Chapter 11

(a) loss of weight after boiling the raw fibre with a 1% caustic soda solution for five minutes;(b) loss after boiling for one hour.

(a) loss of weight after boiling the raw fibre with a 1% caustic soda solution for five minutes;

(b) loss after boiling for one hour.

4. Determination of cellulose: the white residue after

(a) boiling for five minutes with 1% caustic soda,(b) exposure to chlorine gas for one hour,(c) boiling with basic sodium sulphite solution.

(a) boiling for five minutes with 1% caustic soda,

(b) exposure to chlorine gas for one hour,

5. Mercerizing: the loss of weight after digestion with a 20% solution of sodium hydrate for one hour in the cold.

6. Nitration: the weight of the product obtained after digestion with a mixture of equal volumes of sulphuric and nitric acids for one hour in the cold.

7. Acid purification: treatment of the raw fibre with 20% acetic acid for one minute, the product being washed with water and alcohol, and then dried.

8. Determination of the total carbon by combustion.

II.Papermaking.â€”The papermaking industry (seePaper) employs as raw materials a large proportion of the vegetable fibre products already enumerated, and, for the reasons incidentally mentioned, they may be, and are, employed in a large variety of forms: in fact any fibrous material containing over 30% â€œcelluloseâ€ and yielding ultimate fibres of a length exceeding 1 mm. can be used in this industry. Most important staples are cotton and flax; these are known to the paper-maker as â€œragâ€ fibres, rags,i.e.cuttings of textile fabrics, new and old, being their main source of supply. These are used for writing and drawing papers. In the class of â€œprintingsâ€ two of the most important staples are wood pulp, prepared by chemical treatment from both pine and foliage woods, and in England esparto cellulose, the cellulose obtained from esparto grass by alkali treatment; the cereal straws are also used and are resolved into cellulose by alkaline boiling followed by bleaching. In the class of â€œwrappingsâ€ and miscellaneous papers a large number of other materials find use, such as various residues of manufacturing and preparing processes, scutching wastes, ends of rovings and yarns, flax, hemp and manila rope waste, adansonia bast, and jute wastes, raw (cuttings) and manufactured (bagging). Other materials have been experimentally tried, and would no doubt come into use on their papermaking merits, but as a matter of fact the actually suitable raw materials are comprised in the list above enumerated, and are limited in number, through the influence of a number of factors of value or utility.

III.Brush Fibres, &c.â€”In addition to the textile industries there are manufactures which utilize fibres of both animal and vegetable character. The most important of these is brush-making. The familiar brushes of everyday use are extremely diversified in form and texture. The supplies of animal fibres are mainly drawn from the badger, hog, bear, sable, squirrel and horse. These fibres and bristles cover a large range of effects. Brushes required for cleansing purposes are composed of fibres of a more or less hard and resilient character, such as horse hairs, and other tail hairs and bristles. For painting work brushes of soft quality are employed, graduating for fine work into the extreme softness of the â€œcamel hairâ€ pencil. Of vegetable fibres the following are used in this industry. TheCaryota urensfurnishes the Kittul fibre, obtained from the base of the leaf stalks. Piassava is obtained from theAttalea funifera, also from theLeopoldina piassaba(Brazil). Palmyra fibre is obtained from theBorassus flabellifer. These are all members of the natural order of the Palmaceae. Mexican fibre, or Istle, is obtained from the agave. The fibre known as Whisk, largelyused for dusting brushes, is obtained from various species of the Gramineae; the â€œMexican Whiskâ€ fromEpicampeas macroura; and â€œItalian Whiskâ€ fromAndropogon. Thecoirfibre mentioned above in connexion with coarse textiles is also extensively used in brush-making. Aloe and Agave fibres in their softer forms are also used forplasterersâ€™brushes. Many of the whitewashes and cleansing solutions used in house decoration are alkaline in character, and for such uses advantage is taken of the specially resistant character of the cellulose group of materials.

Stuffing and Upholstery.â€”Another important use for fibrous materials is for filling or stuffing in connexion with the seats and cushions in upholstery. In the large range of effects required, a corresponding number and variety of products find employment. One of the most important is the floss or seed-hair of theEriodendron anfractuosum, known as Kapok, the use of which in Europe was created by the Dutch merchants who drew their supplies from Java. The fibre is soft, silky and elastic, and maintains its elasticity in use. Many fibres when used in the mass show, on the other hand, a tendency to become matted and compressed in use, and to restore them to their original state the fibre requires to be removed and subjected to a teasing or carding process. This defect limits the use of other â€œflossesâ€ or seed hairs in competition with Kapok. Horse hair is extensively used in this industry, as are also wool flocks and other short animal hairs and wastes.

Hats and Matting.â€”For these manufactures a large range of the fibrous products above described are employed, chiefly in their natural or raw state.

Bibliography.â€”The list of works appended comprises only a small fraction of the standard literature of the subject, but they are sufficiently representative to enable the specialist, by referring to them, to cover the subject-matter. F.H. Bowman,The Structure of the Wood Fibre(1885),The Structure of Cotton Fibre(1882); Cross, Bevan and King,Indian Fibres and Fibrous Substances(London, 1887); C.F. Cross,Report on Miscellaneous Fibres, Colonial Indian Exhibition, 1886 (London, 1887); Cross and Bevan,Cellulose, Researches on Cellulose, i. and ii. (London, 1895-1905); C.R. Dodge,A Descriptive Catalogue of Useful Fibre Plants of the World(Report No. 9, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, 1897); von HÃ¶hmel,Die Mikroskopie der technisch verwendeten Faserstoffe(Leipzig, 1905); J.J. Hummel,The Dyeing of Textile Fabrics(London, 1885); J.M. Matthews,The Textile Fibres, their Physical, Microscopical and Chemical Properties(New York, 1904); H. MÃ¼ller,Die Pflanzenfaser(Braunschweig, 1877); H. Schlichter, â€œThe Examination of Textile Fibres and Fabricsâ€ (Jour. Soc. Chem. Ind., 1890, 241); M. Vetillart,Ã‰tudes sur les fibres vÃ©gÃ©tales textiles(Paris, 1876); Sir T.H. Wardle,Silk and Wild Silks, original memoirs in connexion with Col. Ind. Ex., 1886, Jubilee Ex. Manchester, 1887; Sir G. Watt,Dictionary of Economic Products of India(London, 1891); Wiesner,Die Rohstoffe des Pflanzenreichs(Leipzig, 1873); O.N. Witt,Chemische Technologie der Gespinnstfasern(Braunschweig, 1888);Kew Bulletin;The Journal of the Imperial Institute;The Journal of the Society of Arts; W.I. Hannam,The Textile Fibres of Commerce(London, 1902); J. Jackson,Commercial Botany; J. Zipser,Die Textilen Rohmaterialien(Wien, 1895); F. Zetzsche,Die wichtigsten Faserstoffe der europÃ¤ischen Industrie(Leipzig, 1895).

(C. F. C.)

1See alsoAlpaca,Felt,Mohair,ShoddyandWool.2Col. Ind. Exhibition, 1886,Miscellaneous Reports.

1See alsoAlpaca,Felt,Mohair,ShoddyandWool.

2Col. Ind. Exhibition, 1886,Miscellaneous Reports.

FIBRIN,orFibrine, a protein formed by the action of the so-called fibrin-ferment on fibrinogen, a constituent of the blood-plasma of all vertebrates. This change takes place when blood leaves the arteries, and the fibrin thus formed occasions the clotting which ensues (seeBlood). To obtain pure coagulated fibrin it is best to heat blood-plasma (preferably that of the horse) to 56Â° C. The usual method of beating a blood-clot with twigs and removing the filamentous fibrin which attaches itself to them yields a very impure product containing haemoglobin and much globulin; moreover, it is very difficult to purify. Fibrin is a very voluminous, tough, strongly elastic, jelly-like substance; when denaturalized by heat, alcohol or salts, it behaves as any other coagulated albumin.

FICHTE, IMMANUEL HERMANN(originallyHartmann)VON(1797-1879), German philosopher, son of J.G. Fichte, was born at Jena on the 18th of July 1797. Having held educational posts at SaarbrÃ¼cken and DÃ¼sseldorf, in 1836 he became extraordinary professor of philosophy at Bonn, and in 1840 full professor. In 1842 he received a call to TÃ¼bingen, retired in 1867, and died at Stuttgart on the 8th of August 1879. The most important of his comprehensive writings are:System der Ethik(1850-1853),Anthropologie(1856, 3rd ed. 1876),Psychologie(1864-1873),Die theistische Weltansicht(1873). In 1837 he had founded theZeitschrift fÃ¼r Philosophieas an organ of his views, more especially on the subject of the philosophy of religion, where he was in alliance with C.H. Weisse; but, whereas Weisse thought that the Hegelian structure was sound in the main, and that its imperfections might be mended, Fichte held it to be incurably defective, and spoke of it as a â€œmasterpiece of erroneous consistency or consistent error.â€ Fichteâ€™s general views on philosophy seem to have changed considerably as he advanced in years, and his influence has been impaired by certain inconsistencies and an appearance of eclecticism, which is strengthened by his predominantly historical treatment of problems, his desire to include divergent systems within his own, and his conciliatory tone. His philosophy is an attempt to reconcile monism (Hegel) and individualism (Herbart) by means of theism (Leibnitz). He attacks Hegelianism for its pantheism, its lowering of human personality, and imperfect recognition of the demands of the moral consciousness. God, he says, is to be regarded not as an absolute but as an Infinite Person, whose nature it is that he should realize himself in finite persons. These persons are objects of Godâ€™s love, and he arranges the world for their good. The direct connecting link between God and man is the â€œgenius,â€ a higher spiritual individuality existing in man by the side of his lower, earthly individuality. Fichte, in short, advocates an ethical theism, and his arguments might easily be turned to account by the apologist of Christianity. In his conception of finite personality he recurs to something like the monadism of Leibnitz. His insistence on moral experience is connected with his insistence on personality. One of the tests by which Fichte discriminates the value of previous systems is the adequateness with which they interpret moral experience. The same reason that made him depreciate Hegel made him praise Krause (panentheism) and Schleiermacher, and speak respectfully of English philosophy. It is characteristic of Fichteâ€™s almost excessive receptiveness that in his latest published work,Der neuere Spiritualismus(1878), he supports his position by arguments of a somewhat occult or theosophical cast, not unlike those adopted by F.W.H. Myers. He also edited the complete works and literary correspondence of his father, including his life.

See R. Eucken, â€œZur Erinnerung I. H. F.,â€ inZeitschrift fÃ¼r Philosophie, ex. (1897); C.C. Scherer,Die Gotteslehre von I. H. F.(1902); article by Karl Hartmann inAllegemeine deutsche Biographiexlviii. (1904). Some of his works were translated by J.D. Morell under the title ofContributions to Mental Philosophy(1860).

FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB(1762-1814), German philosopher, was born at Rammenau in Upper Lusatia on the 19th of May 1762. His father, a ribbon-weaver, was a descendant of a Swedish soldier who (in the service of Gustavus Adolphus) was left wounded at Rammenau and settled there. The family was distinguished for piety, uprightness, and solidity of character. With these qualities Fichte himself combined a certain impetuosity and impatience probably derived from his mother, a woman of a somewhat querulous and jealous disposition.

At a very early age the boy showed remarkable mental vigour and moral independence. A fortunate accident which brought him under the notice of a neighbouring nobleman, Freiherr von Miltitz, was the means of procuring him a more excellent education than his fatherâ€™s circumstances would have allowed. He was placed under the care of Pastor Krebel at Niederau. After a short stay at Meissen he was entered at the celebrated school at Pforta, near Naumburg. In 1780 he entered the university of Jena as a student of theology. He supported himself mainly by private teaching, and during the years 1784-1787 acted as tutor in various families of Saxony. In 1787, after an unsuccessful application to the consistory for pecuniary assistance, he seems to have been driven to miscellaneous literary work. A tutorship at ZÃ¼rich was, however, obtained in the spring of 1788, and Fichte spent in Switzerland two of the happiest years of his life. He made several valuable acquaintances,among others Lavater and his brother-in-law Hartmann Rahn, to whose daughter, Johanna Maria, he became engaged.

Settling at Leipzig, still without any fixed means of livelihood, he was again reduced to literary drudgery. In the midst of this work occurred the most important event of his life, his introduction to the philosophy of Kant. At Schulpforta he had read with delight Lessingâ€™sAnti-Goeze, and during his Jena days had studied the relation between philosophy and religion. The outcome of his speculations,Aphorismen Ã¼ber Religion und Deismus(unpublished, date 1790;Werke, i. 1-8), was a species of Spinozistic determinism, regarded, however, as lying altogether outside the boundary of religion. It is remarkable that even for a time fatalism should have been predominant in his reasoning, for in character he was opposed to such a view, and, as he has said, â€œaccording to the man, so is the system of philosophy he adopts.â€

Fichteâ€™sLettersof this period attest the influence exercised on him by the study of Kant. It effected a revolution in his mode of thinking; so completely did the Kantian doctrine of the inherent moral worth of man harmonize with his own character, that his life becomes one effort to perfect a true philosophy, and to make its principles practical maxims. At first he seems to have thought that the best method for accomplishing his object would be to expound Kantianism in a popular, intelligible form. He rightly felt that the reception of Kantâ€™s doctrines was impeded by their phraseology. An abridgment of theKritik der Urtheilskraftwas begun, but was left unfinished.

Fichteâ€™s circumstances had not improved. It had been arranged that he should return to ZÃ¼rich and be married to Johanna Rahn, but the plan was overthrown by a commercial disaster which affected the fortunes of the Rahn family. Fichte accepted a post as private tutor in Warsaw, and proceeded on foot to that town. The situation proved unsuitable; the lady, as Kuno Fischer says, â€œrequired greater submission and better Frenchâ€ than Fichte could yield, and after a fortnightâ€™s stay Fichte set out for KÃ¶nigsberg to see Kant. His first interview was disappointing; the coldness and formality of the aged philosopher checked the enthusiasm of the young disciple, though it did not diminish his reverence. He resolved to bring himself before Kantâ€™s notice by submitting to him a work in which the principles of the Kantian philosophy should be applied. Such was the origin of the work, written in four weeks, theVersuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung(Essay towards a Critique of all Revelation). The problem which Fichte dealt with in this essay was one not yet handled by Kant himself, the relations of which to the critical philosophy furnished matter for surmise. Indirectly, indeed, Kant had indicated a very definite opinion on theology: from theCritique of Pure Reasonit was clear that for him speculative theology must be purely negative, while theCritique of Practical Reasonas clearly indicated the view that the moral law is the absolute content or substance of any religion. Acriticalinvestigation of the conditions under which religious belief was possible was still wanting. Fichte sent his essay to Kant, who approved it highly, extended to the author a warm reception, and exerted his influence to procure a publisher. After some delay, consequent on the scruples of the theological censor of Halle, who did not like to see miracles rejected, the book appeared (Easter, 1792). By an oversight Fichteâ€™s name did not appear on the title-page, nor was the preface given, in which the author spoke of himself as a beginner in philosophy. Outsiders, not unnaturally, ascribed the work to Kant. TheAllgemeine Literatur-Zeitungwent so far as to say that no one who had read a line of Kantâ€™s writings could fail to recognize the eminent author of this new work. Kant himself corrected the mistake, at the same time highly commending the work. Fichteâ€™s reputation was thus secured at a stroke.

TheCritique of Revelationmarks the culminating point of Fichteâ€™s Kantian period. The exposition of the conditions under which revealed religion is possible turns upon the absolute requirements of the moral law in human nature. Religion itself is the belief in this moral law as divine, and such belief is a practical postulate, necessary in order to add force to the law. It follows that no revealed religion, so far as matter or substance is concerned, can contain anything beyond this law; nor can any fact in the world of experience be recognized by us as supernatural. The supernatural element in religion can only be the divine character of the moral law. Now, the revelation of this divine character of morality is possible only to a being in whom the lower impulses have been, or are, successful in overcoming reverence for the law. In such a case it is conceivable that a revelation might be given in order to add strength to the moral law. Religion ultimately then rests upon the practical reason, and expresses some demand or want of the pure ego. In this conclusion we can trace the prominence assigned by Fichte to the practical element, and the tendency to make the requirements of the ego the ground for all judgment on reality. It was not possible that having reached this point he should not press forward and leave the Kantian position.

This success was coincident with an improvement in the fortunes of the Rahn family, and the marriage took place at ZÃ¼rich in October 1793. The remainder of the year he spent at ZÃ¼rich, slowly perfecting his thoughts on the fundamental problems left for solution in the Kantian philosophy. During this period he published anonymously two remarkable political works,ZurÃ¼ckforderung der Denkfreiheit von den FÃ¼rsten EuropasandBeitrÃ¤ge zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums Ã¼ber die franzÃ¶sische Revolution. Of these the latter is much the more important. The French Revolution seemed to many earnest thinkers the one great outcry of modern times for the liberty of thought and action which is the eternal heritage of every human being. Unfortunately the political condition of Germany was unfavourable to the formation of an unbiassed opinion on the great movement. The principles involved in it were lost sight of under the mass of spurious maxims on social order which had slowly grown up and stiffened into system. To direct attention to the true nature of revolution, to demonstrate how inextricably the right of liberty is interwoven with the very existence of man as an intelligent agent, to point out the inherent progressiveness of state arrangements, and the consequent necessity of reform or amendment, such are the main objects of theBeitrÃ¤ge; and although, as is often the case with Fichte, the arguments are too formal and the distinctions too wire-drawn, yet the general idea is nobly conceived and carried out. As in theCritique of Revelationso here the rational nature of man and the conditions necessary for its manifestation or realization become the standard for critical judgment.

Towards the close of 1793 Fichte received an invitation to succeed K.L. Reinhold as extraordinary professor of philosophy at Jena. This chair, not in the ordinary faculty, had become, through Reinhold, the most important in the university, and great deliberation was exercised in selecting his successor. It was desired to secure an exponent of Kantianism, and none seemed so highly qualified as the author of theCritique of Revelation. Fichte, while accepting the call, desired to spend a year in preparation; but as this was deemed inexpedient he rapidly drew out for his students an introductory outline of his system, and began his lectures in May 1794. His success was instantaneous and complete. The fame of his predecessor was altogether eclipsed. Much of this success was due to Fichteâ€™s rare power as a lecturer. In oral exposition the vigour of thought and moral intensity of the man were most of all apparent, while his practical earnestness completely captivated his hearers. He lectured not only to his own class, but on general moral subjects to all students of the university. These general addresses, published under the titleBestimmung des Gelehrten(Vocation of the Scholar), were on a subject dear to Fichteâ€™s heart, the supreme importance of the highest intellectual culture and the duties incumbent on those who had received it. Their tone is stimulating and lofty.

The years spent at Jena were unusually productive; indeed, the completed Fichtean philosophy is contained in the writings of this period. A general introduction to the system is given in the tractateÃœber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre(On the Notion of the Theory of Science), 1794, and the theoreticalportion is worked out in theGrundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre(Foundation of the whole Theory of Science, 1794) andGrundriss des EigenthÃ¼mlichen d. Wissenschaftslehre(Outline of what is peculiar in the Theory of Science, 1794). To these were added in 1797 aFirstand aSecond Introduction to the Theory of Science, and anEssay towards a new Exposition of the Theory of Science. TheIntroductionsare masterly expositions. The practical philosophy was given in theGrundlage des Naturrechts(1796) andSystem der Sittenlehre(1798). The last is probably the most important of all Fichteâ€™s works; apart from it, his theoretical philosophy is unintelligible.

During this period Fichteâ€™s academic career had been troubled by various storms, the last so violent as to put a close to his professorate at Jena. The first of them, a complaint against the delivery of his general addresses on Sundays, was easily settled. The second, arising from Fichteâ€™s strong desire to suppress theLandsmannschaften(studentsâ€™ orders), which were productive of much harm, was more serious. Some misunderstanding caused an outburst of ignorant ill-feeling on the part of the students, who proceeded to such lengths that Fichte was compelled to reside out of Jena. The third storm, however, was the most violent. In 1798 Fichte, who, with F.I. Niethammer (1766-1848), had edited thePhilosophical Journalsince 1795, received from his friend F.K. Forberg (1770-1848) an essay on the â€œDevelopment of the Idea of Religion.â€ With much of the essay he entirely agreed, but he thought the exposition in so many ways defective and calculated to create an erroneous impression, that he prefaced it with a short paperOn the Grounds of our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe, in which God is defined as the moral order of the universe, the eternal law of right which is the foundation of all our being. The cry of atheism was raised, and the electoral government of Saxony, followed by all the German states except Prussia, suppressed theJournaland confiscated the copies found in their universities. Pressure was put by the German powers on Charles Augustus, grand-duke of Saxe-Weimar, in whose dominions Jena university was situated, to reprove and dismiss the offenders. Fichteâ€™s defences (Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, andGerichtliche Verantwortung der Herausgeber der phil. Zeitschrift, 1799), though masterly, did not make it easier for the liberal-minded grand-duke to pass the matter over, and an unfortunate letter, in which he threatened to resign in case of reprimand, turned the scale against him. The grand-duke accepted his threat as a request to resign, passed censure, and extended to him permission to withdraw from his chair at Jena; nor would he alter his decision, even though Fichte himself endeavoured to explain away the unfortunate letter.

Berlin was the only town in Germany open to him. His residence there from 1799 to 1806 was unbroken save for a course of lectures during the summer of 1805 at Erlangen, where he had been named professor. Surrounded by friends, including Schlegel and Schleiermacher, he continued his literary work, perfecting theWissenschaftslehre. The most remarkable of the works from this period areâ€”(1) theBestimmung des Menschen(Vocation of Man, 1800), a book which, for beauty of style, richness of content, and elevation of thought, may be ranked with the Meditations of Descartes; (2)Der geschlossene Handelsstaat, 1800 (The Exclusive or Isolated Commercial State), a very remarkable treatise, intensely socialist in tone, and inculcating organized protection; (3)Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grÃ¶ssere Publicum Ã¼ber die neueste Philosophie, 1801. In 1801 was also written theDarstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, which was not published till after his death. In 1804 a set of lectures on theWissenschaftslehrewas given at Berlin, the notes of which were published in theNachgelassene Werke, vol. ii. In 1804 were also delivered the noble lectures entitledGrundzÃ¼ge des gegenwÃ¤rtigen Zeitalters(Characteristics of the Present Age, 1804), containing a most admirable analysis of theAufklÃ¤rung, tracing the position of such a movement of thought in the natural evolution of the general human consciousness, pointing out its inherent defects, and indicating as the ultimate goal of progress the life of reason in its highest aspect as a belief in the divine order of the universe. The philosophy of history sketched in this work has something of value with much that is fantastic. In 1805 and 1806 appeared theWesen des Gelehrten(Nature of the Scholar) and theAnweisung zum seligen Leben oder Religionslehre(Way to a Blessed Life), the latter the most important work of this Berlin period. In it the union between the finite self-consciousness and the infinite ego or God is handled in an almost mystical manner. The knowledge and love of God is the end of life; by this means only can we attain blessedness (Seligkeit), for in God alone have we a permanent, enduring object of desire. The infinite God is the all; the world of independent objects is the result of reflection or self-consciousness, by which the infinite unity is broken up. God is thus over and above the distinction of subject and object; our knowledge is but a reflex or picture of the infinite essence. Being is not thought.

Thedisastersof Prussia in 1806 drove Fichte from Berlin. He retired first to Stargard, then to KÃ¶nigsberg (where he lectured for a time), then to Copenhagen, whence he returned to the capital in August 1807. From this time his published writings are practical in character; not till after the appearance of theNachgelassene Werkewas it known in what shape his final speculations had been thrown out. We may here note the order of these posthumous writings as being of importance for tracing the development of Fichteâ€™s thought. From the year 1806 we have the remarkableBericht Ã¼ber die Wissenschaftslehre(Werke, vol. viii.), with its sharp critique of Schelling; from 1810 we have theThatsachen des Bewusstseyns, published in 1817, of which another treatment is given in lectures of 1813 (Nachgel. Werke, vol. i.). Of theWissenschaftslehrewe have, in 1812-1813, four separate treatments contained in theNachgel Werke. As these consist mainly of notes for lectures, couched in uncouth phraseology, they cannot be held to throw much light on Fichteâ€™s views. Perhaps the most interesting are the lectures of 1812 onTranscendental Logic(Nach. Werke, i. 106-400).

From 1812 we have notes of two courses on practical philosophy,Rechtslehre(Nach. Werke, vol. ii.) andSittenlehre(ib.vol. iii.). A finished work in the same department is theStaatslehre, published in 1820. This gives the Fichtean utopia organized on principles of pure reason; in too many cases the proposals are identical with principles of pure despotism.

During these years, however, Fichte was mainly occupied with public affairs. In 1807 he drew up an elaborate and minute plan for the proposed new university of Berlin. In 1507-1808 he delivered at Berlin, amidst danger and discouragement, his noble addresses to the German people (Reden an die deutsche Nation). Even if we think that in these pure reason is sometimes overshadowed by patriotism, we cannot but recognize the immense practical value of what he recommended as the only true foundation for national prosperity.

In 1810 he was elected rector of the new university founded in the previous year. This post he resigned in 1812, mainly on account of the difficulties he experienced in his endeavour to reform the student life of the university.

In 1813 began the great effort of Germany for national independence. Debarred from taking an active part, Fichte made his contribution by way of lectures. The addresses on the idea of a true war (Ãœber den Begriff eines wahrhaften Kriegs, forming part of theStaatslehre) contain a very subtle contrast between the positions of France and Germany in the war.

In the autumn of 1813 the hospitals of Berlin were filled with sick and wounded from the campaign. Among the most devoted in her exertions was Fichteâ€™s wife, who, in January 1814, was attacked with a virulent hospital fever. On the day after she was pronounced out of danger Fichte was struck down. He lingered for some days in an almost unconscious state, and died on the 27th of January 1814.

The philosophy of Fichte, worked out in a series of writings, and falling chronologically into two distinct periods, that of Jena and that of Berlin, seemed in the course of its development to undergo a change so fundamental that many critics have sharply separated and opposed to one another an earlier and a later phase. The ground of the modification, further, has been sought and apparently found in quite external influences, principally that ofSchellingâ€™sNaturphilosophie, to some extent that of Schleiermacher. But as a rule most of those who have adopted this view have done so without the full and patient examination which the matter demands; they have been misled by the difference in tone and style between the earlier and later writings, and have concluded that underlying this was a fundamental difference of philosophic conception. One only, Erdmann, in hisEntwicklung d. deut. Spek. seit Kant, Â§ 29, seems to give full references to justify his opinion, and even he, in his later work,Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos.(ed. 3), Â§ 311, admits that the difference is much less than he had at the first imagined. He certainly retains his former opinion, but mainly on the ground, in itself intelligible and legitimate, that, so far as Fichteâ€™s philosophical reputation and influence are concerned, attention may be limited to the earlier doctrines of theWissenschaftslehre. This may be so, but it can be admitted neither that Fichteâ€™s views underwent radical change, nor that theWissenschaftslehrewas ever regarded as in itself complete, nor that Fichte was unconscious of the apparent difference between his earlier and later utterances. It is demonstrable by various passages in the works and letters that he never looked upon theWissenschaftslehreas containing the whole system; it is clear from the chronology of his writings that the modifications supposed to be due to other thinkers were from the first implicit in his theory; and if one fairly traces the course of thought in the early writings, one can see how he was inevitably led on to the statement of the later and, at first sight, divergent views. On only one point, the position assigned in theWissenschaftslehreto the absolute ego, is there any obscurity; but the relative passages are far from decisive, and from the early work,Neue Darstellung der Wissenchaftslehre, unquestionably to be included in the Jena period, one can see that from the outset the doctrine of the absolute ego was held in a form differing only in statement from the later theory.Fichteâ€™s system cannot be compressed with intelligibility. We shall here note only three points:â€”(a) the origin in Kant; (b) the fundamental principle and method of theWissenschaftslehre; (c) the connexion with the later writings. The most important works for (a) are the â€œReview of Aenesidemus,â€ and theSecond Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre; for (b) the great treatises of the Jena period; for (c) theThatsachen des Bewusstseynsof 1810.(a) The Kantian system had for the first time opened up a truly fruitful line of philosophic speculation, the transcendental consideration of knowledge, or the analysis of the conditions under which cognition is possible. To Kant the fundamental condition was given in the synthetical unity of consciousness. The primitive fact under which might be gathered the special conditions of that synthesis which we call cognition was this unity. But by Kant there was no attempt made to show that the said special conditions were necessary from the very nature of consciousness itself. Their necessity was discovered and proved in a manner which might be called empirical. Moreover, while Kant in a quite similar manner pointed out that intuition had special conditions, space and time, he did not show any link of connexion between these and the primitive conditions of pure cognition. Closely connected with this remarkable defect in the Kantian viewâ€”lying, indeed, at the foundation of itâ€”was the doctrine that the matter of cognition is altogethergiven, or thrown into theformof cognition from without. So strongly was this doctrine emphasized by Kant, that he seemed to refer thematterof knowledge to the action upon us of a non-ego orDing-an-sich, absolutely beyond consciousness. While these hints towards a completely intelligible account of cognition were given by Kant, they were not reduced to system, and from the way in which the elements of cognition were related, could not be so reduced. Only in the sphere of practical reason, where the intelligible nature prescribed to itself its own laws, was there the possibility of systematic deduction from a single principle.The peculiar position in which Kant had left the theory of cognition was assailed from many different sides and by many writers, specially by Schultze (Aenesidemus) and Maimon. To the criticisms of the latter, in particular, Fichte owed much, but his own activity went far beyond what they supplied to him. To complete Kantâ€™s work, to demonstrate that all the necessary conditions of knowledge can be deduced from a single principle, and consequently to expound the complete system of reason, that is the business of theWissenschaftslehre. By it the theoretical and practical reason shall be shown to coincide; for while the categories of cognition and the whole system of pure thought can be expounded from one principle, the ground of this principle is scientifically, or to cognition, inexplicable, and is made conceivable only in the practical philosophy. The ultimate basis for the activity of cognition is given by the will. Even in the practical sphere, however, Fichte found that the contradiction, insoluble to cognition, was not completely suppressed, and he was thus driven to the higher view, which is explicitly stated in the later writings though not, it must be confessed, with the precision and scientific clearness of theWissenschaftslehre.(b) What, then, is this single principle, and how does it work itself out into system? To answer this one must bear in mind what Fichte intended by designating all philosophyWissenschaftslehre, or theory of science. Philosophy is to him the rethinking of actual cognition, thetheoryof knowledge, the complete, systematic exposition of the principles which lie at the basis of all reasoned cognition. It traces the necessary acts by which the cognitive consciousness comes to be what it is, both in form and in content. Not that it is a natural history, or even aphenomenologyof consciousness; only in the later writings did Fichte adopt even the genetic method of exposition; it is the complete statement of the pure principles of the understanding in their rational or necessary order. But if complete, thisWissenschaftslehremust be able to deduce the whole organism of cognition from certain fundamental axioms, themselves unproved and incapable of proof; only thus can we have asystemof reason. From these primary axioms the whole body of necessary thoughts must be developed, and, as Socrates would say, the argument itself will indicate the path of the development.Of such primitive principles, the absolutely necessary conditions of possible cognition, only three are thinkableâ€”one perfectly unconditioned both in form and matter; a second, unconditioned in form but not in matter; a third, unconditioned in matter but not in form. Of these, evidently the first must be the fundamental; to some extent it conditions the other two, though these cannot be deduced from it or proved by it. The statement of these principles forms the introduction toWissenschaftslehre.The method which Fichte first adopted for stating these axioms is not calculated to throw full light upon them, and tends to exaggerate the apparent airiness and unsubstantiality of his deduction. They may be explained thus. The primitive condition of all intelligence is that the ego shall posit, affirm or be aware of itself. The ego is the ego; such is the first pure act of conscious intelligence, that by which alone consciousness can come to be what it is. It is what Fichte called a Deed-act (Thathandlung); we cannot be aware of the process,â€”the egoisnot until it has affirmed itself,â€”but we are aware of the result, and can see the necessity of the act by which it is brought about. The ego then posits itself, as real. What the ego posits is real. But in consciousness there is equally given a primitive act of op-positing, or contra-positing, formally distinct from the act of position, but materially determined, in so far as what is op-posited must be the negative of that which was posited. The non-egoâ€”not, be it noticed, the world as we know itâ€”is op-posed in consciousness to the ego. The ego is not the non-ego. How this act of op-positing is possible and necessary, only becomes clear in the practical philosophy, and even there the inherent difficulty leads to a higher view. But third, we have now an absolute antithesis to our original thesis. Only the ego is real, but the non-ego is posited in the ego. The contradiction is solved in a higher synthesis, which takes up into itself the two opposites. The ego and non-egolimitone another, or determine one another; and, as limitation is negation of part of a divisible quantum, in this third act, the divisible ego is op-posed to a divisible non-ego.From this point onwards the course proceeds by the method already made clear. We progress by making explicit the oppositions contained in the fundamental synthesis, by uniting these opposites, analysing the new synthesis, and so on, until we reach an ultimate pair. Now, in the synthesis of the third act two principles may be distinguished:â€”(1) the non-ego determines the ego; (2) the ego determines the non-ego. As determined the ego is theoretical, as determining it is practical; ultimately the opposed principles must be united by showing how the ego is both determining and determined.It is impossible to enter here on the steps by which the theoretical ego is shown to develop into the complete system of cognitive categories, or to trace the deduction of the processes (productive imagination, intuition, sensation, understanding, judgment, reason) by which the quite indefinite non-ego comes to assume the appearance of definite objects in the forms of time and space. All this evolution is the necessary consequence of the determination of the ego by the non-ego. But it is clear that the non-ego cannot really determine the ego. There is no reality beyond the ego itself. The contradiction can only be suppressed if the ego itself opposes to itself the non-ego, places it as anAnstossor plane on which its own activity breaks and from which it is reflected. Now, this op-positing of theAnstossis the necessary condition of the practical ego, of the will. If the ego be a striving power, then of necessity a limit must be set by which its striving is manifest. But how can the infinitely active ego posit a limit to its own activity? Here we come to thecruxof Fichteâ€™s system, which is only partly cleared up in theRechtslehreandSittenlehre. If the ego be pure activity, free activity, it can only become aware of itself by positing some limit. We cannot possibly have any cognition of how such an act is possible. But as it is a free act, the ego cannot be determined to it by anything beyond itself; it cannot be aware of its own freedom otherwise than as determined by other free egos. Thus in theRechtslehreandSittenlehre, the multiplicity of egos is deduced, and with this deduction the first form of theWissenschaftslehreappeared to end.(c) But in fact deeper questions remained. We have spoken of the ego as becoming aware of its own freedom, and have shown how the existence of other egos and of a world in which these egos may act are the necessary conditions of consciousness of freedom. But all this is the work of the ego. All that has been expounded follows if the ego comes to consciousness. We have therefore to consider that the absolute ego, from which spring all the individual egos, is not subject to these conditions, but freely determines itself to them.How is this absolute ego to be conceived? As early as 1797 Fichte had begun to see that the ultimate basis of his system was the absolute ego, in which is no difference of subject and object; in 1800 theBestimmung des Menschendefined this absolute ego as the infinite moral will of the universe, God, in whom are all the individual egos, from whom they have sprung. It lay in the nature of the thing that more precise utterances should be given on this subject, and these we find in theThatsachen des Bewusstseynsand in all the later lectures. God in them is the absolute Life, the absolute One, who becomes conscious of himself by self-diremption into the individual egos. The individual ego is only possible as opposed to a non-ego, to a world of the senses; thus God, the infinite will, manifests himself in the individual, and the individual has over against him the non-ego or thing. â€œThe individuals do not make part of the being of the one life, but are a pure form of its absolute freedom.â€ â€œThe individual is not conscious of himself, but the Life is conscious of itself in individual form and as an individual.â€ In order that the Life may act, though it is not necessary that itshould act, individualization is necessary. â€œThus,â€ says Fichte, â€œwe reach a final conclusion. Knowledge is not mere knowledge of itself, but of being, and of the one being that truly is, viz. God.... This one possible object of knowledge is never known in its purity, but ever broken into the various forms of knowledge which are and can be shown to be necessary. The demonstration of the necessity of these forms is philosophy orWissenschaftslehreâ€ (Thats. des Bewuss. Werke, ii. 685). This ultimate view is expressed throughout the lectures (in theNachgel. Werke) in uncouth and mystical language.It will escape no one (1) how the idea and method of theWissenschaftslehreprepare the way for the later Hegelian dialectic, and (2) how completely the whole philosophy of Schopenhauer is contained in the later writings of Fichte. It is not to the credit of historians that Schopenhauerâ€™s debt should have been allowed to pass with so little notice.Bibliography.â€”Fichteâ€™s complete works were published by his son J.H. Fichte,SÃ¤mmtliche Werke(8 vols., Berlin, 1845-1846), withNachgelassene Werke(3 vols., Bonn, 1834-1835); alsoLeben und Briefwechsel(2 vols., 1830, ed. 1862). Among translations are those of William Smith,Popular Writings of Fichte, with Memoir(2 vols., London, 1848-1849, 4th ed. 1889); A.E. Kroeger, portions of theWissenschaftslehre(Science of Knowledge, Philadelphia, 1868; ed. London, 1889), theNaturrecht(Science of Rights, 1870; ed. London, 1889); of theVorlesungen Ã¼. d. Bestimmung d. Gelehrten(The Vocation of the Scholar, by W. Smith, 1847);Destination of Man, by Mrs P. Sinnett;Discours Ã la nation allemande, French by LÃ©on Philippe (1895), with preface by F. Picavet, and a biographical memoir.The number of critical works is very large. Besides the histories of post-Kantian philosophy by Erdmann, Fortlage (whose account is remarkably good), Michelet, Biedermann and others, see Wm. Busse,Fichte und seine Beziehung zur Gegenwart des deutschen Volkes(Halle, 1848-1849); J.H. LÃ¶we,Die Philosophic Fichtes(Stuttgart, 1862); Kuno Fischer,Geschichte d. neueren Philosophie(1869, 1884, 1890); Ludwig Noack,Fichte nach seinem Leben, Lehren und Wirken(Leipzig, 1862); R. Adamson, Fichte (1881, in Knightâ€™s â€œPhilosophical Classicsâ€); Oscar Benzow,Zu Fichtes Lekre von Nicht-Ich(Bern, 1898); E.O. Burmann,Die Transcendentalphilosophie Fichtes und Schellings(Upsala, 1890-1892); M. CarriÃ¨re,Fichtes Geistesentwickelung in die Reden Ã¼ber d. Bestimmung des Gelehrten(1894); C.C. Everett,Fichteâ€™s Science of Knowledge(Chicago, 1884); O. Pfleiderer, J.G.Fichtes Lebensbild eines deutschen Denkers und Patrioten(Stuttgart, 1877); T. Wotschke,Fichte und Erigena(1896); W. Kabitz,Studien zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Fichtehen Wissenschaftslehre aus der Kantischen Philosophie(1902); E. Lask,Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte(1902); X. LÃ©on,La Philos. de Fichte(1902); M. Wiener, J.G.Fichtes Lehre vom Wesen und Inhalt der Geschichte(1906).On Fichteâ€™s social philosophy see,e.g., F. Schmidt-Warneck,Die Sociologie Fichtes(Berlin, 1884); W. Windelband,Fichtes Idee des deutschen Staates(1890); M. Weber,Fichtes Sozialismus und sein VerhÃ¤ltnis zur Marxâ€™schen Doctrin(1900); S.H. Gutman, J.G.Fichtes SozialpÃ¤dogogik(1907); H. Lindau,Johann G. Fichte und der neuere Socialismus(1900).

Fichteâ€™s system cannot be compressed with intelligibility. We shall here note only three points:â€”(a) the origin in Kant; (b) the fundamental principle and method of theWissenschaftslehre; (c) the connexion with the later writings. The most important works for (a) are the â€œReview of Aenesidemus,â€ and theSecond Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre; for (b) the great treatises of the Jena period; for (c) theThatsachen des Bewusstseynsof 1810.

(a) The Kantian system had for the first time opened up a truly fruitful line of philosophic speculation, the transcendental consideration of knowledge, or the analysis of the conditions under which cognition is possible. To Kant the fundamental condition was given in the synthetical unity of consciousness. The primitive fact under which might be gathered the special conditions of that synthesis which we call cognition was this unity. But by Kant there was no attempt made to show that the said special conditions were necessary from the very nature of consciousness itself. Their necessity was discovered and proved in a manner which might be called empirical. Moreover, while Kant in a quite similar manner pointed out that intuition had special conditions, space and time, he did not show any link of connexion between these and the primitive conditions of pure cognition. Closely connected with this remarkable defect in the Kantian viewâ€”lying, indeed, at the foundation of itâ€”was the doctrine that the matter of cognition is altogethergiven, or thrown into theformof cognition from without. So strongly was this doctrine emphasized by Kant, that he seemed to refer thematterof knowledge to the action upon us of a non-ego orDing-an-sich, absolutely beyond consciousness. While these hints towards a completely intelligible account of cognition were given by Kant, they were not reduced to system, and from the way in which the elements of cognition were related, could not be so reduced. Only in the sphere of practical reason, where the intelligible nature prescribed to itself its own laws, was there the possibility of systematic deduction from a single principle.

The peculiar position in which Kant had left the theory of cognition was assailed from many different sides and by many writers, specially by Schultze (Aenesidemus) and Maimon. To the criticisms of the latter, in particular, Fichte owed much, but his own activity went far beyond what they supplied to him. To complete Kantâ€™s work, to demonstrate that all the necessary conditions of knowledge can be deduced from a single principle, and consequently to expound the complete system of reason, that is the business of theWissenschaftslehre. By it the theoretical and practical reason shall be shown to coincide; for while the categories of cognition and the whole system of pure thought can be expounded from one principle, the ground of this principle is scientifically, or to cognition, inexplicable, and is made conceivable only in the practical philosophy. The ultimate basis for the activity of cognition is given by the will. Even in the practical sphere, however, Fichte found that the contradiction, insoluble to cognition, was not completely suppressed, and he was thus driven to the higher view, which is explicitly stated in the later writings though not, it must be confessed, with the precision and scientific clearness of theWissenschaftslehre.

(b) What, then, is this single principle, and how does it work itself out into system? To answer this one must bear in mind what Fichte intended by designating all philosophyWissenschaftslehre, or theory of science. Philosophy is to him the rethinking of actual cognition, thetheoryof knowledge, the complete, systematic exposition of the principles which lie at the basis of all reasoned cognition. It traces the necessary acts by which the cognitive consciousness comes to be what it is, both in form and in content. Not that it is a natural history, or even aphenomenologyof consciousness; only in the later writings did Fichte adopt even the genetic method of exposition; it is the complete statement of the pure principles of the understanding in their rational or necessary order. But if complete, thisWissenschaftslehremust be able to deduce the whole organism of cognition from certain fundamental axioms, themselves unproved and incapable of proof; only thus can we have asystemof reason. From these primary axioms the whole body of necessary thoughts must be developed, and, as Socrates would say, the argument itself will indicate the path of the development.

Of such primitive principles, the absolutely necessary conditions of possible cognition, only three are thinkableâ€”one perfectly unconditioned both in form and matter; a second, unconditioned in form but not in matter; a third, unconditioned in matter but not in form. Of these, evidently the first must be the fundamental; to some extent it conditions the other two, though these cannot be deduced from it or proved by it. The statement of these principles forms the introduction toWissenschaftslehre.

The method which Fichte first adopted for stating these axioms is not calculated to throw full light upon them, and tends to exaggerate the apparent airiness and unsubstantiality of his deduction. They may be explained thus. The primitive condition of all intelligence is that the ego shall posit, affirm or be aware of itself. The ego is the ego; such is the first pure act of conscious intelligence, that by which alone consciousness can come to be what it is. It is what Fichte called a Deed-act (Thathandlung); we cannot be aware of the process,â€”the egoisnot until it has affirmed itself,â€”but we are aware of the result, and can see the necessity of the act by which it is brought about. The ego then posits itself, as real. What the ego posits is real. But in consciousness there is equally given a primitive act of op-positing, or contra-positing, formally distinct from the act of position, but materially determined, in so far as what is op-posited must be the negative of that which was posited. The non-egoâ€”not, be it noticed, the world as we know itâ€”is op-posed in consciousness to the ego. The ego is not the non-ego. How this act of op-positing is possible and necessary, only becomes clear in the practical philosophy, and even there the inherent difficulty leads to a higher view. But third, we have now an absolute antithesis to our original thesis. Only the ego is real, but the non-ego is posited in the ego. The contradiction is solved in a higher synthesis, which takes up into itself the two opposites. The ego and non-egolimitone another, or determine one another; and, as limitation is negation of part of a divisible quantum, in this third act, the divisible ego is op-posed to a divisible non-ego.

From this point onwards the course proceeds by the method already made clear. We progress by making explicit the oppositions contained in the fundamental synthesis, by uniting these opposites, analysing the new synthesis, and so on, until we reach an ultimate pair. Now, in the synthesis of the third act two principles may be distinguished:â€”(1) the non-ego determines the ego; (2) the ego determines the non-ego. As determined the ego is theoretical, as determining it is practical; ultimately the opposed principles must be united by showing how the ego is both determining and determined.

It is impossible to enter here on the steps by which the theoretical ego is shown to develop into the complete system of cognitive categories, or to trace the deduction of the processes (productive imagination, intuition, sensation, understanding, judgment, reason) by which the quite indefinite non-ego comes to assume the appearance of definite objects in the forms of time and space. All this evolution is the necessary consequence of the determination of the ego by the non-ego. But it is clear that the non-ego cannot really determine the ego. There is no reality beyond the ego itself. The contradiction can only be suppressed if the ego itself opposes to itself the non-ego, places it as anAnstossor plane on which its own activity breaks and from which it is reflected. Now, this op-positing of theAnstossis the necessary condition of the practical ego, of the will. If the ego be a striving power, then of necessity a limit must be set by which its striving is manifest. But how can the infinitely active ego posit a limit to its own activity? Here we come to thecruxof Fichteâ€™s system, which is only partly cleared up in theRechtslehreandSittenlehre. If the ego be pure activity, free activity, it can only become aware of itself by positing some limit. We cannot possibly have any cognition of how such an act is possible. But as it is a free act, the ego cannot be determined to it by anything beyond itself; it cannot be aware of its own freedom otherwise than as determined by other free egos. Thus in theRechtslehreandSittenlehre, the multiplicity of egos is deduced, and with this deduction the first form of theWissenschaftslehreappeared to end.

(c) But in fact deeper questions remained. We have spoken of the ego as becoming aware of its own freedom, and have shown how the existence of other egos and of a world in which these egos may act are the necessary conditions of consciousness of freedom. But all this is the work of the ego. All that has been expounded follows if the ego comes to consciousness. We have therefore to consider that the absolute ego, from which spring all the individual egos, is not subject to these conditions, but freely determines itself to them.How is this absolute ego to be conceived? As early as 1797 Fichte had begun to see that the ultimate basis of his system was the absolute ego, in which is no difference of subject and object; in 1800 theBestimmung des Menschendefined this absolute ego as the infinite moral will of the universe, God, in whom are all the individual egos, from whom they have sprung. It lay in the nature of the thing that more precise utterances should be given on this subject, and these we find in theThatsachen des Bewusstseynsand in all the later lectures. God in them is the absolute Life, the absolute One, who becomes conscious of himself by self-diremption into the individual egos. The individual ego is only possible as opposed to a non-ego, to a world of the senses; thus God, the infinite will, manifests himself in the individual, and the individual has over against him the non-ego or thing. â€œThe individuals do not make part of the being of the one life, but are a pure form of its absolute freedom.â€ â€œThe individual is not conscious of himself, but the Life is conscious of itself in individual form and as an individual.â€ In order that the Life may act, though it is not necessary that itshould act, individualization is necessary. â€œThus,â€ says Fichte, â€œwe reach a final conclusion. Knowledge is not mere knowledge of itself, but of being, and of the one being that truly is, viz. God.... This one possible object of knowledge is never known in its purity, but ever broken into the various forms of knowledge which are and can be shown to be necessary. The demonstration of the necessity of these forms is philosophy orWissenschaftslehreâ€ (Thats. des Bewuss. Werke, ii. 685). This ultimate view is expressed throughout the lectures (in theNachgel. Werke) in uncouth and mystical language.

It will escape no one (1) how the idea and method of theWissenschaftslehreprepare the way for the later Hegelian dialectic, and (2) how completely the whole philosophy of Schopenhauer is contained in the later writings of Fichte. It is not to the credit of historians that Schopenhauerâ€™s debt should have been allowed to pass with so little notice.

Bibliography.â€”Fichteâ€™s complete works were published by his son J.H. Fichte,SÃ¤mmtliche Werke(8 vols., Berlin, 1845-1846), withNachgelassene Werke(3 vols., Bonn, 1834-1835); alsoLeben und Briefwechsel(2 vols., 1830, ed. 1862). Among translations are those of William Smith,Popular Writings of Fichte, with Memoir(2 vols., London, 1848-1849, 4th ed. 1889); A.E. Kroeger, portions of theWissenschaftslehre(Science of Knowledge, Philadelphia, 1868; ed. London, 1889), theNaturrecht(Science of Rights, 1870; ed. London, 1889); of theVorlesungen Ã¼. d. Bestimmung d. Gelehrten(The Vocation of the Scholar, by W. Smith, 1847);Destination of Man, by Mrs P. Sinnett;Discours Ã la nation allemande, French by LÃ©on Philippe (1895), with preface by F. Picavet, and a biographical memoir.

The number of critical works is very large. Besides the histories of post-Kantian philosophy by Erdmann, Fortlage (whose account is remarkably good), Michelet, Biedermann and others, see Wm. Busse,Fichte und seine Beziehung zur Gegenwart des deutschen Volkes(Halle, 1848-1849); J.H. LÃ¶we,Die Philosophic Fichtes(Stuttgart, 1862); Kuno Fischer,Geschichte d. neueren Philosophie(1869, 1884, 1890); Ludwig Noack,Fichte nach seinem Leben, Lehren und Wirken(Leipzig, 1862); R. Adamson, Fichte (1881, in Knightâ€™s â€œPhilosophical Classicsâ€); Oscar Benzow,Zu Fichtes Lekre von Nicht-Ich(Bern, 1898); E.O. Burmann,Die Transcendentalphilosophie Fichtes und Schellings(Upsala, 1890-1892); M. CarriÃ¨re,Fichtes Geistesentwickelung in die Reden Ã¼ber d. Bestimmung des Gelehrten(1894); C.C. Everett,Fichteâ€™s Science of Knowledge(Chicago, 1884); O. Pfleiderer, J.G.Fichtes Lebensbild eines deutschen Denkers und Patrioten(Stuttgart, 1877); T. Wotschke,Fichte und Erigena(1896); W. Kabitz,Studien zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Fichtehen Wissenschaftslehre aus der Kantischen Philosophie(1902); E. Lask,Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte(1902); X. LÃ©on,La Philos. de Fichte(1902); M. Wiener, J.G.Fichtes Lehre vom Wesen und Inhalt der Geschichte(1906).

On Fichteâ€™s social philosophy see,e.g., F. Schmidt-Warneck,Die Sociologie Fichtes(Berlin, 1884); W. Windelband,Fichtes Idee des deutschen Staates(1890); M. Weber,Fichtes Sozialismus und sein VerhÃ¤ltnis zur Marxâ€™schen Doctrin(1900); S.H. Gutman, J.G.Fichtes SozialpÃ¤dogogik(1907); H. Lindau,Johann G. Fichte und der neuere Socialismus(1900).

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