See Holdich,Indian Borderland(1901); C. E. Yate,Northern Afghanistan(1888).
See Holdich,Indian Borderland(1901); C. E. Yate,Northern Afghanistan(1888).
(T. H. H.*)
HÉRAULT,a department in the south of France, formed from Lower Languedoc. Pop. (1906) 482,779. Area, 2403 sq. m. It is bounded N.E. by Gard, N.W. by Aveyron and Tarn, and S. by Aude and the Golfe du Lion. The southern prolongation of the Cévennes mountains occupies the north-western zone of the department, the highest point being about 4250 ft. above the sea-level. South-east of this range comes a region of hills and plateaus decreasing in height as they approach the sea, from which they are separated by the rich plains at the mouth of the Orb and the Hérault and, farther to the north-east, by the line of intercommunicating salt lagoons (Etang de Thau, &c.) which fringes the coast. The region to the north-west of Montpellier comprises an extensive tract of country known as the Garrigues, a district of dry limestone plateaus and hills, which stretches into the neighbouring department of Gard. The mountains of the north-west form the watershed between the Atlantic and Mediterranean basins. From them flow the Hérault, its tributary the Lergue, and more to the south-west the Livron and the Orb, which are the main rivers of the department. Dry summers, varied by occasional violent storms, are characteristic of Hérault. The climate is naturally colder and more rainy in the mountains.
A third of the surface of Hérault is planted with vines, which are the chief source of agricultural wealth, the department ranking first in France with respect to the area of its vineyards; the red wines of St Georges, Cazouls-lès-Béziers, Picpoul and Maranssan, and the white wines of Frontignan and Lunel (pop. in 1906, 6769) are held in high estimation. The area given over to arable land and pasture is small in extent. Fruit trees of various kinds, but especially mulberries, olives and chestnuts flourish. The rearing of silk-worms is largely carried on. Considerable numbers of sheep are raised, their milk being utilized for the preparation of Roquefort cheeses. The mineral wealth of the department is considerable. There are mines of lignite, coal in the vicinity of Graissessac, iron, calamine and copper, and quarries of building-stone, limestone, gypsum, &c.; the marshes supply salt. Mineral springs are numerous, the most important being those of Lamalon-les-Bains and Balaruc-les-Bains. The chief manufactures are woollen and cotton cloth, especially for military use, silk (Ganges), casks, soap and fertilizing stuffs. There are also oil-works, distilleries (Béziers) and tanneries (Bédarieux). Fishing is an important industry. Cette and Mèze (pop. in 1906, 5574) are the chief ports. Hérault exports salt fish, wine, liqueurs, timber, salt, building-material, &c. It imports cattle, skins, wool, cereals, vegetables, coal and other commodities. The railway lines belong chiefly to theSouthern and Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée companies. The Canal du Midi traverses the south of the department for 44 m. and terminates at Cette. The Canal des Étangs traverses the department for about 20 m., forming part of a line of communication between Cette and Aigues-Mortes. Montpellier, the capital, is the seat of a bishopric of the province of Avignon, and of a court of appeal and centre of an academic (educational division). The department belongs to the 16th military region, which has its headquarters at Montpellier. It is divided into the arrondissements of Montpellier, Béziers, Lodève and St Pons, with 36 cantons and 340 communes.
Montpellier, Béziers, Lodève, Bédarieux, Cette, Agde, Pézenas, Lamalou-les-Bains and Clermont-l’Hérault are the more noteworthy towns and receive separate treatment. Among the other interesting places in the department are St Pons, with a church of the 12th century, once a cathedral, Villemagne, which has several old houses and two ruined churches, one of the 13th, the other of the 14th century; Pignan, a medieval town, near which is the interesting abbey-church of Vignogoul in the early Gothic style; and St Guilhem-le-Désert, which has a church of the 11th and 12th centuries. Maguelonne, which in the 6th century became the seat of a bishopric transferred to Montpellier in 1536, has a cathedral of the 12th century.
HÉRAULT DE SÉCHELLES, MARIE JEAN(1759-1794), French politician, was born at Paris on the 20th of September 1759, of a noble family connected with those of Contades and Polignac. He made his début as a lawyer at the Châtelet, and delivered some very successful speeches; later he wasavocat généralto the parlement of Paris. His legal occupations did not prevent him from devoting himself also to literature, and after 1789 he published an account of a visit he had made to the comte de Buffon at Montbard. Hérault’s account is marked by a delicate irony, and it has with some justice been called a masterpiece of interviewing, before the day of journalists. Hérault, who was an ardent champion of the Revolution, took part in the taking of the Bastille, and on the 8th of December 1789 was appointed judge of the court of the first arrondissement in the department of Paris. From the end of January to April 1791 Hérault was absent on a mission in Alsace, where he had been sent to restore order. On his return he was appointedcommissaire du roiin the court of cassation. He was elected as a deputy for Paris to the Legislative Assembly, where he gravitated more and more towards the extreme left; he was a member of several committees, and, when a member of the diplomatic committee, presented a famous report demanding that the nation should be declared to be in danger (11th June 1793). After the revolution of the 10th of August 1792 (seeFrench Revolution), he co-operated with Danton, one of the organizers of this rising, and on the 2nd of September was appointed president of the Legislative Assembly. He was a deputy to the National Convention for the department of Seine-et-Oise, and was sent on a mission to organize the new department of Mont Blanc. He was thus absent during the trial of Louis XVI., but he made it known that he approved of the condemnation of the king, and would probably have voted for the death penalty. On his return to Paris, Hérault was several times president of the Convention, notably on the 2nd of June 1793, the occasion of the attack on the Girondins, and on the 10th of August 1793, on which the passing of the new constitution was celebrated. On this occasion Hérault, as president of the Convention, had to make several speeches. It was he, moreover, who, on the rejection of the projected constitution drawn up by Condorcet, was entrusted with the task of preparing a fresh one; this work he performed within a few days, and his plan, which, however, differed very little from that of Condorcet, became the Constitution of 1793, which was passed, but never applied. As a member of the Committee of Public Safety, it was with diplomacy that Hérault was chiefly concerned, and from October to December 1793 he was employed on a diplomatic and military mission in Alsace. But this mission helped to make him an object of suspicion to the other members of the Committee of Public Safety, and especially to Robespierre, who as a deist and a fanatical follower of the ideas of Rousseau, hated Hérault, the follower of the naturalism of Diderot. He was accused of treason, and after being tried before the revolutionary tribunal, was condemned at the same time as Danton, and executed on the 16th Germinal in the year II. (5th April 1794). He was handsome, elegant and a lover of pleasure, and was one of the most individual figures of the Revolution.
See theVoyage à Montbard, published by A. Aulard (Paris, 1890); A. Aulard,Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1906); J. Claretie,Camille Desmoulins ... étude sur les Dantonistes(Paris, 1875); Dr Robinet,Le Procès des Dantonistes(Paris, 1879); “Hérault de Séchelles, sa première mission en Alsace” in the reviewLa Révolution Française, tome 22; E. Daudet,Le Roman d’un conventionnel. Hérault de Séchelles et les dames de Bellegarde(1904). HisŒuvres littéraireswere edited (Paris, 1907) by E. Dard.
See theVoyage à Montbard, published by A. Aulard (Paris, 1890); A. Aulard,Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1906); J. Claretie,Camille Desmoulins ... étude sur les Dantonistes(Paris, 1875); Dr Robinet,Le Procès des Dantonistes(Paris, 1879); “Hérault de Séchelles, sa première mission en Alsace” in the reviewLa Révolution Française, tome 22; E. Daudet,Le Roman d’un conventionnel. Hérault de Séchelles et les dames de Bellegarde(1904). HisŒuvres littéraireswere edited (Paris, 1907) by E. Dard.
(R. A.*)
HERB(Lat.herba, grass, food for cattle, generally taken to represent the Old Lat.forbea, Gr.φορβή, pasture,φέρβειν, to feed, Sans.bharb, to eat), in botany, the name given to those plants whose stem or stalk dies entirely or down to the root each year, and does not become, as in shrubs or trees, woody or permanent, such plants are also called “herbaceous.” The term “herb” is also used of those herbaceous plants, which possess certain properties, and are used for medicinal purposes, for flavouring or garnishing in cooking, and also for perfumes (seeHorticultureandPharmacology).
HERBARIUM,orHortus Siccus, a collection of plants so dried and preserved as to illustrate as far as possible their characters. Since the same plant, owing to peculiarities of climate, soil and situation, degree of exposure to light and other influences may vary greatly according to the locality in which it occurs, it is only by gathering together for comparison and study a large series of examples of each species that the flora of different regions can be satisfactorily represented. Even in the best equipped botanical garden it is impossible to have, at one and the same time, more than a very small percentage of the representatives of the flora of any given region or of any large group of plants. Hence a good herbarium forms an indispensable part of a botanical museum or institution. There are large herbaria at the British Museum and at the Royal Gardens, Kew, and smaller collections at the botanical institutions at the principal British universities. The original herbarium of Linnaeus is in the possession of the Linnaean Society of London. It was purchased from the widow of Linnaeus by Dr (afterwards Sir) J. E. Smith, one of the founders of the Linnaean Society, and after his death was purchased by the society. Herbaria are also associated with the more important botanic gardens and museums in other countries. The value of a herbarium is much enhanced by the possession of “types,” that is, the original specimens on the study of which a species was founded. Thus the herbarium at the British Museum, which is especially rich in the earlier collections made in the 18th and early 19th centuries, contains the types of many species founded by the earlier workers in botany. It is also rich in the types of Australian plants in the collections of Sir Joseph Banks and Robert Brown, and contains in addition many valuable modern collections. The Kew herbarium, founded by Sir William Hooker and greatly increased by his son Sir Joseph Hooker, is also very rich in types, especially those of plants described in theFlora of British Indiaand various colonial floras. The collection of Dillenius is deposited at Oxford, and that of Professor W. H. Harvey at Trinity College, Dublin. The collections of Antoine Laurent de Jussieu, his son Adrien, and of Auguste de St Hilaire, are included in the large herbarium of the Jardin des Plantes at Paris, and in the same city is the extensive private collection of Dr Ernest Cosson. At Geneva are three large collections—Augustin Pyrame de Candolle’s, containing the typical specimens of theProdromus, a large series of monographs of the families of flowering plants, Benjamin Delessert’s fine series at the Botanic Garden, and the Boissier Herbarium, which is rich in Mediterranean and Oriental plants. The university of Göttingen has had bequeathed to it the largest collection (exceeding 40,000 specimens) ever made by a single individual—that of Professor Grisebach. At theherbarium in Brussels are the specimens obtained by the traveller Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius, the majority of which formed the groundwork of hisFlora Brasiliensis. The Berlin herbarium is especially rich in more recent collections, and other national herbaria sufficiently extensive to subserve the requirements of the systematic botanist exist at St Petersburg, Vienna, Leiden, Stockholm, Upsala, Copenhagen and Florence. Of those in the United States of America, the chief, formed by Asa Gray, is the property of Harvard university; there is also a large one at the New York Botanical Garden. The herbarium at Melbourne, Australia, under Baron Müller, attained large proportions; and that of the Botanical Garden of Calcutta is noteworthy as the repository of numerous specimens described by writers on Indian botany.
Specimens of flowering plants and vascular cryptograms are generally mounted on sheets of stout smooth paper, of uniform quality; the size adopted at Kew is 17 in. long by 11 in. broad, that at the British Museum is slightly larger; the palms and their allies, however, and some ferns, require a larger size. The tough but flexible coarse grey paper (GermanFliesspapier), upon which on the Continent specimens are commonly fixed by gummed strips of the same, is less hygroscopic than ordinary cartridge paper, but has the disadvantage of affording harbourage in the inequalities of its surface to a minute insect,Atropos pulsatoria, which commits great havoc in damp specimens, and which, even if noticed, cannot be dislodged without difficulty. The majority of plant specimens are most suitably fastened on paper by a mixture of equal parts of gum tragacanth and gum arabic made into a thick paste with water. Rigid leathery leaves are fixed by means of glue, or, if they present too smooth a surface, by stitching at their edges. Where, as in private herbaria, the specimens are not liable to be handled with great frequency, a stitch here and there round the stem, tied at the back of the sheet, or slips of paper passed over the stem through two slits in the sheet and attached with gum to its back, or simply strips of gummed paper laid across the stem, may be resorted to.
To preserve from insects, the plants, after mounting, are often brushed over with a liquid formed by the solution of ¼ ℔. each of corrosive sublimate and carbolic acid in 1 gallon of methylated spirits. They are then laid out to dry on shelves made of a network of stout galvanized iron wire. The use of corrosive sublimate is not, however, recommended, as it forms on drying a fine powder which when the plants are handled will rub off and, being carried into the air, may prove injurious to workers. If the plants are subjected to some process, before mounting, by which injurious organisms are destroyed, such as exposure in a closed chamber to vapour of carbon bisulphide for some hours, the presence of pieces of camphor or naphthalene in the cabinet will be found a sufficient preservative. After mounting are written—usually in the right-hand corner of the sheet, or on a label there affixed—the designation of each species, the date and place of gathering, and the name of the collector. Other particulars as to habit, local abundance, soil and claim to be indigenous may be written on the back of the sheet or on a slip of writing paper attached to its edge. It is convenient to place in a small envelope gummed to an upper corner of the sheet any flowers, seeds or leaves needed for dissection or microscopical examination, especially where from the fixation of the specimen it is impossible to examine the leaves for oil-receptacles and where seed is apt to escape from ripe capsules and be lost. The addition of a careful dissection of a flower greatly increases the value of the specimen. To ensure that all shall lie evenly in the herbarium the plants should be made to occupy as far as possible alternately the right and left sides of their respective sheets. The species of each genus are then arranged either systematically or alphabetically in separate covers of stout, usually light brown paper, or, if the genus be large, in several covers with the name of the genus clearly indicated in the lower left-hand corner of each, and opposite it the names or reference numbers of the species. Undetermined species are relegated to the end of the genus. Thus prepared, the specimens are placed on shelves or movable trays, at intervals of about 6 in., in an air-tight cupboard, on the inner side of the door of which, as a special protection against insects, is suspended a muslin bag containing a piece of camphor.
The systematic arrangement varies in different herbaria. In the great British herbaria the orders and genera of flowering plants are usually arranged according to Bentham and Hooker’sGenera plantarum; the species generally follow the arrangement of the most recent complete monograph of the family. In non-flowering plants the works usually followed are for ferns, Hooker and Baker’sSynopsis filicum; for mosses, Müller’sSynopsis muscorum frondosorum, Jaeger & Sauerbeck’sGenera et species muscorum, and Engler & Prantl’sPflanzenfamilien; for algae, de Toni’sSylloge algarum; for hepaticae, Gottsche, Lindenberg and Nees ab Esenbeck’sSynopsis hepaticarum, supplemented by Stephani’sSpecies hepaticarum; for fungi, Saccardo’sSylloge fungorum, and for mycetozoa Lister’s monograph of the group. For the members of large genera,e.g.PiperandFicus, since the number of cosmopolitan or very widely distributed species is comparatively few, a geographical grouping is found specially convenient by those who are constantly receiving parcels of plants from known foreign sources. The ordinary systematic arrangement possesses the great advantage, in the case of large genera, of readily indicating the affinities of any particular specimen with the forms most nearly allied to it. Instead of keeping a catalogue of the species contained in the herbarium, which, owing to the constant additions, would be almost impossible, such species are usually ticked off with a pencil in the systematic work which is followed in arranging them, so that by reference to this work it is possible to see at a glance whether the specimen sought is in the herbarium and what species are still wanted.
Specimens intended for the herbarium should be collected when possible in dry weather, care being taken to select plants or portions of plants in sufficient number and of a size adequate to illustrate all the characteristic features of the species. When the root-leaves and roots present any peculiarities, they should invariably be collected, but the roots should be dried separately in an oven at a moderate heat. Roots and fruits too bulky to be placed on the sheet of the herbarium may be conveniently arranged in glass-covered boxes contained in drawers. The best and most effective mode of drying specimens is learned only by experience, different species requiring special treatment according to their several peculiarities. The chief points to be attended to are to have a plentiful supply of botanical drying paper, so as to be able to use about six sheets for each specimen; to change the paper at intervals of six to twelve hours; to avoid contact of one leaf or flower with another; and to increase the pressure applied only in proportion to the dryness of the specimen. To preserve the colour of flowers pledgets of cotton wool, which prevent bruising, should be introduced between them, as also, if the stamens are thick and succulent, as inDigitalis, between these and the corolla. A flower dissected and gummed on the sheets will often retain the colour which it is impossible to preserve in a crowded inflorescence. A flat sheet of lead or some other suitable weight should be laid upon the top of the pile of specimens, so as to keep up a continuous pressure. Succulent specimens, as many of theOrchidaceaeand sedums and various other Crassulaceous plants, require to be killed by immersion in boiling water before being placed in drying paper, or, instead of becoming dry, they will grow between the sheets. When, as with some plants likeVerbascum, the thick hard stems are liable to cause the leaves to wrinkle in drying by removing the pressure from them, small pieces of bibulous paper or cotton wool may be placed upon the leaves near their point of attachment to the stem. When a number of specimens have to be submitted to pressure, ventilation is secured by means of frames corresponding in size to the drying paper, and composed of strips of wood or wires laid across each other so as to form a kind of network. Another mode of drying is to keep the specimens in a box of dry sand in a warm place for ten or twelve hours, and then press them in drying paper. A third method consists in placing the specimen within bibulous paper, and enclosing the whole between two plates of coarsely perforated zinc supported in a wooden frame. The zinc plates are then drawn close together by means of straps, and suspended before a fire until the drying is effected. By the last two methods the colour of the flowers may be well preserved. When the leaves are finely divided, as inConium, much trouble will be experienced in lifting a half-dried specimen from one paper to another; but the plant may be placed in a sheet of thin blotting paper, and the sheet containing the plant, instead of the plant itself, can then be moved. Thin straw-coloured paper, such as is used for biscuit bags, may be conveniently employed by travellers unable to carry a quantity ofbibulous paper. It offers the advantage of fitting closely to thick-stemmed specimens and of rapidly drying. A light but strong portfolio, to which pressure by means of straps can be applied, and a few quires of this paper, if the paper be changed night and morning, will be usually sufficient to dry all except very succulent plants. When a specimen is too large for one sheet, and it is necessary, in order to show its habit, &c., to dry the whole of it, it may be divided into two or three portions, and each placed on a separate sheet for drying. Specimens may be judged to be dry when they no longer cause a cold sensation when applied to the cheek, or assume a rigidity not evident in the earlier stages of preparation.Each class of flowerless or cryptogamic plants requires special treatment for the herbarium.Marine algae are usually mounted on tough smooth white cartridge paper in the following manner. Growing specimens of good colour and in fruit are if possible selected, and cleansed as much as practicable from adhering foreign particles, either in the sea or a rocky pool. Some species rapidly change colour, and cause the decay of any others with which they come in contact. This is especially the case with theEctocarpi,Desmarestiae, and a few others, which should therefore be brought home in a separate vessel. In mounting, the specimen is floated out in a flat white dish containing sea-water, so that foreign matter may be detected, and a piece of paper of suitable size is placed under it, supported either by the fingers of the left hand or by a palette. It is then pruned, in order clearly to show the mode of branching, and is spread out as naturally as possible with the right hand. For this purpose a bone knitting-needle answers well for the coarse species, and a camel’s-hair pencil for the more delicate ones. The paper with the specimen is then carefully removed from the water by sliding it over the edge of the dish so as to drain it as much as possible. If during this process part of the fronds run together, the beauty of the specimen may be restored by dipping the edge into water, so as to float out the part and allow it to subside naturally on the paper. The paper, with the specimen upwards, is then laid on bibulous paper for a few minutes to absorb as much as possible of the superfluous moisture. When freed from excess of water it is laid on a sheet of thick white blotting-paper, and a piece of smooth washed calico is placed upon it (unwashed calico, on account of its “facing,” adheres to the sea-weed). Another sheet of blotting-paper is then laid over it; and, a number of similar specimens being formed into a pile, the whole is submitted to pressure, the paper being changed every hour or two at first. The pressure is increased, and the papers are changed less frequently as the specimens become dry, which usually takes place in thirty-six hours. Some species, especially those of a thick or leathery texture, contract so much in drying that without strong pressure the edges of the paper become puckered. Other species of a gelatinous nature, likeNemalionandDudresnaya, may be allowed to dry on the paper, and need not be submitted to pressure until they no longer present a gelatinous appearance. Large coarse algae, such, for instance, as theFucaceaeandLaminariae, do not readily adhere to paper, and require soaking for some time in fresh water before being pressed. The less robust species, such asSphacelaria scoparia, which do not adhere well to paper, may be made to do so by brushing them over either with milk carefully skimmed, or with a liquid formed by placing isinglass (¼ oz.) and water (1½ oz.) in a wide-mouthed bottle, and the bottle in a small glue-pot or saucepan containing cold water, heating until solution is effected, and then adding 1 oz. of rectified spirits of wine; the whole is next stirred together, and when cold is kept in a stoppered bottle. For use, the mixture is warmed to render it fluid, and applied by means of a camel’s hair brush to the under side of the specimen, which is then laid neatly on paper. For the more delicate species, such as theCallithamniaandEctocarpi, it is an excellent plan to place a small fruiting fragment, carefully floated out in water, on a slip of mica of the size of an ordinary microscopical slide, and allow it to dry. The plant can then be at any time examined under the microscope without injuring the mounted specimen. Many of the fresh-water algae which form a mere crust, such asPalmella cruenta, may be placed in a vessel of water, where after a time they float like a scum, the earthy matter settling down to the bottom, and may then be mounted by slipping a piece of mica under them and allowing it to dry.Oscillatoriaemay be mounted by laying a portion on a silver coin placed on a piece of paper in a plate, and pouring in water until the edge of the coin is just covered. The alga by its own peculiar movement will soon form a radiating circle, perfectly free from dirt, around the coin, which may then be removed. There is considerable difficulty in removing mounted specimens of algae from paper, and therefore a small portion preserved on mica should accompany each specimen, enclosed for safety in a small envelope fastened at one corner of the sheet of paper. Filamentous diatoms may be mounted like ordinary sea-weeds, and, as well as all parasitic algae, should whenever possible be allowed to remain attached to a portion of the alga on which they grow, some species being almost alwaysfoundparasitical on particular plants. Ordinary diatoms and desmids may be mounted on mica, as above described, by putting a portion in a vessel of water and exposing it to sunlight, when they rise to the surface, and may be thus removed comparatively free from dirt or impurity. Owing to their want of adhesiveness, they are, however, usually mounted on glass as microscopic slides, either in glycerin jelly, Canada balsam or some other suitable medium.Lichens are generally mounted on sheets of paper of the ordinary size, several specimens from different localities being laid upon one sheet, each specimen having been first placed on a small square of paper which is gummed on the sheet, and which has the locality, date, name of collector, &c., written upon it. This mode has some disadvantages attending it; such sheets are difficult to handle; the crustaceous species are liable to have their surfaces rubbed; the foliaceous species become so compressed as to lose their characteristic appearance; and the spaces between the sheets caused by the thickness of the specimen permit the entrance of dust. A plan which has been found to answer well is to arrange them in cardboard boxes, either with glass tops or in sliding covers, in drawers—the name being placed outside each box and the specimens gummed into the boxes. Lichens for the herbarium should, whenever possible, be sought for on a slaty or laminated rock, so as to procure them on flat thin pieces of the same, suitable for mounting. Specimens on the bark of trees require pressure until the bark is dry, lest they become curled; and those growing on sand or friable soil, such asConiocybe furfuracea, should be laid carefully on a layer of gum in the box in which they are intended to be kept. Many lichens, such as theVerrucariaeandCollemaceae, are found in the best condition during the winter months. In mounting collemas it is advisable to let the specimen become dry and hard, and then to separate a portion from adherent mosses, earth, &c., and mount it separately so as to show the branching of the thallus.Pertusariaeshould be represented by both fruiting and sorediate specimens.The larger species of fungi, such as theAgariciniandPolyporei, &c., are prepared for the herbarium by cutting a slice out of the centre of the plant so as to show the outline of the cap or pileus, the attachment of the gills, and the character of the interior of the stem. The remaining portions of the pileus are then lightly pressed, as well as the central slices, between bibulous paper until dry, and the whole is then “poisoned,” and gummed on a sheet of paper in such a manner as to show the under surface of the one and the upper surface of the other half of the pileus on the same sheet. A “map” of the spores should be taken by separating a pileus and placing it flat on a piece of thin paper for a few hours when the spores will fall and leave a nature print of the arrangement of the gills which may be fixed by gumming the other side of the paper. As it is impossible to preserve the natural colours of fungi, the specimens should, whenever possible, be accompanied by a coloured drawing of the plant. Microscopic fungi are usually preserved in envelopes, or simply attached to sheets of paper or mounted as microscopic slides. Those fungi which are of a dusty nature, and theMyxomycetesorMycetozoamay, like the lichens, be preserved in small boxes and arranged in drawers. Fungi under any circumstances form the least satisfactory portion of an herbarium.Mosses when growing in tufts should be gathered just before the capsules have become brown, divided into small flat portions, and pressed lightly in drying paper. During this process the capsules ripen, and are thus obtained in a perfect state. They are then preserved in envelopes attached to a sheet of paper of the ordinary size, a single perfect specimen being washed, and spread out under the envelope so as to show the habit of the plant. For attaching it to the paper a strong mucilage of gum tragacanth, containing an eighth of its weight of spirit of wine, answers best. If not preserved in an envelope the calyptra and operculum are very apt to fall off and become lost. Scale-mosses are mounted in the same way, or may be floated out in water like sea-weeds, and dried in white blotting paper under strong pressure before gumming on paper, but are best mounted as microscopic slides, care being taken to show the stipules. The specimens should be collected when the capsules are just appearing above or in the colesule or calyx; if kept in a damp saucer they soon arrive at maturity, and can then be mounted in better condition, the fruit-stalks being too fragile to bear carriage in a botanical tin case without injury.Of theCharaceaemany are so exceedingly brittle that it is best to float them out like sea-weeds, except the prickly species, which may be carefully laid out on bibulous paper, and when dry fastened on sheets of white paper by means of gummed strips. Care should be taken in collecting charae to secure, in the case of dioecious species, specimens of both forms, and also to get when possible the roots of those species on which the small granular starchy bodies or gemmae are found, as inC. fragifera. Portions of the fructification may be preserved in small envelopes attached to the sheets.
Specimens intended for the herbarium should be collected when possible in dry weather, care being taken to select plants or portions of plants in sufficient number and of a size adequate to illustrate all the characteristic features of the species. When the root-leaves and roots present any peculiarities, they should invariably be collected, but the roots should be dried separately in an oven at a moderate heat. Roots and fruits too bulky to be placed on the sheet of the herbarium may be conveniently arranged in glass-covered boxes contained in drawers. The best and most effective mode of drying specimens is learned only by experience, different species requiring special treatment according to their several peculiarities. The chief points to be attended to are to have a plentiful supply of botanical drying paper, so as to be able to use about six sheets for each specimen; to change the paper at intervals of six to twelve hours; to avoid contact of one leaf or flower with another; and to increase the pressure applied only in proportion to the dryness of the specimen. To preserve the colour of flowers pledgets of cotton wool, which prevent bruising, should be introduced between them, as also, if the stamens are thick and succulent, as inDigitalis, between these and the corolla. A flower dissected and gummed on the sheets will often retain the colour which it is impossible to preserve in a crowded inflorescence. A flat sheet of lead or some other suitable weight should be laid upon the top of the pile of specimens, so as to keep up a continuous pressure. Succulent specimens, as many of theOrchidaceaeand sedums and various other Crassulaceous plants, require to be killed by immersion in boiling water before being placed in drying paper, or, instead of becoming dry, they will grow between the sheets. When, as with some plants likeVerbascum, the thick hard stems are liable to cause the leaves to wrinkle in drying by removing the pressure from them, small pieces of bibulous paper or cotton wool may be placed upon the leaves near their point of attachment to the stem. When a number of specimens have to be submitted to pressure, ventilation is secured by means of frames corresponding in size to the drying paper, and composed of strips of wood or wires laid across each other so as to form a kind of network. Another mode of drying is to keep the specimens in a box of dry sand in a warm place for ten or twelve hours, and then press them in drying paper. A third method consists in placing the specimen within bibulous paper, and enclosing the whole between two plates of coarsely perforated zinc supported in a wooden frame. The zinc plates are then drawn close together by means of straps, and suspended before a fire until the drying is effected. By the last two methods the colour of the flowers may be well preserved. When the leaves are finely divided, as inConium, much trouble will be experienced in lifting a half-dried specimen from one paper to another; but the plant may be placed in a sheet of thin blotting paper, and the sheet containing the plant, instead of the plant itself, can then be moved. Thin straw-coloured paper, such as is used for biscuit bags, may be conveniently employed by travellers unable to carry a quantity ofbibulous paper. It offers the advantage of fitting closely to thick-stemmed specimens and of rapidly drying. A light but strong portfolio, to which pressure by means of straps can be applied, and a few quires of this paper, if the paper be changed night and morning, will be usually sufficient to dry all except very succulent plants. When a specimen is too large for one sheet, and it is necessary, in order to show its habit, &c., to dry the whole of it, it may be divided into two or three portions, and each placed on a separate sheet for drying. Specimens may be judged to be dry when they no longer cause a cold sensation when applied to the cheek, or assume a rigidity not evident in the earlier stages of preparation.
Each class of flowerless or cryptogamic plants requires special treatment for the herbarium.
Marine algae are usually mounted on tough smooth white cartridge paper in the following manner. Growing specimens of good colour and in fruit are if possible selected, and cleansed as much as practicable from adhering foreign particles, either in the sea or a rocky pool. Some species rapidly change colour, and cause the decay of any others with which they come in contact. This is especially the case with theEctocarpi,Desmarestiae, and a few others, which should therefore be brought home in a separate vessel. In mounting, the specimen is floated out in a flat white dish containing sea-water, so that foreign matter may be detected, and a piece of paper of suitable size is placed under it, supported either by the fingers of the left hand or by a palette. It is then pruned, in order clearly to show the mode of branching, and is spread out as naturally as possible with the right hand. For this purpose a bone knitting-needle answers well for the coarse species, and a camel’s-hair pencil for the more delicate ones. The paper with the specimen is then carefully removed from the water by sliding it over the edge of the dish so as to drain it as much as possible. If during this process part of the fronds run together, the beauty of the specimen may be restored by dipping the edge into water, so as to float out the part and allow it to subside naturally on the paper. The paper, with the specimen upwards, is then laid on bibulous paper for a few minutes to absorb as much as possible of the superfluous moisture. When freed from excess of water it is laid on a sheet of thick white blotting-paper, and a piece of smooth washed calico is placed upon it (unwashed calico, on account of its “facing,” adheres to the sea-weed). Another sheet of blotting-paper is then laid over it; and, a number of similar specimens being formed into a pile, the whole is submitted to pressure, the paper being changed every hour or two at first. The pressure is increased, and the papers are changed less frequently as the specimens become dry, which usually takes place in thirty-six hours. Some species, especially those of a thick or leathery texture, contract so much in drying that without strong pressure the edges of the paper become puckered. Other species of a gelatinous nature, likeNemalionandDudresnaya, may be allowed to dry on the paper, and need not be submitted to pressure until they no longer present a gelatinous appearance. Large coarse algae, such, for instance, as theFucaceaeandLaminariae, do not readily adhere to paper, and require soaking for some time in fresh water before being pressed. The less robust species, such asSphacelaria scoparia, which do not adhere well to paper, may be made to do so by brushing them over either with milk carefully skimmed, or with a liquid formed by placing isinglass (¼ oz.) and water (1½ oz.) in a wide-mouthed bottle, and the bottle in a small glue-pot or saucepan containing cold water, heating until solution is effected, and then adding 1 oz. of rectified spirits of wine; the whole is next stirred together, and when cold is kept in a stoppered bottle. For use, the mixture is warmed to render it fluid, and applied by means of a camel’s hair brush to the under side of the specimen, which is then laid neatly on paper. For the more delicate species, such as theCallithamniaandEctocarpi, it is an excellent plan to place a small fruiting fragment, carefully floated out in water, on a slip of mica of the size of an ordinary microscopical slide, and allow it to dry. The plant can then be at any time examined under the microscope without injuring the mounted specimen. Many of the fresh-water algae which form a mere crust, such asPalmella cruenta, may be placed in a vessel of water, where after a time they float like a scum, the earthy matter settling down to the bottom, and may then be mounted by slipping a piece of mica under them and allowing it to dry.Oscillatoriaemay be mounted by laying a portion on a silver coin placed on a piece of paper in a plate, and pouring in water until the edge of the coin is just covered. The alga by its own peculiar movement will soon form a radiating circle, perfectly free from dirt, around the coin, which may then be removed. There is considerable difficulty in removing mounted specimens of algae from paper, and therefore a small portion preserved on mica should accompany each specimen, enclosed for safety in a small envelope fastened at one corner of the sheet of paper. Filamentous diatoms may be mounted like ordinary sea-weeds, and, as well as all parasitic algae, should whenever possible be allowed to remain attached to a portion of the alga on which they grow, some species being almost alwaysfoundparasitical on particular plants. Ordinary diatoms and desmids may be mounted on mica, as above described, by putting a portion in a vessel of water and exposing it to sunlight, when they rise to the surface, and may be thus removed comparatively free from dirt or impurity. Owing to their want of adhesiveness, they are, however, usually mounted on glass as microscopic slides, either in glycerin jelly, Canada balsam or some other suitable medium.
Lichens are generally mounted on sheets of paper of the ordinary size, several specimens from different localities being laid upon one sheet, each specimen having been first placed on a small square of paper which is gummed on the sheet, and which has the locality, date, name of collector, &c., written upon it. This mode has some disadvantages attending it; such sheets are difficult to handle; the crustaceous species are liable to have their surfaces rubbed; the foliaceous species become so compressed as to lose their characteristic appearance; and the spaces between the sheets caused by the thickness of the specimen permit the entrance of dust. A plan which has been found to answer well is to arrange them in cardboard boxes, either with glass tops or in sliding covers, in drawers—the name being placed outside each box and the specimens gummed into the boxes. Lichens for the herbarium should, whenever possible, be sought for on a slaty or laminated rock, so as to procure them on flat thin pieces of the same, suitable for mounting. Specimens on the bark of trees require pressure until the bark is dry, lest they become curled; and those growing on sand or friable soil, such asConiocybe furfuracea, should be laid carefully on a layer of gum in the box in which they are intended to be kept. Many lichens, such as theVerrucariaeandCollemaceae, are found in the best condition during the winter months. In mounting collemas it is advisable to let the specimen become dry and hard, and then to separate a portion from adherent mosses, earth, &c., and mount it separately so as to show the branching of the thallus.Pertusariaeshould be represented by both fruiting and sorediate specimens.
The larger species of fungi, such as theAgariciniandPolyporei, &c., are prepared for the herbarium by cutting a slice out of the centre of the plant so as to show the outline of the cap or pileus, the attachment of the gills, and the character of the interior of the stem. The remaining portions of the pileus are then lightly pressed, as well as the central slices, between bibulous paper until dry, and the whole is then “poisoned,” and gummed on a sheet of paper in such a manner as to show the under surface of the one and the upper surface of the other half of the pileus on the same sheet. A “map” of the spores should be taken by separating a pileus and placing it flat on a piece of thin paper for a few hours when the spores will fall and leave a nature print of the arrangement of the gills which may be fixed by gumming the other side of the paper. As it is impossible to preserve the natural colours of fungi, the specimens should, whenever possible, be accompanied by a coloured drawing of the plant. Microscopic fungi are usually preserved in envelopes, or simply attached to sheets of paper or mounted as microscopic slides. Those fungi which are of a dusty nature, and theMyxomycetesorMycetozoamay, like the lichens, be preserved in small boxes and arranged in drawers. Fungi under any circumstances form the least satisfactory portion of an herbarium.
Mosses when growing in tufts should be gathered just before the capsules have become brown, divided into small flat portions, and pressed lightly in drying paper. During this process the capsules ripen, and are thus obtained in a perfect state. They are then preserved in envelopes attached to a sheet of paper of the ordinary size, a single perfect specimen being washed, and spread out under the envelope so as to show the habit of the plant. For attaching it to the paper a strong mucilage of gum tragacanth, containing an eighth of its weight of spirit of wine, answers best. If not preserved in an envelope the calyptra and operculum are very apt to fall off and become lost. Scale-mosses are mounted in the same way, or may be floated out in water like sea-weeds, and dried in white blotting paper under strong pressure before gumming on paper, but are best mounted as microscopic slides, care being taken to show the stipules. The specimens should be collected when the capsules are just appearing above or in the colesule or calyx; if kept in a damp saucer they soon arrive at maturity, and can then be mounted in better condition, the fruit-stalks being too fragile to bear carriage in a botanical tin case without injury.
Of theCharaceaemany are so exceedingly brittle that it is best to float them out like sea-weeds, except the prickly species, which may be carefully laid out on bibulous paper, and when dry fastened on sheets of white paper by means of gummed strips. Care should be taken in collecting charae to secure, in the case of dioecious species, specimens of both forms, and also to get when possible the roots of those species on which the small granular starchy bodies or gemmae are found, as inC. fragifera. Portions of the fructification may be preserved in small envelopes attached to the sheets.
HERBART, JOHANN FRIEDRICH(1776-1841), German philosopher and educationist, was born at Oldenburg on the 4th of May 1776. After studying under Fichte at Jena he gave his first philosophical lectures at Göttingen in 1805, whence he removed in 1809 to occupy the chair formerly held by Kant at Königsberg. Here he also established and conducted a seminary of pedagogy till 1833, when he returned once more to Göttingen, and remained there as professor of philosophy till his death on the 14th of August 1841.
Philosophy, according to Herbart, begins with reflection upon our empirical conceptions, and consists in the reformation and elaboration of these—its three primary divisions being determined by asmany distinct forms of elaboration. Logic, which stands first, has to render our conceptions and the judgments and reasonings arising from them clear and distinct. But some conceptions are such that the more distinct they are made the more contradictory their elements become; so to change and supplement these as to make them at length thinkable is the problem of the second part of philosophy, or metaphysics. There is still a class of conceptions requiring more than a logical treatment, but differing from the last in not involving latent contradictions, and in being independent of the reality of their objects, the conceptions, viz. that embody our judgments of approval and disapproval; the philosophic treatment of these conceptions falls to Aesthetic.In Herbart’s writings logic receives comparatively meagre notice; he insisted strongly on its purely formal character, and expressed himself in the main at one with Kantians such as Fries and Krug.As a metaphysician he starts from what he terms “the higher scepticism” of the Hume-Kantian sphere of thought, the beginnings of which he discerns in Locke’s perplexity about the idea of substance. By this scepticism the real validity of even theformsof experience is called in question on account of the contradictions they are found to involve. And yet that these forms are “given” to us, as truly as sensations are, follows beyond doubt when we consider that we are as little able to control the one as the other. To attempt at this stage a psychological inquiry into the origin of these conceptions would be doubly a mistake; for we should have to use these unlegitimated conceptions in the course of it, and the task of clearing up their contradictions would still remain, whether we succeeded in our enquiry or not. But how are we to set about this task? We have given to us a conception A uniting among its constituent marks two that prove to be contradictory, say M and N; and we can neither deny the unity nor reject one of the contradictory members. For to do either is forbidden by experience; and yet to do nothing is forbidden by logic. We are thus driven to the assumption that the conception is contradictory because incomplete; but how are we to supplement it? What we have must point the way to what we want, or our procedure will be arbitrary. Experience asserts that M is the same (i.e.a mark of the same concept) as N, while logic denies it; and so—it being impossible for one and the same M to sustain these contradictory positions—there is but one way open to us; we must positseveralMs. But even now we cannot say one of these Ms is the same as N, another is not; for every M must be both thinkable and valid. We may, however, take the Ms not singly but together; and again, no other course being open to us, this is what we must do; we must assume that N results from a combination of Ms. This is Herbart’s method of relations, the counterpart in his system of the Hegelian dialectic.In theOntologythis method is employed to determine what in reality corresponds to the empirical conceptions of substance and cause, or rather of inherence and change. But first we must analyse this notion of reality itself, to which our scepticism had already led us, for, though we could doubt whether “the given” is what it appears, we cannot doubt that it is something; the conception of the real thus consists of the two conceptions of being and quality. That which we are compelled to “posit,” which cannot be sublated, is that whichis, and in the recognition of this lies the simple conception of being. But when is a thing thus posited? When it is posited as we are wont to posit the things we see and taste and handle. If we were without sensations,i.e.were never bound against our will to endure the persistence of a presentation, we should never know what being is. Keeping fast hold of this idea of absolute position, Herbart leads us next to the quality of the real. (1) This must exclude everything negative; for non-A sublates instead of positing, and is not absolute, but relative to A. (2) The real must be absolutely simple; for if it contain two determinations, A and B, then either these are reducible to one, which is the true quality, or they are not, when each is conditioned by the other and their position is no longer absolute. (3) All quantitative conceptions are excluded, for quantity implies parts, and these are incompatible with simplicity. (4) But there may be a plurality of “reals,” albeit the mere conception of being can tell us nothing as to this. The doctrine here developed is the first cardinal point of Herbart’s system, and has obtained for it the name of “pluralistic realism.”The contradictions he finds in the common-sense conception of inherence, or of “a thing with several attributes,” will now become obvious. Let us take some thing, say A, havingnattributes,a,b,c...: we are forced to posit each of these because each is presented in intuition. But in conceiving A we make, notnpositions, still lessn+ 1 positions, but one position simply; for common sense removes the absolute position from its original source, sensation. So when we ask, What is the one posited? we are told—the possessor ofa,b,c..., or in other words, their seat or substance. But if so, then A, as a real, being simple, must =a; similarly it must =b; and so on. Now this would be possible ifa,b,c... were but “contingent aspects” of A, ase.g.2³, √64, 4 + 3 + 1 are contingent aspects of 8. Such, of course, is not the case, and so we have as many contradictions as there are attributes; for we must say A isa, is nota, isb, is notb, &c. There must then, according to the method of relations, be several As. For a let us assume A1+ A1+ A1...; forb, A2+ A2+ A2...; and so on for the rest. But now what relation can there be among these several As, which will restore to us the unity of our original A or substance? There is but one; we must assume that the first A of every series is identical, just as the centre is the same point in every radius. By way of concrete illustration Herbart instances “the common observation that the properties of things exist only under external conditions. Bodies, we say, are coloured, but colour is nothing without light, and nothing without eyes. They sound, but only in a vibrating medium, and for healthy ears. Colour and tone present the appearance of inherence, but on looking closer we find they are not really immanent in things but rather presuppose a communion among several.” The result then is briefly thus: In place of the one absolute position, which in some unthinkable way the common understanding substitutes for the absolute positions of thenattributes, we have really a series of two or more positions for each attribute, every series, however, beginning with the same (as it were, central) real (hence the unity of substance in a group of attributes), but each being continued by different reals (hence the plurality and difference of attributes in unity of substance). Where there is the appearance of inherence, therefore, there is always a plurality of reals; no such correlative to substance as attribute or accident can be admitted at all. Substantiality is impossible without causality, and to this as its true correlative we now turn.The common-sense conception of change involves at bottom the same contradiction of opposing qualities in one real. The same A that wasa,b,c... becomesa,b,d...; and this, which experience thrusts upon us, proves on reflection unthinkable. The metaphysical supplementing is also fundamentally as before. Sincecdepended on a series of reals A3+ A3+ A3... in connexion with A, anddmay be said similarly to depend on a series A4+ A4+ A4..., then the change fromctodmeans, not that the central real A or any real has changed, but that A is now in connexion with A4, &c., and no longer in connexion with A3, &c.But to think a number of reals “in connexion” (Zusammensein) will not suffice as an explanation of phenomena; something or other must happen when they are in connexion; what is it? The answer to this question is the second hinge-point of Herbart’s theoretical philosophy. What “actually happens” as distinct from all that seems to happen, when two reals A and B are together is that, assuming them to differ in quality, they tend to disturb each other to the extent of that difference, at the same time that each preserves itself intact by resisting, as it were, the other’s disturbance. And so by coming into connexion with different reals the “self-preservations” of A will vary accordingly, A remaining the same through all; just as, by way of illustration, hydrogen remains the same in water and in ammonia, or as the same line may be now a normal and now a tangent. But to indicate this opposition in the qualities of the reals A + B, we must substitute for these symbols others, which, though only “contingent aspects” of A and B,i.e.representing their relations, not themselves, yet like similar devices in mathematics enable thought to advance. Thus we may put A = α + β − γ, B =m+n+ γ; γ then represents the character of the self-preservations in this case, and α + β +m+nrepresents all that could be observed by a spectator who did not know the simple qualities, but was himself involved in the relations of A to B; and such is exactly our position.Having thus determined what really is and what actually happens, our philosopher proceeds next to explain synthetically the objective semblance (der objective Schein) that results from these. But if this construction is to be truly objective,i.e.valid for all intelligences, ontology must furnish us with a clue. This we have in the forms of Space, Time and Motion which are involved whenever we think the reals as being in, or coming into, connexion and the opposite. These forms then cannot be merely the products of our psychological mechanism, though they may turn out to coincide with these. Meanwhile let us call them “intelligible,” as being valid for all who comprehend the real and actual by thought, although no such forms are predicable of the real and actual themselves. The elementary spatial relation Herbart conceives to be “the contiguity (Aneinander) of two points,” so that every “pure and independent line” is discrete. But an investigation of dependent lines which are often incommensurable forces us to adopt the contradictory fiction of partially overlapping,i.e.divisible points, or in other words, the conception of Continuity.1But the contradiction here is one we cannot eliminate by the method of relations, because it does not involve anything real; and in fact as a necessary outcome of an “intelligible” form, the fiction of continuity is valid for the “objective semblance,” and no more to be discarded than say √−1. By its help we are enabled to comprehend what actually happens among reals to produce the appearance of matter. When three or more reals are together, each disturbance and self-preservation will (in general) be imperfect,i.e.of less intensity than when only two reals are together. But “objective semblance” corresponds with reality; the spatial or external relations of the reals in this case must, therefore, tally with their inner or actual states. Had the self-preservations been perfect, the coincidence in space would have been complete, and the group of reals would have been inextended; or had the several reals been simply contiguous,i.e.without connexion, then, as nothingwould actually have happened, nothing would appear. As it is we shall find a continuous molecule manifesting attractive and repulsive forces; attraction corresponding to the tendency of the self-preservations to become perfect, repulsion to the frustration of this. Motion, even more evidently than space, implicates the contradictory conception of continuity, and cannot, therefore, be a real predicate, though valid as an intelligible form and necessary to the comprehension of the objective semblance. For we have to think of the reals as absolutely independent and yet as entering into connexions. This we can only do by conceiving them as originally moving through intelligible space in rectilinear paths and with uniform velocities. For such motion no cause need be supposed; motion, in fact, is no more a state of the moving real than rest is, both alike being but relations, with which, therefore, the real has no concern. The changes in this motion, however, for which weshouldrequire a cause, would be the objective semblance of the self-preservations that actually occur when reals meet. Further, by means of such motion these actual occurrences, which are in themselves timeless, fall for an observer in a definite time—a time which becomes continuous through the partial coincidence of events.But in all this it has been assumed that we are spectators of the objective semblance; it remains to make good this assumption, or, in other words, to show the possibility of knowledge; this is the problem of what Herbart terms Eidolology, and forms the transition from metaphysic to psychology. Here, again, a contradictory conception blocks the way, that, viz. of the Ego as the identity of knowing and being, and as such the stronghold of idealism. The contradiction becomes more evident when the ego is defined to be a subject (and so a real) that is its own object. As real and not merely formal, this conception of the ego is amenable to the method of relations. The solution this method furnishes is summarily that there are several objects which mutually modify each other, and so constitute that ego we take for the presented real. But to explain this modification is the business of psychology; it is enough now to see that the subject like all reals is necessarily unknown, and that, therefore, the idealist’s theory of knowledge is unsound. But though the simple quality of the subject or soul is beyond knowledge, we know what actually happens when it is in connexion with other’s reals, for its self-preservations then are what we call sensations. And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit absolutely.In hisPsychologyHerbart rejects altogether the doctrine of mental faculties as one refuted by his metaphysics, and tries to show that all psychical phenomena whatever result from the action and interaction of elementary ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen). The soul being one and simple, its separate acts of self-preservation or primary presentations must be simple too, and its several presentations must become united together. And this they can do at once and completely when, as is the case, for example, with the several attributes of an object, they are not of opposite quality. But otherwise there ensues a conflict in which the opposed presentations comport themselves like forces and mutually suppress or obscure each other. The act of presentation (Vorstellen) then becomes partly transformed into an effort, and its product, the idea, becomes in the same proportion less and less intense till a position of equilibrium is reached; and then at length the remainders coalesce. We have thus a statics and a mechanics of mind which investigate respectively the conditions of equilibrium and of movement among presentations. In the statics two magnitudes have to be determined: (1) the amount of the suppression or inhibition (Hemmungssumme), and (2) the ratio in which this is shared among the opposing presentations. The first must obviously be as small as possible; thus for two totally-opposed presentations a and b, of which a is the greater, theinhibendum=b. For a given degree of opposition this burden will be shared between the conflicting presentations in the inverse ratio of their strength. When its remainder after inhibition = 0, a presentation is said to be on the threshold of consciousness, for on a small diminution of the inhibition the “effort” will become actual presentation in the same proportion. Such total exclusion from consciousness is, however, manifestly impossible with only two presentations,2though with three or a greater number the residual value of one may even be negative. The first and simplest law in psychological mechanics relates to the “sinking” of inhibited presentations. As the presentations yield to the pressure, the pressure itself diminishes, so that the velocity of sinking decreases,i.e.we have the equation (S − σ) dt = dσ, where S is the totalinhibendum, and σ the intensity actually inhibited after the timet. Hencet= log (S/S − σ), and σ = S(1 − e−t). From this law it follows, for example, that equilibrium is never quite obtained for those presentations which continue above the threshold of consciousness, while the rest which cannot so continue are very speedily driven beyond the threshold. More important is the law according to which a presentation freed from inhibition and rising anew into consciousness tends to raise the other presentations with which it is combined. Suppose two presentationspand π united by the residuarand ρ; then the amount ofp’s “help” to π isr, the portion of which appropriated by π is given by the ratio ρ : π; and thus the initial help isrρ/π. But after a timet, when a portion of ρ represented by ω has been actually brought into consciousness, the help afforded in the next instant will be found by the equationrρ·ρ − ωdt = dω,πρfrom which by integration we have the value of ω.ω = ρ(1 − ε−rt/π).So that if there are several πs connected withpby smaller and smaller parts, there will be a definite “serial” order in which they will be revived byp; and on this fact Herbart rests all the phenomena of the so-called faculty of memory, the development of spatial and temporal forms and much besides. Emotions and volitions, he holds, are not directly self-preservations of the soul, as our presentations are, but variable states of such presentations resulting from their interaction when above the threshold of consciousness. Thus when some presentations tend to force a presentation into consciousness, and others at the same time tend to drive it out, that presentation is the seat of painful feeling; when, on the other hand, its entrance is favoured by all, pleasure results. Desires are presentations struggling into consciousness against hindrances, and when accompanied by the supposition of success become volitions. Transcendental freedom of will in Kant’s sense is an impossibility. Self-consciousness is the result of an interaction essentially the same in kind as that which takes place when a comparatively simple presentation finds the field of consciousness occupied by a long-formed and well-consolidated “mass” of presentations—as,e.g.one’s business or garden, the theatre, &c., which promptly inhibit the isolated presentation if incongruent, and unite it to themselves if not. What we call Self is, above all, such a central mass, and Herbart seeks to show with great ingenuity and detail how this position is occupied at first chiefly by the body, then by the seat of ideas and desires, and finally by that first-personal Self which recollects the past and resolves concerning the future. But at any stage the actual constituents of this “complexion” are variable; the concrete presentation of Self is never twice the same. And, therefore, finding on reflection any particular concrete factor contingent, we abstract the position from that which occupies it, and so reach the speculative notion of the pure Ego.Aestheticselaborates the “ideas” involved in the expression of taste called forth by those relations of object which acquire for them the attribution of beauty or the reverse. The beautiful (καλόν) is to be carefully distinguished from the allied conceptions of the useful and the pleasant, which vary with time, place and person; whereas beauty is predicated absolutely and involuntarily by all who have attained the right standpoint. Ethics, which is but one branch of aesthetics, although the chief, deals with such relations among volitions (Willensverhältnisse) as thus unconditionally please or displease. These relations Herbart finds to be reducible to five, which do not admit of further simplification; and corresponding to them are as many moral ideas (Musterbegriffe), viz.: (1)Internal Freedom, the underlying relation being that of the individual’s will to his judgment of it; (2)Perfection, the relation being that of his several volitions to each other in respect of intensity, variety and concentration; (3)Benevolence, the relation being that between his own will and the thought of another’s; (4)Right, in case of actual conflict with another; and (5)RetributionorEquity, for intended good or evil done. The ideas of a final society, a system of rewards and punishments, a system of administration, a system of culture and a “unanimated society,” corresponding to the ideas of law, equity, benevolence, perfection and internal freedom respectively, result when we take account of a number of individuals. Virtue is the perfect conformity of the will with the moral ideas; of this the single virtues are but special expressions. The conception of duty arises from the existence of hindrances to the attainment of virtue. A general scheme of principles of conduct is possible, but the subsumption of special cases under these must remain matter of tact. The application of ethics to things as they are with a view to the realization of the moral ideas is moral technology (Tugendlehre), of which the chief divisions are Paedagogy and Politics.InTheologyHerbart held the argument from design to be as valid for divine activity as for human, and to justify the belief in a super-sensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither attainable nor on practical grounds desirable.Among the post-Kantian philosophers Herbart doubtless ranks next to Hegel in importance, and this without taking into account his very great contributions to the science of education. His disciples speak of theirs as the “exact philosophy,” and the term well expresses their master’s chief excellence and the character ofthe chief influence he has exerted upon succeeding thinkers of his own and other schools. His criticisms are worth more than his constructions; indeed for exactness and penetration of thought he is quite on a level with Hume and Kant. His merits in this respect, however, can only be appraised by the study of his works at first hand. But we are most of all indebted to Herbart for the enormous advance psychology has been enabled to make, thanks to his fruitful treatment of it, albeit as yet but few among the many who have appropriated and improved his materials have ventured to adopt his metaphysical and mathematical foundations.(J. W.*)Bibliography.—Herbart’s works were collected and published by his disciple G. Hartenstein (Leipzig, 1850-1852; reprinted at Hamburg, with supplementary volume, 1883-1893); another edition by K. Kehrbach (Leipzig, 1882, and Langensalza, 1887). The following are the most important:Allgemeine Pädagogik(1806; new ed., 1894);Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik(1808);Allgemeine praktische Philosophie(1808);Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie(1813; new ed. by Hartenstein, 1883);Lehrbuch der Psychologie(1816; new ed. by Hartenstein, 1887);Psychologie als Wissenschaft(1824-1825);Allgemeine Metaphysik(1828-1829);Encyklopädie der Philosophie(2nd ed., 1841);Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen(2nd ed., 1841);Psychologische Untersuchungen(1839-1840).Some of his works have been translated into English under the following titles:Textbook in Psychology, by M. K. Smith (1891);The Science of Education and the Aesthetic Revelation of the World(1892), andLetters and Lectures on Education(1898), by H. M. and E. Felkin;A B C of Sense Perception and minor pedagogical works(New York, 1896), by W. J. Eckhoff and others;Application of Psychology to the Science of Education(1898), by B. C. Mulliner;Outlines of Educational Doctrine, by A. F. Lange (1901).There is a life of Herbart in Hartenstein’s introduction to hisKleinere philosophische Schriften und Abhandlungen(1842-1843) and by F. H. T. Allihn inZeitschrift für exacte Philosophie(Leipzig, 1861), the organ of Herbart and his school, which ceased to appear in 1873. In America the National Society for the Scientific Study of Education was originally founded as the National Herbart Society.Of the large number of writings dealing with Herbart’s works and theories, the following may be mentioned: H. A. Fechner,Zur Kritik der Grundlagen von Herbart’s Metaphysik(Leipzig, 1853); J. Kaftan,Sollen und Sein in ihrem Verhältniss zu einander: eine Studie zur Kritik Herbarts(Leipzig, 1872); M. W. Drobisch,Über die Fortbildung der Philosophie durch Herbart(Leipzig, 1876); K. S. Just,Die Fortbildung der Kant’schen Ethik durch Herbart(Eisenach, 1876); C. Ufer,Vorschule der Pädagogik Herbarts(1883; Eng. tr. by J. C. Zinser, 1895); G. Közle,Die pädagogische Schule Herbarts und ihre Lehre(Gutersloh, 1889); L. Strümpell,Das System der Pädagogik Herbarts(Leipzig, 1894); J. Christinger,Herbarts Erziehungslehre und ihre Fortbildner(Zürich, 1895); O. H. Lang,Outline of Herbart’s Pedagogics(1894); H. M. and E. Felkin,Introduction to Herbart’s Science and Practice of Education(1895); C. de Garmo,Herbart and the Herbartians(New York, 1895); E. Wagner,Die Praxis der Herbartianer(Langensalza, 1897) andVollständige Darstellung der Lehre Herbarts(ib., 1899); J. Adams,The Herbartian Psychology applied to Education(1897); F. H. Hayward,The Student’s Herbart(1902),The Critics of Herbartianism(1903),Three Historical Educators: Pestalozzi, Fröbel, Herbart(1905),The Secret of Herbart(1907),The Meaning of Education as interpreted by Herbart(1907); W. Kinkel,J. F. Herbart: sein Leben und seine Philosophie(1903); A. Darroch,Herbart and the Herbartian Theory of Education(1903); C. J. Dodd,Introduction to the Herbartian Principles of Teaching(1904); J. Davidson,A new Interpretation of Herbart’s Psychology and Educational Theory through the Philosophy of Leibnitz(1906); see also J. M. Baldwin,Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy(1901-1905).
Philosophy, according to Herbart, begins with reflection upon our empirical conceptions, and consists in the reformation and elaboration of these—its three primary divisions being determined by asmany distinct forms of elaboration. Logic, which stands first, has to render our conceptions and the judgments and reasonings arising from them clear and distinct. But some conceptions are such that the more distinct they are made the more contradictory their elements become; so to change and supplement these as to make them at length thinkable is the problem of the second part of philosophy, or metaphysics. There is still a class of conceptions requiring more than a logical treatment, but differing from the last in not involving latent contradictions, and in being independent of the reality of their objects, the conceptions, viz. that embody our judgments of approval and disapproval; the philosophic treatment of these conceptions falls to Aesthetic.
In Herbart’s writings logic receives comparatively meagre notice; he insisted strongly on its purely formal character, and expressed himself in the main at one with Kantians such as Fries and Krug.
As a metaphysician he starts from what he terms “the higher scepticism” of the Hume-Kantian sphere of thought, the beginnings of which he discerns in Locke’s perplexity about the idea of substance. By this scepticism the real validity of even theformsof experience is called in question on account of the contradictions they are found to involve. And yet that these forms are “given” to us, as truly as sensations are, follows beyond doubt when we consider that we are as little able to control the one as the other. To attempt at this stage a psychological inquiry into the origin of these conceptions would be doubly a mistake; for we should have to use these unlegitimated conceptions in the course of it, and the task of clearing up their contradictions would still remain, whether we succeeded in our enquiry or not. But how are we to set about this task? We have given to us a conception A uniting among its constituent marks two that prove to be contradictory, say M and N; and we can neither deny the unity nor reject one of the contradictory members. For to do either is forbidden by experience; and yet to do nothing is forbidden by logic. We are thus driven to the assumption that the conception is contradictory because incomplete; but how are we to supplement it? What we have must point the way to what we want, or our procedure will be arbitrary. Experience asserts that M is the same (i.e.a mark of the same concept) as N, while logic denies it; and so—it being impossible for one and the same M to sustain these contradictory positions—there is but one way open to us; we must positseveralMs. But even now we cannot say one of these Ms is the same as N, another is not; for every M must be both thinkable and valid. We may, however, take the Ms not singly but together; and again, no other course being open to us, this is what we must do; we must assume that N results from a combination of Ms. This is Herbart’s method of relations, the counterpart in his system of the Hegelian dialectic.
In theOntologythis method is employed to determine what in reality corresponds to the empirical conceptions of substance and cause, or rather of inherence and change. But first we must analyse this notion of reality itself, to which our scepticism had already led us, for, though we could doubt whether “the given” is what it appears, we cannot doubt that it is something; the conception of the real thus consists of the two conceptions of being and quality. That which we are compelled to “posit,” which cannot be sublated, is that whichis, and in the recognition of this lies the simple conception of being. But when is a thing thus posited? When it is posited as we are wont to posit the things we see and taste and handle. If we were without sensations,i.e.were never bound against our will to endure the persistence of a presentation, we should never know what being is. Keeping fast hold of this idea of absolute position, Herbart leads us next to the quality of the real. (1) This must exclude everything negative; for non-A sublates instead of positing, and is not absolute, but relative to A. (2) The real must be absolutely simple; for if it contain two determinations, A and B, then either these are reducible to one, which is the true quality, or they are not, when each is conditioned by the other and their position is no longer absolute. (3) All quantitative conceptions are excluded, for quantity implies parts, and these are incompatible with simplicity. (4) But there may be a plurality of “reals,” albeit the mere conception of being can tell us nothing as to this. The doctrine here developed is the first cardinal point of Herbart’s system, and has obtained for it the name of “pluralistic realism.”
The contradictions he finds in the common-sense conception of inherence, or of “a thing with several attributes,” will now become obvious. Let us take some thing, say A, havingnattributes,a,b,c...: we are forced to posit each of these because each is presented in intuition. But in conceiving A we make, notnpositions, still lessn+ 1 positions, but one position simply; for common sense removes the absolute position from its original source, sensation. So when we ask, What is the one posited? we are told—the possessor ofa,b,c..., or in other words, their seat or substance. But if so, then A, as a real, being simple, must =a; similarly it must =b; and so on. Now this would be possible ifa,b,c... were but “contingent aspects” of A, ase.g.2³, √64, 4 + 3 + 1 are contingent aspects of 8. Such, of course, is not the case, and so we have as many contradictions as there are attributes; for we must say A isa, is nota, isb, is notb, &c. There must then, according to the method of relations, be several As. For a let us assume A1+ A1+ A1...; forb, A2+ A2+ A2...; and so on for the rest. But now what relation can there be among these several As, which will restore to us the unity of our original A or substance? There is but one; we must assume that the first A of every series is identical, just as the centre is the same point in every radius. By way of concrete illustration Herbart instances “the common observation that the properties of things exist only under external conditions. Bodies, we say, are coloured, but colour is nothing without light, and nothing without eyes. They sound, but only in a vibrating medium, and for healthy ears. Colour and tone present the appearance of inherence, but on looking closer we find they are not really immanent in things but rather presuppose a communion among several.” The result then is briefly thus: In place of the one absolute position, which in some unthinkable way the common understanding substitutes for the absolute positions of thenattributes, we have really a series of two or more positions for each attribute, every series, however, beginning with the same (as it were, central) real (hence the unity of substance in a group of attributes), but each being continued by different reals (hence the plurality and difference of attributes in unity of substance). Where there is the appearance of inherence, therefore, there is always a plurality of reals; no such correlative to substance as attribute or accident can be admitted at all. Substantiality is impossible without causality, and to this as its true correlative we now turn.
The common-sense conception of change involves at bottom the same contradiction of opposing qualities in one real. The same A that wasa,b,c... becomesa,b,d...; and this, which experience thrusts upon us, proves on reflection unthinkable. The metaphysical supplementing is also fundamentally as before. Sincecdepended on a series of reals A3+ A3+ A3... in connexion with A, anddmay be said similarly to depend on a series A4+ A4+ A4..., then the change fromctodmeans, not that the central real A or any real has changed, but that A is now in connexion with A4, &c., and no longer in connexion with A3, &c.
But to think a number of reals “in connexion” (Zusammensein) will not suffice as an explanation of phenomena; something or other must happen when they are in connexion; what is it? The answer to this question is the second hinge-point of Herbart’s theoretical philosophy. What “actually happens” as distinct from all that seems to happen, when two reals A and B are together is that, assuming them to differ in quality, they tend to disturb each other to the extent of that difference, at the same time that each preserves itself intact by resisting, as it were, the other’s disturbance. And so by coming into connexion with different reals the “self-preservations” of A will vary accordingly, A remaining the same through all; just as, by way of illustration, hydrogen remains the same in water and in ammonia, or as the same line may be now a normal and now a tangent. But to indicate this opposition in the qualities of the reals A + B, we must substitute for these symbols others, which, though only “contingent aspects” of A and B,i.e.representing their relations, not themselves, yet like similar devices in mathematics enable thought to advance. Thus we may put A = α + β − γ, B =m+n+ γ; γ then represents the character of the self-preservations in this case, and α + β +m+nrepresents all that could be observed by a spectator who did not know the simple qualities, but was himself involved in the relations of A to B; and such is exactly our position.
Having thus determined what really is and what actually happens, our philosopher proceeds next to explain synthetically the objective semblance (der objective Schein) that results from these. But if this construction is to be truly objective,i.e.valid for all intelligences, ontology must furnish us with a clue. This we have in the forms of Space, Time and Motion which are involved whenever we think the reals as being in, or coming into, connexion and the opposite. These forms then cannot be merely the products of our psychological mechanism, though they may turn out to coincide with these. Meanwhile let us call them “intelligible,” as being valid for all who comprehend the real and actual by thought, although no such forms are predicable of the real and actual themselves. The elementary spatial relation Herbart conceives to be “the contiguity (Aneinander) of two points,” so that every “pure and independent line” is discrete. But an investigation of dependent lines which are often incommensurable forces us to adopt the contradictory fiction of partially overlapping,i.e.divisible points, or in other words, the conception of Continuity.1But the contradiction here is one we cannot eliminate by the method of relations, because it does not involve anything real; and in fact as a necessary outcome of an “intelligible” form, the fiction of continuity is valid for the “objective semblance,” and no more to be discarded than say √−1. By its help we are enabled to comprehend what actually happens among reals to produce the appearance of matter. When three or more reals are together, each disturbance and self-preservation will (in general) be imperfect,i.e.of less intensity than when only two reals are together. But “objective semblance” corresponds with reality; the spatial or external relations of the reals in this case must, therefore, tally with their inner or actual states. Had the self-preservations been perfect, the coincidence in space would have been complete, and the group of reals would have been inextended; or had the several reals been simply contiguous,i.e.without connexion, then, as nothingwould actually have happened, nothing would appear. As it is we shall find a continuous molecule manifesting attractive and repulsive forces; attraction corresponding to the tendency of the self-preservations to become perfect, repulsion to the frustration of this. Motion, even more evidently than space, implicates the contradictory conception of continuity, and cannot, therefore, be a real predicate, though valid as an intelligible form and necessary to the comprehension of the objective semblance. For we have to think of the reals as absolutely independent and yet as entering into connexions. This we can only do by conceiving them as originally moving through intelligible space in rectilinear paths and with uniform velocities. For such motion no cause need be supposed; motion, in fact, is no more a state of the moving real than rest is, both alike being but relations, with which, therefore, the real has no concern. The changes in this motion, however, for which weshouldrequire a cause, would be the objective semblance of the self-preservations that actually occur when reals meet. Further, by means of such motion these actual occurrences, which are in themselves timeless, fall for an observer in a definite time—a time which becomes continuous through the partial coincidence of events.
But in all this it has been assumed that we are spectators of the objective semblance; it remains to make good this assumption, or, in other words, to show the possibility of knowledge; this is the problem of what Herbart terms Eidolology, and forms the transition from metaphysic to psychology. Here, again, a contradictory conception blocks the way, that, viz. of the Ego as the identity of knowing and being, and as such the stronghold of idealism. The contradiction becomes more evident when the ego is defined to be a subject (and so a real) that is its own object. As real and not merely formal, this conception of the ego is amenable to the method of relations. The solution this method furnishes is summarily that there are several objects which mutually modify each other, and so constitute that ego we take for the presented real. But to explain this modification is the business of psychology; it is enough now to see that the subject like all reals is necessarily unknown, and that, therefore, the idealist’s theory of knowledge is unsound. But though the simple quality of the subject or soul is beyond knowledge, we know what actually happens when it is in connexion with other’s reals, for its self-preservations then are what we call sensations. And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit absolutely.
In hisPsychologyHerbart rejects altogether the doctrine of mental faculties as one refuted by his metaphysics, and tries to show that all psychical phenomena whatever result from the action and interaction of elementary ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen). The soul being one and simple, its separate acts of self-preservation or primary presentations must be simple too, and its several presentations must become united together. And this they can do at once and completely when, as is the case, for example, with the several attributes of an object, they are not of opposite quality. But otherwise there ensues a conflict in which the opposed presentations comport themselves like forces and mutually suppress or obscure each other. The act of presentation (Vorstellen) then becomes partly transformed into an effort, and its product, the idea, becomes in the same proportion less and less intense till a position of equilibrium is reached; and then at length the remainders coalesce. We have thus a statics and a mechanics of mind which investigate respectively the conditions of equilibrium and of movement among presentations. In the statics two magnitudes have to be determined: (1) the amount of the suppression or inhibition (Hemmungssumme), and (2) the ratio in which this is shared among the opposing presentations. The first must obviously be as small as possible; thus for two totally-opposed presentations a and b, of which a is the greater, theinhibendum=b. For a given degree of opposition this burden will be shared between the conflicting presentations in the inverse ratio of their strength. When its remainder after inhibition = 0, a presentation is said to be on the threshold of consciousness, for on a small diminution of the inhibition the “effort” will become actual presentation in the same proportion. Such total exclusion from consciousness is, however, manifestly impossible with only two presentations,2though with three or a greater number the residual value of one may even be negative. The first and simplest law in psychological mechanics relates to the “sinking” of inhibited presentations. As the presentations yield to the pressure, the pressure itself diminishes, so that the velocity of sinking decreases,i.e.we have the equation (S − σ) dt = dσ, where S is the totalinhibendum, and σ the intensity actually inhibited after the timet. Hencet= log (S/S − σ), and σ = S(1 − e−t). From this law it follows, for example, that equilibrium is never quite obtained for those presentations which continue above the threshold of consciousness, while the rest which cannot so continue are very speedily driven beyond the threshold. More important is the law according to which a presentation freed from inhibition and rising anew into consciousness tends to raise the other presentations with which it is combined. Suppose two presentationspand π united by the residuarand ρ; then the amount ofp’s “help” to π isr, the portion of which appropriated by π is given by the ratio ρ : π; and thus the initial help isrρ/π. But after a timet, when a portion of ρ represented by ω has been actually brought into consciousness, the help afforded in the next instant will be found by the equation
from which by integration we have the value of ω.
ω = ρ(1 − ε−rt/π).
So that if there are several πs connected withpby smaller and smaller parts, there will be a definite “serial” order in which they will be revived byp; and on this fact Herbart rests all the phenomena of the so-called faculty of memory, the development of spatial and temporal forms and much besides. Emotions and volitions, he holds, are not directly self-preservations of the soul, as our presentations are, but variable states of such presentations resulting from their interaction when above the threshold of consciousness. Thus when some presentations tend to force a presentation into consciousness, and others at the same time tend to drive it out, that presentation is the seat of painful feeling; when, on the other hand, its entrance is favoured by all, pleasure results. Desires are presentations struggling into consciousness against hindrances, and when accompanied by the supposition of success become volitions. Transcendental freedom of will in Kant’s sense is an impossibility. Self-consciousness is the result of an interaction essentially the same in kind as that which takes place when a comparatively simple presentation finds the field of consciousness occupied by a long-formed and well-consolidated “mass” of presentations—as,e.g.one’s business or garden, the theatre, &c., which promptly inhibit the isolated presentation if incongruent, and unite it to themselves if not. What we call Self is, above all, such a central mass, and Herbart seeks to show with great ingenuity and detail how this position is occupied at first chiefly by the body, then by the seat of ideas and desires, and finally by that first-personal Self which recollects the past and resolves concerning the future. But at any stage the actual constituents of this “complexion” are variable; the concrete presentation of Self is never twice the same. And, therefore, finding on reflection any particular concrete factor contingent, we abstract the position from that which occupies it, and so reach the speculative notion of the pure Ego.
Aestheticselaborates the “ideas” involved in the expression of taste called forth by those relations of object which acquire for them the attribution of beauty or the reverse. The beautiful (καλόν) is to be carefully distinguished from the allied conceptions of the useful and the pleasant, which vary with time, place and person; whereas beauty is predicated absolutely and involuntarily by all who have attained the right standpoint. Ethics, which is but one branch of aesthetics, although the chief, deals with such relations among volitions (Willensverhältnisse) as thus unconditionally please or displease. These relations Herbart finds to be reducible to five, which do not admit of further simplification; and corresponding to them are as many moral ideas (Musterbegriffe), viz.: (1)Internal Freedom, the underlying relation being that of the individual’s will to his judgment of it; (2)Perfection, the relation being that of his several volitions to each other in respect of intensity, variety and concentration; (3)Benevolence, the relation being that between his own will and the thought of another’s; (4)Right, in case of actual conflict with another; and (5)RetributionorEquity, for intended good or evil done. The ideas of a final society, a system of rewards and punishments, a system of administration, a system of culture and a “unanimated society,” corresponding to the ideas of law, equity, benevolence, perfection and internal freedom respectively, result when we take account of a number of individuals. Virtue is the perfect conformity of the will with the moral ideas; of this the single virtues are but special expressions. The conception of duty arises from the existence of hindrances to the attainment of virtue. A general scheme of principles of conduct is possible, but the subsumption of special cases under these must remain matter of tact. The application of ethics to things as they are with a view to the realization of the moral ideas is moral technology (Tugendlehre), of which the chief divisions are Paedagogy and Politics.
InTheologyHerbart held the argument from design to be as valid for divine activity as for human, and to justify the belief in a super-sensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither attainable nor on practical grounds desirable.
Among the post-Kantian philosophers Herbart doubtless ranks next to Hegel in importance, and this without taking into account his very great contributions to the science of education. His disciples speak of theirs as the “exact philosophy,” and the term well expresses their master’s chief excellence and the character ofthe chief influence he has exerted upon succeeding thinkers of his own and other schools. His criticisms are worth more than his constructions; indeed for exactness and penetration of thought he is quite on a level with Hume and Kant. His merits in this respect, however, can only be appraised by the study of his works at first hand. But we are most of all indebted to Herbart for the enormous advance psychology has been enabled to make, thanks to his fruitful treatment of it, albeit as yet but few among the many who have appropriated and improved his materials have ventured to adopt his metaphysical and mathematical foundations.
(J. W.*)
Bibliography.—Herbart’s works were collected and published by his disciple G. Hartenstein (Leipzig, 1850-1852; reprinted at Hamburg, with supplementary volume, 1883-1893); another edition by K. Kehrbach (Leipzig, 1882, and Langensalza, 1887). The following are the most important:Allgemeine Pädagogik(1806; new ed., 1894);Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik(1808);Allgemeine praktische Philosophie(1808);Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie(1813; new ed. by Hartenstein, 1883);Lehrbuch der Psychologie(1816; new ed. by Hartenstein, 1887);Psychologie als Wissenschaft(1824-1825);Allgemeine Metaphysik(1828-1829);Encyklopädie der Philosophie(2nd ed., 1841);Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen(2nd ed., 1841);Psychologische Untersuchungen(1839-1840).
Some of his works have been translated into English under the following titles:Textbook in Psychology, by M. K. Smith (1891);The Science of Education and the Aesthetic Revelation of the World(1892), andLetters and Lectures on Education(1898), by H. M. and E. Felkin;A B C of Sense Perception and minor pedagogical works(New York, 1896), by W. J. Eckhoff and others;Application of Psychology to the Science of Education(1898), by B. C. Mulliner;Outlines of Educational Doctrine, by A. F. Lange (1901).
There is a life of Herbart in Hartenstein’s introduction to hisKleinere philosophische Schriften und Abhandlungen(1842-1843) and by F. H. T. Allihn inZeitschrift für exacte Philosophie(Leipzig, 1861), the organ of Herbart and his school, which ceased to appear in 1873. In America the National Society for the Scientific Study of Education was originally founded as the National Herbart Society.
Of the large number of writings dealing with Herbart’s works and theories, the following may be mentioned: H. A. Fechner,Zur Kritik der Grundlagen von Herbart’s Metaphysik(Leipzig, 1853); J. Kaftan,Sollen und Sein in ihrem Verhältniss zu einander: eine Studie zur Kritik Herbarts(Leipzig, 1872); M. W. Drobisch,Über die Fortbildung der Philosophie durch Herbart(Leipzig, 1876); K. S. Just,Die Fortbildung der Kant’schen Ethik durch Herbart(Eisenach, 1876); C. Ufer,Vorschule der Pädagogik Herbarts(1883; Eng. tr. by J. C. Zinser, 1895); G. Közle,Die pädagogische Schule Herbarts und ihre Lehre(Gutersloh, 1889); L. Strümpell,Das System der Pädagogik Herbarts(Leipzig, 1894); J. Christinger,Herbarts Erziehungslehre und ihre Fortbildner(Zürich, 1895); O. H. Lang,Outline of Herbart’s Pedagogics(1894); H. M. and E. Felkin,Introduction to Herbart’s Science and Practice of Education(1895); C. de Garmo,Herbart and the Herbartians(New York, 1895); E. Wagner,Die Praxis der Herbartianer(Langensalza, 1897) andVollständige Darstellung der Lehre Herbarts(ib., 1899); J. Adams,The Herbartian Psychology applied to Education(1897); F. H. Hayward,The Student’s Herbart(1902),The Critics of Herbartianism(1903),Three Historical Educators: Pestalozzi, Fröbel, Herbart(1905),The Secret of Herbart(1907),The Meaning of Education as interpreted by Herbart(1907); W. Kinkel,J. F. Herbart: sein Leben und seine Philosophie(1903); A. Darroch,Herbart and the Herbartian Theory of Education(1903); C. J. Dodd,Introduction to the Herbartian Principles of Teaching(1904); J. Davidson,A new Interpretation of Herbart’s Psychology and Educational Theory through the Philosophy of Leibnitz(1906); see also J. M. Baldwin,Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy(1901-1905).