results have been accomplished under a commission plan by the application of common, everyday business principles.Galveston adopted a commission plan, and although its taxable values were reduced twenty-five per cent by the storm of 1900, yet within six years its commissioners not only put the city on a cash basis, made improvements costing $1,000,000 annually, but actually paid off a debt of $394,000 which had been incurred by the old council, and all this was accomplished without borrowing a dollar, issuing a bond, or increasing the rate of taxation. Other cities which have adopted a commission plan are accomplishing equally as beneficial results. Hence, we maintain that the commission form of city government is superior from the standpoint of efficiency in administration.The commission plan is superior in administration for it is adapted to the city's financial problem. The same body of men are held responsible for the levying and collecting of taxes and for the spending of the money. This is desirable because the administrative body which is to spend money knows, accurately, the city's need of revenue. They are in a position to know; it is their business. A legislative body, whether council or a board, cannot know the city's needs for money without getting the facts from the administrative body. F.R. Clow says the council does not pretend to know the city's revenue problem and they adopt the recommendation of the administrative departments. The Negative's system of division of powers simply divides the responsibility between the legislative and administrative departments for the thing which in fact has been done by the administrative department itself. Since the administrative department really dictates the budget, it should be held directly responsible for it. Therefore, we contend that the commissioners, knowing best what the budget should contain because as administrators they know the city's need for money, are the body of men preeminently fitted to handle the city's budget.The commission plan is adapted to the city's financial problem because it fosters economy. Economy is the result of understanding. The commissioners knowing the city's government, not from the administrative side alone, but from the legislative side as well, are in a position to economize and in practice they have done so. The running expenses of Galveston under the commission plan have been reduced one-third. In Houston it costs $12,800 a year less to run the water and light plants than formerly, while by a combination of work in the different departments there is a saving of $9,000 annually. In Cedar Rapids, since the adoption of the commission plan, there has been a reduction in the paving contracts let of ten and one-fifth per cent, in sewerage contracts, fourteen and two-sevenths per cent, and in water contracts, twenty per cent. Immediately after the adoption of the commission plan in Des Moines the annual cost of each arc-light was reduced five dollars. Reports from all the cities using the commission plan show that by the use of business principles the commissioners have economized in the administration of the city's government.The commission plan is adapted to the city's finances because it provides a superior safeguard. Legislative bodies in our cities have been depended upon to represent the citizens' best interest. In practice, as we have pointed out, they have not done so. Never in the history of our municipal affairs, says Henry D.F. Baldwin, has a legislative body stood out as the representatives of the people against the administrative department. Why then continue a representative body which does not in fact represent? Instead of the withered form of a council or legislative body standing between the citizen and his government the commission plan simply removes this useless obstacle and allows the citizen to participate directly in the government. This is directly in harmony with the well-established economic principle that the self-interest of the taxpayer will control where responsibility is fixed.

The reason why this small body can administer with dispatch and efficiency is seen at a glance. Each commissioner is the head of a department for which he is personally responsible. He is not hindered as is the executive at present by an inefficient and meddling council which has more power, often, than the executive himself. He knows the laws for he has helped to make them. It is his business to see that they are executed, and if they are not, he cannot escape blame. He cannot plead ignorance, lack of responsibility, or lack of power as do present administrative officers.

Moreover, this body is admirably constituted for effective carrying out of city business. It is larger than the single headed executive and possesses, therefore, a division of work which makes the administration far more effective. At the same time it is smaller than the old council and for that reason is more efficient in enacting the city's peculiar kind of legislation. In actual practice, and that seems to be the real test of city government, both administration and legislation are accomplished with accuracy and dispatch. For instance, every spring for the last decade carloads of "dagoes" with their dirt and disease have come to Cedar Rapids. Every year protests have gone up to both mayor and council, but without result. Cedar Rapids has adopted a commission form of government. Last spring when the "dagoes" came the same complaints went up as usual, that because of their insanitary methods these people carried with them filth and disease. But the petitioners did not go to the city council which met once in two weeks, nor were they referred to a committee which met less often. They went directly to the commissioners who had charge of the city health and in less than twenty-four hours the "dagoes" had been notified to either clean up or leave, and they left the city. But, say the opponents of this plan, this could have been done under the old system. To be sure, but the burning fact remains that in spite of the protests of the people, it was not done.

In Houston the government was both inefficient and dishonest. For years the annual expenditures had exceeded the income a hundred thousand dollars. The city adopted a commission form and a four hundred thousand dollar floating debt was paid off in one year out of the ordinary income of the city. At the same time the city's taxes were reduced ten per cent. In the health department alone there is a saving of from $100 to $150 per month, while a combination in the operation of the garbage crematory and pumping station saves the city $6,000 annually. These results have been accomplished under a commission plan by the application of common, everyday business principles.

Galveston adopted a commission plan, and although its taxable values were reduced twenty-five per cent by the storm of 1900, yet within six years its commissioners not only put the city on a cash basis, made improvements costing $1,000,000 annually, but actually paid off a debt of $394,000 which had been incurred by the old council, and all this was accomplished without borrowing a dollar, issuing a bond, or increasing the rate of taxation. Other cities which have adopted a commission plan are accomplishing equally as beneficial results. Hence, we maintain that the commission form of city government is superior from the standpoint of efficiency in administration.

The commission plan is superior in administration for it is adapted to the city's financial problem. The same body of men are held responsible for the levying and collecting of taxes and for the spending of the money. This is desirable because the administrative body which is to spend money knows, accurately, the city's need of revenue. They are in a position to know; it is their business. A legislative body, whether council or a board, cannot know the city's needs for money without getting the facts from the administrative body. F.R. Clow says the council does not pretend to know the city's revenue problem and they adopt the recommendation of the administrative departments. The Negative's system of division of powers simply divides the responsibility between the legislative and administrative departments for the thing which in fact has been done by the administrative department itself. Since the administrative department really dictates the budget, it should be held directly responsible for it. Therefore, we contend that the commissioners, knowing best what the budget should contain because as administrators they know the city's need for money, are the body of men preeminently fitted to handle the city's budget.

The commission plan is adapted to the city's financial problem because it fosters economy. Economy is the result of understanding. The commissioners knowing the city's government, not from the administrative side alone, but from the legislative side as well, are in a position to economize and in practice they have done so. The running expenses of Galveston under the commission plan have been reduced one-third. In Houston it costs $12,800 a year less to run the water and light plants than formerly, while by a combination of work in the different departments there is a saving of $9,000 annually. In Cedar Rapids, since the adoption of the commission plan, there has been a reduction in the paving contracts let of ten and one-fifth per cent, in sewerage contracts, fourteen and two-sevenths per cent, and in water contracts, twenty per cent. Immediately after the adoption of the commission plan in Des Moines the annual cost of each arc-light was reduced five dollars. Reports from all the cities using the commission plan show that by the use of business principles the commissioners have economized in the administration of the city's government.

The commission plan is adapted to the city's finances because it provides a superior safeguard. Legislative bodies in our cities have been depended upon to represent the citizens' best interest. In practice, as we have pointed out, they have not done so. Never in the history of our municipal affairs, says Henry D.F. Baldwin, has a legislative body stood out as the representatives of the people against the administrative department. Why then continue a representative body which does not in fact represent? Instead of the withered form of a council or legislative body standing between the citizen and his government the commission plan simply removes this useless obstacle and allows the citizen to participate directly in the government. This is directly in harmony with the well-established economic principle that the self-interest of the taxpayer will control where responsibility is fixed.

Mr. Charles Briggs, the third speaker on the Negative, said:

It will be well while the matter is fresh in our minds, Honorable Judges, to make a brief examination of one matter of which the Affirmative are making a feature, that the commission form affords unusual safeguards for the financial and economic interests of the city. Now, in all fairness to the scheme which is doing quite well in a very few of our smaller cities, the question ought to be raised as to what other form of city government could be devised which would provide greater opportunities for graft and corruption. A little group of autocrats is the ideal form for which the ardent corruptionists might pray. They have it in the commission form. Exemplary men in office or a constant civic interest, may prevent the commissioners from becoming a band of robbers; but are these two preventives likely always to exist? Human experience says "No." The history of New Orleans and Sacramento confirm that decision. Civic interest is bound to subside; corrupt men are sure to become commissioners. Then the oligarchy advocated by the Affirmative becomes not a "safeguard" but a band of raiders equipped by the very form of government to loot the treasury. We must insist, at this point, that our opponents have failed in their assault upon our main contention:First, that the evils in American city government are not attributable to the fundamental principles of that government; second, that the principles underlying the proposed form are in themselves wrong and are not consonant generally with American ideals. It remains to be shown that the commission form is impracticable as a general scheme for the government of all American cities.We can very well agree that where the commission form of government has been tried it has been productive of some good results, and further, that in certain homogeneous communities of high culture and intelligence it might work with considerable success; but that the result obtained in cities where the commission form has been tried would warrant the universal adoption of it by American cities we must deny.We deny the wisdom of adopting the commission form for it results in inadequate responsibility; third, it could never work in the vast majority of American cities. These reasons are apparent from examinations of the commission form where it has been and is being tried, and are inherent in the plan itself.The tremendous centralization of power under this form of city government cannot escape a critical observer. A small body of men have absolute sway over the destiny of the city. They make all laws from the minutely specified contract for a water system to all important school legislation. All franchises are engineered by them. All contracts, great and small, are let by them. The city's bonded debt is in their hands; by them the city is taxed and incumbered. Parks, police, streets, education, public buildings, engineering, finance—everything from the smallest administrative duty to the all-engrossing functions of legislation devolves upon this commission. They can vacate any office, can create any office, and without limit fix any salary they choose. The entire officialdom, outside of the commission itself, and all the employes and the servants of the city are by law made the agents, servants, and dependents of the council. The possibilities for machine power with this autocratic centralization of authority are without condition. We can demonstrate this best by giving practical illustrations taken from the active operation of the commission form. We may preface these by saying that there is nothing inherent in the commission form or any of its attributes which can insure the selection of better men for office. The members of the commission will be about the same kind of men as the ordinary city official. Minneapolis by an election at large placed in the mayor's chair its most notorious grafter. This is proved by the personnel of the commissions where the system is being tried. The investigating committee appointed by the city of Des Moines, quoting their exact words, say that in Houston, where the commissioners are required to stay in the city hall every day, business men do not hold those positions, although the salaries are higher than the proposed salaries of the Des Moines commissioners. One commissioner was formerly a city scavenger, another a blacksmith, justice of the peace and alderman, a third a railway conductor, fourth a dry-goods merchant, and the mayor, a retired capitalist. Mr. Pollock of Kansas City says of the Des Moines commission, "The commission as elected consists of a former police judge and justice of the peace who is mayor-commissioner at the salary of $3,500; a coal miner, deputy sheriff; the former city assessor, whose greatest success has been in public office; a union painter of undoubted honesty and integrity, but far from a $3,000 man; an ex-mayor and politician, who is perhaps the most valuable member of the new form of government, but whose record does not disclose any great business capacity aside from that displayed in public office." The Des Moines committee says of the Galveston commission: "This is a perpetual body, a potentially perfect machine." There has been no change in the membership of the Galveston commission since it was organized. The extensive power of the commissioners have enabled them to control all political factions and to completely crush the opposition. The commissioners' faction is in complete control and even goes so far as to dictate nominations for the legislature and the national congress. In Des Moines we find evidences of this machine power in the very first session of the commission. Mr. Hume was appointed chief of police because he had delivered the labor vote to Mr. Mathis. TheDaily News, the only Des Moines paper that supported the plan, was rewarded by having three of its staff appointed to responsible positions. Mr. Lyman was appointed secretary to Commissioner Hammery, Neil Jones secretary to Mayor Mathis. Another man was appointed to an important technical position. A brakeman was appointed street commissioner because he delivered the vote of the Federation of Labor.These are but a few of the instances where this great centralization of power has shown itself in practice to be a system permitting of unrestricted machine power and political grafting. New Orleans tried the system and abandoned it over 20 years ago because of this very reason. The inhabitants were afraid of this tremendous centralization of power.The friends of the commission idea claim for it the advantage of centered responsibility; but practice has proved that this form of city government is actually formulated to defeat responsibility. By the construction of this governing body each commissioner is held responsible for his respective department. But regulation for each department is made not by the commission as a whole but by the whole commission. This results in a confusion of powers. Thus in the city of Des Moines, Mr. Hume, the personal enemy of Commissioner Hammery was made chief of police by three other members of the commission for political reasons.Who is responsible for the mistakes of Mr. Hume? The people say Hammery. But Hammery says: "I had nothing to do with his appointment." It has actually happened time and again at the commission table in Des Moines that regulations for the financial department were made by the police commission, the street commissioner and the commissioner of parks and public buildings; that the police commissioner would have the deciding vote on some important school legislation; or the commissioner of education control the appointment of policemen. This defect has given rise to log-rolling. Bridges have been built as a personal favor to one commissioner whose vote is needed to construct a new schoolhouse. Large paving and building contracts are let simply because the police commissioner wanted to oust some unfaithful political dependent. In this way each commissioner gains great favor with the voters and at the same time can escape personal responsibility for technical mistakes by shouldering the blame onto the whole commission where his identity is lost. This department trading has found its way into the Galveston commission, claimed to have the best commission of any city under this form of government. Here we find that at the same time the prosecutor of the city cases in the police court is allowed the right to collect a fee of $10 for every criminal, drunk, or vagrant convicted, and $5 for every one who pleads guilty; a 50-year franchise is granted to the Galveston Street Railway Co. without a vote of the people, the city not to receive one cent of tax and no compensation.So, Honorable Judges, we must consider that, while the commission form may be a temporary success in a few small cities, its permanent success there is in grave doubt. Under these conditions we do not ask that it be abolished, but that under no circumstances its application be made general in this country where other forms of city government are in practice more successful and in theory more correct.

First, that the evils in American city government are not attributable to the fundamental principles of that government; second, that the principles underlying the proposed form are in themselves wrong and are not consonant generally with American ideals. It remains to be shown that the commission form is impracticable as a general scheme for the government of all American cities.

We can very well agree that where the commission form of government has been tried it has been productive of some good results, and further, that in certain homogeneous communities of high culture and intelligence it might work with considerable success; but that the result obtained in cities where the commission form has been tried would warrant the universal adoption of it by American cities we must deny.

We deny the wisdom of adopting the commission form for it results in inadequate responsibility; third, it could never work in the vast majority of American cities. These reasons are apparent from examinations of the commission form where it has been and is being tried, and are inherent in the plan itself.

The tremendous centralization of power under this form of city government cannot escape a critical observer. A small body of men have absolute sway over the destiny of the city. They make all laws from the minutely specified contract for a water system to all important school legislation. All franchises are engineered by them. All contracts, great and small, are let by them. The city's bonded debt is in their hands; by them the city is taxed and incumbered. Parks, police, streets, education, public buildings, engineering, finance—everything from the smallest administrative duty to the all-engrossing functions of legislation devolves upon this commission. They can vacate any office, can create any office, and without limit fix any salary they choose. The entire officialdom, outside of the commission itself, and all the employes and the servants of the city are by law made the agents, servants, and dependents of the council. The possibilities for machine power with this autocratic centralization of authority are without condition. We can demonstrate this best by giving practical illustrations taken from the active operation of the commission form. We may preface these by saying that there is nothing inherent in the commission form or any of its attributes which can insure the selection of better men for office. The members of the commission will be about the same kind of men as the ordinary city official. Minneapolis by an election at large placed in the mayor's chair its most notorious grafter. This is proved by the personnel of the commissions where the system is being tried. The investigating committee appointed by the city of Des Moines, quoting their exact words, say that in Houston, where the commissioners are required to stay in the city hall every day, business men do not hold those positions, although the salaries are higher than the proposed salaries of the Des Moines commissioners. One commissioner was formerly a city scavenger, another a blacksmith, justice of the peace and alderman, a third a railway conductor, fourth a dry-goods merchant, and the mayor, a retired capitalist. Mr. Pollock of Kansas City says of the Des Moines commission, "The commission as elected consists of a former police judge and justice of the peace who is mayor-commissioner at the salary of $3,500; a coal miner, deputy sheriff; the former city assessor, whose greatest success has been in public office; a union painter of undoubted honesty and integrity, but far from a $3,000 man; an ex-mayor and politician, who is perhaps the most valuable member of the new form of government, but whose record does not disclose any great business capacity aside from that displayed in public office." The Des Moines committee says of the Galveston commission: "This is a perpetual body, a potentially perfect machine." There has been no change in the membership of the Galveston commission since it was organized. The extensive power of the commissioners have enabled them to control all political factions and to completely crush the opposition. The commissioners' faction is in complete control and even goes so far as to dictate nominations for the legislature and the national congress. In Des Moines we find evidences of this machine power in the very first session of the commission. Mr. Hume was appointed chief of police because he had delivered the labor vote to Mr. Mathis. TheDaily News, the only Des Moines paper that supported the plan, was rewarded by having three of its staff appointed to responsible positions. Mr. Lyman was appointed secretary to Commissioner Hammery, Neil Jones secretary to Mayor Mathis. Another man was appointed to an important technical position. A brakeman was appointed street commissioner because he delivered the vote of the Federation of Labor.

These are but a few of the instances where this great centralization of power has shown itself in practice to be a system permitting of unrestricted machine power and political grafting. New Orleans tried the system and abandoned it over 20 years ago because of this very reason. The inhabitants were afraid of this tremendous centralization of power.

The friends of the commission idea claim for it the advantage of centered responsibility; but practice has proved that this form of city government is actually formulated to defeat responsibility. By the construction of this governing body each commissioner is held responsible for his respective department. But regulation for each department is made not by the commission as a whole but by the whole commission. This results in a confusion of powers. Thus in the city of Des Moines, Mr. Hume, the personal enemy of Commissioner Hammery was made chief of police by three other members of the commission for political reasons.

Who is responsible for the mistakes of Mr. Hume? The people say Hammery. But Hammery says: "I had nothing to do with his appointment." It has actually happened time and again at the commission table in Des Moines that regulations for the financial department were made by the police commission, the street commissioner and the commissioner of parks and public buildings; that the police commissioner would have the deciding vote on some important school legislation; or the commissioner of education control the appointment of policemen. This defect has given rise to log-rolling. Bridges have been built as a personal favor to one commissioner whose vote is needed to construct a new schoolhouse. Large paving and building contracts are let simply because the police commissioner wanted to oust some unfaithful political dependent. In this way each commissioner gains great favor with the voters and at the same time can escape personal responsibility for technical mistakes by shouldering the blame onto the whole commission where his identity is lost. This department trading has found its way into the Galveston commission, claimed to have the best commission of any city under this form of government. Here we find that at the same time the prosecutor of the city cases in the police court is allowed the right to collect a fee of $10 for every criminal, drunk, or vagrant convicted, and $5 for every one who pleads guilty; a 50-year franchise is granted to the Galveston Street Railway Co. without a vote of the people, the city not to receive one cent of tax and no compensation.

So, Honorable Judges, we must consider that, while the commission form may be a temporary success in a few small cities, its permanent success there is in grave doubt. Under these conditions we do not ask that it be abolished, but that under no circumstances its application be made general in this country where other forms of city government are in practice more successful and in theory more correct.

REBUTTAL

Mr. Earl Stewart opened for the Negative:

The gentlemen contend that the work of the city is almost wholly of a business nature. Honorable Judges, if the city does not have important legislative duties, what do we mean by local self-government? The courts have held again and again that the work of the city is primarily governmental. Says Judge Dillon: "The city is essentially public and political in character." Not a business corporation in this country could place vast sums of money in the hands of four of five men without the safeguard of some supervising body. Yet New York City has an annual expenditure of $150,000,000, equaled by the aggregate of seven other American cities of 400,000 population; more than that of nations; three times that of the Argentine Republic; four times that of Sweden and Norway combined. Honorable Judges, the American people are too business-like ever to place the entire raising, appropriating, and extending of such vast sums of money, or the half, or the quarter, or the tenth of such, in the hands of five men without the adequate check and safeguard of some supervising and reviewing body, call it congress, legislature, or council.The gentlemen condemn divisions of powers because the city's functions are of such a mixed nature and no strict line of separation can be drawn. Granted. We have emphasized repeatedly that we are not standing for division of powers; we are standing for separately constituted bodies, which shall co-operate. We are defending no system of disconnected committees which the gentlemen have spent a whole speech in attacking, and we have shown, furthermore, that the evils are only augmented by going to the other extreme and completely confusing the functions in one small body. The gentlemen see no difference between principles of government and the form or mechanism which embodies, adequately or inadequately, those principles. They forget that the National Municipal League debated for three years over detail of form, never once disagreeing as to the essential principle of distinct bodies for legislation and administration. They forget that the model charter, which is efficient because it has a proper co-ordination of departments, is based upon the same principle of separately constituted bodies as the old board system with its disconnected departments and complicated machinery. Because the machinery has been inadequate, owing to causes which the gentlemen have ignored, they would abolish the working principle which is proved correct in every instance of successful city organization, wherever found.Just a word on this over-worked argument of centering responsibility. Accountability means that a man charged with the performance of a task shall be held undividedly responsible for it. Now the commissioners collectively legislate. They can not do this without constantly and seriously intruding upon the work of the several departments. The moment this is done, responsibility is diffused. The Hume incident, mentioned by my colleague, is abundant illustration of the way responsibility is fixed under a commission form. Says Professor F.I. Herriot, head of the department of political science in Drake University and statistician of the Iowa board of control: "A commission form cuts at the very roots of official accountability and responsibility and, strange enough, it is because its friends believe that it enhances fixing of responsibility that they propose it." This from a scholar who has watched the plan in operation. A commission form does not fix responsibility, but even granting for the sake of argument that it does, are we to sacrifice representative government for the sake of fixing responsibility? If so, then why not make it still more definite and establish one-man power? Honorable Judges, we have shown that responsibility is more effectively centered by establishing uniform accounting and publicity.The affirmative contend that the commissioners will furnish superior legislation. Now we do not say that knowledge of administration is of no benefit in legislation. But the necessary information can be secured without confusing the functions in a small executive cabinet. In Europe it is done by making the cabinet responsible to the council. In the United States, for example, Baltimore, it is done by having the cabinet meet and co-operate with the council. Nothing can be done by withholding the information, and as a matter of fact, the city secures all the benefit of the technical training of its administrators without the disadvantage of confusion of functions.

The gentlemen condemn divisions of powers because the city's functions are of such a mixed nature and no strict line of separation can be drawn. Granted. We have emphasized repeatedly that we are not standing for division of powers; we are standing for separately constituted bodies, which shall co-operate. We are defending no system of disconnected committees which the gentlemen have spent a whole speech in attacking, and we have shown, furthermore, that the evils are only augmented by going to the other extreme and completely confusing the functions in one small body. The gentlemen see no difference between principles of government and the form or mechanism which embodies, adequately or inadequately, those principles. They forget that the National Municipal League debated for three years over detail of form, never once disagreeing as to the essential principle of distinct bodies for legislation and administration. They forget that the model charter, which is efficient because it has a proper co-ordination of departments, is based upon the same principle of separately constituted bodies as the old board system with its disconnected departments and complicated machinery. Because the machinery has been inadequate, owing to causes which the gentlemen have ignored, they would abolish the working principle which is proved correct in every instance of successful city organization, wherever found.

Just a word on this over-worked argument of centering responsibility. Accountability means that a man charged with the performance of a task shall be held undividedly responsible for it. Now the commissioners collectively legislate. They can not do this without constantly and seriously intruding upon the work of the several departments. The moment this is done, responsibility is diffused. The Hume incident, mentioned by my colleague, is abundant illustration of the way responsibility is fixed under a commission form. Says Professor F.I. Herriot, head of the department of political science in Drake University and statistician of the Iowa board of control: "A commission form cuts at the very roots of official accountability and responsibility and, strange enough, it is because its friends believe that it enhances fixing of responsibility that they propose it." This from a scholar who has watched the plan in operation. A commission form does not fix responsibility, but even granting for the sake of argument that it does, are we to sacrifice representative government for the sake of fixing responsibility? If so, then why not make it still more definite and establish one-man power? Honorable Judges, we have shown that responsibility is more effectively centered by establishing uniform accounting and publicity.

The affirmative contend that the commissioners will furnish superior legislation. Now we do not say that knowledge of administration is of no benefit in legislation. But the necessary information can be secured without confusing the functions in a small executive cabinet. In Europe it is done by making the cabinet responsible to the council. In the United States, for example, Baltimore, it is done by having the cabinet meet and co-operate with the council. Nothing can be done by withholding the information, and as a matter of fact, the city secures all the benefit of the technical training of its administrators without the disadvantage of confusion of functions.

Mr. Clarence Coulter opened for the Affirmative:

It has been argued by the Negative that the success of the commission form of government is based upon the assumption of electing good men to office, and as an illustration, that the Des Moines commissioners are inefficient members of the old city hall gang. As it happens, however, one of the commissioners is a man with a national reputation as a municipal expert, a man whose honesty and integrity have never once been questioned. The commissioner of public safety has been trained for his position by long experience in municipal affairs and is a college graduate. Admitting, however, for the sake of argument, that the gentleman's contention is true; yet the unquestioned success of the Des Moines government proves the wisdom of the commission plan, for it so centralizes individual responsibility as to require honest and efficient performance of duty on the part of each commissioner.Now as to securing good men. In the first place, the negative did not, and cannot, cite a single city in which the commission plan has failed to secure good men. Better men are elected under the commission plan, for the number of elective offices is greatly decreased, while the responsibility and honor of the position is relatively increased. Moreover, the government is put on a business basis and the commissioners are given steady employment at a good salary. They have an opportunity to make a genuine record for themselves, as well as to serve the best interests of the city. On the other hand, the fact that responsibility is definitely centered on each commissioner will, in itself, prevent men of no ability or grafting politicians from seeking office. Political parties no longer have any opportunity of putting men of little ability into office, but instead, competent men with a genuine interest in the city affairs and with no party affiliations whatever, so far as municipal affairs are concerned, will be attracted to the position of commissioner.The opposition go further and charge that, even though efficient men may be elected to office, the commission plan makes impossible the fixing of responsibility. They failed, however, to point out a single instance in commission-governed cities to prove their point and made no attempt to show how responsibility could be better fixed under the present system. As a matter of fact, Honorable Judges, the fixing of individual responsibility, under the present system, is utterly impossible, as we have already shown, while it is the strongest virtue of the commission plan. In matters of pure administration it is absolutely impossible for the commissioner to escape individual responsibility, for he has full charge of the administration of his own department. In matters of legislation, where the majority vote of the commission may determine a policy affecting a certain commissioner, responsibility is not lost but is fixed upon those few who voted for such policy.It has been contended that the commission form of government is unpopular and that this plan has been rejected in both Sioux City and Davenport. That these cities rejected it is true. But why? Sioux City turned it down because the constitutionality of the plan had not, at that time, been determined. Davenport refused to accept it because the grafting politicians and the political ring so dominated the city's politics that they were able to defeat the new plan and retain the old, which was best suited to the furtherance of their own ends.The gentlemen of the opposition have argued that the present inefficiency of city government is due to the interference of the state legislatures and contend that the ultimate solution of the difficulty lies in greater municipal home rule. They are correct, Honorable Judges! The state legislature has interfered. But why? Simply because the city council has proved itself inefficient. New York City's council was in full possession of its powers when the state legislature began to interfere. Legislation by somebody was necessary. The council failed, and now the negative say, give back to the city its powers and let the council try again.According to the gentlemen themselves, the end to be achieved is less interference of state legislatures and more home rule. It is obvious, however, that this can be accomplished only when the city itself can put forth a capable and efficient legislative body. Honorable Judges, in our second speech we proved to you, that the commission provides a small but efficient legislative body, far superior to that of an isolated council. If you want municipal home rule, establish a form of government which makes it possible.

Now as to securing good men. In the first place, the negative did not, and cannot, cite a single city in which the commission plan has failed to secure good men. Better men are elected under the commission plan, for the number of elective offices is greatly decreased, while the responsibility and honor of the position is relatively increased. Moreover, the government is put on a business basis and the commissioners are given steady employment at a good salary. They have an opportunity to make a genuine record for themselves, as well as to serve the best interests of the city. On the other hand, the fact that responsibility is definitely centered on each commissioner will, in itself, prevent men of no ability or grafting politicians from seeking office. Political parties no longer have any opportunity of putting men of little ability into office, but instead, competent men with a genuine interest in the city affairs and with no party affiliations whatever, so far as municipal affairs are concerned, will be attracted to the position of commissioner.

The opposition go further and charge that, even though efficient men may be elected to office, the commission plan makes impossible the fixing of responsibility. They failed, however, to point out a single instance in commission-governed cities to prove their point and made no attempt to show how responsibility could be better fixed under the present system. As a matter of fact, Honorable Judges, the fixing of individual responsibility, under the present system, is utterly impossible, as we have already shown, while it is the strongest virtue of the commission plan. In matters of pure administration it is absolutely impossible for the commissioner to escape individual responsibility, for he has full charge of the administration of his own department. In matters of legislation, where the majority vote of the commission may determine a policy affecting a certain commissioner, responsibility is not lost but is fixed upon those few who voted for such policy.

It has been contended that the commission form of government is unpopular and that this plan has been rejected in both Sioux City and Davenport. That these cities rejected it is true. But why? Sioux City turned it down because the constitutionality of the plan had not, at that time, been determined. Davenport refused to accept it because the grafting politicians and the political ring so dominated the city's politics that they were able to defeat the new plan and retain the old, which was best suited to the furtherance of their own ends.

The gentlemen of the opposition have argued that the present inefficiency of city government is due to the interference of the state legislatures and contend that the ultimate solution of the difficulty lies in greater municipal home rule. They are correct, Honorable Judges! The state legislature has interfered. But why? Simply because the city council has proved itself inefficient. New York City's council was in full possession of its powers when the state legislature began to interfere. Legislation by somebody was necessary. The council failed, and now the negative say, give back to the city its powers and let the council try again.

According to the gentlemen themselves, the end to be achieved is less interference of state legislatures and more home rule. It is obvious, however, that this can be accomplished only when the city itself can put forth a capable and efficient legislative body. Honorable Judges, in our second speech we proved to you, that the commission provides a small but efficient legislative body, far superior to that of an isolated council. If you want municipal home rule, establish a form of government which makes it possible.

Mr. Charles Briggs replied for the Negative:

My colleague has proved that whatever the form of government, there must be a body capable of wise legislation, in fact, that there must be a body that is primarily legislative in character no matter what its connection or relation with the other departments of government. That a small commission, burdened with administrative and judicial functions, is not a proper legislative body is at once apparent. My colleague has demonstrated that this confusion of powers must result in inefficiency. But further than this, it is our contention that a body such as is the commission, without respect to the confusion of powers, without regard to the administrative duties weighing upon it, that this commission, of itself, is not suited to legislation.There is no more reason for placing the legislation of the city of Chicago in the hands of five men than that the state legislature of Minnesota should be reduced to five members. It is true that, in many respects, the legislation of a city differs from that of a state, but it is, nevertheless, legislation, and in the larger cities particularly it is necessary that there be a representative legislative body. Five men no more constitute a proper legislative body for 800,000 or a million people of a city than for that many people outside the city. It is contrary to the fundamental conception of a legislative body that it be composed of a few. In no country of free institutions is a legislative body so constituted. My colleague has proved, and it cannot be successfully controverted, that in the city, as well as in the state, there is a large field for legislation. Why, then, should there not be a legislative body to perform the work of legislation? Why place the work in the hands of a body that is primarily administrative in character?This objection alone must forever prevent the larger cities of the United States from adopting the commission plan. Or, if adopted, it must, for this reason alone, prove itself a failure.

There is no more reason for placing the legislation of the city of Chicago in the hands of five men than that the state legislature of Minnesota should be reduced to five members. It is true that, in many respects, the legislation of a city differs from that of a state, but it is, nevertheless, legislation, and in the larger cities particularly it is necessary that there be a representative legislative body. Five men no more constitute a proper legislative body for 800,000 or a million people of a city than for that many people outside the city. It is contrary to the fundamental conception of a legislative body that it be composed of a few. In no country of free institutions is a legislative body so constituted. My colleague has proved, and it cannot be successfully controverted, that in the city, as well as in the state, there is a large field for legislation. Why, then, should there not be a legislative body to perform the work of legislation? Why place the work in the hands of a body that is primarily administrative in character?

This objection alone must forever prevent the larger cities of the United States from adopting the commission plan. Or, if adopted, it must, for this reason alone, prove itself a failure.

Mr. Robbins replied for the Affirmative:

The Negative argue that the mechanisms of government in Boston may differ from those of San Francisco. This is not a discussion of the mechanisms of government. It involves deep and fundamental principles relative to a given form of city organization. The gentlemen have not, nor cannot, cite one iota of evidence that the underlying principles of organization in the governments of Boston and San Francisco should be different. The allusion to changing mechanisms is no excuse for their failure to set in operation a definite and positive form of organization. Yet the gentlemen have ingeniously endeavored to evade this duty. Why have they done so? Because every system of municipal organization based upon the separation of powers—for which the gentlemen are contending—has proved an admitted failure.Do not the citizens of Brooklyn and San Francisco, as the citizens of every American city, like to drink pure water? Don't they desire good transportation facilities, and aren't they glad when they have clean streets and honest administration? Why, then, don't the gentlemen come forward, as the Affirmative has done, with a specific form of organization which provides for the successful administration of the underlying features of city government? Instead, the gentlemen seem to delight in wandering across the seas, telling what might happen if we would be indulgent enough to pattern our form of organization after that of France, Germany, or Bohemia. Yet they glibly refuse to consider that the city problem of this country is distinctly American and is due to conditions peculiar to America.As a matter of fact, the gentlemen have held before us the salient features of a half dozen opposing forms of organization, none of which have succeeded individually, and the combined features of which can make nothing more than a conglomeration of theories and dogmas. Yes, the gentlemen have been painfully careful not to put their scheme into practical operation.They talk blandly of more home rule, when it is evident that such a matter is actually beside the question at issue. In the same way they speak at length of the cabinet system of England, forgetting that the form the Affirmative is advocating involves the underlying features of the cabinet system altered to meet conditions peculiar to America. The commission form, Honorable Judges, is an evolution of the cabinet form.Likewise they have talked much of the need for a separate reviewing body, citing the insurance scandals of New York state legislature to prove their contention. Why don't they give instances where a municipal reviewing body has checked fraud? The reason is obvious. As Henry Baldwin writes, "Never has there been an instance in American municipal history where the council has stood out against the corruption of the administrative department." Rather these so-called "reviewing bodies" are hand in hand with graft. Look at the shameful conditions of the "reviewing bodies" of Philadelphia, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh, with their hands in the city treasury up to their elbows, and we realize something of the absurdity of the argument for a separate reviewing body to preserve efficiency and honesty in the city government. The people should be the reviewing body of their government. Its organization should be so simple, yet so complete, that every citizen from the educated theorist to the humblest day laborer, can review its facts with ease and understanding. This is the kind of government the commission form supplies. Why don't the gentlemen come forward with an organization equally as simple and complete?Then the gentlemen go on to tell how they will compel the administrative officials to confer with their isolated "reviewing body," and thus secure a proper co-ordination that has failed for a century. Automatic mechanism in government can never take the place of simplicity and responsibility. Such schemes are futile. The men who can make mechanisms can break them. What we must have is a government that compels efficiency and honesty, not one which attempts to produce such results through theoretical contrivances.Finally, the gentlemen claim that the commission form has failed in New Orleans and Sacramento. Will the gentlemen give their authority for the statement that these cities had a commission government? Every authority upon the subject which the affirmative has found points to the conclusion, that the form of government employed by these cities was not a commission form.

Do not the citizens of Brooklyn and San Francisco, as the citizens of every American city, like to drink pure water? Don't they desire good transportation facilities, and aren't they glad when they have clean streets and honest administration? Why, then, don't the gentlemen come forward, as the Affirmative has done, with a specific form of organization which provides for the successful administration of the underlying features of city government? Instead, the gentlemen seem to delight in wandering across the seas, telling what might happen if we would be indulgent enough to pattern our form of organization after that of France, Germany, or Bohemia. Yet they glibly refuse to consider that the city problem of this country is distinctly American and is due to conditions peculiar to America.

As a matter of fact, the gentlemen have held before us the salient features of a half dozen opposing forms of organization, none of which have succeeded individually, and the combined features of which can make nothing more than a conglomeration of theories and dogmas. Yes, the gentlemen have been painfully careful not to put their scheme into practical operation.

They talk blandly of more home rule, when it is evident that such a matter is actually beside the question at issue. In the same way they speak at length of the cabinet system of England, forgetting that the form the Affirmative is advocating involves the underlying features of the cabinet system altered to meet conditions peculiar to America. The commission form, Honorable Judges, is an evolution of the cabinet form.

Likewise they have talked much of the need for a separate reviewing body, citing the insurance scandals of New York state legislature to prove their contention. Why don't they give instances where a municipal reviewing body has checked fraud? The reason is obvious. As Henry Baldwin writes, "Never has there been an instance in American municipal history where the council has stood out against the corruption of the administrative department." Rather these so-called "reviewing bodies" are hand in hand with graft. Look at the shameful conditions of the "reviewing bodies" of Philadelphia, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh, with their hands in the city treasury up to their elbows, and we realize something of the absurdity of the argument for a separate reviewing body to preserve efficiency and honesty in the city government. The people should be the reviewing body of their government. Its organization should be so simple, yet so complete, that every citizen from the educated theorist to the humblest day laborer, can review its facts with ease and understanding. This is the kind of government the commission form supplies. Why don't the gentlemen come forward with an organization equally as simple and complete?

Then the gentlemen go on to tell how they will compel the administrative officials to confer with their isolated "reviewing body," and thus secure a proper co-ordination that has failed for a century. Automatic mechanism in government can never take the place of simplicity and responsibility. Such schemes are futile. The men who can make mechanisms can break them. What we must have is a government that compels efficiency and honesty, not one which attempts to produce such results through theoretical contrivances.

Finally, the gentlemen claim that the commission form has failed in New Orleans and Sacramento. Will the gentlemen give their authority for the statement that these cities had a commission government? Every authority upon the subject which the affirmative has found points to the conclusion, that the form of government employed by these cities was not a commission form.

Mr. Starzinger closed for the Negative and said:

The Affirmative have mentioned our authority. What we have said in regard to Sacramento, Cal., is based upon excerpts from an article by the Hon. Clinton White, published in the Cedar RapidsEvening Times. Most of our facts concerning the southern cities which adopted the new plan are taken from the reports of the Des Moines investigation committee, headed by the Hon. W.N. Jordan. We would be glad to submit these pamphlets to the gentlemen for examination. The mere fact that Des Moines adopted the commission form does not disprove the integrity of the authorities.It is claimed that our stand is indefinite. True, we have not offered a panacea for all municipal ills. But we have advocated numerous reforms and have pointed out countless instances of municipal success under various forms, yet all based upon the same fundamental principle, that there be separately constituted departments of government. One of the fatal objections to the gentlemen's proposition is that they are attempting to blanket the whole country with one arbitrary form, regardless of differing conditions. They have completely ignored our cases of successful city government. We demand that they explain them.The gentlemen have said that state interference has been precipitated by the decay of the city council. Yet they advocate its complete destruction. Nothing could be more incorrect than to say that special legislation was brought on as a result of an inherent weakness in council government. Under the early council system, there was practically no state interference. About the middle of the last century, the board system was introduced and the councils were shorn of their dignity and much of their legislative power. Right there state dominion in local affairs began. These are the unbiased facts as given by Professor Goodnow in his book on city government.In conclusion, Honorable Judges, the solution of the American city problem will be best promoted by a program of reform which strikes at the real causes of the evils, instead of the universal overturning of all traditions and theories of government in the hope of finding a short-cut road to municipal success. Give the city a proper sphere of local autonomy. Co-ordinate the departments of government, so as to establish responsibility and secure harmonious action. Simplify present city organization without destroying the two branches of government. Introduce new and improving methods, such as non-partisan primaries, civil service, uniform municipal accounting, and publicity of proceedings. Remedy bad social and economic conditions. Arouse civic interest. Do this, and there is no necessity for such a radical and revolutionary change as the universal adoption of a commission form.The new plan means, not alone a change in the form of government, but a positive overturning of the working principle of successful city organization the world over. Its experience has been in the small towns for a short time, under unusual conditions, amid aroused public sentiment. Even here it has shown fatal weaknesses which the gentlemen have not satisfactorily explained. It was abandoned by the only large city that ever tried it; and cast aside as an abject failure by Sacramento, Cal., after fifteen years of operation. In the face of these facts, the gentlemen would have all American cities turn to this form as the final goal of municipal success; a form which attempts to revive the old board system of selecting administrative heads by popular vote; which, in addition, centers the whole government of a city in a small executive cabinet, without review or oversight; a form which, in the words of Professor Fairlie, of the University of Michigan, "is in direct opposition to the advancing idea of municipal home rule."

It is claimed that our stand is indefinite. True, we have not offered a panacea for all municipal ills. But we have advocated numerous reforms and have pointed out countless instances of municipal success under various forms, yet all based upon the same fundamental principle, that there be separately constituted departments of government. One of the fatal objections to the gentlemen's proposition is that they are attempting to blanket the whole country with one arbitrary form, regardless of differing conditions. They have completely ignored our cases of successful city government. We demand that they explain them.

The gentlemen have said that state interference has been precipitated by the decay of the city council. Yet they advocate its complete destruction. Nothing could be more incorrect than to say that special legislation was brought on as a result of an inherent weakness in council government. Under the early council system, there was practically no state interference. About the middle of the last century, the board system was introduced and the councils were shorn of their dignity and much of their legislative power. Right there state dominion in local affairs began. These are the unbiased facts as given by Professor Goodnow in his book on city government.

In conclusion, Honorable Judges, the solution of the American city problem will be best promoted by a program of reform which strikes at the real causes of the evils, instead of the universal overturning of all traditions and theories of government in the hope of finding a short-cut road to municipal success. Give the city a proper sphere of local autonomy. Co-ordinate the departments of government, so as to establish responsibility and secure harmonious action. Simplify present city organization without destroying the two branches of government. Introduce new and improving methods, such as non-partisan primaries, civil service, uniform municipal accounting, and publicity of proceedings. Remedy bad social and economic conditions. Arouse civic interest. Do this, and there is no necessity for such a radical and revolutionary change as the universal adoption of a commission form.

The new plan means, not alone a change in the form of government, but a positive overturning of the working principle of successful city organization the world over. Its experience has been in the small towns for a short time, under unusual conditions, amid aroused public sentiment. Even here it has shown fatal weaknesses which the gentlemen have not satisfactorily explained. It was abandoned by the only large city that ever tried it; and cast aside as an abject failure by Sacramento, Cal., after fifteen years of operation. In the face of these facts, the gentlemen would have all American cities turn to this form as the final goal of municipal success; a form which attempts to revive the old board system of selecting administrative heads by popular vote; which, in addition, centers the whole government of a city in a small executive cabinet, without review or oversight; a form which, in the words of Professor Fairlie, of the University of Michigan, "is in direct opposition to the advancing idea of municipal home rule."

Mr. Luxford closed the debate for the Affirmative, and said:

The case for the Negative is now closed. It has been indefinite from start to finish. They acknowledge the success of the commission form but refuse to accept it as the proper form toward which American cities should work. They have none to offer except a form which is completely unknown in American cities and successful alone in Europe under totally dissimilar conditions. We have shown that every vital move for city improvement today is toward a commission form, both in practice and theory. The gentlemen have sought to overthrow the argument for the commission form, and yet suggest no possible American substitute.But the position is not only indefinite, but it is inconsistent. At one time they say, "the commission form is working well in small cities." In another they declare that the commission form ignores the only principles which are at the basis of successful city government the world over. Putting these statements together we must conclude that the gentlemen who made the second statement failed to hear the gentlemen who made the first. If they grant that the commission form is successful anywhere in the world how can it be that it is ignoring the only principles of successful city government the world over?But we would not be unjust to the gentlemen. They are not perhaps altogether indefinite. They would keep the old mayor and council plan but would have non-partisan primaries, uniform municipal accounting, and publicity of proceedings. Non-partisan primaries and publicity of proceedings they have stolen bodily from the commission. We are grateful to the gentlemen for this hearty indorsement of the material features of the commission form. As to uniform municipal accounting, while it is just as possible under the commission as under any other form of city government, its advocacy by the gentlemen is inconsistent with their insistent demand for municipal home rule. Who but the state can supervise a uniform accounting of all cities? And the gentlemen have deplored state interference.Not only that, but the commission plan provides the necessary responsibility whereby the citizens may know and participate in the city government. In the first place the publication of monthly itemized statements of all the proceedings is required. Every ordinance appropriating money or ordering any street improvements, or sewer, or the making of any contract shall remain on file for public inspection at least one week before final passage. Franchises are granted not by any legislative body but by direct vote of the people. Similarly the citizens retain the right to reject any ordinance passed, or to require the passage of any needed ordinance. And finally, the citizens by direct vote may remove any commissioner at any time.Thus we see that the commissioners know both the legislative and administrative side of the city's work, and the responsibility of doing both is fixed upon them.Lastly, Honorable Judges, the Affirmative rest their cases upon these fundamental arguments: that the whole tendency in American city government is toward centralization of power in one body; where this concentration has been partial, city government has failed. This failure is due largely to the fact that, while power has centered, responsibility has been diffused. This unfortunate condition has been obviated by the adoption of the commission form which is found to be a success because it awakens civic interest, secures competent officials, and provides in the best possible manner for the legislative and administrative work of the city, centering power and responsibility in one small body of men.

But the position is not only indefinite, but it is inconsistent. At one time they say, "the commission form is working well in small cities." In another they declare that the commission form ignores the only principles which are at the basis of successful city government the world over. Putting these statements together we must conclude that the gentlemen who made the second statement failed to hear the gentlemen who made the first. If they grant that the commission form is successful anywhere in the world how can it be that it is ignoring the only principles of successful city government the world over?

But we would not be unjust to the gentlemen. They are not perhaps altogether indefinite. They would keep the old mayor and council plan but would have non-partisan primaries, uniform municipal accounting, and publicity of proceedings. Non-partisan primaries and publicity of proceedings they have stolen bodily from the commission. We are grateful to the gentlemen for this hearty indorsement of the material features of the commission form. As to uniform municipal accounting, while it is just as possible under the commission as under any other form of city government, its advocacy by the gentlemen is inconsistent with their insistent demand for municipal home rule. Who but the state can supervise a uniform accounting of all cities? And the gentlemen have deplored state interference.

Not only that, but the commission plan provides the necessary responsibility whereby the citizens may know and participate in the city government. In the first place the publication of monthly itemized statements of all the proceedings is required. Every ordinance appropriating money or ordering any street improvements, or sewer, or the making of any contract shall remain on file for public inspection at least one week before final passage. Franchises are granted not by any legislative body but by direct vote of the people. Similarly the citizens retain the right to reject any ordinance passed, or to require the passage of any needed ordinance. And finally, the citizens by direct vote may remove any commissioner at any time.

Thus we see that the commissioners know both the legislative and administrative side of the city's work, and the responsibility of doing both is fixed upon them.

Lastly, Honorable Judges, the Affirmative rest their cases upon these fundamental arguments: that the whole tendency in American city government is toward centralization of power in one body; where this concentration has been partial, city government has failed. This failure is due largely to the fact that, while power has centered, responsibility has been diffused. This unfortunate condition has been obviated by the adoption of the commission form which is found to be a success because it awakens civic interest, secures competent officials, and provides in the best possible manner for the legislative and administrative work of the city, centering power and responsibility in one small body of men.

(The House having under consideration the bill [S. 7031] to codify, revise, and amend the laws relating to the judiciary.—From theCongressional Record, March 3, 1911.)

Mr. Speaker: In the ten years of my membership in this House I have seldom taken advantage of the latitude afforded by general debate to discuss any question not immediately before the House. But there is a question now before the country, particularly before the people of the state I have the honor to represent in part upon this floor, upon which I entertain very positive convictions, and which, I believe, is a proper subject for discussion at this time and in this place. That question, bluntly stated, is this: Is representative government a failure? We are being asked now to answer that question in the affirmative. A new school of statesmen has arisen, wiser than Washington and Hamilton and Franklin and Madison, wiser than Webster and Clay and Calhoun and Benton, wiser than Lincoln and Sumner and Stevens and Chase, wiser than Garfield and Elaine and McKinley and Taft, knowing more in their day than all the people have learned in all the days of the years since the Republic was founded.

And they tell us that representative government is a failure. They do not put this declaration into so many words—part of them because they do not know enough about the science of government to understand that the doctrines they advocate are revolutionary, and the rest of them because they lack the courage to openly declare that it is their intention to change our form of government, to subvert the system upon which our institutions are founded. But that is in effect what they propose to do.

Every school boy knows that in a pure democracy the people themselves perform directly all the functions of government, enacting laws without the intervention of a legislature, and trying causes that arise under those laws without the intervention of judge or jury; while in a republic, on the other hand, the people govern themselves, not by each citizen exercising directly all the functions of government, but by delegating that power to certain ones among them whom they choose to represent them in the legislatures, in the courts of justice, and in the various executive offices.

It follows, therefore, that to substitute the methods of a democracy for the methods of a republic touching any one of the three branches of government is to that extent to declare that representative government is a failure, is to that extent subversive and revolutionary.

Now, it does not follow by any means that because a proposed change is revolutionary it is therefore unwise. Taking it by and large, wherever the word "revolution" has come into human history it has been only another word for progress. Because a nation has pursued certain methods for a long time it does not at all follow that those methods are the best, although when a nation like the United States, so bold and alert, so little hampered by tradition, so ready to try experiments, has clung to the same methods of government for 130 years, a strong presumption has certainly been established that these methods are the best, at least for that particular nation.

But is the new system wiser than the old—in the matter of making laws, for example? The old system vests the law-making power in a legislative body composed of men elected by the people and supposed to be peculiarly fitted by reason of character, education, and training for the performance of that duty. These men come together and give their entire time through a period of some weeks or months to the consideration of proposed legislation, and the laws they enact go into immediate effect, and remain in force until set aside by the courts as unconstitutional or until repealed by the same authority that enacted them.

The new system—taking the Oregon law, for example, and it is commonly cited as a model—provides that 8 per cent of the voters of a state may submit a measure directly to the people, and if a majority of those voting upon it give it their support it shall become a law without reference to the legislature or to the governor. That is the initiative. And it provides that if 5 per cent of the voters are opposed to a law which the legislature has passed, upon signing the proper petition the law shall be suspended until the next general election, when the people shall be given an opportunity to pass upon it. That is the referendum.

Now, there are several things about this plan which I believe the people of this country, when they come really to consider it, will scrutinize with a good deal of care and possibly with some suspicion.

It is to be noted, in the first place, that a very few of the people can put all the people to the trouble and expense of a vote upon any measure, and the inquiry may well arise whether the cause of settled and orderly government will be promoted by vesting power in the minority thus to harass and annoy the majority. In my own state, for example, who can doubt that the prohibitory amendment, or some one of the statutes enacted for its enforcement, would have been resubmitted again and again if the initiative had been in force there these past twenty-five years.

Again, it will be observed that still fewer of the people have it in their power to suspend a law which a legislature may have passed in plain obedience to the mandate of a majority of the people, or which may be essential to the prompt and orderly conduct of public affairs, and when they come to think about it the people may wonder if the referendum might not make it possible for a small, malevolent, and mischievous minority to obstruct the machinery of government and for a time at least to nullify the will of the majority.

In the third place, it is to be remarked that a measure submitted either by the initiative or the referendum cannot be amended, but must be accepted or rejected as a whole, and we may well inquire whether this might not afford "the interests" quite as good an opportunity as they would have in a legislature to "initiate" some measure which on its face was wholesome and beneficent but within which was concealed some little "joker" that would either nullify the good features of the law or make it actively vicious, and which, through lack of discussion, would not be discovered. Every day we have new and incontestable proof that "in the multitude of counselors there is wisdom." But that wisdom can never be had under a system of legislation which lays before the people the work of one man's mind to be accepted in whole or rejected altogether.

Once more let us observe that under this system, no matter how few votes are cast upon a given measure, if there are more for it than against it, it becomes a law, so that the possibility is always present that laws may be enacted which represent the judgment or the interest of the minority rather than the majority of the people. Indeed, experience would seem to show that this is a probability rather than a possibility, for in the last Oregon election not one of the nine propositions enacted into law received as much as 50 per cent of the total vote cast, while some of them received but little more than 30 per cent of the total vote.

And finally and chiefly, without in the the least impeaching the intelligence of the people, remembering the slight and casual attention the average citizen gives to the details of public questions, we may well inquire whether the average vote cast upon these proposed measures of legislation will really represent an informed and well-considered judgment. In his thoughtful work on democracy, discussing this very question, Dr. Hyslop, of Columbia University, says:

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