Comte’s classification of the sciences has been subjected to a vigorous criticism by Herbert Spencer. Spencer’s two chief points are these:—(1) He denies that the principle of the development of the sciences is the principle ofCriticism on Comte’s classification.decreasing generality; he asserts that there are as many examples of the advent of a science being determined by increasing generality as by increasing speciality. (2) He holds that any grouping of the sciences in a succession gives a radically wrong idea of their genesis and their interdependence; no true filiation exists; no science develops itself in isolation; no one is independent, either logically or historically. Littré, by far the most eminent of the scientific followers of Comte, concedes a certain force to Spencer’s objections, and makes certain secondary modifications in the hierarchy in consequence, while still cherishing his faith in the Comtist theory of the sciences. J. S. Mill, while admitting the objections as good, if Comte’s arrangement pretended to be the only one possible, still holds the arrangement as tenable for the purpose with which it was devised. G. H. Lewes asserts against Spencer that the arrangement in a series is necessary, on grounds similar to those which require that the various truths constituting a science should be systematically co-ordinated although in nature the phenomena are intermingled.
The first three volumes of thePositive Philosophycontain an exposition of the partial philosophies of the five sciences that precede sociology in the hierarchy. Their value has usually been placed very low by the special followers of the sciences concerned; they say that the knowledge is second-hand, is not coherent, and is too confidently taken for final. The Comtist replies that the task is philosophic; and is not to be judged by the minute accuracies of science. In these three volumes Comte took the sciences roughly as he found them. His eminence as a man of science must be measured by his only original work in that department,—the construction, namely, of the new science of society. This work is accomplished in the last three volumes of thePositive Philosophy, and the second and third volumes of thePositive Polity. The Comtist maintains that even if these five volumes together fail in laying down correctly and finally the lines of the new science, still they are the first solution of a great problem hitherto unattempted. “Modern biology has got beyond Aristotle’s conception; but in the construction of the biological science, not even the most unphilosophical biologist would fail to recognize the value of Aristotle’s attempt. So for sociology. Subsequent sociologists may have conceivably toremodel the whole science, yet not the less will they recognize the merit of the first work which has facilitated their labours.â€â€”Congreve.
We shall now briefly describe Comte’s principal conceptions in sociology, his position in respect to which is held by himself, and by others, to raise him to the level of Descartes or Leibnitz. Of course the first step was to approach the phenomenaSociological conceptions.of human character and social existence with the expectation of finding them as reducible to general laws as the other phenomena of the universe, and with the hope of exploring these laws by the same instruments of observation and verification as had done such triumphant work in the case of the latter. Comte separates the collective facts of society and history from the individual phenomena of biology; then he withdraws these collective facts from the region of external volition, and places them in the region of law. The facts of history must be explained, not by providential interventions, but by referring them to conditions inherent in the successive stages of social existence. This conception makes a science of society possible.Method.What is the method? It comprises, besides observation and experiment (which is, in fact, only the observation of abnormal social states), a certain peculiarity of verification. We begin by deducing every well-known historical situation from the series of its antecedents. Thus we acquire a body of empirical generalizations as to social phenomena, and then we connect the generalizations with the positive theory of human nature. A sociological demonstration lies in the establishment of an accordance between the conclusions of historical analysis and the preparatory conceptions of biological theory. As Mill puts it:—“If a sociological theory, collected from historical evidence, contradicts the established general laws of human nature; if (to use M. Comte’s instances) it implies, in the mass of mankind, any very decided natural bent, either in a good or in a bad direction; if it supposes that the reason, in average human beings, predominates over the desires, or the disinterested desires over the personal,—we may know that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false. On the other hand, if laws of social phenomena, empirically generalized from history, can, when once suggested, be affiliated to the known laws of human nature; if the direction actually taken by the developments and changes of human society, can be seen to be such as the properties of man and of his dwelling-place made antecedently probable, the empirical generalizations are raised into positive laws, and sociology becomes a science.†The result of this method, is an exhibition of the events of human experience in co-ordinated series that manifest their own graduated connexion.
Next, as all investigation proceeds from that which is known best to that which is unknown or less well known, and as, in social states, it is the collective phenomenon that is more easy of access to the observer than its parts, therefore we must consider and pursue all the elements of a given social state together and in common. The social organization must be viewed and explored as a whole. There is a nexus between each leading group of social phenomena and other leading groups; if there is a change in one of them, that change is accompanied by a corresponding modification of all the rest. “Not only must political institutions and social manners, on the one hand, and manners and ideas, on the other, be always mutually connected; but further, this consolidated whole must be always connected by its nature with the corresponding state of the integral development of humanity, considered in all its aspects of intellectual, moral and physical activity.â€â€”Comte.
Is there any one element which communicates the decisive impulse to all the rest,—any predominating agency in the course of social evolution? The answer is that all the other parts of social existence are associated with, andDecisive Importance of Intellectual development.drawn along by, the contemporary condition of intellectual development. The Reason is the superior and preponderant element which settles the direction in which all the other faculties shall expand. “It is only through the more and more marked influence of the reason over the general conduct of man and of society, that the gradual march of our race has attained that regularity and persevering continuity which distinguish it so radically from the desultory and barren expansion of even the highest animal orders, which share, and with enhanced strength, the appetites, the passions, and even the primary sentiments of man.†The history of intellectual development, therefore, is the key to social evolution, and the key to the history of intellectual development is the Law of the Three States.
Among other central thoughts in Comte’s explanation of history are these:—The displacement of theological by positive conceptions has been accompanied by a gradual rise of an industrial régime out of the military régime;—the great permanent contribution of Catholicism was the separation which it set up between the temporal and the spiritual powers;—the progress of the race consists in the increasing preponderance of the distinctively human elements over the animal elements;—the absolute tendency of ordinary social theories will be replaced by an unfailing adherence to the relative point of view, and from this it follows that the social state, regarded as a whole, has been as perfect in each period as the co-existing condition of humanity and its environment would allow.
The elaboration of these ideas in relation to the history of the civilization of the most advanced portion of the human race occupies two of the volumes of thePositive Philosophy, and has been accepted by very different schools as a masterpiece of rich, luminous, and far-reaching suggestion. Whatever additions it may receive, and whatever corrections it may require, this analysis of social evolution will continue to be regarded as one of the great achievements of human intellect.
The third volume of thePositive Politytreats of social dynamics, and takes us again over the ground of historic evolution. It abounds with remarks of extraordinary fertility and comprehensiveness; but it is oftenSocial dynamics in the Positive Polity.arbitrary; and its views of the past are strained into coherence with the statical views of the preceding volume. As it was composed in rather less than six months, and as the author honestly warns us that he has given all his attention to a more profound co-ordination, instead of working out the special explanations more fully, as he had promised, we need not be surprised if the result is disappointing to those who had mastered the corresponding portion of thePositive Philosophy. Comte explains the difference between his two works. In the first his “chief object was to discover and demonstrate the laws of progress, and to exhibit in one unbroken sequence the collective destinies of mankind, till then invariably regarded as a series of events wholly beyond the reach of explanation, and almost depending on arbitrary will. The present work, on the contrary, is addressed to those who are already sufficiently convinced of the certain existence of social laws, and desire only to have them reduced to a true and conclusive system.â€
The main principles of the Comtian system are derived from thePositive Polityand from two other works,—thePositivist Catechism: a Summary Exposition of the Universal Religion, in Twelve Dialogues between a Woman and a Priest of Humanity;The Positivist system.and, second,The Subjective Synthesis(1856), which is the first and only volume of a work upon mathematics announced at the end of thePositive Philosophy. The system for which thePositive Philosophyis alleged to have been the scientific preparation contains a Polity and a Religion; a complete arrangement of life in all its aspects, giving a wider sphere to Intellect, Energy and Feeling than could be found in any of the previous organic types,—Greek, Roman or Catholic-feudal. Comte’s immense superiority over such prae-Revolutionary utopians as the Abbé Saint Pierre, no less than over the group of post-revolutionary Utopians, is especially visible in this firm grasp of the cardinal truth that the improvement of the social organism can only be effected by a moral development, and never by any changes in mere political mechanism, or any violences in the way of an artificial redistribution of wealth. A moral transformation must precede any real advance. The aim, both in public and private life, is tosecure to the utmost possible extent the victory of the social feeling over self-love, or Altruism over Egoism.1This is the key to the regeneration of social existence, as it is the key to that unity of individual life which makes all our energies converge freely and without wasteful friction towards a common end. What are the instruments for securing the preponderance of Altruism? Clearly they must work from the strongest element in human nature, and this element is Feeling or the Heart. Under the Catholic system the supremacy of Feeling was abused, and the Intellect was made its slave. Then followed a revolt of Intellect against Sentiment. The business of the new system will be to bring back the Intellect into a condition, not of slavery, but of willing ministry to the Feelings. The subordination never was, and never will be, effected except by means of a religion, and aThe Religion of humanity.religion, to be final, must include a harmonious synthesis of all our conceptions of the external order of the universe. The characteristic basis of a religion is the existence of a Power without us, so superior to ourselves as to command the complete submission of our whole life. This basis is to be found in the Positive stage, in Humanity, past, present and to come, conceived as the Great Being.
“A deeper study of the great universal order reveals to us at length the ruling power within it of the true Great Being, whose destiny it is to bring that order continually to perfection by constantly conforming to its laws, and which thus best represents to us that system as a whole. This undeniable Providence, the supreme dispenser of our destinies, becomes in the natural course the common centre of our affections, our thoughts, and our actions. Although this Great Being evidently exceeds the utmost strength of any, even of any collective, human force, its necessary constitution and its peculiar function endow it with the truest sympathy towards all its servants. The least amongst us can and ought constantly to aspire to maintain and even to improve this Being. This natural object of all our activity, both public and private, determines the true general character of the rest of our existence, whether in feeling or in thought; which must be devoted to love, and to know, in order rightly to serve, our Providence, by a wise use of all the means which it furnishes to us. Reciprocally this continued service, whilst strengthening our true unity, renders us at once both happier and better.â€
“A deeper study of the great universal order reveals to us at length the ruling power within it of the true Great Being, whose destiny it is to bring that order continually to perfection by constantly conforming to its laws, and which thus best represents to us that system as a whole. This undeniable Providence, the supreme dispenser of our destinies, becomes in the natural course the common centre of our affections, our thoughts, and our actions. Although this Great Being evidently exceeds the utmost strength of any, even of any collective, human force, its necessary constitution and its peculiar function endow it with the truest sympathy towards all its servants. The least amongst us can and ought constantly to aspire to maintain and even to improve this Being. This natural object of all our activity, both public and private, determines the true general character of the rest of our existence, whether in feeling or in thought; which must be devoted to love, and to know, in order rightly to serve, our Providence, by a wise use of all the means which it furnishes to us. Reciprocally this continued service, whilst strengthening our true unity, renders us at once both happier and better.â€
The exaltation of Humanity into the throne occupied by the Supreme Being under monotheistic systems made all the rest of Comte’s construction easy enough. Utility remains the test of every institution, impulse, act; his fabricRemarks on the religion.becomes substantially an arch of utilitarian propositions, with an artificial Great Being inserted at the top to keep them in their place. The Comtist system is utilitarianism crowned by a fantastic decoration. Translated into the plainest English, the position is as follows: “Society can only be regenerated by the greater subordination of politics to morals, by the moralization of capital, by the renovation of the family, by a higher conception of marriage and so on. These ends can only be reached by a heartier development of the sympathetic instincts. The sympathetic instincts can only be developed by the Religion of Humanity.†Looking at the problem in this way, even a moralist who does not expect theology to be the instrument of social revival, might still ask whether the sympathetic instincts will not necessarily be already developed to their highest point, before people will be persuaded to accept the religion, which is at the bottom hardly more than sympathy under a more imposing name. However that may be, the whole battle—into which we shall not enter—as to the legitimateness of Comtism as a religion turns upon this erection of Humanity into a Being. The various hypotheses, dogmas, proposals, as to the family, to capital, &c., are merely propositions measurable by considerations of utility and a balance of expediencies. Many of these proposals are of the highest interest, and many of them are actually available; but there does not seem to be one of them of an available kind, which could not equally well be approached from other sides, and even incorporated in some radically antagonistic system. Adoption, for example, as a practice for improving the happiness of families and the welfare of society, is capable of being weighed, and can in truth only be weighed, by utilitarian considerations, and has been commended by men to whom the Comtist religion is naught. The singularity of Comte’s construction, and the test by which it must be tried, is the transfer of the worship and discipline of Catholicism to a system in which “the conception of God is superseded†by the abstract idea of Humanity, conceived as a kind of Personality.
And when all is said, the invention does not help us. We have still to settle whatisfor the good of Humanity, and we can only do that in the old-fashioned way. There is no guidance in the conception. No effective unity can follow from it, because you can only find out the right and wrong of a given course by summing up the advantages and disadvantages, and striking a balance, and there is nothing in the Religion of Humanity to force two men to find the balance on the same side. The Comtists are no better off than other utilitarians in judging policy, events, conduct.
The particularities of the worship, its minute and truly ingenious re-adaptations of sacraments, prayers, reverent signs, down even to the invocation of a New Trinity, need not detain us. They are said, though it is not easy toThe worship and discipline.believe, to have been elaborated by way of Utopia. If so, no Utopia has ever yet been presented in a style so little calculated to stir the imagination, to warm the feelings, to soothe the insurgency of the reason. It is a mistake to present a great body of hypotheses—if Comte meant them for hypotheses—in the most dogmatic and peremptory form to which language can lend itself. And there is no more extraordinary thing in the history of opinion than the perversity with which Comte has succeeded in clothing a philosophic doctrine, so intrinsically conciliatory as his, in a shape that excites so little sympathy and gives so much provocation. An enemy defined Comtism as CatholicismminusChristianity, to which an able champion retorted by calling it CatholicismplusScience. Comte’s Utopia has pleased the followers of the Catholic, just as little as those of the scientific, spirit.
The elaborate and minute systematization of life, proper to the religion of Humanity, is to be directed by a priesthood. The priests are to possess neither wealth nor material power; they are not to command, but to counsel; their authority is toThe priesthood.rest on persuasion, not on force. When religion has become positive, and society industrial, then the influence of the church upon the state becomes really free and independent, which was not the case in the middle ages. The power of the priesthood rests upon special knowledge of man and nature; but to this intellectual eminence must also be added moral power and a certain greatness of character, without which force of intellect and completeness of attainment will not receive the confidence they ought to inspire. The functions of the priesthood are of this kind:—To exercise a systematic direction over education; to hold a consultative influence over all the important acts of actual life, public and private; to arbitrate in cases of practical conflict; to preach sermons recalling those principles of generality and universal harmony which our special activities dispose us to ignore; to order the due classification of society; to perform the various ceremonies appointed by the founder of the religion. The authority of the priesthood is to rest wholly on voluntary adhesion, and there is to be perfect freedom of speech and discussion. This provision hardly consists with Comte’s congratulations to the tsar Nicholas on the “wise vigilance†with which he kept watch over the importation of Western books.
From his earliest manhood Comte had been powerfully impressed by the necessity of elevating the condition of women. (See remarkable passage in his letters to M. Valat, pp. 84-87.) His friendship with Madame de Vaux hadWomen.deepened the impression, and in the reconstructed society women are to play a highly important part. They are to be carefully excluded from public action, but they are to do many more important things than things political. To fit them for their functions, they are to be raised above material cares, and they are to be thoroughly educated. The family, which is so important an element of the Comtist scheme of things, exists to carry the influence of woman over man to the highest point of cultivation. Through affection she purifies the activity ofman. “Superior in power of affection, more able to keep both the intellectual and the active powers in continual subordination to feeling, women are formed as the natural intermediaries between Humanity and man. The Great Being confides specially to them its moral Providence, maintaining through them the direct and constant cultivation of universal affection, in the midst of all the distractions of thought or action, which are for ever withdrawing men from its influence.... Beside the uniform influence of every woman on every man, to attach him to Humanity, such is the importance and the difficulty of this ministry that each of us should be placed under the special guidance of one of these angels, to answer for him, as it were, to the Great Being. This moral guardianship may assume three types,—the mother, the wife and the daughter; each having several modifications, as shown in the concluding volume. Together they form the three simple modes of solidarity, or unity with contemporaries,—obedience, union and protection—as well as the three degrees of continuity between ages, by uniting us with the past, the present and the future. In accordance with my theory of the brain, each corresponds with one of our three altruistic instincts—veneration, attachment and benevolence.â€
How the positive method of observation and verification of real facts has landed us in this, and much else of the same kind, is extremely hard to guess. Seriously to examine an encyclopaedic system, that touches life, societyConclusion.and knowledge at every point, is evidently beyond the compass of such an article as this. There is in every chapter a whole group of speculative suggestions, each of which would need a long chapter to itself to elaborate or to discuss. There is at least one biological speculation of astounding audacity, that could be examined in nothing less than a treatise. Perhaps we have said enough to show that after performing a great and real service to thought Comte almost sacrificed his claims to gratitude by the invention of a system that, as such, and independently of detached suggestions, is markedly retrograde. But the world will take what is available in Comte, while forgetting that in his work which is as irrational in one way as Hegel is in another.
See also the articlePositivism.Bibliography.—Works, Editions and Translations: Cours de philosophie positive(6 vols., Paris, 1830-1842; 2nd ed. with preface by E. Littré, Paris, 1864; 5th ed., 1893-1894; Eng. trans. Harriet Martineau, 2 vols., London, 1853; 3 vols. London and New York, 1896);Discours sur l’esprit positif(Paris, 1844; Eng. trans. with explanation E. S. Beesley, 1905);Ordre et progrès(ib. 1848);Discours sur l’ensemble de positivisme(1848, Eng. trans. J. H. Bridges, London, 1852);Système de politique positive, ou Traité de sociologie(4 vols., Paris, 1852-1854; ed. 1898; Eng. trans. with analysis and explanatory summary by Bridges, F. Harrison, E. S. Beesley and others, 1875-1879);Catéchisme positiviste(Paris, 1852; 3rd ed., 1890; Eng. trans. R. Congreve, Lond. 1858, 3rd ed., 1891);Appel aux Conservateurs(Paris, 1855 and 1898);Synthèse subjective(1856 and 1878);Essai de philos. mathématique(Paris, 1878); P. Descours and H. Gordon Jones,Fundamental Principles of Positive Philos.(trans. 1905), with biog. preface by E. S. Beesley. The Letters of Comte have been published as follows:—the letters to M. Valat and J. S. Mill, inLa Critique philosophique(1877); correspondence with Mde. de Vaux (ib., 1884);Correspondance inédite d’Aug. Comte(1903 foll.);Lettres inédites de J. S. Mill à Aug. Comte publ. avec les résponses de Comte(1899).Criticism.—J. S. Mill,Auguste Comte and Positivism; J. H. Bridges’ reply to Mill,The Unity of Comte’s Life and Doctrines(1866); Herbert Spencer’s essay on theGenesis of Scienceand pamphlet onThe Classification of the Sciences; Huxley’s “Scientific Aspects of Positivism,†in hisLay Sermons; R. Congreve,Essays Political, Social and Religious(1874); J. Fiske,Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy(1874); G. H. Lewes,History of Philosophy, vol. ii.; Edward Caird,The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte(Glasgow, 1885); Hermann Gruber,Aug. Comte der Begründer des Positivismus. Sein Leben und seine Lehre(Freiburg, 1889) andDer Positivismus vom Tode Aug. Comtes bis auf unsere Tage, 1857-1891(Freib. 1891); L. Lévy-Bruhl,La Philosophie d’Aug. Comte(Paris, 1900); H. D. Hutton,Comte’s Theory of Man’s Future(1877),Comte, the Man and the Founder(1891),Comte’s Life and Work(1892); E. de Roberty,Aug. Comte et Herbert Spencer(Paris, 1894); J. Watson,Comte, Mill and Spencer. An outline of Philos.(1895 and 1899); Millet,La Souveraineté d’après Aug. Comte(1905); L. de Montesquieu Fezensac,Le Système politique d’Aug. Comte(1907); G. Dumas,Psychologie de deux Messies positivistes(1905).
See also the articlePositivism.
Bibliography.—Works, Editions and Translations: Cours de philosophie positive(6 vols., Paris, 1830-1842; 2nd ed. with preface by E. Littré, Paris, 1864; 5th ed., 1893-1894; Eng. trans. Harriet Martineau, 2 vols., London, 1853; 3 vols. London and New York, 1896);Discours sur l’esprit positif(Paris, 1844; Eng. trans. with explanation E. S. Beesley, 1905);Ordre et progrès(ib. 1848);Discours sur l’ensemble de positivisme(1848, Eng. trans. J. H. Bridges, London, 1852);Système de politique positive, ou Traité de sociologie(4 vols., Paris, 1852-1854; ed. 1898; Eng. trans. with analysis and explanatory summary by Bridges, F. Harrison, E. S. Beesley and others, 1875-1879);Catéchisme positiviste(Paris, 1852; 3rd ed., 1890; Eng. trans. R. Congreve, Lond. 1858, 3rd ed., 1891);Appel aux Conservateurs(Paris, 1855 and 1898);Synthèse subjective(1856 and 1878);Essai de philos. mathématique(Paris, 1878); P. Descours and H. Gordon Jones,Fundamental Principles of Positive Philos.(trans. 1905), with biog. preface by E. S. Beesley. The Letters of Comte have been published as follows:—the letters to M. Valat and J. S. Mill, inLa Critique philosophique(1877); correspondence with Mde. de Vaux (ib., 1884);Correspondance inédite d’Aug. Comte(1903 foll.);Lettres inédites de J. S. Mill à Aug. Comte publ. avec les résponses de Comte(1899).
Criticism.—J. S. Mill,Auguste Comte and Positivism; J. H. Bridges’ reply to Mill,The Unity of Comte’s Life and Doctrines(1866); Herbert Spencer’s essay on theGenesis of Scienceand pamphlet onThe Classification of the Sciences; Huxley’s “Scientific Aspects of Positivism,†in hisLay Sermons; R. Congreve,Essays Political, Social and Religious(1874); J. Fiske,Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy(1874); G. H. Lewes,History of Philosophy, vol. ii.; Edward Caird,The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte(Glasgow, 1885); Hermann Gruber,Aug. Comte der Begründer des Positivismus. Sein Leben und seine Lehre(Freiburg, 1889) andDer Positivismus vom Tode Aug. Comtes bis auf unsere Tage, 1857-1891(Freib. 1891); L. Lévy-Bruhl,La Philosophie d’Aug. Comte(Paris, 1900); H. D. Hutton,Comte’s Theory of Man’s Future(1877),Comte, the Man and the Founder(1891),Comte’s Life and Work(1892); E. de Roberty,Aug. Comte et Herbert Spencer(Paris, 1894); J. Watson,Comte, Mill and Spencer. An outline of Philos.(1895 and 1899); Millet,La Souveraineté d’après Aug. Comte(1905); L. de Montesquieu Fezensac,Le Système politique d’Aug. Comte(1907); G. Dumas,Psychologie de deux Messies positivistes(1905).
(J. Mo.; X.)
1For Comte’s place in the history of ethical theory seeEthics.
1For Comte’s place in the history of ethical theory seeEthics.
COMUS(fromκῶμος, revel, or a company of revellers), in the later mythology of the Greeks, the god of festive mirth. In classic mythology the personification does not exist; but Comus appears in theΕἰκόνες, orDescriptions of Pictures, of Philostratus, a writer of the 3rd centuryA.D.as a winged youth, slumbering in a standing attitude, his legs crossed, his countenance flushed with wine, his head—which is sunk upon his breast—crowned with dewy flowers, his left hand feebly grasping a hunting spear, his right an inverted torch. Ben Jonson introduces Comus, in his masque entitledPleasure reconciled to Virtue(1619), as the portly jovial patron of good cheer, “First father of sauce and deviser of jelly.†In theComus, sive Phagesiposia Cimmeria; Somnium(1608, and at Oxford, 1634), a moral allegory by a Dutch author, Hendrik van der Putten, or Erycius Puteanus, the conception is more nearly akin to Milton’s, and Comus is a being whose enticements are more disguised and delicate than those of Jonson’s deity. But Milton’s Comus is a creation of his own. His story is one
“Which never yet was heard in tale or songFrom old or modern bard, in hall or bower.â€
“Which never yet was heard in tale or song
From old or modern bard, in hall or bower.â€
Born from the loves of Bacchus and Circe, he is “much like his father, but his mother moreâ€â€”a sorcerer, like her, who gives to travellers a magic draught that changes their human face into the “brutal form of some wild beast,†and, hiding from them their own foul disfigurement, makes them forget all the pure ties of life, “to roll with pleasure in a sensual sty.â€
COMYN, JOHN(d. c. 1300), Scottish baron, was a son of John Comyn (d. 1274), justiciar of Galloway, who was a nephew of the constable of Scotland, Alexander Comyn, earl of Buchan (d. 1289), and of the powerful and wealthy Walter Comyn, earl of Mentieth (d. 1258). With his uncle the earl of Buchan, the elder Comyn took a prominent part in the affairs of Scotland during the latter part of the 13th century, and he had interests and estates in England as well as in his native land. He fought for Henry III. at Northampton and at Lewes, and was afterwards imprisoned for a short time in London. The younger Comyn, who had inherited the lordship of Badenoch from his great-uncle the earl of Mentieth, was appointed one of the guardians of Scotland in 1286, and shared in the negotiations between Edward I. and the Scots in 1289 and 1290. When Margaret, the Maid of Norway, died in 1290, Comyn was one of the claimants for the Scottish throne, but he did not press his candidature, and like the other Comyns urged the claim of John de Baliol. After supporting Baliol in his rising against Edward I., Comyn submitted to the English king in 1296; he was sent to reside in England, but returned to Scotland shortly before his death.
Comyn’s son,John Comyn(d. 1306), called the “red Comyn,†is more famous. Like his father he assisted Baliol in his rising against Edward I., and he was for some time a hostage in England. Having been made guardian of Scotland after the battle of Falkirk in 1298 he led the resistance to the English king for about five years, and then early in 1304 made an honourable surrender. Comyn is chiefly known for his memorable quarrel with Robert the Bruce. The origin of the dispute is uncertain. Doubtless the two regarded each other as rivals; Comyn may have refused to join in the insurrection planned by Bruce. At all events the pair met at Dumfries in January 1306; during a heated altercation charges of treachery were made, and Comyn was stabbed to death either by Bruce or by his followers.
Another member of the Comyn family who took an active part in Scottish affairs during these troubled times isJohn Comyn, earl of Buchan (d. c. 1313). This earl, a son of Earl Alexander, was constable of Scotland, and was first an ally and then an enemy of Robert the Bruce.
CONACRE(a corruption of corn-acre), in Ireland, a system of letting land, mostly in small patches, and usually for the growth of potatoes as a kind of return instead of wages. It is now practically obsolete.
CONANT, THOMAS JEFFERSON(1802-1891), American Biblical scholar, was born at Brandon, Vermont, on the 13th of December 1802. Graduating at Middlebury College in 1823, he became tutor in the Columbian University (now GeorgeWashington University) from 1825 to 1827, professor of Greek, Latin and German at Waterville College (now Colby College) from 1827 to 1833, professor of biblical literature and criticism in Hamilton (New York) Theological Institute from 1835 to 1851, and professor of Hebrew and of Biblical exegesis in Rochester Theological Seminary from 1851 to 1857. From 1857 to 1875 he was employed by the American Bible Union on the revision of the New Testament (1871). He married in 1830 Hannah O’Brien Chaplin (1809-1865), who was herself the author ofThe Earnest Man, a biography of Adoniram Judson (1855), and ofThe History of the English Bible(1859), besides being her husband’s able assistant in his Hebrew studies. He died in Brooklyn, New York, on the 30th of April 1891. Conant was the foremost Hebrew scholar of his time in America. His treatise,The Meaning and Use of “Baptizein†Philologically and Historically Investigated(1860), an “appendix to the revised version of the Gospel by Matthew,†is a valuable summary of the evidence for Baptist doctrine. He translated and edited Gesenius’sHebrew Grammar(1839; 1877), and published revised versions with notes ofJob(1856),Genesis(1868),Psalms(1871),Proverbs(1872),Isaiahi.-xiii. 22 (1874), andHistorical Books of the Old Testament, Joshua to II. Kings(1884).
CONATION(from Lat.conari, to attempt, strive), a psychological term, originally chosen by Sir William Hamilton (Lectures on Metaphysics, pp. 127 foll.), used generally of an attitude of mind involving a tendency to takeaction,e.g.when one decides to remove an object which is causing a painful sensation, or to try to interrupt an unpleasant train of thought. This use of the word tends to lay emphasis on the mind as self-determined in relation to external objects. Another less common use of the word is to describe the pleasant or painful sensations which accompany muscular activity; theconativephenomena, thus regarded, are psychic changes brought about by external causes.
The chief difficulty in connexion with Conation is that of distinguishing it from Feeling, a term of very vague significance both in technical and in common usage. Thus the German psychologist F. Brentano holds that no real distinction can be made. He argues that the mental process from sorrow or dissatisfaction, through hope for a change and courage to act, up to the voluntary determination which issues in action, is a single homogeneous whole (Psychologie, pp. 308-309). The mere fact, however, that the series is continuous is no ground for not distinguishing its parts; if it were so, it would be impossible to distinguish by separate names the various colours in the solar spectrum, or indeed perception from conception. A more material objection, moreover, is that, in point of fact, the feeling of pleasure or pain roused by a given stimulus is specifically different from, and indeed may not be followed by, the determination to modify or remove it. Pleasure and pain,i.e.hedonic sensationper se, are essentially distinct from appetition and aversion; the pleasures of hearing music or enjoying sunshine are not in general accompanied by any volitional activity. It is true that painful sensations are generally accompanied by definite aversion or a tendency to take action, but the cases of positive pleasure are amply sufficient to support a distinction. Therefore, though in ordinary language such phrases as “feeling aversion†are quite legitimate, accurate psychology compels us to confine “feeling†to states of consciousness in which no conative activity is present,i.e.to the psychic phenomena of pleasure or pain considered in and by themselves. The study of such phenomena is specifically described as Hedonics (Gr.ἡδονή, pleasure) or Algedonics (Gr.ἀλγηδών, pain); the latter term was coined by H. R. Marshall (inPain, Pleasure and Aesthetics, 1894), but has not been generally used.
The problem of conation is closely related to that of Attention (q.v.), which indeed, regarded as active consciousness, implies conation (G. T. Ladd,Psychology, 1894, p. 213). Thus, whenever the mind deliberately focusses itself upon a particular object, there is implied a psychic effort (for the relation between Attention and Conation, see G. F. Stout,Analytic Psychology, book i. chap. vi.). All conscious action, and in a less degree even unconscious or reflex action, implies attention; when the mind “attends†to any given external object, the organ through the medium of which information regarding that object is conveyed to the mind is set in motion. (SeePsychology.)
CONCA, SEBASTIANO(1679-1764), Italian painter of the Florentine school, was born at Gaeta, and studied at Naples under Francesco Solimena. In 1706, along with his brother Giovanni, who acted as his assistant, he settled at Rome, where for several years he worked in chalk only, to improve his drawing. He was patronized by the Cardinal Ottoboni, who introduced him to Clement XI.; and a Jeremiah painted in the church of St John Lateran was rewarded by the pope with knighthood and by the cardinal with a diamond cross. His fame grew quickly, and he received the patronage of most of the crowned heads of Europe. He painted till near the day of his death, and left behind him an immense number of pictures, mostly of a brilliant and showy kind, which are distributed among the churches of Italy. Of these the Probatica, or Pool of Siloam, in the hospital of Santa Maria della Scala, at Siena, is considered the finest.
CONCARNEAU,a fishing port of western France in the department of Finistère, 14 m. by road S.E. of Quimper. Pop. (1906) 7887. The town occupies a picturesque situation on an inlet opening into the Bay of La Forêt. The old portion stands on an island, and is surrounded by ramparts, parts of which are believed to date from the 14th century. It is an important centre of the sardine, mackerel and lobster fisheries. Sardine-preserving, boat-building and the manufacture of sardine-boxes are carried on.
CONCEPCIÓN,a province of southern Chile, lying between the provinces of Maule and Ñuble on the N. and Bio-Bio on the S., and extending from the Pacific to the Argentine boundary. Its outline is very irregular, the Itata river forming its northern boundary, and the Bio-Bio and one of its tributaries a part of its southern boundary. Area (estimated) 3252 sq. m.; pop. (1895) 188,190. Concepción is the most important province of southern Chile because of its advantageous commercial position, fertility and productive industries. Its coast is indented by two large well-sheltered bays, Talcahuano and Arauco, the former having the ports of Talcahuano, Penco and El Tomé, and the latter Coronel and Lota. Its railway communications are good, and the Bio-Bio, which crosses its S.W. corner, has 100 m. of navigable channel. The province produces wheat and manufactures flour for export; its wines are reputed the best in Chile, cattle are bred in large numbers, wool is produced, and considerable timber is shipped. Near the coast are extensive deposits of coal, which is shipped from Lota and Coronel, the former being the site of the most productive coal-mine in South America. The climate is mild and the rainfall is abundant. Large copper-smelting and glass works have been established at Lota because of its coal resources. The valley of the Itata is largely devoted to vine cultivation, and the port of this district, El Tomé, is noted for its wine vaults and trade. It also possesses a small woollen factory. The principal towns are on the coast and had in 1895 the following populations: Talcahuano, 10,431; Lota, 9797 (largely operatives in the mines and smelting works); Coronel, 4575; and El Tomé, 3977.
CONCEPCIÓN,a city of southern Chile, capital of a province and department of the same name, on the right bank of the Bio-Bio river, 7 m. above its mouth, and 355 m. S.S.W. of Santiago by rail. Pop. (1895) 39,837; (1902, estimated) 49,351. It is the commercial centre of a rich agricultural region, but because of obstructions at the mouth of the Bio-Bio its trade passes in great part through the port of Talcahuano, 8 m. distant by rail. The small port of Penco, situated on the same bay and 10 m. distant by rail, also receives a part of the trade because of official restrictions at Talcahuano. Concepción is one of the southern termini of the Chilean central railway, by which it is connected with Santiago to the N., with Valdivia and Puerto Montt to the S., and with the port of Talcahuano. Another line extends southward through the Chilean coal-producing districts to Curanilhué, crossing the Bio-Bio by a steel viaduct 6000 ft. long on 62 skeleton piers; and a short line of 10 m. runsnorthward to Penco. The Bio-Bio is navigable above the city for 100 m. and considerable traffic comes through this channel. The districts tributary to Concepción produce wheat, wine, wool, cattle, coal and timber, and among the industrial establishments of the city are flour mills, furniture and carriage factories, distilleries and breweries. The city is built on a level plain but little above the sea-level, and is laid out in regular squares with broad streets. It is an episcopal see with a cathedral and several fine churches, and is the seat of a court of appeal. The city was founded by Pedro de Valdivia in 1550, and received the singular title of “La Concepción del Nuevo Extremo.†It was located on the bay of Talcahuano where the town of Penco now stands, about 9 m. from its present site, but was destroyed by earthquakes in 1570, 1730 and 1751, and was then (1755) removed to the margin of the Bio-Bio. In 1835 it was again laid in ruins, a graphic description of which is given by Charles Darwin inThe Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle. The city was twice burned by the Araucanians during their long struggle against the Spanish colonists.
CONCEPCIÓN,orVilla Concepción, the principal town and a river port of northern Paraguay, on the Paraguay river, 138 m. (234 m. by river) N. of Asunción, and about 345 ft. above sea-level. Pop. (1895, estimate) 10,000, largely Indians and mestizos. It is an important commercial centre, and a port of call for the river steamers trading with the Brazilian town of Corumbá, Matto Grosso. It is the principal point for the exportation of Paraguay tea, or “yerba maté†(Ilex paraguayensis). The town has a street railway and telephone service, a national college, a public school, a market, and some important commercial establishments. The neighbouring country is sparsely settled and produces little except forest products. Across the river, in the Paraguayan Chaco, is an English missionary station, whose territory extends inland among the Indians for many miles.
CONCEPT1(Lat.conceptus, a thought, fromconcipere, to take together, combine in thought; Ger.Begriff), in philosophy, a term applied to a general idea derived from and considered apart from the particulars observed by the senses. The mental process by which this idea is obtained is called abstraction (q.v.). By the comparison, for instance, of a number of boats, the mind abstracts a certain common quality or qualities in virtue of which the mind affirms the general idea of “boat.†Thus the connotation of the term “boat,†being the sum of those qualities in respect of which all boats are regarded as alike, whatever their individual peculiarities may be, is described as a “concept.†The psychic process by which a concept is affirmed is called “Conception,†a term which is often loosely used in a concrete sense for “Concept†itself. It is also used even more loosely as synonymous in the widest sense with “idea,†“notion.†Strictly, however, it is contrasted with “perception,†and implies the mental reconstruction and combination of sense-given data. Thus when one carries one’s thoughts back to a series of events, one constructs a psychic whole made up of parts which take definite shape and character by their mutual interrelations. This process is calledconceptual synthesis, the possibility of which is asine qua nonfor the exchange of information by speech and writing. It should be noticed that this (very common) psychological interpretation of “conception†differs from the metaphysical or general philosophical definition given above, in so far as it includes mental presentations in which the universal is not specifically distinguished from the particulars. Some psychologists prefer to restrict the term to the narrower use which excludes all mental states in which particulars are cognized, even though the universal be present also.
In biology conception is the coalescence of the male and female generative elements, producing pregnancy.
1The word “conceit†in its various senses (“idea,†“plan,†“fancy,†“imagination,†and, by modern extension, an overweening sense of one’s own value) is likewise derived ultimately from the Latinconcipere. It appears to have been formed directly from the English derivative “conceive†on the analogy of “deceit†from “deceive.†According to theNew English Dictionarythere is no intermediate form in Old French.
1The word “conceit†in its various senses (“idea,†“plan,†“fancy,†“imagination,†and, by modern extension, an overweening sense of one’s own value) is likewise derived ultimately from the Latinconcipere. It appears to have been formed directly from the English derivative “conceive†on the analogy of “deceit†from “deceive.†According to theNew English Dictionarythere is no intermediate form in Old French.
CONCEPTUALISM(from “Conceptâ€), in philosophy, a term applied by modern writers to a scholastic theory of the nature of universals, to distinguish it from the two extremes of Nominalism and Realism. The scholastic philosophers took up the old Greek problem as to the nature of true reality—whether the general idea or the particular object is more truly real. Between Realism which asserts that thegenusis more real than thespecies, and that particulars have no reality, and Nominalism according to whichgenusandspeciesare merely names (nomina, flatus vocis), Conceptualism takes a mean position. The conceptualist holds that universals have a real existence, but only in the mind, as the concepts which unite the individual things:e.g.there is in the mind a general notion or idea of boats, by reference to which the mind can decide whether a given object is, or is not, a boat. On the one hand “boat†is something more than a mere sound with a purely arbitrary conventional significance; on the other it has, apart from particular things to which it applies, no reality; its reality is purely abstract or conceptual. This theory was enunciated by Abelard in opposition to Roscellinus (nominalist) and William of Champeaux (realist). He held that it is only by becoming a predicate that the class-notion or general term acquires reality. Thus similarity (conformitas) is observed to exist between a number of objects in respect of a particular quality or qualities. This quality becomes real as a mental concept when it is predicated of all the objects possessing it (“quod de pluribus natum est praedicariâ€). Hence Abelard’s theory is alternatively known as Sermonism (sermo, “predicateâ€). His statement of this position oscillates markedly, inclining sometimes towards the nominalist, sometimes towards the realist statement, using the arguments of the one against the other. Hence he is described by some as a realist, by others as a nominalist. When he comes to explain that objective similarity in things which is represented by the class-concept or general term, he adopts the theological Platonic view that the ideas which are the archetypes of the qualities exist in the mind of God. They are, therefore,ante rem, in reandpost rem, or, as Avicenna stated it,universalia ante multiplicitatem, in multiplicitate, post multiplicitatem. (SeeLogic,Metaphysics.)
CONCERT(through the French from Lat.con-, with, andcertare, to strive), a term meaning, in general, co-operation, agreement or union; the more specific usages being, in music, for a public performance by instrumentalists, vocalists or both combined, and in diplomacy, for an understanding or agreement for common action between two or more states, whether defined by treaty or not. The term “Concert of Europe†has been commonly applied, since the congress of Vienna (1814-1815), to the European powers consulting or acting together in questions of common interest. (SeeAllianceandEurope:History.)
CONCERTINA,orMelodion(Fr.concertina, Ger.ZiehharmonicaorBandoneon), a wind instrument of the seraphine family with free reeds, forming a link in the evolution of the harmonium from the mouth organ, intermediate links being the cheng and the accordion. The concertina consists of two hexagonal or rectangular keyboards connected by a long expansible bellows of many folds similar to that of the accordion. The keyboards are furnished with rows of knobs, which, on being pressed down by the fingers, open valves admitting the air compressed by the bellows to the free reeds, which are thus set in vibration. These free reeds consist of narrow tongues of brass riveted by one end to the inside surface of the keyboard, and having their free ends slightly bent, some outwards, some inwards, the former actuated by suction when the bellows are expanded, the latter by compression. The pitch of the note depends upon the length and thickness of the reeds, reduction of the length tending to sharpen the pitch of the note, while reduction of the thickness lowers it. The bellows being unprovided with a valve can only draw in and emit the air through the reed valves. In order to produce the sound, the concertina is held horizontally between the hands, the bellows being by turns compressed and expanded. The English concertina, invented and patented by Sir Charles Wheatstone in 1829, the year of thereputed invention of the accordion (q.v.), is constructed with a double action, the same note being produced on compressing and expanding the bellows, whereas in the German concertina or accordion two different notes are given out. Concertinas are made in complete families—treble, tenor, bass and double bass, having a combined total range of nearly seven octaves. The compass is as follows:—