A. Logical1.Κατηγορίαι:Categoriae: On simple expressions signifying different kinds of things and capable of predication [probably an early work of Aristotle, accepting species and genera as “secondary substances” in deference to Plato’s teaching].2.περὶ Έρμηνείας:De interpretatione: On language as expression of mind, and especially on the enunciation or assertion (ἀπόφανσις, ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος) [rejected by Andronicus according to Alexander; but probably an early work of Aristotle, based on Plato’s analysis of the sentence into noun and verb].3.Άναλυτικὰ πρότερα:Analytica Priora, On syllogism, with a view to demonstration.4.Άναλυτικὰ ὔστερα:Analytica Posteriora: On demonstration, or demonstrative or scientific syllogism (ἀπόδειξις, ἀποδεικτικὸς ἢ ἐπιστημονικὸς συλλογισμός).5.Τοπικά:Topica: On dialectical syllogism (διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμός), so called from consisting mainly of commonplaces (τόποι.loci), or general sources of argument.6.Σοφιστικοὶ ἒλεγχοι:Sophistici Elenchi: On sophistic (σοφιστικὸς) or eristic syllogism (ἐριστικὸς συλλογισμός), so called from the fallacies used by sophists in refutation (ἒλεγχος) of their opponents.[Numbers 1-6 were afterwards grouped together as theOrganon.]B. Physical1.Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις:Physica Auscultatio: On Nature as cause of change, and the general principles of natural science.2.περὶ οὐρανοῦ:De coelo: On astronomy, &c.3.περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς:De generatione et corruptione: On generation and destruction in general.4.Μετεωρολογικά:Meteorologica: On sublunary changes.5. †περὶ κόσμου:De mundo: On the universe. [Supposed by Zeller to belong to the latter half of the 1st centuryB.C.]6.περὶ ψυχῆς:De anima: On soul, conjoined with organic body.7.περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν:De sensu et sensili: On sense and objects of sense.8.περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως:De memoria et reminiscentia: On memory and recollection.9.περὶ ὒπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως:De somno et vigilia: On sleep and waking.10.περὶ ἐνυπνίων:De insomniis: On dreams.11.περὶ τῆς καθ᾽ ὔπνον μαντικῆςorπερὶ μαντικῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὔπνοις:De divinatione per somnum: On prophecy in sleep.12.περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος:De longitudine et brevitate vitae: On length and shortness of life.13.περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ περὶ ζωῆςκαὶ θανάτου:De juventute et senectute et de vita et morte: On youth and age, and on life and death.14.περὶ ἀναπνοῆς:De respiratione: On respiration. [Numbers 7-14 are grouped together as Parva naturalia.]15. †περὶ πνεύματος:De spiritu: On innate spirit (spiritus vitalis).16.περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι:Historia animalium: Description of facts about animals,i.e.their organs. &c.17.περὶ ζᾠων μορίων.De partibus animalium: Philosophy of the causes of the facts about animals,i.e.their functions.18. †περὶ ζᾠων κινήσεως:De animalium motione: On the motion of animals. [Ascribed to the school of Theophrastus and Strato by Zeller.]19.περὶ ζᾠων πορείας:De animalium incessu: On the going of animals.20.περὶ ζᾠων γενἐσεως:De animalium generatione: On the generation of animals.21. †περὶ χρωμάτων:De coloribus: On colours. [Ascribed to the school of Theophrastus and Strato by Zeller.]22. †πεςὶ ἀκουστῶν:De audibilibus. [Ascribed to the school of Theophrastus and Strato by Zeller.]23. †Φυσιογνωμονικά:Physiognomonica: On physiognomy, and the sympathy of body and soul.24. †περὶ φυτῷν:De plantis: On plants. [Not Aristotle’s work on this subject.]25. †περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων:De mirabilibus ausculationibus: On phenomena chiefly connected with natural history.26. †Μηχανικά:Quaestiones mechanicae: Mechanical questions.C. Miscellaneous1. †Προβλήματα:Problemata: Problems on various subjects [gradually collected by the Peripatetics from partly Aristotelian materials, according to Zeller].2. †περὶ ἀτομῶν γραμμῶν:De insecabilibus lineis: On indivisible lines. [Ascribed to Theophrastus, or his time, by Zeller.]3. †ἀνέμων θέσεις καὶ προσηγορίαι:Ventorum situs et appellationes: A fragment on the winds.4. †περὶ Ξενοφάνους, περὶ Ζήνωνος, περὶ Γοργίου:De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia: On Xenophanes, Zeno and Gorgias.D. Primary Philosophy or Theology or Wisdomτὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά:Metaphysica: On being as being and its properties, its causes and principles, and on God as the motive motor of the world.E. Practical1.Ήθικὰ Νικομάχεια:Ethica Nicomachea: On the good of the individual.2. †Ήθικὰ μεγάλα:Magna Moralia: On the same subject. [According to Zeller, an abstract of theNicomacheanand theEudemian Ethics, tending to follow the latter, but possibly an early draft of theNicomachean Ethics.]3. †Ήθικὰ Εὐδήμιαorπρὸς Εὔδημον:Ethica ad Eudemum: On the same subject. [Usually supposed to be written by Eudemus, but possibly an early draft of theNicomachean Ethics.]4. †περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν:De virtutibus et vitiis: On virtues and vices. [An eclectic work of the 1st centuryB.C., half Academic and half Peripatetic, according to Zeller.]5.Πολιτικά:De re publica: Politics, on the good of the state.6. †Οἰκονομικά:De cura rei familiaris: Economics, on the good of the family. [The first book a work of the school of Theophrastus or Eudemus, the second later Peripatetic, according to Zeller.]F. Art1.τἐχνη ῾Ρητορική:Ars rhetorica: On the art of oratory.2. †῾Ρητορικὴ πρὸς: Άλέξανδρον:Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: On the same subject. [Ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus (fl. 365, Diodorus xv. 76) by Petrus Victorius, and Spengel, but possibly an earlier rhetoric by Aristotle.]3.περὶ Ποιητικῆς:De poetica: On the art of poetry [fragmentary].G. HistoricalΆθηναίων πολιτείαDe republica Atheniensium: On the Constitution of Athens. [One of theΠολιτεῖαι, said to have been 158 at least, the genuineness of which is attested by the defence which Polybius (xii.) makes of Aristotle’s history of the Epizephyrian Locrians against Timaeus, Aristotle’s contemporary and critic. Hitherto, only fragments have come down to us (cf.Fragm. 381-603). The present treatise, without however its beginning and end, written on a papyrus discovered in Egypt and now in the British Museum, was first edited by F.G. Kenyon 1890-1891.] (See the articleConstitution of Athens.)
A. Logical
1.Κατηγορίαι:Categoriae: On simple expressions signifying different kinds of things and capable of predication [probably an early work of Aristotle, accepting species and genera as “secondary substances” in deference to Plato’s teaching].
2.περὶ Έρμηνείας:De interpretatione: On language as expression of mind, and especially on the enunciation or assertion (ἀπόφανσις, ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος) [rejected by Andronicus according to Alexander; but probably an early work of Aristotle, based on Plato’s analysis of the sentence into noun and verb].
3.Άναλυτικὰ πρότερα:Analytica Priora, On syllogism, with a view to demonstration.
4.Άναλυτικὰ ὔστερα:Analytica Posteriora: On demonstration, or demonstrative or scientific syllogism (ἀπόδειξις, ἀποδεικτικὸς ἢ ἐπιστημονικὸς συλλογισμός).
5.Τοπικά:Topica: On dialectical syllogism (διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμός), so called from consisting mainly of commonplaces (τόποι.loci), or general sources of argument.
6.Σοφιστικοὶ ἒλεγχοι:Sophistici Elenchi: On sophistic (σοφιστικὸς) or eristic syllogism (ἐριστικὸς συλλογισμός), so called from the fallacies used by sophists in refutation (ἒλεγχος) of their opponents.
[Numbers 1-6 were afterwards grouped together as theOrganon.]
B. Physical
1.Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις:Physica Auscultatio: On Nature as cause of change, and the general principles of natural science.
2.περὶ οὐρανοῦ:De coelo: On astronomy, &c.
3.περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς:De generatione et corruptione: On generation and destruction in general.
4.Μετεωρολογικά:Meteorologica: On sublunary changes.
5. †περὶ κόσμου:De mundo: On the universe. [Supposed by Zeller to belong to the latter half of the 1st centuryB.C.]
6.περὶ ψυχῆς:De anima: On soul, conjoined with organic body.
7.περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν:De sensu et sensili: On sense and objects of sense.
8.περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως:De memoria et reminiscentia: On memory and recollection.
9.περὶ ὒπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως:De somno et vigilia: On sleep and waking.
10.περὶ ἐνυπνίων:De insomniis: On dreams.
11.περὶ τῆς καθ᾽ ὔπνον μαντικῆςorπερὶ μαντικῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὔπνοις:De divinatione per somnum: On prophecy in sleep.
12.περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος:De longitudine et brevitate vitae: On length and shortness of life.
13.περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ περὶ ζωῆςκαὶ θανάτου:De juventute et senectute et de vita et morte: On youth and age, and on life and death.
14.περὶ ἀναπνοῆς:De respiratione: On respiration. [Numbers 7-14 are grouped together as Parva naturalia.]
15. †περὶ πνεύματος:De spiritu: On innate spirit (spiritus vitalis).
16.περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι:Historia animalium: Description of facts about animals,i.e.their organs. &c.
17.περὶ ζᾠων μορίων.De partibus animalium: Philosophy of the causes of the facts about animals,i.e.their functions.
18. †περὶ ζᾠων κινήσεως:De animalium motione: On the motion of animals. [Ascribed to the school of Theophrastus and Strato by Zeller.]
19.περὶ ζᾠων πορείας:De animalium incessu: On the going of animals.
20.περὶ ζᾠων γενἐσεως:De animalium generatione: On the generation of animals.
21. †περὶ χρωμάτων:De coloribus: On colours. [Ascribed to the school of Theophrastus and Strato by Zeller.]
22. †πεςὶ ἀκουστῶν:De audibilibus. [Ascribed to the school of Theophrastus and Strato by Zeller.]
23. †Φυσιογνωμονικά:Physiognomonica: On physiognomy, and the sympathy of body and soul.
24. †περὶ φυτῷν:De plantis: On plants. [Not Aristotle’s work on this subject.]
25. †περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων:De mirabilibus ausculationibus: On phenomena chiefly connected with natural history.
26. †Μηχανικά:Quaestiones mechanicae: Mechanical questions.
C. Miscellaneous
1. †Προβλήματα:Problemata: Problems on various subjects [gradually collected by the Peripatetics from partly Aristotelian materials, according to Zeller].
2. †περὶ ἀτομῶν γραμμῶν:De insecabilibus lineis: On indivisible lines. [Ascribed to Theophrastus, or his time, by Zeller.]
3. †ἀνέμων θέσεις καὶ προσηγορίαι:Ventorum situs et appellationes: A fragment on the winds.
4. †περὶ Ξενοφάνους, περὶ Ζήνωνος, περὶ Γοργίου:De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia: On Xenophanes, Zeno and Gorgias.
D. Primary Philosophy or Theology or Wisdom
τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά:Metaphysica: On being as being and its properties, its causes and principles, and on God as the motive motor of the world.
E. Practical
1.Ήθικὰ Νικομάχεια:Ethica Nicomachea: On the good of the individual.
2. †Ήθικὰ μεγάλα:Magna Moralia: On the same subject. [According to Zeller, an abstract of theNicomacheanand theEudemian Ethics, tending to follow the latter, but possibly an early draft of theNicomachean Ethics.]
3. †Ήθικὰ Εὐδήμιαorπρὸς Εὔδημον:Ethica ad Eudemum: On the same subject. [Usually supposed to be written by Eudemus, but possibly an early draft of theNicomachean Ethics.]
4. †περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν:De virtutibus et vitiis: On virtues and vices. [An eclectic work of the 1st centuryB.C., half Academic and half Peripatetic, according to Zeller.]
5.Πολιτικά:De re publica: Politics, on the good of the state.
6. †Οἰκονομικά:De cura rei familiaris: Economics, on the good of the family. [The first book a work of the school of Theophrastus or Eudemus, the second later Peripatetic, according to Zeller.]
F. Art
1.τἐχνη ῾Ρητορική:Ars rhetorica: On the art of oratory.
2. †῾Ρητορικὴ πρὸς: Άλέξανδρον:Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: On the same subject. [Ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus (fl. 365, Diodorus xv. 76) by Petrus Victorius, and Spengel, but possibly an earlier rhetoric by Aristotle.]
3.περὶ Ποιητικῆς:De poetica: On the art of poetry [fragmentary].
G. Historical
Άθηναίων πολιτείαDe republica Atheniensium: On the Constitution of Athens. [One of theΠολιτεῖαι, said to have been 158 at least, the genuineness of which is attested by the defence which Polybius (xii.) makes of Aristotle’s history of the Epizephyrian Locrians against Timaeus, Aristotle’s contemporary and critic. Hitherto, only fragments have come down to us (cf.Fragm. 381-603). The present treatise, without however its beginning and end, written on a papyrus discovered in Egypt and now in the British Museum, was first edited by F.G. Kenyon 1890-1891.] (See the articleConstitution of Athens.)
The Difficulty.—The genuineness of the Aristotelian works, as Leibnitz truly said (De Stilo Phil. Nizolii, xxx.), is ascertained by the conspicuous harmony of their theories, and by their uniform method of swift subtlety. Nevertheless difficulties lurk beneath their general unity of thought and style. In style they are not quite the same: now they are brief and now diffuse: sometimes they are carelessly written, sometimes so carefully as to avoid hiatus,e.g.theMetaphysicsΑ, and parts of theDe CoeloandParva Naturalia, which in this respect resemble the fragment quoted by Plutarch from the early dialogueEudemus(Fragm. 44). They also appear to contain displacements, interpolations, prefaces such as that to theMeteorologica, and appendices such as that to theSophistical Elenchi, which may have been added. An Aristotelian work often goes on continuously at first, and then becomes disappointing by suddenly introducing discussions which break the connexion or are even inconsistent with the beginning; as in thePosterior Analytics, which, after developing a theory of demonstration from necessary principles, suddenly makes the admission, which is also the main theory of science in theMetaphysics, that demonstration is about either the necessary or the contingent, from principles either necessary or contingent, only not accidental. At times order is followed by disorder, as in thePolitics. Again, there are repetitions and double versions,e.g.those of thePhysics, vii., and those of theDe Anima, ii., discovered by Torstrik; or two discussions of the same subject,e.g.of pleasure in theNicomachean Ethics, vii. and x.; or several treatises on the same subject very like one another, viz. theNicomachean Ethics, theEudemian Ethicsand theMagna Moralia; or, strangest of all, a consecutive treatise and other discourses amalgamated,e.g.in theMetaphysics, where a systematic theory of being running through several books (Β, Γ, Ε, Ζ, Η, Θ) is preceded, interrupted and followed by other discussions of the subject. Further, there are frequently several titles of the same work or of different parts of it. Sometimes diagrams (διαγραφαίorὑπογραφαί) are mentioned, and sometimes given (e.g.inDe Interp. 13, 22 a 22;Nicomachean Ethics, ii. 7;Eudemian Ethics, ii. 3), but sometimes only implied (e.g.inHist. An.i. 17, 497 a 32; iii. 1, 510 a 30; iv. 1, 525 a 9). The different works are more or less connected by a system of references, which give rise to difficulties, especially when they are cross-references: for example, theAnalyticsandTopicsquote one another: so do thePhysicsand theMetaphysics; theDe VitaandDe Respirationeand theDe Partibus Animalium; this latter treatise and theDe Animalium Incessu; theDe Interpretationeand theDe Anima. A late work may quote an earlier; but how, it may be asked, can the earlier reciprocally quote the later?
Besides these difficulties in and between the works there are others beyond them. On the one hand, there is the curious story given partly by Strabo (608-609) and partly in Plutarch’sSulla(c. 26), that Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus left the books of both to their joint pupil, Neleus of Scepsis, where they were hidden in a cellar, till in Sulla’s time they were sold to Apellicon, who made new copies, transferred after Apellicon’s death by Sulla to Rome, and there edited and published by Tyrannio and Andronicus. On the other hand, there are the curious and puzzling catalogues of Aristotelian books, one given by Diogenes Laertius, another by an anonymous commentator (perhaps Hesychius of Miletus) quoted in the notes of Gilles Ménage on Diogenes Laertius, and known as “Anonymus Menagii,” and a third copied by two Arabian writers from Ptolemy, perhaps King Ptolemy Philadelphus, son of the founder of the library at Alexandria. (See Rose,Fragm. pp. 1-22.) But the extraordinary thing is that, without exactly agreeing among themselves, the catalogues give titles which do not agree well with the Aristotelian works as we have them. A title in some cases suits a given work or a part of it; but in other cases there are no titles for works which exist, or titles for works which do not exist.
These difficulties are complicated by various hypotheses concerning the composition of the Aristotelian works. Zeller supposes that, though Aristotle may have made preparations for his philosophical system beforehand, still the properly didactic treatises composing it almost all belong to the last period of his life,i.e.from 335-334 to 322; and from the references of one work to another Zeller has further suggested a chronological order of composition during this period of twelve years, beginning with the treatises on Logic and Physics, and ending with that on Metaphysics. There is a further hypothesis that the Aristotelian works were not originally treatises, but notes of lectures either for or by his pupils. This easily passes into the further and still more sceptical hypothesis that the works, as we have them, under Aristotle’s name, are rather the works of the Peripatetic school, from Aristotle, Theophrastus and Eudemus downwards. “We cannot assert with certainty,” says R. Shute in hisHistory of the Aristotelian Writings(p. 176), “that we have even got throughout a treatise in the exact words of Aristotle, though we may be pretty clear that we have a fair representation of his thought. The unity of style observable may belong quite as much to the school and the method as to the individual.” This sceptical conclusion, the contrary of that drawn by Leibnitz from the harmony of thought and style pervading the works, shows us that the Homeric question has been followed by the Aristotelian question.
The Solution.—Such hypotheses attend to Aristotle’s philosophy to the neglect of his life. He was really, as we have seen, a prolific writer from the time when he was a young man under Plato’s guidance at Athens; beginning with dialogues in the manner of his master, but afterwards preferring to write didactic works during the prime of his own life between thirty-eight and fifty (347-335-334), and with the further advantage of leisure at Atarneus and Mitylene, in Macedonia and at home in Stagira. When at fifty he returned to Athens, as head of the Peripatetic school, he no doubt wrote much of his extant philosophy during the twelve remaining years of his life (335-322). But he was then a busy teacher, was growing old, and suffered from a disease in the stomach for a considerable time before it proved fatal at the age of sixty-three. It is therefore improbable that he could between fifty and sixty-three have written almost the whole of the many books on many subjects constituting that grand philosophical system which is one of the most wonderful works of man. It is far more probable that he was previously composing them at his leisure and in the vigour of manhood, precisely as his contemporary Demosthenes composed all his great speeches except theDe Coronabefore he was fifty.
Turning to Aristotle’s own works, we immediately light upon a surprise: Aristotle began his extant scientific works during Plato’s lifetime. By a curious coincidence, in two different works he mentions two different events as contemporary with the time of writing, one in 357 and the other in 356. In thePolitics(Ε 10, 1312 b 10), he mentions as now (νῦν) Dion’s expedition to Sicily which occurred in 357. In theMeteorologica(iii. 1, 371 a 30), he mentions as now (νῦν) the burning of the temple at Ephesus, which occurred in 356. To save his hypothesis of late composition, Zeller resorts to the vagueness of the word “now” (νῦν). But Aristotle is graphically describing isolated events, and could hardly speak of events of 357 and 356 as happening “now” in or near 335. Moreover, these two works contain further proofs that they were both begun earlier than thisdate. ThePolitics(Β 10) mentions as having happened lately (νεωστί) the expedition of Phalaecus to Crete, which occurred towards the end of the Sacred War in 346. TheMeteorologica(Γ 7) mentions the comet of 341. It is true that thePoliticsalso mentions much later events,e.g.the assassination of Philip which took place in 336 (Ε 10, 1311 b 1-3). Indeed, the whole truth about this great work is that it remained unfinished at Aristotle’s death. But what of that? The logical conclusion is that Aristotle began writing it as early as 357, and continued writing it in 346, in 336, and so on till he died. Similarly, he began theMeteorologicaas early as 356 and was still writing it in 341. Both books were commenced some years before Plato’s death: both were works of many years: both were destined to form parts of the Aristotelian system of philosophy. It follows that Aristotle, from early manhood, not only wrote dialogues and didactic works, surviving only in fragments, but also began some of the philosophical works which are still parts of his extant writings. He continued these and no doubt began others during the prime of his life. Having thus slowly matured his separate writings, he was the better able to combine them more and more into a system, in his last years. No doubt, however, he went on writing and rewriting well into the last period of his life; for example, the recently discoveredΆθηναίων πολιτείαmentions on the one hand (c. 54) the archonship of Cephisophon (329-328), on the other hand (c. 46) triremes and quadriremes but without quinqueremes, which first appeared at Athens in 325-324; and as it mentions nothing later it probably received its final touches between 320 and 324. But it may have been begun long before, and received additions and changes. However early Aristotle began a book, so long as he kept the manuscript, he could always change it. Finally he died without completing some of his works, such as thePolitics, and notably that work of his whole philosophic career and foundation of his whole philosophy—theMetaphysics—which, projected in his early criticism of Plato’s philosophy of universal forms, gradually developed into his positive philosophy of individual substances, but remained unfinished after all.
On the whole, then, Aristotle was writing his extant works very gradually for some thirty-five years (357-322), like Herodotus (iv. 30) contemplated additions, continued writing them more or less together, not so much successively as simultaneously, and had not finished writing at his death.
There is a curious characteristic connected with this gradual composition. An Aristotelian treatise frequently has the appearance of being a collection of smaller discourses (λόγοι), as,e.g., K.L. Michelet has remarked.
This is obvious enough in theMetaphysics: it has two openings (Books Α and α); then comes a nearly consecutive theory of being (Β, Γ, Ε, Ζ, Η, Θ), but interrupted by a philosophical lexicon Δ; afterwards follows a theory of unity (Ι); then a summary of previous books and of doctrines from thePhysics(Κ); next a new beginning about being, and, what is wanted to complete the system, a theory of God in relation to the world (Λ); finally a criticism of mathematical metaphysics (Μ, Ν), in which the argument against Plato (Α 9) is repeated almost word for word (Μ 4-5). TheMetaphysicsis clearly a compilation formed from essays or discourses; and it illustrates another characteristic of Aristotle’s gradual method of composition. It refers back to passages “in the first discourses” (ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις) —an expression not uncommon in Aristotelian writings. Sometimes the reference is to the beginning of the whole treatise;e.g.Met. Β 2, 997 b 3-5, referring back to Α 6 and 9 about Platonic forms. Sometimes, on the other hand, the reference only goes back to a previous part of a given topic,e.g.Met. Θ 1, 1045 b 27-32, referring back to Ζ 1, or at the earliest to Γ 2. On either alternative, however, “the first discourses” mentioned may have originally been a separate discourse; for Book Γ begins quite fresh with the definition of the science of being, long afterwards called “Metaphysics,” and Book Ζ begins Aristotle’s fundamental doctrine of substance.
Another indication of a treatise having arisen out of separate discourses is its consisting of different parts imperfectly connected. Thus theNicomachean Ethicsbegins by identifying the good with happiness (εὐδαιμονία), and happiness with virtuous action. But when it comes to the moral virtues (Book iii. 6), a new motive of the “honourable” (τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα) is suddenly introduced without preparation, where one would expect the original motive of happiness. Then at the end of the moral virtues justice is treated at inordinate length, and in a different manner from the others, which are regarded as means between two vices, whereas justice appears as a mean only because it is of the middle between too much and too little. Later, the discussion on friendship (Books viii.-ix.) is again inordinate in length, and it stands alone. Lastly, pleasure, after having been first defined (Book vii.) as an activity, is treated over again (Book x.) as an end beyond activity, with a warning against confusing activity and pleasure. The probability is that theNicomachean Ethicsis a collection of separate discourses worked up into a tolerably systematic treatise; and the interesting point is that these discourses correspond to separate titles in the list of Diogenes Laertius (περὶ καλοῦ, περὶ δικαίων, περὶ φιλίας, περὶ ἡδονῆς, andπερὶ ἡδονῶν). The same list also refers to tentative notes (ὐπομνήματα ἐπιχειρηματικά), and the commentators speak of ethical notes (ἠθικὰ ὑπομνήματα). Indeed, they sometimes divide Aristotle’s works into notes (ὑπομνηματικά) and compilations (συνταγματικά). How can it be doubted that in the gradual composition of his works Aristotle began with notes (ὑπομνήματα) and discourses (λόγοι), and proceeded to treatises (πραγματείαι)? He would even be drawn into this process by his writing materials, which were papyrus rolls of some magnitude; he would tend to write discourses on separate rolls, and then fasten them together in a bundle into a treatise.
If then Aristotle was for some thirty-five years gradually and simultaneously composing manuscript discourses into treatises and treatises into a system, he was pursuing a process which solves beforehand the very difficulties which have since been found in his writings. He could very easily write in different styles at different times, now avoiding hiatus and now not, sometimes writing diffusely and sometimes briefly, partly polishing and partly leaving in the rough, according to the subject, his own state of health or humour, his age, and the degree to which he had developed a given topic; and all this even in the same manuscript as well as in different manuscripts, so that a difference of style between different parts of a work or between different works, explicable by one being earlier than another, does not prove either to be not genuine. As he might write, so might he think differently in his long career. To put one extreme case, about the soul he could think at first in theEudemuslike Plato that it is imprisoned in the body, and long afterwards in theDe Animalike himself that it is the immateriate essence of the material bodily organism. Again, he might be inconsistent; now, for example, calling a universal a substance in deference to Plato, and now denying that a universal can be a substance in consequence of his own doctrine that every substance is an individual; and so as to contradict himself in the same treatise, though not in the same breath or at the same moment of thinking. Again, in developing his discourses into larger treatises he might fall into dislocations; although it must be remembered that these are often inventions of critics who do not understand the argument, as when they make out that the treatment of reciprocal justice in theEthics(v. 5-6) needs rearrangement through their not noticing that, according to Aristotle, reciprocal justice, being the fairness of a commercial bargain, is not part of absolute or political justice, but is part of analogical or economical justice. Or he might make repetitions, as in the same book, where he twice applies the principle, that so far as the agent does the patient suffers, first to the corrective justice of the law court (Eth. v. 4) in order to prove that in a wrong the injurer gains as much as the injured loses, and immediately afterwards to the reciprocal justice of commerce (ib. 5) in order to prove that in a bargain a house must be exchanged for as many shoes as equal it in value. Or he might himself, without double versions, repeat the same argument with a different shade of meaning; as when in theNic. Ethics(vii. 4) he first argues that incontinenceabout such natural pleasures as that of gain is only modified incontinence, a sign (ascausa cognoscendi) of which is that it is not so bad as incontinence about carnal pleasures, and then argues that, because (ascausa essendi) it is only modified incontinence, therefore it is not so bad. Or he might return again and again to the same point with a difference: there is a good instance in his conclusion that the speculative life is the highest happiness; which he first infers because it is the life of man’s highest and divine faculty, intelligence (1176 b-1178 a 8), then after an interval infers a second time because our speculative life is an imitation of that of God (1178 b 7-32), and finally after another interval infers a third time, because it will make man most dear to God (1179 a 22-32). Or, extending himself as it were still more, he might write two drafts, or double versions of his own, on the same subject;e.g. Physics, vii. andDe Anima, ii. Or he might, going still further, in his long literary career write two or more treatises on the same subject, different and even more or less inconsistent with each other, as we shall find in the sequel. Finally, having a great number of discourses and treatises, containing all those small blemishes, around him in his library, and determined to collect, consolidate and connect them into a philosophical system, he would naturally be often taking them down from their places to consult and compare one with another, and as naturally enter in them references one to the other, and cross-references between one another. Thus he would enter in theMetaphysicsa reference to thePhysics, and in thePhysicsa reference to theMetaphysics, precisely because both were manuscripts in his library. For the same purpose of connexion he would be tempted to add a preface to a book like theMeteorologica. In order to refer back to thePhysics, theDe Coelo, and theDe Generatione, this work begins by stating that the first causes of all nature and all natural motion, the stars ordered according to celestial motion and the bodily elements with their transmutations, and generation and corruption have all been discussed; and by adding that there remains to complete this investigation, what previous investigators called meteorology. To suppose this preface, presupposing many sciences, to have been written in 356, when theMeteorologicahad been already commenced, would be absurd; but equally absurd would it be to reject that date on account of the preface, which even a modern author often writes long after his book. Nor is it at all absurd to suppose that, long after he began theMeteorologica, Aristotle himself added the preface in the process of gathering his general treatises on natural science into a system. So he might afterwards add the preface to theDe Interpretatione, in order to connect it with theDe Anima, though written afterwards, in order to connect his treatises on mind and on its expression. So also he might add the appendix to theSophistical Elenchi, long after he had written that book, and perhaps, to judge from its being a general claim to have discovered the syllogism, when the founder of logic had more or less realized that he had written a number of connected treatises on reasoning.
The Question of Publication.—There is still another point which would facilitate Aristotle’s gradual composition of discourses into treatises and treatises into a system; there was no occasion for him to publish his manuscripts beyond his school. Printing has accustomed us to publication, and misled us into applying to ancient times the modern method of bringing out one book after another at definite dates by the same author. But Greek authors contemplated works rather than books. Some of the greatest authors were not even writers: Homer, Aesop, Thales, Socrates. Some who were writers were driven to publish by the occasion; and after the orders of government, which were occasionally published to be obeyed, occasional poems, such as the poems of Solon, the odes of Pindar and the plays of the dramatists, which all had a political significance, were probably the first writings to be published or, rather, recited and acted, from written copies. With them came philosophical poems, such as those of Xenophanes and Empedocles; the epical history of Herodotus; the dramatic philosophy of Plato. On a larger scale speeches written by orators to be delivered by litigants were published and encouraged publication; and, as the Attic orators were his contemporaries, publication had become pretty common in the time of Aristotle, who speaks of many bundles (δέσμας) of judicial speeches by Isocrates being hawked about by the booksellers (Fragm. 140).
No doubt then Aristotle’s library contained published copies of the works of other authors, as well as the autographs of his own. It does not follow that his own works went beyond his library and his school. Publication to the world is designed for readers, who at all times have demanded popular literature rather than serious philosophy such as that of Aristotle. Accordingly it becomes a difficult question, how far Aristotle’s works were published in his lifetime. In answering it we must be careful to exclude any evidence which refers to Aristotle as a man, not as a writer, or refers to him as a writer but does not prove publication while he was alive.
Beginning then with his early writings, which are now lost, the dialoguesOn Poetryand theEudemuswere probably the published discourses to which Aristotle himself refers (Poetics, 15;De Anima, i. 4); and the dialogueProtrepticuswas known to the Cynic Crates, pupil of Diogenes and master of Zeno (Fragm. 50), but not necessarily in Aristotle’s lifetime, as Crates was still alive in 307. Again, Aristotle’s early rhetorical instructions and perhaps writings, as well as his opinion that a collection of proverbs is not worth while, must have been known outside Aristotle’s rhetorical school to the orator Cephisodorus, pupil of Isocrates and master of Demosthenes, for him to be able to write in hisReplies to Aristotle(ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Άριστοτέλην ἀντιγραφαῖς) an admired defence of Isocrates (Dionys. H.De Isoc. 18). But this early dialectic and rhetoric, being popular, would tend to be published. History comes nearer to philosophy; and Aristotle’sConstitutionswere known to his enemy Timaeus, who attacked him for disparaging the descent of the Locrians of Italy, according to Polybius (xii.), who defended Aristotle. But as Timaeus brought his history down to 264B.C.(Polyb. i. 5), and therefore might have got his information after Aristotle’s death, we cannot be sure that any of theConstitutionswere published in the author’s lifetime. We are equally at a loss to prove that Aristotle published his philosophy. He had, like all the great, many enemies, personal and philosophical; but in his lifetime they attacked the man, not his philosophy. In the Megarian school, first Eubulides quarrelled with him and calumniated him (Diog. Laert. ii. 109) in his lifetime; but the attack was on his life, not on his writings: afterwards Stilpo wrote a dialogue (Άριστοτέλης]), which may have been a criticism of the Aristotelian philosophy from the Megarian point of view; but he outlived Aristotle thirty years. In the absence of any confirmation, “the current philosophemata” (τὰ ἐγκύκλια φιλοσοφήματα), mentioned in theDe Coela(i. 9, 279 a 30), are sometimes supposed to be Aristotle’s published philosophy, to which he is referring his readers. But the example there given, that the divine is unchangeable, is precisely such a religious commonplace as might easily be a current philosopheme of Aristotle’s day, not of Aristotle; and this interpretation suits the parallel passage in theNic. Ethics(i. 5, 1096 a 3) where opinions about the happiness of political life are said to have been sufficiently treated “even in current discussions” (καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις).
There is therefore no contemporary proof that Aristotle published any part of his mature philosophical system in his lifetime. It is true that a book of Andronicus, as reported by Aulus Gellius (xx. 5), contained a correspondence between Alexander and Aristotle in which the pupil complained that his master had published his “acroatic discourses” (τοὺς ἀκροατικοὺς τῶν λόγων). But ancient letters are proverbially forgeries, and in the three hundred years which elapsed between the supposed correspondence and the time of Andronicus there was plenty of time for the forgery of these letters. But even if the correspondence is genuine, “acroatic discourses” must be taken to mean what Alexander would mean by them in the time of Aristotle, and not what they had come to mean by the time of Andronicus. Alexander meant those discourses which Aristotle, when he was his tutor, intended for the ears of himself and his fellow-pupils; such as the early political works onMonarchyand onColonies, and the early rhetorical works, theTheodectea, theCollection of Arts,and possibly theRhetoric to Alexander, in the preface to which the writer actually says to Alexander: “You wrote to me that nobody else should receive this book.” These few early works may have been published, and contrary to the wishes of Alexander, without affecting Aristotle’s later system. But even so, Alexander’s complaint would not justify writers three centuries later in taking Alexander to have referred to mature scientific writings, which were not addressed, and not much known, to him, the conqueror of Asia; although by the times of Andronicus and Aulus Gellius, Aristotle’s scientific writings were all called acroatic, or acroamatic, or sometimes esoteric, in distinction from exoteric—a distinction altogether unknown to Aristotle, and therefore to Alexander. In the absence of any contemporary evidence, we cannot believe that Aristotle in his lifetime published any, much less all, of his scientific books. The conclusion then is that Aristotle on the one hand to some extent published his early dialectical and rhetorical writings, because they were popular, though now they are lost, but on the other hand did not publish any of the extant historical and philosophical works which belong to his mature system, because they were best adapted to his philosophical pupils in the Peripatetic school. The object of the philosopher was not the applause of the public but the truth of things. Now this conclusion has an important bearing on the composition of Aristotle’s writings and on the difficulties which have been found in them. If he had like a modern author brought out each of his extant philosophical works on a definite day of publication, he would not have been able to change them without a second edition, which in the case of serious writings so little in demand would not be worth while. But as he did not publish them, but kept the unpublished manuscripts together in his library and used them in his school, he was able to do with them as he pleased down to the very end of his life, and so gradually to consolidate his many works into one system.
While Aristotle did not publish his philosophical works to the world, he freely communicated them to the Peripatetic school. They are not mere lectures; but he used them for lectures: he allowed his pupils to read them in his library, and probably to take copies from them. He also used diagrams, which are sometimes incorporated in his works, but sometimes are only mentioned, and were no doubt used for purposes of teaching. He also availed himself of his pupils’ co-operation, as we may judge from his description in theEthics(x. 7) of the speculative philosopher who, though he is self-sufficing, is better having co-operators (συνεργοὺς ἔχων). From an early time he had a tendency to address his writings to his friends. For example, he addressed theTheodecteato his pupil Theodectes; and even in ancient times a doubt arose whether it was a work of the master or the pupil. It was certainly by Aristotle, because it contained the triple grammatical division of words into noun, verb and conjunction, which the history of grammar recognized as his discovery. But we may explain the share of Theodectes by supposing that he had a hand in the work (cf. Dionys. H.De Comp. Verb.2; Quintilian i. 4. 18). Similarly in astronomy, Aristotle used the assistance of Eudoxus and Callippus. Indeed, throughout his writings he shows a constant wish to avail himself of what is true in the opinions of others, whether they are philosophers, or poets or ordinary people expressing their thoughts in sayings and proverbs. With one of his pupils in particular, Theophrastus, who was born about 370 and therefore was some fifteen years younger than himself, he had a long and intimate connexion; and the work of the pupil bears so close a resemblance to that of his master, that, even when he questions Aristotle’s opinions (as he often does), he seems to be writing in an Aristotelian atmosphere; while he shows the same acuteness in raising difficulties, and has caught something of the same encyclopaedic genius. Another pupil, Eudemus of Rhodes, wrote and thought so like his master as to induce Simplicius to call him the most genuine of Aristotle’s companions (ὁ γνησιώτατος τῶν Άριστοτέλους ἑταίρων). It is probable that this extraordinary resemblance is due to the pupils having actually assisted their master; and this supposition enables us to surmount a difficulty we feel in reading Aristotle’s works. How otherwise, we wonder, could one man writing alone and with so few predecessors compose the first systematic treatises on the psychology of the mental powers and on the logic of reasoning, the first natural history of animals, and the first civil history of one hundred and fifty-eight constitutions, in addition to authoritative treatises on metaphysics, biology, ethics, politics, rhetoric and poetry; in all penetrating to the very essence of the subject, and, what is most wonderful, describing more facts than any other man has ever done on so many subjects?
The Uncompleted Works.—Such then was the method of composition by which Aristotle began in early manhood to write his philosophical works, continued them gradually and simultaneously, combined shorter discourses into longer treatises, compared and connected them, kept them together in his library without publishing them, communicated them to his school, used the co-operation of his best pupils, and finally succeeded in combining many mature writings into one harmonious system. Nevertheless, being a man, he did not quite succeed. He left some unfinished; such as theCategories, in which the main part on categories is not finished, while the last part, afterwards called postpredicaments, is probably not his, thePoliticsand thePoetics. He left others imperfectly arranged, and some of the most important, theMetaphysics, thePoliticsand the logical writings. Of the imperfect arrangement of theMetaphysicswe have already spoken; and we shall speak of that of his logical writings when we come to the order of his whole system. At present thePoliticswill supply us with a conspicuous example of the imperfect arrangement of some, as well as of the gradual composition of all, of Aristotle’s extant writings.
ThePoliticswas begun as early as 357, yet not finished in 322. It betrays its origin from separate discourses. First comes a general theory of constitutions, right and wrong (Books Α, Β, Γ); and this part is afterwards referred to as “the first discourses” (ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις). Then follows the treatment of oligarchy, democracy, commonwealth and tyranny, and of the various powers of government (Δ), and independent investigation of revolution, and of the means of preserving states (Ε), and a further treatment of democracy and oligarchy, and of the different offices of the state (Ζ), and finally a return to the discussion of the right form of constitution (Η, Θ). But Δ and Ζ are a group interrupted by Ε, and Η and Θ are another group unconnected with the previous group and with Ε, and are also distinguished in style by avoiding hiatus. Further, the group (Δ, Ζ) and the group (Η, Θ) are both unfinished. Finally the group (Δ, Ζ), the book (Ε) and the group (Η, Θ) though unconnected with one another, are all connected though imperfectly with “the first discourses” (Α, Β, Γ). This complicated arrangement may be represented in the following diagram:—
The simplest explanation is that Aristotle began by writing separate discourses, four at least, on political subjects; that he continued to write them and perhaps tried to combine them: but that in the end he failed and left thePoliticsunfinished and in disorder. But modern commentators, possessed by the fallacy that Aristotle like a modern author must from the first have comtemplated a whole treatise in a regular order for definite publication, lose themselves in vain disputes as to whether to go by the traditional order of books indicated by their letters and known to have existed as early as the abstract (given in Stobaeus,Ecl.ii. 7) ascribed to Didymus (1st centuryA.D.), or to put the group Η, Θ, as more connected with Α, Β, Γ, before the group Δ, Ζ, and this group before the book Η. It is agreed, says Zeller, that the traditional order contradicts the original plan. But what right have we to say that Aristotle had an original plan?
The incomplete state in which Aristotle left theMetaphysics, thePoliticsand his logical works, brings us to the hard question how much he did, and how much his Peripatetic followers didto his writings after his death. To answer it we should have to go far beyond Aristotle. But two corollaries follow from our present investigation of his extant writings; the first, that it was the long continuance of the Peripatetic school which gradually caused the publication, and in some cases the forgery, of the separate writings; and the second, that his Peripatetic successors arranged and edited some of Aristotle’s writings, and gradually arrived by the time of Andronicus, the eleventh from Aristotle, at an order of the whole body of writings forming the system. Now, it is probable that the arrangement of the works which we are considering was done by the Peripatetic successors of Aristotle. There is nothing indeed in theMetaphysicsto show whether he left it in isolated treatises or in its present disorder; and nothing in thePolitics. On the other hand, in the case of logic, it is certain that he did not combine his works on the subject into one whole, but that the Peripatetics afterwards put them together as organic, and made them the parts of logic as an organon, as they are treated by Andronicus. Perhaps something similar occurred to theMetaphysics, as Alexander imputed its redaction to Eudemus, and the majority of ancient commentators attributed its second opening (Book α) to Pasicles, nephew of Eudemus. Again, it is not unlikely that thePoliticswas arranged in the traditional order of books by Theophrastus, and that this is the meaning of the curious title occurring in the list of Aristotle’s works as given by Diogenes Laertius,πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου α´β´γ´δ´ε´ς´ζ´η´, which agrees with thePoliticsin having eight books. Although, however, we may concede that such great works as theMetaphysics, thePoliticsand the logical writings did not receive their present form from Aristotle himself, that concession does not deprive Aristotle of the authorship, but only of the arrangement of those works. On the contrary, Theophrastus and Eudemus, his immediate followers, both wrote works presupposing Aristotle’sMetaphysicsand his logical works, and Dicaearchus, their contemporary, used hisPoliticsfor his ownTripoliticus. It was Aristotle himself then who wrote these works, whether he arranged them or not; and if he wrote the incomplete works, thena fortiorihe wrote the completed works except those which are proved spurious, and practically consummated the Aristotelian system, which, as Leibnitz said, by its unity of thought and style evinces its own genuineness and individuality. We must not exaggerate the school and underrate the individual, especially such an individual. What he mainly wanted was the time, the leisure and the labour, which we have supposed to have been given to the gradual composition of the extant Aristotelian writings. Aristotle, asked where dwell the Muses, answered, “In the souls of those who love work.”
IV. Earlier and Later Writings
Aristotle’s quotations of his other books and of historical facts only inform us at best of the dates of isolated passages, and cannot decide the dates and sequences of whole philosophical books which occupied him for many years. Is there then any way of discriminating between early and late works? There is the evidence of the influences under which the books were written. This evidence applies to the whole Aristotelian literature including the fragments. As to the fragments, we are safe in saying that the early dialogues in the manner of Plato were written under the influence of Plato, and that the subsequent didactic writings connected with Alexander were written more under the influence of Philip and Alexander. Turning to the extant writings, we find that some are more under the influence of Plato, while others are more original and Aristotelian. Also some writings are more rudimentary than others on the same subject; and some have the appearance of being first drafts of others. By these differences we can do something to distinguish between earlier and later philosophical works; and also vindicate as genuine some works, which have been considered spurious because they do not agree in style or in matter with his most mature philosophy. In thirty-five years of literary composition, Aristotle had plenty of time to change, because any man can differ from himself at different times.
On these principles, we regard as early genuine philosophical works of Aristotle, (1) theCategories, (2) theDe Interpretatione;(3) theEudemian EthicsandMagna Moralia; (4) theRhetoric to Alexander.
1. The Categories (κατηγορίαι).—This short discourse turns on Aristotle’s fundamental doctrine of individual substances, without which there is nothing. He arrives at it from a classification of categories, by which he here means “things stated in no combination” (τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα) or what we should call “names,” capable of becoming predicates (κατηγορούμενα κατηγορίαι). “Every name,” says he (chap. 4), “signifies either substance or something quantitative, or qualitative, or relative, or somewhere, or sometimes, or that it is in a position, or in a condition, or active or passive.” He immediately adds that, by the combination of these names with one another, affirmation or negation arises. The categories then are names signifying things capable of becoming predicates in a proposition. Next he proceeds to substances (οὐσίαι), which he divides into primary (πρῶται) and secondary (δεύτεραι). “Substance”, says he (chap. 5), “which is properly, primarily and especially so called, is that which is neither a predicate of a subject nor inherent in a subject; for example, a particular man, or a particular horse. Secondary substances so called are the species in which are the primarily called substances, and the genera of these species: for example, a particular man is in a species, man, the genus of which is animal: these then are called secondary substances, man and animal.” Having made these subdivisions of substance, he thereupon reduces secondary substances and all the rest of the categories to belongings of individual or primary substances. “All other things”, says he, “are either predicates of primary substances as subjects” (καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν) “or inherent in them as subjects” (ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς). He explains that species and genus are predicates of, and that other categories (e.g.the quality of colour) are inherent in, some individual substance such as a particular man. Then follows his conclusion: “without primary substances it is impossible for anything to be” (μὴ οὐσῶν οῧν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.Cat.5, 2 b 5-6).
Things are individual substances, without which there is nothing—this is the fundamental point of Aristotelianism, as against Platonism, of which the fundamental point is that things are universal forms without which there becomes nothing. The world, according to Aristotle, consists of substances, each of which is a separate individual, this man, this horse, this animal, this plant, this earth, this water, this air, this fire; in the heavens that moon, that sun, those stars; above all, God. On the other hand, a universal species or genus of substances is a predicate which, as well as everything else in all the other categories, always belongs to some individual substance or other as subject, and has no separate being. In full, then, a substance is a separate individual, having universals, and things in all other categories, inseparably belonging to it. The individual substance Socrates, for example, is a man and an animal (οὐσία), tall, (ποσόν), white (ποιόν), a husband (πρός τι), in the market (ποῦ), yesterday (πότε), sitting (κεῖσθαι), armed (ἔχειν), talking (ποιεῖν), listening (πάσχειν). Aristotelianism is this philosophy of substantial things.