France took no notice of the protest, declaring that the claim had merely an archaeological interest, and that, in any case, China in military affairs was aquantité négligeable. France found, however, that she had undertaken a very serious task inTroubles with France.trying to put down the forces of disorder (seeTongking). The Black Flags were, it was believed, being aided by money and arms from China, and as time went on, the French were more and more being confronted with regular Chinese soldiers. Several forts, well within the Tongking frontier, were known to be garrisoned by Chinese troops. Operations continued with more or less success during the winter and spring of 1883-1884. Both sides, however, were desirous of an arrangement, and in May 1884 a convention was signed between Li Hung-Chang and a Captain Fournier, who had been commissionedad hoc, whereby China agreed to withdraw her garrisons and to open her frontiers to trade, France agreeing, on her part, to respect the fiction of Chinese suzerainty, and guarantee the frontier from attack by brigands. No date had been fixed in the convention for the evacuation of the Chinese garrisons, and Fournier endeavoured to supplement this by a memorandum to Li Hung-Chang, at the same time announcing the fact to his government. In pursuance of this arrangement the French troops proceeded to occupy Langson on the date fixed (21st June 1884). The Chinese commandant refused to evacuate, alleging, in a despatch which no one in the French camp was competent to translate, that he had received no orders, and begged for a short delay to enable him to communicate with his superiors. The French commandant ordered an attack, which was repulsed with severe loss. Mutual recriminations ensued. From Paris there came a demand for a huge indemnity as reparationfor the insult. The Peking government offered to carry out the convention, and to pay a small indemnity for the lives lost through the misunderstanding. This was refused, and hostilities recommenced, or, as the French preferred to call them, reprisals, for the fiction was still kept up that the two countries were not at war. Under cover of this fiction the French fleet peaceably entered the harbour of Fuchow, having passed the forts at the entrance to the river without hindrance. Once inside, they attacked and destroyed the much inferior Chinese fleet which was then quietly at anchor, destroying at the same time a large part of the arsenal which adjoins the anchorage (23rd August 1884). Retracing its steps, the French fleet attacked and destroyed with impunity the forts which were built to guard the entrance to the Min river, and could offer no resistance to a force coming from the rear. After this exploit the French fleet left the mainland and continued its reprisals on the coast of Formosa. Kelung, a treaty port, was bombarded and taken, October 4th. A similar attempt, however, on the neighbouring port of Tamsui was unsuccessful, the landing party having been driven back to their ships with severe loss. The attempt was not renewed, and the fleet thereafter confined itself to a semi-blockade of the island, which was prolonged into 1885 but led to no practical results. Negotiations for peace, however, which had been for some time in progress through the mediation of Sir Robert Hart, were at this juncture happily concluded (April 1885). The terms were practically those of the Fournier convention of the year before, the demand for an indemnity having been quietly dropped.
France took no notice of the protest, declaring that the claim had merely an archaeological interest, and that, in any case, China in military affairs was aquantité négligeable. France found, however, that she had undertaken a very serious task inTroubles with France.trying to put down the forces of disorder (seeTongking). The Black Flags were, it was believed, being aided by money and arms from China, and as time went on, the French were more and more being confronted with regular Chinese soldiers. Several forts, well within the Tongking frontier, were known to be garrisoned by Chinese troops. Operations continued with more or less success during the winter and spring of 1883-1884. Both sides, however, were desirous of an arrangement, and in May 1884 a convention was signed between Li Hung-Chang and a Captain Fournier, who had been commissionedad hoc, whereby China agreed to withdraw her garrisons and to open her frontiers to trade, France agreeing, on her part, to respect the fiction of Chinese suzerainty, and guarantee the frontier from attack by brigands. No date had been fixed in the convention for the evacuation of the Chinese garrisons, and Fournier endeavoured to supplement this by a memorandum to Li Hung-Chang, at the same time announcing the fact to his government. In pursuance of this arrangement the French troops proceeded to occupy Langson on the date fixed (21st June 1884). The Chinese commandant refused to evacuate, alleging, in a despatch which no one in the French camp was competent to translate, that he had received no orders, and begged for a short delay to enable him to communicate with his superiors. The French commandant ordered an attack, which was repulsed with severe loss. Mutual recriminations ensued. From Paris there came a demand for a huge indemnity as reparationfor the insult. The Peking government offered to carry out the convention, and to pay a small indemnity for the lives lost through the misunderstanding. This was refused, and hostilities recommenced, or, as the French preferred to call them, reprisals, for the fiction was still kept up that the two countries were not at war. Under cover of this fiction the French fleet peaceably entered the harbour of Fuchow, having passed the forts at the entrance to the river without hindrance. Once inside, they attacked and destroyed the much inferior Chinese fleet which was then quietly at anchor, destroying at the same time a large part of the arsenal which adjoins the anchorage (23rd August 1884). Retracing its steps, the French fleet attacked and destroyed with impunity the forts which were built to guard the entrance to the Min river, and could offer no resistance to a force coming from the rear. After this exploit the French fleet left the mainland and continued its reprisals on the coast of Formosa. Kelung, a treaty port, was bombarded and taken, October 4th. A similar attempt, however, on the neighbouring port of Tamsui was unsuccessful, the landing party having been driven back to their ships with severe loss. The attempt was not renewed, and the fleet thereafter confined itself to a semi-blockade of the island, which was prolonged into 1885 but led to no practical results. Negotiations for peace, however, which had been for some time in progress through the mediation of Sir Robert Hart, were at this juncture happily concluded (April 1885). The terms were practically those of the Fournier convention of the year before, the demand for an indemnity having been quietly dropped.
China, on the whole, came out of the struggle with greatly increased prestige. She had tried conclusions with a first-class European power and had held her own. Incorrect conclusions as to the military strength of China wereIncreased prestige of China.consequently drawn, not merely by the Chinese themselves—which was excusable—but by European and even British authorities, who ought to have been better informed. War vessels were ordered by China both from England and Germany, and Admiral Lang, who had withdrawn his services while the war was going on, was re-engaged together with a number of British officers and instructors. The completion of the works at Port Arthur was taken in hand, and a beginning was made in the construction of forts at Wei-hai-wei as a second naval base. A new department was created for the control of naval affairs, at the head of which was placed Prince Chun, father of the emperor, who since the downfall of Prince Kung in 1884 had been taking a more and more prominent part in public affairs.
From 1885 to 1894 the political history of China does not call for extended notice. Two incidents, however, must be recorded, (1) the conclusion in 1886 of a convention with Great Britain, in which the Chinese government undertook to recognize British sovereignty in Burma, and (2) the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton by the British fleet (May 1885-February 1887).1885-1894.In 1890 Admiral Lang resigned his command of the Chinese fleet. During a temporary absence of Lang’s colleague, Admiral Ting, the Chinese second in command, claimed the right to take charge—a claim which Admiral Lang naturally resented. The question was referred to Li Hung-Chang, who decided against Lang, whereupon the latter threw up his commission. From this point the fleet on which so much depended began to deteriorate. Superior officers again began to steal the men’s pays, the ships were starved, shells filled with charcoal instead of powder were supplied, accounts were cooked, and all the corruption and malfeasance that were rampant in the army crept back into the navy.
The year 1894 witnessed the outbreak of the war with Japan. In the spring, complications again arose with Japan over Korea, and hostilities began in July. The story of the war is told elsewhere (seeChino-Japanese War), and it isWar with Japan, 1894.unnecessary here to recount the details of the decisive victory of Japan. A new power had arisen in the Far East, and when peace was signed by Li Hung-Chang at Shimonoseki on the 17th of April 1895 it meant the beginning of a new epoch. The terms included the cession of Liao-tung peninsula, then in actual occupation by the Japanese troops, the cession of Formosa, an indemnity of H. taels 200,000,000 (about £30,000,000) and various commercial privileges.
The signature of this treaty brought the European powers on the scene. It had been for some time the avowed ambition of Russia to obtain an ice-free port as an outlet to her Siberian possessions—an ambition which was considered by British statesmen as not unreasonable. It did not, therefore, at all suit her purposes to see the rising power of Japan commandingEuropean intervention.the whole of the coast-line of Korea. Accordingly in the interval between the signature and the ratification of the treaty, invitations were addressed by Russia to the great powers to intervene with a view to its modification on the ground of the disturbance of the balance of power, and the menace to China which the occupation of Port Arthur by the Japanese would involve. France and Germany accepted the invitation, Great Britain declined. In the end the three powers brought such pressure to bear on Japan that she gave up the whole of her continental acquisitions, retaining only the island of Formosa. The indemnity was on the other hand increased by H. taels 30,000,000. For the time the integrity of China seemed to be preserved, and Russia, France and Germany could pose as her friends. Evidence was, however, soon forthcoming that Russia and France had not been disinterested in rescuing Chinese territory from the Japanese grasp. Russia now obtained the right to carry the Siberian railway across Chinese territory from Stryetensk to Vladivostok, thus avoiding a long détour, besides giving a grasp on northern Manchuria. France obtained, by a convention dated the 20th of June 1895, a rectification of frontier in the Mekong valley and certain railway and mining rights in Kiang-si and Yun-nan. Both powers obtained concessions of land at Hankow for the purposes of a settlement. Russia was also said to have negotiated a secret treaty, frequently described as the “Cassini Convention,” but more probably signed by Li Hung-Chang at Moscow, giving her the right in certain contingencies to Port Arthur, which was to be refortified with Russian assistance. And by way of further securing her hold, Russia guaranteed a 4% loan of £15,000,000 issued in Paris to enable China to pay off the first instalment of the Japanese indemnity.
The convention between France and China of the 20th of June 1895 brought China into sharp conflict with Great Britain. China, having by the Burma convention of 1886 agreed to recognize British sovereignty overMekong valley dispute, 1895.Burma, her quondam feudatory, also agreed to a delimitation of boundaries at the proper time. Effect was given to this last stipulation by a subsequent convention concluded in London (1st of March 1894), which traced the boundary line from the Shan states on the west as far as the Mekong river on the east. In the Mekong valley there were two semi-independent native territories over which suzerainty had been claimed in times gone by both by the kings of Ava and by the Chinese emperors. These territories were named Meng Lun and Kiang Hung—the latter lying partly on one side and partly on the other of the Mekong river, south of the point where it issues from Chinese territory. The boundary line was so drawn as to leave both these territories to China, but it was stipulated that China should not alienate any portion of these territories to any other power without the previous consent of Great Britain. Yielding to French pressure, and regardless of the undertaking she had entered into with Great Britain, China, in the convention with France in June 1895, so drew the boundary line as to cede to France that portion of the territory of Kiang Hung which lay on the left bank of the Mekong. Compensation was demanded by Great Britain from China for this breach of faith, and at the same time negotiations were entered into with France. These resulted in a joint declaration by the governments of France and Great Britain, dated the 15th of January 1896, by which it was agreed as regards boundary that the Mekong from the point of its confluence with the Nam Huk northwards as far as the Chinese frontier should be the dividing line between the possessions or spheres of influence of the two powers. It was also agreed that any commercial privileges obtained by either power in Yun-nan or Sze-ch‘uen should be open to the subjects of the other. The negotiations with China resulted in a further agreement, dated the 4th of February 1897, whereby considerable modifications in favour of Great Britain were made in the Burma boundary drawn by the 1894 convention.
While Russia and France were profiting by what they were pleased to call the generosity of China, Germany alone had so far received no reward for her share in compelling the retrocession of Liao-tung; but, in November 1897, sheKiaochow, Port Arthur, Wei-hai-wei.proceeded to help herself by seizing the Bay of Kiaochow in the province of Shan-tung. The act was done ostensibly in order to compel satisfaction for the murder of two German missionaries. A cession was ultimately made by way of a lease for a term of ninety-nine years—Germany to have full territorial jurisdiction during the continuance of the lease, with liberty to erect fortifications, build docks, and exercise all the rights of sovereignty. In December the Russian fleet was sent to winter in Port Arthur, and though this was at first described as a temporary measure, its object was speedily disclosed by a request made, in January 1898, by the Russian ambassador in London that two British cruisers, then also anchored at Port Arthur, should be withdrawn “in order to avoid friction in the Russian sphere of influence.” They left shortly afterwards, and their departure in the circumstances was regarded as a blow to Great Britain’s prestige in the Far East. In March the Russian government peremptorily demanded a lease of Port Arthur and the adjoining anchorage of Talienwan—a demand which China could not resist without foreign support. After an acrimonious correspondence with the Russian government Great Britain acquiesced in thefait accompli. The Russian occupation of Port Arthur was immediately followed by a concession to build a line of railway from that point northwards to connect with the Siberian trunk line in north Manchuria. As a counterpoise to the growth of Russian influence in the north, Great Britain obtained a lease of Wei-hai-wei, and formally took possession of it on its evacuation by the Japanese troops in May 1898.
After much hesitation the Chinese government had at last resolved to permit the construction of railways with foreign capital. An influential official named Sheng Hsuan-hwai was appointed director-general of railways, and empowered to enter into negotiations with foreign capitalists for that purpose. A keen competition thereupon ensued between syndicates of different nationalities, and their claims being espoused by their various governments, an equally keen international rivalry was set up. Great Britain, though intimating her preference for the “open door” policy, meaning equal opportunity for“Open door,” and “spheres of influence.”all, yet found herself compelled to fall in with the general movement towards what became known as the “spheres of influence” policy, and claimed the Yangtsze valley as her particular sphere. This she did by the somewhat negative method of obtaining from the Chinese government a declaration that no part of the Yangtsze valley should be alienated to any foreign power. A more formal recognition of the claim, as far as railway enterprise was concerned, was embodied in an agreement (28th of April 1899) between Great Britain and Russia, and communicated to the Chinese government, whereby the Russian government agreed not to seek for any concessions within the Yangtsze valley, including all the provinces bordering on the great river, together with Cheh-kiang and Ho-nan, the British government entering into a similar undertaking in regard to the Chinese dominions north of the Great Wall.50
In 1899 Talienwan and Kiaochow were respectively thrown open by Russia and Germany to foreign trade, and, encouraged by these measures, the United States government initiated in September of the same year a correspondence with the great European powers and Japan, with a view to securing their definite adhesion to the “open door” policy. The British government gave an unqualified approval to the American proposal, and the replies of the other powers, though more guarded, were accepted at Washington as satisfactory. A further and more definite step towards securing the maintenance of the “open door” in China was the agreement concluded in October 1900 between the British and German governments. The signatories, by the first two articles, agreed to endeavour to keep the ports on the rivers and littoral free and open to international trade and economic activity, and to uphold this rule for all Chinese territory as far as (woin the German counterpart) they could exercise influence; not to use the existing complications to obtain territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and to seek to maintain undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese empire. By a third article they reserved their right to come to a preliminary understanding for the protection of their interests in China, should any other power use those complications to obtain such territorial advantages under any form whatever. On the submission of the agreement to the powers interested, Austria, France, Italy and Japan accepted its principles without express reservation—Japan first obtaining assurances that she signed on the same footing as an original signatory. The United States accepted the first two articles, but expressed no opinion on the third. Russia construed the first as limited to ports actually open in regions where the two signatories exercise “their” influence, and favourably entertained it in that sense, ignoring the reference to other forms of economic activity. She fully accepted the second, and observed that in the contingency contemplated by the third, she would modify her attitude according to circumstances.Meanwhile, negotiations carried on by the British minister at Peking during 1898 resulted in the grant of very important privileges to foreign commerce. The payment of the second instalment of the Japanese indemnity was becoming due, and it was much discussed how and on what terms China would be able to raise the amount. The Russian government, as has been stated, had made China a loan of the sum required for the first portion of the indemnity, viz. £15,000,000, taking a charge on the customs revenue as security. The British government was urged to make a like loan of £16,000,000 both as a matter of friendship to China and as a counterpoise to the Russian influence. An arrangement was come to accordingly, on very favourable terms financially to the Chinese, but at the last moment they drew back, being overawed, as they said, by the threatening attitude of Russia. Taking advantage of the position which this refusal gave him, the British minister obtained from the Tsung-Li-Yamen, besides the declaration as to the non-alienation of the Yangtsze valley above mentioned, an undertaking to throw the whole of the inland waterways open to steam traffic. The Chinese government at the same time undertook that the post of inspector-general of customs (then held by Sir Robert Hart) should always be held by an Englishman so long as the trade of Great Britain was greater than that of any other nation. Minor concessions were also made, but the opening of the waterways was by far the greatest advance that had been made since 1860.Of still greater importance were the railway and mining concessions granted during the same year (1898). The Chinese government had been generally disposed to railway construction since the conclusion of the Japanese War, but hoped to be able to retain the control in their own hands. The masterful methods of Russia and Germany had obliged them to surrender this control so far as concerned Manchuria and Shan-tung. In the Yangtsze valley, Sheng, the director-general of railways, had been negotiating with several competing syndicates. One of these was a Franco-Belgian syndicate, which was endeavouring to obtain the trunk line from Hankow to Peking. A British company was tendering for the same work, and as the line lay mainly within the British sphere it was considered not unreasonable to expect it should be given to the latter. At a critical moment, however, the French and Russian ministers intervened, and practically forced the Yamen to grant a contract in favour of the Franco-Belgian company. The Yamen had a few days before explicitly promised the British minister that the contract should not be ratified without his having an opportunity of seeing it. As a penalty for this breach of faith, and as a set-off to the Franco-Belgian line, the British minister required the immediate grant of all the railway concessions for which British syndicates were then negotiating, and on terms not inferior to those granted to the Belgian line. In this way all the lines in the lower Yangtsze, as also the Shan-si Mining Companies’ lines, were secured. A contract for a trunk line from Canton to Hankow was negotiated in the latter part of 1898 by an American company.
In 1899 Talienwan and Kiaochow were respectively thrown open by Russia and Germany to foreign trade, and, encouraged by these measures, the United States government initiated in September of the same year a correspondence with the great European powers and Japan, with a view to securing their definite adhesion to the “open door” policy. The British government gave an unqualified approval to the American proposal, and the replies of the other powers, though more guarded, were accepted at Washington as satisfactory. A further and more definite step towards securing the maintenance of the “open door” in China was the agreement concluded in October 1900 between the British and German governments. The signatories, by the first two articles, agreed to endeavour to keep the ports on the rivers and littoral free and open to international trade and economic activity, and to uphold this rule for all Chinese territory as far as (woin the German counterpart) they could exercise influence; not to use the existing complications to obtain territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and to seek to maintain undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese empire. By a third article they reserved their right to come to a preliminary understanding for the protection of their interests in China, should any other power use those complications to obtain such territorial advantages under any form whatever. On the submission of the agreement to the powers interested, Austria, France, Italy and Japan accepted its principles without express reservation—Japan first obtaining assurances that she signed on the same footing as an original signatory. The United States accepted the first two articles, but expressed no opinion on the third. Russia construed the first as limited to ports actually open in regions where the two signatories exercise “their” influence, and favourably entertained it in that sense, ignoring the reference to other forms of economic activity. She fully accepted the second, and observed that in the contingency contemplated by the third, she would modify her attitude according to circumstances.
Meanwhile, negotiations carried on by the British minister at Peking during 1898 resulted in the grant of very important privileges to foreign commerce. The payment of the second instalment of the Japanese indemnity was becoming due, and it was much discussed how and on what terms China would be able to raise the amount. The Russian government, as has been stated, had made China a loan of the sum required for the first portion of the indemnity, viz. £15,000,000, taking a charge on the customs revenue as security. The British government was urged to make a like loan of £16,000,000 both as a matter of friendship to China and as a counterpoise to the Russian influence. An arrangement was come to accordingly, on very favourable terms financially to the Chinese, but at the last moment they drew back, being overawed, as they said, by the threatening attitude of Russia. Taking advantage of the position which this refusal gave him, the British minister obtained from the Tsung-Li-Yamen, besides the declaration as to the non-alienation of the Yangtsze valley above mentioned, an undertaking to throw the whole of the inland waterways open to steam traffic. The Chinese government at the same time undertook that the post of inspector-general of customs (then held by Sir Robert Hart) should always be held by an Englishman so long as the trade of Great Britain was greater than that of any other nation. Minor concessions were also made, but the opening of the waterways was by far the greatest advance that had been made since 1860.
Of still greater importance were the railway and mining concessions granted during the same year (1898). The Chinese government had been generally disposed to railway construction since the conclusion of the Japanese War, but hoped to be able to retain the control in their own hands. The masterful methods of Russia and Germany had obliged them to surrender this control so far as concerned Manchuria and Shan-tung. In the Yangtsze valley, Sheng, the director-general of railways, had been negotiating with several competing syndicates. One of these was a Franco-Belgian syndicate, which was endeavouring to obtain the trunk line from Hankow to Peking. A British company was tendering for the same work, and as the line lay mainly within the British sphere it was considered not unreasonable to expect it should be given to the latter. At a critical moment, however, the French and Russian ministers intervened, and practically forced the Yamen to grant a contract in favour of the Franco-Belgian company. The Yamen had a few days before explicitly promised the British minister that the contract should not be ratified without his having an opportunity of seeing it. As a penalty for this breach of faith, and as a set-off to the Franco-Belgian line, the British minister required the immediate grant of all the railway concessions for which British syndicates were then negotiating, and on terms not inferior to those granted to the Belgian line. In this way all the lines in the lower Yangtsze, as also the Shan-si Mining Companies’ lines, were secured. A contract for a trunk line from Canton to Hankow was negotiated in the latter part of 1898 by an American company.
There can be little doubt that the powers, engrossed in the diplomatic conflicts of which Peking was the centre, had entirely underrated the reactionary forces gradually mustering for a struggle against the aggressive spirit of Western civilization. The lamentable consequences of administrative corruption and incompetence, and the superiority of foreign methods which had been amply illustrated by the Japanese War, had at first produced a considerable impression, not only upon the more enlightened commercial classes, but even upon many of the younger members of the official classes in China. The dowager-empress, who, in spite of the emperor Kwang-su having nominally attained his majority, had retained practical control of the supreme power until the conflict with Japan, had been held, not unjustly, to blame for the disasters of the war, and even before its conclusion the young emperor was adjured by some of the most responsible among his own subjects to shake himself free from the baneful restraint of “petticoat government,”and himself take the helm. In the following years a reform movement, undoubtedly genuine, though opinions differ as to the value of the popular support which it claimed,The reform movement, 1898.spread throughout the central and southern provinces of the empire. One of the most significant symptoms was the relatively large demand which suddenly arose for the translations of foreign works and similar publications in the Chinese language which philanthropic societies, such as that “for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge amongst the Chinese,” had been trying for some time past to popularize, though hitherto with scant success. Chinese newspapers published in the treaty ports spread the ferment of new ideas far into the interior. Fifteen hundred young men of good family applied to enter the foreign university at Peking, and in some of the provincial towns the Chinese themselves subscribed towards the opening of foreign schools. Reform societies, which not infrequently enjoyed official countenance, sprang up in many of the large towns, and found numerous adherents amongst the youngerliterati. Early in 1898 the emperor, who had gradually emancipated himself from the dowager-empress’s control, summoned several of the reform leaders to Peking, and requested their advice with regard to the progressive measures which should be introduced into the government of the empire. Chief amongst these reformers was Kang Yu-wei, a Cantonese, whose scholarly attainments, combined with novel teachings, earned for him from his followers the title of the “Modern Sage.” Of his more or less active sympathizers who had subsequently to suffer with him in the cause of reform, the most prominent were Chang Yin-huan, a member of the grand council and of the Tsung-Li-Yamen, who had represented his sovereign at Queen Victoria’s jubilee in 1897; Chin Pao-chen, governor of Hu-nan; Liang Chichao, the editor of the reformers’ organ,Chinese Progress; Su Chiching, a reader of the Hanlin College, the educational stronghold of Chinese conservatism; and his son Su In-chi, also a Hanlin man, and provincial chancellor of public instruction in Hu-nan.
It soon became evident, that there was no more enthusiastic advocate of the new ideas than the emperor himself. Within a few months the vermilion pencil gave the imperial sanction to a succession of edicts which, had they been carried into effect, would have amounted to a revolution as far-reaching as that which had transformed Japan thirty years previously. The fossilized system of examinations for the public service was to be altogether superseded by a new schedule based on foreign learning, for the better promotion of which a number of temples were to be converted into schools for Western education; a state department was to be created for the translation and dissemination of the standard works of Western literature and science; even the scions of the ruling Manchu race were to be compelled to study foreign languages and travel abroad; and last, but not least, all useless offices both in Peking and in the provinces were to be abolished. A further edict was even reported to be in contemplation, doing away with thequeueor pigtail, which, originally imposed upon the Chinese by their Manchu conquerors as a badge of subjection, had gradually become the most characteristic and most cherished feature of the national dress. But the bureaucracy of China, which had battened for centuries on corruption and ignorance, had no taste for self-sacrifice. Other vested interests felt themselves equally threatened, and behind them stood the whole latent force of popular superstition and unreasoning conservatism.
The dowager-empress saw her opportunity. The Summer Palace, to which she had retired, had been for some time the centre of resistance to the new movement, and in the middle of September 1898 a report became current that, in order to put an end to the obstruction which hampered his reform policy, the emperor intended to seize the person of the dowager-empress and have her deported into the interior. Some colour was given to this report by an official announcement that the emperor would hold a review of the foreign-drilled troops at Tientsin, and had summoned Yuan Shihkai, their general, to Peking in order to confer with him on the necessary arrangements. But the reformers had neglected to secure the goodwill of the army, which was still entirely in the hands of the reactionaries. During the night of the 20th of September the palace of the emperorThe Empress’s coup d‘état.was occupied by the soldiers, and on the following day Kwang-su, who was henceforth virtually a prisoner in the hands of the empress, was made to issue an edict restoring her regency. Kang Yu-wei, warned at the last moment by an urgent message from the emperor, succeeded in escaping, but many of the most prominent reformers were arrested, and six of them were promptly executed. ThePeking Gazetteannounced a few days later that the emperor himself was dangerously ill, and his life might well have been despaired of had not the British minister represented in very emphatic terms the serious consequences which might ensue if anything happened to him. Drastic measures were, however, adopted to stamp out the reform movement in the provinces as well as in the capital. The reform edicts were cancelled, the reformers’ associations were dissolved, their newspapers suppressed, and those who did not care to save themselves by a hasty recantation of their errors were imprisoned, proscribed or exiled. In October the reaction had already been accompanied by such a recrudescence of anti-foreign feeling that the foreign ministers at Peking had to bring up guards from the fleet for the protection of the legations, and to demand the removal from the capital of the disorderly Kan-suh soldiery which subsequently played so sinister a part in the troubles of June 1900. But the unpleasant impression produced by these incidents was in a great measure removed by the demonstrative reception which the empress Tsz‘e Hsi gave on the 15th of October to the wives of the foreign representatives—an act of courtesy unprecedented in the annals of the Chinese court.
The reactionary tide continued to rise throughout the year 1899, but it did not appear materially to affect the foreign relations of China. Towards the end of the year the brutal murder of Mr Brooks, an English missionary,The Boxer movement, 1900.in Shan-tung, had compelled attention to a popular movement which had been spreading rapidly throughout that province and the adjoining one of Chih-li with the connivance of certain high officials, if not under their direct patronage. The origin of the “Boxer” movement is obscure. Its name is derived from a literal translation of the Chinese designation, “the fist of righteous harmony.” Like the kindred “Big Sword” Society, it appears to have been in the first instance merely a secret association of malcontents chiefly drawn from the lower classes. Whether the empress Tsz‘e Hsi and her Manchu advisers had deliberately set themselves from the beginning to avert the danger by deflecting what might have been a revolutionary movement into anti-foreign channels, or whether with Oriental heedlessness they had allowed it to grow until they were powerless to control it, they had unquestionably resolved to take it under their protection before the foreign representatives at Peking had realized its gravity. The outrages upon native Christians and the threats against foreigners generally went on increasing. The Boxers openly displayed on their banners the device: “Exterminate the foreigners and save the dynasty,” yet the representatives of the powers were unable to obtain any effective measures against the so-called “rebels,” or even a definite condemnation of their methods.51
Four months (January-April 1900) were spent in futile interviews with the Tsung-Li-Yamen. In May a number of Christian villages were destroyed and native converts massacred near the capital. On the 2nd of June two English missionaries, Mr Robinson and Mr Norman, were murdered at Yung Ching, 40 m. from Peking. The whole country was overrun with bands of Boxers, who tore up the railway and set fire to the stations at different points on the Peking-Tientsin line. Fortunately amixed body of marines and bluejackets of various nationalities, numbering 18 officers and 389 men, had reached Peking on the 1st of June for the protection of the legations. The whole city was in a state of turmoil. Murder and pillage were of daily occurrence. The reactionary Prince Tuan (grandson of the emperor Tao-kwang) and the Manchus generally, together with the Kan-suh soldiery under the notorious Tung-fu-hsiang, openly sided with the Boxers. The European residents and a large number of native converts took refuge in the British legation, where preparations were hastily made in view of a threatened attack. On the 11th the chancellor of the Japanese legation, Mr Sugiyama, was murdered by Chinese soldiers. On the night of the 13th most of the foreign buildings, churches and mission houses in the eastern part of the Tatar city were pillaged and burnt, and hundreds of native Christians massacred. On the 20th of June the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, was murdered whilst on his way to the Tsung-Li-Yamen. At 4P.M.on the afternoon of the 20th the Chinese troops opened fire upon the legations. The general direction of the defence was undertaken by Sir Claude Macdonald, the British minister.
Meanwhile Peking had been completely cut off since the 14th from all communication with the outside world, and in view of the gravity of the situation, naval and military forces were being hurried up by all the powers to the GulfInternational expedition.of Chih-li. On the 10th of June Admiral Sir E. Seymour had already left Tientsin with a mixed force of 2000 British, Russian, French, Germans, Austrians, Italians, Americans and Japanese, to repair the railway and restore communications with Peking. But his expedition met with unexpectedly severe resistance, and it had great difficulty in making good its retreat after suffering heavy losses. When it reached Tientsin again on the 26th of June, the British contingent of 915 men had alone lost 124 killed and wounded out of a total casualty list of 62 killed and 218 wounded. The Chinese had in the meantime made a determined attack upon the foreign settlements at Tientsin, and communication between the city and the sea being also threatened, the Taku forts at the mouth of the Pei-ho were captured by the allied admirals on the 17th. The situation at Tientsin nevertheless continued precarious, and it was not till the arrival of considerable reinforcements that the troops of the allied powers were able to assume the offensive, taking the native city by storm on July 14th, at a cost, however, of over 700 killed and wounded. Even in this emergency international jealousy had grievously delayed the necessary concentration of forces. No power was so favourably situated to take immediate action as Japan, and the British government, who had strongly urged her to act speedily and energetically, undertook at her request to sound the other powers with regard to her intervention. No definite objection was raised, but the replies of Germany and Russia barely disguised their ill-humour. Great Britain herself went so far as to offer Japan the assistance of the British treasury, in case financial difficulties stood in the way, but on the same day on which this proposal was telegraphed to Tokyo (6th of July), the Japanese government had decided to embark forthwith the two divisions which it had already mobilized. By the beginning of August one of the Indian brigades had also reached Tientsin together with smaller reinforcements sent by the other powers, and thanks chiefly to the energetic counsels of the British commander, General Sir Alfred Gaselee, a relief column, numbering 20,000 men, at last set out for Peking on the 4th of August, a British naval brigade having started up river the previous afternoon. After a series of small engagements and very trying marches it arrived within striking distance of Peking on the evening of the 13th. The Russians tried to steal a march upon the allies during the night, but were checked at the walls and suffered heavy losses. The Japanese attacked another point of the walls the next morning, but met with fierce opposition, whilst the Americans were delayed by getting entangled in the Russian line of advance. The British contingent was more fortunate, and skilfully guided to an unguarded water-gate, General Gaselee and a party of Sikhs were the first to force their way through to the British legation. About 2 p.m. on the afternoon of the 14th of August, the long siege was raised.
For nearly six weeks after the first interruption of communications, no news reached the outside world from Peking except a few belated messages, smuggled through the Chinese lines by native runners, urging the imperative necessitySiege of the Peking legations.of prompt relief. During the greater part of that period the foreign quarter was subjected to heavy rifle and artillery fire, and the continuous fighting at close quarters with the hordes of Chinese regulars, as well as Boxers, decimated the scanty ranks of the defenders. The supply of both ammunition and food was slender. But the heroism displayed by civilians and professional combatants alike was inexhaustible. In their anxiety to burn out the British legation, the Chinese did not hesitate to set fire to the adjoining buildings of the Hanlin, the ancient seat of Chinese classical learning, and the storehouse of priceless literary treasures and state archives. TheFu, or palace, of Prince Su, separated only by a canal from the British legation, formed the centre of the international position, and was held with indomitable valour by a small Japanese force under Colonel Sheba, assisted by a few Italian marines and volunteers of other nationalities and a number of Christian Chinese. The French legation on the extreme right, and the section of the city wall held chiefly by Germans and Americans, were also points of vital importance which had to bear the brunt of the Chinese attack.
Little is known as to what passed in the councils of the Chinese court during the siege.52But there is reason to believe that throughout that period grave divergences of opinion existed amongst the highest officials. The attack upon the legations appears to have received the sanction of the dowager-empress, acting upon the advice of Prince Tuan and the extreme Manchu party, at a grand council held during the night of the 18th/19th June, upon receipt of the news of the capture of the Taku forts by the international forces. The emperor himself, as well as Prince Ching and a few other influential mandarins, strongly protested against the empress’s decision, but it was acclaimed by the vast majority of those present. Three members of the Tsung-Li-Yamen were publicly executed for attempting to modify the terms of an imperial edict ordering the massacre of all foreigners throughout the provinces, and most of the Manchu nobles and high officials, and the eunuchs of the palace, who played an important part in Chinese politics throughout the dowager-empress’s tenure of power, were heart and soul with the Boxers. But it was noted by the defenders of the legations that Prince Ching’s troops seldom took part, or only in a half-hearted way, in the fighting, which was chiefly conducted by Tung-fu-hsiang’s soldiery and the Boxer levies. The modern artillery which the Chinese possessed was only spasmodically brought into play. Nor did any of the attacking parties ever show the fearlessness and determination which the Chinese had somewhat unexpectedly displayed on several occasions during the fighting at and around Tientsin. Nevertheless, the position of the defenders at the end of the first four weeks of the siege had grown well-nigh desperate. Mining and incendiarism proved far greater dangers than shot and shell. Suddenly, just when things were looking blackest, on the 17th of July the Chinese ceased firing, and a sort of informal armistice secured a period of respite for the beleaguered Europeans. The capture of the native city of Tientsin by the allied forces had shaken the self-confidence of the Chinese authorities, who had hitherto not only countenanced, but themselves directed the hostilities.53Desultory fighting, nevertheless, continued, and grave fears were entertained that the approach of the relief column would prove the signal for a desperate attempt to rush the legations. The attempt was made, but failed. The relief, however, came not a day too soon. Of the small band of defenders which, including civilian volunteers, had never mustered 500, 65 had been killed and 131 wounded. Ammunition and provisions were almost at an end. Even more desperate was the situation at the Pei-tang, the Roman Catholic northern cathedral and mission house, where, with the help of a small body of French and Italian marines, Mgr Favier had organized an independent centre of resistance for his community of over 3000 souls. Their rations were absolutely exhausted when, on the 15thof August, a relief party was despatched to their assistance from the legations.
Little is known as to what passed in the councils of the Chinese court during the siege.52But there is reason to believe that throughout that period grave divergences of opinion existed amongst the highest officials. The attack upon the legations appears to have received the sanction of the dowager-empress, acting upon the advice of Prince Tuan and the extreme Manchu party, at a grand council held during the night of the 18th/19th June, upon receipt of the news of the capture of the Taku forts by the international forces. The emperor himself, as well as Prince Ching and a few other influential mandarins, strongly protested against the empress’s decision, but it was acclaimed by the vast majority of those present. Three members of the Tsung-Li-Yamen were publicly executed for attempting to modify the terms of an imperial edict ordering the massacre of all foreigners throughout the provinces, and most of the Manchu nobles and high officials, and the eunuchs of the palace, who played an important part in Chinese politics throughout the dowager-empress’s tenure of power, were heart and soul with the Boxers. But it was noted by the defenders of the legations that Prince Ching’s troops seldom took part, or only in a half-hearted way, in the fighting, which was chiefly conducted by Tung-fu-hsiang’s soldiery and the Boxer levies. The modern artillery which the Chinese possessed was only spasmodically brought into play. Nor did any of the attacking parties ever show the fearlessness and determination which the Chinese had somewhat unexpectedly displayed on several occasions during the fighting at and around Tientsin. Nevertheless, the position of the defenders at the end of the first four weeks of the siege had grown well-nigh desperate. Mining and incendiarism proved far greater dangers than shot and shell. Suddenly, just when things were looking blackest, on the 17th of July the Chinese ceased firing, and a sort of informal armistice secured a period of respite for the beleaguered Europeans. The capture of the native city of Tientsin by the allied forces had shaken the self-confidence of the Chinese authorities, who had hitherto not only countenanced, but themselves directed the hostilities.53Desultory fighting, nevertheless, continued, and grave fears were entertained that the approach of the relief column would prove the signal for a desperate attempt to rush the legations. The attempt was made, but failed. The relief, however, came not a day too soon. Of the small band of defenders which, including civilian volunteers, had never mustered 500, 65 had been killed and 131 wounded. Ammunition and provisions were almost at an end. Even more desperate was the situation at the Pei-tang, the Roman Catholic northern cathedral and mission house, where, with the help of a small body of French and Italian marines, Mgr Favier had organized an independent centre of resistance for his community of over 3000 souls. Their rations were absolutely exhausted when, on the 15thof August, a relief party was despatched to their assistance from the legations.
The ruin wrought in Peking during the two months’ fighting was appalling. Apart from the wholesale destruction of foreign property in the Tatar city, and of Chinese as well as European buildings in the vicinity of the legations, theLooting of Peking.wealthiest part of the Chinese city had been laid in ashes. The flames from a foreign drug store fired by the Boxers had spread to the adjoining buildings, and finally consumed the whole of the business quarter with all its invaluable stores of silks, curiosities, furs, &c. The retribution which overtook Peking after its capture by the international forces was scarcely less terrible. Looting was for some days almost universal. Order was, however, gradually restored, first in the Japanese and then in the British and American quarters, though several months elapsed before there was any real revival of native confidence.
So unexpected had been the rapid and victorious advance of the allies, that the dowager-empress with the emperor and the rest of the court did not actually leave Peking until the day after the legations had been relieved. ButFlight of the Chinese court.the northern and western portions of the Tatar city had not yet been occupied, and the fugitives made good their escape on the 15th. When the allies some days later marched through the Forbidden City, they only found a few eunuchs and subordinate officials in charge of the imperial apartments. At the end of September, Field Marshal Count von Waldersee, with a German expeditionary force of over 20,000 men, arrived to assume the supreme command conferred upon him with the more or less willing assent of the other powers.
The political task which confronted the powers after the occupation of Peking was far more arduous than the military one. The action of the Russians in Manchuria, even in a treaty port like Niu-chwang, the seizure of the railwayRestoration of order.line not only to the north of the Great Wall, but also from Shan-hai-kwan to Peking, by the Russian military authorities, and the appropriation of an extensive line of river frontage at Tientsin as a Russian “settlement,” were difficult to reconcile with the pacific assurances of disinterestedness which Russia, like the rest of the powers, had officially given. Great anxiety prevailed as to the effect of the flight of the Chinese court in other parts of the empire. The anti-foreign movement had not spread much beyond the northern provinces, in which it had had the open support of the throne and of the highest provincial officials. But among British and Americans alone, over 200 defenceless foreigners, men, women and children, chiefly missionaries, had fallen victims to the treachery of high-placed mandarins like Yü Hsien, and hundreds of others had had to fly for their lives, many of them owing their escape to the courageous protection of petty officials and of the local gentry and peasantry. In the Yangtsze valley order had been maintained by the energy of the viceroys of Nanking and Wu-chang, who had acted throughout the critical period in loyal co-operation with the British consuls and naval commanders, and had courageously disregarded the imperial edicts issued during the ascendancy of the Boxers. After some hesitation, an Indian brigade, followed by French, German and Japanese contingents, had been landed at Shanghai for the protection of the settlements, and though the viceroy, Liu Kun-yi, had welcomed British support, and even invited the joint occupation of the Yangtsze forts by British and Chinese troops, the appearance of other European forces in the Yangtsze valley was viewed with great suspicion. In the south there were serious symptoms of unrest, especially after Li Hung-Chang had left Canton for the north, in obedience, as he alleged at the time, to an imperial edict which, there is reason to believe, he invented for the occasion. The Chinese court, after one or two intermediate halts, had retired to Si-gan-fu, one of the ancient capitals of the empire, situated in the inaccessible province of Shen-si, over 600 m. S.W. of Peking. The influence of the ultra-reactionaries, headed by Prince Tuan and General Tung-fu-hsiang, still dominated its councils, although credentials were sent to Prince Ching and to Li Hung-Chang, who, after waiting upon events at Shanghai, had proceeded to Peking, authorizing them to treat with the powers for the re-establishment of friendly relations.
The harmony of the powers, which had been maintained with some difficulty up to the relief of the legations, was subjected to a severe strain as soon as the basis of negotiations with the Chinese government came to be discussed.Measures of reparation.While for various reasons Russia, Japan and the United States were inclined to treat China with great indulgence, Germany insisted upon the signal punishment of the guilty officials as aconditio sine qua non, and in this she had the support not only of the other members of the Triple Alliance, but also of Great Britain, and to some extent even of France, who, as protector of the Roman Catholic Church in Eastern countries, could not allow the authors of the atrocities committed upon its followers to escape effectual punishment. It was not until after months of laborious negotiations that the demands to be formally made upon the Chinese government were embodied in a joint note signed by all the foreign ministers on the 20th and 21st of December 1900. The demands were substantially as follows:
Honourable reparation for the murder of von Ketteler and of Mr Sugiyama, to be made in a specified form, and expiatory monuments to be erected in cemeteries where foreign tombs had been desecrated. “The most severe punishment befitting their crimes” was to be inflicted on the personages designated by the decree of the 21st of September, and also upon others to be designated later by the foreign ministers, and the official examinations were to be suspended in the cities where foreigners had been murdered or ill-treated. An equitable indemnity, guaranteed by financial measures acceptable to the powers, was to be paid to states, societies and individuals, including Chinese who had suffered because of their employment by foreigners, but not including Chinese Christians who had suffered only on account of their faith. The importation or manufacture of arms ormatérielwas to be forbidden; permanent legation guards were to be maintained at Peking, and the diplomatic quarter was to be fortified, while communication with the sea was to be secured by a foreign military occupation of the strategic points and by the demolition of the Chinese forts, including the Taku forts, between the capital and the coast. Proclamations were to be posted throughout China for two years, threatening death to the members of anti-foreign societies, and recording the punishment of the ringleaders in the late outrages: and the viceroys, governors and provincial officials were to be declared by imperial edict responsible, on pain of immediate dismissal and perpetual disability to hold office, for anti-foreign outbreaks or violations of treaty within their jurisdictions. China was to facilitate commercial relations by negotiating a revision of the commercial treaties. The Tsung-Li-Yamen was to be reformed and the ceremonial for the reception of foreign ministers modified as the powers should demand. Compliance with these terms was declared to be a condition precedent to the arrangement of a time limit to the occupation of Peking and of the provinces by foreign troops.
Honourable reparation for the murder of von Ketteler and of Mr Sugiyama, to be made in a specified form, and expiatory monuments to be erected in cemeteries where foreign tombs had been desecrated. “The most severe punishment befitting their crimes” was to be inflicted on the personages designated by the decree of the 21st of September, and also upon others to be designated later by the foreign ministers, and the official examinations were to be suspended in the cities where foreigners had been murdered or ill-treated. An equitable indemnity, guaranteed by financial measures acceptable to the powers, was to be paid to states, societies and individuals, including Chinese who had suffered because of their employment by foreigners, but not including Chinese Christians who had suffered only on account of their faith. The importation or manufacture of arms ormatérielwas to be forbidden; permanent legation guards were to be maintained at Peking, and the diplomatic quarter was to be fortified, while communication with the sea was to be secured by a foreign military occupation of the strategic points and by the demolition of the Chinese forts, including the Taku forts, between the capital and the coast. Proclamations were to be posted throughout China for two years, threatening death to the members of anti-foreign societies, and recording the punishment of the ringleaders in the late outrages: and the viceroys, governors and provincial officials were to be declared by imperial edict responsible, on pain of immediate dismissal and perpetual disability to hold office, for anti-foreign outbreaks or violations of treaty within their jurisdictions. China was to facilitate commercial relations by negotiating a revision of the commercial treaties. The Tsung-Li-Yamen was to be reformed and the ceremonial for the reception of foreign ministers modified as the powers should demand. Compliance with these terms was declared to be a condition precedent to the arrangement of a time limit to the occupation of Peking and of the provinces by foreign troops.
Under instructions from the court, the Chinese plenipotentiaries affixed their signatures on the 14th of January 1901 to a protocol, by which China pledged herself to accept these terms in principle, and the conference of ministers then proceeded to discuss the definite form in which compliance with them was to be exacted. This further stage of the negotiations proved even more laborious and protracted than the preliminary proceedings. No attempt was made to raise the question of the dowager-empress’s responsibility for the anti-foreign movement, as Russia had from the first set her face against the introduction of what she euphemistically termed “the dynastic question.” But even with regard to the punishment of officials whose guilt was beyond dispute, grave divergences arose between the powers. The death penalty was ultimately waived in the case even of such conspicuous offenders as Prince Tuan and Tung-fu-hsiang, but the notorious Yü Hsien and two others were decapitated by the Chinese, and three other metropolitan officials were ordered to commit suicide, whilst upon others sentences of banishment, imprisonment and degradation were passed, in accordance with a list drawn up by the foreign representatives. The question of the punishment of provincial officials responsible for the massacre of scores of defenceless men, women and children was unfortunately reserved for separate treatment, and when it came up for discussion it became impossible to preserve even the semblance of unanimity, the Russian minister at once taking issue with his colleagues, although he had originally pledged himself as formally as the others to the principle. CountLamsdorff frankly told the British ambassador at St Petersburg that Russia took no interest in missionaries, and as the foreigners massacred in the provinces belonged mostly to that class, she declined to join in the action of the other powers.
The real explanation of Russia’s cynical secession from the concert of powers on this important issue must be sought in her anxiety to conciliate the Chinese in view of the separate negotiations in which she was at the same time engagedRussia and Manchuria.with China in respect of Manchuria. When the Boxer movement was at its height at the end of June 1900, the Chinese authorities in Manchuria had wantonly “declared war” against Russia, and for a moment a great wave of panic seems to have swept over the Russian administration, civil and military, in the adjoining provinces. The reprisals exercised by the Russians were proportionately fierce. The massacre at Blagovyeshchensk, where 5000 Chinese—men, women and children—were flung into the Amur by the Cossacks, was only one incident in the reign of terror by which the Russians sought to restore their power and their prestige. The resistance of the Chinese troops was soon overcome, and Russian forces overran the whole province, occupying even the treaty port of Niu-chwang. The Russian government officially repudiated all responsibility for the proclamations issued by General Gribsky and others, foreshadowing, if not actually proclaiming, the annexation of Chinese territory to the Russian empire. But Russia was clearly bent on seizing the opportunity for securing a permanent hold upon Manchuria. In December 1900 a preliminary agreement was made between M. Korostovetz, the Russian administrator-general, and Tseng, the Tatar general at Mukden, by which the civil and military administration of the whole province was virtually placed under Russian control. In February 1901 negotiations were opened between the Russian government and the Chinese minister at St Petersburg for the conclusion of a formal convention of a still more comprehensive character. In return for the restoration to China of a certain measure of civil authority in Manchuria, Russia was to be confirmed in the possession of exclusive military, civil and commercial rights, constituting in all but name a protectorate, and she was also to acquire preferential rights over all the outlying provinces of the Chinese empire bordering on the Russian dominions in Asia. The clauses relating to Chinese Turkestan, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan and Mongolia were subsequently stated to have been dropped, but the convention nevertheless provoked considerable opposition both in foreign countries and amongst the Chinese themselves. Most of the powers, including Germany, who, however, denied that the Anglo-German agreement of the 16th of October 1900 applied to Manchuria,54advised the Chinese government not to pursue separate negotiations with one power whilst collective negotiations were in progress at Peking, and both Japan and Great Britain pressed for definite information at St Petersburg with regard to the precise tenor of the proposed convention. At the same time the two viceroys of the lower Yangtsze memorialized the throne in the strongest terms against the convention, and these protests were endorsed not only by the great majority of Chinese officials of high rank throughout the provinces, but by popular meetings and influential guilds and associations. Ultimately the two viceroys, Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kun-yi,55took the extreme step of warning the throne that they would be unable to recognize the convention, even if it were ratified, and notwithstanding the pressure exercised in favour of Russia by Li Hung-Chang, the court finally instructed the Chinese minister at St Petersburg to decline his signature. The attitude of Japan, where public feeling ran high, was equally significant, and on the 3rd of April the Russian government issued a circular note to the powers, stating that, as the generous intentions of Russia had been misconstrued, she withdrew the proposed convention.
The work of the conference at Peking, which had been temporarily disturbed by these complications, was then resumed. Friction between European troops of different nationalities and an Anglo-Russian dispute over the constructionThe peace protocol, 1901.of certain roads and railway sidings at Tientsin showed that an international occupation was fraught with manifold dangers. The question of indemnities, however, gave rise to renewed friction. Each power drew up its own claim, and whilst Great Britain, the United States and Japan displayed great moderation, other powers, especially Germany and Italy, put in claims which were strangely out of proportion to the services rendered by their military and naval forces. It was at last settled that China should pay altogether an indemnity of 450 million taels, to be secured (1) on the unhypothecated balance of the customs revenue administered by the imperial maritime customs, the import duties being raised forthwith to an effective 5% basis; (2) on the revenues of the “native” customs in the treaty ports; (3) on the total revenues of the salt gabelle. Finally the peace protocol was drawn up in a form which satisfied all the powers as well as the Chinese court. The formal signature was, however, delayed at the last moment by a fresh difficulty concerning Prince Chun’s penitential mission to Berlin. This prince, an amiable and enlightened youth,56son of the Prince Chun who was the emperor Hien-fêng’s brother, and thus himself half-brother to the emperor Kwang-su, had reached Basel towards the end of August on his way to Germany, when he was suddenly informed that he and his suite would be expected to performkowtowbefore the German emperor. The prince resented this unexpected demand, and referred home for instructions. The Chinese court appear to have remained obdurate, and the German government perceived the mistake that had been made in exacting from the Chinese prince a form of homage which Western diplomacy had for more than a century refused to yield to the Son of Heaven, on the ground that it was barbarous and degrading. The point was waived, and Prince Chun was received in solemn audience by the emperor William at Potsdam on the 4th of September. Three days later, on the 7th of September, the peace protocol was signed at Peking.
The articles recorded the steps to be taken to satisfy the demands of the powers as to commerce. Article 11 provided for the amendment of existing treaties of commerce and navigation, and for river conservancy measures at Tientsin and Shanghai. The British government appointed a special commission, with Sir J. Mackay, member of the council of India, as chief commissioner, to proceed to Shanghai to carry on the negotiations, and a commercial treaty was signed at Shanghai on the 6th of September 1902, by which existing obstacles to foreign trade, such aslikin, &c., were removed, regulations were made for facilitating steamer navigation on inland waters, and several new ports were opened to foreign commerce.
In accordance with the terms of the protocol, all the foreign troops, except the legation guards, were withdrawn from Peking on the 17th of September, and from the rest of Chih-li, except the garrisons at the different points specified along the line of communications, by the 22nd of September. On the 7th of October it was announced that the Chinese court had left Si-gan-fu on its way back to the northern capital. A month later (7th of November) the death of Li Hung-Chang at Peking removed, if not the greatest of Chinese statesmen, at any rate the one who had enjoyed the largest share of the empress-dowager’s confidence.