CHAPTER VIII.

“It is clear,” says Montesquieu, “that in a monarchy, where he who causes the laws to be executed is above the laws, there is less virtue requisite than in a popular government, where he who causes the laws to be executed, feels that he is himself subject to them, and will have to bear the consequence of their violation.“It is further clear that a monarch who, through bad advice or negligence, ceases to have the laws executed, may easily repair the evil; he has but to change counselors or correct himself of his negligence. But when in a popular government, the laws have ceased to be executed, as this can only happen through the corruption of the republic, the State is already lost.”

“It is further clear that a monarch who, through bad advice or negligence, ceases to have the laws executed, may easily repair the evil; he has but to change counselors or correct himself of his negligence. But when in a popular government, the laws have ceased to be executed, as this can only happen through the corruption of the republic, the State is already lost.”

Montesquieu then describes, in the strongest and liveliest colors, a republican state where the laws have ceased to be enforced.

“They were free with the laws; they wish to be free without them. Each citizen is as a slave escaped from the house of his master. What before was calledmaxim, is now calledseverity; what wasruleis now annoyingrestraint; what wasattention, is nowfear. The republic has become booty, and its strength is no longer anything more than the power of a few and the license of all.”

In the republics of Athens and Rome, as long as they were prosperous and great, the empire of the laws was admirable. Socrates, in his prison, gave of this a sublime example. Hewas unjustly condemned by his fellow-citizens to drink the hemlock, namely, to die by poison. Meanwhile, his friends pressed him to resort to flight; and everything leads to the belief that this would have been quite easy, as the judges themselves almost wished to be relieved of the responsibility of his death. Yet Socrates resisted, and refused to employ this means of safety. The principal reason given by him was, that, having been condemned by the laws of his country, he could save himself only by violating these laws.

This is what Plato has expressed in the dialogue entitledCrito. The laws of the country are represented as addressing a speech to Socrates; it is called theProsopopœia[62]of Crito:

“Socrates,” they will say to me, “was that our agreement, or was it not rather that thou shouldst submit to the judgments rendered by the republic?... What cause of complaint hast thou against us that thou shouldst try to destroy us? Dost thou not, in the first place, owe us thy life? Was it not under our auspices that thy father took to himself the companion that gave thee birth? If thou owest us thy birth and education, canst thou deny that thou art our child and servant? And if this be so, thinkest thou thy rights equal to ours; and that thou art permitted to make us suffer for what we make thee suffer? What! in the case of a father or a master, if thou hadst one, thou wouldst not have the right to do to him what he would do to thee; to speak to him insultingly if he insulted thee; to strike him, if he struck thee, nor anything like it; and thou shouldst hold such a right toward thy country! and if we had sentenced thee to death, thinking the sentence just, thou shouldst undertake to destroy us!... Does not thy wisdom teach thee that the country has a greater right to thy respect and homage, that it is more august and more wise before the gods and the sages, than father, mother, and all ancestors; that the country in its anger must be respected, that one must convince it of its error through persuasion, or obey its commands, suffer without murmuring whatever it orders to be suffered, even to be beaten and loaded with chains?... What else then dost thou do?” they would proceed to say, “than violate the treaty that binds thee to us, and trample under foot thy agreement?...In suffering thy sentence, thou diest an honorable victim of the iniquity, not of the laws, but of men; but if thou takest to flight, thou repellest unworthily injustice by injustice, evil by evil, and thou violatest the treaty whereby thou wert under obligation to us: thou imperilest those it was thy duty to protect, thou imperilest thyself, thy friends, thy country, and us. We shall be thy enemies all thy life; and when thou shalt descend to the dead, our sisters, the laws of Hades, knowing that thou hast tried thy best to destroy us here, will not receive thee very favorably.”

Pretended Exceptions.—The duty of obedience to the laws must then be admitted as a principle; but is this duty absolute? is it not susceptible of some exceptions? A learned theologian of the XVI. century, a Jesuit, Suarez (Traité des lois, III., iv.), admits three exceptions to the obedience due to the law: 1, if a law is unjust—for an unjust law is no law—not only is one not obliged to accept, but even, when accepted, one is not obliged to obey it; 2, if it is too hard; for then one may reasonably presume that the law was not made by the prince with the absolute intention that it should be obeyed, but rather as an experiment; now, under this supposition one can always begin by not observing it;—3, if, in fact, the majority of the people have ceased to observe it, even though the first who had commenced should have sinned; the minority is not obliged to observe what the majority has abandoned: for one cannot suppose the prince to intend obliging such or such individuals to observe it, when the community at large have ceased observing it.

These exceptions, proposed by Suarez, are inadmissible, at least the two first. To authorize disobedience to unjust laws is introducing into society an inward principle of destruction. All law is supposed to be just, otherwise it is arbitrariness and not law. Every man finds always the law that punishes him unjust. If there are unjust laws, which is possible, we must ask their abrogation; and, in these our days, the liberty of the press is ready to give satisfaction to the need of criticism; but, in the meantime, we must obey. The second exception is not tenable either. To say that it is permitted to disobeya law when it is too hard, in supposing that the prince only made it for an experiment, is to permit the eluding of all the laws: for every law is hard for somebody; and there is, besides, no determining the hardness of laws. Such an appreciation is, moreover, fictitious; a prince who makes a law is supposeda priorito wish it executed: to say that he only meant to try us therewith is a wholly gratuitous invention. Certainly one may by such conduct succeed in wearing a law out when the prince is feeble; but it is not the less unjust, and no State could resist such a cause of dissolution. As to the third exception, it can be admitted that there are laws fallen into disuse, and which are no longer applied by any one because they stand in contradiction to the manners, and are no longer of any use; but, except in such case, it is nowise permitted to say that it is sufficient for the majority to disobey to entitle the minority to do the same. For instance, if it pleased the majority to engage in smuggling, or to make false declarations in the matter of taxes, it would nowise acquit the good citizens from continuing to fulfill their duty.

Now, if it is an absolute duty to obey a law, we must, at the same time, admit as a corrective, the right of criticising the law. This right is the right of the minority, and it is recognized to-day in all civilized countries. A law may, in fact, be unjust or erroneous: it may have been introduced by passion, by party-spirit; even without having been originally unjust, it may have become so in time through change in manners; it may also be the work of ignorance, prejudice, etc.; and thereby hurtful. Hence the necessity of what is called theliberty of the press, the inviolable guaranty of the minorities. But the right ofcriticisingthe law is not the right ofinsultingit. Discussion is notinsult. Every law is entitled to respect because it is a law; it is the expression of the public reason, the public will, of sovereignty. One may try topersuadethe sovereign by reasoning, and induce him to change the law; one should not inspirecontemptwhich leads unavoidably to disobedience.

87. Respect for magistrates.—Another duty, which is the corollary to obedience to the laws, is therespect for the magistrate. The magistrate—that is, the functionary, whoever he be, in charge of the execution of the laws—should be obeyed, not only because he represents force, but also because he is the expression of the law. For this reason, he should be for all an object of respect. The person is nothing; it is the authority itself that is entitled to respect, and not such or such an individual. Many ignorant persons are always disposed to regard the functionary as a tyrant, and every act of authority, an act of oppression. This is a puerile and lamentable prejudice. The greatest oppression is always that of individual passions, and the most dangerous of despotisms is anarchy: for then it is the right of the strongest which alone predominates. Authority, whatever it be, makes the maintenance of order its special interest, and order is the guaranty of every one. The magistrate is, moreover, entitled to respect, as he represents the country; if the country be a family, the authority of the magistrate should be regarded the same as that of the head of the family, an authority entitled to respect even in its errors.

88. The ballot.—Of all the special obligations which we have enumerated, the most important to point out is that of theballot, because it is free and left entirely at the will of the citizens.

In regard to the other obligations, constraint may, up to a certain point, supply the good will; he who does not pay his taxes from a sense of duty, is obliged to pay them from necessity; but the ballot is free; one may vote or not vote; one may vote for whom he pleases: there is no other restraint than the sense of duty; for this reason, it is necessary to insist on this kind of obligation.

1. It is a duty to vote. What in fact the law demands, in granting to the citizens the right of suffrage, is that the will of the citizens be made manifest, and that the decisions about to be taken, be those of the majority. This principle of the right of the majorities has often been questioned: for, it issaid, why might not the majority be mistaken? Certainly, but why might not the minority be also mistaken? The majority is a rule which puts an end to disputes and forestalls the appeal to force. The minorities certainly may have cause for complaint, for no rule is absolutely perfect; but they have the chance of becoming majorities in their turn. This is seen in all free States, where the majority is constantly being modified with the time. If such is the principle of elective governments (whatever be the measure or extension of the electoral right), it can be seen of what importance it is that the true majority show itself; and this can only take place through the greatest possible number of voters. If, for example, half of the citizens abstain, and that of the half that vote, one-half alone, plus one, constitute the majority, it follows that it is a fourth of the citizens that make the law; which would seem to be reversing the principle of majorities. This is certainly not absolutely unjust, for it may be said that those who do not vote admit implicitly the result obtained; but this negative compliance has not the same value as a positive compliance.

To abstain from voting may have two causes: either indifference, or ignorance of the questions propounded, and consequently the impossibility of deciding one way or another. In the first case, especially is the abstaining culpable. No citizen has the right to be indifferent to public affairs. Skepticism in this matter is want of patriotism. In the second case, the question is a more delicate one. How can I vote? it may be said. I understand nothing about the question; I have no opinion; I have no preference as to candidates. To combat this evil, it is, of course, necessary that education gain a larger development, and that liberty enter into customs and manners. There will be seen then a greater and greater number of citizens understandingly interested in public affairs. But even in the present state of things, a man may still fulfill his duty in consulting enlightened men, in choosing some one in whom he may have confidence; in short, in making every effort to gain information.

2. The vote should bedisinterested. The question here is not only one concerning thevenalityof the vote, which is a shameful act, punishable, moreover, by the laws; but it embraces disinterestedness in a wider sense. One should in voting consider the interests of the country alone, and in nowise, or at least, only secondarily, the interests of localities, unless the question be precisely as to those latter interests, when voting for municipal officers.

3. The vote should befree. The electors or representatives of an assembly should obey their conscience alone: they should repel all pressure, as well that from committees arrogating omnipotence, as from the power itself.

4. In fine, the vote should beenlightened. Each voter should gather information touching the matter in hand, the candidates, their morality, their general fitness for their duty, their opinions. In order to vote with knowledge of the facts, one must have some education. That, of course, depends on our parents; but what depends on us, is to develop the education already obtained; we must read the papers, but not one only, or we may become the slaves of a watch word and of bigoted minds; we must also gather information from men more enlightened, etc.

89. Taxes.—It is a duty to pay the taxes; for, without the contributions of each citizen, the State would have no budget, and could not set the offices it is commissioned with, to work.

How could justice be rendered, instruction be given, the territory be defended, the roads kept up, without money? This money, besides, is voted by the representatives of the country, elected for that purpose. But if the State is not to tax the citizens without their consent and supervision, they in their turn should not refuse it their money. Certainly, this evil is not much to be feared, for in the absence of good will, there is still the constraint which can be brought to bear upon refractory citizens. Yet there are still means of defrauding the law. The common people believe too readily that to deceive the State is not deceiving; they do not scruple tomake false declarations where declarations are required, to pass prohibited goods over the frontier, etc.; which are so many ways of refusing to pay the taxes.

90. Military service, as are the taxes, is obligatory by law, and consequently does not depend on individual choice. But it is not enough to do our duty because we are obliged to do it; we must also do it conscientiously and heartily.

“It is not enough to pay out of one’s purse,” says a moralist;[63]“one must also pay with one’s person.” Certainly, it is not for any one’s pleasure that he leaves his parents and friends, his work and habits, to go to do military service in barracks, and, if needs be, to fight on the frontiers. But who will defend the country in case of attack if it be not its young and robust men? And must they not learn the use of arms in order to be efficient on the day when the country shall need them? This is why there are armies. Certainly, it would be a thousand times better if there were no need of this, if all nations were just enough never to make war with each other. But whilst this ideal is being realized, the least any one can do is to hold himself in readiness to defend his liberty, his honor.... Thanks to a good army, one not only can remain quiet at home, but the humblest citizen is respected wherever he goes, wherever his interests take him. In looking carefully at the matter it can be seen that even in respect to simple interests, the time spent in the service of the flag, is nothing in comparison with the advantages derived from it. Is it not because others have been there before us that we have been enabled to grow up peacefully and happy to the age of manhood? Is it not just that we should take their place and in our turn watch over the country? And when we return, others will take our place, and we, in our turn, shall be enabled to raise a family, attend to our business, and lead a quiet and contented life.

Let us add to these judicious remarks that military service is a school of discipline, order, obedience, courage, patience, and as such, contributes to strengthening the mind and body, to developing personality, to forming good citizens.

The principal infractions of the duty of military service are: 1,mutilationsby which some render themselves improper for service; 2,simulated infirmitiesby which one tries to escape from the obligation; 3,desertionin times of war, and whatis more criminal still,passing over to the enemy; 4,insubordinationor disobedience to superiors.

This latter vice is the most important to point out, the others being more or less rare; but insubordination is an evil most frequent in our armies, and a most dangerous evil. Military operations have become so complicated and difficult in these days, that nothing is possible without the strictest obedience on the part of soldiers. In times when individual valor was almost everything, insubordination might have presented fewer inconveniences; but in these days, all is done through masses, and if the men do not obey, the armies are necessarily beaten because they cannot oppose an equal force to the enemy. Suppose the enemy to be 50,000 men strong in a certain place, that you yourself belong to a body of 50,000, and that you all together reach the same place at the same time as the enemy: you are equal in numbers, one against one, and you have at least as many chances as they; and if, besides, you have other qualities which they have not, you will have more chances. But if in the corps you belong to, there is no discipline, if every one disobeys—if, for example, when the order for marching is given, each starts when he pleases, and marches but as he pleases, you will arrive too late, and the enemy will have taken the best positions; there is then one chance lost. If, moreover, through the disorder in your ranks, you do not all arrive together, if there are but 25,000 men in a line, the others remaining behind, these 25,000 will be overwhelmed. As for those who do not reach the spot, think you they will escape the consequences of the battle? By no means; the disorder will not save them; it will deliver them defenseless into the hands of the pursuing enemy. Now, all disorder is followed by similar consequences. On the other hand, the obedience of the soldier being sure, the army is as one man who lends himself to all the plans, all the combinations; who takes advantage of all the happy chances, who runs less dangers because the business proceeds more rapidly, and that with less means one obtains moreresults. Such are the reasons for the punctilious discipline required of soldiers. We are treated as machines, you will say. Yes; if you resist: for then constraint becomes indispensable; but if you understand the necessity of the discipline, if you submit to it on your own accord, then are you no longer machines: you are men. The only way of not being a machine is then precisely to obey freely.

It has often been asked, in these days, whether the soldier is always obliged to obey, even such orders as his conscience disapproves of. These are dangerous questions to raise, and they tend to imperil discipline without much profit to morality. No doubt if a soldier were ordered to commit a crime—as, for example, to go and kill a defenseless man—he would have the right to refuse doing it. At the time of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, an order was sent to all the provinces to follow the example of Paris. One of the governors, the Viscount Orthez, replied that his soldiers did not do executioner’s service; and this answer was admired by all the world. But these are very rare cases; and it is dangerous for such uncertain eventualities to inspire mistrust against order and discipline, which are the certain guaranties of the defense and independence of a country.

91. Educational obligation.—The duty to instruct children results from the natural relations between parents and children. The obligation to raise children implies, in fact, the obligation to instruct them. There is no more education without instruction than instruction without education. To-day educational obligation is inserted in the law, and has its sanction therein. But parents owe it to themselves to obey the law without constraint.

92. Civil courage.—We have already spoken above of civil courage as opposed to military courage. But here is the place to return to this subject. Let us recall a fine page by J. Barni in his book onMorality in Democracy:

The stoics defined courage admirably:Virtue combating for equity. Civil courage might be defined: virtue defending the liberty and rightsof citizens against tyranny, whether this tyranny be that of the masses or a despot’s. As much courage, and perhaps more, is demanded in the first case as in the second; it is less easy to resist a crowd than a single man, were there nothing more to be feared thanunpopularity, one of the disadvantages hardest to brave. How much more difficult when it comes to risking a popularity already acquired? Yet must one, if necessary, be able to make the sacrifice. True civil courage shows itself the same in all cases. Thus, Socrates, this type of civil virtue, as he was of all other virtues, refused, at the peril of his life, to obey the iniquitous orders of the tyrant Critias; and he resisted with no less courage the people, who, contrary to justice and law, asked for the death of the generals who conquered at Arginusæ. Another name presents itself to the memory, namely, that of Boissy d’Anglas, immortalized for the heroism he showed as president of the National Convention, the 1st Prairial, year II. (20 May, 1795). Assailed by the clamors of the crowd which had invaded the Assembly, threatened by the guns which were pointed at him, he remains impassible; and without even appearing to be aware of the danger he is running, he reminds the crowd of the respect due to national representatives. They cry: “We do not want thy Assembly; the people is here; thou art the president of the people; sign, says one, the decree shall be good, or I kill thee!” He quietly replied: “Life to me is a trifle; you speak of committing a great crime; I am a representative of the people; I am president of the convention;” and he refused to sign. The head of a representative of the people who had just been massacred by the populace for having attempted to prevent the invasion of the Convention, is presented to him on the end of a pike; he salutes it and remains firm at his post. This is a great example of civil courage.

PROFESSIONAL DUTIES.

SUMMARY.

Professional duties:founded on the division of social work.The absence of a profession—Leisure.—Is it a duty to have a profession? Rules for the choice of a profession.Division of social professions.—Plato’s theory; the Saint Simonian theory; Fichte’s theory. Résumé and synthesis of these theories.Mechanic and industrial professions.—Employers and employees.—Workmen and farmers.Military duties.Public functions.—Elective functions; the magistracy and the bar.Science.—Teaching.—Medicine.—The arts and letters.

Professional duties:founded on the division of social work.

The absence of a profession—Leisure.—Is it a duty to have a profession? Rules for the choice of a profession.

Division of social professions.—Plato’s theory; the Saint Simonian theory; Fichte’s theory. Résumé and synthesis of these theories.

Mechanic and industrial professions.—Employers and employees.—Workmen and farmers.

Military duties.

Public functions.—Elective functions; the magistracy and the bar.

Science.—Teaching.—Medicine.—The arts and letters.

93. Division of social work.—Independently of the general duties to which man is held, as man or member of a particular group (family, country), there are still others relating to the situation he holds in society, to the part he plays therein, to his particular line of work. Society is, in fact, a sort of great enterprise where all pursue a common end, namely, the greatest happiness or the greatest morality of the human species; but as this end is very complex, it is necessary that the parts to be played toward reaching it be divided; and, as in industrial pursuits, unity of purpose, rapidity of execution, perfection of work, cannot be obtained except bydivision of labor, so is there also in society a sort ofsocial division of labor, which allots to each his share of the common work. The special work each is appointed to accomplishin society is what is called a profession, and the peculiar duties of each profession are theprofessional duties.

94. The absence of a profession—Leisure.—The first question to be considered is, whether a man should have a profession, or if, having received from his family a sufficient fortune to live without doing anything, he has a right to dispense with all profession and give himself up to what is calledleisure. Some schools have condemnedleisureabsolutely, have denounced what they callidlersas the enemies of society. This is a rather delicate question, and concerning which one must guard against arriving at a too absolute conclusion.

And, in the first place, there cannot be question here of approving or permitting that sort of foolish and shameful leisure to which some young prodigals, without sense of dignity and morality, are given, who dissipate in disorder hereditary fortunes, or the wealth obtained by the indefatigable labor of their fathers. It is sometimes said that this does more good than harm, because fortunes pass thus from hand to hand, and each profits by it in his turn. But who does not know that to make a good use of a fortune is more profitable to society than dissipation? However that may be, nothing is more unworthy of youth than this nameless idleness, where all the strength of the body and soul, the energy of character, the life of the intelligence, all the gifts of nature are squandered. There have been sometimes seen superior souls who rose from such disorders victorious over themselves, and stronger for the combat of life. But how rare such examples! How often does it not, on the contrary, happen that the idleness of his youth determines the whole course of the man’s life?Sometimes, it is true, one may choose a life of leisure designedly, not with an idea of dissipation, but, on the contrary, with that of being free to do great things. Certain independent minds believe that a profession deprives a person of his liberty, narrows him, fastens him down to mean and monotonous occupations, subjects him to conventional and narrow modes of thinking—in short, that a positive kind of work weakens and lowers the mind. There is some truth in these remarks. Everybody has observed how men of different professions differ in their mode of thinking. What more different than a physician, a man of letters, a soldier, a merchant? All these men thought about the same in their youth; they see each other twenty years later; each has undergone a peculiar bent; each has his particular physiognomy, costume, etc. Not only has the profession absorbed the man, but it has also deadened hisindividuality. One may conceive, then, how some ambitious minds may expect to escape the yoke and preserve their liberty in renouncing all professions. To be subject to no fixed and prescribed occupation, to depend upon no master, to nobly cultivate the mind in every direction, to make vast experiments, to be a stranger to nothing, bound to nothing, is not that, seemingly, the height of human happiness? Some men of genius have followed this system, and found no bad results from it. Descartes relates to us in hisDiscours sur la Méthode(Part I.), that, during nine years of his life, he did nothing but “roll about the world, hither and thither, trying to be a spectator, rather than an actor, in the comedies played therein.” He tells us further, that he employed his “youth in traveling, in visiting courts and armies, in associating with people of various humors and conditions, in gathering divers experiences, in testing himself in the encounters chance favored him with, etc.” That this may be an admirable school, a marvelously instructive arena for well-endowed minds, no one will doubt; but what is possible and useful to a Descartes or a Pascal, will it suit the majority of men? Is it not to be feared that this wandering in every direction, this habit of having nowhere a foot-hold, may make the mind superficial and weaken its energy?He who renounces being an actor, to be only a spectator, as did Descartes, takes too easy a part; he frees himself from all responsibility: this may sharpen the mind, but there will always remain some radical deficiency. Force of character, however, and personal superiority may set at naught all these conclusions—sound as they in general are in theory.[64]

Sometimes, it is true, one may choose a life of leisure designedly, not with an idea of dissipation, but, on the contrary, with that of being free to do great things. Certain independent minds believe that a profession deprives a person of his liberty, narrows him, fastens him down to mean and monotonous occupations, subjects him to conventional and narrow modes of thinking—in short, that a positive kind of work weakens and lowers the mind. There is some truth in these remarks. Everybody has observed how men of different professions differ in their mode of thinking. What more different than a physician, a man of letters, a soldier, a merchant? All these men thought about the same in their youth; they see each other twenty years later; each has undergone a peculiar bent; each has his particular physiognomy, costume, etc. Not only has the profession absorbed the man, but it has also deadened hisindividuality. One may conceive, then, how some ambitious minds may expect to escape the yoke and preserve their liberty in renouncing all professions. To be subject to no fixed and prescribed occupation, to depend upon no master, to nobly cultivate the mind in every direction, to make vast experiments, to be a stranger to nothing, bound to nothing, is not that, seemingly, the height of human happiness? Some men of genius have followed this system, and found no bad results from it. Descartes relates to us in hisDiscours sur la Méthode(Part I.), that, during nine years of his life, he did nothing but “roll about the world, hither and thither, trying to be a spectator, rather than an actor, in the comedies played therein.” He tells us further, that he employed his “youth in traveling, in visiting courts and armies, in associating with people of various humors and conditions, in gathering divers experiences, in testing himself in the encounters chance favored him with, etc.” That this may be an admirable school, a marvelously instructive arena for well-endowed minds, no one will doubt; but what is possible and useful to a Descartes or a Pascal, will it suit the majority of men? Is it not to be feared that this wandering in every direction, this habit of having nowhere a foot-hold, may make the mind superficial and weaken its energy?

He who renounces being an actor, to be only a spectator, as did Descartes, takes too easy a part; he frees himself from all responsibility: this may sharpen the mind, but there will always remain some radical deficiency. Force of character, however, and personal superiority may set at naught all these conclusions—sound as they in general are in theory.[64]

It may, therefore, be doubtful whether a life of leisure, with some exceptions, be good for him who gives himself up to it; but what is not legitimate, is the kind of jealousy and envy which those who work often entertain against those who have nothing to do. There is a legitimate leisure and nobly employed. For example, a legitimate leisure is that which, obtained through hereditary fortune, is engaged in gratuitously serving the country, in study, in the management of property, the cultivation of land, in travels devoted to observation and the amelioration of human things, in a noble intercourse with society. It is a grievous error to wish to blot out of societies all existence that has not gain for its end, and is not connectedwith daily wants. Property and riches are true social functions, and among the most difficult of functions. Those who know how to use them with profit, fill one of the most useful parts in society, and cannot be said to be without a profession.

95. Of the choice of a profession.—If it is necessary in society to have a profession, it is important that it be well chosen. He who is not in his right place, is wanting in some essential quality to fill the one he occupies:

“If the abbé de Carignan had yielded to the wishes of Madame de Soissons, his mother, what glory would not the house of Savoy have been deprived of! The empire would have been deprived of one of its greatest captains, one of the bulwarks of Christianity. Prince Eugene was a very great man in the profession they wished to interdict him; what would he have been in the profession they wished him to embrace? M. de Retz insisted absolutely that his youngest son should be an ecclesiastic, despite the repugnance he manifested for this profession, despite the scandalous conduct he indulged in to escape from it. This duke [M. de Retz] gives to the church a sacrilegious priest, to Paris a sanguinary archbishop, to the kingdom a great rebel, and deprives his house of the last prop that could have sustained it.”[65]

One should, therefore, study his vocation, not decide too quickly, get information on the nature and duties of different professions; then consult his taste, but without allowing himself to be carried away by illusory, proud, inconsistent fancies; consult wise and enlightened persons; finally, if necessary, make certain experiments, taking care, however, to stop in time.

96. Division of social professions.—It would be impossible to make a survey of all the professions society is composed of: it were an infinite labor. We must, therefore, bring the professions down to a certain number of types or classes, which allow the reducing of the rules ofprofessional moralityto a small number. Several philosophers have busied themselves in dividing and classifying social occupations. We shall recall only the principal ones of these divisions.

Plato has reduced the different social functions to fourclasses, namely: 1,magistrates; 2,warriors; 3,farmers; 4,artisans. The two first classes are the governing classes; the two others are the classes governed. The two first apply themselves to moral things: education, science, the defense of the country; the others to material life. This classification of Plato is somewhat too general for our modern societies, which comprise more varied and numerous elements: these divisions, nevertheless, are important, and should be taken account of in morals.

Since Plato, there is scarcely any but the socialist Saint-Simon who attempted to classify the social careers. He reduces them to three groups:industrials,artists, andscientists(savants). The meaning of this classification is this: the object of human labor, according to Saint-Simon, is the cultivation of the globe—that is to say, the greatest possible production; but this is the object of productive labor; it is what is calledindustry. Now, the cultivation of nature requires a knowledge of nature’s laws, namely,science. Science and invention are, then, the two great branches of social activity. According to Saint-Simon, work—that is to say, industry—must take the place of war; science, that of the laws. Hence no warriors, no magistrates; or, rather, the scientists (savants) should be the true magistrates. Science and industry, however, having only relation to material nature, Saint-Simon thought there was a part to be given to the moral order, to thebeautifulor thegood; hence a third class, which he now callsartists, nowmoralistsandphilosophers, and to whom a sort of religious rôle is assigned. It will be seen that this theory is absolutely artificial and utopian, that it has relation to an imaginary system, and not to the order of things as it is: it is an ingenious conception, but quite impracticable.

One of the greatest of modern moralists, the German philosopher Fichte, assigned, in hisPractical Morality, a part to the doctrine ofprofessionalduties; and he began by giving a theory of the professions more complete and satisfactory than any of the preceding ones.

Fichte makes of the special professions two great divisions: 1, those which have for their object the keeping up of material life; 2, those which have for their object the keeping up of intellectual and moral life. On the one side,mechanical labor; on the other,intellectualandmoral labor.

The object of mechanical labor isproduction,manufacture, andexchangeof produce; hence three functions: those ofproducers,manufacturers, andmerchants.

The moral and spiritual labor has also three objects: 1, the administration of justice in the State; 2, the theoretic culture of intelligence; 3, the moral culture of the will. Hence three classes: 1,public functions; 2,science and instruction; 3,the Church and the clergy. Lastly, there is in human nature a faculty which serves as a link between the theoretical and the practical faculties: it is theesthetic sense; the sense of the beautiful; hence a last class, that ofartists.

This theory is more scientific than that of the Saint-Simonians, but it is still somewhat defective; it is not clear, for example, in a moral point of view, that there is a great difference of duties between the producers, manufacturers, and merchants: they are economical rather than moral distinctions. Plato’s division is better, when he puts the farmers in opposition to the artisans. It is certain that there are, especially in these days, interesting moral questions, which differ according as the workmen live in the city or in the country. We therefore prefer on this point Plato’s division; and we will treat, on the one side,industryandcommerce, and on the otheragriculture; and in each of these divisions we will distinguish those who direct or remunerate the work, namely, contractors, masters, proprietors, capitalists in some degree, and those who work with their hands and receive wages.

In characterizing the second class of careers, those which have moral interests for their object, we will again borrow of Plato one of the names of his division, namely,the defense of the State. As to the administration of justice in the State, it is divided, as we have already said, into three powers: theexecutive,legislative, andjudicialpowers. Hence three orders of functions:administration,deputation, and themagistracy, with which latter is connected thebar.

As to science, it is eitherspeculativeorpractical.

In the first case, it only concerns the individual; we have spoken of it under individual duties (ch. iv.). In the second case, it has for its objectapplication, and bears either onthingsor onmen.

Applied to things, science is associated with the industry we have already spoken of. Applied to men, it ismedicine, in respect to bodies;moralityorreligion, in respect to hearts and souls.

Lastly, along with the sciences which seek the true, there are the letters and the arts which treat of and produce the beautiful. Hence a last class, namely,poets,writers,artists.

Such is about the outline of what a system of social professions might be. A treatise of professional morality which would be in harmony with this outline, would be all one science, the elements of which scarcely exist, being dispersed in a multitude of works, or rather in the practice and interior life of each profession. We will content ourselves with a few general indications.

97. I. Mechanical and industrial professions.—1.Employers and employees.—The professions which have for their object the material cultivation of the globe, and particularlyindustryandcommerce, are divided into two great classes: 1, on one side, those who, having capital,undertakeand direct the works; 2, those who execute them with their arms and receivewages. The first are theemployers; the second theemployees. What are the respective duties of these two classes?

98. Duties of employers.—The duties of all those who, by virtue of their capital legitimately acquired, or by virtue of their intelligence, command, direct and pay for the work done by men, are the following:

1. They should raise the wages of the workmen as high asthe state of the market permits; and they should not wait to be compelled to it by strikes or threats of strikes. Conversely, they should not, from weakness or want of foresight, yield to every threat of the kind; for in raising the wages unreasonably high, one may disable himself from entering into foreign competition, or may cause the ruin of the humbler manufacturers who have not sufficient capital.

2. Capitalists, employers and masters should obey strictly the laws established for the protection of childhood. They should employ the work of minors within proper limits, and according to the conditions fixed by the law.

3. Their task is not done when they have secured to the workmen and their children the share of work and wages which is their due, even when they are content to claim nothing beyond justice. They have yet to fulfill toward their subordinates the duties of protection and benevolence; they must assist them, relieve them, be it in accidents happening to them in the work they are engaged in, or in illness. They must spare them suspensions of work as much as possible; in short, they must, through all sorts of establishments—schools, mutual-help societies, workmen-cities (cités ouvrières), etc.—encourage education, economy, property, yet without forcing upon them anything that would diminish their own responsibility or impair their personal dignity.

99. Duties of workingmen.—The duties of workingmen should correspond to those of the employers.

1. The workingmen owe it to themselves not to cherish in their hearts feelings of hatred, envy, covetousness, and revolt against the employers. Division of work requires that in industrial matters some should direct and others be directed. Material exploitation requires capital; and those who bring this capital, the fruit of former work, are as necessary to the workingmen to utilize their work as these are to the first in utilizing their capital.

2. The workingmen owe their work to the establishment which pays them; it is as much their interest as their duty.The result oflazinessandintemperanceismisery. We cannot enough deplore the use of what is called theMondays—a day of rest over and beyond the legitimate and necessary Sunday. It is certain that one day of rest in a week is absolutely a necessity. No man can nor ought (except in circumstances unavoidable) work without interruption the whole year through. But the week’s day of rest once secure, all that is over and above that, is taken from what belongs to the family and the provisions against old age.

3. Supposing that, in consequence of the progress of industry, the number of hours of rest could be increased—that, for example, the hours of the day’s work could be reduced—these hours of rest should then be devoted to the family, to the cultivation of the mind, and not to the fatal pleasures of intoxication.

The workingmen have certainly a right to ask, as far as they are worthy of it, equality of consideration and influence in society; and all our modern laws are so constituted as to insure them this equality. It rests with them, therefore, to render themselves worthy of this new equality by their morals and their education. To have their children educated; to educate themselves; to occupy their leisure with family interests, in reading, in innocent and elevating recreations (music, the theatre, gardening, if possible), it is by all such pursuits that the workingmen will reduce or entirely remove the inequality of manners and education which may still exist between them and their superiors.

4. Workingmen cannot be blamed for seeking to defend their interests and increase their comforts; in so doing they only do what all men should do. They have also the right, in order to get satisfaction, to attach to their work such conditions as they may reasonably desire: it is thelaw of demandandsupply, common to all industries. In short, as an individual refusal to work is a means absolutely inefficacious to bring about an increase of wages, it must be admitted that the workingmen have a right to act in concert and collectivelyto refuse to work, and, collectively, to make their conditions; hence the right of strikes recognized to-day by the law. But this right, granted to the principle of the liberty of work, must not be turned against this principle. The workingmen who freely refuse to work should not stand in the way of those who, finding their demands ill-founded, persist in continuing to work under the existing conditions. All violence, all threats to force into the strike him who is opposed thereto, is an injustice and a tyranny. This violence is condemned by law; but as it is easily disguised, it cannot always be reached; it is, therefore, through the morals one must act upon it—through persuasion and education. The workmen must gradually adopt the morals of liberty, must respect each other. For the same reason they should respect women’s work; should not interdict to their wives and daughters the right of improving their condition by work. Unquestionably it is much to be desired that woman should become more and more centred in domestic duties, the care of her household and family. This is her principal part in the social work. But as long as the imperfect condition of the laboring classes does not permit this state of things, it may be said that the workmen work against themselves in trying to close the field of industry to women.

The tendency toward the equality of wages, as the ideal of the remuneration of work, is also to be condemned. Nothing is more contrary to the spirit of the times, which demands that every one be treated according to his work. Capacity, painstaking, personal efforts, are elements that demand to be proportionately remunerated. Let us add, that it is the duty of head masters, in the case of a good will, succumbing to physical inability, to conciliate benevolence and equity with justice; this, however, is only an exceptional case. But, as a principle, each one should be rewarded only for what he has done. Otherwise there would be an inducement to indifference and idleness.

100. Workmen and farmers.—Having considered workmenin their relations with their masters, let us consider them now on a line with farmers; for, according as one lives in the city or in the country, there is a great difference in manners, and consequently in duties. The workmen who live in the city are for that very reason more apt to acquire new ideas and general information; they have many more means of educating themselves; the very pleasures of the city afford them opportunities to cultivate their mind. Besides, living nearer to each other, they are more disposed to consider their common interests and turn them to account. Hence advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are, the superiority of intellectual culture, the greater aptitude in conceiving general ideas, a stronger interest in public affairs; in all these respects, city-life presents advantages over country-life. But hence also arise great dangers. The workingmen, quite ready to admit general ideas, but without sufficient information and political experience to control them, abandon themselves readily to utopian preachings and instigations to revolt. Further, very much preoccupied with their common interests, they are too much disposed to think only of their own class, and to form, as it were, a class apart in society and in the nation. Hence for the workmen a double duty: 1, to obtain enough information not to blindly follow all demagogues; 2, to learn to consider their interests as connected with all those of the other classes and professions.

Farmers are indebted to the country-life for certain advantages, which carry with them, at the same time, certain disadvantages. The farmer is generally more attached to social stability than the more or less shifting inhabitants of the towns; he thinks much of property; he does not like to change in his manners and ideas. He is thereby a powerful support to conservatism and the spirit of tradition, without which society could not live and last. He has, moreover, had till now the great merit of not singling himself out, of not separating his interests from those of the country in general. Thus, on these two points—opposition to utopias, preservationof social unity—the countryman serves as a counterpoise to all the opposite tendencies in the workmen. But these very qualities are, perhaps, the result of certain defects: namely, the absence of information and enlightenment. The countryman sees not very much beyond his church-steeple; material life occupies and absorbs him wholly; individual and personal interests are absolutely predominant in him. He is but little disposed to give his children any education; and he is disposed to look upon them as so many instruments of work less expensive than others. The idea of a general country, general interests surpassing private interests, is more or less wanting in him. What it is necessary to persuade the countryman of, is the usefulness of education. He should be inspired with a taste for liberty, which is a security to him and his family, as well as to all the other classes of society. The workman in becoming better informed, the farmer more informed, they will gradually blend with the middle classes, and there will then be no longer those oppositions of classes and interests so dangerous at the present day. (See Appendix.)

101. II. Military duties.—We have already considered military duties, as the duty of citizens toward the State; we have now to consider here military duties in themselves, as special duties, peculiar to a certain class of citizens, to a certain social profession.

1. It is useless to say that the peculiar virtue and special duty of the military class iscourage. We have but to refer the reader to what will be said further on (ch. xiv.) touching the virtue of courage, in regard to the duties of man toward himself.

2.Patriotismis a duty of all classes and all professions; but it is particularly one with those who are commissioned to defend the country: it is, therefore, the military virtuepar excellence.

3.Fidelity to the flag.—This duty is implied in the two preceding ones. The duty of courage, in fact, implies that one should not flee before the enemy: it is the crime ofdesertion;that one should not pass over to the enemy: it is the crime ofdefectionortreason. This latter crime has become very rare, and has even wholly disappeared in modern France. Formerly there was seen a Condé, the great Condé fighting against the French at the head of Spanish troops; and so great a fault scarcely injured his reputation; in our days, a simple suspicion, and that an unjust one, blackened the whole life of a Marshal of France.[66]

4.Obedience and discipline.(See above,Duties toward the State, preceding chapter.)

102. III. Public functions—Administration—Deputation—Magistracy—The Bar.—The public functions are the divers acts which compose the government of a State. We even include theelectivefunctions (deputation, general councils, town councils, etc.), because, whilst they have their origin in election, they are, nevertheless, functions, the purpose of which is thecommon weal,public interests. For the same reason, though the bar is a free profession, it is so connected with magistracy, it is so necessary a dependency of the judicial power, that it is thereby itself a sort of public power.

103. Functionaries.—We callfunctionaries, more particularly, those who take part in the administration of the country and the execution of its laws. This admitted, the principal duties of functionaries are:

1. TheKnowledge of the lawsthey are commissioned to execute. Power is only legitimate as far as it is guaranteed bycompetency. Ignorance in public functions has for its resultsinjustice, since arbitrariness takes then the place of the law; administrativedisorder, since the law has precisely for its object to establish rules and maintain traditions;negligence, since ignorant of the principles by which affairs ought to be settled, conclusions are kept off as much as possible. But one must not defer obtaining administrative information till calledto take a share in the administration. A general information should be acquired beforehand; for, once engaged in administrative affairs, there is then no longer time to acquire it.

To go to workis, therefore, the first duty of those who would be prepared for public functions; and this duty of work continues with the functions; for after general information has been obtained, comes the special and technical information, where there is always something new to learn.

2. The second duty of functionaries of any degree, isexactitudeandassiduity. The most brilliant qualities, and the largest and amplest mind for public affairs, will render but inefficient service—at any rate, a service very inferior to what could be expected of them, if these qualities are counterbalanced and paralyzed by negligence, laziness, disorder, inexactness. One must not forget that all negligence in public affairs is a denial of justice to some one. An administrative decision, whatever it be, has always for its result to satisfy the just, or to deny the unjust, claims of some one. To retard a case through negligence, may therefore deprive some one of what he has a right to. There are, of course, necessary delays which arise from the complication of affairs, and order itself requires that everything come in time; but delays occasioned by our own fault are a wrong toward others.

3.Integrityanddiscretionare also among the most important duties of functionaries. The first bears especially upon what concerns finances; but there are everywhere more or less opportunities to fail in probity. For example, there is nothing more shameful than to sell one’s influence; this is what is calledextortion. An administrator given to extortion is the shame and ruin of the State. As to discretion, it is again a duty which depends on the nature of things. It is especially obligatory when persons are in question, and still more so in certain careers—as, for example, indiplomacy.

4.Justice.—The strict duty of every administrator or functionary, is to have no other rule than thelaw; to avoidarbitrarinessandfavor, to have no regard to persons. Thisduty, it must be said, whilst it is the most necessary, is also the most difficult to exercise, and one which requires most courage and will. Public opinion, unfortunately, encourages in this respect, the weaknesses of officials; it is convinced, and spreads everywhere this conviction, that all is due tofavoritism, that it is not the most deserving that succeed, but the best recommended. Everybody complains of it, and everybody helps toward it. There is unquestionably much exaggeration in these complaints. Favor is not everything in this world. It is too much the interest of administrators that they should have industrious and intelligent assistants, and that they should employ every means to choose them well; and in public affairs, the interests of the common weal always predominate in the end. It is, nevertheless, an evil that so unfavorable a prejudice should exist; and it is absolutely a duty with functionaries to uproot it, in showing it to be false.

104. Elective functions—Deputation—Elective councils.—There is a whole class of functionaries, if it be permitted to say so, who owe their origin to election, and who are the mandataries of the people, either in municipal councils, or in general councils, or in the great elective bodies of the State, theSenateandHouse of Representatives. (SeeCivil instruction.) The principle of the sovereignty of the people requires that for all its interests, communal, departmental or national, the country have a deliberative voice by means of its representatives. The duties of these mandataries are generally the same in any degree of rank.

1.Fidelity to the mandate.—The representative is the interpreter of certain opinions, of certain tendencies, and although the majority which have elected him comprise very diverse elements, there exists an average of opinions, and it is this average which the deputy represents, or should represent. He would, therefore, fail in his duty if, once elected, he passed over to his opponents, or, if wishing to do so, he did not tender his resignation. However, this fidelity to the mandate should not be carried so far as to accept what is called theimperative mandate, which is the negation of all liberty in the representative, and makes of him a simple voting machine. The representative is a representative precisely because he is empowered, on his own responsibility, to find the best means to carry out the wishes of his constituents.

2.Independence.—The deputy, senator, municipal, or departmental officer should be independent both in regard to the authorities and in regard to the electors. From the authorities he should receive no favors; he should not sell his vote in any interest whatsoever; from the electors he has to receive advice only, but no orders. Outside their office as electors, the electors are nothing but simple individuals. As such they may try to influence representatives, but they have otherwise no other title before the representatives of the electoral corps. The representative should, above all, avoid making himself the servant of the electors, for the satisfaction of their private interests and passions. It is often thought that independence only consists in resisting courts and princes; there is no less independence, and sometimes even is there more merit and courage required to resist the tyranny of the masses, and especially that of popular leaders. The deputy should, we have said, be faithful to his trust—that is to say, to the general line of politics adopted by the political party to which he belongs; but within these general limits it is for him to assume the responsibility, for it is for this very reason that he is elected a representative. Let us, moreover, add that fidelity to opinions should not degenerate into party spirit, and that there is an interest which should supersede all others, namely, the interest of the country.

3. The spirit ofconciliationand the spirit ofdiscipline.—Political liberty, more than any other political principle, requires the spirit of concession. If each, indeed, fortifies himself in his own opinions, without ever making a concession, all having the right to do the same, it is evident that no common conclusion can be arrived at. The consequence of theliberum veto,[67]pushed to excess, is paralysis of power or anarchy. Nothing is done; and in politics, when nothing is done, all becomes disorganized, dissolved. It is, therefore, necessary that whilst preserving their independence, the representatives sent forth by the electors should endeavor to render government possible; they should not overstep the limits of their trust by confounding legislative power with executive power; they should try to harmonize with the other bodies of the State—in short, they ought each to sacrifice the necessary amount of their individual opinion to bring about a common opinion. In a free government it is no more a duty to belong to themajoritythan to theopposition, since the opposition may, in its turn, become majority; but whether belonging to the one or to the other, the representative should subordinate his particular views to the common interest; otherwise the parties scatter, which, in the long run, can only be profitable to despotism.

105. Judicial power.—The magistracy and the bar.—The judicial power is exercised by magistrates calledjudges: it is they who decide about quarrels between individuals: this is what is calledcivil justice; they also decide about the punishments inflicted on criminals who have made attempts upon a life or property; and this ispenal justice. The duties of the magistrate are easily deduced from these obligations.

1.Impartiality and neutrality.—The judge must necessarily remainneutralamong all parties; he should have no regard to persons, should render equal justice to the rich and to the poor, to the high and to the low.Equality before the law, which is one of the principles of our modern institutions, should not only be a principle in the abstract; it should also be a practical principle, and be brought before the eyes of the judges as one among the first of their obligations.

2.Integrity and disinterestedness.—No less strict a duty for the judges, and which it is scarcely necessary to point out, is integrity. The magistrate should be free from all suspicion of venality. Under the oldrégime, as may be seen in Racine’s comedy ofThe Pleaders, the judges were not always free from such suspicion. Of course, it is but a comedy; but such a comedy could no longer be written nowadays; it would no longer be understood; our morals are too much improved for that. The obligation should, nevertheless, be pointed out.

3. Impartiality and integrity concern above all civil justice. The duty which more especially concerns criminal justice, isequity; namely, a moderate justice, intermediary between a dangerous lenity and an excessive severity. In truth, in most cases, at least in the graver cases, the judge has scarcely anything more to do than to apply the law. It is for the jury, a sort of free and irresponsible magistracy, to decide upon the culpability or innocence of the prisoners. It is for the jury to find a just medium between harshness and lenity. But the juryman who, above all, judges as a man, and often recoils from responsibility, should fear the excess of lenity: the judge, on the contrary, accustomed to repression, and above all preoccupied with the interests of society, should rather defend himself against excess of rigor and severity.

4.Knowledge.—What is for most men but a luxury, becomes in such or such a profession a strict duty.The knowledge of the laws, for example, is, for the magistrate, as the knowledge of the human body for the physician, a strict obligation. He who wishes to enter the magistracy, should therefore carry the study of the law as far as his youth permits it; but he should not stop his studies the moment he has entered upon his career. He has always something to learn; he should keep himself informed of the progress jurisprudence is making. It is useless to say that, independently of this general work, the special and thorough study of each case brought before him is for the judge a duty still more strict.

Alongside of the magistracy, and co-operating with it, is placed thebar, which is charged with the defense of private interests from a civil or criminal point of view.

From a civil point of view, the trial is between two citizens, each claiming his right in the case; they are what is calledpleaders, and the trial itself is called alaw-suit. The pleaders, not knowing the laws, need an intermediary to explain and defend their cause, bring it clearly to the comprehension of the magistrates and enforce its reasons. This is the part of the lawyers.

From a criminal point of view, the trial is not between two individuals; but between society and the criminal. Society, to defend itself, employs what is called apublic prosecutor; the criminal needs acounsel. The part of a counsel belongs again to the lawyers.

The duties of lawyers are varied according as the cases are civil or criminal cases.

In civil law-suits, the absolute duty is the following: not to take upbad cases. Only it is necessary to understand well this principle. It is generally believed that a bad case is the losing one, and a good case the winning one. Thus would there in every law-suit be a lawyer who failed in his duty: the one, namely, who lost the case. This is a false idea, which very unjustly throws in many minds discredit upon the profession of the law.

Certainly there are cases where the law is so clear, jurisprudence so established, the morality so evident and imperious, that a suit having the three against itself, may be called a bad case; and the lawyer who can allow his client to believe the suit defensible, and who employs his skill and eloquence in defending it, fails in his professional duty. But this is not generally the case. In most cases, it is very difficult to tell beforehand who is right, who wrong, and precisely because it is difficult, are there judges whose proper function it is to decide. Now, in order that the judge may decide, he must be acquainted with all the details of the case; all possible reasonsfrom both sides must be laid before him. Everybody knows that one can never of one’s own account find in favor of a solution or conclusion, all the reasons which the interested party can; now, it is just that these reasons be set forth: this is the business of the lawyers. One must not forget that in every law-suit there is a pro and a con. It is for this very reason there is a suit. The lawyers are specially here to plead for the pro and con, each from his own standpoint. One could very well understand, for example, that the court should have at its disposal functionaries commissioned to prepare the cases and plead for the contending parties: one would take up Peter’s cause, the other, Paul’s; this is just the part of the lawyers, with this difference, that the choice of the lawyer is left to the client, because it is but just that a deputy be chosen by him he is supposed to represent.

In criminal cases there are equally very delicate questions. How can a lawyer defend as innocent one who is guilty? Were it not an actual lie? And yet society does not allow that any accused, whoever he be, be left without counsel; and when none present themselves, it provides one, charging him to save the life of the accused if he can. It is the interest of society that no innocent person be condemned, and that even the guilty should not be punished beyond what he deserves; in short, it takes care that all the reasons that can be brought forth to attenuate the gravity of an offense be well weighed, and even set forth in a manner to arouse pity and sympathy. Such is the business of the lawyers.

It is evident that these considerations, which show the lawyer’s profession to be one so legitimate and exalted, should not be improperly understood. These general rules must be interpreted with delicacy of feeling and conscience.

106. IV. Science—Teaching—Medicine—The letters and arts.—Beside thesocial powerswhichmake,executeandapplythe laws, there isscience, which instructs men, enlightens them, directs their work, and which even, setting utility aside, is yet in itself an object of disinterested research.Side by side with the sciences are the letters and arts, which pursue and express thebeautiful, as science pursues thetrue. Finally, to science and art are addedmoralityandreligion, whose object is thegood. The moralists, it is true, do not constitute a particular profession in society, or at least their part is blended with teaching in general; religion has its interpreters, who find in their dogmas and traditions the rules of their duties. It is not the business of lay morality to teach these. Let us, therefore, content ourselves with a few principles concerning the sciences and letters.

107. Science—Duties of Scientists.—Science may be cultivated in two different ways and from two different standpoints: 1, for itself; 2, for its social advantages—for the services it renders to men. There is but a small number of men who have a natural taste for pure science, and the leisure to give themselves up to the love of it; but those who choose such a life contract thereby certain duties.

The first of all is thelove of truth. The only object for the scientist to pursue is truth. He must, therefore, lay aside all interests and passions antagonistic to truth; and, above all, personal interest which inclines one to prefer one theme to another, because of the advantages it may bring; this is, however, so gross a motive, that it would not be supposed to exist with a true scholar; yet are there other causes of error no less dangerous—for example, the interest of a cause—of a conviction which is dear to us; the interest of our self-love, which makes us persist in error known to be such; the spirit of system, by which one shows his peculiar forte, etc. All these passions should give way before the pure love of truth.

108. The communication of science—Teaching.—The principal duty of those who are possessed of science is to communicate it to other men. Certainly, all men are not called to be scholars; but all should in some degree have their intelligence cultivated byinstruction. Hence the duty of teaching imposed upon scholars; but this duty brings with it many others.

1. The masters who teach others should themselves first beeducated. Hence the duty of intellectual work, not merely to acquire knowledge, without which one cannot be a teacher, but to preserve and increase it. The teacher should, therefore, set an example to his pupil of assiduous and continuous intellectual work.

2. The teacher should love his pupils—children, if he is called upon to teach children; young men, if he is to address young men. The teacher should not only think of the science he teaches, but of the fruits his pupils are to reap from it; one can only be interested in what he loves. A teacher indifferent toward the young, will never make the necessary effort to lead and educate them.

3. The teacher, in teaching, should unite in a just measuredisciplineandliberty. Instruction naturally presupposes one that knows and one that does not know; and it is necessary that the one should direct the other; hence the necessity of discipline. But the purpose of instruction is to teach to do without the master—to be one’s own master in thought and conduct; hence the necessity of liberty. This liberty should grow along with the instruction, and, of course, proportionately to age; but, at any age, one should take advantage of the faculties of a child, and make it as much as possible find out by itself what is within its reach.

4. The teacher should not separateinstructionfromeducation. He should not only communicate knowledge—he should above all form men, characters, wills. Instruction is, besides, already in itself an education. Can one instruct without accustoming young minds to work, to obedience, to correct habits of thought; without putting into their hands good books; without giving them good examples? It is most true that one does not form men with pure and abstract science alone,—it is necessary to add the letters, history, morality, religion. The teacher, besides, should study the character of his pupils, should, through work and moral and physical exercises, put down presumption, correct unmanliness, combat selfishness, anticipate or restrain the passions.

109. Applied science—Industry—Medicine.—Science may find its application in two ways, either tothings, or tomen. Applied to things, it is calledindustry; applied to men,medicine. There are no special duties concerning industrial pursuits. Engineers, private or in the service of the State, employed in civil or military works, have no other duties then the general duties of functionaries, military-men, employees, etc. It is not the same with medicine. There are here obligations of a special and graver nature.

110. Duties of the physician—His knowledge.—Knowledge is an obligation in every profession; everywhere it is indispensable to know the thing one is engaged in; but, in medicine, ignorance is of a much more serious character: for it may end inmanslaughter. How can any one attend the sick if he knows nothing of the human body; if he is ignorant of the symptoms of a disease? He has, it is true, the resource of doing nothing; but might not this also be manslaughter? Does he not then take the place of him who knows and might save the patient?

2.Secrecy.—The physician is above all held to secrecy. He must not make known the diseases which have been revealed to him. This is what is calledmedical secrecy. This obligation may in certain cases give rise to the most serious troubles of conscience; but, as a principle, it may be said that secrecy is as absolute a duty for the physician as it is for the father-confessor.

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