Chapter 15

See W.H. Stevenson, Introduction to Asser’sLife of King Alfred(Oxford, 1904); R. Pauli, Introduction toKönig Aelfred(Berlin, 1851).

ASSESSMENT,(from Lat.assessare, to sit beside, to judge), a term expressing either an official valuation of income or property for purposes of taxation, or the amount so determined (seeTaxationandValuation). It is also applied to the amount of damages fixed by a jury in a court of law (seeDamages).

Anassessment committeeis a statutory committee appointed under the Union Assessment Acts 1862, 1880, for the purpose of making out the valuation lists upon which the poor-law rate is based.

Anassessment policy, in life insurance, is a policy issued at a fixed premium, the excess of which over the portion necessary to meet current claims and expenses goes to form a reserve fund which is devoted to various forms of benefit for the policy-holders. SeeInsuranceandFriendly Societies.

ASSESSOR(Lat.assessare,assidere, to sit by), a Roman term originally applied to a trained lawyer who sat beside a governor of a province or other magistrate, to instruct him in the administration of the laws (see Roll,De assessoribus magistratuum Romanorum, Leipzig, 1872). The system is still exemplified in Scotland, where it is usual in the larger towns for municipal magistrates, in the administration of their civil jurisdiction, to have the aid of professional assessors. In England, by the Judicature Act 1873, the court of appeal and the High Court may in any cause or matter call in the aid of assessors. The Patents Act 1907 makes special provision for assessors in patent and trade-mark cases. By the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1891 the House of Lords may, in appeals in admiralty actions, call in the aid of assessors, while in the admiralty division of the High Court it is usual for the Elder Brethren of Trinity House to assist as nautical assessors. In admiralty cases in the county courts, too, the judge is frequently assisted by assessors of “nautical skill and experience” (County Court Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868). In the ecclesiastical courts assessors assist the bishop in proceedings under the Church Discipline Act 1840, s. 11, while under the Clergy Discipline Act 1892, s. 2, they assist the chancellor in determining questions of fact. By the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, s. 14, the king in council may make rules for the attendance of archbishops and bishops as assessors in the hearing of ecclesiastical cases by the judicial committee of the privy council.

The term “assessor” is also very generally applied to persons appointed to ascertain and fix the value of rates, taxes, &c., and in this sense the word is used in the United States.

In France and in all European countries where the civil law system prevails, the termassesseuris applied to those assistant judges who, with a president, compose a judicial court.

In Germany anAssessor, orBeisitzer, is a member of the legal profession who has passed four years in actual practice and become qualified for the position of a judge.

ASSETS(from the O. Nor. Fr.assetz, mod. Fr.assez, “enough”), in English law, strictly the property of a debtor in the hands of his representative sufficient for the satisfaction of his creditors or legatees. Thus the property of a bankrupt is termed his assets and is the fund out of which his liabilities must be paid. All property of the debtor is assets, and it is not necessary that it should have been reduced into possession by him.

The creditors of a debtor are either secured or unsecured. A secured creditor,e.g.a mortgagee, has a prior claim to be paid his debt out of his security. If on realization of the security there is a balance after paying the debt, such balance becomes assets for the unsecured creditors; if there is a deficit, then the creditor becomes an unsecured creditor for such deficit. The unsecured creditors were formerly divided into creditors by specialty and by simple contract, the first being creditors secured by instrument under seal who ranked in priority to simple contract creditors. But by Hinde Palmer’s Act [the Executors Act] 1869 all unsecured creditors rank alike.

Assets are divisible into legal assets and equitable assets, and the former class is again divisible into assets real and personal. These distinctions, though formerly of great importance, have now lost most of their meaning, but it is necessary briefly to describe the nature of these divisions and their consequences. The distinction between assets legal and equitable depends entirely upon the remedy open to the creditor to recover his debt and in no way upon the nature of the property from which the debt is sought to be recovered. If the creditor had to sue the executor of a debtor at law to obtain payment out of the property, that property was legal assets; but if the only remedy open to the creditor to get at the property was to bring an action in chancery for the administration of the estate, then the assets were equitable.

Legal assets, as has been said, were divided into real and personal assets. The personal assets were those which devolvedvirtute officiion the executor or administrator; such assets are since Hinde Palmer’s Act available equally for specialty and simple contract creditors. The real assets consisted of those descending to the heir or devised to a devisee, and were at law only liable for specialty debts. However, by the Land Transfer Act 1897 it is provided that the real estate of a deceased shall devolve upon the executor and “shall be administered in the same manner ... and with the same incidents as if it were personal estate.” The distinction, therefore, between assets real and personal has practically ceased to exist, and only continues in regard to such property as is not included in the act, the most important of which is land held in copyhold.

The equitable assets were treated otherwise. In the eyes of equity all unsecured creditors stand upon the same footing, and a creditor suing for administration of the estate sued on behalf of himself and all other creditors of the estate, and the distinction between specialty and simple contract creditors was ignored. Land was not at law liable to satisfy simple contract creditors; but if a testator expressly charged it with payment of his debts or devised it to his executors upon trust to pay his debts, equity treated it as equitable assets and so made it available to satisfy simple contract creditors; and finally by an act of 1833 it was provided that real estate should in all cases be assets to be administered by equity for the benefit of simple contract creditors as well as creditors by specialty. It will be seen therefore that, generally speaking, all creditors have now the same remedies against the executorseither at law or in equity. The only property as to which these distinctions at all survive is that not touched by the Land Transfer Act 1897.

The act of 1833 just mentioned does not, however, deal with legacies, which continue to be payable only out of personalty unless they are expressly charged upon the realty by the testator; it has been contended that the effect of the Land Transfer Act 1897 has been to alter this and make the realty assets for the purpose of paying legacies, but this view is believed to be unsound.

It is necessary for the representative so to distribute the assets that any fund primarily liable shall bear its proper burden, and that as far as possible all debts and legacies may be paid; this is said to be “marshalling the assets,” and a few examples of the principal cases of marshalling will make this clear. If the personalty is exhausted in satisfying the creditors the legatees are left without a fund from which to be paid. But inasmuch as the creditor could have got paid out of the realty, as well as the personalty, it is not fair that the legatee should suffer by the creditor’s choice, and he will therefore get payment from the real estate. So again if one legacy is charged upon the real estate and another is not, then if the former be paid out of the personalty the latter will stand in its place and be paid from the real estate.

Finally it shall be noticed that an insolvent estate may be administered in bankruptcy. In such a case the law of bankruptcy regulates the order in which the assets are divided among the creditors (seeBankruptcy), but by the Judicature Act 1875, it is provided that an insolvent estate may be administered in the chancery division, and in such a case “the same rules shall prevail and be observed as to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors and as to the debts and liabilities provable and as to the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities respectively as may be in force for the time being under the law of bankruptcy.” This clause must be construed strictly, and it is only in the three cases specifically mentioned that the rules of bankruptcy will be imported into the administration of an insolvent estate by the chancery division.

In a less strict sense, the term “assets,” or “an asset,” is used derivatively as a synonym for any property, or as opposed to “liabilities.” Cecil Rhodes once spoke of the British flag as a “great commercial asset” in South Africa, meaning merely that the imperial connexion was a source of strength and credit.

ASSIDEANS(the Anglicized form, derived through the Greek, of the HebrewḤasidim, “the pious”), the name of a party or sect which stood out against the Hellenization of the Jews in the 2nd centuryB.C.After the massacre of those who fled from the forces of Antiochus Epiphanes and would not resist on the sabbath, Mattathias (or Judas) decided to set aside the law and was joined by a company of Assideans, brave men of Israel every one, who offered themselves willingly for the law (1 Macc. ii. 42, cf. 2 Macc. viii. 1). On the appointment of Alcimus (162B.C.), “a descendant of Aaron” as high-priest, “the Assideans were the first who sought peace” (1 Macc. vii. 13 f.); but the treacherous murder of sixty of them (ib. 16) threw them back into the arms of Judas. According to 2 Macc. xiv., Alcimus identified them with the whole party of the rebels, of which they were only one, though the most important, section.

See Schurer,Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes, i. 203; art. inJewish Encyclopaedia, s.v. “Ḥasidim” (S.M. Dubnow).

(J. H. A. H.)

ASSIGNATS(from Lat.assignatus, assigned), a form of paper-money issued in France from 1789 to 1796. Assignats were so termed, as representing landassignedto the holders.

The financial strait of the French government in 1789 was extreme. Coin was scarce, loans were not taken up, taxes had ceased to be productive, and the country was threatened with imminent bankruptcy. In this emergency assignats were issued to provide a substitute for a metallic currency. They were originally of the nature of mortgage bonds on the national lands. These lands consisted of the church property confiscated, on the motion of Mirabeau, by the Constituent Assembly on the 2nd of November 1789, and the crown lands, which had been taken over by the nation on the 7th of October (seeFrench Revolution).

The assignats were first to be paid to the creditors of the state. With these the creditors could purchase national land, the assignats having, for this purpose, the preference over other forms of money. If the creditor did not care to purchase land, it was supposed that he could obtain the face-value for them from those who desired land. Those assignats which were returned to the state as purchase-money were to be cancelled, and the whole issue, it was argued, would consequently disappear as the national lands were distributed.

A first issue was made of 400,000,000 francs’ worth of assignats, each note being of 100 francs’ value and bearing interest daily at a rate of 5%. They were to be redeemed by the product of the sales, and from certain other sources, at the rate of 120,000,000 francs in 1791, 100,000,000 francs in 1792, 80,000,000 francs in 1793 and 1794, and the surplus in 1795. The success of the issue was undoubted, and, possibly, if the assignats had been restricted, as Mirabeau at first desired, to the extent of one-half the value of the lands sold, they would not have shared the usual fate of inconvertible paper money. Mirabeau was a strenuous advocate of the assignats. “They represent,” he said, “real property, the most secure of all possessions, the soil on which we tread.” “There cannot be a greater error than the fear so generally prevalent as to the over-issue of assignats ... reabsorbed progressively in the purchase of the national domains, this paper-money can never become redundant.”

In 1790 the interest was reduced to 3%, and as the treasury had again become exhausted, a further issue was decided upon; it was also decreed that the assignats were to be accepted as legal tender, all public departments being instructed to receive them as the equivalent of metallic money. This second issue amounted to 800,000,000 francs and carried no interest. It was solemnly declared in the decree authorizing the issue that the maximum issue was never to exceed twelve hundred millions. This pledge, however, was soon broken, and further issues brought the total up to 3,750,000,000 francs. The consequence of these further issues was instant depreciation, and the note of 100 francs nominal value sank to less than 20 francs coin. Recourse was then had to protective legislation. The first step was to decree the penalty of six years’ imprisonment against any person who should sell specie for a more considerable quantity of assignats, or who should stipulate a different price for commodities according as the payment was to be made in specie or in assignats. For the second offence the penalty was to be twenty years’ imprisonment (August 1, 1793), for which the death penalty was ultimately substituted (May 10, 1794). This severe provision was, however, repealed after the fall of Robespierre. Notwithstanding these precautions, the value of assignats still declined, till the proportion to specie had become that of six to one. Then came the passing by the Convention on the 3rd of May 1793 of the absurd “maximum.” The decree required all farmers and corn-dealers to declare the quantity of corn in their possession and to sell it only in recognized markets. No person was to be allowed to lay in more than one month’s supply. A maximum price was fixed, above which no one was to buy or sell under severe penalties. These measures were soon stultified by further issues, and by June 1794 the total number of assignats aggregated nearly 8,000,000,000, of which only 2,464,000,000 had returned to the treasury and been destroyed. The extension of the “maximum” to all commodities only increased the confusion. Trade was paralysed and all manufacturing establishments were closed down. Attempts by the Convention to increase the value of the assignats were of no avail. Too many causes operated in favour of their depreciation: the enormous issue, the uncertainty as to their value if the Revolution should fail, the relation they bore to both specie and commodities, which retained their value and refused to be exchanged for a money of constantly diminishing purchasing power. Evenbetween the assignats themselves there were differences. The royal assignats, which had been issued under Louis XVI., had depreciated less than the republican ones. They were worth from 8 to 15% more, a fact due to the hope that in case of a counter-revolution they would be less likely to be discredited.

The Directory was guilty of even greater abuses in dealing with the assignats. By 1796 the issues had reached the enormous figure of 45,500,000,000 francs, and even this gigantic total was swollen still more by the numerous counterfeits introduced into France from the neighbouring countries. The assignats had now become totally valueless—the abolition of the “maximum” the previous year (1795) had produced no effect, and, though, by various payments into the treasury, the total number had been reduced to about 24,000,000,000 francs, their face-value was about 30 to 1 of coin. At this value they were converted into 800,000,000 francs of land-warrants, ormandats territoriaux, which were to constitute a mortgage on all the lands of the republic. Thesemandatswere no more successful than the assignats, and even on the day of their issue were at a discount of 82%. They had an existence of six months, and were finally received back by the state at about the seventieth part of their face-value in coin.

Authorities.—L.A. Thiers,Histoire de la révolution française, gives a full and graphic account of the assignats, the causes of their depreciation, &c.; J. Garnier,Traité des Finances(1862); J. Bresson,Histoire financière de la France(1829); R. Stourm,Les Finances de l’ancien régime et de la révolution(1885); F.A. Walker,Money(1891); Henry Higgs, in theCambridge Modern History, vol. viii. (1904).

(T. A. I.)

ASSIGNMENT,Assignation, Assignee(from Lat.assignare, to mark out), terms which, as derivatives of the verb “to assign,” are of frequent technical use in law. To assign is to make over, and the term is generally used to express a transference by writing, in contradistinction to a transference by actual delivery. In England the usual expression is assignment, in Scotland it is assignation. The person making over is called theassignororcedent; the recipient, theassignorassignee. An assignee may be such eitherby deed, as when a lessee assigns his lease to another, orin law, as when property devolves upon an executor. The law as to assignment in connexion with each particular subject, as the assignment of a chose in action, assignment in contract, of dower, of errors, of a lease, &c., will be found under the respective headings. In a colloquial sense, “assignation” means a secretly contrived meeting between lovers.

ASSINIBOIA,a name formerly applied to two districts of Canada, but not now held by any. (1) A district formed in 1835 by the Hudson’s Bay Company, having in it Fort Garry at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine rivers in Rupert’s Land, North America. It extended over a circular area, with a radius of 50 m. from Fort Garry. It was governed by a local council nominated by the Hudson’s Bay Company. It ceased to exist when Rupert’s Land was transferred to Canada in 1870. (2) A district of the North-west Territories, which was given definite existence by an act of the Dominion parliament in 1875. Assiniboia extended from the western boundary of Manitoba (99° W. in 1875, and 101° 25′ W. in 1881) to 111° W., and from 49° N. to 52° N. The name was a misnomer, as it barely touched the Assiniboine river. To the north of the district lay the district of Saskatchewan, so that when the two were united by the Dominion act of 1905, they were somewhat changed in boundaries and the name Saskatchewan was given to the new province. The derivation of Assiniboia is from two Ojibway words,assinimeaning a stone, and the termination “to cook by roasting”; from these came a name first applied to a Dakota or Sioux tribe living on the Upper Red river; afterwards when this tribe separated from the Dakotas, its name was given to the branch of the Red river which the tribe visited, the river being known as the Assiniboine and the tribe as Assiniboin.

ASSINIBOIN(“Stone-Cookers”), a tribe of North American Indians of Siouan stock. Their name (see above) is said to refer to their method of boiling water by dropping red-hot stones into it. Their former range was between the Missouri and the middle Saskatchewan on both sides of the Canadian frontier. In 1904 there were 1234 in the United States, all on reservations in Montana; and in 1902 there were 1371 in Canada.

SeeHandbook of American Indians, ed. F.W. Hodge (Washington, 1907).

ASSISE(from the Fr., derived from Lat.assidere, to sit beside), a geological term for two or more beds of rock united by the occurrence of the same characteristic species or genera.

ASSISI(anc.Asisium), a town and episcopal see of Umbria, Italy, in the province of Perugia, 15 m. E.S.E. by rail from the town of Perugia. Pop. (1901) town, 5338; commune, 17,240. The town occupies a fine position on a mountain (1345 ft. above sea-level) with a view over the valleys of the Tiber and Topino. It is mainly famous in connexion with St Francis, who was born here in 1182, and returned to die in 1226. The Franciscan monastery and the lower and upper church of St Francis were begun immediately after his canonization in 1228, and completed in 1253, being fine specimens of Gothic architecture. The crypt was added in 1818, when the sarcophagus containing his remains was discovered. The lower church contains frescoes by Cimabue, Giotto and others, the most famous of which are those over the high altar by Giotto, illustrating the vows of the Franciscan order; while the upper church has frescoes representing scenes from the life of St Francis (probably by Giotto and his contemporaries) on the lower portion of the walls of the nave, and scenes from Old and New Testament history by pupils of Cimabue on the upper. The church of Santa Chiara (St Clare), the foundress of the Poor Clares, with its massive lateral buttresses, fine rose-window, and simple Gothic interior, was begun in 1257, four years after her death. It contains the tomb of the saint and 13th-century frescoes and pictures. Santa Maria Maggiore is also a good Gothic church. The cathedral (San Rufino) has a fine façade with three rose-windows of 1140; the interior was modernized in 1572. The town is dominated by the medieval castle (1655 ft.), built by Cardinal Albornoz (1367) and added to by Popes Pius II. and Paul III. Two miles to the east in a ravine below Monte Subasio is the hermitagedelle Carceri(2300 ft.), partly built, partly cut out of the solid rock, given to St Francis by Benedictine monks as a place of retirement. Below the town to the south-west, close to the station, is the large pilgrimage church of Santa Maria degli Angeli, begun in 1569 by Pope Pius V., with Vignola as architect; but not completed until 1640. It contains the original oratory of St Francis and the cell in which he died. Adjacent is the garden in which the saint’s thornless roses bloom in May. Half a mile outside the town to the south-east is the convent of San Damiano, erected by St Francis, of which St Clare was first abbess.

In the early middle ages Assisi was subject to the dukes of Spoleto; but in the 11th century it seems to have been independent. It became involved, however, in the disputes of Guelphs and Ghibellines, and was frequently at war with Perugia. It was sacked by Perugia and the papal troops in 1442, and even after that continued to be the prey of factions. The place is now famous as a resort of pilgrims, and is also important for the history of Italian art. The poet Metastasio was born here in 1698.

See L. Duff-Gordon,Assisi(“Mediaeval Towns” series, London, 1900). For ancient history seeAsisium.

(T. As.)

ASSIUT,orSiut, capital of a province of Upper Egypt of the same name, and the largest and best-built town in the Nile Valley south of Cairo, from which it is distant 248 m. by rail. The population rose from 32,000 in 1882 to 42,000 in 1900. Assiut stands near the west bank of the Nile across which, just below the town, is a barrage, completed in 1902, consisting of an open weir, 2733 ft. long, and over 100 bays or sluices, each 16½ ft. wide, which can be opened or closed at will. At the western end of the barrage begins the Ibrahimia canal, the feeder of the Bahr Yusuf, the largest irrigation canal of Egypt. The Ibrahimia canal is skirted by a magnificent embankment planted with shady trees leading from the river to the town. There are several bazaars, baths and handsome mosques, one noted for its lofty minaret, and here the American Presbyterian mission has established a college for both sexes. Assiut is famous for its red and black pottery and for ornamental wood and ivory work,which find a ready market all over Egypt. It is one of the chief centres of the Copts. Here also is the northern terminus of the caravan route across the desert, which, passing through the Kharga oasis, goes south-west to Darfur. It is known as the Arbain, or forty days road, from the time occupied on the journey. Assiut (properly Asyūt) is the successor of the ancient Lycopolis (Eg. Siöout), capital of the 13th nome of Upper Egypt. Here were worshipped two canine gods (seeAnubis), Ophoïs (Wepwoi) being the principal god of the city, while Anubis apparently presided over the necropolis. No ruins are visible, the mounds of the old city being for the most part hidden under modern buildings; but the slopes of the limestone hills behind it are pierced with an infinity of rock-cut tombs, some of which were large and decorated with sculptures, paintings and long inscriptions. The archaeological commission of theDescription de l’Égyptevisited them in 1799, when the walls of many of the large tombs were still almost intact; in the first half of the 19th century (and to some extent later) an immense amount of destruction was caused by blasting for stone. Three of the tombs illustrate one of the darkest periods in Egypt’s history, when the princes of Siut played a leading part in the struggle between Heracleopolis and Thebes (Dyns. IX.-XI.); another, of the XIIth Dynasty, contains a remarkable inscription detailing the contracts made by the nomarch with the priests of the temples of Ophoïs and Anubis for perpetual services at his tomb (see Breasted,Ancient Records of Egypt, Historical Documents, vol. i. pp. 179, 258). Remains of the mummies of dogs and similar animals sacred to these deities are scattered among the débris on the hillside in abundance. Lycopolis was the birthplace of Plotinus, the founder of Neo-Platonism (A.D.205-270). From the 4th century onwards its grottoes were the dwellings of Christian hermits, amongst whom John of Lycopolis was the most celebrated.

(F. Ll. G.)

ASSIZE,orAssise(Lat.assidere, to sit beside; O. Fr.assire, to sit,assis, seated), a legal term, meaning literally a “session,” but in fact, as Littleton has styled it, anomen aequivocum, meaning sometimes a jury, sometimes the sittings of a court, and sometimes the ordinances of a court or assembly.

It originally signified the form of trial by a jury of sixteen persons, which eventually superseded the barbarous judicial combat; this jury was named the grand assize and was sworn to determine the right of seisin of land (seeEvidence). The grand assize was abolished in 1833; but the term assize is still applicable to the jury in criminal causes in Scotland.

In the only sense in which the word is not now almost obsolete, assize means the periodical session of the judges of the High Court of Justice, held in the various counties of England, chiefly for the purposes of gaol delivery and trying causes atnisi prius. Previous to Magna Carta (1215) writs of assize had all to be tried at Westminster, or to await trial in the locality in which they had originated at the septennial circuit of the justices in eyre; but, by way of remedy for the great consequent delay and inconvenience, it was provided by this celebrated act that the assizes ofmort d’ancestorandnovel disseisinshould be tried annually by the judges in every county. By successive enactments, the civil jurisdiction of the justices of assize was extended, and the number of their sittings increased, till at last the necessity of repairing to Westminster for judgment in civil actions was almost obviated to country litigants by an act, passed in the reign of Edward I., which provided that the writ summoning the jury to Westminster should also appoint a time and place for hearing such causes within the county of their origin. The date of the alternative summons to Westminster was always subsequent to the former date, and so timed as to fall in the vacation preceding the Westminster term, and thus “Unless before,” ornisi prius, issues came to be dealt with by the judges of assize before the summons to Westminster could take effect. Thenisi priusclause, however, was not then introduced for the first time. It occurs occasionally in writs of the reign of Henry III. The royal commissions to hold the assizes are—(1) general, (2) special. The general commission is issued twice a year to the judges of the High Court of Justice, and two judges are generally sent on each circuit. It covers commissions—(1) of oyer and terminer, by which they are empowered to deal with treasons, murders, felonies, &c. This is their largest commission; (2) ofnisi prius(q.v.) (3) of gaol delivery, which requires them to try every prisoner in gaol, for whatsoever offence committed; (4) of the peace, by which all justices must be present at their county assizes, or else suffer a fine. Special commissions are granted for inquest in certain causes and crimes. See also the articlesCircuit;Jury.

Assizes, in the sense of ordinances or enactments of a court or council of state, as the “assize of bread and ale,” the “assize of Clarendon,” the “assize of arms,” are important in early economic history. As early as the reign of John the observance of theassisae venaliumwas enforced, and for a period of 500 years thereafter it was considered no unimportant part of the duties of the legislature to regulate by fixed prices, for the protection of the lieges, the sale of bread, ale, fuel, &c. (seeAdulteration). Sometimes in city charters the right to assize such articles is specially conceded. Regulations of this description were beneficial in the repression of fraud and adulteration. Assizes are sometimes used in a wider legislative connexion by early chroniclers and historians—the “assisae of the realme,”e.g.occasionally meaning the organic laws of the country. For the “assizes of Jerusalem” seeCrusades.

The term assize, originally applying to an assembly or court, became transferred to actions before the court or the writs by which they were instituted. The following are the more important.

Assize of darrien presentment, or last presentation, was a writ directed to the sheriff to summon an assize or jury to enquire who was the last patron that presented to a church then vacant, of which the plaintiff complained that he was deforced or unlawfully deprived by the defendant. It was abolished in 1833 and the action ofquare impedit(q.v.) substituted. But by the Common Law Procedure Act 1860, noquare impeditcan be brought, so that an action in the king’s bench of the High Court was substituted for it.

Assize ofmort d’ancestorwas a writ which lay where a plaintiff complained of an “abatement” or entry upon his freehold, effected by a stranger on the death of the plaintiff’s father, mother, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, &c. It was abolished in 1833.

Assize ofnovel disseisinwas an action to recover lands of which the plaintiff had been “disseised” or dispossessed. It was abolished in 1833. See Pollock and Maitland,Hist. Eng. Law.

Assize, clerk of, an officer “who writes all things judicially done by the justices of assizes in their circuits.” He has charge of the commission, and takes recognizances, records, judgments and sentences, grants certificates of conviction, draws up orders, &c. By the Clerks of Assize Act 1869 he must either have been for three years a barrister or solicitor in actual practice, or have acted for three years in the capacity of subordinate officer of a clerk of assize on circuit.

United States.—There are no assize courts in the United States; it is not the custom for supreme court judges of the states to go on circuit, but the judges of the United States Supreme Court do sit as members of the United States circuit courts in the several states periodically throughout the year. These courts are not assize courts, but are federal as distinguished from state courts, and have a special and limited jurisdiction. In the several states the highest court is divided into departments, in each of which there are courts presided over by supreme court judges residing in that department, thus avoiding the assize court or circuit-going system.

ASSMANNSHAUSEN,a village of Germany, in the Prussian province of Hesse-Nassau, on the right bank of the Rhine and the railway from Frankfort-on-Main to Niederlahnstein. Pop. 1100. It has a lithium spring, baths and aKurhaus, and is famed for its red wine (Assmannshäuser), which resembles light Burgundy. From here a railway ascends the Niederwald.

ASSOCIATE(Lat.associatus, fromad, to, andsociareto join). one who is united with another, and so generally a companion—in particular a subordinate member of an institution or society,as an associate of the Royal Academy, or one holding a degree in a learned society lower than that of fellow. In English law the associates are officers of the supreme court, whose duties are to draw up the list of causes, enter verdicts, hand the records to the parties, &c., and generally to conduct the business of trials. By the Judicature (Officers) Act 1879 they were styled masters of the supreme court, but the office is now amalgamated with the crown office department, of which they are clerks.

ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS,orMental Association, a term used in psychology to express the conditions under which representations arise in consciousness, and also for a principle put forward by an important historical school of thinkers to account generally for the facts of mental life. Modern physiological psychology has so altered the approach to this subject that much of the older discussion has become antiquated, but it may be recapitulated here for historical purposes.

Earlier Theory.—In the long and erudite Note D**, appended by Sir W. Hamilton to his edition of Reid’s Works, many anticipations of modern statements on association are cited from the works of ancient or medieval thinkers; and for Aristotle, in particular, the glory is claimed of having at once originated the doctrine and practically brought it to perfection.1As translated by Hamilton, but without his interpolations, the classical passage from theDe Memoria et Reminiscentiaruns as follows:—“When, therefore, we accomplish an act of reminiscence, we pass through a certain series of precursive movements, until we arrive at a movement on which the one we are in quest of is habitually consequent. Hence, too, it is that we hunt through the mental train, excogitating from the present or some other, and from similar or contrary or coadjacent. Through this process reminiscence takes place. For the movements are, in these cases, sometimes at the same time, sometimes parts of the same whole, so that the subsequent movement is already more than half accomplished.”The passage is obscure, but it does at all events indicate the various principles commonly termed contiguity, similarity and contrast. Similar principles are stated by Zeno the Stoic, by Epicurus (see Diog. Laert. vii. § 52, x. § 32), and by St Augustine (Confessions, x. e. 19). Aristotle’s doctrine received a more or less intelligent expansion and illustration from the ancient commentators and the schoolmen, and in the still later period of transition from the age of scholasticism to the time of modern philosophy, prolonged in the works of some writers far into the 17th century, Hamilton adduced not a few philosophical authorities who gave prominence to the general fact of mental association—the Spaniard Ludovicus Vives (1492-1540) especially being most exhaustive in his account of memory.In Hobbes’s psychology much importance is assigned to what he called, variously, the succession, sequence, series, consequence, coherence, train of imaginations or thoughts in mental discourse. But not before Hume is there express question as to what are the distinct principles of association. John Locke had, meanwhile, introduced the phrase “Association of Ideas” as the title of a supplementary chapter incorporated with the fourth edition of hisEssay, meaning it, however, only as the name of a principle accounting for the mental peculiarities of individuals, with little or no suggestion of its general psychological import. Of this last Hume had the strongest impression; he reduced the principles of association to three—Resemblance, Contiguity in time and place, Cause and (or) Effect. Dugald Stewart put forward Resemblance, Contrariety, and Vicinity in time and place, though he added, as another obvious principle, accidental coincidence in the sounds of words, and further noted three other cases of relation, namely, Cause and Effect, Means and End, Premisses and Conclusion, as holding among the trains of thought under circumstances of special attention. Reid, preceding Stewart, was rather disposed to make light of the subject of association, vaguely remarking that it seems to require no other original quality of mind but the power of habit to explain the spontaneous recurrence of trains of thinking, when become familiar by frequent repetition (Intellectual Powers, p. 387).Hamilton’s own theory of mental reproduction, suggestion or association is a development, greatly modified, of the doctrine expounded in hisLectures on Metaphysics(vol. ii. p. 223, seq.), which reduced the principles of association first to two—Simultaneity and Affinity, and these further to one supreme principle of Redintegration or Totality. In the ultimate scheme he posits no less than four general laws of mental succession concerned in reproduction: (1)Associabilityor possible co-suggestion (all thoughts of the same mental subject are associable or capable of suggesting each other); (2)Repetitionor direct remembrance (thoughts coidentical in modification, but differing in time, tend to suggest each other); (3)Redintegration, direct remembrance or reminiscence (thoughts once coidentical in time, are, however, different as mental modes, again suggestive of each other, and that in the mutual order which they originally held); (4)Preference(thoughts are suggested not merely by force of the general subjective relation subsisting between themselves, they are also suggested in proportion to the relation of interest, from whatever source, in which they stand to the individual mind). Upon these follow, as special laws:—A, Primary—modes of the laws of Repetition and Redintegration—(1) law of Similars (Analogy, Affinity); (2) law of Contrast; (3) law of Coadjacency (Cause and Effect, &c.); B, Secondary—modes of the law of Preference, under the law of Possibility—(1) laws of Immediacy and Homogeneity; (2) law of Facility.The Associationist School.—This name is given to the English psychologists who aimed at explaining all mental acquisitions, and the more complex mental processes generally under laws not other than those which have just been set out as determining simple reproduction. Hamilton, though professing to deal with reproduction only, formulates a number of still more general laws of mental succession—law of Succession, law of Variation, law of Dependence, law of Relativity or Integration (involving law of Conditioned), and, finally, law of Intrinsic or Objective Relativity—as the highest to which human consciousness is subject; but it is in a sense quite different that the psychologists of the so-called Associationist School intend their appropriation of the principle or principles commonly signalized. As far as can be judged from imperfect records, they were anticipated to some extent by the experientialists of ancient times, both Stoic and Epicurean (cf. Diogenes Laertius, as above). In the modern period, Hobbes is the first thinker of permanent note to whom this doctrine may be traced. Though, in point of fact, he took anything but an exhaustive view of the phenomena of mental succession, yet, after dealing with trains of imagination, or what he called mental discourse, he sought in the higher departments of intellect to explain reasoning as a discourse in words, dependent upon an arbitrary system of marks, each associated with, or standing for, a variety of imaginations; and, save for a general assertion that reasoning is a reckoning—otherwise, a compounding and resolving—he had no other account of knowledge to give. The whole emotional side of mind, or, in his language, the passions, he, in like manner, resolved into an expectation of consequences, based on past experience of pleasures and pains of sense. Thus, though he made no serious attempt to justify his analysis in detail, he is undoubtedly to be classed with the associationists of the next century. They, however, were wont to trace their psychological theory no further back than to Locke’sEssay. Bishop Berkeley was driven to posit expressly a principle of suggestion or association in these terms:—“That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it will suffice that they have been observed to go together, without any demonstration of the necessity of their coexistence, or so much as knowing what it is that makes them so to coexist” (New Theory of Vision, § 25); and to support the obvious application of the principle to the case of the sensations of sight and touch before him, he constantly urged that association of sound and sense of language which the later school has always put in the foreground, whether as illustrating the principle in general or in explanation of the supreme importance of language for knowledge. It was natural, then, that Hume, coming after Berkeley, and assuming Berkeley’s results, though he reverted to the larger inquiry of Locke, should be more explicit in his reference to association; but he was original also, when he spoke of it as a “kind of attraction which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms” (Human Nature, i. 1, § 4). Other inquirers about the same time conceived of association with this breadth of view, and set themselves to track, as psychologists, its effects in detail.David Hartley in hisObservations on Man, published in 1749 (eleven years after theHuman Nature, and one year after the better-knownInquiry, of Hume), opened the path for all the investigations of like nature that have been so characteristic of English psychology. A physician by profession, he sought to combine with an elaborate theory of mental association a minutely detailed hypothesis as to the corresponding action of the nervous system, based upon the suggestion of a vibratory motion within the nerves thrown out by Newton in the last paragraph of thePrincipia. So far, however, from promoting the acceptance of the psychological theory, this physical hypothesis proved to have rather the opposite effect, and it began to be dropped by Hartley’s followers (as F. Priestley, in his abridged edition of theObservations, 1775) before it was seriously impugned from without. When it is studied in the original, and not taken upon the report of hostile critics, who would not, or could not understand it, no little importance must still be accorded to the first attempt, not seldom a curiously felicitous one, to carry through that parallelism of the physical and psychical, which since then has come to count for more and more in the science of mind. Nor should it be forgotten that Hartley himself, for all his paternal interest in the doctrine of vibrations, was careful to keep separate from its fortunes the cause of his other doctrine of mental association. Of this the point lay in no mere restatement, with new precision, of a principle of coherence among “ideas,” but in its being taken as a clue by whichto follow the progressive development of the mind’s powers. Holding that mental states could be scientifically understood only as they were analysed, Hartley sought for a principle of synthesis to explain the complexity exhibited not only in trains of representative images, but alike in the most involved combinations of reasonings and (as Berkeley had seen) in the apparently simple phenomena of objective perception, as well as in the varied play of the emotions, or, again, in the manifold conscious adjustments of the motor system. One principle appeared to him sufficient for all, running, as enunciated for the simplest case, thus: “Any sensations A, B, C, &c., by being associated with one another a sufficient number of times, get such a power over the corresponding ideas (called by Hartley also vestiges, types, images)a, b, c, &c., that any one of the sensations A, when impressed alone, shall be able to excite in the mindb, c, &c., the ideas of the rest.” To render the principle applicable in the cases where the associated elements are neither sensations nor simple ideas of sensations, Hartley’s first care was to determine the conditions under which states other than these simplest ones have their rise in the mind, becoming the matter of ever higher and higher combinations. The principle itself supplied the key to the difficulty, when coupled with the notion, already implied in Berkeley’s investigations, of a coalescence of simple ideas of sensation into one complex idea, which may cease to bear any obvious relation to its constituents. So far from being content, like Hobbes, to make a rough generalization to all mind from the phenomena of developed memory, as if these might be straightway assumed, Hartley made a point of referring them, in a subordinate place of their own, to his universal principle of mental synthesis. He expressly put forward the law of association, endued with such scope, as supplying what was wanting to Locke’s doctrine in its more strictly psychological aspect, and thus marks by his work a distinct advance on the line of development of the experiential philosophy.The new doctrine received warm support from some, as Law and Priestley, who both, like Hume and Hartley himself, took the principle of association as having the like import for the science of mind that gravitation had acquired for the science of matter. The principle began also, if not always with direct reference to Hartley, yet, doubtless, owing to his impressive advocacy of it, to be applied systematically in special directions, as by Abraham Tucker (1768) to morals, and by Archibald Alison (1790) to aesthetics. Thomas Brown (d. 1820) subjected anew to discussion the question of theory. Hardly less unjust to Hartley than Reid or Stewart had been, and forward to proclaim all that was different in his own position, Brown must yet be ranked with the associationists before and after him for the prominence he assigned to the associative principle in sense-perception (what he called external affections of mind), and for his reference of all other mental states (internal affections) to the two generic capacities or susceptibilities of Simple and Relative Suggestion. He preferred the word Suggestion to Association, which seemed to him to imply some prior connecting process, whereof there was no evidence in many of the most important cases of suggestion, nor even, strictly speaking, in the case of contiguity in time where the term seemed least inapplicable. According to him, all that could be assumed was a general constitutional tendency of the mind to exist successively in states that have certain relations to each other, of itself only, and without any external cause or any influence previous to that operating at the moment of the suggestion. Brown’s chief contribution to the general doctrine of mental association, besides what he did for the theory of perception, was, perhaps, his analysis of voluntary reminiscence and constructive imagination—faculties that appear at first sight to lie altogether beyond the explanatory range of the principle. In James Mill’sAnalysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind(1829), the principle, much as Hartley had conceived it, was carried out, with characteristic consequence, over the psychological field. With a much enlarged and more varied conception of association, Alexander Bain re-executed the general psychological task, while Herbert Spencer revised the doctrine from the new point of view of the evolution-hypothesis. John Stuart Mill made only occasional excursions into the region of psychology proper, but sought, in hisSystem of Logic(1843), to determine the conditions of objective truth from the point of view of the associationist theory, and, thus or otherwise being drawn into general philosophical discussion, spread wider than any one before him its repute.The Associationist School has been composed chiefly of British thinkers, but in France also it has had distinguished representatives. Of these it will suffice to mention Condillac, who professed to explain all knowledge from the single principle of association (liaison) of ideas, operating through a previous association with signs, verbal or other. In Germany, before the time of Kant, mental association was generally treated in the traditional manner, as by Wolff. Kant’s inquiry into the foundations of knowledge, agreeing in its general purport with Locke’s, however it differed in its critical procedure, brought him face to face with the newer doctrine that had been grafted on Locke’s philosophy; and to account for the fact of synthesis in cognition, in express opposition to associationism, as represented by Hume, was, in truth, his prime object, starting, as he did, from the assumption that there was that in knowledge which no mere association of experiences could explain. To the extent, therefore, that his influence prevailed, all inquiries made by the English associationists were discounted in Germany. Notwithstanding, under the very shadow of his authority a corresponding, if not related, movement was initiated by J.F. Herbart. Peculiar, and widely different from anything conceived by the associationists, as Herbart’s metaphysical opinions were, he was at one with them, and at variance with Kant, in assigning fundamental importance to the psychological investigation of the development of consciousness, nor was his conception of the laws determining the interaction and flow of mental presentations and representations, when taken in its bare psychological import, essentially different from theirs. In F.E. Beneke’s psychology also, and in more recent inquiries conducted mainly by physiologists, mental association has been understood in its wider scope, as a general principle of explanation.The associationists differ not a little among themselves in the statement of their principle, or, when they adduce several principles, in their conception of the relative importance of these. Hartley took account only of Contiguity, or the repetition of impressions synchronous or immediately successive; the like is true of James Mill, though, incidentally, he made an express attempt to resolve the received principle of Similarity, and through this the other principle of Contrast, into his fundamental law—law of Frequency, as he sometimes called it, because upon frequency, in conjunction with vividness of impressions, the strength of association, in his view, depended. In a sense of his own, Brown also, while accepting the common Aristotelian enumeration of principles, inclined to the opinion that “all suggestion may be found to depend on prior coexistence, or at least on such proximity as is itself very probably a modification of coexistence,” provided account be taken of “the influence of emotions and other feelings that are very different from ideas, as when an analogous object suggests an analogous object by the influence of an emotion which each separately may have produced before, and which is, therefore, common to both.” To the contrary effect, Spencer maintained that the fundamental law of all mental association is that presentations aggregate or cohere with their like in past experience, and that, besides this law, there is in strictness no other, all further phenomena of association being incidental. Thus in particular, he would have explained association by Contiguity as due to the circumstance of imperfect assimilation of the present to the past in consciousness. A. Bain regarded Contiguity and Similarity logically, as perfectly distinct principles, though in actual psychological occurrence blending intimately with each other, contiguous trains being started by a first (it may be, implicit) representation through Similarity, while the express assimilation of present to past in consciousness is always, or tends to be, followed by the revival of what was presented in contiguity with that past.The highest, philosophical interest, as distinguished from that which is more strictly psychological, attaches to the mode of mental association called Inseparable. The coalescence of mental states noted by Hartley, as it had been assumed by Berkeley, was farther formulated by James Mill in these terms:—“Some ideas are by frequency and strength of association so closely combined that they cannot be separated; if one exists, the other exists along with it in spite of whatever effort we make to disjoin them.”—(Analysis of the Human Mind, 2nd ed. vol. i. p. 93.)J.S. Mill’s statement is more guarded and particular:—“When two phenomena have been very often experienced in conjunction, and have not, in any single instance, occurred separately either in experience or in thought, there is produced between them what has been called inseparable, or, less correctly, indissoluble, association; by which is not meant that the association must inevitably last to the end of life—that no subsequent experience or process of thought can possibly avail to dissolve it; but only that as long as no such experience or process of thought has taken place, the association is irresistible; it is impossible for us to think the one thing disjoined from the other.”—(Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy, 2nd ed. p. 191.)It is chiefly by J.S. Mill that the philosophical application of the principle has been made. The first and most obvious application is to so-called necessary truths—such, namely, as are not merely analytic judgments but involve a synthesis of distinct notions. Again, the same thinker sought to prove Inseparable Association the ground of belief in an external objective world. The former application, especially, is facilitated, when the experience through which the association is supposed to be constituted is understood as cumulative in the race, and transmissible as original endowment to individuals—endowment that may be expressed either, subjectively, as latent intelligence, or, objectively, as fixed nervous connexions. Spencer, as before suggested, is the author of this extended view of mental association.Modern Criticism.—Of recent years the associationist theory has been subjected to searching criticism, and it has been maintained by many writers that the laws are both unsatisfactorily expressed and insufficient to explain the facts. Among the most vigorous and comprehensive of these investigations is that of F.H. Bradley in hisPrinciples of Logic(1883). Having admitted the psychological fact of mental association, he attacks the theories of Mill and Bain primarily on the ground that they purport to give an account of mental life as a whole, a metaphysical doctrine of existence. According to this doctrine, mental activity is ultimately reducible toparticular feelings, impressions, ideas, which are disparate and unconnected, until chance Association brings them together. On this assumption the laws of Association naturally emerge in the following form:—(1) Thelaw of Contiguity.—“Actions, sensations and states of feeling, occurring together or in close connexion, tend to grow together, or cohere, in such a way that, when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea” (A. Bain,Senses and Intellect, p. 327). (2) Thelaw of Similarity.—“Present actions, sensation, thoughts or emotions tend to revive their like among previous impressions or states” (A. Bain,ibid.457. Compare J.S. Mill,Logic, ii. p. 440, 9th ed.). The fundamental objection to (1) is that ideas and impressions once experienced do not recur; they are particular existences, and, as such, do not persevere to recur or be presented. So Mill is wrong in speaking of two impressions being “frequently experienced.” Bradley claims thus to reduce the law to “When we have experienced (or even thought of) several pairs of impressions (simultaneous or successive), which pairs are like one another; then whenever an idea occurs which is like all the impressions on one side of these pairs, it tends to excite an idea which is like all the impressions on the other side.” This statement is destructive of the title of the law, because it appears that what were contiguous (the impressions) are not associated, and what are associated (the ideas) were not contiguous; in other words, the association is not due to contiguity at all.Proceeding to the law of Similarity (which in Mill’s view is at the back of association by contiguity), and having made a similar criticism of its phrasing, Bradley maintains that it involves an even greater absurdity; if two ideas are to be recognized as similar, they must both be present in the mind; if one is to call up the other, one must be absent. To the obvious reply that the similarity is recognizedex post facto, and not while the former idea is being called up, Bradley replies simply that such a view reduces the law to the mere statement of a phenomenon and deprives it of any explanatory value, though he hardly makes it clear in what sense this necessarily invalidates the law from a psychological point of view. He further points out with greater force that in point of fact mere similarity is not the basis of ordinary cases of mental reproduction, inasmuch as in any given instance there is more difference than similarity between the ideas associated.Bradley himself bases association on identity plus contiguity:—“Any part of a single state of mind tends, if reproduced, to re-instate the remainder,” or “any element tends to reproduce those elements with which it has formed one state of mind.” This law he calls by the name “redintegration,” understood, of course, in a sense different from that in which Hamilton used it. The radical difference between this law and those of Mill and Bain is that it deals not with particular units of thoughts but with universals or identity between individuals. In any example of such reproduction the universal appears in a particular form which is more or less different from that in which it originally existed.Psychophysical Researches.—Bradley’s discussion deals with the subject purely from the metaphysical side, and the total result practically is that association occurs only between universals. From the point of view of empirical psychologists Bradley’s results are open to the charge which he made against those who impugned his view of the law of similarity, namely that they are merely a statement—not in any real sense an explanation. The relation between the mental and the physical phenomena of association has occupied the attention of all the leading psychologists (seePsychology). William James holds that association is of “objects” not of “ideas,” is between “things thought of”—so far as the word stands for an effect. “So far as it stands for a cause it is between processes in the brain.” Dealing with the law of Contiguity he says that the “most natural way of accounting for it is to conceive it as a result of the laws of habit in the nervous system; in other words to ascribe it to a physiological cause.” Association is thus due to the fact that when a nerve current has once passed by a given way, it will pass more easily by that way in future; and this fact is a physical fact. He further seeks to maintain the important deduction that the only primary or ultimate law of association is that of neural habit.The objections to the associationist theory are summed up by G.F. Stout (Analytic Psychol., vol. ii. pp. 47 seq.) under three heads. Of these the first is that the theory as stated,e.g.by Bain, lays far too much stress on the mere connexion of elements hitherto entirely separate; whereas, in fact, every new mental state or synthesis consists in the development or modification of a pre-existing state or psychic whole. Secondly, it is quite false to regard an association as merely an aggregate of disparate units; in fact, theformof the new idea is quite as important as the elements which it comprises. Thirdly, the phraseology used by the associationists seems to assume that the parts that go to form the whole retain their identity unimpaired; in fact, each part or element isipso factomodified by the very fact of its entering into such combination.The experimental methods now in vogue have to a large extent removed the discussion of the whole subject of association of ideas, depending in the case of the older writers on introspection, into a new sphere. In such a work as E.B. Titchener’sExperimental Psychology(1905), association is treated as a branch of the study of mental reactions, of which association reactions are one division.Bibliography.—SeePsychology; and the works of Bradley, Stout, and James, above quoted, and general works on psychology: articles inMind(passim); A. Bain,Senses and Intellect(4th ed., 1894), and inMind, xii. (1887) pp. 237-249; John Watson,An Outline of Philosophy(1898); H. Höffding,Hist. of Mod. Philos.(Eng. trans., Lond., 1900),Psychologie in Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung(2nd ed., Leipzig, 1893); Jas. Sully,The Human Mind(1892), andOutlines of Psych.(Lond., 1892); E.B. Titchener,Outline of Psych.(New York, 1896), and in his trans. of O. Külpe’sOutlines of Psych.(New York, 1895,); Jas. Ward inMind, viii. (1883), xii. (1887), new series ii. (1893), iii. (1894); G.T. Ladd,Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory(Lond., 1894); C.L.C. Morgan,Introd. to Comparative Psych.(Lond., 1894); W. Wundt,Princip. of Physiol. Psych.(Eng. trans., 1904),Human and Animal Psych.(Eng. trans., 1894), pp. 282-307;Outlines of Psych.(Eng. trans., 1897); E. Claparède,L’Association des idées(1903). For associationism in Greek philosophy see J.I. Beare,Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition(Oxford, 1906), part iii. §§ 14, 43 seq.

“When, therefore, we accomplish an act of reminiscence, we pass through a certain series of precursive movements, until we arrive at a movement on which the one we are in quest of is habitually consequent. Hence, too, it is that we hunt through the mental train, excogitating from the present or some other, and from similar or contrary or coadjacent. Through this process reminiscence takes place. For the movements are, in these cases, sometimes at the same time, sometimes parts of the same whole, so that the subsequent movement is already more than half accomplished.”

The passage is obscure, but it does at all events indicate the various principles commonly termed contiguity, similarity and contrast. Similar principles are stated by Zeno the Stoic, by Epicurus (see Diog. Laert. vii. § 52, x. § 32), and by St Augustine (Confessions, x. e. 19). Aristotle’s doctrine received a more or less intelligent expansion and illustration from the ancient commentators and the schoolmen, and in the still later period of transition from the age of scholasticism to the time of modern philosophy, prolonged in the works of some writers far into the 17th century, Hamilton adduced not a few philosophical authorities who gave prominence to the general fact of mental association—the Spaniard Ludovicus Vives (1492-1540) especially being most exhaustive in his account of memory.

In Hobbes’s psychology much importance is assigned to what he called, variously, the succession, sequence, series, consequence, coherence, train of imaginations or thoughts in mental discourse. But not before Hume is there express question as to what are the distinct principles of association. John Locke had, meanwhile, introduced the phrase “Association of Ideas” as the title of a supplementary chapter incorporated with the fourth edition of hisEssay, meaning it, however, only as the name of a principle accounting for the mental peculiarities of individuals, with little or no suggestion of its general psychological import. Of this last Hume had the strongest impression; he reduced the principles of association to three—Resemblance, Contiguity in time and place, Cause and (or) Effect. Dugald Stewart put forward Resemblance, Contrariety, and Vicinity in time and place, though he added, as another obvious principle, accidental coincidence in the sounds of words, and further noted three other cases of relation, namely, Cause and Effect, Means and End, Premisses and Conclusion, as holding among the trains of thought under circumstances of special attention. Reid, preceding Stewart, was rather disposed to make light of the subject of association, vaguely remarking that it seems to require no other original quality of mind but the power of habit to explain the spontaneous recurrence of trains of thinking, when become familiar by frequent repetition (Intellectual Powers, p. 387).

Hamilton’s own theory of mental reproduction, suggestion or association is a development, greatly modified, of the doctrine expounded in hisLectures on Metaphysics(vol. ii. p. 223, seq.), which reduced the principles of association first to two—Simultaneity and Affinity, and these further to one supreme principle of Redintegration or Totality. In the ultimate scheme he posits no less than four general laws of mental succession concerned in reproduction: (1)Associabilityor possible co-suggestion (all thoughts of the same mental subject are associable or capable of suggesting each other); (2)Repetitionor direct remembrance (thoughts coidentical in modification, but differing in time, tend to suggest each other); (3)Redintegration, direct remembrance or reminiscence (thoughts once coidentical in time, are, however, different as mental modes, again suggestive of each other, and that in the mutual order which they originally held); (4)Preference(thoughts are suggested not merely by force of the general subjective relation subsisting between themselves, they are also suggested in proportion to the relation of interest, from whatever source, in which they stand to the individual mind). Upon these follow, as special laws:—A, Primary—modes of the laws of Repetition and Redintegration—(1) law of Similars (Analogy, Affinity); (2) law of Contrast; (3) law of Coadjacency (Cause and Effect, &c.); B, Secondary—modes of the law of Preference, under the law of Possibility—(1) laws of Immediacy and Homogeneity; (2) law of Facility.

The Associationist School.—This name is given to the English psychologists who aimed at explaining all mental acquisitions, and the more complex mental processes generally under laws not other than those which have just been set out as determining simple reproduction. Hamilton, though professing to deal with reproduction only, formulates a number of still more general laws of mental succession—law of Succession, law of Variation, law of Dependence, law of Relativity or Integration (involving law of Conditioned), and, finally, law of Intrinsic or Objective Relativity—as the highest to which human consciousness is subject; but it is in a sense quite different that the psychologists of the so-called Associationist School intend their appropriation of the principle or principles commonly signalized. As far as can be judged from imperfect records, they were anticipated to some extent by the experientialists of ancient times, both Stoic and Epicurean (cf. Diogenes Laertius, as above). In the modern period, Hobbes is the first thinker of permanent note to whom this doctrine may be traced. Though, in point of fact, he took anything but an exhaustive view of the phenomena of mental succession, yet, after dealing with trains of imagination, or what he called mental discourse, he sought in the higher departments of intellect to explain reasoning as a discourse in words, dependent upon an arbitrary system of marks, each associated with, or standing for, a variety of imaginations; and, save for a general assertion that reasoning is a reckoning—otherwise, a compounding and resolving—he had no other account of knowledge to give. The whole emotional side of mind, or, in his language, the passions, he, in like manner, resolved into an expectation of consequences, based on past experience of pleasures and pains of sense. Thus, though he made no serious attempt to justify his analysis in detail, he is undoubtedly to be classed with the associationists of the next century. They, however, were wont to trace their psychological theory no further back than to Locke’sEssay. Bishop Berkeley was driven to posit expressly a principle of suggestion or association in these terms:—“That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it will suffice that they have been observed to go together, without any demonstration of the necessity of their coexistence, or so much as knowing what it is that makes them so to coexist” (New Theory of Vision, § 25); and to support the obvious application of the principle to the case of the sensations of sight and touch before him, he constantly urged that association of sound and sense of language which the later school has always put in the foreground, whether as illustrating the principle in general or in explanation of the supreme importance of language for knowledge. It was natural, then, that Hume, coming after Berkeley, and assuming Berkeley’s results, though he reverted to the larger inquiry of Locke, should be more explicit in his reference to association; but he was original also, when he spoke of it as a “kind of attraction which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms” (Human Nature, i. 1, § 4). Other inquirers about the same time conceived of association with this breadth of view, and set themselves to track, as psychologists, its effects in detail.

David Hartley in hisObservations on Man, published in 1749 (eleven years after theHuman Nature, and one year after the better-knownInquiry, of Hume), opened the path for all the investigations of like nature that have been so characteristic of English psychology. A physician by profession, he sought to combine with an elaborate theory of mental association a minutely detailed hypothesis as to the corresponding action of the nervous system, based upon the suggestion of a vibratory motion within the nerves thrown out by Newton in the last paragraph of thePrincipia. So far, however, from promoting the acceptance of the psychological theory, this physical hypothesis proved to have rather the opposite effect, and it began to be dropped by Hartley’s followers (as F. Priestley, in his abridged edition of theObservations, 1775) before it was seriously impugned from without. When it is studied in the original, and not taken upon the report of hostile critics, who would not, or could not understand it, no little importance must still be accorded to the first attempt, not seldom a curiously felicitous one, to carry through that parallelism of the physical and psychical, which since then has come to count for more and more in the science of mind. Nor should it be forgotten that Hartley himself, for all his paternal interest in the doctrine of vibrations, was careful to keep separate from its fortunes the cause of his other doctrine of mental association. Of this the point lay in no mere restatement, with new precision, of a principle of coherence among “ideas,” but in its being taken as a clue by whichto follow the progressive development of the mind’s powers. Holding that mental states could be scientifically understood only as they were analysed, Hartley sought for a principle of synthesis to explain the complexity exhibited not only in trains of representative images, but alike in the most involved combinations of reasonings and (as Berkeley had seen) in the apparently simple phenomena of objective perception, as well as in the varied play of the emotions, or, again, in the manifold conscious adjustments of the motor system. One principle appeared to him sufficient for all, running, as enunciated for the simplest case, thus: “Any sensations A, B, C, &c., by being associated with one another a sufficient number of times, get such a power over the corresponding ideas (called by Hartley also vestiges, types, images)a, b, c, &c., that any one of the sensations A, when impressed alone, shall be able to excite in the mindb, c, &c., the ideas of the rest.” To render the principle applicable in the cases where the associated elements are neither sensations nor simple ideas of sensations, Hartley’s first care was to determine the conditions under which states other than these simplest ones have their rise in the mind, becoming the matter of ever higher and higher combinations. The principle itself supplied the key to the difficulty, when coupled with the notion, already implied in Berkeley’s investigations, of a coalescence of simple ideas of sensation into one complex idea, which may cease to bear any obvious relation to its constituents. So far from being content, like Hobbes, to make a rough generalization to all mind from the phenomena of developed memory, as if these might be straightway assumed, Hartley made a point of referring them, in a subordinate place of their own, to his universal principle of mental synthesis. He expressly put forward the law of association, endued with such scope, as supplying what was wanting to Locke’s doctrine in its more strictly psychological aspect, and thus marks by his work a distinct advance on the line of development of the experiential philosophy.

The new doctrine received warm support from some, as Law and Priestley, who both, like Hume and Hartley himself, took the principle of association as having the like import for the science of mind that gravitation had acquired for the science of matter. The principle began also, if not always with direct reference to Hartley, yet, doubtless, owing to his impressive advocacy of it, to be applied systematically in special directions, as by Abraham Tucker (1768) to morals, and by Archibald Alison (1790) to aesthetics. Thomas Brown (d. 1820) subjected anew to discussion the question of theory. Hardly less unjust to Hartley than Reid or Stewart had been, and forward to proclaim all that was different in his own position, Brown must yet be ranked with the associationists before and after him for the prominence he assigned to the associative principle in sense-perception (what he called external affections of mind), and for his reference of all other mental states (internal affections) to the two generic capacities or susceptibilities of Simple and Relative Suggestion. He preferred the word Suggestion to Association, which seemed to him to imply some prior connecting process, whereof there was no evidence in many of the most important cases of suggestion, nor even, strictly speaking, in the case of contiguity in time where the term seemed least inapplicable. According to him, all that could be assumed was a general constitutional tendency of the mind to exist successively in states that have certain relations to each other, of itself only, and without any external cause or any influence previous to that operating at the moment of the suggestion. Brown’s chief contribution to the general doctrine of mental association, besides what he did for the theory of perception, was, perhaps, his analysis of voluntary reminiscence and constructive imagination—faculties that appear at first sight to lie altogether beyond the explanatory range of the principle. In James Mill’sAnalysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind(1829), the principle, much as Hartley had conceived it, was carried out, with characteristic consequence, over the psychological field. With a much enlarged and more varied conception of association, Alexander Bain re-executed the general psychological task, while Herbert Spencer revised the doctrine from the new point of view of the evolution-hypothesis. John Stuart Mill made only occasional excursions into the region of psychology proper, but sought, in hisSystem of Logic(1843), to determine the conditions of objective truth from the point of view of the associationist theory, and, thus or otherwise being drawn into general philosophical discussion, spread wider than any one before him its repute.

The Associationist School has been composed chiefly of British thinkers, but in France also it has had distinguished representatives. Of these it will suffice to mention Condillac, who professed to explain all knowledge from the single principle of association (liaison) of ideas, operating through a previous association with signs, verbal or other. In Germany, before the time of Kant, mental association was generally treated in the traditional manner, as by Wolff. Kant’s inquiry into the foundations of knowledge, agreeing in its general purport with Locke’s, however it differed in its critical procedure, brought him face to face with the newer doctrine that had been grafted on Locke’s philosophy; and to account for the fact of synthesis in cognition, in express opposition to associationism, as represented by Hume, was, in truth, his prime object, starting, as he did, from the assumption that there was that in knowledge which no mere association of experiences could explain. To the extent, therefore, that his influence prevailed, all inquiries made by the English associationists were discounted in Germany. Notwithstanding, under the very shadow of his authority a corresponding, if not related, movement was initiated by J.F. Herbart. Peculiar, and widely different from anything conceived by the associationists, as Herbart’s metaphysical opinions were, he was at one with them, and at variance with Kant, in assigning fundamental importance to the psychological investigation of the development of consciousness, nor was his conception of the laws determining the interaction and flow of mental presentations and representations, when taken in its bare psychological import, essentially different from theirs. In F.E. Beneke’s psychology also, and in more recent inquiries conducted mainly by physiologists, mental association has been understood in its wider scope, as a general principle of explanation.

The associationists differ not a little among themselves in the statement of their principle, or, when they adduce several principles, in their conception of the relative importance of these. Hartley took account only of Contiguity, or the repetition of impressions synchronous or immediately successive; the like is true of James Mill, though, incidentally, he made an express attempt to resolve the received principle of Similarity, and through this the other principle of Contrast, into his fundamental law—law of Frequency, as he sometimes called it, because upon frequency, in conjunction with vividness of impressions, the strength of association, in his view, depended. In a sense of his own, Brown also, while accepting the common Aristotelian enumeration of principles, inclined to the opinion that “all suggestion may be found to depend on prior coexistence, or at least on such proximity as is itself very probably a modification of coexistence,” provided account be taken of “the influence of emotions and other feelings that are very different from ideas, as when an analogous object suggests an analogous object by the influence of an emotion which each separately may have produced before, and which is, therefore, common to both.” To the contrary effect, Spencer maintained that the fundamental law of all mental association is that presentations aggregate or cohere with their like in past experience, and that, besides this law, there is in strictness no other, all further phenomena of association being incidental. Thus in particular, he would have explained association by Contiguity as due to the circumstance of imperfect assimilation of the present to the past in consciousness. A. Bain regarded Contiguity and Similarity logically, as perfectly distinct principles, though in actual psychological occurrence blending intimately with each other, contiguous trains being started by a first (it may be, implicit) representation through Similarity, while the express assimilation of present to past in consciousness is always, or tends to be, followed by the revival of what was presented in contiguity with that past.

The highest, philosophical interest, as distinguished from that which is more strictly psychological, attaches to the mode of mental association called Inseparable. The coalescence of mental states noted by Hartley, as it had been assumed by Berkeley, was farther formulated by James Mill in these terms:—

“Some ideas are by frequency and strength of association so closely combined that they cannot be separated; if one exists, the other exists along with it in spite of whatever effort we make to disjoin them.”—(Analysis of the Human Mind, 2nd ed. vol. i. p. 93.)

J.S. Mill’s statement is more guarded and particular:—

“When two phenomena have been very often experienced in conjunction, and have not, in any single instance, occurred separately either in experience or in thought, there is produced between them what has been called inseparable, or, less correctly, indissoluble, association; by which is not meant that the association must inevitably last to the end of life—that no subsequent experience or process of thought can possibly avail to dissolve it; but only that as long as no such experience or process of thought has taken place, the association is irresistible; it is impossible for us to think the one thing disjoined from the other.”—(Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy, 2nd ed. p. 191.)

It is chiefly by J.S. Mill that the philosophical application of the principle has been made. The first and most obvious application is to so-called necessary truths—such, namely, as are not merely analytic judgments but involve a synthesis of distinct notions. Again, the same thinker sought to prove Inseparable Association the ground of belief in an external objective world. The former application, especially, is facilitated, when the experience through which the association is supposed to be constituted is understood as cumulative in the race, and transmissible as original endowment to individuals—endowment that may be expressed either, subjectively, as latent intelligence, or, objectively, as fixed nervous connexions. Spencer, as before suggested, is the author of this extended view of mental association.

Modern Criticism.—Of recent years the associationist theory has been subjected to searching criticism, and it has been maintained by many writers that the laws are both unsatisfactorily expressed and insufficient to explain the facts. Among the most vigorous and comprehensive of these investigations is that of F.H. Bradley in hisPrinciples of Logic(1883). Having admitted the psychological fact of mental association, he attacks the theories of Mill and Bain primarily on the ground that they purport to give an account of mental life as a whole, a metaphysical doctrine of existence. According to this doctrine, mental activity is ultimately reducible toparticular feelings, impressions, ideas, which are disparate and unconnected, until chance Association brings them together. On this assumption the laws of Association naturally emerge in the following form:—(1) Thelaw of Contiguity.—“Actions, sensations and states of feeling, occurring together or in close connexion, tend to grow together, or cohere, in such a way that, when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea” (A. Bain,Senses and Intellect, p. 327). (2) Thelaw of Similarity.—“Present actions, sensation, thoughts or emotions tend to revive their like among previous impressions or states” (A. Bain,ibid.457. Compare J.S. Mill,Logic, ii. p. 440, 9th ed.). The fundamental objection to (1) is that ideas and impressions once experienced do not recur; they are particular existences, and, as such, do not persevere to recur or be presented. So Mill is wrong in speaking of two impressions being “frequently experienced.” Bradley claims thus to reduce the law to “When we have experienced (or even thought of) several pairs of impressions (simultaneous or successive), which pairs are like one another; then whenever an idea occurs which is like all the impressions on one side of these pairs, it tends to excite an idea which is like all the impressions on the other side.” This statement is destructive of the title of the law, because it appears that what were contiguous (the impressions) are not associated, and what are associated (the ideas) were not contiguous; in other words, the association is not due to contiguity at all.

Proceeding to the law of Similarity (which in Mill’s view is at the back of association by contiguity), and having made a similar criticism of its phrasing, Bradley maintains that it involves an even greater absurdity; if two ideas are to be recognized as similar, they must both be present in the mind; if one is to call up the other, one must be absent. To the obvious reply that the similarity is recognizedex post facto, and not while the former idea is being called up, Bradley replies simply that such a view reduces the law to the mere statement of a phenomenon and deprives it of any explanatory value, though he hardly makes it clear in what sense this necessarily invalidates the law from a psychological point of view. He further points out with greater force that in point of fact mere similarity is not the basis of ordinary cases of mental reproduction, inasmuch as in any given instance there is more difference than similarity between the ideas associated.

Bradley himself bases association on identity plus contiguity:—“Any part of a single state of mind tends, if reproduced, to re-instate the remainder,” or “any element tends to reproduce those elements with which it has formed one state of mind.” This law he calls by the name “redintegration,” understood, of course, in a sense different from that in which Hamilton used it. The radical difference between this law and those of Mill and Bain is that it deals not with particular units of thoughts but with universals or identity between individuals. In any example of such reproduction the universal appears in a particular form which is more or less different from that in which it originally existed.

Psychophysical Researches.—Bradley’s discussion deals with the subject purely from the metaphysical side, and the total result practically is that association occurs only between universals. From the point of view of empirical psychologists Bradley’s results are open to the charge which he made against those who impugned his view of the law of similarity, namely that they are merely a statement—not in any real sense an explanation. The relation between the mental and the physical phenomena of association has occupied the attention of all the leading psychologists (seePsychology). William James holds that association is of “objects” not of “ideas,” is between “things thought of”—so far as the word stands for an effect. “So far as it stands for a cause it is between processes in the brain.” Dealing with the law of Contiguity he says that the “most natural way of accounting for it is to conceive it as a result of the laws of habit in the nervous system; in other words to ascribe it to a physiological cause.” Association is thus due to the fact that when a nerve current has once passed by a given way, it will pass more easily by that way in future; and this fact is a physical fact. He further seeks to maintain the important deduction that the only primary or ultimate law of association is that of neural habit.

The objections to the associationist theory are summed up by G.F. Stout (Analytic Psychol., vol. ii. pp. 47 seq.) under three heads. Of these the first is that the theory as stated,e.g.by Bain, lays far too much stress on the mere connexion of elements hitherto entirely separate; whereas, in fact, every new mental state or synthesis consists in the development or modification of a pre-existing state or psychic whole. Secondly, it is quite false to regard an association as merely an aggregate of disparate units; in fact, theformof the new idea is quite as important as the elements which it comprises. Thirdly, the phraseology used by the associationists seems to assume that the parts that go to form the whole retain their identity unimpaired; in fact, each part or element isipso factomodified by the very fact of its entering into such combination.

The experimental methods now in vogue have to a large extent removed the discussion of the whole subject of association of ideas, depending in the case of the older writers on introspection, into a new sphere. In such a work as E.B. Titchener’sExperimental Psychology(1905), association is treated as a branch of the study of mental reactions, of which association reactions are one division.

Bibliography.—SeePsychology; and the works of Bradley, Stout, and James, above quoted, and general works on psychology: articles inMind(passim); A. Bain,Senses and Intellect(4th ed., 1894), and inMind, xii. (1887) pp. 237-249; John Watson,An Outline of Philosophy(1898); H. Höffding,Hist. of Mod. Philos.(Eng. trans., Lond., 1900),Psychologie in Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung(2nd ed., Leipzig, 1893); Jas. Sully,The Human Mind(1892), andOutlines of Psych.(Lond., 1892); E.B. Titchener,Outline of Psych.(New York, 1896), and in his trans. of O. Külpe’sOutlines of Psych.(New York, 1895,); Jas. Ward inMind, viii. (1883), xii. (1887), new series ii. (1893), iii. (1894); G.T. Ladd,Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory(Lond., 1894); C.L.C. Morgan,Introd. to Comparative Psych.(Lond., 1894); W. Wundt,Princip. of Physiol. Psych.(Eng. trans., 1904),Human and Animal Psych.(Eng. trans., 1894), pp. 282-307;Outlines of Psych.(Eng. trans., 1897); E. Claparède,L’Association des idées(1903). For associationism in Greek philosophy see J.I. Beare,Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition(Oxford, 1906), part iii. §§ 14, 43 seq.

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