Another confusion of ideas which should be equally avoided, and which is very common among men, is that which consists in taking the reward itself for a good, and the punishment for an evil.
It is thus that men are often more proud of the titles andhonors they have obtained, than of the real merit through which they have won them. It is thus also that they fear the prison more than the crime, and shame more than vice.
It is for this reason that the greatest courage is needed to bear undeserved punishment.
We distinguish generallyfour speciesof sanction:
1.Naturalsanction; 2,legalsanction; 3, the sanction ofpublic opinion; 4,inwardsanction.
1. Natural sanction is that which rests on the natural consequences of our actions. It is natural for sobriety to keep up and establish health, for intemperance to be a cause of disease. It is natural for work to bring with it ease of circumstances, for idleness to be a source of misery and poverty. It is natural that probity should insure security, confidence, and credit; that courage should put off the chances of death; that patience should render life more bearable; that good-will should call forth good-will; that wickedness should drive men from us; that perjury should cause them to distrust us, etc. These facts have ever been verified by experience. The honest is not always the useful; but it is often what is most useful.
2.Legalsanction is above all apenalsanction. It is composed of the chastisements which the law has established for the guilty. There are, in general, few rewards established by the law, and they may be classed among what is called the esteem of men.
3. Another kind of sanction consists in theopinionother men entertain in regard to our actions and character. We have seen that it is in the nature of good actions to inspire esteem, in the nature of the bad to inspire blame and contempt. The honest man generally enjoys public honor and consideration. The dishonest man, even though the law does not reach him, is branded with discredit, aversion, contempt, etc.
4. Finally, a more exact and certain sanction is that which results from the very conscience and moral sentiment mentioned above.
16. The superior sanction: the future life.—These various sanctions being insufficient to satisfy our want of justice, there is required still another, namely, thesuperior religioussanction.
It is a well-known fact that virtue is not a sufficient shield to protect us against the blows of adversity, and that immorality does not necessarily condemn one to misery and grief. It is evident that a man corrupt and wicked may be born with all the advantages of genius, fortune, health; and that an honest man may have inherited none of these.
There is in this neither injustice nor blind chance; but it proves that the harmony between moral good and happiness is not of this world.
In regard to the pleasures and pains of conscience, it is also evident that they are not sufficient. In fact, the pleasures of the senses may divert and deaden the pangs of remorse; and it must also be said, though it be still more sad, that it sometimes happens that a merciless continuance of misfortune deadens in an honest soul the delight in virtue; and the painful efforts which virtue costs may finally obliterate in a man, tired of life, the calm and sweet enjoyment which it naturally brings with it.
If such is the disproportion and disagreement between the inner pleasures and pains, and the moral merit of him who experiences them, what shall we say of that wholly outward sanction which consists in the rewards and punishments distributed by the unequal justice of man? I do not speak of legal pains alone; it is well known that they often fall upon the innocent, and are spared to the guilty; that they are almost always disproportioned: the law punishing the crime, without taking note of the exact moral value of the action; but I speak also of the pains and rewards of public opinion, esteem, and contempt. Are these always in an exact proportion to merit?
From all these observations it results that the law of harmony between good and happiness is not of this world; thatthere is always disagreement, or at least disproportion, between moral merit and the pleasures of the senses. Hence the necessity of a superior sanction, the means and time of which are in the hand of God.
“The more I go within myself,” says a philosopher,[5]“the more I consult myself, the more I read these words written in my soul:be just and thou shalt be happy. And yet it is not so, looking at the actual state of things: the wicked prosper, and the just are oppressed. See, also, what indignation arises in us when this expectation is frustrated! The conscience murmurs and rebels against its author; it cries to him, groaning: Thou hast deceived me! I have deceived thee, oh thou rash one? Who has told thee so? Is thy soul annihilated? Hast thou ceased to exist? Oh, Brutus! oh, my son, do not stain thy noble life by putting an end to it; do not leave thy hopes and glory with thy body on the fields of Philippi. Why sayest thou: Virtue is nothing when thou art now about entering into the enjoyment of thine? Thou shalt die, thinkest thou; no, thou shalt live, and it is then I shall keep what I have promised! One would say, hearing the murmurings of impatient mortals, that God owes them a reward before they have shown any merit, and that he is obliged to pay their virtue in advance. Oh! let us first be good; we shall be happy afterwards. Do not let us claim the prize before the victory, nor the salary before the work. ‘It is not in the lists,’ says Plutarch, ‘that the victors in our sacred games are crowned; it is after they have run the course.’”
DIVISION OF DUTIES—GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL MORALITY.
SUMMARY.
Division of duties.—In theory there is but one duty, which is to do right; but this duty is subdivided according to the various relations of man. Hence three classes of duties: duties towards ourselves, towards others, towards God:individual,social,religiousmorality. We will begin with social morality, which requires the most expounding.General principles of social duties:to do good; not to do evil.Different degrees of this double obligation:1, not to return evil for good (ingratitude); 2, not to do evil to those who have not done us any (injustice and cruelty); 3, not to return evil for evil (revenge); 4, to return good for good (gratitude); 5, to do good to those who have not done us any (charity); 6, to return good for evil (clemency,generosity).Distinction between the various kinds of social duties:1, towards thelivesof other men; 2, towards theirproperty; 3, towards theirfamily; 4, towards theirhonor; 5, towards theirliberty.Distinction between the duties of justice and the duties of charity.—Justice is absolute, without restriction, without exception. Charity, although as obligatory as justice, is more independent in its application. It chooses its time and place; its objects and means;its beauty is in its liberty.
Division of duties.—In theory there is but one duty, which is to do right; but this duty is subdivided according to the various relations of man. Hence three classes of duties: duties towards ourselves, towards others, towards God:individual,social,religiousmorality. We will begin with social morality, which requires the most expounding.
General principles of social duties:to do good; not to do evil.
Different degrees of this double obligation:1, not to return evil for good (ingratitude); 2, not to do evil to those who have not done us any (injustice and cruelty); 3, not to return evil for evil (revenge); 4, to return good for good (gratitude); 5, to do good to those who have not done us any (charity); 6, to return good for evil (clemency,generosity).
Distinction between the various kinds of social duties:1, towards thelivesof other men; 2, towards theirproperty; 3, towards theirfamily; 4, towards theirhonor; 5, towards theirliberty.
Distinction between the duties of justice and the duties of charity.—Justice is absolute, without restriction, without exception. Charity, although as obligatory as justice, is more independent in its application. It chooses its time and place; its objects and means;its beauty is in its liberty.
We have seen thatpracticalmorality orprivatemorality has for its object to acquaint us with theapplicationof theoretical morality. It bears not so much ondutyas onduties. The first question, then, that presents itself to us is that of thedivision of duties.
17. Division of duties.—It has been reasonably asserted that there is in reality but one duty, which is to do good under all circumstances, the same as it has also been said that there is but one virtue: wisdom, or obedience to the laws of reason. But as these two general divisions teach us in reality nothing touching our various actions, which are very numerous, it is useful and necessary to classify the principal circumstances in which we have to act, in order to specify in a more particular manner wherein the general principle which commands us to do good may be applied in each case.
Human actions may then be divided, either in regard to the different beings they have for their object, or in regard to the various faculties to which they relate.
The ancients divided morality particularly in reference to the divers humanfaculties, and in private morality they considered above all thevirtues.
The moderns, on the other hand, have divided morality particularly in its relations to the differentobjectsof our actions; and, in private morality, they have considered, above all, theduties.
The ancients reduced all virtues to four principal ones:prudence,temperance,courage, andjustice. This division was transmitted to us, and it is these four virtues which the catechism teaches under the name ofcardinalvirtues.
The moderns reduced duties to three classes: the duties towardsourselves, towardsothers, and towardsGod. Some add a fourth class, namely, duties towardsanimals.
That portion of morality which treats of the duties towards ourselves, is calledindividualmorality; that which treats of the duties towards God, is calledreligious morality; that which treats of the duties towards other men,social morality. As to the duties towards animals, they are of so secondary an order, that it is not worth while to classify them apart; we shall include them in social morality.
Social morality is by far the most extended in precepts and applications, the various relations of men with each otherbeing extremely numerous. It may be subdivided into three parts: 1, general duties ofsociallife, or moralityproperly called social; 2, duties towards the State, orcivilmorality; 3, duties towards the family, ordomesticmorality.
We will begin with the study of social morality, social duties towards men in general, and we will first establish their principles and different varieties.
Let us in a few pages rapidly take a summary review of the general principles ofsocialmorality.
18. General principles of social duties: to do good, not to do evil.—All human actions, in regard to others, may be reduced to these two precepts: 1, to do good to men; 2, not to do them harm. To this all the virtues of social morality may be reduced. But before exhibiting these virtues and vices more in detail, let us explain what is understood by the expressionsto do goodandto do evil.
In the most general and apparent sense to do any one good would seem to beto give him pleasure; to do him harm, would seem to beto give him pain. Yet, is it always doing good to a person to procure him pleasure? and is it always doing him harm, to cause him pain? For example, Kant[6]says, “Shall we allow the idler soft cushions; the drunkard wines in abundance; the rogue an agreeable face and manners, to deceive more easily; the violent man audacity and a good fist?” Would it really be doing good to these men to grant them the object of their desires, what may satisfy their passions? On the other hand, the surgeon who amputates a mortified limb, the dentist who pulls out a bad tooth, the teacher who obliges you to learn, the father who corrects your faults or restrains your passions, do they really do you harm because they give you pain? No, certainly not. There are, then, cases where to do some one good is to cause him pain, and to do him harm is to procure him pleasure.
One may reasonably reduce all principles of social morality to these two maxims of the gospel: “Do not do to others whatyou do not wish them do to you;”—“Do to others as you wish to be done by.” These two maxims are admirable, certainly; but they must be interpreted rightly. If, for instance, we have done wrong, do we generally wish to be corrected and punished? When we are yielding to a passion, do we wish to be repressed in it, have it repelled? On the contrary, do we not rather wish to be allowed to enjoy it, and have the free range of our vices? Is not this generally what we all wish, when the voice of duty is mute and does not silence our passionate feelings? If this is so, should we wish to do to others as we wish in similar circumstances, namely, in the gratification of passions, to be done by? Should we not rather do to them what we should not like them do to us, that is, punish and correct them? It is evidently not in that sense we are to understand the two evangelical maxims; for they would be then no other than maxims of remissness and improper kindness; whilst they, on the contrary, express most admirably a moral truth; only when they speak of what we wish, they mean atrueandgoodwish, not the desires of passion; the same when we recommend men to do good, we mean real good and not apparent good; as also in recommending to do no harm, we mean real harm, not the illusory harm of the senses, imagination and passions.
Thus, to well understand the duties we have to fulfil towards other men, we must understand the distinction betweentrue goodandfalse good. False good is that which consists exclusively in pleasure, all abstraction being made of usefulness or moral value; as, for example, the pleasures of passions. True good is that which independently of pleasure recommends itself either through usefulness or through moral value; as, for instance, health or education. The real evils, of course, are those which injure either the interests of others or their moral dignity, such as misery or corruption. Apparent evils are those which cause us to suffer but a moment and redeem themselves by subsequent advantages: as, for instance, remedies or chastisements.
When we speak of good in regard to others, we should not fear to understand by that their interest, as well as their moral welfare; for, though we should not make our own interest the aim of our actions, it is not so in our relation with others. The seeking of our own happiness has no moral value; but the seeking of other people’s happiness may have one, provided, we repeat, that we do not deceive ourselves touching the real sense of the wordhappiness, and that we do not understand by it a deceitful and short-lived delight.
“To do to othersas we wishto be done by; not to do to them what we donot wishthey should do us,” should, therefore, be understood in the sense of anenlightenedwill, which wills for itself nothing but what is truly conformable either to a proper interest or to virtue. Thus understood (and it is their true sense[7]), these two maxims comprehend perfectly the whole of social morality.
19. Different degrees of this double obligation.—The sense of these two expressions, to do good and to do harm, being now well-defined, let us examine the various cases which may present themselves, in rising, so to say, from the lowest to the highest round of duty. Let us first suppose a certain good or a certain evil, which will not vary in any of the following cases: this is the scale one may observe starting from the least virtue, to which corresponds evidently the greatest vice (by virtue of the principle set forth above[8]), to rise to the highest virtue, to which the least vice corresponds.
1.Not to return evil for good.—This is, one may say (all things being equal), the feeblest of the virtues, as to return evil for good constitutes the greatest of wrongs. Say, for example, homicide: is it not evident that the murder of a benefactor is the most abominable of all? that to rob a benefactor is the most horrible of robberies? that the slander of a benefactor is the most criminal of slanders? On the otherhand again, not to kill, not to steal, not to slander, not to deceive a benefactor, is the minimum of moral virtue. To abstain from doing harm to him who has done you good, is a wholly negative virtue, which is simply the absence of a crime. We cannot call that gratitude, for gratitude is a positive virtue, not a negative one; it is all in action, and not in omission; but, before being grateful, the first condition at least, is to be not ungrateful. We shall then say that the greatest of crimes isingratitude.It is by reason of this principle that the crimes towards parents are the most odious of all; for we have no greater benefactors than our parents, and without mentioning the crimes nature finds repugnant enough, it is evident that the same kind of harm (wounds, blows, insults, negligence, etc.) will always be more blamable when done to parents than to any other benefactors, and to benefactors in general, than to any other men.
2.Not to do harm to those who have not done us any.—The violation of this maxim is the second degree of crime and of sin, somewhat less serious than the preceding one, but still odious enough that to abstain from it is, in many cases, a rather feeble virtue. Not to kill, not to steal, not to deceive, not to expose one’s self to the punishments of the law, are, indeed, of a very feeble moral value; whilst their contraries constitute the basest and most odious of actions.
The kind of vice which injures others without provocation is what is calledinjustice, and when the pleasure of doing wrong is joined thereto, it is calledcruelty. Cruelty is an injustice which rejoices in the harm done to others; injustice contents itself with taking advantage of it. There is, therefore, a higher degree of evil in cruelty than in injustice pure and simple.
The virtue opposed to injustice isjustice, which has two degrees and two forms: the one negative, which consists simply in abstaining from doinginjury to any one; the second positive, which consists inrendering to each his due. This second form of justice is more difficult than the first, for it isactive. It is more difficult to restore to others what we hold as our own, or to pay one’s debts, than to abstain from stealing; it is more difficult to speak well of one’s rivals, than to abstain from slandering them; it is more difficult to give up one’s position to another who deserves it, than to abstain from taking his; and yet there are cases where justice requires one should act instead of simply abstaining.
3.Not to return evil for good.—Here we rise, in some respect, a degree in the moral scale. The two inferior degrees, namely, ingratitude and cruelty, have always and everywhere been considered as crimes. Nowhere has it ever been considered allowable to do harm to those who have done us good. But in nearly all societies, at a certain degree of civilization, has it been considered allowable, and even praiseworthy, to return evil for evil. “To do good to our friends, and harm to our enemies,” is one of the maxims the poets and sages of Greece oftenest repeat. Among the Indians of America, glory consists in ornamenting one’s dwelling with the greatest possible number of scalps taken from conquered enemies. We know about the Corsicanvendetta. In one word, the passion of revenge (which consists precisely in returning evil for evil) is one of the most natural and the most profound in the human heart, and it demands a very advanced moral education to comprehend that revenge is contrary to the laws of morality. Now, as the beauty of virtue is in proportion to the difficulty of the passions to be overcome, it is evident that the virtues contrary to revenge, namely:gentleness,clemency,pardon of injuries, are amongst the most beautiful and most sublime. Already among the ancients had morality reached this maxim, that one should not do any harm, namely, even to those who had done us some, as may be seen from the dialogue of Plato, entitled theCrito. “Socrates: One should then commit no injustice whatsoever?” “Crito: No, certainly not.” “Socrates: Then should one not be unjust even towards those who are unjust towards us.”
4. Thus far we have only spoken of the virtues whichexpress themselves negatively, and which consist especially in doing no harm. Let us now consider those which express themselves affirmatively, and which consist in doing good. The first degree is to returngood for good: which is gratitude, the contrary of which, as we have seen, is ingratitude; but there are two sorts of ingratitude, as there are two sorts of gratitude. There is a negative ingratitude, as there is a positive ingratitude. The positive ingratitude, which is, as we have seen, the most odious of all crimes, consists in returning evil for good; negative ingratitude consists simply in not returning good for good, namely, in forgetting a kindness. It is not so reprehensible as the former, but it has still a certain character of baseness. Gratitude is also twofold in its degrees and forms: it is negative, inasmuch as it abstains from injuring a benefactor;[9]it is positive, inasmuch as it returns good for good. In one sense, gratitude is a part of justice, for it consists in returning to a benefactor what is due him; but it is also a notable part, and one which deserves being pointed out, for it seems that there is nothing easier than to return good for good; and experience, on the contrary, teaches us that there is nothing more rare. [This is certainly too strongly put.]
5.To do good to those who have done us neither good nor harm.This is what is called charity, which is a degree above the preceding, for in the preceding case we scarcely do more than give back what we have received; in this case we put in something of our own. But to characterize this new degree of virtue, it is necessary to well explain that the question relates to a goodthat is not due. For justice, we have seen, does not always mean to abstain from evil; it even does goodsometimes. To restore a trust to one not expecting it; to do good to him who deserves it; to elect to a position one worthy of it; or, what is still more heroic, to give one’s own position up to him, this evidently is doing good to others, and to those who have not done us any; but these are goodsdue, which already belong in some respects to those upon whom we confer them. It is not so with the goods which charity distributes. The gifts I make to the poor, the consolations I give to the afflicted, the care I bestow upon the sick, all of which take from my time, my interests, and my life which I endanger to save a fellow-being, are also goods which are my own and not his. I do not return to him what he would otherwise legitimately possess, whether he knows it or not. I give him something of my own; it is a puregift. This gift is suggested to me by love, not by justice. The contrary of charity or devotion to others isselfishness.
Finally, there is a last degree above all other preceding degrees, namely,to return good for evil. This kind of virtue, the highest of all, has no particular name in the language. Charity, in fact, consists in doing good generally, and comprises the two degrees: to do good to the unfortunate, and return good for evil. Clemency may consist in simply pardoning; it does not necessarily go so far as to return good for evil.
Corneille might as well have called his tragedy of Cinna, the Clemency of Augustus, even if Augustus had merely pardoned Cinna, and not added: “Let us be friends!” Thus has this great and magnificent virtue no name, and as science is powerless in creating words suitable for every-day language, it must rest satisfied with periphrases. Nevertheless, this sublime virtue finds nowhere a grander expression than in those maxims of the Gospel: “You have been told that it was said: Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thy enemy: But I say to you: Love your enemies; do good to those that hate you, and pray for those that despitefully use you and persecute you.”
20. Different kinds of social duties.—After the preceding division, which answers to the different degrees of obligation which may exist among men, there is another classification which rests on the variousspeciesorkindsof duties which we may have to perform towards our fellow-beings. Let us first briefly state what will be developed at greater length in the following chapters.
1.Duties relating to the life of others.—According to the two maxims cited above, these duties are of two kinds: 1, not to attempt the life of others; 2, to make efforts to save the life of others. All attempt at the life of others is calledhomicide. When accompanied by perfidy or treason, it isassassination. The murder of parents by children is calledparricide; of children by parents (especially at the tenderest age),infanticide; of brothers by brothers,fratricide. All these crimes are most odious, and most repugnant to the human heart. Murder is never permitted, even when the highest interest and the greatest good is at stake. Thus did the ancients err in believing that the murder of a tyrant, ortyrannicide, was not only legitimate, but also honorable and beautiful. However, there is to be excepted the case oflegitimate self-defense; for we cannot be forbidden to defend ourselves against him who wishes to deprive us of life. But theduelshould not be considered an act of legitimate self-defense: that is evident in the case of the aggressor; and, on the other side, there is only the defense that there has been the consent to be put in peril. As to the question whether an attack on honor is not equivalent to an attack on life, it cannot be said that it is false in all cases; but the abuse of the thing is here so near the principle, that it is wiser to condemn altogether a barbarous practice, of which so deplorable an abuse has been made. Finally, homicide in war, within the conditions authorized by international law, is considered a case of legitimate self-defense.[10]
If murder is the most criminal of actions, and the most revolting to our sensibilities, the action, on the contrary, which consists insaving the lifeof others is the most beautiful of all. “The good shepherd gives his life for the sheep.”
With the fundamental duty not to attempt the life of other men, is connected, as corollary, the duty not to injure them bodily by blows or wounds, or by dangerous violence done to their health, and, conversely, to assist them in illness.
2.Duties relating to property.—It is evident[11]that man cannot preserve his life and render it happy and comfortable without a certain number of material objects which are his. The legitimate possession of these goods is what is calledproperty.[12]The right of property rests in one respect on social utility, and in the other on human labor. On the one hand, society cannot subsist without a certain order that settles for each what ishis own; on the other, it is but right that each should be the proprietor of what he has earned by his work; the right of possession carries with it the right of economizing, and, consequently, the right of forming acapital, and, moreover, the right of using this capital in making it bearinterest. Again, the right of preserving implies also the right oftransmission; hence the legitimacy ofinheritance.
Property once founded upon law, it becomes our duty not to transgress the law. The act of taking what belongs to another is calledtheft. Theft is absolutely forbidden by the moral law, whatever name it may assume, or under whatever prestige it may present itself. “Thou shalt not steal.” Theft does not consist merely in putting one’s hand into a neighbor’s pocket; it includes all possible ways whereby the property of others may be appropriated. For example, todefraudin regard to the quality of the thing sold; to practice illegalstock-jobbing; to convert to one’s own use adepositentrustedto one’s care; to borrow without knowing whether one can pay, and after having borrowed, to disown the debt, or refuse to pay it; there are as many forms of theft as there are ways of appropriating the property of others.
Regarding the property of others, the negative duty then consists in not taking what belongs to others. The positive duty consists in assisting others with one’s own property, in relieving their misery. This is calledbenevolence, which benevolence may be exercised in various ways, either bygift, or byloan. It may also be exercised inkind,that is in giving to others the objects necessary to their maintenance or support, or in money, that is, in furnishing them the means of procuring them; or inwork, which is the best of all gifts; for in thus relieving others we procure them the means of helping themselves.
With the duty relating to the property of others, are connected as corollaries, the duties relating to the observance of agreements or contracts; the transmission of property in society being not always done from hand to hand, but by means of promises and writings. To fail in keeping one’s promise, to pervert the sense of solemn contracts, is, on the one side, to appropriate other people’s property, and on the other, to lie and deceive, and thus to fail in a double duty.
3.Duties relating to the families of others.—We have seen above what are the duties of man in his family; there remains to be said a few words touching the duties towards the families of others. One may fail in these duties either by violating the conjugal bond, which isadultery; or by carrying off other people’s children, which isabduction, or by depraving them through bad advice or bad examples, which iscorruption.
4.Duties relating to the honor of others.—One may fail in these duties, either by saying to a man (who does not deserve it), wounding and rude things to his face, which areinsults, or in speaking ill of others; and here we distinguish two degrees: if what is said is true, it isbackbiting; if what is saidis false and an invention, it isslander. In general one must not too easily ascribe evil to other men; this kind of defect is what is calledrash judgments.
Thepositiveduty respecting other people’s reputation is to be just towards every one, even towards one’s enemies; to speak well of them if they deserve it, and even of those who speak ill of us. It is a duty to entertain a kindly disposition towards men in general, provided this does not go so far as to wink at wrong. In our relations with our neighbors, usage of the world has, in order to avoid quarrels and insults, introduced what is calledpoliteness, which, for being a worldly virtue, is not the less a necessary virtue in the order of society.
5.Duties towards the liberty of others.—These are rather the duties of the State than of the individual. They consist in respecting in others the liberty of conscience, the liberty of labor, individual liberty, personal responsibility, all of which are thenatural rightsof man. However, private individuals may themselves also fail in this kind of duties. The violation of the liberty of conscience is calledintolerance; it consists either in employing force to constrain the consciences, or in imputing bad morals or bad motives to those who do not think as we do. The virtue opposed to intolerance istolerance, a disposition of the soul which consists, not in approving what we think false, but in respecting in others what we wish they should respect in us, namely, conscience. One may also violate individual liberty, the liberty of labor, in keeping one’s fellow-beings inslavery; but slavery is rather a social institution than an individual act. However, there may be cases where one may seek to injure other people’s work, in restraining others by threats from work; which, for example, takes sometimes place in workmen’s strikes. There is also a certain way of domineering over the freedom of others without restraining it materially, which constitutes realtyranny; it is the dominion which a strong will exercises over a feeble will, and of which it too often is tempted to take advantage.On the contrary, it is a duty, not only to respect the liberty of others, but also to encourage it, to develop it, to enlighten it through education.
6.Duties relating to friendship.—All the preceding duties are the same towards all men. There are others which concern more particularly certain men, those, for example, to whom we are attached either by congeniality of disposition or uniformity of occupation, or a common education, etc., those, namely, whom we callfriends. The duties relating to friendship are: 1, to choose well one’s friends; to choose the honest, and enlightened, in order to find in their society encouragement to right-doing. Nothing more dangerous than pleasure-friends or interested friends, united by vices and passions, instead of being united by wisdom and virtue; 2, the friends once chosen, the reciprocal duty isfidelity. They should treat each other with perfectequalityand withconfidence. They owe each othersecrecywhen they mutually entrust their dearest interests; they owe each otherself-devotionwhen they need each other’s help. Finally, they owe to each other in a more strict and rigorous a sense, all they generally owe to other men, for the faults or crimes against humanity in general assume a still more odious character when against friends.
21. Professional duties and civic duties.—Such are the general duties of men in relation to each other, when simply viewed as men. But these duties become diversified and specialized according as we view man either in the light of the private functions he fills in society, which are hisprofessionalduties, or in the light of the particular society of which he is a member, and which is called theStateor the country, and these are thecivicduties. (See chapters xii. and xiii.)
22. Distinction between the duties of justice and the duties of charity.—We have said above that all the social duties could be reduced to these two maxims: “Do not do unto others what you do not wish they should do to you. Do to others as you wish to be done by.” These two maximscorrespond with what is called: 1, the duties ofjustice; 2, the duties ofcharity.
The first consists in not doing wrong, or at least in repairing the wrong already done. Charity consists in doing good, or at least in giving to others what is not really their due. A celebrated writer[13]has made a very subtle and forcible distinction between these two virtues:
“The respect for the rights of others is called justice. All violation of any right whatsoever is an injustice. The greatest of injustices, since it comprises all, is slavery. Slavery is the subjugation of all the faculties of a man for the benefit of another. Moral personality should be respected in you as well as in me, and for the same reason. In regard to myself it has imposed a duty on me; in you it becomes the foundation of a right, and imposes thereby, relatively to you, a new duty on me. I owe you the truth as I owe it to myself, and it is my strict duty to respect the development of your intelligence and not arrest its progress towards the truth. I must also respect your liberty; perhaps even I owe it to you more than I do to myself, for I have not always the right to prevent you from making a mistake.
“I must respect you in your affections, which are a part of yourself; and of all the affections none are more holy than those of the family. To violate the conjugal and paternal right is to violate what a person holds most sacred.
“I owe respect to your body, inasmuch as belonging to you, it is the instrument of your personality. I have neither the right to kill you nor to wound you, unless in self-defense.
“I owe respect to your property, for it is the product of your labor; I owe respect to your labor, which is your very liberty in action; and if your property comes from inheritance, I owe respect to the free will which has transmitted it to you.
“Justice, that is, the respect for the person in all that constitutes his personality, is the first duty of man towards his fellow-man. Is this duty the only one?
“When we have respected the person of others, when we have neither put a restraint upon their liberty, nor smothered their intelligence, nor maltreated their body, nor interfered with their family rights nor their property, can we say that we have fulfilled towards them all moral duties? A wretch is here suffering before us. Is our conscience satisfied if we can assure ourselves that we have not contributed to his sufferings? No; something tells us that it would be well if we should give him bread, help, consolation; and yet this man in pain, who, perhaps, is going to die, has not the least right to the least part of our fortune, were this fortune ever so great; and if he were to use violence to take a farthing from us, he would commit a crime. We shall meet here a new order of duties which do not correspond to rights. Man, we have seen, may resort to force to have his rights respected, but he cannot impose on another a sacrifice, whatever that may be. Justicerespectsorrestores: charitygives.
“One cannot say that to be charitable is not obligatory; but this obligation is by no means as precise and as inflexible as justice. Charity implies sacrifice. Now, who will furnish the rule for sacrifice, the formula for self-renunciation? For justice, the formula is clear: to respect the rights of others. But charity knows neither rule nor limits. It is above all obligation. Its beauty is precisely in its liberty.”
It follows from these considerations that justice is absolute, without restriction, without exception. Charity, whilst it is as obligatory as justice, is more independent in its applications; it chooses its place and its time, considers its objects and means. In a word, as Victor Cousin says, “its beauty is in its liberty.”
Let us not hesitate to borrow from the Apostle St. Paul his admirable exaltation of charity:
“Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, andhave not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal.”
“And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.”[14]
“And though I bestowed all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”
“Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself; is not puffed up.”
“Doth not behave itself unseemely; seeketh not her own; is not easily provoked; thinketh no evil.”
“Beareth all things; believeth all things; endureth all things.”[15]
DUTIES OF JUSTICE—DUTIES TOWARDS HUMAN LIFE.
SUMMARY.
Division of the duties of justice.—Four kinds of duties: 1, towards the life of others; 2, towards the liberty of others; 3, towards the honor of others; 4, towards the property of others.Duties towards human life.—Avoid homicide, acts of violence, and mutilation. Pascal and theProvinciales.The right of self-defense.—Right to oppose force to force. Limits of this right.Problems.—Four very grave problems are bound up in the question of self-defense: 1, the penalty of death; 2, political assassination; 3, the duel; 4, war.The penalty of death.—The penalty of death is the right of self-defense exercised by society: it is just so far as it is efficacious.Political assassination.—Murder is always a crime, under whatever pretext it may conceal itself.The duel.—The duel is at the same time ahomicideand asuicide; it is falsely considered justice, since it appeals to chance and skill.War.—War is the only mode of self-defense existing among nations; it is desirable for the sake of humanity that it may some day disappear; but humanity cannot now exact this sacrifice of the country.
Division of the duties of justice.—Four kinds of duties: 1, towards the life of others; 2, towards the liberty of others; 3, towards the honor of others; 4, towards the property of others.
Duties towards human life.—Avoid homicide, acts of violence, and mutilation. Pascal and theProvinciales.
The right of self-defense.—Right to oppose force to force. Limits of this right.
Problems.—Four very grave problems are bound up in the question of self-defense: 1, the penalty of death; 2, political assassination; 3, the duel; 4, war.
The penalty of death.—The penalty of death is the right of self-defense exercised by society: it is just so far as it is efficacious.
Political assassination.—Murder is always a crime, under whatever pretext it may conceal itself.
The duel.—The duel is at the same time ahomicideand asuicide; it is falsely considered justice, since it appeals to chance and skill.
War.—War is the only mode of self-defense existing among nations; it is desirable for the sake of humanity that it may some day disappear; but humanity cannot now exact this sacrifice of the country.
23. Division of social duties.—According to the foregoing distinctions, we will first divide duties intoduties of justiceandduties of charity.
Let us begin by expounding the duties of justice.
These duties may be summed up in a general manner inthe respect for the person of others, and for all that is necessaryfor the preservation and development of that person. Hence four kinds of duties:
1. Towards the life of other men.2. Towards their liberty.3. Towards their honor.4. Towards their property.
1. Towards the life of other men.
2. Towards their liberty.
3. Towards their honor.
4. Towards their property.
Besides these duties, purely negative, which consist only in doing others no harm, there are also the duties of justice, which may be calledpositive; and which consist not only in not injuring others, but also in granting each what he has a right to. This is calleddistributiveorremunerativejustice, and is the duty of all those who have others under them, and who are commissioned to distribute rewards, titles, or functions.
24. Duties towards the life of men.—We have seen above that self-preservation is the duty of every one, and that one should not attempt one’s own life, nor mutilate one’s self, nor injure one’s health. Now, all these obligations which we have towards ourselves, we have equally towards others; for that which each owes to himself, he owes it to his quality, asman, to his quality as a free and reasonable being, amoral person. It is, as Kant says, humanity itself that each one must respect in his own person; and it is also humanity which each must respect in others. We should not do to others what we do not wish that they should do to us, or what we should not wish to do to ourselves. Now, no one wishes others to attempt his life; no one should wish to attempt it himself. For the same reason he should not wish to attempt the life of others.
These are such self-evident considerations that it is useless to insist on them. Let us add that this duty rests, besides, on one of the most powerful instincts of humanity, the instinct of sympathy for other men, the horror of their sufferings, the horror of spilt blood. Those who are wanting in this sentiment are like monsters in the midst of humanity.
One of the corollaries of this principle is to avoid the blows and wounds which might, through imprudence andunexpectedly, cause death, and which, besides, are in themselves to be condemned, inasmuch as they contribute, if not towards destroying, at least towards mutilating, the person and rendering it unfitted to fulfil its duties and functions. In a word, to avoid scuffles, bodily quarrels, which are unworthy, moreover, from their very brutality, of a reasonable being; all this is comprised in the duty of avoiding homicide. All may be summed up in these words of the Decalogue: “Thou shalt not kill.”
Pascal, in his letter on homicide (xiv.Provinciale), expressed most eloquently the duty concerning the respect for human life: