(J. S. Bl.)
The works of Huss are usually classed under four heads: the dogmatical and polemical, the homiletical, the exegetical and the epistolary. In the earlier editions of his works sufficient care was not taken to distinguish between his own writings and those of Wycliffe and others who were associated with him. In connexion with his sermons it is worthy of note that by means of them and by his public teaching generally Huss exercised a considerable influence not only on the religious life of his time, but on the literary development of his native tongue. The earliest collected edition of his works,Historia et monumenta Joannis Hus et Hieronymi Pragensis, was published at Nuremberg in 1558 and was reprinted with a considerable quantity of new matter at Frankfort in 1715. A Bohemian edition of the works has been edited by K. J. Erben (Prague, 1865-1868), and theDocumenta J. Hus vitam, doctrinam, causam in Constantiensi concilio(1869), edited by F. Palacky, is very valuable. More recentlyJoannis Hus. Opera omniahave been edited by W. Flojšhaus (Prague, 1904 fol.). TheDe Ecclesiawas published by Ulrich von Hutten in 1520; other controversial writings by Otto Brumfels in 1524; and Luther wrote an interesting preface toEpistolae Quaedam, which were published in 1537. TheseEpistolaehave been translated into French by E. de Bonnechose (1846), and the letters written during his imprisonment have been edited by C. von Kügelgen (Leipzig, 1902).The best and most easily accessible information for the English reader on Huss is found in J. A. W. Neander’sAllgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche, translated by J. Torrey (1850-1858); in G. von Lechler’sWiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation, translated by P. Lorimer (1878); in H. H. Milman’sHistory of Latin Christianity, vol. viii. (1867); and in M. Creighton’sHistory of the Papacy(1897). Among the earlier authorities is theHistoria Bohemicaof Aeneas Sylvius (1475). TheActaof the council of Constance (published by P. Labbe in hisConcilia, vol. xvi., 1731; by H. von der Haardt in hisMagnum Constantiense concilium, vol. vi., 1700; and by H. Finke in hisActa concilii Constantiensis, 1896); and J. Lenfant’sHistoire de la guerre des Hussites(1731) and the same writer’sHistoire du concile de Constance(1714) should be consulted. F. Palacky’sGeschichte Böhmens(1864-1867) is also very useful. Monographs on Huss are very numerous. Among them may be mentioned J. A. von Helfert,Studien über Hus und Hieronymus(1853; this work is ultramontane in its sympathies); C. von Höfler,Hus und der Abzug der deutschen Professoren und Studenten aus Prag(1864); W. Berger,Johannes Hus und König Sigmund(1871); E. Denis,Huss et la guerre des Hussites(1878); P. Uhlmann,König Sigmunds Geleit für Hus(1894); J. Loserth,Hus und Wiclif(1884), translated into English by M. J. Evans (1884); A. Jeep,Gerson, Wiclefus, Hussus, inter se comparati(1857); and G. von Lechler,Johannes Hus(1889). See also Count Lützow,The Life and Times of John Hus(London, 1909).
The works of Huss are usually classed under four heads: the dogmatical and polemical, the homiletical, the exegetical and the epistolary. In the earlier editions of his works sufficient care was not taken to distinguish between his own writings and those of Wycliffe and others who were associated with him. In connexion with his sermons it is worthy of note that by means of them and by his public teaching generally Huss exercised a considerable influence not only on the religious life of his time, but on the literary development of his native tongue. The earliest collected edition of his works,Historia et monumenta Joannis Hus et Hieronymi Pragensis, was published at Nuremberg in 1558 and was reprinted with a considerable quantity of new matter at Frankfort in 1715. A Bohemian edition of the works has been edited by K. J. Erben (Prague, 1865-1868), and theDocumenta J. Hus vitam, doctrinam, causam in Constantiensi concilio(1869), edited by F. Palacky, is very valuable. More recentlyJoannis Hus. Opera omniahave been edited by W. Flojšhaus (Prague, 1904 fol.). TheDe Ecclesiawas published by Ulrich von Hutten in 1520; other controversial writings by Otto Brumfels in 1524; and Luther wrote an interesting preface toEpistolae Quaedam, which were published in 1537. TheseEpistolaehave been translated into French by E. de Bonnechose (1846), and the letters written during his imprisonment have been edited by C. von Kügelgen (Leipzig, 1902).
The best and most easily accessible information for the English reader on Huss is found in J. A. W. Neander’sAllgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche, translated by J. Torrey (1850-1858); in G. von Lechler’sWiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation, translated by P. Lorimer (1878); in H. H. Milman’sHistory of Latin Christianity, vol. viii. (1867); and in M. Creighton’sHistory of the Papacy(1897). Among the earlier authorities is theHistoria Bohemicaof Aeneas Sylvius (1475). TheActaof the council of Constance (published by P. Labbe in hisConcilia, vol. xvi., 1731; by H. von der Haardt in hisMagnum Constantiense concilium, vol. vi., 1700; and by H. Finke in hisActa concilii Constantiensis, 1896); and J. Lenfant’sHistoire de la guerre des Hussites(1731) and the same writer’sHistoire du concile de Constance(1714) should be consulted. F. Palacky’sGeschichte Böhmens(1864-1867) is also very useful. Monographs on Huss are very numerous. Among them may be mentioned J. A. von Helfert,Studien über Hus und Hieronymus(1853; this work is ultramontane in its sympathies); C. von Höfler,Hus und der Abzug der deutschen Professoren und Studenten aus Prag(1864); W. Berger,Johannes Hus und König Sigmund(1871); E. Denis,Huss et la guerre des Hussites(1878); P. Uhlmann,König Sigmunds Geleit für Hus(1894); J. Loserth,Hus und Wiclif(1884), translated into English by M. J. Evans (1884); A. Jeep,Gerson, Wiclefus, Hussus, inter se comparati(1857); and G. von Lechler,Johannes Hus(1889). See also Count Lützow,The Life and Times of John Hus(London, 1909).
1From which the name Huss, or more properly Hus, an abbreviation adopted by himself about 1396, is derived. Prior to that date he was invariably known as Johann Hussynecz, Hussinecz, Hussenicz or de Hussynecz.
1From which the name Huss, or more properly Hus, an abbreviation adopted by himself about 1396, is derived. Prior to that date he was invariably known as Johann Hussynecz, Hussinecz, Hussenicz or de Hussynecz.
HUSSAR,originally the name of a soldier belonging to a corps of light horse raised by Matthias Corvinus, king of Hungary, in 1458, to fight against the Turks. The Magyarhuszar, from which the word is derived, was formerly connected with the Magyarhusz, twenty, and was explained by a supposed raising of the troops by the taking of each twentieth man. According to theNew English Dictionarythe word is an adaptation of the Italiancorsaro, corsair, a robber, and is found in 15th-century documents coupled withpraedones. The hussar was the typical Hungarian cavalry soldier, and, in the absence of good light cavalry in the regular armies of central and western Europe, the name and character of the hussars gradually spread into Prussia, France, &c. Frederick the Great sent Major H. J. von Zieten to study the work of this type of cavalry in the Austrian service, and Zieten so far improved on the Austrian model that he defeated his old teacher, General Baranyai, in an encounter between the Prussian and Austrian hussars at Rothschloss in 1741. The typical uniform of the Hungarian hussar was followed with modifications in other European armies. It consisted of a busby or a high cylindrical cloth cap, jacket with heavy braiding, and a dolman or pelisse, a loose coat worn hanging from the left shoulder. The hussar regiments of the British army were converted from light dragoons at the following dates: 7th (1805), 10th and 15th (1806), 18th (1807, and again on revival after disbandment, 1858), 8th (1822), 11th (1840), 20th (late 2nd Bengal European Cavalry) (1860), 13th, 14th, and 19th (late 1st Bengal European Cavalry) (1861). The 21st Lancers were hussars from 1862 to 1897.
HUSSITES,the name given to the followers of John Huss (1369-1415), the Bohemian reformer. They were at first often called Wycliffites, as the theological theories of Huss were largely founded on the teachings of Wycliffe. Huss indeed laid more stress on church reform than on theological controversy. On such matters he always writes as a disciple of Wycliffe. The Hussite movement may be said to have sprung from three sources, which are however closely connected. Bohemia, which had first received Christianity from the East, was from geographical and other causes long but very loosely connected with the Church of Rome. The connexion became closer at the time when the schism with its violent controversies between the rival pontiffs, waged with the coarse invective customary to medieval theologians, had brought great discredit on the papacy. The terrible rapacity of its representatives in Bohemia, which increased in proportion as it became more difficult to obtain money from western countries such as England and France, caused general indignation; and this was still further intensified by the gross immorality of the Roman priests. The Hussite movement was also a democratic one, an uprising of the peasantry against the landowners at a period when a third of the soil belonged to the clergy. Finally national enthusiasm for the Slavic race contributed largely to its importance. The towns, in most cases creations of the rulers of Bohemia who had called in German immigrants, were, with the exception of the “new town” of Prague, mainly German; and in consequence of the regulations of the university, Germans also held almost all the more important ecclesiastical offices—a condition of things greatly resented by the natives of Bohemia, which at this period had reached a high degree of intellectual development.
The Hussite movement assumed a revolutionary character as soon as the news of the death of Huss reached Prague. The knights and nobles of Bohemia and Moravia, who were in favour of church reform, sent to the council at Constance (September 2nd, 1415) a protest, known as the “protestatio Bohemorum” which condemned the execution of Huss in the strongest language. The attitude of Sigismund, king of the Romans, who sent threatening letters to Bohemia declaring that he would shortly “drown all Wycliffites and Hussites,” greatly incensed the people. Troubles broke out in various parts of Bohemia, and many Romanist priests were driven from their parishes. Almost from the first the Hussites were divided into two sections, though many minor divisions also arose among them. Shortly before his death Huss had accepted a doctrine preached during his absence by his adherents at Prague, namely that of “utraquism,”i.e.the obligation of the faithful to receive communion in both kinds (sub utraque specie). This doctrine became the watchword of the moderate Hussites who were known as the Utraquists or Calixtines (calix, the chalice), in Bohemian,podoboji; while the more advanced Hussites were soon known as the Taborites, from the city of Tabor that became their centre.
Under the influence of his brother Sigismund, king of the Romans, King Wenceslaus endeavoured to stem the Hussite movement. A certain number of Hussites lead by Nicolas of Hus—no relation of John Huss—left Prague. They held meetings in various parts of Bohemia, particularly at Usti, near the spot where the town of Tabor was founded soon afterwards. At these meetings Sigismund was violently denounced, and the people everywhere prepared for war. In spite of the departure of many prominent Hussites the troubles at Prague continued. On the 30th of July 1419, when a Hussite procession headed by the priest John of Želivo (in Ger. Selau) marched through the streets of Prague, stones were thrown at the Hussites from the windows of the town-hall of the “new town.” The people, headed by John Žižka (1376-1424), threw the burgomaster and several town-councillors, who were the instigators of this outrage, from the windows and they were immediately killed by thecrowd. On hearing this news King Wenceslaus was seized with an apoplectic fit, and died a few days afterwards. The death of the king resulted in renewed troubles in Prague and in almost all parts of Bohemia. Many Romanists, mostly Germans—for they had almost all remained faithful to the papal cause—were expelled from the Bohemian cities. In Prague, in November 1419, severe fighting took place between the Hussites and the mercenaries whom Queen Sophia (widow of Wenceslaus and regent after the death of her husband) had hurriedly collected. After a considerable part of the city had been destroyed a truce was concluded on the 13th of November. The nobles, who though favourable to the Hussite cause yet supported the regent, promised to act as mediators with Sigismund; while the citizens of Prague consented to restore to the royal forces the castle of Vyšehrad, which had fallen into their hands. Žižka, who disapproved of this compromise, left Prague and retired to Plzeň (Pilsen). Unable to maintain himself there he marched to southern Bohemia, and after defeating the Romanists at Sudoměř—the first pitched battle of the Hussite wars—he arrived at Usti, one of the earliest meeting-places of the Hussites. Not considering its situation sufficiently strong, he moved to the neighbouring new settlement of the Hussites, to which the biblical name of Tabor was given. Tabor soon became the centre of the advanced Hussites, who differed from the Utraquists by recognizing only two sacraments—Baptism and Communion—and by rejecting most of the ceremonial of the Roman Church. The ecclesiastical organization of Tabor had a somewhat puritanic character, and the government was established on a thoroughly democratic basis. Four captains of the people (hejtmane) were elected, one of whom was Žižka; and a very strictly military discipline was instituted.
Sigismund, king of the Romans, had, by the death of his brother Wenceslaus without issue, acquired a claim on the Bohemian crown; though it was then, and remained till much later, doubtful whether Bohemia was an hereditary or an elective monarchy. A firm adherent of the Church of Rome, Sigismund was successful in obtaining aid from the pope. Martin V. issued a bull on the 17th of March 1420 which proclaimed a crusade “for the destruction of the Wycliffites, Hussites and all other heretics in Bohemia.” The vast army of crusaders, with which were Sigismund and many German princes, and which consisted of adventurers attracted by the hope of pillage from all parts of Europe, arrived before Prague on the 30th of June and immediately began the siege of the city, which had, however, soon to be abandoned (seeŽižka, John). Negotiations took place for a settlement of the religious differences. The united Hussites formulated their demands in a statement known as the “articles of Prague.” This document, the most important of the Hussite period, runs thus in the wording of the contemporary chronicler, Laurence of Brezova:—
I. The word of God shall be preached and made known in the kingdom of Bohemia freely and in an orderly manner by the priests of the Lord....II. The sacrament of the most Holy Eucharist shall be freely administered in the two kinds, that is bread and wine, to all the faithful in Christ who are not precluded by mortal sin—according to the word and disposition of Our Saviour.III. The secular power over riches and worldly goods which the clergy possesses in contradiction to Christ’s precept, to the prejudice of its office and to the detriment of the secular arm, shall be taken and withdrawn from it, and the clergy itself shall be brought back to the evangelical rule and an apostolic life such as that which Christ and his apostles led....IV. All mortal sins, and in particular all public and other disorders, which are contrary to God’s law shall in every rank of life be duly and judiciously prohibited and destroyed by those whose office it is.
I. The word of God shall be preached and made known in the kingdom of Bohemia freely and in an orderly manner by the priests of the Lord....
II. The sacrament of the most Holy Eucharist shall be freely administered in the two kinds, that is bread and wine, to all the faithful in Christ who are not precluded by mortal sin—according to the word and disposition of Our Saviour.
III. The secular power over riches and worldly goods which the clergy possesses in contradiction to Christ’s precept, to the prejudice of its office and to the detriment of the secular arm, shall be taken and withdrawn from it, and the clergy itself shall be brought back to the evangelical rule and an apostolic life such as that which Christ and his apostles led....
IV. All mortal sins, and in particular all public and other disorders, which are contrary to God’s law shall in every rank of life be duly and judiciously prohibited and destroyed by those whose office it is.
These articles, which contain the essence of the Hussite doctrine, were rejected by Sigismund, mainly through the influence of the papal legates, who considered them prejudicial to the authority of the Roman see. Hostilities therefore continued. Though Sigismund had retired from Prague, the castles of Vyšehrad and Hradčany remained in possession of his troops. The citizens of Prague laid siege to the Vyšehrad, and towards the end of October (1420) the garrison was on the point of capitulating through famine. Sigismund attempted to relieve the fortress, but was decisively defeated by the Hussites on the 1st of November near the village of Pankrác. The castles of Vyšehrad and Hradčany now capitulated, and shortly afterwards almost all Bohemia fell into the hands of the Hussites. Internal troubles prevented them from availing themselves completely of their victory. At Prague a demagogue, the priest John of Želivo, for a time obtained almost unlimited authority over the lower classes of the townsmen; and at Tabor a communistic movement (that of the so-called Adamites) was sternly suppressed by Žižka. Shortly afterwards a new crusade against the Hussites was undertaken. A large German army entered Bohemia, and in August 1421 laid siege to the town of Zatec (Saaz). The crusaders hoped to be joined in Bohemia by King Sigismund, but that prince was detained in Hungary. After an unsuccessful attempt to storm Zatec the crusaders retreated somewhat ingloriously, on hearing that the Hussite troops were approaching. Sigismund only arrived in Bohemia at the end of the year 1421. He took possession of the town of Kutna Hora (Kuttenberg), but was decisively defeated by Žižka at Německy Brod (Deutschbrod) on the 6th of January 1422. Bohemia was now again for a time free from foreign intervention, but internal discord again broke out caused partly by theological strife, partly by the ambition of agitators. John of Želivo was on the 9th of March 1422 arrested by the town council of Prague and decapitated. There were troubles at Tabor also, where a more advanced party opposed Žižka’s authority. Bohemia obtained a temporary respite when, in 1422, Prince Sigismund Korybutovič of Poland became for a short time ruler of the country. His authority was recognized by the Utraquist nobles, the citizens of Prague, and the more moderate Taborites, including Žižka. Korybutovič, however, remained but a short time in Bohemia; after his departure civil war broke out, the Taborites opposing in arms the more moderate Utraquists, who at this period are also called by the chroniclers the “Praguers,” as Prague was their principal stronghold. On the 27th of April 1423, Žižka now again leading, the Taborites defeated at Horic the Utraquist army under Čenek of Wartemberg; shortly afterwards an armistice was concluded at Konopišt.
Papal influence had meanwhile succeeded in calling forth a new crusade against Bohemia, but it resulted in complete failure. In spite of the endeavours of their rulers, the Slavs of Poland and Lithuania did not wish to attack the kindred Bohemians; the Germans were prevented by internal discord from taking joint action against the Hussites; and the king of Denmark, who had landed in Germany with a large force intending to take part in the crusade, soon returned to his own country. Free for a time from foreign aggression, the Hussites invaded Moravia, where a large part of the population favoured their creed; but, again paralysed by dissensions, soon returned to Bohemia. The city of Königgrätz (Králové Hradec), which had been under Utraquist rule, espoused the doctrine of Tabor, and called Žižka to its aid. After several military successes gained by Žižka (q.v.) in 1423 and the following year, a treaty of peace between the Hussites was concluded on the 13th of September 1424 at Liben, a village near Prague, now part of that city.
In 1426 the Hussites were again attacked by foreign enemies. In June of that year their forces, led by Prokop the Great—who took the command of the Taborites shortly after Žižka’s death in October 1424—and Sigismund Korybutovič, who had returned to Bohemia, signally defeated the Germans at Aussig (Usti nad Labem). After this great victory, and another at Tachau in 1427, the Hussites repeatedly invaded Germany, though they made no attempt to occupy permanently any part of the country.
The almost uninterrupted series of victories of the Hussites now rendered vain all hope of subduing them by force of arms. Moreover, the conspicuously democratic character of the Hussite movement caused the German princes, who were afraid thatsuch views might extend to their own countries, to desire peace. Many Hussites, particularly the Utraquist clergy, were also in favour of peace. Negotiations for this purpose were to take place at the oecumenical council which had been summoned to meet at Basel on the 3rd of March 1431. The Roman see reluctantly consented to the presence of heretics at this council, but indignantly rejected the suggestion of the Hussites that members of the Greek Church, and representatives of all Christian creeds, should also be present. Before definitely giving its consent to peace negotiations, the Roman Church determined on making a last effort to reduce the Hussites to subjection. On the 1st of August 1431 a large army of crusaders, under Frederick, margrave of Brandenburg, whom Cardinal Cesarini accompanied as papal legate, crossed the Bohemian frontier; on the 14th of August it reached the town of Domažlice (Tauss); but on the arrival of the Hussite army under Prokop the crusaders immediately took to flight, almost without offering resistance.
On the 15th of October the members of the council, who had already assembled at Basel, issued a formal invitation to the Hussites to take part in its deliberations. Prolonged negotiations ensued; but finally a Hussite embassy, led by Prokop and including John of Rokycan, the Taborite bishop Nicolas of Pelhřimov, the “English Hussite,” Peter Payne and many others, arrived at Basel on the 4th of January 1433. It was found impossible to arrive at an agreement. Negotiations were not, however, broken off; and a change in the political situation of Bohemia finally resulted in a settlement. In 1434 war again broke out between the Utraquists and the Taborites. On the 30th of May of that year the Taborite army, led by Prokop the Great and Prokop the Less, who both fell in the battle, was totally defeated and almost annihilated at Lipan. The moderate party thus obtained the upper hand; and it formulated its demands in a document which was finally accepted by the Church of Rome in a slightly modified form, and which is known as “the compacts.” The compacts, mainly founded on the articles of Prague, declare that:—
1. The Holy Sacrament is to be given freely in both kinds to all Christians in Bohemia and Moravia, and to those elsewhere who adhere to the faith of these two countries.2. All mortal sins shall be punished and extirpated by those whose office it is so to do.3. The word of God is to be freely and truthfully preached by the priests of the Lord, and by worthy deacons.4. The priests in the time of the law of grace shall claim no ownership of worldly possessions.
1. The Holy Sacrament is to be given freely in both kinds to all Christians in Bohemia and Moravia, and to those elsewhere who adhere to the faith of these two countries.
2. All mortal sins shall be punished and extirpated by those whose office it is so to do.
3. The word of God is to be freely and truthfully preached by the priests of the Lord, and by worthy deacons.
4. The priests in the time of the law of grace shall claim no ownership of worldly possessions.
On the 5th of July 1436 the compacts were formally accepted and signed at Iglau, in Moravia, by King Sigismund, by the Hussite delegates, and by the representatives of the Roman Church. The last-named, however, refused to recognize as archbishop of Prague, John of Rokycan, who had been elected to that dignity by the estates of Bohemia. The Utraquist creed, frequently varying in its details, continued to be that of the established church of Bohemia till all non-Roman religious services were prohibited shortly after the battle of the White Mountain in 1620. The Taborite party never recovered from its defeat at Lipan, and after the town of Tabor had been captured by George of Poděbrad in 1452 Utraquist religious worship was established there. The Bohemian brethren, whose intellectual originator was Peter Chelčicky, but whose actual founders were Brother Gregory, a nephew of Archbishop Rokycan, and Michael, curate of Zamberk, to a certain extent continued the Taborite traditions, and in the 15th and 16th centuries included most of the strongest opponents of Rome in Bohemia. J. A. Komensky (Comenius), a member of the brotherhood, claimed for the members of his church that they were the genuine inheritors of the doctrines of Hus. After the beginning of the German Reformation many Utraquists adopted to a large extent the doctrines of Luther and Calvin; and in 1567 obtained the repeal of the compacts, which no longer seemed sufficiently far-reaching. From the end of the 16th century the inheritors of the Hussite tradition in Bohemia were included in the more general name of “Protestants” borne by the adherents of the Reformation.
All histories of Bohemia devote a large amount of space to the Hussite movement. See Count Lützow,Bohemia; an Historical Sketch(London, 1896); Palacky,Geschichte von Böhmen; Bachmann,Geschichte Böhmens; L. Krummel,Geschichte der böhmischen Reformation(Gotha, 1866) andUtraquisten und Taboriten(Gotha, 1871); Ernest Denis,Huss et la guerre des Hussites(Paris, 1878); H. Toman,Husitské Válečnictvi(Prague, 1898).
All histories of Bohemia devote a large amount of space to the Hussite movement. See Count Lützow,Bohemia; an Historical Sketch(London, 1896); Palacky,Geschichte von Böhmen; Bachmann,Geschichte Böhmens; L. Krummel,Geschichte der böhmischen Reformation(Gotha, 1866) andUtraquisten und Taboriten(Gotha, 1871); Ernest Denis,Huss et la guerre des Hussites(Paris, 1878); H. Toman,Husitské Válečnictvi(Prague, 1898).
(L.)
HUSTING(O. Eng.hústing, from Old Norwegianhústhing), the “thing” or “ting,”i.e.assembly, of the household of personal followers or retainers of a king, earl or chief, contrasted with the “folkmoot,” the assembly of the whole people. “Thing” meant an inanimate object, the ordinary meaning at the present day, also a cause or suit, and an assembly; a similar development of meaning is found in the Latinres. The word still appears in the names of the legislative assemblies of Norway, theStorthingand of Iceland, theAlthing. “Husting,” or more usually in the plural “hustings,” was the name of a court of the city of London. This court was formerly the county court for the city and was held before the lord mayor, the sheriffs and aldermen, for pleas of land, common pleas and appeals from the sheriffs. It had probate jurisdiction and wills were registered. All this jurisdiction has long been obsolete, but the court still sits occasionally for registering gifts made to the city. The charter of Canute (1032) contains a reference to “hustings” weights, which points to the early establishment of the court. It is doubtful whether courts of this name were held in other towns, but John Cowell (1554-1611) in hisInterpreter(1601)s.v., “Hustings,” says that according to Fleta there were such courts at Winchester, York, Lincoln, Sheppey and elsewhere, but the passage from Fleta, as theNew English Dictionarypoints out, does not necessarily imply this (11. lv.Habet etiam Rex curiam in civitatibus ... et in locis ... sicut in Hustingis London, Winton, &c.). The ordinary use of “hustings” at the present day for the platform from which a candidate speaks at a parliamentary or other election, or more widely for a political candidate’s election campaign, is derived from the application of the word, first to the platform in the Guildhall on which the London court was held, and next to that from which the public nomination of candidates for a parliamentary election was formerly made, and from which the candidate addressed the electors. The Ballot Act of 1872 did away with this public declaration of the nomination.
HUSUM,a town in the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein, in a fertile district 21⁄2m. inland from the North Sea, on the canalized Husumer Au, which forms its harbour and roadstead, 99 m. N.W. from Hamburg on a branch line from Tönning. Pop. (1900) 8268. It has steam communication with the North Frisian Islands (Nordstrand, Föhr and Sylt), and is a port for the cattle trade with England. Besides a ducal palace and park, it possesses an Evangelical church and a gymnasium. Cattle markets are held weekly, and in them, as also in cereals, a lively export trade is done. There are also extensive oyster fisheries, the property of the state, the yield during the season being very considerable. Husum is the birthplace of Johann Georg Forchhammer (1794-1865), the mineralogist, Peter Wilhelm Forchhammer (1801-1894), the archaeologist, and Theodore Storm (1817-1888), the poet, to the last of whom a monument has been erected here.
Husum is first mentioned in 1252, and its first church was built in 1431. Wisby rights were granted it in 1582, and in 1603 it received municipal privileges from the duke of Holstein. It suffered greatly from inundations in 1634 and 1717.
See Christiansen,Die Geschichte Husums(Husum, 1903); and Henningsen,Das Stiftungsbuch der Stadt Husum(Husum, 1904).
See Christiansen,Die Geschichte Husums(Husum, 1903); and Henningsen,Das Stiftungsbuch der Stadt Husum(Husum, 1904).
HUTCHESON, FRANCIS(1694-1746), English philosopher, was born on the 8th of August 1694. His birthplace was probably the townland of Drumalig, in the parish of Saintfield and county of Down, Ireland.1Though the family had sprung from Ayrshire, in Scotland, both his father and grandfather were ministers of dissenting congregations in the north of Ireland. Hutcheson was educated partly by his grandfather, partly at an academy, where according to his biographer, Dr Leechman, he was taught“the ordinary scholastic philosophy which was in vogue in those days.” In 1710 he entered the university of Glasgow, where he spent six years, at first in the study of philosophy, classics and general literature, and afterwards in the study of theology. On quitting the university, he returned to the north of Ireland, and received a licence to preach. When, however, he was about to enter upon the pastorate of a small dissenting congregation he changed his plans on the advice of a friend and opened a private academy in Dublin. In Dublin his literary attainments gained him the friendship of many prominent inhabitants. Among these was Archbishop King (author of theDe origine mali), who resisted all attempts to prosecute Hutcheson in the archbishop’s court for keeping a school without the episcopal licence. Hutcheson’s relations with the clergy of the Established Church, especially with the archbishops of Armagh and Dublin, Hugh Boulter (1672-1742) and William King (1650-1729), seem to have been most cordial, and his biographer, in speaking of “the inclination of his friends to serve him, the schemes proposed to him for obtaining promotion,” &c., probably refers to some offers of preferment, on condition of his accepting episcopal ordination. These offers, however, were unavailing.
While residing in Dublin, Hutcheson published anonymously the four essays by which he is best known, namely, theInquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design, theInquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, in 1725, theEssay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and AffectionsandIllustrations upon the Moral Sense, in 1728. The alterations and additions made in the second edition of these Essays were published in a separate form in 1726. To the period of his Dublin residence are also to be referred theThoughts on Laughter(a criticism of Hobbes) and the Observations on theFable of the Bees, being in all six letters contributed toHibernicus’ Letters, a periodical which appeared, in Dublin (1725-1727, 2nd ed. 1734). At the end of the same period occurred the controversy in theLondon Journalwith Gilbert Burnet (probably the second son of Dr Gilbert Burnet, bishop of Salisbury); on the “True Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness.” All these letters were collected in one volume (Glasgow, 1772).
In 1729 Hutcheson succeeded his old master, Gershom Carmichael, in the chair of moral philosophy in the university of Glasgow. It is curious that up to this time all his essays and letters had been published anonymously, though their authorship appears to have been well known. In 1730 he entered on the duties of his office, delivering an inaugural lecture (afterwards published),De naturali hominum socialitate. It was a great relief to him after the drudgery of school work to secure leisure for his favourite studies; “non levi igitur laetitia commovebar cum almam matrem Academiam me, suum olim alumnum, in libertatem asseruisse audiveram.” Yet the works on which Hutcheson’s reputation rests had already been published.
The remainder of his life he devoted to his professorial duties. His reputation as a teacher attracted many young men, belonging to dissenting families, from England and Ireland, and he enjoyed a well-deserved popularity among both his pupils and his colleagues. Though somewhat quick-tempered, he was remarkable for his warm feelings and generous impulses. He was accused in 1738 before the Glasgow presbytery for “following two false and dangerous doctrines: first, that the standard of moral goodness was the promotion of the happiness of others; and second, that we could have a knowledge of good and evil without and prior to a knowledge of God” (Rae,Life of Adam Smith, 1895). The accusation seems to have had no result.
In addition to the works named, the following were published during Hutcheson’s lifetime: a pamphlet entitledConsiderations on Patronage(1735);Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria, ethices et jurisprudentiae naturalis elementa continens, lib. iii.(Glasgow, 1742);Metaphysicae synopsis ontologiam et pneumatologiam complectens(Glasgow, 1742). The last work was published anonymously. After his death, his son, Francis Hutcheson (c.1722-1773), author of a number of popular songs (e.g.“As Colin one evening,” “Jolly Bacchus,” “Where Weeping Yews”), published much the longest, though by no means the most interesting, of his works,A System of Moral Philosophy, in Three Books(2 vols., London, 1755). To this is prefixed a life of the author, by Dr William Leechman (1706-1785), professor of divinity in the university of Glasgow. The only remaining work assigned to Hutcheson is a small treatise onLogic(Glasgow, 1764). This compendium, together with theCompendium of Metaphysics, was republished at Strassburg in 1722.
Thus Hutcheson dealt with metaphysics, logic and ethics. His importance is, however, due almost entirely to his ethical writings, and among these primarily to the four essays and the letters published during his residence in Dublin. His standpoint has a negative and a positive aspect; he is in strong opposition to Thomas Hobbes and Bernard de Mandeville, and in fundamental agreement with Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd earl of Shaftesbury), whose name he very properly coupled with his own on the title-page of the first two essays. There are no two names, perhaps, in the history of English moral philosophy, which stand in a closer connexion. The analogy drawn between beauty and virtue, the functions assigned to the moral sense, the position that the benevolent feelings form an original and irreducible part of our nature, and the unhesitating adoption of the principle that the test of virtuous action is its tendency to promote the general welfare are obvious and fundamental points of agreement between the two authors.
I.Ethics.—According to Hutcheson, man has a variety of senses, internal as well as external, reflex as well as direct, the general definition of a sense being “any determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain” (Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, sect. 1). He does not attempt to give an exhaustive enumeration of these “senses,” but, in various parts of his works, he specifies, besides the five external senses commonly recognized (which, he rightly hints, might be added to),—(1) consciousness, by which each man has a perception of himself and of all that is going on in his own mind (Metaph. Syn.pars i. cap. 2); (2) the sense of beauty (sometimes called specifically “an internal sense”); (3) a public sense, or sensus communis, “a determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery”; (4) the moral sense, or “moral sense of beauty in actions and affections, by which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or others”; (5) a sense of honour, or praise and blame, “which makes the approbation or gratitude of others the necessary occasion of pleasure, and their dislike, condemnation or resentment of injuries done by us the occasion of that uneasy sensation called shame”; (6) a sense of the ridiculous. It is plain, as the author confesses, that there may be “other perceptions, distinct from all these classes,” and, in fact, there seems to be no limit to the number of “senses” in which a psychological division of this kind might result.Of these “senses” that which plays the most important part in Hutcheson’s ethical system is the “moral sense.” It is this which pronounces immediately on the character of actions and affections, approving those which are virtuous, and disapproving those which are vicious. “His principal design,” he says in the preface to the two first treatises, “is to show that human nature was not left quite indifferent in the affair of virtue, to form to itself observations concerning the advantage or disadvantage of actions, and accordingly to regulate its conduct. The weakness of our reason, and the avocations arising from the infirmity and necessities of our nature, are so great that very few men could ever have formed those long deductions of reasons which show some actions to be in the whole advantageous to the agent, and their contraries pernicious. The Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct than our moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful instructions as we have for the preservation of our bodies. He has made virtue a lovely form, to excite our pursuit of it, and has given us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous action.” Passing over the appeal to final causes involved in this and similar passages, as well as the assumption that the “moral sense” has had no growth or history, but was “implanted” in man exactly in the condition in which it is now to be found among the more civilized races, an assumption common to the systems of both Hutcheson and Butler, it may be remarked that this use of the term “sense” has a tendency to obscure the real nature of the process which goes on in an act of moral judgment. For, as is so clearly established by Hume, this act really consists of two parts: one an act of deliberation, more or less prolonged, resulting in an intellectual judgment; the other a reflex feeling, probably instantaneous, of satisfaction at actions which we denominate good, of dissatisfaction at those which we denominate bad. By the intellectual part of this process we refer the action or habit to a certain class; but no sooner is the intellectual process completedthan there is excited in us a feeling similar to that which myriads of actions and habits of the same class, or deemed to be of the same class, have excited in us on former occasions. Now, supposing the latter part of this process to be instantaneous, uniform and exempt from error, the former certainly is not. All mankind may, apart from their selfish interests, approve that which is virtuous or makes for the general good, but surely they entertain the most widely divergent opinions, and, in fact, frequently arrive at directly opposite conclusions as to particular actions and habits. This obvious distinction is undoubtedly recognized by Hutcheson in his analysis of the mental process preceding moral action, nor does he invariably ignore it, even when treating of the moral approbation or disapprobation which is subsequent on action. None the less, it remains true that Hutcheson, both by his phraseology, and by the language in which he describes the process of moral approbation, has done much to favour that loose, popular view of morality which, ignoring the necessity of deliberation and reflection, encourages hasty resolves and unpremeditated judgments. The term “moral sense” (which, it may be noticed, had already been employed by Shaftesbury, not only, as Dr Whewell appears to intimate, in the margin, but also in the text of hisInquiry), if invariably coupled with the term “moral judgment,” would be open to little objection; but, taken alone, as designating the complex process of moral approbation, it is liable to lead not only to serious misapprehension but to grave practical errors. For, if each man’s decisions are solely the result of an immediate intuition of the moral sense, why be at any pains to test, correct or review them? Or why educate a faculty whose decisions are infallible? And how do we account for differences in the moral decisions of different societies, and the observable changes in a man’s own views? The expression has, in fact, the fault of most metaphorical terms: it leads to an exaggeration of the truth which it is intended to suggest.But though Hutcheson usually describes the moral faculty as acting instinctively and immediately, he does not, like Butler, confound the moral faculty with the moral standard. The test or criterion of right action is with Hutcheson, as with Shaftesbury, its tendency to promote the general welfare of mankind. He thus anticipates the utilitarianism of Bentham—and not only in principle, but even in the use of the phrase “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” (Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 3).It is curious that Hutcheson did not realize the inconsistency of this external criterion with his fundamental ethical principle. Intuition has no possible connexion with an empirical calculation of results, and Hutcheson in adopting such a criterion practically denies his fundamental assumption.As connected with Hutcheson’s virtual adoption of the utilitarian standard may be noticed a kind of moral algebra, proposed for the purpose of “computing the morality of actions.” This calculus occurs in theInquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 3.The most distinctive of Hutcheson’s ethical doctrines still remaining to be noticed is what has been called the “benevolent theory” of morals. Hobbes had maintained that all our actions, however disguised under apparent sympathy, have their roots inBenevolence.self-love. Hutcheson not only maintains that benevolence is the sole and direct source of many of our actions, but, by a not unnatural recoil, that it is the only source of those actions of which, on reflection, we approve. Consistently with this position, actions which flow from self-love only are pronounced to be morally indifferent. But surely, by the common consent of civilized men, prudence, temperance, cleanliness, industry, self-respect and, in general, the “personal virtues,” are regarded, and rightly regarded, as fitting objects of moral approbation. This consideration could hardly escape any author, however wedded to his own system, and Hutcheson attempts to extricate himself from the difficulty by laying down the position that a man may justly regard himself as a part of the rational system, and may thus “be, in part, an object of his own benevolence” (Ibid.),—a curious abuse of terms, which really concedes the question at issue. Moreover, he acknowledges that, though self-love does not merit approbation, neither, except in its extreme forms, does it merit condemnation, indeed the satisfaction of the dictates of self-love is one of the very conditions of the preservation of society. To press home the inconsistencies involved in these various statements would be a superfluous task.The vexed question of liberty and necessity appears to be carefully avoided in Hutcheson’s professedly ethical works. But, in theSynopsis metaphysicae, he touches on it in three places, briefly stating both sides of the question, but evidently inclining to that which he designates as the opinion of the Stoics in opposition to what he designates as the opinion of the Peripatetics. This is substantially the same as the doctrine propounded by Hobbes and Locke (to the latter of whom Hutcheson refers in a note), namely, that our will is determined by motives in conjunction with our general character and habit of mind, and that the only true liberty is the liberty of acting as we will, not the liberty of willing as we will. Though, however, his leaning is clear, he carefully avoids dogmatizing, and deprecates the angry controversies to which the speculations on this subject had given rise.It is easy to trace the influence of Hutcheson’s ethical theories on the systems of Hume and Adam Smith. The prominence given by these writers to the analysis of moral action and moral approbation, with the attempt to discriminate the respective provinces of the reason and the emotions in these processes, is undoubtedly due to the influence of Hutcheson. To a study of the writings of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson we might, probably, in large measure, attribute the unequivocal adoption of the utilitarian standard by Hume, and, if this be the case, the name of Hutcheson connects itself, through Hume, with the names of Priestley, Paley and Bentham. Butler’sSermonsappeared in 1726, the year after the publication of Hutcheson’s two first essays, and the parallelism between the “conscience” of the one writer and the “moral sense” of the other is, at least, worthy of remark.II.Mental Philosophy.—In the sphere of mental philosophy and logic Hutcheson’s contributions are by no means so important or original as in that of moral philosophy. They are interesting mainly as a link between Locke and the Scottish school. In the former subject the influence of Locke is apparent throughout. All the main outlines of Locke’s philosophy seem, at first sight, to be accepted as a matter of course. Thus, in stating his theory of the moral sense, Hutcheson is peculiarly careful to repudiate the doctrine of innate ideas (see, for instance,Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 1ad fin., and sect. 4; and compareSynopsis Metaphysicae, pars i. cap. 2). At the same time he shows more discrimination than does Locke in distinguishing between the two uses of this expression, and between the legitimate and illegitimate form of the doctrine (Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. 2). All our ideas are, as by Locke, referred to external or internal sense, or, in other words, to sensation and reflection (see, for instance,Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap. 1;Logicae Compend.pars i. cap. 1;System of Moral Philosophy, bk. i. ch. 1). It is, however, a most important modification of Locke’s doctrine, and one which connects Hutcheson’s mental philosophy with that of Reid, when he states that the ideas of extension, figure, motion and rest “are more properly ideas accompanying the sensations of sight and touch than the sensations of either of these senses”; that the idea of self accompanies every thought, and that the ideas of number, duration and existence accompany every other idea whatsoever (seeEssay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, sect. i. art. 1;Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap. 1, pars ii. cap. 1; Hamilton on Reid, p. 124, note). Other important points in which Hutcheson follows the lead of Locke are his depreciation of the importance of the so-called laws of thought, his distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies, the position that we cannot know the inmost essences of things (“intimae rerum naturae sive essentiae”), though they excite various ideas in us, and the assumption that external things are known only through the medium of ideas (Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap. 1), though, at the same time, we are assured of the existence of an external world corresponding to these ideas. Hutcheson attempts to account for our assurance of the reality of an external world by referring it to a natural instinct (Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap. 1). Of the correspondence or similitude between our ideas of the primary qualities of things and the things themselves God alone can be assigned as the cause. This similitude has been effected by Him through a law of nature. “Haec prima qualitatum primariarum perceptio, sive mentis actio quaedam sive passio dicatur, non alia similitudinis aut convenientiae inter ejusmodi ideas et res ipsas causa assignari posse videtur, quam ipse Deus, qui certa naturae lege hoc efficit, ut notiones, quae rebus praesentibus excitantur, sint ipsis similes, aut saltem earum habitudines, si non veras quantitates, depingant” (pars ii. cap. 1). Locke does speak of God “annexing” certain ideas to certain motions of bodies; but nowhere does he propound a theory so definite as that here propounded by Hutcheson, which reminds us at least as much of the speculations of Malebranche as of those of Locke.Amongst the more important points in which Hutcheson diverges from Locke is his account of the idea of personal identity, which he appears to have regarded as made known to us directly by consciousness. The distinction between body and mind,corpusormateriaandres cogitans, is more emphatically accentuated by Hutcheson than by Locke. Generally, he speaks as if we had a direct consciousness of mind as distinct from body (see, for instance,Syn. Metaph.pars ii. cap. 3), though, in the posthumous work onMoral Philosophy, he expressly states that we know mind as we know body “by qualities immediately perceived though the substance of both be unknown” (bk. i. ch. 1). The distinction between perception proper and sensation proper, which occurs by implication though it is not explicitly worked out (see Hamilton’sLectures on Metaphysics, Lect. 24; Hamilton’s edition ofDugald Stewart’s Works, v. 420), the imperfection of the ordinary division of the external senses into five classes, the limitation of consciousness to a special mental faculty (severely criticized in Sir W. Hamilton’sLectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xii.) and the disposition to refer on disputed questions of philosophy not so much to formal arguments as to the testimony of consciousness and our natural instincts are also amongst the points in which Hutcheson supplemented or departed from the philosophy of Locke. The last point can hardly fail to suggest the “common-sense philosophy” of Reid.Thus, in estimating Hutcheson’s position, we find that in particular questions he stands nearer to Locke, but in the general spirit of his philosophy he seems to approach more closely to his Scottish successors.The shortCompendium of Logic, which is more original than suchworks usually are, is remarkable chiefly for the large proportion of psychological matter which it contains. In these parts of the book Hutcheson mainly follows Locke. The technicalities of the subject are passed lightly over, and the book is readable. It may be specially noticed that he distinguishes between the mental result and its verbal expression [idea—term; judgment—proposition], that he constantly employs the word “idea,” and that he defines logical truth as “convenientia signorum cum rebus significatis” (or “propositionis convenientia cum rebus ipsis,”Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap 3), thus implicitly repudiating a merely formal view of logic.III.Aesthetics.—Hutcheson may further be regarded as one of the earliest modern writers on aesthetics. His speculations on this subject are contained in theInquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design, the first of the two treatises published in 1725. He maintains that we are endowed with a special sense by which we perceive beauty, harmony and proportion. This is areflexsense, because it presupposes the action of the external senses of sight and hearing. It may be called an internal sense, both in order to distinguish its perceptions from the mere perceptions of sight and hearing, and because “in some other affairs, where our external senses are not much concerned, we discern a sort of beauty, very like in many respects to that observed in sensible objects, and accompanied with like pleasure” (Inquiry, &c., sect. 1). The latter reason leads him to call attention to the beauty perceived in universal truths, in the operations of general causes and in moral principles and actions. Thus, the analogy between beauty and virtue, which was so favourite a topic with Shaftesbury, is prominent in the writings of Hutcheson also. Scattered up and down the treatise there are many important and interesting observations which our limits prevent us from noticing. But to the student of mental philosophy it may be specially interesting to remark that Hutcheson both applies the principle of association to explain our ideas of beauty and also sets limits to its application, insisting on there being “a natural power of perception or sense of beauty in objects, antecedent to all custom, education or example” (seeInquiry, &c., sects. 6, 7; Hamilton’sLectures on Metaphysics, Lect. 44ad fin.).Hutcheson’s writings naturally gave rise to much controversy. To say nothing of minor opponents, such as “Philaretus” (Gilbert Burnet, already alluded to), Dr John Balguy (1686-1748), prebendary of Salisbury, the author of two tracts on “The Foundation of Moral Goodness,” and Dr John Taylor (1694-1761) of Norwich, a minister of considerable reputation in his time (author ofAn Examination of the Scheme of Morality advanced by Dr Hutcheson), the essays appear to have suggested, by antagonism, at least two works which hold a permanent place in the literature of English ethics—Butler’sDissertation on the Nature of Virtue, and Richard Price’sTreatise of Moral Good and Evil(1757). In this latter work the author maintains, in opposition to Hutcheson, that actions arein themselvesright or wrong, that right and wrong are simple ideas incapable of analysis, and that these ideas are perceived immediately by the understanding. We thus see that, not only directly but also through the replies which it called forth, the system of Hutcheson, or at least the system of Hutcheson combined with that of Shaftesbury, contributed, in large measure, to the formation and development of some of the most important of the modern schools of ethics (see especially art.Ethics).Authorities.—Notices of Hutcheson occur in most histories, both of general philosophy and of moral philosophy, as, for instance, in pt. vii. of Adam Smith’sTheory of Moral Sentiments; Mackintosh’sProgress of Ethical Philosophy; Cousin,Cours d’histoire de la philosophie morale du XVIIIesiècle; Whewell’sLectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England; A. Bain’sMental and Moral Science; Noah Porter’s Appendix to the English translation of Ueberweg’sHistory of Philosophy; Sir Leslie Stephen’sHistory of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, &c. See also Martineau,Types of Ethical Theory(London, 1902); W. R. Scott,Francis Hutcheson(Cambridge, 1900); Albee,History of English Utilitarianism(London, 1902); T. Fowler,Shaftesbury and Hutcheson(London, 1882); J. McCosh,Scottish Philosophy(New York, 1874). Of Dr Leechman’sBiographyof Hutcheson we have already spoken. J. Veitch gives an interesting account of his professorial work in Glasgow,Mind, ii. 209-212.
I.Ethics.—According to Hutcheson, man has a variety of senses, internal as well as external, reflex as well as direct, the general definition of a sense being “any determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain” (Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, sect. 1). He does not attempt to give an exhaustive enumeration of these “senses,” but, in various parts of his works, he specifies, besides the five external senses commonly recognized (which, he rightly hints, might be added to),—(1) consciousness, by which each man has a perception of himself and of all that is going on in his own mind (Metaph. Syn.pars i. cap. 2); (2) the sense of beauty (sometimes called specifically “an internal sense”); (3) a public sense, or sensus communis, “a determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery”; (4) the moral sense, or “moral sense of beauty in actions and affections, by which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or others”; (5) a sense of honour, or praise and blame, “which makes the approbation or gratitude of others the necessary occasion of pleasure, and their dislike, condemnation or resentment of injuries done by us the occasion of that uneasy sensation called shame”; (6) a sense of the ridiculous. It is plain, as the author confesses, that there may be “other perceptions, distinct from all these classes,” and, in fact, there seems to be no limit to the number of “senses” in which a psychological division of this kind might result.
Of these “senses” that which plays the most important part in Hutcheson’s ethical system is the “moral sense.” It is this which pronounces immediately on the character of actions and affections, approving those which are virtuous, and disapproving those which are vicious. “His principal design,” he says in the preface to the two first treatises, “is to show that human nature was not left quite indifferent in the affair of virtue, to form to itself observations concerning the advantage or disadvantage of actions, and accordingly to regulate its conduct. The weakness of our reason, and the avocations arising from the infirmity and necessities of our nature, are so great that very few men could ever have formed those long deductions of reasons which show some actions to be in the whole advantageous to the agent, and their contraries pernicious. The Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct than our moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful instructions as we have for the preservation of our bodies. He has made virtue a lovely form, to excite our pursuit of it, and has given us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous action.” Passing over the appeal to final causes involved in this and similar passages, as well as the assumption that the “moral sense” has had no growth or history, but was “implanted” in man exactly in the condition in which it is now to be found among the more civilized races, an assumption common to the systems of both Hutcheson and Butler, it may be remarked that this use of the term “sense” has a tendency to obscure the real nature of the process which goes on in an act of moral judgment. For, as is so clearly established by Hume, this act really consists of two parts: one an act of deliberation, more or less prolonged, resulting in an intellectual judgment; the other a reflex feeling, probably instantaneous, of satisfaction at actions which we denominate good, of dissatisfaction at those which we denominate bad. By the intellectual part of this process we refer the action or habit to a certain class; but no sooner is the intellectual process completedthan there is excited in us a feeling similar to that which myriads of actions and habits of the same class, or deemed to be of the same class, have excited in us on former occasions. Now, supposing the latter part of this process to be instantaneous, uniform and exempt from error, the former certainly is not. All mankind may, apart from their selfish interests, approve that which is virtuous or makes for the general good, but surely they entertain the most widely divergent opinions, and, in fact, frequently arrive at directly opposite conclusions as to particular actions and habits. This obvious distinction is undoubtedly recognized by Hutcheson in his analysis of the mental process preceding moral action, nor does he invariably ignore it, even when treating of the moral approbation or disapprobation which is subsequent on action. None the less, it remains true that Hutcheson, both by his phraseology, and by the language in which he describes the process of moral approbation, has done much to favour that loose, popular view of morality which, ignoring the necessity of deliberation and reflection, encourages hasty resolves and unpremeditated judgments. The term “moral sense” (which, it may be noticed, had already been employed by Shaftesbury, not only, as Dr Whewell appears to intimate, in the margin, but also in the text of hisInquiry), if invariably coupled with the term “moral judgment,” would be open to little objection; but, taken alone, as designating the complex process of moral approbation, it is liable to lead not only to serious misapprehension but to grave practical errors. For, if each man’s decisions are solely the result of an immediate intuition of the moral sense, why be at any pains to test, correct or review them? Or why educate a faculty whose decisions are infallible? And how do we account for differences in the moral decisions of different societies, and the observable changes in a man’s own views? The expression has, in fact, the fault of most metaphorical terms: it leads to an exaggeration of the truth which it is intended to suggest.
But though Hutcheson usually describes the moral faculty as acting instinctively and immediately, he does not, like Butler, confound the moral faculty with the moral standard. The test or criterion of right action is with Hutcheson, as with Shaftesbury, its tendency to promote the general welfare of mankind. He thus anticipates the utilitarianism of Bentham—and not only in principle, but even in the use of the phrase “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” (Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 3).
It is curious that Hutcheson did not realize the inconsistency of this external criterion with his fundamental ethical principle. Intuition has no possible connexion with an empirical calculation of results, and Hutcheson in adopting such a criterion practically denies his fundamental assumption.
As connected with Hutcheson’s virtual adoption of the utilitarian standard may be noticed a kind of moral algebra, proposed for the purpose of “computing the morality of actions.” This calculus occurs in theInquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 3.
The most distinctive of Hutcheson’s ethical doctrines still remaining to be noticed is what has been called the “benevolent theory” of morals. Hobbes had maintained that all our actions, however disguised under apparent sympathy, have their roots inBenevolence.self-love. Hutcheson not only maintains that benevolence is the sole and direct source of many of our actions, but, by a not unnatural recoil, that it is the only source of those actions of which, on reflection, we approve. Consistently with this position, actions which flow from self-love only are pronounced to be morally indifferent. But surely, by the common consent of civilized men, prudence, temperance, cleanliness, industry, self-respect and, in general, the “personal virtues,” are regarded, and rightly regarded, as fitting objects of moral approbation. This consideration could hardly escape any author, however wedded to his own system, and Hutcheson attempts to extricate himself from the difficulty by laying down the position that a man may justly regard himself as a part of the rational system, and may thus “be, in part, an object of his own benevolence” (Ibid.),—a curious abuse of terms, which really concedes the question at issue. Moreover, he acknowledges that, though self-love does not merit approbation, neither, except in its extreme forms, does it merit condemnation, indeed the satisfaction of the dictates of self-love is one of the very conditions of the preservation of society. To press home the inconsistencies involved in these various statements would be a superfluous task.
The vexed question of liberty and necessity appears to be carefully avoided in Hutcheson’s professedly ethical works. But, in theSynopsis metaphysicae, he touches on it in three places, briefly stating both sides of the question, but evidently inclining to that which he designates as the opinion of the Stoics in opposition to what he designates as the opinion of the Peripatetics. This is substantially the same as the doctrine propounded by Hobbes and Locke (to the latter of whom Hutcheson refers in a note), namely, that our will is determined by motives in conjunction with our general character and habit of mind, and that the only true liberty is the liberty of acting as we will, not the liberty of willing as we will. Though, however, his leaning is clear, he carefully avoids dogmatizing, and deprecates the angry controversies to which the speculations on this subject had given rise.
It is easy to trace the influence of Hutcheson’s ethical theories on the systems of Hume and Adam Smith. The prominence given by these writers to the analysis of moral action and moral approbation, with the attempt to discriminate the respective provinces of the reason and the emotions in these processes, is undoubtedly due to the influence of Hutcheson. To a study of the writings of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson we might, probably, in large measure, attribute the unequivocal adoption of the utilitarian standard by Hume, and, if this be the case, the name of Hutcheson connects itself, through Hume, with the names of Priestley, Paley and Bentham. Butler’sSermonsappeared in 1726, the year after the publication of Hutcheson’s two first essays, and the parallelism between the “conscience” of the one writer and the “moral sense” of the other is, at least, worthy of remark.
II.Mental Philosophy.—In the sphere of mental philosophy and logic Hutcheson’s contributions are by no means so important or original as in that of moral philosophy. They are interesting mainly as a link between Locke and the Scottish school. In the former subject the influence of Locke is apparent throughout. All the main outlines of Locke’s philosophy seem, at first sight, to be accepted as a matter of course. Thus, in stating his theory of the moral sense, Hutcheson is peculiarly careful to repudiate the doctrine of innate ideas (see, for instance,Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 1ad fin., and sect. 4; and compareSynopsis Metaphysicae, pars i. cap. 2). At the same time he shows more discrimination than does Locke in distinguishing between the two uses of this expression, and between the legitimate and illegitimate form of the doctrine (Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. 2). All our ideas are, as by Locke, referred to external or internal sense, or, in other words, to sensation and reflection (see, for instance,Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap. 1;Logicae Compend.pars i. cap. 1;System of Moral Philosophy, bk. i. ch. 1). It is, however, a most important modification of Locke’s doctrine, and one which connects Hutcheson’s mental philosophy with that of Reid, when he states that the ideas of extension, figure, motion and rest “are more properly ideas accompanying the sensations of sight and touch than the sensations of either of these senses”; that the idea of self accompanies every thought, and that the ideas of number, duration and existence accompany every other idea whatsoever (seeEssay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, sect. i. art. 1;Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap. 1, pars ii. cap. 1; Hamilton on Reid, p. 124, note). Other important points in which Hutcheson follows the lead of Locke are his depreciation of the importance of the so-called laws of thought, his distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies, the position that we cannot know the inmost essences of things (“intimae rerum naturae sive essentiae”), though they excite various ideas in us, and the assumption that external things are known only through the medium of ideas (Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap. 1), though, at the same time, we are assured of the existence of an external world corresponding to these ideas. Hutcheson attempts to account for our assurance of the reality of an external world by referring it to a natural instinct (Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap. 1). Of the correspondence or similitude between our ideas of the primary qualities of things and the things themselves God alone can be assigned as the cause. This similitude has been effected by Him through a law of nature. “Haec prima qualitatum primariarum perceptio, sive mentis actio quaedam sive passio dicatur, non alia similitudinis aut convenientiae inter ejusmodi ideas et res ipsas causa assignari posse videtur, quam ipse Deus, qui certa naturae lege hoc efficit, ut notiones, quae rebus praesentibus excitantur, sint ipsis similes, aut saltem earum habitudines, si non veras quantitates, depingant” (pars ii. cap. 1). Locke does speak of God “annexing” certain ideas to certain motions of bodies; but nowhere does he propound a theory so definite as that here propounded by Hutcheson, which reminds us at least as much of the speculations of Malebranche as of those of Locke.
Amongst the more important points in which Hutcheson diverges from Locke is his account of the idea of personal identity, which he appears to have regarded as made known to us directly by consciousness. The distinction between body and mind,corpusormateriaandres cogitans, is more emphatically accentuated by Hutcheson than by Locke. Generally, he speaks as if we had a direct consciousness of mind as distinct from body (see, for instance,Syn. Metaph.pars ii. cap. 3), though, in the posthumous work onMoral Philosophy, he expressly states that we know mind as we know body “by qualities immediately perceived though the substance of both be unknown” (bk. i. ch. 1). The distinction between perception proper and sensation proper, which occurs by implication though it is not explicitly worked out (see Hamilton’sLectures on Metaphysics, Lect. 24; Hamilton’s edition ofDugald Stewart’s Works, v. 420), the imperfection of the ordinary division of the external senses into five classes, the limitation of consciousness to a special mental faculty (severely criticized in Sir W. Hamilton’sLectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xii.) and the disposition to refer on disputed questions of philosophy not so much to formal arguments as to the testimony of consciousness and our natural instincts are also amongst the points in which Hutcheson supplemented or departed from the philosophy of Locke. The last point can hardly fail to suggest the “common-sense philosophy” of Reid.
Thus, in estimating Hutcheson’s position, we find that in particular questions he stands nearer to Locke, but in the general spirit of his philosophy he seems to approach more closely to his Scottish successors.
The shortCompendium of Logic, which is more original than suchworks usually are, is remarkable chiefly for the large proportion of psychological matter which it contains. In these parts of the book Hutcheson mainly follows Locke. The technicalities of the subject are passed lightly over, and the book is readable. It may be specially noticed that he distinguishes between the mental result and its verbal expression [idea—term; judgment—proposition], that he constantly employs the word “idea,” and that he defines logical truth as “convenientia signorum cum rebus significatis” (or “propositionis convenientia cum rebus ipsis,”Syn. Metaph.pars i. cap 3), thus implicitly repudiating a merely formal view of logic.
III.Aesthetics.—Hutcheson may further be regarded as one of the earliest modern writers on aesthetics. His speculations on this subject are contained in theInquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design, the first of the two treatises published in 1725. He maintains that we are endowed with a special sense by which we perceive beauty, harmony and proportion. This is areflexsense, because it presupposes the action of the external senses of sight and hearing. It may be called an internal sense, both in order to distinguish its perceptions from the mere perceptions of sight and hearing, and because “in some other affairs, where our external senses are not much concerned, we discern a sort of beauty, very like in many respects to that observed in sensible objects, and accompanied with like pleasure” (Inquiry, &c., sect. 1). The latter reason leads him to call attention to the beauty perceived in universal truths, in the operations of general causes and in moral principles and actions. Thus, the analogy between beauty and virtue, which was so favourite a topic with Shaftesbury, is prominent in the writings of Hutcheson also. Scattered up and down the treatise there are many important and interesting observations which our limits prevent us from noticing. But to the student of mental philosophy it may be specially interesting to remark that Hutcheson both applies the principle of association to explain our ideas of beauty and also sets limits to its application, insisting on there being “a natural power of perception or sense of beauty in objects, antecedent to all custom, education or example” (seeInquiry, &c., sects. 6, 7; Hamilton’sLectures on Metaphysics, Lect. 44ad fin.).
Hutcheson’s writings naturally gave rise to much controversy. To say nothing of minor opponents, such as “Philaretus” (Gilbert Burnet, already alluded to), Dr John Balguy (1686-1748), prebendary of Salisbury, the author of two tracts on “The Foundation of Moral Goodness,” and Dr John Taylor (1694-1761) of Norwich, a minister of considerable reputation in his time (author ofAn Examination of the Scheme of Morality advanced by Dr Hutcheson), the essays appear to have suggested, by antagonism, at least two works which hold a permanent place in the literature of English ethics—Butler’sDissertation on the Nature of Virtue, and Richard Price’sTreatise of Moral Good and Evil(1757). In this latter work the author maintains, in opposition to Hutcheson, that actions arein themselvesright or wrong, that right and wrong are simple ideas incapable of analysis, and that these ideas are perceived immediately by the understanding. We thus see that, not only directly but also through the replies which it called forth, the system of Hutcheson, or at least the system of Hutcheson combined with that of Shaftesbury, contributed, in large measure, to the formation and development of some of the most important of the modern schools of ethics (see especially art.Ethics).
Authorities.—Notices of Hutcheson occur in most histories, both of general philosophy and of moral philosophy, as, for instance, in pt. vii. of Adam Smith’sTheory of Moral Sentiments; Mackintosh’sProgress of Ethical Philosophy; Cousin,Cours d’histoire de la philosophie morale du XVIIIesiècle; Whewell’sLectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England; A. Bain’sMental and Moral Science; Noah Porter’s Appendix to the English translation of Ueberweg’sHistory of Philosophy; Sir Leslie Stephen’sHistory of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, &c. See also Martineau,Types of Ethical Theory(London, 1902); W. R. Scott,Francis Hutcheson(Cambridge, 1900); Albee,History of English Utilitarianism(London, 1902); T. Fowler,Shaftesbury and Hutcheson(London, 1882); J. McCosh,Scottish Philosophy(New York, 1874). Of Dr Leechman’sBiographyof Hutcheson we have already spoken. J. Veitch gives an interesting account of his professorial work in Glasgow,Mind, ii. 209-212.