With this article compare those onSolon;Boule;Areopagus;Greek Law, and, for other ancient popular assemblies,Apella;Comitia. See also A.H.J. Greenidge,Handbook of Greek Constitutional History(1896); Gilbert,Greek Constitutional Antiquities(trans. Brooks and Nicklin, 1895); Schömann,De comitiis Atheniensium; L. Schmidt, “De Atheniensis reipublicae indole democratica” inInd. Lect.(Marburg, 1865); J.W. Headlam,Election by Lot at Athens(Cambridge, 1891). See also the histories of Greece by Meyer, Busolt, Grote, Evelyn Abbott, and J.E. Sandys’ edition of theConstitution of Athens(1892); for a comparative study, E.A. Freeman,Comparative Politics.
With this article compare those onSolon;Boule;Areopagus;Greek Law, and, for other ancient popular assemblies,Apella;Comitia. See also A.H.J. Greenidge,Handbook of Greek Constitutional History(1896); Gilbert,Greek Constitutional Antiquities(trans. Brooks and Nicklin, 1895); Schömann,De comitiis Atheniensium; L. Schmidt, “De Atheniensis reipublicae indole democratica” inInd. Lect.(Marburg, 1865); J.W. Headlam,Election by Lot at Athens(Cambridge, 1891). See also the histories of Greece by Meyer, Busolt, Grote, Evelyn Abbott, and J.E. Sandys’ edition of theConstitution of Athens(1892); for a comparative study, E.A. Freeman,Comparative Politics.
(J. M. M.)
ECCLESIASTES(Heb.קהלת,Kohelet, “Koheleth”; Sept.ἐκκλησιαστής; Jeromeconcionator), one of the Wisdom Books of the Old Testament (seeWisdom Literature). The book, as it stands, is a collection of the discourses, observations and aphorisms of a sage called Koheleth, a term the precise meaning of which is not certain. The Greekecclesiastesmeans one who takes part in the deliberations of an assembly (ecclesia), a debater or speaker in an assembly (Plato,Gorgias, 452 E), and this is the general sense of the Hebrew word. Its form (singular feminine) has been supposed to be the adoption or imitation of the Arabic employment of a fem. sing. as the designation of a high official person, as is the case in the titlecaliph(whence the rendering in the margin of the Revised Version, “Great orator”); but the adoption of an Arabic idiom is not probable. This usage is not Hebrew; it is not found either in the Old Testament or in the later (Mishnaic) Hebrew. The form may have been suggested by that of the Hebrew word for “wisdom.”Koheleth, however, is employed in the book not as a title of wisdom (for “wisdom” is never the speaker), but as the independent name of the sage. It is intended to represent him as a member of an assembly (Kahal)—not the Jewish congregation, but a body of students or inquirers, such as is referred to in xii. 9-11, a sort of collegium, of which he was the head; and as instructor of this body he gives his criticism of life. The author begins, indeed, with identifying his sage with King Solomon (i. 12-ii. 11, 12b); but he soon abandons this literary device, and speaks in his own name. The rendering “preacher” has a misleading connotation.
In the book as we have it there is no orderly exposition of a theory; it rather has the appearance of a collection of remarks jotted down by a pupil (somewhat after the manner of Xenophon’sMemorabilia), or of extracts from a sage’s notebook. It is, however, characterized throughout (except in some scribal additions) by a definite thought, and pervaded by a definite tone of feeling. The keynote is given in the classic phrase with which the discussion opens and with which it closes: “Vanity of vanities (i.e.absolute vanity), all1is vanity!” Life, says the author, has nothing of permanent value to offer. His attitude is one not of bitterness but of calm hopelessness, with an occasional tinge of disgust or contempt. He fancies that he has tried or observed everything in human experience, and his deliberate conclusion is that nothing is worth doing. He believes in an all-powerful but indifferent God, and is himself an observer of society, standing aloof from its passions and ambitions, and interested only in pointing out their emptiness.
This general view is set forth in a number of particular observations.
1. His fundamental proposition is that there is a fixed, unchangeable order in the world, a reign of inflexible law (i. 4-11, iii. 1-11, 14, 15, vii. 13, viii. 5-9): natural phenomena, such as sunrise and sunset, recur regularly; for everything in human experience a time has been set; birth and death, building up and destroying, laughing and weeping, silence and speech, love and hate, war and peace, are to be regarded not as utterances of a living, self-directing world, but as incidents in the work of a vast machine that rolls on for ever; there is an endless repetition—nothing is new, nothing is lost; if one thinks he has found something new, inquiry shows that it was in existence long ago; God, the author of all, seeks out the past in order to make it once more present; it is impossible to add to or take from the content of the world, impossible to change the nature of things, to effect any radical betterment of life; the result is unspeakable weariness—a depressing series of sights and sounds. No goal or purpose is discoverable in this eternal round; if the sun rises and goes on his journey through the sky, it is merely to come back to the place where he rose; rivers flow for ever into the sea without filling it. To what end was the world created? It is impossible to say. Such is Koheleth’s view of life, and it is obvious that such a conception of an aimless cosmos is thoroughly non-Jewish, if we may judge Jewish thought by the great body of the extant literature.
2. Further, says Koheleth, man is impelled to study the world, but under the condition that he shall never comprehend it (iii. 11, vii. 23, 24, viii. 16, 17). As to the meaning of the Hebrew termolamin iii. 11, there are various opinions, but “world” appears to be the rendering favoured by the connexion: “God has made everything beautiful in its time, and has put theolaminto men’s minds, yet so that they cannot understand His work”: theolam, the sum of phenomena, is God’s work. The word is not found in this sense elsewhere in the Old Testament, but it so occurs in the Mishna (Pirke Aboth, iv. 7), and the vocabulary of Ecclesiastes is admittedly similar to that of the Mishna. Only here in the Old Testament does it stand as a simple isolated noun; elsewhere it is the definition of a noun (in “everlasting covenant,” &c.), or it is preceded by a preposition, in the phrases “for ever,” “of old,” or it stands alone (sing. or plur.) in the same adverbial sense, “for ever.” The word means first a remote point in past or future, then a future point without limit of time, then a period of history, and finally the world considered as a mass of human experiences (cf.αἰών). The renderings “eternity” and “future” in the present passage are unsatisfactory; the former has an inappropriate metaphysical connotation, and yields no distinct sense; the latter does not suit the connexion, though there is reference to the future elsewhere (ix. 1). God, the text here declares, has made the world an object of man’s thought, yet so that man can never find out the work that God has done (iii. 11). The reference seems to be not so much to the variety and complexity of phenomena as to the impossibility of construing them rationally or in such a way that man may foresee and provide for his future. Man is in the clutches of fate (ix. 11, 12): there is no observable relation between exertion and result in life: the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong;success does not attend wisdom, knowledge and skill; men are like fish taken in a net or birds caught in a snare.
3. Human life, Koheleth declares, is unsatisfying. He inquired, he says, into everything that is done by men under the sun (i. 12-16): God has inflicted on men a restless desire for movement and work2, yet life is but a catalogue of fruitless struggles. He gives a number of illustrations. In his character of king he tried all the bodily pleasures of life (ii. 1-11): he had houses, vineyards, gardens, parks, ponds, forests, servants, flocks and herds, treasures of gold and silver, singers, wives; all these he set himself to enjoy in a rational way—indeed, he found a certain pleasure in carrying out his designs, but, when all was done, he surveyed it only to see that it was weary and unprofitable. Dropping the rôle of Solomon and speaking as an observer of life, the author declares (iv. 4) that the struggle for success is the result of rivalry among men, which has no worthy outcome. The securing of riches is a fallacious achievement, for often wealth perishes by some accident (v. 13 f.), or its possessor is unable to enjoy it (vi. 1-3a), or he has no one to whom to leave it, and he cannot keep it—naked man comes into the world, naked he goes out. He does not consider the possibility of deriving enjoyment from wealth by helping the poor or encouraging learning (this latter, indeed, he looks on as vanity), and in general he recognizes no obligation on the part of a man to his fellows. A noteworthy survival of an old belief is found in vi. 3: though a man have the great good fortune to live long and to have many children, yet, if he have not proper burial the blank darkness of an untimely birth is better than he: this latter is merely the negation of existence; the former, it appears to be held, is positive misfortune, the loss of a desirable place in Sheol, though elsewhere (ix. 5) existence in Sheol is represented as the negation of real life. It is not necessary to suppose that the writer has here any particular case in mind.
If wealth be thus a vain thing, yet a sage might be supposed to find satisfaction in wisdom, that is, practical good sense and sagacity; but this also the author puts aside as bringing no lasting advantage, since a wise man must finally give up the fruit of his wisdom to someone else, who may be a fool, and in any case the final result for both fools and wise men is the same—both are forgotten (ii. 12-23). A particular instance is mentioned (ix. 13-15) of abeleagueredcity saved by a wise man; but the man happened to be poor, and no one remembered him. The whole constitution of society, in fact, seems to the sage a lamentable thing: the poor are oppressed, the earth is full of their cries, and there is no helper (iv. 1); strange social upheavals may be seen: the poor3set in high places, the rich cast down, slaves on horseback, princes on foot (x. 5-7). He permits himself a sweeping generalization (vii. 25-28): human beings as a rule are bad: one may occasionally find a good man, never a good woman—woman is a snare and a curse. He (or an editor) adds (vii. 29) that this condition of things is due to social development: man was created upright (Gen. i. 27; Enoch lxix. 11), but in the course of history has introduced corrupting complications into life.
4. The natural outcome of these experiences of the author is that he cannot recognize a moral government of the world. He finds, like Job, that there are good men who die prematurely notwithstanding their goodness, and bad men who live long notwithstanding their badness (vii. 15), though long life, it is assumed, is one of the great blessings of man’s lot; and in general there is no moral discrimination in the fortunes of men (viii. 14, ix. 2).
5. There is no sacredness or dignity in man or in human life: man has no pre-eminence over beasts, seeing that he and they have the same final fate, die and pass into the dust, and no one knows what becomes of the spirit, whether in man’s case it goes up to heaven, and in the case of beasts goes down into Sheol—death is practically the end-all; and so poor a thing is life that the dead are to be considered more fortunate than the living, and more to be envied than either class is he who never came into existence (iv. 2, 3). It is a special grievance that the wicked when they die are buried with pomp and ceremony, while men who have acted well are forgotten4in the city (viii. 10).
6. That the author does not believe in a happy or active future life appears in the passage (iv. 2, 3) quoted above. The old Hebrew view of the future excluded from Sheol the common activities of life and also the worship of the national god (Isa. xxxviii. 18); he goes even beyond this in his conception of the blankness of existence in the underworld. The living, he says, at least know that they shall die, but the dead know nothing—the memory of them, their love, hate and envy, perishes, they have no reward, no part in earthly life (ix. 5, 6); there is absolutely no knowledge and no work in Sheol (ix. 10). His conclusion is that men should do now with all their might what they have to do; the future of man’s vital part, the spirit, is wholly uncertain.
7. His conception of God is in accord with these views. God for him is the creator and ruler of the world, but hardly more; he is the master of a vast machine that grinds out human destinies without sympathy with man and without visible regard for what man deems justice—a being to be acknowledged as lord, not one to be loved. There can thus be no social contact between man and God, no communion of soul, no enthusiasm of service. Moral conduct is to be regulated not by divine law (of this nothing is said) but by human experience. The author’s theism is cold, spiritless, without influence on life.
If now the question be asked what purpose or aim a man can have, seeing that there is nothing of permanent value in human work, an answer is given which recurs, like a refrain, from the beginning to the end of the book, and appears to be from the hand of the original author: after every description of the vanity of things comes the injunction to enjoy such pleasures as may fall to one’s lot (ii. 24, 25, iii. 12, 13, 22, v. 18, 19, viii. 15, ix. 7-10, xi. 7-xii. 7). Elsewhere (ii.), it is true, it is said that there is no lasting satisfaction in pleasure; but the sage may mean to point out that, though there is no permanent outcome to life, it is the part of common-sense to enjoy what one has. The opportunity and the power to enjoy are represented as being the gift of God; but this statement is not out of accord with the author’s general position, which is distinctly theistic. All the passages just cited, except the last (xi. 7-xii. 7), are simple and plain, but the bearing of the last is obscured by interpolations. Obviously the purpose of the paragraph is to point out the wisdom of enjoying life in the time of youth while the physical powers are fresh and strong, and the impotency of old age has not yet crept in. Omitting xi. 8c, 9b, 10b, xii. 1a, the passage will read: “Life is pleasant in the bright sunshine—however long a man may live, he must be cheerful always, only remembering that dark days will come. Let the young man enjoy all the pleasures of youth, putting away everything painful, before the time comes when his bodily powers decay and he can enjoy nothing.” To relieve the apparent Epicureanism of this passage, an editor has inserted reminders of the vanity of youthful pleasures, and admonitions to remember God and His judgment. The author, however, does not recommend dissipation, and does not mean to introduce a religious motive—he offers simply a counsel of prudence. The exhortation to remember the Creator in the days of youth, though it is to be retained in the margin as a pious editorial addition, here interrupts the line of thought. In xii. 1a some critics propose to substitute for “remember thy Creator” the expression of xi. 9, “let thy heart cheer thee”; but the repetition is improbable. Others would read: “remember thy cistern” (Bickell), or “thy well” (Haupt), that is, thy wife. The wife is so called in Prov. v. 15-19 in an elaborate poetical figure (the wife as a source of bodily pleasure), in which the reference is clear from the context; but there is no authority, in the Old Testament or in other literature of this period, fortaking the term as a simple prose designation of a wife. Nor would this reference to the wife be appropriate in the connexion, since the writer’s purpose is simply to urge men to enjoy life while they can. The paragraph (and the original book) concludes with a sustained and impressive figure, in which the failing body of the old man is compared to a house falling into decay: first, the bodily organs (xii. 3, 4a): the keepers of the house (the arms and hands) tremble, the strong men (the legs and perhaps the backbone) are bent, the grinding women (the teeth) cease to work, those that look out of the windows (the eyes) are darkened, the street-doors are shut, the sound of the mill being low (apparently a summary statement of the preceding details: communication with the outer world through the senses is cut off, the performance of bodily functions being feeble); the rest of v. 4 may refer to the old man’s inability to make or hear music: in the house there is no sound of birds5or of singers, there are none of the artistic delights of a well-to-do household; further (v. 5a) the inmates of the house fear dangers from all powerful things and persons (the old man is afraid of everything), the almond tree blossoms (perhaps the hair turns white). The two next clauses are obscure.6Then comes the end: man goes to his everlasting home; the dust (the body) returns to the earth whence it came (Gen. ii. 7), and the breath of life, breathed by God into the body, returns to him who gave it. This last clause does not affirm the immortality of the soul; it is simply an explanation of what becomes of the vital principle (the “breath of life” of Gen. ii. 7); its positive assertion is not in accord with the doubt expressed in iii. 21 (“who knows whether the spirit of man goes upward?”), and it seems to be from another hand than that of the author of the original book.
There are other sayings in the book that appear to be at variance with its fundamental thought. Wisdom is praised in a number of passages (iv. 13, vii. 5, 11, 12, 19, viii. 1, ix. 16, 17, x. 2, 3), though it is elsewhere denounced as worthless. It may be said that the author, while denying that wisdom (practical sagacity and level-headedness) can give permanent satisfaction, yet admits its practical value in the conduct of life. This may be so; but it would be strange if a writer who could say, “in much wisdom is much grief,” should deliberately laud wisdom. The question is not of great importance and may be left undecided. It may be added that there are in the book a number of aphorisms about fools (v. 3[4], vii. 5, 6, x. 1-3, 12-15) quite in the style of the book of Proverbs, some of them contrasting the wise man and the fool; these appear to be the insertions of an editor. Further, it may be concluded with reasonable certainty that the passages that affirm a moral government of the world are additions by pious editors who wished to bring the book into harmony with the orthodox thought of the time. Such assertions as those of ii. 26 (God gives joy to him who pleases him,andmakes the sinner toil to lay up for the latter), viii. 12 (it shall be well with those that fear God, but not with the wicked), xii. 13 f. (man’s duty is simply to obey the commands of God, for God will bring everything into judgment) are irreconcilable with the oft-repeated statement that there is no difference in the earthly lots of the righteous and the wicked, and no ethical life after death.
Many practical admonitions and homely aphorisms are scattered through the book: iv. 5, quiet is a blessing; iv. 9-12, two are better than one; iv. 17 (Eng. v. 1), be reverent in visiting the house of God (the temple and the connected buildings)—to listen (to the service of song or the reading of Scripture) is better than to offer a foolish (thoughtless) sacrifice; v. 1 (2), be sparing of words in addressing God; v. 1-5 (2-6), pay your vows—do not say to the priest’s messenger that you made a mistake; vii. 2-4, sorrow is better than mirth; vii. 16-18, be not over-righteous (over-attentive to details of ritual and convention) or over-wicked (flagrantly neglectful of established beliefs and customs); here “righteous” and “wicked” appear to be technical terms designating two parties in the Jewish world of the 2nd and 1st centuriesB.C., the observers and the non-observers of the Jewish ritual law; these parties represent in a general way the Pharisees and the Sadducees; viii. 2-4, x. 20, it is well to obey kings and to be cautious in speaking about them, for there are talebearers everywhere; vii. 20, no man is free from sin; vii. 21, do not listen to all that you may overhear, lest you hear yourself ill spoken of; ix. 4, a living dog is better than a dead lion; xi. 1-6, show prudence and decision in business; do not set all your goods on one venture; act promptly and hope for the best. At the close of the book (xii. 9-12) there are two observations that appear to be editorial recommendations and cautions. First, Koheleth is endorsed as an industrious, discriminating and instructive writer. Possibly this is in reply to objections that had been made to what he had written. There follows an obscure passage (v.11) which seems to be meant as a commendation of the teaching of the sages in general: their words are said to be like goads (inciting to action) and like nails driven in a building (giving firmness to character); they issue from masters of assemblies,7heads of academies (but not of the Sanhedrin). The succeeding clause “they are given from one shepherd” may refer to a collection or revision by one authoritative person, but its relevancy is not obvious. The “shepherd” cannot be God (Gen. xlix. 24; Ps. xxiii. 1); the poetical use of the word would not be appropriate here. The clause is possibly a gloss, a comment on the preceding expression. A caution against certain books is added (v.12), probably works then considered harmful (perhaps philosophic treatises), of which, however, nothing further is known.
Composition of the Book.—If the analysis given above is correct, the book is not a unit; it contains passages mutually contradictory and not harmonizable. Various attempts have been made to establish its unity. The hypothesis of “two voices” is now generally abandoned; there is no indication of a debate, of affirmations and responses. A more plausible theory is that the author is an honest thinker, a keen observer and critic of life, who sees that the world is full of miseries and unsolved problems, regards as futile the attempts of his time to demonstrate an ethically active future life, and, recognizing a divine author of all, holds that the only wise course for men is to abandon the attempt to get full satisfaction out of the struggle for pleasure, riches and wisdom, and to content themselves with making the best of what they have. This conception of him is largely true, as is pointed out above, but it does not harmonize the contradictions of the book, the discrepancies between the piety of some passages and the emotional indifference toward God shown in others. Other of the Biblical Wisdom books (Job, Proverbs) are compilations—why not this? It is not necessary to multiply authors, as is done, for example, by Siegfried, who supposes four principal writers (a pessimistic philosopher, an Epicurean glossator, a sage who upholds the value of wisdom, and an orthodox editor) besides a number of annotators; it is sufficient to assume that several conservative scribes have made short additions to the original work. Nor is it worth while to attempt a logical or symmetrical arrangement of the material. It has been surmised (by Bickell) that the sheets of the original codex became disarranged and were rearranged incorrectly;8by other critics portions of the book are transferredhither and thither; in all cases the critic is guided in these changes by what he conceives to have been the original form of the book. But it is more probable that we have it in the form in which it grew up—a series of observations by the original author with interspersed editorial remarks; and it is better to preserve the existing form as giving a record of the process of growth.
Date.—As to the date of the book, though there are still differences of opinion among scholars, there is a gradual approach to a consensus. The Solomonic authorship has long since been given up: the historical setting of the work and its atmosphere—the silent assumption of monotheism and monogamy, the non-national tone, the attitude towards kings and people, the picture of a complicated social life, the strain of philosophic reflection—are wholly at variance with what is known of the 10th centuryB.C.and with the Hebrew literature down to the 5th or 4th centuryB.C.The introduction of Solomon, the ideal of wisdom, is a literary device of the later time, and probably deceived nobody. The decisive considerations for the determination of the date are the language, the historical background and the thought. The language belongs to the post-classical period of Hebrew. The numerous Aramaisms point to a time certainly not earlier than the 4th centuryB.C., and probably (though the history of the penetration of Aramaic into Hebrew speech is not definitely known) not earlier than the 3rd century. More than this, there are many resemblances between the dialect of Koheleth and that of Mishna. Not only are new words employed, and old words in new significations, but the grammatical structure has a modern stamp—some phrases have the appearance of having been translated out of Aramaic into Hebrew. By about the beginning of our era the Jews had given up Hebrew and wrote in Aramaic; the process of expulsion had been going on, doubtless, for some time; but comparison with the later extant literature (Chronicles, the HebrewEcclesiasticusorBen-Sira,Esther) makes it improbable that such Hebrew as that of Koheleth would have been written earlier than the 2nd centuryB.C.(for details see Driver’sIntroduction). The general historical situation, also, presupposed or referred to, is that of the period from the year 200B.C.to the beginning of our era; in particular, the familiar references to kings as a part of the social system, and to social dislocations (servants and princes changing places, x. 7), suggest the troublous time of the later Greek and the Maccabean rulers, of which the history of Josephus gives a good picture.
The conception of the world and of human life as controlled by natural law, a naturalistic cosmos, is alien not only to the prophetic and liturgical Hebrew literature but also to Hebrew thought in general. Whether borrowed or not, it must be late; and its resemblance to Greek ideas suggests Greek influence. The supposition of such influence is favoured by some critics (Tyler, Plumptre, Palm, Siegfried, Cheyne in hisJewish Religious Life after the Exile, and others), rejected by some (Zeller, Renan, Kleinert and others). This disagreement comes largely from the attempts made to find definitely expressed Greek philosophical dogmas in the book; such formulas it has not, but the general air of Greek reflection seems unmistakable.Thescepticism of Koheleth differs from that of Job in quality and scope: it is deliberate and calm, not wrung out by personal suffering; and it relates to the whole course and constitution of nature, not merely to the injustices of fortune. Such a conception has a Greek tinge, and would be found in Jewish circles, probably, not before the 2nd centuryB.C.
A precise indication of date has been sought in certain supposed references or allusions to historical facts. The mention of persons who do not sacrifice or take oaths (ix. 2) is held by some to point to the Essenes; if this be so, it is not chronologically precise, since we have not the means of determining the beginning of the movement of thought that issued in Essenism. So also the coincidences of thought withBen-Sira(Ecclesiasticus) are not decisive: cf. iii. 14 withB.S.xviii. 6; v. 2-6 (3-7) withB.S.xxxiv. 1-7; vii. 19 withB.S.xxxvii. 14; x. 8 withB.S.xxvii. 26a; xi. 10 withB.S.xxx. 21; xii. 10, 11 withB.S.xxxix. 2 ff., xii. 13 withB.S.xliii. 27; if there be borrowing in these passages, it is not clear on which side it lies; and it is not certain that there is borrowing—the thoughts may have been taken independently by the two authors from the same source. In any case, sinceBen-Sirabelongs to about 180B.C., the date of Koheleth, so far as these coincidences indicate it, would not be far from 200B.C.The contrast made in x. 16 f. between a king who is a boy and one who is of noble birth may allude to historical persons. The antithesis is not exact; we expect either “boy and mature man” or “low-born and high-born.” The “child” might be Antiochus V. (164B.C.), or Ptolemy V., Epiphanes (204B.C.), but the reference is too general to be decisive. The text of the obscure passage iv. 13-16 is in bad condition, and it is only by considerable changes that a clear meaning can be got from it. The two personages—the “old and foolish king” and the “poor and wise youth”—have been supposed (by Winckler) to be Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164B.C.) and Demetrius (162-150B.C.), or (by Haupt) Antiochus and the impostor Alexander Balas (150-146B.C.), or (by others) Demetrius and Alexander; in favour of Alexander as the “youth” it may be said that he was of obscure origin, was at first popular, and was later abandoned by his friends. Such identifications, however, do not fix the date of the book precisely; the author may have referred to events that happened before his time. The reign of Herod, a period of despotism and terror, and of strife between Jewish religious parties, is preferred by some scholars (Grätz, Cheyne and others) as best answering to the social situation depicted in the book, while still others (as Renan) decide for the reign of Alexander Jannaeus (104-78B.C.). The data are not numerous and distinct enough to settle the question beyond determining general limits: for reasons given above the book can hardly have been composed before about 200B.C., and if, as is probable, a Septuagint translation of it was made (though the present Septuagint text shows the influence of Aquila), it is to be put earlier than 50B.C.Probably also, its different parts are of different dates.
Of the author nothing is known beyond the obvious fact that he was a man of wide observation and philosophic thought, of the Sadducean type in religion, but non-Jewish in his attitude toward life. He was, doubtless, a man of high standing, but neither a king nor a high-priest, certainly not the apostate priest Alcimus (1 Macc. vii. ix.); nor was he necessarily a physician—there are no details in ch. xii. or elsewhere that any man of good intelligence might not know. The book is written in prose, some of which is rhythmical, with bits of verse here and there: thus i. 2-11 is balanced prose, 12-14 plain prose, 15 a couplet, i. 16-ii. 25 simple prose, vii. contains a number of poetical aphorisms, and so on. Some of the verses are apparently from the author, some from editors.
The fortunes of the book are not known in detail, but it is clear that its merciless criticism of life and its literary charm made it popular, while its scepticism excited the apprehensions of pious conservatives. Possibly theWisdom of Solomon(c.50B.C.) was written partly as a reply to it. The claim of sacredness made for it was warmly contested by some Jewish scholars. In spite of the relief afforded by orthodox additions, it was urged that its Epicurean sentiments contradicted the Torah and favoured heresy. Finally, by some process of reasoning not fully recorded, the difficulties were set aside and the book was received into the sacred canon; Jerome (on Eccl. xii. 13, 14) declares that the decisive fact was the orthodox statement at the end of the book: the one important thing is to fear God and keep His commandments. The probability is that the book had received the stamp of popular approbation before the end of the 1st century of our era, and the leading men did not dare to reject it. It is not certain that it is quoted in the New Testament, but it appears to be included in Josephus’ list of sacred books.
Literature.—For the older works see Zöckler (in Lange’sComm.); for Jewish commentaries see Zedner,Cat. of Heb. books in Libry. of Brit. Mus.(1867), and for the history of the interpretations, C.D. Ginsburg,Coheleth(1861).Introductionsof A. Kuenen, S.R. Driver, Cornhill, König. Articles in Herzog-Hauck,Realencykl.(by P. Kleinert); Hastings,Dict. Bible(by A.S. Peake); T.K. Cheyne,Encycl. Bibl.(by A.B. Davidson);Jew. Encycl.(by D.S. Margoliouth). Commentaries: F. Hitzig (1847); C.D. Ginsburg (1861); H. Grätz (1871); Tyler (1874); Delitzsch (1875); E.H. Plumptre (1881); C.H.H. Wright (1883); Nowack, revision of Hitzig (1883); Volck (in Strack u. Zöckler’sKurzgef. Komm., 1889); Wildeboer (in Marti’sKurzer Hand-Comm., 1898); C. Siegfried (in W. Nowack’sHandkomm., 1898); Oort (inDe Oude Test., 1899). Other works: C. Taylor,Dirge of Koh.(1874); Wünsche,Midrashon Koh. (in hisBiblioth. rabbin., 1880); E. Renan,L’Ecclésiaste(1882); Bickell,Der Prediger(1884) andKohel.-Untersuchungen(1886; Engl. by E.J. Dillon,Sceptics of Old Test., 1895); Schiffer,Das Buch Koh. nach d. Auffass. d. Weisen d. Talmuds, &c. (1884); A. Palm,Qoh. u. d. nach-aristotel. Philosophie(1885) andDie Qoh.-Lit.(1886); E. Pfleiderer,Die Phil. d. Heraklit, &c. (1886); Cheyne,Job and Solomon(1887) andJew. Relig. Life, &c. (1898); W. Euringer,Der Masorahtext d. Koh.(1890); W.T. Davison,Wisdom-Lit. of Old Test.(1894); H. Winckler, in hisAltorient. Forschungen(1898); J.F. Genung,Words of Koh.(Boston, Mass., 1904); P. Haupt,Ecclesiastes(Baltimore, 1905). The rabbinical discussions of the book are mentioned inShabbath, 30b;Megilla, 7a;Eduyoth, v. 3;Mishna Yadaim, iii. 5, iv. 6;Midrash Koheleth(on xi. 9),Aboth d’ Rab. Nathan, i.
Literature.—For the older works see Zöckler (in Lange’sComm.); for Jewish commentaries see Zedner,Cat. of Heb. books in Libry. of Brit. Mus.(1867), and for the history of the interpretations, C.D. Ginsburg,Coheleth(1861).Introductionsof A. Kuenen, S.R. Driver, Cornhill, König. Articles in Herzog-Hauck,Realencykl.(by P. Kleinert); Hastings,Dict. Bible(by A.S. Peake); T.K. Cheyne,Encycl. Bibl.(by A.B. Davidson);Jew. Encycl.(by D.S. Margoliouth). Commentaries: F. Hitzig (1847); C.D. Ginsburg (1861); H. Grätz (1871); Tyler (1874); Delitzsch (1875); E.H. Plumptre (1881); C.H.H. Wright (1883); Nowack, revision of Hitzig (1883); Volck (in Strack u. Zöckler’sKurzgef. Komm., 1889); Wildeboer (in Marti’sKurzer Hand-Comm., 1898); C. Siegfried (in W. Nowack’sHandkomm., 1898); Oort (inDe Oude Test., 1899). Other works: C. Taylor,Dirge of Koh.(1874); Wünsche,Midrashon Koh. (in hisBiblioth. rabbin., 1880); E. Renan,L’Ecclésiaste(1882); Bickell,Der Prediger(1884) andKohel.-Untersuchungen(1886; Engl. by E.J. Dillon,Sceptics of Old Test., 1895); Schiffer,Das Buch Koh. nach d. Auffass. d. Weisen d. Talmuds, &c. (1884); A. Palm,Qoh. u. d. nach-aristotel. Philosophie(1885) andDie Qoh.-Lit.(1886); E. Pfleiderer,Die Phil. d. Heraklit, &c. (1886); Cheyne,Job and Solomon(1887) andJew. Relig. Life, &c. (1898); W. Euringer,Der Masorahtext d. Koh.(1890); W.T. Davison,Wisdom-Lit. of Old Test.(1894); H. Winckler, in hisAltorient. Forschungen(1898); J.F. Genung,Words of Koh.(Boston, Mass., 1904); P. Haupt,Ecclesiastes(Baltimore, 1905). The rabbinical discussions of the book are mentioned inShabbath, 30b;Megilla, 7a;Eduyoth, v. 3;Mishna Yadaim, iii. 5, iv. 6;Midrash Koheleth(on xi. 9),Aboth d’ Rab. Nathan, i.
(C. H. T.*)
1The Hebrew has the definite article, “the whole,”τὸ πᾶν.2In fact, he suggests, a curse, as in Gen. iii. 17-19, though with a wider sweep than that passage has in mind.3The text has “folly,” but the parallelism and v. 7 point to social, not intellectual, conditions, and a slight change (מסכןforהסכל) gives the sense “poor.”4The Septuagint has less well: “They (the wicked) are praised in the city.”5The clause is obscure; literally “he (or, one) rises at (?) the voice of the bird,” usually understood to refer to the old man’s inability to sleep in the morning; but this is not a universal trait of old age, and besides, a reference to affairs in the house is to be expected; the Hebrew construction also is of doubtful correctness. A change of the Hebrew text seems necessary; possibly we should readישפל קול, “low is the voice,” instead ofיקום לקול“he rises up at the voice.”6The second is perhaps to be read: “the caper-berry blooms” (white hair); usually “the caper-berry loses its appetizing power”; Eng. Auth. Vers. “desire shall fail.” For the meaning of the wordabyona(“caper-berry,” not “desire” or “poverty”), see art. by G.F. Moore inJourn. of Bibl. Lit.x. 1 (Boston, Mass., 1891).7This is the Talmudic understanding of the Hebrew expression (Jerus. Sanhed. 10, 28a, cf. Sanhed. 12a; see Ecclus. xxxix. 2). There is no good authority for the renderings “collectors of maxims,” “collections of maxims.”8It is not certain that the codex form was in use in Palestine or in Egypt as early as the 2nd or the 1st centuryB.C.
1The Hebrew has the definite article, “the whole,”τὸ πᾶν.
2In fact, he suggests, a curse, as in Gen. iii. 17-19, though with a wider sweep than that passage has in mind.
3The text has “folly,” but the parallelism and v. 7 point to social, not intellectual, conditions, and a slight change (מסכןforהסכל) gives the sense “poor.”
4The Septuagint has less well: “They (the wicked) are praised in the city.”
5The clause is obscure; literally “he (or, one) rises at (?) the voice of the bird,” usually understood to refer to the old man’s inability to sleep in the morning; but this is not a universal trait of old age, and besides, a reference to affairs in the house is to be expected; the Hebrew construction also is of doubtful correctness. A change of the Hebrew text seems necessary; possibly we should readישפל קול, “low is the voice,” instead ofיקום לקול“he rises up at the voice.”
6The second is perhaps to be read: “the caper-berry blooms” (white hair); usually “the caper-berry loses its appetizing power”; Eng. Auth. Vers. “desire shall fail.” For the meaning of the wordabyona(“caper-berry,” not “desire” or “poverty”), see art. by G.F. Moore inJourn. of Bibl. Lit.x. 1 (Boston, Mass., 1891).
7This is the Talmudic understanding of the Hebrew expression (Jerus. Sanhed. 10, 28a, cf. Sanhed. 12a; see Ecclus. xxxix. 2). There is no good authority for the renderings “collectors of maxims,” “collections of maxims.”
8It is not certain that the codex form was in use in Palestine or in Egypt as early as the 2nd or the 1st centuryB.C.
ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS,in England, a body corporate, whose full title is “Ecclesiastical and Church Estates Commissioners for England,” invested with very important powers, under the operation of which extensive changes have been made in the distribution of the revenues of the Established Church. Their appointment was one of the results of the vigorous movements for the reform of public institutions which followed the Reform Act of 1832. In 1835 two commissions were appointed “to consider the state of the several dioceses of England and Wales, with reference to the amount of their revenues and the more equal distribution of episcopal duties, and the prevention of the necessity of attaching by commendam to bishoprics certain benefices with cure of souls; and to consider also the state of the several cathedral and collegiate churches in England and Wales, with a view to the suggestion of such measures as might render them conducive to the efficiency of the established church, and to provide for the best mode of providing for the cure of souls, with special reference to the residence of the clergy on their respective benefices.” And it was enacted by an act of 1835 that during the existence of the commission the profits of dignities and benefices without cure of souls becoming vacant should be paid over to the treasurer of Queen Anne’s Bounty. In consequence of the recommendation of these commissioners, a permanent commission was appointed by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners Act 1836 for the purpose of preparing and laying before the king in council such schemes as should appear to them to be best adapted for carrying into effect the alterations suggested in the report of the original commission and recited in the act. The new commission was constituted a corporation with power to purchase and hold lands for the purposes of the act, notwithstanding the statutes of mortmain. The first members of the commission were the two archbishops and three bishops, the lord chancellor and the principal officers of state, and three laymen named in the act.
The constitution of the commission was amended by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners Act 1840 and subsequent acts, and now consists of the two archbishops, all the bishops, the deans of Canterbury, St Paul’s and Westminster, the lord chancellor, the lord president of the council, the first lord of the treasury, the chancellor of the exchequer, the home secretary, the lord chief justice, the master of the rolls, two judges of the admiralty division, and certain laymen appointed by the crown and by the archbishop of Canterbury. The lay commissioners are required to be “members of the Church of England, and to subscribe a declaration to that effect.” The crown also appoints two laymen as church estates commissioners, and the archbishop of Canterbury one. These three are the joint treasurers of the commission, and constitute, along with two members appointed by the commission, the church estates committee, charged with all business relating to the sale, purchase, exchange, letting or management of any lands, tithes or hereditaments. The commission has power to make inquiries and examine witnesses on oath. Five commissioners are a quorum for the transaction of business, provided two of them are church estates commissioners; two ecclesiastical commissioners at least must be present at any proceeding under the common seal, and if only two are present they can demand its postponement to a subsequent meeting. The schemes of the commission having, after due notice to persons affected thereby, been laid before the king in council, may be ratified by orders, specifying the times when they shall take effect, and such orders when published in theLondon Gazettehave the same force and effect as acts of parliament.
The recommendations of the commission recited in the act of 1836 are too numerous to be given here. They include an extensive rearrangement of the dioceses, equalization of episcopal income, providing residences, &c. By the act of 1840 the fourth report of the original commissioners, dealing chiefly with cathedral and collegiate churches, was carried into effect, a large number of canonries being suspended, and sinecure benefices and dignities suppressed.The emoluments of these suppressed or suspended offices, and the surplus income of the episcopal sees, constitute the fund at the disposal of the commissioners. By an act of 1860, on the avoidance of any bishopric or archbishopric, all the land and emoluments of the see, except the patronage and lands attached to houses of residence, become, by order in council, vested in the commissioners, who may, however, reassign to the see so much of the land as may be sufficient to secure the net annual income named for it by statute or order. All the profits and emoluments of the suspended canonries, &c., pass over to the commissioners, as well as the separate estates of those deaneries and canonries which are not suspended. Out of this fund the expenses of the commission are to be paid, and the residue is to be devoted to increasing the efficiency of the church by the augmentation of the smaller bishoprics and of poor livings, the endowment of new churches, and employment of additional ministers.The substitution of one central corporation for the many local and independent corporations of the church, so far at least as the management of property is concerned, was a constitutional change of great importance, and the effect of it undoubtedly was to correct the anomalous distribution of ecclesiastical revenues by equalizing incomes and abolishing sinecures. At the same time it was regarded as having made a serious breach in the legal theory of ecclesiastical property. “The important principle,” says Cripps, “on which the inviolability of the church establishment depends, that the church generally possesses no property as a corporation, or which is applicable to general purposes, but that such particular ecclesiastical corporation, whether aggregate or sole, has its property separate, distinct and inalienable, according to the intention of the original endowment, was given up without an effort to defend it” (Law Relating to the Church and Clergy, p. 46).
The recommendations of the commission recited in the act of 1836 are too numerous to be given here. They include an extensive rearrangement of the dioceses, equalization of episcopal income, providing residences, &c. By the act of 1840 the fourth report of the original commissioners, dealing chiefly with cathedral and collegiate churches, was carried into effect, a large number of canonries being suspended, and sinecure benefices and dignities suppressed.
The emoluments of these suppressed or suspended offices, and the surplus income of the episcopal sees, constitute the fund at the disposal of the commissioners. By an act of 1860, on the avoidance of any bishopric or archbishopric, all the land and emoluments of the see, except the patronage and lands attached to houses of residence, become, by order in council, vested in the commissioners, who may, however, reassign to the see so much of the land as may be sufficient to secure the net annual income named for it by statute or order. All the profits and emoluments of the suspended canonries, &c., pass over to the commissioners, as well as the separate estates of those deaneries and canonries which are not suspended. Out of this fund the expenses of the commission are to be paid, and the residue is to be devoted to increasing the efficiency of the church by the augmentation of the smaller bishoprics and of poor livings, the endowment of new churches, and employment of additional ministers.
The substitution of one central corporation for the many local and independent corporations of the church, so far at least as the management of property is concerned, was a constitutional change of great importance, and the effect of it undoubtedly was to correct the anomalous distribution of ecclesiastical revenues by equalizing incomes and abolishing sinecures. At the same time it was regarded as having made a serious breach in the legal theory of ecclesiastical property. “The important principle,” says Cripps, “on which the inviolability of the church establishment depends, that the church generally possesses no property as a corporation, or which is applicable to general purposes, but that such particular ecclesiastical corporation, whether aggregate or sole, has its property separate, distinct and inalienable, according to the intention of the original endowment, was given up without an effort to defend it” (Law Relating to the Church and Clergy, p. 46).
ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION.This phrase in its primary sense imports not jurisdiction over ecclesiastics, but jurisdiction exercised by ecclesiastics over other ecclesiastics and over the laity. “Jurisdiction” is a word borrowed from the jurists which has acquired a wide extension in theology, wherein, for example, it is frequently used in contradistinction to “order,” to express the right to administer sacraments as something superadded to thepowerto celebrate them. So it is used to express the territorial or other limits of ecclesiastical, executive or legislative authority. Here it is used, in the limited sense defined by an American Court, as “the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide causes.”
Such authority in the minds of lay Roman lawyers who first used this word “jurisdiction” was essentially temporal in its origin and in its sphere. The Christian Church transferred the notion to the spiritual domain as part ofOrigin of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.the general idea of a Kingdom of God correlative, on the spiritual side of man upon earth, to the powers, also ordained of God, who had dominion over his temporal estate (seeCanon Law). As the Church in the earliest ages had executive and legislative power in its own spiritual sphere, so also it had “judicial officers,” “taking cognizance of and deciding causes.” Only before its union with the State, its power in this direction, as in others, was merely over the spirits of men. Coercive temporal authority over their bodies or estates could only be given by concession from the temporal prince. Moreover, even spiritual authority over members of the Church,i.e.baptized persons, could not be exclusively claimed asof rightby the Church tribunals, if the subject matter of the cause were purely temporal. On the other hand, it is clear thatallthe faithful were subject to these courts (when acting within their own sphere), and that, in the earliest times, no distinction was made in this respect between clergy and laity.
The fundamental principle of ecclesiastical jurisdiction with its“sanction” of excommunication will be found in Christ’s words in Matt. xviii. 15-18. A very early example of criminal spiritual jurisdiction exercised by St Paul is found in the case of the incestuous Corinthian (1 Cor. v.). We find later the same apostle exercising like jurisdiction in the cause of Hymenaeus and Alexander (1 Tim. i. 20). After the time of the Apostles, we find this criminal jurisdiction exercised by the bishops individually over their respective “subjects”—doubtless with the advice of their presbyters according to the precept of St Ignatius (c.110). As neighbouring dioceses coalesced into “provinces” and provinces into larger districts (corresponding to the civil “dioceses” of the later Roman Empire), the provincial synods of bishops and the synods of the larger districts acquired a criminal jurisdiction, still purely spiritual, of their own. At first this was “original” and mainly (although not exclusively) over bishops (of the province or larger district). The beginnings of an appellate jurisdiction in the cases of clerics and laymen may be traced before the conversion of the Empire. The bishop over whom the synod of neighbouring bishops had exercised jurisdiction had no formal right of appeal; but sometimes bishops in other parts of the Church would refuse to acknowledge the local synodical sentence and would communicate with a bishop whom they deemed unjustly deposed. The theory, as expressed in legal phrase by St Cyprian in the 3rd century, was that the apostolic power of delegated sovereignty from the Lord, alike legislative and judicial, was held in joint-tenancy by the whole body of Catholic bishops. In both capacities, however, a certain undefined pre-eminence was conceded to the occupants of “Apostolic” sees,i.e.sees traditionally founded by Apostles, or of sees with a special secular position.
Even before the edict of Milan, at least as early as the latter half of the 3rd century, the spiritual sentences of deposition from office had sometimes indirect temporal consequences recognized by the secular courts. The classical example is the case of Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch. It would seem that, in the intervals of persecution, some rights of property were recognized in the Christian Church and its officers; although the Church was an illegal society. After some previous abortive trials, Paul of Samosata was deposed and excommunicated, in 269, by a great synod of the Antiochene district. Paul, notwithstanding his deposition, kept possession of the episcopal residence. The local church sought recovery of it before the tribunals of the Empire. The judicial authorities requested a rescript from the emperor Aurelian for the decision of the cause. Aurelian referred the matter to the bishop of Rome and the bishops of Italy, who gave their award in favour of the Antiochene Church.
Side by side with this which we may call criminal jurisdiction—none the less real or coercive because its sanctions were purely spiritual—there grew up a quasi-jurisdiction in causes entirely temporal, based upon the free consent of theTemporal Jurisdiction of the Church.parties to accept the arbitration of the bishop. This system had also its roots in the New Testament (see Matt, xviii. 15-17 and 1 Cor. vi. 1-8). In the matter of criminal jurisdiction we paused for a moment at the edict of Milan; but we may at once trace this second or civil branch of episcopal judicature or quasi-judicature down as far as the reign of Charlemagne, when it underwent a fundamental change, and became, ifeitherlitigant once chose, no longer a matter of consent but of right.
Constantine decreed that judgment in causes might be passed by bishops when litigants preferred their adjudication to that of the secular courts (see his epistle to the Numidian bishops andCod. Theodos. Tit. de Episcopis). The episcopal judgment was to be equivalent to that of the emperor and irreversible, and the civil authorities were to see to its execution. Saints Ambrose and Augustine both spent days in deciding temporal causes. Honorius, in the West, at the end of the 4th century, made a constitution providing that if any desired to litigate before the bishops they should not be forbidden, but that in civil matters the prelates should render judgment in the manner of arbitrators by consent (Cod.1,Tit.iv.). Where the faithful had had recourse to the bishop, no appeal was to be allowed, and the judges were to command execution of the episcopal decree. A quarter of a century later, however, Valentinian III. in the West expressly provided that bishops were not to be permitted to be judges (that is, of course, in temporal causes), save by the consent of the parties. This legislation was, substantially, adopted by Justinian.
On the revival of the Western Empire, however, Charlemagne, in the beginning of the 9th century, under the mistaken belief that he was following the authority of Constantine I. and Theodosius I., took a great step forward, by which the bishop ceased to be a mere legally indicated arbitrator by consent in secular causes, and became a real judge. By a capitulary he provided that either litigant, without the consent of the other party, and not only at the beginning of a suit but at any time during its continuance, might take the cause from lay cognizance and transfer it to the bishop’s tribunal. He re-enacted the prohibition of appeal.
It should be remembered that, from the latter part of the 3rd century, the leading bishops had generally been trained in secular learning. St Cyprian, St Ambrose and St Augustine, St Paulinus of Nola and St John Chrysostom had practised law as teachers or advocates. St Ambrose and St Paulinus had even held high administrative and judicial offices.
To return to the evolution of ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the time of Constantine. With the “Nicene period” came a great development on the criminal side. A system begins to be formed, and the secular arm supportsRoman empire from Constantine.the decrees of the Church. The first trace of system is in the limited right of appeal given by the first oecumenical council of Nicaea and its provision that episcopal sentences or those of provincial synods on appeal were to be recognized throughout the world. The fifth canon provides that those, whether clerics or laymen, who are cut off from communion in any particular province are not to be admitted thereto elsewhere. Still examination must be had whether persons have been expelled from the congregation by any episcopal small-mindedness (μικροψυχία), or contentious spirit, or such-like harshness (ἀηδία). That this may be conveniently inquired into, synods are to be held, three in every year, in each province, and questions of this kind examined. There is to be no “stay of execution”; the episcopal sentence is to prevail until the provincial synod otherwise decide. It will be noticed that as yet no provision is made for appeals bybishopsfrom provincial synods sitting in first instance.
The edicts of Milan had only admitted the Christian Church among the number of lawful religions; but the tendency (except in the time of Julian) was towards making it the only lawful religion. Hence the practice, immediately after Nicaea I., of superadding banishment by the emperor to synodical condemnation. The dogmatic decrees of Nicaea I. were at once enforced in this temporal manner. On the other hand, the Arian reaction at court worked its objects (see Pusey,Councils of the Church) by using the criminal spiritual jurisdiction of synods against the Catholics—often packing the synods for the purpose. The acts of councils of this age are full of the trials of bishops not only for heresy but for immorality and common law crimes. The accusations are frequently unfounded; but the trials are already conducted in a certain regular forensic form. The secular authorities follow the precedent of Nicaea I. and intervene to supplement the spiritual sentence by administrative penalties. Sometimes an imperial officer of high rank (as,e.g.a “count”) is present at the synod, as an assessor to maintain order and advise upon points of procedure. Leading examples may be found in the various prosecutions of St Athanasius, in whose case also there is the germ of an appeal,tanquam ab abusu. It has been contended that, according to later and more formulated jurisprudence, such an appeal would have lain, since the trial at Tyre was not concerned with purely spiritual matters (see the case in Hefele,Councils, in loc.).
The trial of St Athanasius led to extensions of the right of appeal. This was favoured by the development of the greater sees into positions of great administrative dignity, shortly to be called “patriarchal.” A synod was held at Rome, attendedby bishops from various regions, which reversed the original judgment of the synod of Tyre which had condemned Athanasius. A much larger synod at Antioch, gathered only from the East, on the other hand, confirmed that judgment. This last synod did something to systematize the criminal procedure of the Church, and its legislation has been always received.
This legislation marks another step forward. Deposition of a bishop by a synod, or of a priest or deacon by his bishop, is to take effect even pending an appeal, and a cleric continuing his functions after sentence in first instance is to lose all right of appeal. The appeal given by Nicaea I. to clerics and laymen from episcopal excommunications is extended. The synod may restore them if convinced of the justice of their cause (and not merely in cases ofἀηδία). A bishop may appeal to a great assembly of bishops. Any bishop, priest or deacon “importuning” the emperor, instead of exerting his right of appeal to synods, is to lose all right of appeal and never to be restored or pardoned. If a provincial synod be divided as to the guilt of a bishop, the metropolitan is to convene bishops from the neighbouring provinces to decide the cause jointly with the bishops of the original province.
A few years later, in 347, the council of Sardica, a council of practically the whole West save Africa, reversed Tyre and acquitted St Athanasius after a full judicial inquiry. This council endeavoured to set up a system of appeals in the case of bishops, in which the see of Rome was made to play a great part. “Out of honour to the memory of St Peter,” a condemned bishop may ask the intervention of Rome. If this be done, the synod of first instance is to send letters to Julius, bishop of Rome. If that prelate think the cause should be heard again, he is to appoint judges; if otherwise, the original judgment is to be confirmed. Pending appeal, the appellant’s see is not to be filled up. The judges appointed by the bishop of Rome to hear the appeal are to be from the neighbouring provinces. The appellant may, however, request that bishop to send priests from his side to sit with the synod of appeal. If such priests are sent, they are to preside in the court of appeal. These canons were always repudiated in the East, and when, sixty years afterwards, they were, for the first time, heard of in Africa, they were repudiated there also.
A rescript of Gratian in 378 empowered the bishop of Rome to judge bishops with the assistance of six or seven other bishops or, in the case of a metropolitan, of fifteen comprovincial bishops. A bishop refusing to come to Rome was to be brought there by the civil power. The rescript, however, was not incorporated in the Codes and perhaps was only a temporary measure.
The tendency to give pre-eminence to Rome appears again in an imperial letter to St Flavian, who, in the judgment of the East, was bishop of Antioch, but who was rejected by the West and Egypt, summoning him to Rome to be there judged by the bishops of the imperial city—a summons which St Flavian did not obey (Tillemont,Mém. Ecc.). In Africa in the beginning of the 5th century Apiarius, a priest who had been deposed by the bishop of Sicca for immorality, and whose deposition had been affirmed by the “provincial synod,” instead of further appealing to a general synod of Africa, carried his appeal to Pope Zosimus. The pope received the appeal, absolved him and restored him to the rank of priest, and sent a bishop and two priests as legates to Africa with instructions to them to hear the cause of Apiarius anew and for execution of their sentence to crave the prefect’s aid; moreover, they were to summon the bishop of Sicca to Rome and to excommunicate him, unless he should amend those things which the legates deemed wrong. The upshot of a long conflict was that the papal claim to entertain appeals from Africa by priests and deacons was rejected by the African bishops, who in their final synodical epistle also repudiate in terms any right of appeal by Africanbishopsto “parts beyond the seas” (see Hefele,Councils, bk. viii.).
The story of the administrative development of the Church in the 5th century is mainly the story of the final emergence and constitution of the great “patriarchates,” as authorities superior to metropolitans and provincial synods. In consequence of the occupants of the thrones of Constantinople and Alexandria falling successively into opposite heresies, the question arose how “patriarchs” were to be judged. In both cases, as it seems, an attempt was made by the bishop of Rome to depose the erring patriarch by his authority as primate of Christendom, acting in concert with a Western synod. In both cases, apparently, an oecumenical synod ignored the Roman deposition and judged the alleged offences of the respective patriarchs in first and last instance. The third and fourth oecumenical synods (Ephesus, 431; Chalcedon, 451) were primarily tribunals for the trials of Nestorius and Dioscorus; it was secondarily that they became organs of the universal episcopate for the definition of the faith, or legislative assemblies for the enactment of canons. Nothing is more remarkable than their minute care as to observance of rules of procedure. In both cases, imperial assessors were appointed. At Ephesus the Count Candidian was commissioned to maintain order, but took little part in the proceedings. At Chalcedon, on the other hand, the imperial commissioners decided points of order, kept the synod to the question, took the votes and adjourned the court. But the synod alone judged and pronounced sentence. No oecumenical synod has tried a patriarch of Old Rome while yet in the flesh. The fifth oecumenical council came nearest to so doing, in the case of Vigilius. That pope, although in Constantinople, refused to attend the sittings of the council. He was cited three times, in the canonical manner, and upon not appearing was threatened in the third session with anathema (Hefele,Councils, sect. 268ad fin.). He was not, however, charged with direct heresy, as were Nestorius and Dioscorus, and the synod seems to have hesitated to deal stringently with the primate of Christendom. In the seventh session it accepted the suggestion of Justinian, merely to order the name of Vigilius to be removed from the liturgical prayers, at the same time expressing its desire to maintain unity with the see of Old Rome (Hefele, sect. 273). After the council, Justinian banished the pope to Egypt, and afterwards to an island, until he accepted the council, which he ultimately did (ib.276). The sixth oecumenical synod decreed that the dead pope Honorius should be “cast out from the holy Catholic Church of God” and anathematized, a sentence approved by the reigning pope Leo II. and affirmed by the seventh oecumenical synod in 787.
The constitution of the patriarchal system resulted in the recognition of a certain right of appeal to Rome from the larger part of the West. Britain remained outside that jurisdiction, the Celtic churches of the British islands, after those islands were abandoned by the Empire, pursuing a course of their own. In the East, Constantinople, from its principality, acquired special administrative pre-eminence, naturally followed, as in the case of “old Rome,” by judicial pre-eminence. An example of this is found in the ninth canon of Chalcedon, which also illustrates the enforcement upon a clerical plaintiff in dispute with a brother cleric of that recourse to the arbitration of their ecclesiastical superior already mentioned. The canon provides that any clerk having a complaint against another clerk must not pass by his own bishop and turn to secular tribunals, but first lay bare his cause before him, so that by the sentence of the bishop himself the dispute may be settled by arbitrators acceptable to both parties. Any one acting against these provisions shall be subject to canonical penalties. If any clerk have a complaint against his own bishop, he shall have his cause adjudicated upon by the synod of the province. But if a bishop or clerk have a difference with the metropolitan of his province let him bring it before the exarch of the “diocese” (i.e.the larger district answering to the civil “diocese”), or before the royal see of Constantinople, who shall do justice upon it. An “exarch” means properly a superior metropolitan having several provinces under him. In the next century Justinian (Nov.123, c. 22) put the other patriarchates on the same footing as Constantinople. In c. 21 he gives either plaintiff or defendant an appeal within ten days to the secular judge of the locality from the bishop’s judgment. If there be no appeal, that judge is to give execution to the episcopal award. The growth of a special “original” jurisdiction at Constantinople, which perhapsdeveloped earlier than the corresponding institution at Rome, may be traced to the fact that bishops from all parts were constantly in Constantinople. The bishop of Constantinople, even before he became properly “patriarch,” would often assemble a synod from these visiting bishops, which acquired the technical name ofσύνοδος ἐνδημοῦσα, the synod of sojourners. This synod frequently decided questions belonging to other patriarchates.
The criminal jurisdiction thus exercised was generally speaking unlimited. It must be remembered that theforum externumof the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in the sense in which we now use the phrase, of a judge deciding causes, was not then clearly marked off from theforum internum, or what afterwards came to be called the “tribunal of penance” (see Van Espen,Jus ecc. univ.pars iii. tit. iv. c. 1). Ecclesiastical proceedings by way of prosecution are called “criminal,” but they are primarilypro salute animae; whereas temporal criminal proceedings are primarily for the protection of the state and its citizens. Hence a Christian might be first punished in the civil courts and then put to public penance by the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, or vice versa: an apparently double system of punishment which the medieval Church, when theforum externumhad become quite separated from theforum internum, sometimes repudiated (see Maitland,English Canon Law, 138, 139, 144).
Theodosius began the system of giving secular authority to Church tribunals. Thus, in 376, L. 23Cod. Theodos. de. Episcopis, &c., subjected clerics for small offences pertaining to the observances of religion to bishops and synods. In 399, L. 1Cod. de Religioneprovides that, when it is a matter of religion, it beseems the bishop to judge. A rescript of Constantius, in 355, inserted inCod. Theod.lxii.de Epis. Ecc. et Cler., excluded bishops from accusations before secular judges and commanded such accusations to be speedily brought before the tribunal of other bishops. This law was probably only intended to be of a temporary character. Then comes the law of Gratian already noticed. Then, in 399, a law of Honorius (Cod. Theod.L. 1de Religione): “As often as it concerns religion, it is meet that the bishops should judge, but other causes which belong to ordinary jurisdiction or to public law are to be heard in the ordinary courts (legibus oportet audiri).” L. 3de Epis. Jud., at the end of the Theodosian Code, seems spurious (see the comment of Gothofredus in loco). But a constitution of Honorius in 412 (Cod. Theod.L. xli.de Epis. Ecc. et Cler.) provides that clerks are not to be accused except before the bishop. Bishops, priests, deacons, and every other “minister of the Christian law” of inferior degree, are taken from secular jurisdiction in criminal cases. The words are quite general; but it has been contended that they apply only to crimes of an ecclesiastical character (see Gothofredus in loc.; Van Espen, pars iii. tit. iii. c. 1, 10). In 425 a constitution of Theodosius II. provides that a recent decree of the usurper John should be disregarded and that clerks whom he had brought before secular judges should be reserved for the episcopal jurisdictions, “since it is not lawful to subject the ministers of the divine office to the arbitrament of temporal powers.” Justinian has a clearer perception of the demarcation between the spheres of spiritual and temporal law. The 83rd Novell provides that if the offence be ecclesiastical, needing ecclesiastical correction, the bishop shall take cognizance of it. The 123rd Novell (c.21) provides that if a clerk be accused of a secular crime he shall be accused before his bishop, who may depose him from his office and order, and then the competent judge may take him and deal with him according to the laws. If the prosecutor have first brought him before the civil judge, the evidence is to be sent to the bishop, and the latter, if he thinks the crime has been committed, may deprive him of his office and order, and the judge shall apply to him the proper legal punishment. But if the bishop think the evidence insufficient, the affair shall be referred to the emperor, by way of appeal both from bishop and judge. If the cause be ecclesiastical, the civil judges are to take no part in the inquiry. The law includes with clerics, monks, deaconesses, nuns, ascetics; and the word “clerics” covered persons in minor orders, down to doorkeepers. It will be noticed that Justinian supposes that the prosecutor may begin the proceedings before the civil judge. A constitution of Alexius Comnenus I. seems to send him to the special forum of the accused.
Certain enactments of later Saxon times in England have been sometimes spoken of as though they united together the temporal and spiritual jurisdictions into one mixed tribunal deriving its authority from the State. In the latterAnglo-Saxon courts.part of the 10th century, laws of Edgar provided that the bishop should be at the county court and also the alderman, and that there each of them should put in use both God’s laws and the world’s law (Johnson’sEnglish Canons, i. 411). This probably was, as Johnson suggests, that the bishop might enforce secular laws by ecclesiastical censure and the alderman ecclesiastical laws with secular punishment. But the two jurisdictions were kept separate; for by another law of Edgar (Leges Edg.c. v.) it was provided that “in the most august assembly the bishop and alderman should be present, and the one should interpret to the people the law of God, the other the laws of men.” Edgar, in a speech to St Dunstan and the bishops in synod (in 969), said, “I hold in my hands the sword of Constantine, you that of Peter. Let us join right hands and unite sword to sword” (Hardouin,Conc.tom. vi. p. 1, col. 675). The juxtaposition of the judicatures may, however, have led to some confusion between them.
As to appeals the mixed council of Cliff at Hoo (747) said they should go to the synod of the province. The only appeal to Rome in Saxon times was that of St Wilfrid, bishop of York, who appealed from the division of his see and his deposition for refusing to consent to it, and was heard in a Roman synod under the presidency of Pope Agatho. The synod found him unlawfully deposed and ordered his restoration. Upon his return to England, the Roman judgment was refused recognition and he was for a time imprisoned. Ten years later he was recalled to York, but refusing to consent to the division of his see was again deposed and again appealed to Rome. The appeal was heard at great length, in a synod of 703 under John VI., deputies from the archbishop of Canterbury being present. St Wilfrid was justified and was sent back to his see, with papal letters to the kings of Northumbria and Mercia. The Roman decree was again disregarded. At the council of “Nid” he was reconciled to the other bishops of the province, but not restored. In the end he was brought back to York, but not to the undivided see. The details of the case will be found in Wilkins,Concilia, in Mansi,Concilia, under the various councils named, and in Haddan & Stubbs,Councils and Eccl. Documents, vol. iii.
The penalties which the spiritual court could inflict, in the period between the edict of Milan and c. 854, were properly excommunication whether generally or as exclusion from the sacraments for a term of months or years orPenalties inflicted by ecclesiastical courts.till the day of death and (in the case of clerics) suspension or deposition. Gradually, however, doubtless by way of commutation of excommunication and of penance, temporal penalties were added, as scourging, banishment, seclusion in a monastery, fines. It is difficult to say how far some of these temporal penalties were penitential only or how far they could be inflictedin invitos. But the secular arm, from the time of Nicaea I., was in the habit of aiding spiritual decrees, as by banishing deposed bishops, and gradually by other ways, even with laymen. Scourging (although it had been a well-known punishment of the synagogue) was at first forbidden. Can. 28 (26) of the Apostolic Canons imposes deposition on any bishop, priest or deacon striking the delinquent faithful. In Africa, however, a contrary practice early sprang up (see St Augustine,Epist.clix.ad Marcellum al.cxxxiii.). The small council of Vannes in Brittany in 465 made it an alternative punishment for clerks convicted of drunkenness (Can. 13). Canon 13 of the first council of Orleans, which has been cited in this matter, seems to have no application. St Gregory the Great seems to assume that scourging and seclusion in a monastery are in the discretion of episcopal tribunals (seeEpistles, lib. ii. ep. 11, 40, 42, 44, 45; lib. vii. ep. 11, 67; lib. xii. ep. 31, c. 4). The 16th council of Toledo(in 693) has been cited as if it visited certain very great sinners with scourging as an ecclesiastical punishment. In fact, it only approves the punishment as ordered by the Visigothic laws. An alleged decree of a council of Autun in 670 is part of a code of discipline for monasteries (see authorities cited by Hefele,Councils, sect. 290, towards the end). Banishment does not seem to have been inflicted by the spiritual courtin invitum. Seclusion in a monastery seems first to have been used by the civil power in aid of the spiritual. The fifth canon of the council of Macon, in 584, forbids clergy to dress like laymen and imposes a penalty of thirty days’ imprisonment on bread and water; but this may be merely penitential. There is little evidence of the imposition of fines as ecclesiastical penalties; but there are references to the practice in the epistles of St Gregory the Great, notably in his instructions to St Augustine. Gregory III. copies from St Gregory I. Probably these also were by way of penance. Isolated examples in the early middle ages of metropolitans dealing with their suffragan bishops by imprisonment in chains were extra-canonical abuses, connected with the perversion of Church law which treated the metropolitan (who originally was merely convener of the provincial synod and its representative during the intervals of sessions) as the feudal “lord” of his comprovincials.
With the later 9th century we enter upon a new epoch, and by the time of Gregory VII., in the 11th century, the tribunals have fallen into the hands of a regular class of canonists who are in fact professional church-lawyers in orders. The changes due to the adoption of the False Decretals by Nicholas I. and the application of their principles by Hildebrand (afterwards Gregory VII.) are discussed in the articleCanon Law. The later medieval system, thus inaugurated, may be considered (1) in its hierarchy, (2) in the subject matter of its jurisdiction, (3) in its penalties.
1. (a) It is a system of courts. Much that had been done by bishops,sine strepitu forensi et figura judicii, is now done in the course of regular judicial procedure. Again, the court takes the place of the synod. The diocesan synodLater medieval system.ceases to have judicial work. The court of the metropolitan takes the place of the provincial synod, except possibly for the trial of bishops, and even this becomes doubtful.