[59]Traité élémentaire de philosophie, p. 262.
[60]Concerning these three powers, see Montesquieu,Esprit des lois, I., xi.
[61]See on this subject theNotions d’instruction civique.
[62]Prosopopœia in rhetoric is the form of expression which consists in animating physical or abstract things, in lending them “a soul, a mind, a visage” (Boileau), in making them speak or being spoken to as if they were present and living. InCrito, the laws are personified, and it is they that speak.
[63]Droits et devoirs de l’homme, Henri Marion, Paris, 1880, p. 67.
[64]The preceding quotation is from ourPhilosophie du bonheur.
[65]Philosophie sociale, Essai sur les devoirs de l’homme et du citoyen, par l’abbé Durosoi (Paris, 1783).
[66]Marshal Marmont was accused of treason for having accepted the capitulation of Essonne, which was perhaps imposed upon him by necessity.
[67]Theliberum vetoin Poland was the right of each representative to oppose the veto of the laws which were voted unanimously.
[68]Montaigne thus expressed himself in regard to marriage: “A good marriage is a sweet society for life, full of constancy, troubles, and an infinite number of useful and substantial services and mutual obligations.”
[69]Ad. Garnier,Morale socialeI., ii., p. 104.
[70]See our book,La Famille, 3d lecture. We take the liberty to refer the reader to this book for the development of the subject.
[71]Xenophon.
[72]A. Garnier,Morale sociale.
[73]The law of divorce has since been passed again in France.—[Transl.]
[74]David Hume,Essays.
[75]A great German moralist, Fichte, denies, however, people having a right to voluntarily and systematically renounce marriage: “An unmarried person,” he says, “is but half a person. A fixed resolution not to marry is absolutely contrary to duty. Not to marry is, without its being one’s fault, a great misfortune; but not to marry through one’s fault is a great fault (Durch seine Schuld, eine grosse Schuld). It is not permitted to sacrifice this end to other ends, even where the service of the Church, or family or State duties, or, in fine, the repose of a contemplative life, are concerned; for there is no higher end for man than to be a complete man.” There is much truth in these words of Fichte, yet may we be permitted to think that his doctrine in this respect is pushed to excess, as well as that which forbids second marriages.
[76]La Famille.4th Lecture.
[77]Du droit de la guerre et de la paix, I., II. ch. v. § 2.
[78]And that may be questioned.
[79]This duty to-day is imposed by law: “Primary instruction is obligatory for children of both sexes from six to thirteen years.” (Law of the 28th March, 1882, art. 4.)
[80]Fichte,System der Sittenlehre, Pt. III., ch. iii., § 29.
[81]Doctrine of happiness.
[82]Fichte is right here when he speaks of the exaggeration of this principle. But the principle itself is a true one, namely, that one should accustom children to act according to their own reason: it is the only means of teaching them liberty.
[83]The Dialogues of Plato. Laws. B. Jowett’s Translation, B. IV., 238.
[84]Xenophon’sMemorabilia of Socrates, translation by J. S. Watson, B. II., Chap. 2.
[85]Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Translation J. S. Watson.
[86]Des Devoirs de l’homme, ch. xii.
[87]A European custom.—Transl.
[88]See our work onLa Famille(3d lecture).
[89]Le Vrai, le Beau et le Bien.Lect. xxi., ch. xxii.
[90]There is no injustice done to him who consents to it.
[91]St. Augustin,Cité de Dieu, I., xvii., trad. d’Em. Saisset.
[92]One will say, perhaps, that the merchant is never innocent, for he should have foreseen the risks which threatened him, and provided against them. But there is no commerce without risks. There is, then, a certain amount of risks which it is allowed and even necessary to run, or else suppress commerce altogether. For example, a merchant in times of peace certainly knows that there may suddenly arise a cause of war, and he must make provision against the eventuality; but if all his transactions were influenced by that idea, commerce in times of peace would not differ from commerce in times of war, and would consequently be null.
[93]Rousseau’sEmile, I., i.
[94]Bossuet,Traité de la concupiscence, Ch. iv.
[95]We may apply here what La Bruyère said of clothes: “There is as much weakness in avoiding fashion as affecting it. A philosopher allows his tailor to dress him.” In the same sense is there as much weakness in rebelling against pleasure as in seeking it too artfully. The honest man simply enjoys it without thinking of it. Between the rigorist and the sensualist, the sensible man has his place.
[96]Ciceron,Traité des devoirs, I., xxxiv.
[97]Cicero,Traité des devoirs, ch. xxxvi.
[98]We nowise mean to uphold here the doctrine of thephysiocratsfor whom land was the only riches; we shall merely say that it is the basis of all wealth.
[99]There is here, again, a broad duty, for how can we interdict to a merchant the desire for gain without suppressing one of the incitements to his activity and work? All that we can recommend to him is moderation, and not to sacrifice to this incitement sentiments of a higher order.
[100]Kant himself recognizes that self-interest may become a duty when combated by passion. “To secure one’s own happiness,” he says, “is at least an indirect duty; for he who is dissatisfied with his condition may easily, in the midst of the cares and wants which besiege him, yield to the temptation of transgressing his duties.... Therefore, even though this tendency in man to seek his happiness did not determine his will, even though health were not, for him at least, a thing to be taken account of in his calculations, there would still remain in this case, as in all others, a law, the one, namely, which commands him to work for his happiness, not from inclination, but from a sense of duty, and it is only by this that his conduct may have a real moral value.
[101]Franklin,Poor Richard’s Almanac.
[102]Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, iv., i.
[103]Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, v., i.
[104]Aristotle, Politics, i., ii.
[105]Xenophon’s Memorabilia of Socrates, Bohn’s translation, by Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A., II., vii.
[106]Confucius and Mencius, Pauthier’s translation, p. 303.
[107]The word mercenary has always had an unfavorable meaning attached to it, a relic of ancient prejudice. In the proper sense, mercenary means remunerative, and should have no condemnatory signification. Yet already in antiquity the wordmercenaryhad a higher sense than the wordservile; for Cicero, wishing to say that one should treat one’s slaves well, said that they should be treated as mercenaries—that is to say, as men remunerated but free.
[108]Plato, Republic, i., ii.
[109]See hisDe Officiis, i., iv.
[110]It might be calledsensibility, in the sense this word had in the XVIII. century. It is not enough to be human toward others, one owes some feeling to one’s self also.
[111]Nicomachean Ethics, VI., ii.
[112]Ibid., VI., xii.
[113]Nicomachean Ethics, VI., ii.
[114]We do not mean by this that science cannot be a means of livelihood: nothing more legitimate, on the contrary. We only mean that it is not that alone.
[115]See also the admirable passage of Augustin Thierry in the preface toDix ans d’étude.
[116]“Answer me, ye illustrious philosophers, ye through whom we know what are the causes which attract bodies to a vacuum; what are in the revolutions of the planets, the relations of the spaces they travel over at equal periods ... how man sees everything in God; how the soul and the body correspond to each other without inter-communication, like two clocks.... Even though you had not taught us any of these things, should we be less numerous, less flourishing, more depraved?” This passage recalls vividly that of Malebranche quoted above. What, however, is most curious about it is that Rousseau in his criticism appropriates Malebranche’s hypothesis.
[117]“Good sense is the best distributed thing in the world,” says Descartes at the beginning of hisDiscours de la Méthode.
[118]Unless, of course, passion itself implies a duty superior to self-interest: which is not the case here.
[119]See Burlamaqui,Droit naturel, part I., ch. vi.
[120]See the celebrated lines in theMisanthrope, act ii., sc. v.
[121]Virtusin Latin has both meanings.
[122]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by R. W. Browne, III., vi.
[123]This idea of Aristotle may be questioned; for, in a sudden peril, one may be sustained by a natural impulse, and the feeling of self-defense, whilst anticipated peril allows all the impressions of fear to grow: it requires, therefore, a greater effort to overcome them.
[124]De Officiis, I., xxiii.
[125]See Xenophon’sMemorabilia of Socrates, I., i.
[126]Discours de la Méthode, part III.
[127]The Works of Epictetus. T. W. Higginson’s translation, ch. vi., p. 21.
[128]The Works of Epictetus. T. W. Higginson’s translation, ch. xv., page 139.
[129]Latin,gyrus, the ring in which colts are driven round by horse-breakers.
[130]Cicero,De Officiis, I., xxvi.
[131]Plato’sRepublic, I., iv.: A man deserves to be called courageous when that part of his soul in which anger resides obeys the commands of reason.
[132]Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, R. W. Browne’s transl., IV., v.
[133]Plato’sRepublic, I., iv.
[134]Anger is still nobler when provoked by injustice done to others.
[135]Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, IV., v.
[136]Kant,Doctrine de la Vertu,trad. franç., p. 96.
[137]Molière’sTartufe.
[138]
And shall I speak of Iris, loved and praised by all?Ah! what heart! ah! what heart! humanity itself!A wounded butterfly calls forth the truest tears!Ah, yes; but when to death poor Lally is condemned,And to the block is dragged, a spectacle to all,Iris will be the first to go to the dread feast,And buy herself the joy to see his dear head fall.Gilbert,le Dix-Huitième Siècle.
[139]Lettre sur la métaphysique, lettre II., chap. ix.
[140]Metaphysics is the science which treats of what is beyond and above nature. We callmetaphysicalsuch attributes of God by which he surpasses nature; as, for instance, infinitude, immensity; the moral attributes, on the contrary, are those which have their analogies in the human soul, such as kindness, wisdom, etc.
[141]V. Cousin,Le Vrai, le Beau et le Bien, xvieleçon.
[142]SeeDictionnaire de l’Académie française(7eedition, 1878): “Veneration, respect for holy things. It is also said of the respectful esteem in which certain persons are held.”
[143]A postulate is a truth which, although it cannot be rigorously demonstrated should, nevertheless, by reason of the necessity of its consequences, be practically admitted.
[144]Kant,Critique de la raison pratique, II., ii. Trad. de J. Barni, p. 334.
[145]Critique de la raison pratique; trad. fr., p. 363.
[146]Jules Simon,La Liberté de Conscience, 4eleçon (Paris, 1857).—We have borrowed some few passages of another book of the same author,La Liberté(Vol. ii., 4e, part 1, ch. 1).
[147]Fénélon.Lettres sur la métaphysique et la religion.Letter II., ch. i.
[148]The works of Epictetus. T. W. Higginson’s transl., I., xvi.
[149]De Augmentis Scientiarum, III., i. and iii.
[150]Kant,Anthropologie. Trad. franc. de Tissot, p. 27.
[151]Kant gives ingenious examples of these three degrees of action. See hisAnthropologische charakteristik.
[152]Aristotle’sRhetoric, book II., ch. xii., xiii., xiv., Bohn’s translation.
[153]Psychology is the science which treats of the faculties and operations of the soul.
[154]Diagnosis in medicine is the art of determining a disease by means of the symptoms or signs it presents.
[155]Imitation of Jesus Christ, I., xii.
[156]We should, however, make a distinction between the passion for wine and drunkenness. One can have this passion without giving up to it. Drunkenness is the habit of yielding to it.
[157]Sentimentalityis false sensibility, and not exaggerated sensibility.Softnessis a vague expression. Patriotism may by exaggeration becomefanaticism; but this is equally true of other sentiments—of the religious sentiment, for example.
[158]Chap. III., 19.
[159]Plato in the Phædo (trad. de Saisset, p. 31) seems to condemn the idea of combating passion by passion: “To exchange one sensual pleasure for another,” he says, “one grief for another, one fear for another, and to do like those who get small change for a piece of money, is not the path which leads to virtue. Wisdom is the only true coin against which all the others should be exchanged.... Without wisdom all other virtues are but shadows of virtues, a virtue the slave of vice, wherein there is nothing wholesome nor true. True virtue is free from all passion.” Nothing more true and more noble; but there is in this doctrine nothing contrary to that of Bossuet. The question is not to exchange one passion for another, for such an act is devoid of all moral character, but to exchange passion against wisdom and virtue; and all we want to know is the means. Now experience confirms what Bossuet has said, namely, that one cannot immediately triumph over a passion, especially when at its zenith, and that it is necessary to turn one’s thoughts upon other objects and appeal to more innocent passions or to passions, if not less ardent, at least more noble, such as patriotism or the religious sentiment.
[160]Confessions, VIII., v.
[161]The virtues of the pagans have been often depreciated, and St. Augustine himself, great an admirer as he was of antiquity, called them, nevertheless,splendid vices(vitia splendida). They are often regarded as induced by pride rather than by a sincere love of virtue. We should beware of such interpretations, for once on the road of moral pessimism, there is no reason for stopping at anything. We may as well maintain that there are a thousand forms of pride, and that self-love often sets its glory in pretending to overcome itself. “We must therefore not wonder to find it coupled with the greatest austerity, and, in order to destroy itself, make us bravely a companion of it, for whilst it ruins itself in one place, it starts up again in another.” It may be seen by this passage of La Rochefoucauld, that it is of no use to interpret the pagan virtues in a bad sense, for the argument can be retorted. It is better to regard virtue as sincere and true wherever we meet with it, so long as there are no proofs to the contrary.
[162]Traité de morale, III., 2.
[163]The theory ofinadmissible sanctityconsisted in maintaining that man, having reached a state of sanctity, could never again, whatever he might do, fall from it.
[164]The Dignity of Sciences, VII., iii.
[165]Essays on the Human Understanding, II., xxi.
[166]Epictetus, II., xxiii. (T. W. Higginson’s transl.).
[167]De Officiis, I., xxx.
[168]The greatest tragic actor at Rome, and a contemporary of Roscius, the greatest comic actor.—Translator.
[169]De Officiis, I., xxxi.
[170]Memorabilia of Socrates, IV., iv.
[171]Seneca, on Anger, III., 38. To tell the truth, Seneca forgave himself sometimes too easily perhaps, as, for example, on the day when he defended the murder of Agrippina; we are often too much disposed to imitate him.
[172]Imitation of Jesus Christ, I., xi.
[173]Doctrine de la Vertu, trad. fr. p. 170.
We give here this catechism as an example of what might be done in a course of morals. The teacher can modify its form and developments as he thinks best.
[174]We can see by this that Kant understood youth. In a Socratic interrogation of this kind, the pupil, distrusting his powers, will always begin by being silent. It is only when he perceives that he knows what was asked him, that he ventures to answer, and answers well.
[175]We give this as a useful supplement to Chapter VIII. It is a lecture formerly delivered on theUnion of Classes(1867,Revue des cours littéraires, v., p. 42).... We beg to be pardoned for what negligences of style may have crept into the improvisation.