Chapter 13

Authorities.—W.S. Holdsworth,History of English Law, vol. iii.; Pollock and Maitland,History of English Law; Stephen,History of Criminal Law, vol. iii.; Stephen,Commentaries; Russell onCrimes.

ARSONVAL,a village of France in the department of Aube, lies on the right bank of the Aube, about 30 m. east of Troyes. It has a church dating from the 12th century. Pop. 434.

ARSOT,the name of a forest in France, in the immediate neighbourhood of Belfort. It has an area of about 1500 acres, is almost encircled by a small stream, the Eloie, and is about 1400 ft. above the sea. On the east it is continued by the forest of Denney, which contains the fortress of Roppe, dominating the road from Colmar into France.

ARSUF,a town on the coast of Palestine, 12 m. N.N.E. of Jaffa, famous as the scene of a victory of the crusaders under Richard I. of England over the army of Saladin. After the capture of Acre on the 12th of July 1191, the army of the crusaders, under Richard Cœur-de-Lion and the duke of Burgundy, opened their campaign for the recovery of Jerusalem by marching southward towards Jaffa, from which place it was intended to move direct upon the holy city. The march wasalong the sea-shore, and, the forces of Saladin being in the vicinity, the army moved in such a formation as to be able to give battle at any moment. Richard thus moved slowly, but in such compact order as to arouse the admiration even of the enemy. The right column of baggage and supplies, guarded by infantry, was nearest the sea, the various corps of heavy cavalry, one behind the other, formed the central column, and on the exposed left flank was the infantry, well closed up, and “level and firm as a wall,” according to the testimony of Saracen authors. The columns were united into a narrow rectangle by the advanced and rear guards. The whole march was a running fight between untiring horse-archers and steady infantry. Only once did the column open out, and the opportunity was swiftly seized by the Saracens, yet so rapid was the rally of the crusaders that little damage was done (August 25). The latter maintained for many days an absolutely passive defence, and could not be tempted to fight; Richard and his knights made occasional charges, but quickly withdrew, and on the 7th of September this irregular skirmishing, in which the crusaders had scarcely suffered at all, culminated in the battle of Arsuf. Saladin had by now decided that the only hope of success lay in compelling the rear of the Christians’ column to halt—and thus opening a gap, should the van be still on the move. Richard, on the other hand, had prepared for action by closing up still more, and as the crusaders were now formed a simple left turn brought them into two lines of battle, infantry in first line, cavalry in second line. Near Arsuf the road entered a defile between the sea and a wooded range of hills; and from the latter the whole Moslem army suddenly burst forth. The weight of the attack fell upon the rear of Richard’s column, as Saladin desired. The column slowly continued its march, suffering heavily in horses, but otherwise unharmed. The first assault thus made no impression, but a fierce hand-to-hand combat followed, in which the Hospitallers, who formed the rear of the Christian army, were hard pressed. Their grand master, like many other subordinates in history, repeatedly begged to be allowed to charge, but Richard, who on this occasion showed the highest gift of generalship, that of feeling the pulse of the fight, waited for the favourable moment. Almost as he gave the signal for the whole line to charge, the sorely pressed Hospitallers rode out upon the enemy on their own initiative. At once the whole of the cavalry followed suit. The head (or right wing) and centre were not closely engaged, and their fleeter opponents had time to ride off, but the rear of the column carried all before it in its impetuous onset, and cut down the Saracens in great numbers. A second charge, followed by a third, dispersed the enemy in all directions. The total loss of the Saracens was more than tenfold that of the Christians, who lost but seven hundred men. The army arrived at Jaffa on the 10th of September.

See Oman,Hist. of the Art of War, ii. 303-317.

ARSURE,a village of France in the department of Jura, has some stone quarries and extensive layers of peat in its neighbourhood. Its church has a choir dating from the 11th century. Pop. 370.

ARSURES,a village of France in the department of Jura, situated on a small stream, the Lurine. It is surrounded by vineyards, from which excellent wine is produced. Pop. 233.

ART,a word in its most extended and most popular sense meaning everything which we distinguish from Nature. Art and Nature are the two most comprehensive genera of which the human mind has formed the conception. Under the genus Nature, or the genus Art, we include all the phenomena of the universe. But as our conception of Nature is indeterminate and variable, so in some degree is our conception of Art. Nor does such ambiguity arise only because some modes of thought refer a greater number of the phenomena of the universe to the genus Nature, and others a greater number to the genus Art. It arises also because we do not strictly limit the one genus by the other. The range of the phenomena to which we point, when we say Art, is never very exactly determined by the range of the other phenomena which at the same time we tacitly refer to the order of Nature. Everybody understands the general meaning of a phrase like Chaucer’s “Nature ne Art ne koude him not amende,” or Pope’s “Blest with each grace of nature and of art.” In such phrases we intend to designate familiarly as Nature all which exists independently of our study, forethought and exertion—in other words, those phenomena in ourselves or the world which we do not originate but find; and we intend to designate familiarly as Art all which we do not find but originate—or, in other words, the phenomena, which we add by study, forethought and exertion to those existing independently of us. But we do not use these designations consistently. Sometimes we draw an arbitrary line in the action of individuals and societies, and say, Here Nature ends and Art begins—such a law, such a practice, such an industry even, is natural, and such another is artificial; calling those natural which happen spontaneously and without much reflection, and the others artificial. But this line different observers draw at different places. Sometimes we adopt views which waive the distinction altogether. One such view is that wherein all phenomena are regarded as equally natural, and the idea of Nature is extended so as to include “all the powers existing in either the outer or the inner world, and everything which exists by means of those powers.” In this view Art becomes a part of Nature. It is illustrated in the familiar passage of Shakespeare, where Polixenes reminds Perdita that

“Nature is made better by no mean,But nature makes that mean: so, over that artWhich, you say, adds to nature, is an artThat nature makes.” ...“This is an artWhich does mend nature, change it rather, butThe art itself is nature.”

“Nature is made better by no mean,

But nature makes that mean: so, over that art

Which, you say, adds to nature, is an art

That nature makes.” ...

“This is an art

Which does mend nature, change it rather, but

The art itself is nature.”

A posthumous essay of John Stuart Mill contains a full philosophical exposition and defence of this mode of regarding the relations of Nature and Art. Defining Nature as above, and again as a “collective name for all facts, actual and possible,” that writer proceeds to say that such a definition

“is evidently inapplicable to some of the modes in which the word is familiarly employed. For example, it entirely conflicts with the common form of speech by which Nature is opposed to Art, and natural to artificial. For in the sense of the word Nature which has thus been defined, and which is the true scientific sense, Art is as much Nature as anything else; and everything which is artificial is natural—Art has no independent powers of its own: Art is but the employment of the powers of Nature for an end. Phenomena produced by human agency no less than those which, as far as we are concerned, are spontaneous, depend on the properties of the elementary forces, or of the elementary substances and their compounds. The united powers of the whole human race could not create a new property of matter in general, or of any one of its species. We can only take advantage for our purposes of the properties we find. A ship floats by the same laws of specific gravity and equilibrium as a tree uprooted by the wind and blown into the water. The corn which men raise for food grows and produces its grain by the same laws of vegetation by which the wild rose and the mountain strawberry bring forth their flowers and fruit. A house stands and holds together by the natural properties, the weight and cohesion of the materials which compose it. A steam engine works by the natural expansive force of steam, exerting a pressure upon one part of a system of arrangements, which pressure, by the mechanical properties of the lever, is transferred from that to another part, where it raises the weight or removes the obstacle brought into connexion with it. In these and all other artificial operations the office of man is, as has often been remarked, a very limited one; it consists of moving things into certain places. We move objects, and by doing this, bring some things into contact which were separate, or separate others which were in contact; and by this simple change of place, natural forces previously dormant are called into action, and produce the desired effect. Even the volition which designs, the intelligence which contrives, and the muscular force which executes these movements, are themselves powers of Nature.”

Another mode of thought, in some sort complementary to the last, is based on the analogy which the operations of forces external to a man bear to the operations of man himself. Study, forethought and exertion are assigned to Nature, and her operations are called operations of Art. This view was familiar to ancient systems of philosophy, and especially to that of the Stoics. According to the report of Cicero, Nature as conceived by Zeno was a fire, and at the same time a voluntary agent having the power or art of creating things with regularity and design (“naturam esse ignem artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via”). To this fire not merely creative force andsystematic action were ascribed, but actual personality. Nature was “non artificiosa solum, sed plane artifex.” “That which in the works of human art is done by hands, is done with much greater art by Nature, that is, by a fire which exercises an art and is the teacher of other arts.” This conception of Nature as an all-generating fire, and at the same time as a personal artist both teaching and including in her own activity all the human arts, on the one hand may be said, with Polixenes and J.S. Mill, to merge Art in Nature; but on the other hand it finds the essence of Nature in the resemblance of her operations to those of Art. “It is thepropriumof art,” according to the same system, “to create and beget,” and the reasoning proceeds—Nature creates and begets, therefore Nature is an artist or Demiurgus. A kindred view is set forth by Sir Thomas Browne in theReligio Medici, when he declares that “all things are artificial; for Nature is the Art of God.”

But these modes of thought, according to which, on the one hand, the processes of Art are included among processes of Nature, or on the other the processes of Nature among the processes of Art, are exceptional. In ordinary use the two conceptions, each of them somewhat vague and inexact, are antithetical. Their antithesis was what Dr Johnson had chiefly in his mind when he defined Art as “the power of doing something which is not taught by Nature or by instinct.” But this definition is insufficient, because the abstract word Art, whether used of all arts at once or of one at a time, is a name not only for the power of doing something, but for the exercise of the power; and not only for the exercise of the power, but for the rules according to which it is exercised; and not only for the rules, but for the result. Painting, for instance, is an art, and the word connotes not only the power to paint, but the act of painting; and not only the act, but the laws for performing the act rightly; and not only all these, but the material consequences of the act or the thing painted. So of agriculture, navigation and the rest. Exception might also be taken to Dr Johnson’s definition on the ground that it excludes all actions of instinct from the genus Art, whereas usage has in more languages than one given the name of Art to several of those ingenuities in the lower animals which popular theory at the same time declares to be instinctive. Dante, for instance, speaks of boughs shaken by the wind, but not so violently as to make the birds forgo their Art—

“Non però dal lor esser dritto sparteTanto, che gl’ augelletti per le cimeLasciasser d’ operar ogni lorarte.”

“Non però dal lor esser dritto sparte

Tanto, che gl’ augelletti per le cime

Lasciasser d’ operar ogni lorarte.”

And Fontenelle, speaking in the language not of poetry but of science:—“Most animals—as, for instance, bees, spiders and beavers—have a kind of art peculiar to themselves; but each race of animals has no more than one art, and this one has had no first inventor among the race. Man, on the other hand, has an infinity of different arts which were not born with his race, and of which the glory is his own.” Dr Johnson might reply that those properties of variety and of originality or individual invention, which Fontenelle himself alleges in the ingenuities of man but not in those of the lower animals, are sufficient to make a generic difference, and to establish the impropriety of calling a honeycomb or a spider’s web a work of Art. It is not our purpose to trespass on ground so debateable as that of the nature of consciousness in the lower animals. Enough that when we use the term Art of any action, it is because we are thinking of properties in the action from which we infer, whether justly or not, that the agent voluntarily and designedly puts forth skill for known ends and by regular and uniform methods. If, then, we were called upon to frame a general definition of Art, giving the word its widest and most comprehensive meaning, it would run thus:—Every regulated operation or dexterity by which organized beings pursue ends which they know beforehand, together with the rules and the result of every such operation or dexterity.

Here it will be well to consider very briefly the natural history of the name which has been given to this very comprehensive conception by the principal branches of civilized mankind. Our own word Art the English language has taken, as all the Romance languages of modern Europe have taken theirs, directly from the Latin. The Latinars, according to the prevailing opinion of philologists, proceeds from a root AR, of which the primitive signification was to put or fit things together, and which is to be found in a large family of Greek words. The Greekτέχνη, the name both for arts in the particular and art in the abstract, is by its root related both toτέκ-τωνandτέκ-νον, and thus contains the allied ideas of making and begetting. Thepropriumof art in the logic of the Stoics, “to create and beget,” was strictly in accordance with this etymology. The TeutonicKunstis formed fromkönnen, andkönnenis developed from a primitiveIch kann. Inkannphilology is inclined to recognize a preterite form of a lost verb, of which we find the traces inKin-d, a child; and the formIch kannthus meaning originally “I begot,” contains the germ of the two several developments,—können, “to be master,” “to be able,” andkennen, “to know.” We thus see that the chief Indo-European languages have with one consent extended a name for the most elementary exercise of a constructive or productive power, till that name has covered the whole range of the skilled and deliberate operations of sentient beings.

In proportion as men left out of sight the idea of creation, of constructing or producing, “artificiosum esse ad gignendum,” which is the primitive half of this extended notion, and attended only to the idea of skill, of proceeding by regular and disciplined methods, “progredi via,” which is the superadded half, the whole notion Art, and the name for it, might become subject to a process of thought which, if analysed, would be like this:—What is done by regular and disciplined methods is Art; facts are observed and classified, and a systematic view of the order of the universe obtained, by regular and disciplined methods; the observing and classifying of facts, and obtaining a systematic view of the order of the universe, is therefore Art. To a partial extent this did unconsciously take place. Science, of which the essence is only in knowledge and theory, came to be spoken of as Art, of which the essence is all in practice and production. Cicero, notwithstanding his citation of the Stoical dictum that practice and production were of the essence of Art, elsewhere divides Art into two kinds—one by which things are only contemplated in the mind, another by which something is produced and done. (“Quumque artium aliud eiusmodi sit, ut tantummodo rem cernat; aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat.”—Acad. ii. 7.) Of the former kind his instance is geometry; of the latter the art of playing on the lyre. Now geometry, understanding by geometry an acquisition of the mind, that is, a collected body of observations and deductions concerning the properties of space and magnitude, is a science and not an art; although there is an art of the geometer, which is the skill by which he solves any given problem in his science, and the rules of that skill, and his exertion in putting it forth. And so every science has its instrumental art or practical discipline; and in as far as the word Art is used only of the practical discipline or dexterity of the geometer, the astronomer, the logician, the grammarian, or other person whose business it is to collect and classify facts for contemplation, in so far the usage is just. The same justification may be extended to another usage, whereby in Latin, and some of its derivative languages, the name Art came to be transferred in a concrete sense to the body of rules, the written code or manual, which lays down the discipline and regulates the dexterity; asars grammatica, ars logica, ars rhetoricaand the rest. But when the word is stretched so as to mean the sciences, as theoretical acquisitions of the mind, that meaning is illegitimate. Whether or not Cicero, in the passage above quoted, had in his mind the science of geometry as a collected body of observations and deductions, it is certain that the Ciceronian phrase of theliberal arts, theingenuous arts, both in Latin and its derivatives or translations in modern speech, has been used currently to denote the sciences themselves, and not merely the disciplines instrumental to them. Thetriviumand thequadrivium(grammar, logic and rhetoric—geometry, astronomy, music and arithmetic) have been habitually called arts, when some of them have been named in that sense in which they meannot arts but sciences, “only contemplating things in the mind.” Hence the nomenclature, history and practical organization, especially in Britain, of one great division of university studies: the division of “arts,” with its “faculty,” its examinations, and its degrees.

In the German language the words for Art and Science have in general been loosely interchanged. The etymology of the word for Art secured a long continuance for this ambiguity.Kunstwas employed indiscriminately in both the senses of the primitiveIch kann, to signify what I know, or Science, and what I can do, or Art. It was not till the end of the 17th century that a separate word for Science, the modernWissenschaft, came into use. On the other hand, the Greek wordτέχνη, with its distinct suggestion of the root signification to make or get, acted probably as a safeguard against this tendency. The distinction betweenτέχνη, Art or practice, andἐπιστήμη, knowledge or Science, is observed, though not systematically, in Greek philosophy. But for our present purpose, that of making clear the true relation between the one conception and the other, further quotation is rendered superfluous by the discussion the subject has received at the hands of the modern writer already quoted. Between Art, of which we practise the rules, and Science, of which we entertain the doctrines, J.S. Mill establishes the difference in the simplest shape, by pointing out that one grammatical mood is proper for the conclusions of Science, and another for those of Art. Science enunciates her conclusions in the indicative mood, whereas “the imperative is the characteristic of Art, as distinguished from Science.” And as Art utters her conclusions in her own form, so she supplies the substance of her own major premise.

“Every art has one first principle, or general major premise, not borrowed from science, that which enunciates the object aimed at, and affirms it to be a desirable object. The builder’s art assumes that it is desirable to have buildings; architecture (as one of the fine arts) that it is desirable to have them beautiful and imposing. The hygienic and medical arts assume, the one that the preservation of health, the other that the cure of disease, are fitting and desirable ends. These are not propositions of science. Propositions of science assert a matter of fact—an existence, a co-existence, a succession, or a resemblance. The propositions now spoken of do not assert that anything is, but enjoin or recommend that something should be. They are a class by themselves. A proposition of which the predicate is expressed by the wordsoughtorshould beis generically different from one which is expressed byisorwill be.”

And the logical relation of Art and Science, in other words, the manner of framing the intermediate member between the general major premise of Art and its imperative conclusion, is thus defined:—

“The Art [in any given case] proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the Science. The Science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to Art with a theorem of the causes and combinations by which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of the premises, therefore, which Art supplies, is the original major premise, which asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable. Science, then, lends to Art the proposition (obtained by a series of inductions or deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these premises Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable, and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept.... The grounds, then, of every rule of Art are to be found in the theorems of Science. An Art, or a body of Art, consists of the rules, together with as much of the speculative propositions as comprises the justification of these rules. The complete Art of any matter includes a selection of such a portion from the Science as is necessary to show on what conditions the effects, which the Art aims at producing, depend. And Art in general consists of the truths of Science arranged in the most convenient order for practice, instead of the order which is most convenient for thought. Science groups and arranges its truths so as to enable us to take in at one view as much as possible of the general order of the universe. Art, though it must assume the same general laws, follows them only into such of their detailed consequences as have led to the formation of rules of conduct, and brings together from parts of the field of Science most remote from one another, the truths relating to the production of the different and heterogeneous causes necessary to each effect which the exigencies of practical life require to be produced.”—(Mill’sLogic, vol. ii. pp. 542-549).

The whole discussion may be summed up thus. Science consists in knowing, Art consists in doing. What I must do in order to know, is Art subservient to Science: what I must know in order to do, is Science subservient to Art.

Art, then, is defined by two broad distinctions: first, its popular distinction from Nature; and next, its practical and theoretic distinction from Science. Both of these distinctions are observed in the terms of our definition given above. Within the proper limits of this definition, the conception of Art, and the use of the word for it, have undergone sundry variations. These variations correspond to certain vicissitudes or developments in the order of historical facts and in society. The requirements of society, stimulating the ingenuity of its individual members, have led to the invention of arts and groups of arts, constantly progressing, with the progress of civilization, in number, in complexity, and in resource. The religious imagination of early societies, who find themselves in possession of such an art or group of arts, forgets the history of the invention, and assigns it to the inspiration or special grace of some god or hero. So the Greeks assigned the arts of agriculture to Triptolemus, those of spinning and navigation to Athena, and of music to Apollo. At one stage of civilization one art or group of arts is held in higher esteem, another at another. In societies, like most of those of the ancient world, where slaves were employed in domestic service, and upon the handicrafts supplying the immediate utilities of life—food, shelter and clothing—these constituted a group of servile arts. The arts of husbandry or agriculture, on the other hand, have alternately been regarded as servile and as honourable according as their exercise has been in the hands of a subject class, as under feudal institutions, or, as under the Roman republic, of free cultivators. Under feudal institutions, or in a society in a state of permanent war, the allied arts of war and of government have been held the only honourable class. In commercial states, like the republics of Italy, the arts of gain, or of production (other than agricultural) and distribution, have made good their title to equal estimation and greater power beside the art of captains. But among peaceful arts, industries or trades, some have always been held to be of higher and others of lower rank; the higher rank being assigned to those that required larger operations, higher training, or more thoughtful conduct, and yielded ampler returns—the lower rank to those which called for simple manual exercise, especially if such exercise was of a disagreeable or degrading kind. In the cities of Italy, where both commerce and manufactures were for the first time organized on a considerable scale, the namearte, Art, was retained to designate the gilds or corporations by which the several industries were exercised; and, according to the nature of the industry, the art was classed as higher or lower (maggioreandminore).

The arts of which we have hitherto spoken have arisen from positive requirements, and supply what are strictly utilities, in societies; not excluding the art of war, at least so far as concerns one-half of war, the defensive half. But war continued to be an honourable pursuit, because it was a pursuit associated with birth, power and wealth, as well as with the virtue of courage, in cases where it had no longer the plea of utility, but was purely aggressive or predatory; and the arts of the chase have stood in this respect in an analogous position to those of war.

There are other arts which have not had their origin in positive practical needs, but have been practised from the first for pleasure or amusement. The most primitive human beings of whom we have any knowledge, the cave-dwellers of the palaeolithic period, had not only the useful art of chipping stones into spear-heads, knife-heads and arrow-heads, and making shafts or handles of these implements out of bone; they had also the ornamental art of scratching upon the bone handle the outlines of the animals they saw—mammoth, rhinoceros or reindeer—or of carving such a handle into a rude resemblance of one of these animals. Here we have a skill exercised, in the first case, for pure fancy or pleasure, and in the second, for adding an element of fancy or pleasure to an element of utility. Here, therefore, is thegerm of all those arts which produce imitations of natural objects for purposes of entertainment or delight, as painting, sculpture, and their subordinates; and of all those which fashion useful objects in one way rather than another because the one way gives pleasure and the other does not, as architecture and the subordinate decorative arts of furniture, pottery and the rest. Arts that work in a kindred way with different materials are those of dancing and music. Dancing works with the physical movements of human beings. Music works with sound. Between that imitative and plastic group, and the group of these which only produce motion or sound and pass away, there is the intermediate group of eloquence and the drama, which deal with the expression of human feeling in spoken words and acted gestures. There is also the comprehensive art of poetry, which works with the material of written words, and can ideally represent the whole material of human life and experience. Of all these arts the end is not use but pleasure, or pleasure before use, or at least pleasure and use conjointly. In modern language, there has grown up a usage which has put them into a class by themselves under the name of the Fine Arts, as distinguished from the Useful or Mechanical Arts. (SeeAestheticsandFine Arts.) Nay more, to them alone is often appropriated the use of the generic word Art, as if they and they only were the artsκατ᾽ ἐξοχήν. And further yet, custom has reduced the number which the class-word is meant to include. When Art and the works of Art are now currently spoken of in this sense, not even music or poetry is frequently denoted, but only architecture, sculpture and painting by themselves, or with their subordinate and decorative branches. In correspondence with this usage, another usage has removed from the class ofarts, and put into a contrasted class ofmanufactures, a large number of industries and their products, to which the generic term Art, according to our definition, properly applies. The definition covers themechanicalarts, which can be efficiently exercised by mere trained habit, rote or calculation, just as well as the fine arts, which have to be exercised by a higher order of powers. But the word Art, becoming appropriated to the fine arts, has been treated as if it necessarily carried along with it, and as if works to be called works of art must necessarily possess, the attributes of free individual skill and invention, expressing themselves in ever new combinations of pleasurable contrivance, and seeking perfection not as a means towards some ulterior practical end but as an ideal end in itself.

(S. C.)

ARTA(Narda,i.e.ἐν Ἄρδα, orZarta,i.e.εἰς Ἄρτα), a town of Greece, in the province of Arta, 59 m. N.N.W. of Mesolonghi. Pop. about 7000. It is built on the site of the ancient Ambracia (q.v.), its present designation being derived from a corruption of the name of the river Arachthus (Arta) on which it stands. This enters the Gulf of Arta some distance south of the town. The river forms the frontier between Greece and Turkey, and is crossed by a picturesque bridge, which is neutral ground. There are a few remains of old cyclopean walls. The town contains also a Byzantine castle, built on the lofty site of the ancient citadel; a palace belonging to the Greek metropolitan; a number of mosques, synagogues and churches, the most remarkable being the church of the Virgin of Consolation, founded in 819. The streets of the town were widened and improved in 1869. Manufacture of woollens, cottons, Russia leather and embroidery is carried on, and there is trade in cattle, wine, tobacco, hemp, hides and grain. Much of the neighbouring plain is very fertile, and the town is surrounded with gardens and orchards, in which orange, lemon and citron come to great perfection. In 1083 Arta was taken by Bohemund of Tarentum; in 1449 by the Turks; in 1688 by the Venetians. In 1797 it was held by the French, but in the following year, 1798, Ali Pasha of Iannina captured it. During the Greek War of Independence it suffered severely, and was the scene of several conflicts, in which the ultimate success was with the Turks. An insurrection in 1854 was at once repressed. It was ceded to Greece in 1881. In the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 the Greeks gained some temporary successes at Arta during April and May.

ARTA, GULF OF(anc.Sinus Ambracius), an inlet of the Ionian Sea, 25 m. long and 10 broad, most of the northern shores of which belong to Turkey, the southern and eastern to Greece. Its only important affluent, besides the Arta, is the Luro (anc.Charadra), also from the north. The gulf abounds with mullets, soles and eels. Around its shores are numerous ruins of ancient cities: Actium at the entrance, where the famous battle was fought in 31B.C.; Nicopolis, Argos, Limnaea and Olpae; and several flourishing towns, such as Preveza, Arta (anc.Ambracia), Karavasara or Karbasaras, and Vonitza.

The riverArta(anc.ArachthusorAratthus, in Livy xxxviii. 3,Aretho) is the chief river of Epirus, and is said to have been navigable in ancient times as far as Ambracia. Below this town it flows through a marshy plain, consisting mainly of its own alluvium; its upper course is through the territory of the Molossians; its total length is about 80 m.

ARTABANUS,the name of a number of Persian princes, soldiers and administrators. The most important are the following:—

1. Brother of Darius I., and, according to Herodotus, the trusted adviser of his nephew Xerxes. Herodotus makes him a principal figure in epic dialogues: he warns Darius not to attack the Scythians (iv. 83; cf. also iv. 143), and predicts to Xerxes his defeat by the Greeks (vii. 10 ff., 46 ff.); Xerxes sent him home to govern the empire during the campaign (vii. 52, 53).

2. Vizier of Xerxes (Ctesias,Pers. 20), whom he murdered in 465B.C.According to Aristotle,Pol. v. 1311 b, he had previously killed Xerxes’ son Darius, and was afraid that the father would avenge him; according to Ctesias,Pers. 29, Justin iii. 1, Diod. xi. 69, he killed Xerxes first and then pretended that Darius had murdered him, and instigated his brother Artaxerxes to avenge the parricide. At all events, during the first months of the reign of Artaxerxes I., he was the ruling power in the state (therefore the chronographers wrongly reckon him as king, with a reign of seven months), until Artaxerxes, having learned the truth about the murder of his father and his brother, overwhelmed and killed Artabanus and his sons in open fight.

3. A satrap of Bactria, who revolted against Artaxerxes I., but was defeated in two battles (Ctes.Pers. 31).

The name was borne also by four Parthian kings. The Parthian king Arsaces, who was attacked by Antiochus III. in 209, has been called Artabanus by some modern authors without any reason.

4.Artabanus I., successor of his nephew Phraates II. about 127B.C., perished in a battle against the Tochari, a Mongolian tribe, which had invaded the east of Iran (Justin xli. 2). He is perhaps identical with the Artabanus mentioned in Trogus, Prol. xlii.

5.Artabanus II.c.A.D.10-40, son of an Arsacid princess (Tac.Ann. vi. 48), lived in the East among the Dahan nomads. He was raised to the throne by those Parthian grandees who would not acknowledge Vonones I., whom Augustus had sent from Rome (where he lived as hostage) as successor of his father Phraates IV. The war between the two pretenders was long and doubtful; on a coin Vonones mentions a victory over Artabanus. At last Artabanus defeated his rival completely and occupied Ctesiphon; Vonones fled to Armenia, where he was acknowledged as king, under the protection of the Romans. But when Artabanus invaded Armenia, Vonones fled to Syria, and the emperor Tiberius thought it prudent to support him no longer. Germanicus, whom he sent to the East, concluded a treaty with Artabanus, in which he was recognized as king and friend of the Romans. Armenia was given (A.D.18) to Zeno, the son of the king of Pontus (Tac.Ann. ii. 3 f., 58; Joseph.Ant. 18. 24).

Artabanus II., like all Parthian princes, was much troubled by the opposition of the grandees. He is said to have been very cruel in consequence of his education among the Dahan barbarians (Tac.Ann. vi. 41). To strengthen his power he killed all the Arsacid princes whom he could reach (Tac.Ann. vi. 31). Rebellions of the subject nations may have occurred also. We learn that he intervened in the Greek city Seleucia in favour of the oligarchs (Tac.Ann. vi. 48), and that two Jewish brigandsmaintained themselves for years in Neerda in the swamps of Babylonia, and were acknowledged as dynasts by Artabanus (Jos.Ant.18. 9). InA.D.35 he tried anew to conquer Armenia, and to establish his son Arsaces as king there. A war with Rome seemed inevitable. But that party among the Parthian magnates which was hostile to Artabanus applied to Tiberius for a king of the race of Phraates. Tiberius sent Phraates’s grandson, Tiridates III., and ordered L. Vitellius (the father of the emperor) to restore the Roman authority in the East. By very dexterous military and diplomatic operations Vitellius succeeded completely. Artabanus was deserted by his followers and fled to the East. Tiridates, who was proclaimed king, could no longer maintain himself, because he appeared to be a vassal of the Romans; Artabanus returned from Hyrcania with a strong army of Scythian (Dahan) auxiliaries, and was again acknowledged by the Parthians. Tiridates left Seleucia and fled to Syria. But Artabanus was not strong enough for a war with Rome; he therefore concluded a treaty with Vitellius, in which he gave up all further pretensions (A.D.37). A short time afterwards Artabanus was deposed again, and a certain Cinnamus was proclaimed king. Artabanus took refuge with his vassal, the king Izates, of Adiabene; and Izates by negotiations and the promise of a complete pardon induced the Parthians to restore Artabanus once more to the throne (Jos.Ant.20. 3). Shortly afterwards Artabanus died, and was succeeded by his son, Vardanes, whose reign was still more turbulent than that of his father.

6.Artabanus III. reigned a short time inA.D.80 (on a coin of this year he calls himself Arsaces Artabanus) and the following years, and supported a pretender who rose in Asia Minor under the name of Nero (Zonaras xi. 18), but could not maintain himself against Pacorus II.

7.Artabanus IV., the last Parthian king, younger son of Vologaeses IV., who diedA.D.209. He rebelled against his brother Vologaeses V. (Dio Cass. vii. 12), and soon obtained the upper hand, although Vologaeses V. maintained himself in a part of Babylonia till aboutA.D.222. The emperor Caracalla, wishing to make use of this civil war for a conquest of the East in imitation of his idol, Alexander the Great, attacked the Parthians in 216. He crossed the Tigris, destroyed the towns and spoiled the tombs of Arbela; but when Artabanus advanced at the head of an army, he retired to Carrhae. There he was murdered by Macrinus in April 217. Macrinus was defeated at Nisibis and concluded a peace with Artabanus, in which he gave up all the Roman conquests, restored the booty, and paid a heavy contribution to the Parthians (Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26 f.). But at the same time, the Persian dynast Ardashir (q.v.) had already begun his conquests in Persia and Carmania. When Artabanus tried to subdue him his troops were defeated. The war lasted several years; at last Artabanus himself was vanquished and killed (A.D.226), and the rule of the Arsacids came to an end.

See furtherPersia: History, § ancient, and works there quoted.

(Ed. M.)

ART AND PART,a term used in Scots law to denote the aiding or abetting in the perpetration of a crime,—the being an accessory before or at the perpetration of the crime. There is no such offence recognized in Scotland as that of being an accessory after the fact.

ARTAPHERNES,more correctlyArtaphrenes, brother of Darius Hystaspis, and satrap of Sardis. It was he who received the embassy from Athens sent probably by Cleisthenes (q.v.) in 507B.C., and subsequently warned the Athenians to receive back the “tyrant” Hippias. Subsequently he took an important part in suppressing the Ionian revolt (seeIonia,Aristagoras,Histiaeus), and after the war compelled the cities to make agreements by which all differences were to be settled by reference. He also measured out their territories in parasangs and assessed their tributes accordingly (Herod, vi. 42). In 492 he was superseded in his satrapy by Mardonius (Herodotus v. 25, 30-32, 35, &c.; Diod. Sic. x. 25). His son, of the same name, was appointed (490), together with Datis, to take command of the expedition sent by Darius to punish Athens and Eretria for their share in the Ionian revolt. After the defeat of Marathon he returned to Asia. In the expedition of Xerxes, ten years later, he was in command of the Lydians and Mysians (Herod, vi. 94, 119; vii. 74, Aesch.Persae, 21).

Aeschylus in his list of Persian kings (Persae, 775 ff.), which is quite unhistorical, mentions two kings with the name Artaphrenes, who may have been developed out of these two Persian commanders.

(Ed. M.)

ARTAXERXES,a name representing Pers.Artakhshatra, “he whose empire is well-fitted” or “perfected”, Heb.Artakhshasta, Bab.Artakshatsu, SusianIrtakshashsha(and variants), Gr.Ἀρταξέρξης,Ἀρτοξέρξης, and in an inscription of Tralles (Dittenberger,Sylloge, 573)Ἀρταξέσσης; Herodotus (vi. 98) gives the translationμέγας ἀρήιος, and considers the name as a compound of Xerxes, showing thereby that he knew nothing of the Persian language; the later Persian form isArdashir, which occurs in the form Artaxias (Artaxes) as the name of some kings of Armenia. It was borne by three kings of the Achaemenian dynasty of ancient Persia; though, so long as its meaning was understood, it can have been adopted by the kings only after their accession to the throne.

1.Artaxerxes I., surnamedMacrocheir, Longimanus, “Longhand,” because his right hand was longer than his left (Plut.Artax.i.). He was the younger son of Xerxes, and was raised to the throne in 465 by the vizier Artabanus, the murderer of his father. After a few months he became aware of the crimes of the vizier, and slew him and his sons in a hand-to-hand fight in the palace. His reign was, on the whole, peaceful; the empire had reached a period of stagnation. Plutarch (Artax.i.) says that he was famous for his mild and magnanimous character, Nepos (de Reg.i.) that he was exceedingly beautiful and valiant. From the authentic report of his cup-bearer Nehemiah we see that he was a kind, good-natured, but rather weak monarch, and he was undoubtedly much under the baneful influence of his mother Amestris (for whose mischievous character cf. Herod. ix. 109 ff.) and his sister and wife Amytis. The peacefulness of his rule was interrupted by several insurrections. At the very beginning the satrap Artabanus raised a rebellion in Bactria, but was defeated in two battles. More dangerous was the rebellion of Egypt under Inarus (Inarōs), which was put down by Megabyzus only after a long struggle against the Egyptians and the Athenians (460-454). Out of it sprang the rebellion of Megabyzus, who was greatly exasperated because, though he had persuaded Inarus to surrender by promising that his life would be spared, Artaxerxes, yielding to the entreaties of his wife Amytis, who wanted to take revenge on Inarus for the death of her brother Achaemenes, the satrap of Egypt, had surrendered him to her for execution.

In spite of his weakness, Artaxerxes I. was not unsuccessful in his polity. In 448 the war with Athens was terminated by the treaty concluded by Callias (but seeCalliasandCimon), by which the Athenians left Cyprus and Egypt to the Persians, while Persia gave up nothing of her rights, but promised not to make use of them against the Greek cities on the Asiatic coast, which had gained their liberty (Ed. Meyer,Forschungen zur alt. Gesch.ii. 71 ff.). In the Samian and the Peloponnesian wars, Artaxerxes remained neutral, in spite of the attempts made by both Sparta and Athens to gain his alliance.

During the reign of Artaxerxes I. the Jewish religion was definitely established and sanctioned by law in Jerusalem, on the basis of a firman granted by the king to the Babylonian priest Ezra in his seventh year, 458B.C., and the appointment of his cup-bearer Nehemiah as governor of Judaea in his twentieth year, 445B.C.The attempts which have been made to deny the authenticity of those parts of the books of Ezra and Nehemiah which contain an account of these two men, taken from their own memoirs, or to place them in the reign of Artaxerxes II., are not convincing (cf. Ed. Meyer,Die Entstehung des Judentums, 1896; see furtherJews, §§ 19, 21, 22;Ezra and Nehemiah).

Artaxerxes I. died in December 425, or January 424 (Thuc. iv. 50). To his reign must belong the famous quadrilingual alabaster vases from Egypt (on which his name is written in Persian,Susian and Babylonian cuneiform characters and in hieroglyphics), for Artaxerxes II. and III. did not possess Egypt. A great many tablets, dated from his reign, have been found in Nippur (published by H. von Hilprecht and Clay,The Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania, series A, vol. ix.), and a few others at other places in Babylonia. Inscriptions of the king himself are not extant; his grandson mentions his buildings in Susa. For the suggested identification of Artaxerxes I. with the Biblical Ahasuerus, seeAhasuerus.

2.Artaxerxes II., surnamedMnemon, the eldest son of Darius II., whom he succeeded in the spring of 404. According to Ctesias (Pers.57; Plut.Artax.i.) he was formerly called Arsaces or Arsikas, whereas Dinon (Plut.Artax.i.) calls him Oarses. This is corroborated by a Babylonian tablet with observations of the moon (Brit. Mus. Sp. ii. 749;Zeitsch. f. Assyriologie, vii. 223), which is dated from the 26th year of “Arshu, who is Artakshatsu,”i.e.379B.C.(cp. Ed. Meyer,Forschungen zur allen Geschichte, ii. 466 ff.). When Artaxerxes II. mounted the throne, the power of Athens had been broken by Lysander, and the Greek towns in Asia were again subjects of the Persian empire. But his whole reign is a time of continuous decay; the original force of the Persians had been exhausted in luxury and intrigues, and the king, though personally brave and good-natured, was quite dependent upon his favourites and his harem, and especially upon his mother Parysatis. In the beginning of his reign falls the rebellion of his brother Cyrus, who was secretly favoured by Parysatis and by Sparta. Although Cyrus was defeated at Cunaxa, this rebellion was disastrous inasmuch as it opened to the Greeks the way into the interior of the empire, and demonstrated that no oriental force was able to withstand a band of well-trained Greek soldiers. Subsequently Greek mercenaries became indispensable not only to the king but also to the satraps, who thereby gained the means for attempting successful rebellions, into which they were provoked by the weakness of the king, and by the continuous intrigues between the Persian magnates. The reign is, therefore, a continuous succession of rebellions. Egypt soon revolted anew and could not be subdued again. When in 399 war broke out between Sparta and Persia, the Persian troops in Asia Minor were quite unable to resist the Spartan armies. The active and energetic Persian general Pharnabazus succeeded in creating a fleet by the help of Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, and the Athenian commander Conon, and destroyed the Spartan fleet at Cnidus (August 394). This victory enabled the Greek allies of Persia (Thebes, Athens, Argos, Corinth) to carry on the Corinthian war against Sparta, and the Spartans had to give up the war in Asia Minor. But it soon became evident that the only gainers by the war were the Athenians, who in 389, under Thrasybulus, tried to found their old empire anew (seeDelian League). At the same time Evagoras attempted to conquer the whole of Cyprus, and was soon in open rebellion. The consequence was that, when in 388 the Spartan admiral Antalcidas (q.v.) came to Susa, the king was induced to conclude a peace with Sparta by which Asia fell to him and European Greece to Sparta. After the peace, Evagoras was attacked. He lost his conquests, but had to be recognized as independent king of Salamis (380B.C.). Two expeditions against Egypt (385-383 and 374-372) ended in complete failure. At the same period there were continuous rebellions in Asia Minor; Pisidia, Paphlagonia, Bithynia and Lycia, threw off the Persian yoke and Hecatomnus, the satrap of Caria, obtained an almost independent position. Similar wars were going on against the mountain tribes of Armenia and Iran, especially against the Cadusians on the Caspian Sea. In this war Artaxerxes is said to have distinguished himself personally (380B.C.), but got into such difficulties in the wild country that he was glad when Tiribazus succeeded in concluding a peace with the Cadusian chieftains.

By the peace of Antalcidas the Persian supremacy was proclaimed over Greece; and in the following wars all parties, Spartans, Athenians, Thebans, Argives continually applied to Persia for a decision in their favour. After the battle of Leuctra, when the power of Thebes was founded by Epaminondas, Pelopidas went to Susa (367) and restored the old alliance between Persia and Thebes. The Persian supremacy, however, was not based upon the power of the empire, but only on the discord of the Greeks. Shortly after the edict by which the king had proclaimed his alliance with Thebes, and the conditions of the general peace which he was going to impose upon Greece, his weakness became evident, for since 366 all the satraps of Asia Minor (Datames, Ariobarzanes, Mausolus, Orontes, Artabazus) were in rebellion again, in close alliance with Athens, Sparta and Egypt. The king could do little against them; even Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, who had remained faithful, was forced for some time to unite himself with the rebels. But every one of the allies mistrusted all the others; and the sole object of every satrap was to improve his condition and his personal power, and to make a favourable peace with the king, for which his neighbours and former allies had to pay the costs. The rebellion was at last put down by a series of treacheries and perfidious negotiations. Some of the rebels retained their provinces; others were punished, as opportunity offered. Mithradates betrayed his own father Ariobarzanes, who was crucified, and murdered Datames, to whom he had introduced himself as a faithful ally. When the long reign of Artaxerxes II. came to its close in the autumn of 359 the authority of the empire had been restored almost everywhere.

Artaxerxes himself had done very little to obtain this result. In fact, in the last years of his reign he had sunk into a perfect dotage. All his time was spent in the pleasures of his harem, the intrigues of which were further complicated by his falling in love with and marrying his own daughter Atossa (according to the Persian religion a marriage between the nearest relations is no incest). At the same time, his sons were quarrelling about the succession; one of them, Ochus, induced the father by a series of intrigues to condemn to death three of his older brothers, who stood in his way. Shortly afterwards, Artaxerxes II. died.

In this reign an important innovation took place in the Persian religion. Berossus (in Clemens Alex.Protrept.i. 5. 65) tells us that the Persians knew of no images of the gods until Artaxerxes II. erected images of Anaitis in Babylon, Susa, Ecbatana, Persepolis, Bactra, Damascus, Sardis. This statement is proved correct by the inscriptions; all the former kings name only Auramazda (Ahuramazda), but Artaxerxes II. in his building inscriptions from Susa and Ecbatana invokes Ahuramazda, Anahita and Mithra. These two gods belonged to the old popular religion of the Iranians, but had until then been neglected by the true Zoroastrians; now they were introduced into the official worship much in the way in which the cult of the saints came into the Christian religion. About the history of Artaxerxes II. we are comparatively well informed from Greek sources; for the earlier part of his reign from Ctesias and Xenophon (Anabasis), for the later times from Dinon of Ephesus, the historian of the Persians (from whom the account of Justin is derived), from Ephorus (whose account is quoted by Diodorus) and others. Upon these sources is based the biography of the king by Plutarch.

3.Artaxerxes III. is the title adopted by Ochus, the son of Artaxerxes II., when he succeeded his father in 359. The chronographers generally retain the name Ochus, and in the Babylonian inscriptions he is called “Umasu, who is called Artakshatsu.” The same form of the name (probably pronounced Uvasu) occurs in the Syrian version of the canon of Ptolemy by Elias of Nisibis (Amōs).

Artaxerxes III. was a cruel but an energetic ruler. To secure his throne he put to death almost all his relatives, but he suppressed the rebellions also. In 356 he ordered all the satraps to dismiss their mercenaries. Most of them obeyed; Artabazus of Phrygia, who tried to resist and was supported by his brothers-in-law, Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes, was defeated and fled to Philip of Macedon. Athens, whose general Chares had supported Artabazus, was by the threatening messages of the king forced to conclude peace, and to acknowledge the independence of its rebellious allies (355B.C.). Then the king attemptedto subjugate Egypt, but two expeditions were unsuccessful, and, in consequence, Sidon and the other Phoenician towns, and the princes of Cyprus, rebelled against Persia and defeated the Persian generals. After great preparations the king came in person, but again the attack on Egypt was repelled by the Greek generals of Nectanebus (346). One or two years later Artaxerxes, at the head of a great army, began the siege of Sidon. The Sidonian king Tennes considered resistance hopeless, and betrayed the town to the Persian king, assisted by Mentor, who had been sent with Greek troops from Egypt to defend the town. Artaxerxes repressed the rebellion with great cruelty and destroyed the town. The traitor Tennes was put to death, but Mentor rose high in the favour of the king, and entered into a close alliance with the eunuch Bagoas, the king’s favourite and vizier. They succeeded in subjecting the other rebels, and, after a hard fight at Pelusium, and many intrigues, conquered Egypt (343); Nectanebus fled to Ethiopia. Artaxerxes used his victory with great cruelty; he plundered the Egyptian temples and is said to have killed the Apis. After his return to Susa, Bagoas ruled the court and the upper satrapies, while Mentor restored the authority of the empire everywhere in the west. He deposed or killed many Greek dynasts, among them the famous Hermias of Atarneus, the protector of Aristotle, who had friendly relations with Philip (342B.C.). When Philip attacked Perinthus and Byzantium (340), Artaxerxes sent them support, by which they were enabled to withstand the Macedonians; Philip’s antagonists in Greece, Demosthenes and his party, hoped to get subsidies from the king, but were disappointed.

In 338 Artaxerxes III., with his older sons, was killed by Bagoas, who raised his youngest son Arses to the throne. Artaxerxes III. is said never to have entered the country of Persia proper, because, being a great miser, he would not pay the present of a gold piece for every Persian woman, which it was usual to give on such occasions (Plut.Alex.69). But we have a building inscription from Persepolis, which contains his name and genealogy, and invocations of Ahuramazda and Mithra.

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