Chapter 21

(R. L.*)

CHINDE, a town of Portuguese East Africa, chief port for the Zambezi valley and British Central Africa, at the mouth of the Chinde branch of the Zambezi, in 18° 40′ S., 36° 30′ E. Pop. (1907) 2790, of whom 218 were Europeans. Large steamers are unable to cross the bar, over which the depth of water varies from 10 to 18 ft. Chinde owes its existence to the discovery in 1889 that the branch of the river on the banks of which it is built is navigable from the ocean (seeZambezi). The Portuguese in 1891 granted on lease for 99 years an area of 5 acres—subsequently increased to 25—to the British government, on which goods in transit to British possessions could be stored duty free. This block of land is known as the British Concession, or British Chinde. The prosperity of the town largely depends on the transit trade with Nyasaland and North East Rhodesia. There is also a considerable export from Portuguese districts, sugar, cotton and ground nuts being largely cultivated in the Zambezi valley, and gold and copper mines worked.

CHINDWIN, a river of Burma, the largest tributary of the Irrawaddy, its entire course being in Burmese territory. It is called Ningthi by the Manipuris. The Chindwin is formed by the junction of the Tanai, the Tawan and the Tarôn or Turông, but it is still uncertain which is the main stream. The Tanai has hitherto been looked on as the chief source. It rises in about 25° 30′ N. and 97° E., on the Shwedaung-gyi peak of the Kumôn range, 12 m. N. of Mogaung, and flows due N. for the first part of its course until it reaches the Hukawng valley, when it turns to the W. and flows through the middle of the plain to the end of the valley proper. There it curves round to the S., passes through the Tarôn or Turông valley, takes the name of the Chindwin, and maintains a general southerly course until it enters the Irrawaddy, after flowing through the entire length of the Upper and Lower Chindwin districts, in about 21° 30′ N. and 95° 15′ E. Its extreme outlets are 22 m. apart, the interval forming a succession of long, low, partially populated islands. The most southerly mouth of the Chindwin is, according to tradition, an artificial channel, cut by one of the kings of Pagān. It was choked up for many centuries until in 1824 it was opened out by an exceptional flood. The Tanai (it is frequently called Tanaikha, butkhais merely the Kachin word for river), as long as it retains that name, is a swift, clear river, from 50 to 300 yds. wide and from 3 to 15 ft. deep. The river is navigated by native boats in the Hukawng valley, but launches cannot come up from the Chindwin proper because of the reefs below Taro.

The Tarôn, Turông or Towang river seems to be the real main source of the Chindwin. It flows into the Hukawng valley from the north, and has a swift current with a succession of rapids. Its sources are in the hills to the south of Sadiya, rising from 10,000 to 11,000 ft. above sea-level. It flows through a deep valley, with a general E. and W. direction, as far as its junction with the Loglai. It then turns S., and after draining an intricate system of hills, breaks into the Hukawng valley a few miles N. of Saraw, and joins or receives the Tanai about 10 m. above Kintaw village. Except the Tanai, the chief branches of the Upper Chindwin rise in mountains that are covered at least with winter snows. Below the Hukawng valley the Chindwin is interrupted at several places by fails or transverse reefs. At the village of Haksa there is a fall, which necessitates transhipment from large boats to canoes. Not far below this the Uyu river comes in on the left bank at Homalin, and from this point downwards the steamers of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company ply for the greater part of the year. The Uyu flows through a fertile and well-cultivated valley, and during the rainy season it is navigable for a distance of 150 m. from its mouth by steamers of light draught. Ordinarily regular steam communication with Homalin ceases in the dry weather, but from Kindat, nearly 150 m. below it, there are weekly steamers all the year round. Below Kindat the only considerable affluent of the Chindwin is the Myit-tha, which receives the Chin hills drainage. The Chindwin rises considerably during the rains, but in March and April it is here and there so shallow as to make navigation difficult even for small steam launches. Whirlpools and narrows and shifting sandbanks also give some trouble, but much has been done to improve navigation since the British annexation. Kindat, the headquarters of the Upper Chindwin district, and Mônywa of the Lower, are on the banks of the river.

The Tarôn, Turông or Towang river seems to be the real main source of the Chindwin. It flows into the Hukawng valley from the north, and has a swift current with a succession of rapids. Its sources are in the hills to the south of Sadiya, rising from 10,000 to 11,000 ft. above sea-level. It flows through a deep valley, with a general E. and W. direction, as far as its junction with the Loglai. It then turns S., and after draining an intricate system of hills, breaks into the Hukawng valley a few miles N. of Saraw, and joins or receives the Tanai about 10 m. above Kintaw village. Except the Tanai, the chief branches of the Upper Chindwin rise in mountains that are covered at least with winter snows. Below the Hukawng valley the Chindwin is interrupted at several places by fails or transverse reefs. At the village of Haksa there is a fall, which necessitates transhipment from large boats to canoes. Not far below this the Uyu river comes in on the left bank at Homalin, and from this point downwards the steamers of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company ply for the greater part of the year. The Uyu flows through a fertile and well-cultivated valley, and during the rainy season it is navigable for a distance of 150 m. from its mouth by steamers of light draught. Ordinarily regular steam communication with Homalin ceases in the dry weather, but from Kindat, nearly 150 m. below it, there are weekly steamers all the year round. Below Kindat the only considerable affluent of the Chindwin is the Myit-tha, which receives the Chin hills drainage. The Chindwin rises considerably during the rains, but in March and April it is here and there so shallow as to make navigation difficult even for small steam launches. Whirlpools and narrows and shifting sandbanks also give some trouble, but much has been done to improve navigation since the British annexation. Kindat, the headquarters of the Upper Chindwin district, and Mônywa of the Lower, are on the banks of the river.

(J. G. SC.)

CHINDWIN, UPPERandLOWER, two districts in the Sagaing division of Upper Burma. Upper Chindwin has an area of 19,062 sq. m., and a population, according to the census of 1901, of 154,551. Lower Chindwin has an area of 3480 sq. m., and a population of 276,383. Upper Chindwin lies to the north of the lower district, and is bounded on the N. by the Chin, Nāga and Kachin hills; on the E. they are bounded by the Myitkyina, Katha and Shwebo districts; Lower Chindwin is bounded on the S. by the Pakôkku and Sagaing districts; and both districts are bounded on the W. by the Chin hills, and by Pakôkku on the southern stretch. The western portion of both districts is hilly, and the greater part of Upper Chindwin is of the same character. Both have valuable teak forests. The total rainfall averages in Lower Chindwin 27 and in Upper Chindwin 60 in. Coal exists in extensive fields, but these are not very accessible. Rice forms the great crop, but a certain amount of til-seed and of indigo is also cultivated. Kindat, a mere village, is the headquarters of the upper district, and Mônywa, with a population of 7869, of the lower. Both are on the Chindwin river, and are served by the steamers of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company. Alôn, close to Mônywa, and formerly the headquarters, is the terminus of the railway from Sagaing westwards, which was opened in 1900.

CHINESE PAVILLON,Turkish Crescent, Turkish Jingle, orJingling Johnny(Fr.chapeau chinois; Ger.türkischer Halbmond, Schellenbaum; Ital.cappello chinese), an instrument of percussion of indefinite sonorousness,i.e.not producing definite musical tones. Thechapeau chinoiswas formerly an adjunct in military bands, but never in the orchestra, where an instrument of somewhat similar shape, often confused with it and known as theGlockenspiel(q.v.), is occasionally called into requisition. The Chinese pavilion consists of a pole about 6 ft. high terminating in a conical metal cap or pavilion, hung with small jingling bells and surmounted by a crescent and a star. Below this pavilion are two or more metal bands forming a fanciful double crescent or squat lyre, likewise furnished with tiny bells. The two points of the crescent are curved over, ending in fanciful animal heads from whose mouths hang low streaming tails of horse-hair. The Chinese pavilion is played by shaking or waving the pole up and down and jingling the bells, a movement which can at best be but a slow one repeated once orat most twice in a bar to punctuate the phrases and add brilliancy to the military music. The Turkish crescent or “jingling Johnny,” as it was familiarly called in the British army bands, was introduced by the Janissaries into western Europe. It has fallen into disuse now, having been replaced by the glockenspiel or steel harmonica. Edinburgh University possesses two specimens.1In the 18th century at Bartholomew Fair one of the chief bands hired was one well known as playing in London on winter evenings in front of the Spring-Garden coffee house and opposite Wigley’s. This band consisted of a double drum, a Dutch organ (seeBarrel-organ), a tambourine, a violin, pipes and the Turkish jingle.2

(K. S.)

1See Captain C.R. Day,Descriptive Catalogue of Musical Instruments(London, 1891), p. 233.2See Hone’sEveryday Book, i. 1248.

1See Captain C.R. Day,Descriptive Catalogue of Musical Instruments(London, 1891), p. 233.

2See Hone’sEveryday Book, i. 1248.

CHINGFORD, an urban district in the Epping parliamentary division of Essex, England, 10½ m. N. of London (Liverpool Street station) by the Great Eastern railway. Pop. (1901) 4373. It lies between the river Lea and the western outskirts of Epping Forest. The church of All Saints has Early English and Perpendicular remains. Queen Elizabeth’s or Fair Mead hunting lodge, a picturesque half-timbered building, is preserved under the Epping Forest Preservation Act. A majestic oak, one of the finest trees in the Forest, stands near it. Buckhurst Hill (an urban district; pop. 4786) lies to the N.E.

CHINGLEPUT, orChengalpat, a town and district of British India, in the Madras presidency. The town, situated 36 m. by rail from Madras, had a population in 1901 of 10,551. With Chandragiri in North Arcot, Chingleput was once the capital of the Vijayanagar kings, after their overthrow by the Mussulmans at Talikota in 1565. In 1639 a chief, subject to these kings, granted to the East India Company the land on which Fort St George now stands. The fort built by the Vijayanagar kings in the 16th century was of strategic importance, owing to its swampy surroundings and the lake that flanked its side. It was taken by the French in 1751, and was retaken in 1752 by Clive, after which it proved invaluable to the British, especially when Lally in his advance on Madras left it unreduced in his rear. During the wars of the British with Hyder Ali it withstood his power, and afforded a refuge to the natives; and in 1780, after the defeat of Colonel W. Baillie, the army of Sir Hector Munro here found refuge. The town is noted for its manufacture of pottery, and carries on a trade in rice.

TheDistrict of Chingleputsurrounds the city of Madras, stretching along the coast for about 115 m. The administrative headquarters are at Saidapet. Area, 3079 sq. m. Pop. (1901) 1,312,122, showing an increase of 9% in the decade. Salt is extensively manufactured all along the coast. Cotton and silk weaving is also largely carried on, and there are numerous indigo vats, tanneries and an English cigar factory.

CHIN HILLS, a mountainous district of Upper Burma. It lies on the border between the Lushai districts of Eastern Bengal and Assam and the plains of Burma, and has an area of 8000 sq. m. It is bounded N. by Assam and Manipur, S. by Arakan, E. by Burma, and W. by Tippera and the Chittagong hill tracts. The Chins, Lushais and Kukis are to the north-east border of India what the Pathan tribes are to the north-west frontier. In 1895 the Chin Hills were declared a part of the province of Burma, and constituted a scheduled district which is now administered by a political officer with headquarters at Falam. The tract forms a parallelogram 250 m. from N. to S. by 100 to 150 m. wide. The country consists of a much broken and contorted mass of mountains, intersected by deep valleys. The main ranges run generally N. to S., and vary in height from 5000 to 9000 ft., among the most important being the Letha or Tang, which is the watershed between the Chindwin and Manipur rivers; the Imbukklang, which divides the Sokte tribe from the Whenchs and sheds the water from its eastern slopes into Upper Burma and that from its western slopes into Arakan; and the Rong-klang, which with its prolongations is the main watershed of the southern hills, its eastern slopes draining into the Myittha and thus into the Chindwin, while the western fall drains into the Boinu river, which winding through the hills discharges itself eventually in the Bay of Bengal. The highest peak yet discovered is the Liklang, between Rawywa and Lungno, some 70 m. S. of Haka (nearly 10,000 ft.).

It is supposed that the Kukis of Manipur, the Lushais of Bengal and Assam, and the Chins originally lived in Tibet and are of the same stock; their form of government, method of cultivation, manners and customs, beliefs and traditions all point to one origin. The slow speech, the serious manner, the respect for birth and the knowledge of pedigrees, the duty of revenge, the taste for and the treacherous method of warfare, the curse of drink, the virtue of hospitality, the clannish feeling, the vice of avarice, the filthy state of the body, mutual distrust, impatience under control, the want of power of combination and of continued effort, arrogance in victory, speedy discouragement and panic in defeat, are common traits. The Chins, Lushais and Kukis were noted for the secrecy of their plans, the suddenness of their raids, and their extraordinary speed in retreating to their fastnesses. After committing a raid they have been known to march two days and two nights consecutively without cooking a meal or sleeping, so as to escape from any parties which might follow them. The British, since the occupation of Upper Burma, have been able to penetrate the Chin-Lushai country from both sides at once. The pacification of the Chin Hills is a triumph for British administration. Roads, on which Chin coolies now readily work, have been constructed in all directions. The rivers have been bridged; the people have taken up the cultivation of English vegetables, and the indigenous districts have been largely developed. The Chin Hills had a population (1901 census) of 87,189, while the Chins in Burma totalled 179,292. The Pakôkku Chin Hills, which form a separate tract, have an area of 2260 sq. m.; pop. (1901) 13,116.

It is supposed that the Kukis of Manipur, the Lushais of Bengal and Assam, and the Chins originally lived in Tibet and are of the same stock; their form of government, method of cultivation, manners and customs, beliefs and traditions all point to one origin. The slow speech, the serious manner, the respect for birth and the knowledge of pedigrees, the duty of revenge, the taste for and the treacherous method of warfare, the curse of drink, the virtue of hospitality, the clannish feeling, the vice of avarice, the filthy state of the body, mutual distrust, impatience under control, the want of power of combination and of continued effort, arrogance in victory, speedy discouragement and panic in defeat, are common traits. The Chins, Lushais and Kukis were noted for the secrecy of their plans, the suddenness of their raids, and their extraordinary speed in retreating to their fastnesses. After committing a raid they have been known to march two days and two nights consecutively without cooking a meal or sleeping, so as to escape from any parties which might follow them. The British, since the occupation of Upper Burma, have been able to penetrate the Chin-Lushai country from both sides at once. The pacification of the Chin Hills is a triumph for British administration. Roads, on which Chin coolies now readily work, have been constructed in all directions. The rivers have been bridged; the people have taken up the cultivation of English vegetables, and the indigenous districts have been largely developed. The Chin Hills had a population (1901 census) of 87,189, while the Chins in Burma totalled 179,292. The Pakôkku Chin Hills, which form a separate tract, have an area of 2260 sq. m.; pop. (1901) 13,116.

(J. G. SC.)

CHINKIANG, orChen-Kiang-fu, a treaty port of China, in the province of Kiang-su, on the Yangtsze-kiang above Shanghai, from which it is distant 160 m. It is in railway communication both with Shanghai and Nanking (40 m. distant), and being at the point where the Grand Canal running N. and S. intersects the Yangtsze, which runs E. and W., is peculiarly well situated to be a commercial entrepôt. The total value of exports and imports for 1904 was £4,632,992; estimated pop. 168,000. In the war of 1842 it yielded to the British only after a desperate resistance. It was laid waste by the T‘aip‘ing rebels in 1853, and was recaptured by the imperial forces in 1858.

CHINO-JAPANESE WAR(1894-95). The causes of this conflict arose out of the immemorial rivalry of China and Japan for influence in Korea. In the 16th century a prolonged war in the peninsula had ended with the failure of Japan to make good her footing on the mainland—a failure brought about largely by lack of naval resources. In more modern times (1875, 1882, 1884) Japan had repeatedly sent expeditions to Korea, and had fostered the growth of a progressive party in Seoul. The difficulties of 1884 were settled between China and Japan by the convention of Tientsin, wherein it was agreed that in the event of future intervention each should inform the other if it were decided to despatch troops to the peninsula. Nine years later the occasion arose. A serious rebellion induced the Korean government to apply for military assistance from China. Early in June 1894 a small force of Chinese troops were sent to Asan, and Japan, duly informed of this action, replied by furnishing her minister at Seoul with an escort, rapidly following up this step by the despatch of about 5000 troops under Major-General Oshima. A complicated situation thus arose. Chinese troops were present in Korea by the request of the government to put down rebellion. The Japanese controlled the capital, and declined to recognize Korea as a tributary of China. But she proposed that the two powers should unite to suppress the disturbance and to inaugurate certain specified reforms. China considered that the measures of reform must be left to Korea herself. The reply was that Japan considered the government of Korea “lacking in some of the elements which are essential to responsible independence.” By the middle of July war had become inevitable unless the Peking government were willing to abandon all claims over Korea, and as Chinese troops were already in the country by invitation, it was not to be expected that the shadowy suzerainty would be abandoned.

At Seoul the issue was forced by the Japanese minister, who delivered an ultimatum to the Korean government on the 20th of July. On the 23rd the palace was forcibly occupied. Meanwhile China had despatched about 8000 troops to the Yalu river.The outbreak of war thus found the Japanese in possession of Seoul and ready to send large forces to Korea, while the Chinese occupied Asan (about 40 m. south of the capital), and had a considerable body of troops in Manchuria in addition to those despatched to the Yalu river. To Japan the command of the sea was essential for the secure transport and supply of her troops. Without it the experience of the war of the 16th century would be repeated. China, too, could only utilize overland routes to Korea by submitting to the difficulties and delays entailed. To both powers the naval question was thus important.

By the time war was finally declared (August 1) hostilities had already begun. On the 25th of July Oshima set out from Seoul to attack the Chinese at Asan. On the 29th he won a victory at Söng-hwan, but the Chinese commander escaped with a considerable part of his forces by a detour to Ping-Yang (Phyong-Yang). Meanwhile a portion of the Japanese fleet had encountered some Chinese warships and transports off Phung-Tao, and scored an important success, sinking, amongst other vessels, the transport “Kowshing” (July 25). The loss of more than 1000 Chinese soldiers in this vessel materially lightened Oshima’s task. The intention of the Chinese to crush their enemies between their forces at Asan and Ping-Yang was completely frustrated, and the Japanese obtained control of all southern Korea.Reinforcements from Japan were now pouring into Korea, in spite of the fact that the rival navies had not yet tried conclusions, and General Nozu, the senior Japanese officer present, soon found himself in a position to move on Ping-Yang. Three columns converged upon the place on the 15th of September, and in spite of its strong walls carried it, though only after severe fighting.Nearly all the troops on either side had been conveyed to the scene of war by sea, though the decisive contest for sea supremacy was still to be fought. The Chinese admiral Ting with the Northern Squadron (which alone took part in the war) had hitherto remained inactive in Wei-hai-wei, and on the other side Vice-Admiral Ito’s fleet had not directly interfered with the hostile transports which were reinforcing the troops on the Yalu. But two days after the battle of Ping-Yang, Ting, who had conveyed a large body of troops to the mouth of the Yalu, encountered the Japanese fleet on his return journey off Hai-Yang-Tao on the 17th of September. The heavy battleships “Chen-Yuen” and “Ting-Yuen” constituted the strongest element of the Chinese squadron, for the Japanese, superior as they were in every other factor of success, had no vessels which could compare with these in the matter of protection. Ting advanced in a long irregular line abreast; the battleships in the centre, the lighter vessels on the wings. Ito’s fast cruisers steamed in line ahead against the Chinese right wing, crushing their weaker opponents with their fire. In the end the Chinese fleet was defeated and scattered, but the two heavy battleships drew off without serious injury. This battle of the Yalu gave Japan command of the sea, but Ito continued to act with great caution. The remnants of the vanquished fleet took refuge in Port Arthur, whence after repairs Ting proceeded to Wei-hai-wei.The victory of Ping-Yang had cleared Korea of the Chinese troops, but on the lower Yalu—their own frontier—large forces threatened a second advance. Marshal Yamagata therefore took the offensive with his 1st army, and on the 24th and 25th of October, under great difficulties—though without serious opposition from the enemy—forced the passage of the river and occupied Chiulien-cheng. Part of the Chinese force retired to the north-east, part to Feng-hwang-cheng and Hsiu-yuen (Siu-Yen). The Japanese 1st army advanced several columns towards the mountains of Manchuria to secure its conquests and prepare for a future advance. General Tachimi’s brigade occupied Feng-hwang-cheng on the 29th of October. On the 7th of November a column from the Yalu took Takushan, and a few days later a converging attack from these two places was made upon Hsiu-yuen, which was abandoned by the Chinese. Meanwhile Tachimi, skirmishing with the enemy on the Mukden and Liao-Yang roads, found the Chinese in force. A simultaneous forward move by both sides led to the action of Tsao-ho-ku (November 30), after which both sides withdrew—the Chinese to the line of the mountains covering Hai-cheng, Liao-Yang and Mukden, with the Tatar general Ikotenga’s force, 14,000 strong, on the Japanese right north-east of Feng-hwang-cheng; and the Japanese to Chiulien-cheng, Takushan and Hsiu-yuen. The difficulties of supply in the hills were almost insurmountable, and no serious advance was intended by the Japanese until January 1895, when it was to be made in co-operation with the 2nd army. This army, under Marshal Oyama, had been formed in September and at first sent to Chemulpo as a support to the forces under Yamagata; but its chief task was the siege and capture of the Chinese fortress, dockyard and arsenal of Port Arthur.The Liao-Tong peninsula was guarded by the walled city of Kinchow and the forts of Ta-lien-wan (Dalny under the Russian régime, and Tairen under the Japanese) as well as the fortifications around Port Arthur itself. On the 24th of October the disembarkation of the 2nd army began near Pi-tsze-wo, and the successive columns of the Japanese gradually moved towards Kinchow, which was carried without difficulty on the 6th of November. Even less resistance was offered by the modern forts of Ta-lien-wan. The Japanese now held a good harbour within a few miles of the main fortress. Here they landed siege artillery, and on the 17th of November the advance was resumed. The attack was made on the 19th at dawn. Yamaji’s division (Nogi’s and Nishi’s brigades) after a trying night march assaulted and carried the western defences and moved upon the town. Hasegawa in the centre, as soon as Yamaji began to appear in rear of his opponents in the northern forts, pushed home his attack with equal success, and by 3P.M.practically all resistance was at an end. The Japanese paid for this important success with but 423 casualties. Meanwhile the Chinese general Sung, who had marched from Hai-cheng to engage the 2nd army, appeared before Kinchow, where he received on the 22nd a severe repulse at the hands of the Japanese garrison. Marshal Oyama subsequently stationed his advanced guard towards Hai-cheng, the main body at Kinchow, and a brigade of infantry at Port Arthur. Soon after this overtures of peace were made by China; but her envoy, a foreigner unfurnished with credentials, was not received by the Tokyo government.The Japanese 1st army (now under General Nozu) at Antung and Feng-hwang-cheng prepared, in spite of the season, to move across the mountains, and on the 3rd of December General Katsura left Antung for Hai-cheng. His line of march was by Hsi-mu-cheng, and strong flank guards followed parallel routes on either side. The march was accomplished safely and Hai-cheng occupied on the 13th of December. In the meantime Tachimi had moved northward from Feng-hwang-cheng, in order to distract the attention of the Chinese from Hai-cheng, and there were some small engagements between this force and that of Ikotenga, who ultimately retired beyond the mountains to Liao-Yang. Sung had already left Kai-ping to secure Hai-cheng when he heard of the fall of that place; his communications with Ikotenga being now severed, he swerved to the north-west and established a new base at Niu-chwang. Once on his new line Sung moved upon Hai-cheng. As it was essential that he should be prevented from joining forces with Ikotenga, General Katsura marched out of Hai-cheng to fight him. At Kang-wang-tsai (December 19th) the Chinese displayed unusual steadiness, and it cost the Japanese some 343 casualties to dislodge the enemy. The victors returned to Hai-cheng exhausted with their efforts, but secure from attack for some time to come. The advanced troops of the 2nd army (Nogi’s brigade) were now ready to advance, and only the Kai-ping garrison (left behind by Sung) barred their junction with Katsura. At Kai-ping (January 10th) the resistance of the Chinese was almost as steady as at Kang-wang-tsai, and the Japanese lost 300 killed and wounded in their successful attack. In neither of these actions was the defeated force routed, nor did it retire very far. On the 17th of January and again on the 22nd Ikotenga attacked Hai-cheng from the north, but was repulsed.Meanwhile the 2nd army, still under Oyama, had undertaken operations against Wei-hai-wei, the second great fortress and dockyard of northern China, where Admiral Ting’s squadron had been refitting since the battle of the Yalu; and it was hoped that both armies would accomplish their present tasks in time to advance in the summer against Peking itself. On the 18th of January a naval demonstration was made at Teng-chow-fu, 70 m. west of Wei-hai-wei, and on the 19th the Japanese began their disembarkation at Yung-cheng Bay, about 12 m. from Wei-hai-wei. The landing was scarcely opposed, and on the 26th the Japanese advance was begun. The south-eastern defences of Wei-hai-wei harbour were carried by the 6th division, whilst the 2nd division reached the inner waters of the bay, driving the Chinese before them. The fleet under Ito co-operated effectively. On the night of the 4th-5th of February the Chinese squadron in harbour was attacked by ten torpedo boats. Two boats were lost, but the armour-clad “Ting-Yuen” was sunk. On the following night a second attack was made, and three more vessels were sunk. On the 9th the “Ching-Yuen” was sunk by the guns in one of the captured forts. On the 12th Admiral Ting wrote to Admiral Ito offering to surrender, and then took poison, other officers following his example. Wei-hai-wei was then dismantled by the Japanese, who recovered the remnant of the Chinese squadron, including the “Chen Yuen,” and the 2nd army concentrated at Port Arthur for the advance on Peking.While this campaign was in progress the Chinese despatched a second peace mission, also with defective credentials. The Japanese declined to treat, and the mission returned to China. In February the Chinese made further unsuccessful attacks on Hai-cheng. Yamaji near Kai-ping fought a severe action on the 21st, 22nd and 23rd of February at Taping-shan against a part of Sung’s army under General Ma-yu-kun. This action was fought with 2 ft. of snow on the ground, the thermometer registering zero F., and no less than 1500 cases of frost-bite were reported. It was the intention of General Nozu, after freeing the Hai-cheng garrison from Ikotenga, to seize Niu-chwang port. Two divisions converged on An-shan-chan, and the Chinese, threatened in front and flank, retired to Liao-Yang. Meanwhile two more attacks on Hai-cheng had been repulsed. The 3rd and 5th divisions then moved on Niu-chwang, and Yamaji’s 1st division at Kai-ping joined in the advance. The column from An-shan-chan stormed Niu-chwang, which was obstinately defended, and cost the stormers nearly 400 men. Allthree divisions converged on Niu-chwang port (Ying-kow), and the final engagement took place at Tien-chwang-tai, which was captured on the 9th of March. The Chinese forces in Manchuria being thoroughly broken and dispersed, there was nothing to prevent the Japanese from proceeding to the occupation of Peking, since they could, after the break-up of the ice, land and supply large forces at Shan-hai-kwan, within 170 m. of the capital. Two more Japanese divisions were sent out, with Prince Komatsu as supreme commander. Seven divisions were at Port Arthur ready to embark, when negotiations were reopened. Li Hung-Chang proceeded to Shimonoseki, where the treaty was signed on the 17th of April 1895. An expedition was sent towards the end of March to the Pescadores, and later the Imperial Guard division was sent to Formosa.It is impossible to estimate the Chinese losses in the war. The Japanese lost 4177 men by death in action or by sickness, and 56,862 were wounded or disabled by sickness, exclusive of the losses in the Formosa and Pescadores expeditions. Nearly two-thirds of these losses were incurred by the 1st army in the trying winter campaign in Manchuria.The most important works dealing with the war are: Vladimir,China-Japan War(London, 1896); Jukichi Inouye,The Japan-China War(Yokohama, &c., 1896); du Boulay,Epitome of the China-Japanese War(London, 1896), the official publication of the British War Office; Atteridge,Wars of the Nineties, pp. 535-636 (London, 1899); von Kunowski and Fretzdorff,Der japanisch-chinesische Krieg(Leipzig, 1895); von Müller,Der Krieg zwischen China und Japan(Berlin, 1895); Bujac,Précis de quelques campagnes contemporaines: II. La Guerre sino-japonaise(Paris and Limoges).

By the time war was finally declared (August 1) hostilities had already begun. On the 25th of July Oshima set out from Seoul to attack the Chinese at Asan. On the 29th he won a victory at Söng-hwan, but the Chinese commander escaped with a considerable part of his forces by a detour to Ping-Yang (Phyong-Yang). Meanwhile a portion of the Japanese fleet had encountered some Chinese warships and transports off Phung-Tao, and scored an important success, sinking, amongst other vessels, the transport “Kowshing” (July 25). The loss of more than 1000 Chinese soldiers in this vessel materially lightened Oshima’s task. The intention of the Chinese to crush their enemies between their forces at Asan and Ping-Yang was completely frustrated, and the Japanese obtained control of all southern Korea.

Reinforcements from Japan were now pouring into Korea, in spite of the fact that the rival navies had not yet tried conclusions, and General Nozu, the senior Japanese officer present, soon found himself in a position to move on Ping-Yang. Three columns converged upon the place on the 15th of September, and in spite of its strong walls carried it, though only after severe fighting.

Nearly all the troops on either side had been conveyed to the scene of war by sea, though the decisive contest for sea supremacy was still to be fought. The Chinese admiral Ting with the Northern Squadron (which alone took part in the war) had hitherto remained inactive in Wei-hai-wei, and on the other side Vice-Admiral Ito’s fleet had not directly interfered with the hostile transports which were reinforcing the troops on the Yalu. But two days after the battle of Ping-Yang, Ting, who had conveyed a large body of troops to the mouth of the Yalu, encountered the Japanese fleet on his return journey off Hai-Yang-Tao on the 17th of September. The heavy battleships “Chen-Yuen” and “Ting-Yuen” constituted the strongest element of the Chinese squadron, for the Japanese, superior as they were in every other factor of success, had no vessels which could compare with these in the matter of protection. Ting advanced in a long irregular line abreast; the battleships in the centre, the lighter vessels on the wings. Ito’s fast cruisers steamed in line ahead against the Chinese right wing, crushing their weaker opponents with their fire. In the end the Chinese fleet was defeated and scattered, but the two heavy battleships drew off without serious injury. This battle of the Yalu gave Japan command of the sea, but Ito continued to act with great caution. The remnants of the vanquished fleet took refuge in Port Arthur, whence after repairs Ting proceeded to Wei-hai-wei.

The victory of Ping-Yang had cleared Korea of the Chinese troops, but on the lower Yalu—their own frontier—large forces threatened a second advance. Marshal Yamagata therefore took the offensive with his 1st army, and on the 24th and 25th of October, under great difficulties—though without serious opposition from the enemy—forced the passage of the river and occupied Chiulien-cheng. Part of the Chinese force retired to the north-east, part to Feng-hwang-cheng and Hsiu-yuen (Siu-Yen). The Japanese 1st army advanced several columns towards the mountains of Manchuria to secure its conquests and prepare for a future advance. General Tachimi’s brigade occupied Feng-hwang-cheng on the 29th of October. On the 7th of November a column from the Yalu took Takushan, and a few days later a converging attack from these two places was made upon Hsiu-yuen, which was abandoned by the Chinese. Meanwhile Tachimi, skirmishing with the enemy on the Mukden and Liao-Yang roads, found the Chinese in force. A simultaneous forward move by both sides led to the action of Tsao-ho-ku (November 30), after which both sides withdrew—the Chinese to the line of the mountains covering Hai-cheng, Liao-Yang and Mukden, with the Tatar general Ikotenga’s force, 14,000 strong, on the Japanese right north-east of Feng-hwang-cheng; and the Japanese to Chiulien-cheng, Takushan and Hsiu-yuen. The difficulties of supply in the hills were almost insurmountable, and no serious advance was intended by the Japanese until January 1895, when it was to be made in co-operation with the 2nd army. This army, under Marshal Oyama, had been formed in September and at first sent to Chemulpo as a support to the forces under Yamagata; but its chief task was the siege and capture of the Chinese fortress, dockyard and arsenal of Port Arthur.

The Liao-Tong peninsula was guarded by the walled city of Kinchow and the forts of Ta-lien-wan (Dalny under the Russian régime, and Tairen under the Japanese) as well as the fortifications around Port Arthur itself. On the 24th of October the disembarkation of the 2nd army began near Pi-tsze-wo, and the successive columns of the Japanese gradually moved towards Kinchow, which was carried without difficulty on the 6th of November. Even less resistance was offered by the modern forts of Ta-lien-wan. The Japanese now held a good harbour within a few miles of the main fortress. Here they landed siege artillery, and on the 17th of November the advance was resumed. The attack was made on the 19th at dawn. Yamaji’s division (Nogi’s and Nishi’s brigades) after a trying night march assaulted and carried the western defences and moved upon the town. Hasegawa in the centre, as soon as Yamaji began to appear in rear of his opponents in the northern forts, pushed home his attack with equal success, and by 3P.M.practically all resistance was at an end. The Japanese paid for this important success with but 423 casualties. Meanwhile the Chinese general Sung, who had marched from Hai-cheng to engage the 2nd army, appeared before Kinchow, where he received on the 22nd a severe repulse at the hands of the Japanese garrison. Marshal Oyama subsequently stationed his advanced guard towards Hai-cheng, the main body at Kinchow, and a brigade of infantry at Port Arthur. Soon after this overtures of peace were made by China; but her envoy, a foreigner unfurnished with credentials, was not received by the Tokyo government.

The Japanese 1st army (now under General Nozu) at Antung and Feng-hwang-cheng prepared, in spite of the season, to move across the mountains, and on the 3rd of December General Katsura left Antung for Hai-cheng. His line of march was by Hsi-mu-cheng, and strong flank guards followed parallel routes on either side. The march was accomplished safely and Hai-cheng occupied on the 13th of December. In the meantime Tachimi had moved northward from Feng-hwang-cheng, in order to distract the attention of the Chinese from Hai-cheng, and there were some small engagements between this force and that of Ikotenga, who ultimately retired beyond the mountains to Liao-Yang. Sung had already left Kai-ping to secure Hai-cheng when he heard of the fall of that place; his communications with Ikotenga being now severed, he swerved to the north-west and established a new base at Niu-chwang. Once on his new line Sung moved upon Hai-cheng. As it was essential that he should be prevented from joining forces with Ikotenga, General Katsura marched out of Hai-cheng to fight him. At Kang-wang-tsai (December 19th) the Chinese displayed unusual steadiness, and it cost the Japanese some 343 casualties to dislodge the enemy. The victors returned to Hai-cheng exhausted with their efforts, but secure from attack for some time to come. The advanced troops of the 2nd army (Nogi’s brigade) were now ready to advance, and only the Kai-ping garrison (left behind by Sung) barred their junction with Katsura. At Kai-ping (January 10th) the resistance of the Chinese was almost as steady as at Kang-wang-tsai, and the Japanese lost 300 killed and wounded in their successful attack. In neither of these actions was the defeated force routed, nor did it retire very far. On the 17th of January and again on the 22nd Ikotenga attacked Hai-cheng from the north, but was repulsed.

Meanwhile the 2nd army, still under Oyama, had undertaken operations against Wei-hai-wei, the second great fortress and dockyard of northern China, where Admiral Ting’s squadron had been refitting since the battle of the Yalu; and it was hoped that both armies would accomplish their present tasks in time to advance in the summer against Peking itself. On the 18th of January a naval demonstration was made at Teng-chow-fu, 70 m. west of Wei-hai-wei, and on the 19th the Japanese began their disembarkation at Yung-cheng Bay, about 12 m. from Wei-hai-wei. The landing was scarcely opposed, and on the 26th the Japanese advance was begun. The south-eastern defences of Wei-hai-wei harbour were carried by the 6th division, whilst the 2nd division reached the inner waters of the bay, driving the Chinese before them. The fleet under Ito co-operated effectively. On the night of the 4th-5th of February the Chinese squadron in harbour was attacked by ten torpedo boats. Two boats were lost, but the armour-clad “Ting-Yuen” was sunk. On the following night a second attack was made, and three more vessels were sunk. On the 9th the “Ching-Yuen” was sunk by the guns in one of the captured forts. On the 12th Admiral Ting wrote to Admiral Ito offering to surrender, and then took poison, other officers following his example. Wei-hai-wei was then dismantled by the Japanese, who recovered the remnant of the Chinese squadron, including the “Chen Yuen,” and the 2nd army concentrated at Port Arthur for the advance on Peking.

While this campaign was in progress the Chinese despatched a second peace mission, also with defective credentials. The Japanese declined to treat, and the mission returned to China. In February the Chinese made further unsuccessful attacks on Hai-cheng. Yamaji near Kai-ping fought a severe action on the 21st, 22nd and 23rd of February at Taping-shan against a part of Sung’s army under General Ma-yu-kun. This action was fought with 2 ft. of snow on the ground, the thermometer registering zero F., and no less than 1500 cases of frost-bite were reported. It was the intention of General Nozu, after freeing the Hai-cheng garrison from Ikotenga, to seize Niu-chwang port. Two divisions converged on An-shan-chan, and the Chinese, threatened in front and flank, retired to Liao-Yang. Meanwhile two more attacks on Hai-cheng had been repulsed. The 3rd and 5th divisions then moved on Niu-chwang, and Yamaji’s 1st division at Kai-ping joined in the advance. The column from An-shan-chan stormed Niu-chwang, which was obstinately defended, and cost the stormers nearly 400 men. Allthree divisions converged on Niu-chwang port (Ying-kow), and the final engagement took place at Tien-chwang-tai, which was captured on the 9th of March. The Chinese forces in Manchuria being thoroughly broken and dispersed, there was nothing to prevent the Japanese from proceeding to the occupation of Peking, since they could, after the break-up of the ice, land and supply large forces at Shan-hai-kwan, within 170 m. of the capital. Two more Japanese divisions were sent out, with Prince Komatsu as supreme commander. Seven divisions were at Port Arthur ready to embark, when negotiations were reopened. Li Hung-Chang proceeded to Shimonoseki, where the treaty was signed on the 17th of April 1895. An expedition was sent towards the end of March to the Pescadores, and later the Imperial Guard division was sent to Formosa.

It is impossible to estimate the Chinese losses in the war. The Japanese lost 4177 men by death in action or by sickness, and 56,862 were wounded or disabled by sickness, exclusive of the losses in the Formosa and Pescadores expeditions. Nearly two-thirds of these losses were incurred by the 1st army in the trying winter campaign in Manchuria.

The most important works dealing with the war are: Vladimir,China-Japan War(London, 1896); Jukichi Inouye,The Japan-China War(Yokohama, &c., 1896); du Boulay,Epitome of the China-Japanese War(London, 1896), the official publication of the British War Office; Atteridge,Wars of the Nineties, pp. 535-636 (London, 1899); von Kunowski and Fretzdorff,Der japanisch-chinesische Krieg(Leipzig, 1895); von Müller,Der Krieg zwischen China und Japan(Berlin, 1895); Bujac,Précis de quelques campagnes contemporaines: II. La Guerre sino-japonaise(Paris and Limoges).

CHINON, a town of western France, capital of an arrondissement in the department of Indre-et-Loire, on the right bank of the Vienne, 32m. S.W. of Tours on the State railway. Pop. (1906) 4071. Chinon lies at the foot of the rocky eminence which is crowned by the ruins of the famous castle. Its narrow, winding streets contain many houses of the 15th and 16th centuries. The oldest of its churches, St Mexme, is in the Romanesque style, but only the façade and nave are left. The church of St Etienne dates from the 15th century, that of St Maurice from the 12th, 15th and 16th centuries. The castle, which has undergone considerable modern restoration, consists of three portions. That to the east, the Château de St Georges, built by Henry II. of England, has almost vanished, only the foundation of the outer wall remaining. The Château du Milieu (11th to 15th centuries) comprises the keep, the Pavilion de l’Horloge and the Grand Logis, in the principal apartment of which the first meeting between Joan of Arc and Charles VII. took place. Of the Château du Coudray, which is separated by a moat from the Château du Milieu, the chief remains are the Tour du Moulin (10th century) and two less ancient towers. A statue of Rabelais, who was born in the vicinity of the town, stands on the river-quay. Chinon has trade in wheat, brandy, red wine and plums. Basket and rope manufacture, tanning and cooperage are among its industries. Chinon (Caïno) existed before the Roman occupation of Gaul, and was from early times an important fortress. It was occupied by the Visigoths, and subsequently, after forming part of the royal domain, came to the counts of Touraine and from them to the counts of Anjou. Henry II. often resided in the castle, and died there. The place was taken by Philip Augustus in 1205 after a year’s siege.

CHINOOK, a tribe of North American Indians, dwelling at the mouth of the Columbia river, Washington. They were fishermen and traders, and used huge canoes of hollowed cedar trunks. The tribe is practically extinct, but the name survives in the trade language known as “Chinook jargon.” This has been analysed as composed of two-fifths Chinook, two-fifths other Indian tongues, and the rest English and Canadian French; but the proportion of English has tended to increase. The Chinookan linguistic family includes a number of separate tribes.

The name CHINOOK is also applied to a wind which blows from W. or N. over the slopes of the Rocky Mountains, where it descends as a dry wind warm in winter and cool in summer (cf.Föhn). It is due to a cyclone passing northward, and continues from a few hours to several days. It moderates the climate of the eastern Rockies, the snow melting quickly on account of its warmth and vanishing on account of its dryness, so that it is said to “lick up” the snow from the slopes.

See Gill,Dictionary of Chinook Jargon(Portland, Ore., 1891); Boas, “Chinook Texts,” inSmithsonian Report, Bureau of Ethnology (Washington, 1894); J.C. Pilling, “Bibliography of Chinookan Languages,”Smithsonian Report, Bureau of Ethnology (Washington, 1893); Horatio Hale,Manual of Oregon Trade Language(London, 1890); G.C. Shaw,The Chinook Jargon(Seattle, 1909);Handbook of American Indians(Washington, 1907).

See Gill,Dictionary of Chinook Jargon(Portland, Ore., 1891); Boas, “Chinook Texts,” inSmithsonian Report, Bureau of Ethnology (Washington, 1894); J.C. Pilling, “Bibliography of Chinookan Languages,”Smithsonian Report, Bureau of Ethnology (Washington, 1893); Horatio Hale,Manual of Oregon Trade Language(London, 1890); G.C. Shaw,The Chinook Jargon(Seattle, 1909);Handbook of American Indians(Washington, 1907).

CHINSURA, a town of British India, on the Hugli river, 24 m. above Calcutta, formerly the principal Dutch settlement in Bengal. The Dutch erected a factory here in 1656, on a healthy spot of ground, much preferable to that on which Calcutta is situated. In 1759 a British force under Colonel Forde was attacked by the garrison of Chinsura on its march to Chandernagore, but in less than half an hour the Dutch were entirely routed. In 1795, during the Napoleonic wars, the settlement was occupied by a British garrison. At the peace of 1814 it was restored to the Dutch. It was among the cessions in India made by the king of the Netherlands in 1825 in exchange for the British possessions in Sumatra. Hugli College is maintained by government; and there are a number of schools, several of which are carried on by Scottish Presbyterian missionaries. Chinsura is included in the Hugli municipality.

CHINTZ, a word derived from the Hinduchīnt, spotted or variegated. This name was given to a kind of stained or painted calico produced in India. It is now applied to a highly glazed printed calico, commonly made in several colours on a light ground and used for bed hangings, covering furniture, &c.

CHIOGGIA, a town and episcopal see of Venetia, Italy, in the province of Venice, from which it is 18½ m. S. by sea. Pop. (1901) 21,384 (town), 31,218 (commune). It is inhabited mostly by fishermen, and is situated upon an island at the S. end of the lagoons. It is traversed by one main canal, La Vena. The peculiar dialect and customs of the inhabitants still survive to some extent. It is of earlier origin than Venice, and indeed is probably identical with the Roman Portus Aedro, or Ebro, though its name is derived from the Roman Fossa Claudia, a canalized estuary which with the two mouths of the Meduacus (Brenta) went to form the harbour. In 672 it entered the league of the cities of the lagoons, and recognized the authority of the doge. In 809 it was almost destroyed by Pippin, but in 1110 was made a city, remaining subject to Venice, whose fortunes it thenceforth followed. It was captured after a determined resistance by the Genoese in 1379, but recovered in 1380. Chioggia is connected by rail with Rovigo, 35 m. to the south-west.

(T. AS.)

Naval War of Chioggia (1378-80).—The naval war of 1378-1380, carried on by Venice against the Genoese and their allies, the lord of Carrara and the king of Hungary, is of exceptional interest as one in which a superior naval power, having suffered disaster in its home waters, and having been invaded, was yet able to win in the end by holding out till its squadrons in distant seas could be recalled for its defence.

When the war began in the spring of 1378, Venice was mainly concerned for the safety of its trading stations in the Levant and the Black Sea, which were exposed to the attacks of the Genoese. The more powerful of the two fleets which it sent out was despatched into the eastern Mediterranean under Carlo Zeno, the bailiff and captain of Negropont. A smaller force was sent to operate against the Genoese in the western Mediterranean, and was placed under the command of Vettor Pisani. The possessions of Venice on the mainland, which were then small, were assailed by Francesco Carrara and the Hungarians. Her only ally in the war, Bernabó Visconti of Milan, gave her little help on this side, but his mercenaries invaded the territory of Genoa. The danger on land seemed trifling to Venice so long as she could keep the sea open to her trade and press the war against the Genoese in the Levant.During the first stage of the war the plans of the senate were carried out with general success. While Carlo Zeno harassed the Genoese stations in the Levant, Vettor Pisani brought one of their squadrons to action on the 30th of May 1378 off Punta di Anzio to the south of the Tiber, and defeated it. The battle was fought in a gale by 10 Venetian against 11 Genoese galleys. The Genoese admiral, Luigi de’ Fieschi, was taken with 5 of his galleys, and others were wrecked. Four of the squadron escaped, and steered for Famagusta in Cyprus, then held by Genoa. If Pisani had directed his course to Genoa itself, which was thrown into a panic by the defeat at Anzio, it is possible that he might have dictated peace, but he thought his squadron too weak, and preferred to follow the Genoese galleys which had fled to Famagusta. During the summer of 1378 he was employed partly in attacking the enemy in Cyprus,but mainly in taking possession of the Istrian and Dalmatian towns which supported the Hungarians from fear of the aggressive ambition of Venice. He was ordered to winter on the coast of Istria, where his crews suffered from exposure and disease. Genoa, having recovered from the panic caused by the disaster at Anzio, decided to attack Venice at home while the best of her ships were absent with Carlo Zeno. She sent a strong fleet into the Adriatic under Luciano Doria. Pisani had been reinforced early in the spring of 1378, but when he was sighted by the Genoese fleet of 25 sail off Pola in Istria on the 7th of May, he was slightly outnumbered, and his crews were still weak. The Venetian admiral would have preferred to avoid battle, and to check an attack on Venice itself, by threatening the Genoese fleet from his base on the Istrian coast. He was forced into battle by the commissioner (proveditore) Michael Steno, who as agent of the senate had authority over the admiral. The Venetians were defeated with the loss of all their galleys except six. Luciano Doria fell in the battle, and the Genoese, who had suffered severely, did not at once follow up their success. On the arrival of his successor, Pietro Doria, with reinforcements, they appeared off the Lido, the outer barrier of the lagoon of Venice, in July, and in August they entered on a combined naval and military attack on the city, in combination with the Carrarese and the Hungarians. The Venetians had closed the passages through the outer banks except at the southern end, at the island of Brondolo, and the town of Chioggia. The barrier here approaches close to the mainland, and the position facilitated the co-operation of the Genoese with the Carrarese and Hungarians, but Chioggia is distant from Venice, which could only be reached along the canals across the lagoon. The Venetians had taken up the buoys which marked the fairway, and had placed a light squadron on the lagoon. The allies, after occupying the island of Brondolo, attacked, and on the 13th of August took the town of Chioggia with its garrison of 3000 men.There appeared to be nothing to prevent the enemy from advancing to the city of Venice except the difficult navigation of the lagoon. The senate applied for peace, but when the Genoese replied that they were resolved to “bit and bridle the horses of Saint Mark” the Venetians decided to fight to the end. Vettor Pisani, who had been imprisoned after the defeat at Pola, but who possessed the confidence of the people and the affection of the sailors, was released and named commander-in-chief against the wish of the aristocracy. Under his guidance the Venetians adopted a singularly bold and ingenious policy of offensive defence. The heavy Genoese vessels were much hampered by the shallow water and intricate passages through the lagoon. By taking advantage of their embarrassment and his own local knowledge, Pisani carried out a series of movements which entirely turned the tables on the invaders. Between the 23rd and 25th of August he executed a succession of night attacks, during which he sank vessels laden with stores not only in the canals leading through the lagoon to Venice, but in the fairways leading from Chioggia to the open sea round both ends of the island of Brondolo. The Genoese were thus shut in at the very moment when they thought they were about to besiege Venice. Pisani stationed the galleys under his command in the open sea outside Brondolo, and during the rest of the year blockaded the enemy closely. The distress of the Venetians themselves was great, but the Doge Andrea Contarini and the nobles set an example by sharing the general hardships, and taking an oath not to return to Venice till they had recovered Chioggia. Carlo Zeno had long since been ordered to return, but the slowness and difficulty of communication and movement under 14th century conditions delayed his reappearance. The besiegers of Chioggia were at the end of their powers of endurance, and Pisani had been compelled to give a promise that the siege would be raised, when Zeno’s fleet reached the anchorage off Brondolo on the 1st of January 1380. The attack on Chioggia was now pressed with vigour. The Genoese held out resolutely in the hope of relief from home. But the resources of Genoa had been taxed to fit out the squadrons she had already sent to sea. It was not until the 12th of May 1380 that her admiral, Matteo Maruffo, was able to reach the neighbourhood of Brondolo with a relieving force. By this time the Venetians had recovered the island, and their fleet occupied a fortified anchorage from which they refused to be drawn. Maruffo could do nothing, and on the 24th of June 1380 the defenders of Chioggia surrendered. The crisis of the war was past. Venice, being now safe at home, recovered the command of the sea, and before the close of the year was able to make peace as a conqueror.Authorities.—S. Romanin,Storia documentata di Venezia(Venice, 1855); W.C. Hazlitt,History of the Venetian Republic(London, 1860); Horatio F. Brown,Venice(London, 1893).

When the war began in the spring of 1378, Venice was mainly concerned for the safety of its trading stations in the Levant and the Black Sea, which were exposed to the attacks of the Genoese. The more powerful of the two fleets which it sent out was despatched into the eastern Mediterranean under Carlo Zeno, the bailiff and captain of Negropont. A smaller force was sent to operate against the Genoese in the western Mediterranean, and was placed under the command of Vettor Pisani. The possessions of Venice on the mainland, which were then small, were assailed by Francesco Carrara and the Hungarians. Her only ally in the war, Bernabó Visconti of Milan, gave her little help on this side, but his mercenaries invaded the territory of Genoa. The danger on land seemed trifling to Venice so long as she could keep the sea open to her trade and press the war against the Genoese in the Levant.

During the first stage of the war the plans of the senate were carried out with general success. While Carlo Zeno harassed the Genoese stations in the Levant, Vettor Pisani brought one of their squadrons to action on the 30th of May 1378 off Punta di Anzio to the south of the Tiber, and defeated it. The battle was fought in a gale by 10 Venetian against 11 Genoese galleys. The Genoese admiral, Luigi de’ Fieschi, was taken with 5 of his galleys, and others were wrecked. Four of the squadron escaped, and steered for Famagusta in Cyprus, then held by Genoa. If Pisani had directed his course to Genoa itself, which was thrown into a panic by the defeat at Anzio, it is possible that he might have dictated peace, but he thought his squadron too weak, and preferred to follow the Genoese galleys which had fled to Famagusta. During the summer of 1378 he was employed partly in attacking the enemy in Cyprus,but mainly in taking possession of the Istrian and Dalmatian towns which supported the Hungarians from fear of the aggressive ambition of Venice. He was ordered to winter on the coast of Istria, where his crews suffered from exposure and disease. Genoa, having recovered from the panic caused by the disaster at Anzio, decided to attack Venice at home while the best of her ships were absent with Carlo Zeno. She sent a strong fleet into the Adriatic under Luciano Doria. Pisani had been reinforced early in the spring of 1378, but when he was sighted by the Genoese fleet of 25 sail off Pola in Istria on the 7th of May, he was slightly outnumbered, and his crews were still weak. The Venetian admiral would have preferred to avoid battle, and to check an attack on Venice itself, by threatening the Genoese fleet from his base on the Istrian coast. He was forced into battle by the commissioner (proveditore) Michael Steno, who as agent of the senate had authority over the admiral. The Venetians were defeated with the loss of all their galleys except six. Luciano Doria fell in the battle, and the Genoese, who had suffered severely, did not at once follow up their success. On the arrival of his successor, Pietro Doria, with reinforcements, they appeared off the Lido, the outer barrier of the lagoon of Venice, in July, and in August they entered on a combined naval and military attack on the city, in combination with the Carrarese and the Hungarians. The Venetians had closed the passages through the outer banks except at the southern end, at the island of Brondolo, and the town of Chioggia. The barrier here approaches close to the mainland, and the position facilitated the co-operation of the Genoese with the Carrarese and Hungarians, but Chioggia is distant from Venice, which could only be reached along the canals across the lagoon. The Venetians had taken up the buoys which marked the fairway, and had placed a light squadron on the lagoon. The allies, after occupying the island of Brondolo, attacked, and on the 13th of August took the town of Chioggia with its garrison of 3000 men.

There appeared to be nothing to prevent the enemy from advancing to the city of Venice except the difficult navigation of the lagoon. The senate applied for peace, but when the Genoese replied that they were resolved to “bit and bridle the horses of Saint Mark” the Venetians decided to fight to the end. Vettor Pisani, who had been imprisoned after the defeat at Pola, but who possessed the confidence of the people and the affection of the sailors, was released and named commander-in-chief against the wish of the aristocracy. Under his guidance the Venetians adopted a singularly bold and ingenious policy of offensive defence. The heavy Genoese vessels were much hampered by the shallow water and intricate passages through the lagoon. By taking advantage of their embarrassment and his own local knowledge, Pisani carried out a series of movements which entirely turned the tables on the invaders. Between the 23rd and 25th of August he executed a succession of night attacks, during which he sank vessels laden with stores not only in the canals leading through the lagoon to Venice, but in the fairways leading from Chioggia to the open sea round both ends of the island of Brondolo. The Genoese were thus shut in at the very moment when they thought they were about to besiege Venice. Pisani stationed the galleys under his command in the open sea outside Brondolo, and during the rest of the year blockaded the enemy closely. The distress of the Venetians themselves was great, but the Doge Andrea Contarini and the nobles set an example by sharing the general hardships, and taking an oath not to return to Venice till they had recovered Chioggia. Carlo Zeno had long since been ordered to return, but the slowness and difficulty of communication and movement under 14th century conditions delayed his reappearance. The besiegers of Chioggia were at the end of their powers of endurance, and Pisani had been compelled to give a promise that the siege would be raised, when Zeno’s fleet reached the anchorage off Brondolo on the 1st of January 1380. The attack on Chioggia was now pressed with vigour. The Genoese held out resolutely in the hope of relief from home. But the resources of Genoa had been taxed to fit out the squadrons she had already sent to sea. It was not until the 12th of May 1380 that her admiral, Matteo Maruffo, was able to reach the neighbourhood of Brondolo with a relieving force. By this time the Venetians had recovered the island, and their fleet occupied a fortified anchorage from which they refused to be drawn. Maruffo could do nothing, and on the 24th of June 1380 the defenders of Chioggia surrendered. The crisis of the war was past. Venice, being now safe at home, recovered the command of the sea, and before the close of the year was able to make peace as a conqueror.

Authorities.—S. Romanin,Storia documentata di Venezia(Venice, 1855); W.C. Hazlitt,History of the Venetian Republic(London, 1860); Horatio F. Brown,Venice(London, 1893).

(D. H.)

CHIOS, an island on the west coast of Asia Minor, called by the Greeks Chios (Χίος ᾽σ τὴ Χίο) and by the Turks Saki Adasi; the soft pronunciation of Χ before ι in modern Greek, approximating tosh, causedΧίοto be Italianized as Scio. It forms, with the islands of Psara, Nikaria, Leros, Calymnus and Cos, a sanjak of the Archipelago vilayet. Chios is about 30 m. long from N. to S., and from 8 to 15 m. broad; pop. 64,000. It well deserves the epithet “craggy” (παιπαλόεσσα) of the Homeric hymn. Its figs were noted in ancient times, but wine and gum mastic have always been the most important products. The climate is healthy; oranges, olives and even palms grow freely. The wine grown on the N.W. coast, in the district called by Strabo Ariusia, was known asvinum Arvisium. Early in the 7th centuryB.C.Glaucus of Chios discovered the process of welding iron (κόλλησις: see J.G. Frazer’sPausanias, note on x. 16. 1, vol. v. pp. 313-314), and the iron stand of a large crater whose parts were all connected by this process was constructed by him, and preserved as one of the most interesting relics of antiquity at Delphi. The long line of Chian sculptors (seeGreek Art) in marble bears witness to the fame of Chian art. In literature the chief glory of Chios was the school of epic poets called Homeridae, who helped to create a received text of Homer and gave the island the reputation of being the poet’s birthplace. The chief town, Chios (pop. 16,000), is on the E. coast. A theatre and a temple of Athena Poliuchus existed in the ancient city. About 6 m. N. of the city there is a curious monument of antiquity, commonly called “the school of Homer”; it is a very ancient sanctuary of Cybele, with an altar and a figure of the goddess with her two lions, cut out of the native rock on the summit of a hill. On the west coast there is a monastery of great wealth with a church founded by Constantine IX. Monomachus (1042-1054). Starting from the city and encompassing the island, one passes in succession the promontory Posidium; Cape Phanae, the southern extremity of Chios, with a harbour and a temple of Apollo; Notium, probably the south-western point of the island; Laii, opposite the city of Chios, where the island is narrowest; the town Bolissus (now Volisso), the home of the Homerid poets; Melaena, the north-western point; the wine-growing district Ariusia; Cardamyle (now Cardhamili); the north-eastern promontory was probably named Phlium, and the mountains that cross the northern part of the island Pelinaeus or Pellenaeus.

The history of Chios is very obscure. According to Pherecydes, the original inhabitants were Leleges, while according to other accounts Thessalian Pelasgi possessed the island before it became an Ionian state. The name Aethalia, common to Chios and Lemnos in very early times, suggests the original existence of a homogeneous population in these and other neighbouring islands. Oenopion, a mythical hero, son of Dionysus or of Rhadamanthus, was an early king of Chios. His successor in the fourth generation, Hector, united the island to the Ionian confederacy (Pausan. vii. 4), though Strabo (xiv. p. 633) implies an actual conquest by Ionian settlers. The regal government was at a later time exchanged for an oligarchy or a democracy. The names of two tyrants, Amphiclus and Polytecnus, are mentioned. The products of the island were largely exported on the ships of Miletus, with which city Chios formed a close mercantile alliance in opposition to the rival league of Phocaea and Samos. Similar commercial considerations determined the Chians in their attitude towards the Persian conquerors: in 546 they submitted to Cyrus as eagerly as Phocaea resisted him; during the Ionian revolt their fleet of 100 sail joined the Milesians in offering a desperate opposition at Lade (494). The island was subsequently punished with great rigour by the Persians. The Chian ships, under the tyrant Strattis, served in the Persian fleet at Salamis. After its liberation in 479 Chios joined the Delian League and long remained a firm ally of the Athenians, who allowed it to retain full autonomy. But in 413 the island revolted, and was not recaptured. After the Peloponnesian War it took the first opportunity to renew the Athenian alliance, but in 357 again seceded. As a member of the Delian League it had regained its prosperity, being able to equip a fleet of 50 or 60 sail. Moreover, it was reputed one of the best-governed states in Greece, for although it was governed alternately by oligarchs and democrats neither party persecuted the other severely. It was not till late in the 4th century that civil dissension became a danger to the state, leaving it a prey to Idrieus, the dynast of Caria (346), and to the Persian admiral Memnon (333). During the Hellenistic age Chios maintained itself in a virtually independent position. It supported the Romans in their Eastern wars, and was made a “free and allied state.” Under Roman and Byzantine rule industry and commerce were undisturbed, its chief export at this time being the Arvisian wine, which had become very popular. After temporary occupations by the Seljuk Turks (1089-1092) and by the Venetians (1124-1125, 1172, 1204-1225), it was given in fief to the Genoese family of Zaccaria, and in 1346 passed definitely into the hands of a Genoesemaona, or trading company, which was organized in 1362 under the name of “the Giustiniani.” This mercantile brotherhood, formerly a privileged class, alone exploited the mastic trade; at the same time the Greeks were allowed to retain their rights of self-government and continued to exercise their industries. In 1415 the Genoese became tributary to the Ottomans. In spite of occasional secessionswhich brought severe punishment upon the island (1453, 1479), the/# rule of the Giustiniani was not abolished till 1566. Under the Ottoman government the prosperity of Chios was hardly affected. But the island underwent severe periods of suffering after its capture and reconquest from the Florentines (1595) and the Venetians (1694-1695), which greatly reduced the number of the Latins. Worst of all were the massacres of 1822, which followed upon an attack by some Greek insurgents executed against the will of the natives. In 1881 Chios was visited by a very severe earthquake in which over 5600 persons lost their lives and more than half the villages were seriously damaged. The island has now recovered its prosperity. There is a harbour at Castro, and steam flour-mills, foundries and tanneries have been established. Rich antimony and calamine mines are worked by a French undertaking, and good marble is quarried by an Italian company.Authorities.—Strabo xiv. pp. 632 f.; Athenaeus vi. 265-266; Herodotus i. 160-165, vi. 15-31; Thucydides viii. 14-61;Corpus Inscr. Atticarum, iv. (2), pp. 9, 10; H. Houssaye inRevue des deux mondes, xlvi. (1876), pp. 1 ff.; T. Bent inHistorical Review(1889), pp. 467-480; Fustel de Coulanges,L’Île de Chio(ed. Jullian, Paris, 1893); for coinage, B.V. Head,Historia numorum(Oxford, 1887), pp. 513-515, and NUMISMATICS:Greek.

The history of Chios is very obscure. According to Pherecydes, the original inhabitants were Leleges, while according to other accounts Thessalian Pelasgi possessed the island before it became an Ionian state. The name Aethalia, common to Chios and Lemnos in very early times, suggests the original existence of a homogeneous population in these and other neighbouring islands. Oenopion, a mythical hero, son of Dionysus or of Rhadamanthus, was an early king of Chios. His successor in the fourth generation, Hector, united the island to the Ionian confederacy (Pausan. vii. 4), though Strabo (xiv. p. 633) implies an actual conquest by Ionian settlers. The regal government was at a later time exchanged for an oligarchy or a democracy. The names of two tyrants, Amphiclus and Polytecnus, are mentioned. The products of the island were largely exported on the ships of Miletus, with which city Chios formed a close mercantile alliance in opposition to the rival league of Phocaea and Samos. Similar commercial considerations determined the Chians in their attitude towards the Persian conquerors: in 546 they submitted to Cyrus as eagerly as Phocaea resisted him; during the Ionian revolt their fleet of 100 sail joined the Milesians in offering a desperate opposition at Lade (494). The island was subsequently punished with great rigour by the Persians. The Chian ships, under the tyrant Strattis, served in the Persian fleet at Salamis. After its liberation in 479 Chios joined the Delian League and long remained a firm ally of the Athenians, who allowed it to retain full autonomy. But in 413 the island revolted, and was not recaptured. After the Peloponnesian War it took the first opportunity to renew the Athenian alliance, but in 357 again seceded. As a member of the Delian League it had regained its prosperity, being able to equip a fleet of 50 or 60 sail. Moreover, it was reputed one of the best-governed states in Greece, for although it was governed alternately by oligarchs and democrats neither party persecuted the other severely. It was not till late in the 4th century that civil dissension became a danger to the state, leaving it a prey to Idrieus, the dynast of Caria (346), and to the Persian admiral Memnon (333). During the Hellenistic age Chios maintained itself in a virtually independent position. It supported the Romans in their Eastern wars, and was made a “free and allied state.” Under Roman and Byzantine rule industry and commerce were undisturbed, its chief export at this time being the Arvisian wine, which had become very popular. After temporary occupations by the Seljuk Turks (1089-1092) and by the Venetians (1124-1125, 1172, 1204-1225), it was given in fief to the Genoese family of Zaccaria, and in 1346 passed definitely into the hands of a Genoesemaona, or trading company, which was organized in 1362 under the name of “the Giustiniani.” This mercantile brotherhood, formerly a privileged class, alone exploited the mastic trade; at the same time the Greeks were allowed to retain their rights of self-government and continued to exercise their industries. In 1415 the Genoese became tributary to the Ottomans. In spite of occasional secessionswhich brought severe punishment upon the island (1453, 1479), the/# rule of the Giustiniani was not abolished till 1566. Under the Ottoman government the prosperity of Chios was hardly affected. But the island underwent severe periods of suffering after its capture and reconquest from the Florentines (1595) and the Venetians (1694-1695), which greatly reduced the number of the Latins. Worst of all were the massacres of 1822, which followed upon an attack by some Greek insurgents executed against the will of the natives. In 1881 Chios was visited by a very severe earthquake in which over 5600 persons lost their lives and more than half the villages were seriously damaged. The island has now recovered its prosperity. There is a harbour at Castro, and steam flour-mills, foundries and tanneries have been established. Rich antimony and calamine mines are worked by a French undertaking, and good marble is quarried by an Italian company.

Authorities.—Strabo xiv. pp. 632 f.; Athenaeus vi. 265-266; Herodotus i. 160-165, vi. 15-31; Thucydides viii. 14-61;Corpus Inscr. Atticarum, iv. (2), pp. 9, 10; H. Houssaye inRevue des deux mondes, xlvi. (1876), pp. 1 ff.; T. Bent inHistorical Review(1889), pp. 467-480; Fustel de Coulanges,L’Île de Chio(ed. Jullian, Paris, 1893); for coinage, B.V. Head,Historia numorum(Oxford, 1887), pp. 513-515, and NUMISMATICS:Greek.


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