Chapter 6

Drill is the military form of education by repetition and association (see G. le Bon,Psychologie de l’éducation). Materially it consists in exercises frequently repeated by bodies of soldiers with a view to ensuring the harmonious action of each individualDrill.in the work to be performed by the mass—in a word, rehearsals. Physical “drill” is based on physiology and gymnastics, and aims at the development of the physique and the individual will power.16But the psychological or moral is incomparably the most important side of drill. It is the method or art of discipline. Neither self-control nor devotion in the face of imminent danger can as a rule come from individual reasoning. A commander-in-chief keeps himself free from the contact with the turmoil of battle so long as he has to calculate, to study reports or to manœuvre, and commanders of lower grades, in proportion as their duty brings them into the midst of danger, are subjected to greater or less disturbing influences. The man in the fighting line where the danger is greatest is altogether the slave of the unconscious. Overtaxed infantry, whether defeated or successful, have been observed to present an appearance of absolute insanity. It is true that in the special case of great war experience reason resumes part of its dominion in proportion as the fight becomes the soldier’s habitualmilieu. Thus towards the end of a long war men become skilful and cunning individual fighters; sometimes, too, feelings of respect for the enemy arise and lead to interchange of courtesies at the outposts, and it has also been noticed that in the last stage of a long war men are less inclined to sacrifice themselves. All this is “reason” as against inborn or inbred “instinct.” But in the modern world, which is normally at peace, some method must be found of ensuring that the peace-trained soldier will carry out his duties when his reason is submerged. Now we know that the constant repetition of a certain act, whether on a given impulse or of the individual’s own volition, will eventually make the performance of that act a reflex action. For this reason peace-drilled troops have often defeated a war-trained enemy, even when the motives for fighting were equally powerful on each side. The mechanical performance of movements, and loading and firing at the enemy, under the most disturbing conditions can be ensured by bringing the required self-control from the domain of reason into that of instinct. “L’éducation,” says le Bon, “est l’art de faire passer le conscient dans l’inconscient.” Lastly, the instincts of the recruit being those special to his race or nation, which are the more powerful because they are operative through many generations, it is the drill sergeant’s business to bring about, by disuse, atrophy of the instincts which militate against soldierly efficiency, and to develop, by constant repetition and special preparation, other useful instincts which the Englishman or Frenchman or German does not as such possess. In short, as regards infantry training, there is no real distinction between drill and education, save in so far as the latter term covers instruction in small details of field service which demand alertness, shrewdness and technical knowledge (as distinct from technical training). As understood by the controversialists of the last generation, drill was the antithesis of education. To-day, however, the principle of education having prevailed against the old-fashioned notion of drill, it has been discovered that after all drill is merely an intensive form of education. This discovery (or rather definition and justification of an existing empirical rule) is attributable chiefly to a certain school of French officers, who seized more rapidly than civilians the significance of modern psycho-physiology. In their eyes, a military body possesses in a more marked degree than another, the primary requisite of the “psychological crowd,” studied by Gustave le Bon, viz. the orientation of the wills of each and all members of the crowd in a determined direction. Such a crowd generates a collective will that dominates the wills of the individuals composing it. It coheres and acts on the common property of all the instincts and habits in which each shares. Further it tends to extremes of baseness and heroism—this being particularly marked in the military crowd—and lastly it reacts to a stimulus. The last is the keynote of the whole subject of infantry training as also, to a lesser degree, of that of the other arms. The officer can be regarded practically as a hypnotist playing upon the unconscious activities of his subject. In the lower grades, it is immaterial whether reason, caprice or a fresh set of instincts stimulated by an outside authority, set in motion the “suggestion.” The true leader, whatever the provenance of his “suggestion,” makes it effective by dominating the “psychological crowd” that he leads. On the other hand, if he fails to do so, he is himself dominated by the uncontrolled will of the crowd, and although leaderless mobs have at times shown extreme heroism, it is far more usual to find them reverting to the primitive instinct of brutality or panic fear. A mob, therefore, or a raw regiment, requires greater powers of suggestion in its leader, whereas a thorough course of drill tunes the “crowd” to respond to the stimulus that average officers can apply.

So far from diminishing, drill has increased in importance under modern conditions of recruiting. It has merely changed in form, and instead of being repressive it has become educative. The force of modern short-service troops, astroops, is far sooner spent than that of the old-fashioned automatic regiments, while the reserve force of its component parts, remaining after the dissolution, is far higher than of old. But this uncontrolled, force is liable to panic as well as amenable to an impulse of self-sacrifice. In so far, then, it is necessary to adopt the catchword of the Bülow school and to “organize disorder,” and the only known method of doing so is drill. “Individualism” pure and simple had certainly a brief reign during and after the South African War, especially in Great Britain, and both France and Germany coquetted with “Boer tactics,” until the Russo-Japanese war brought military Europe back to the old principles.

But the South African War came precisely at the point of time when the controversies of 1870 had crystallized into a form of tactics that was not suitable to the conditions of that war, while about the same time the relations of infantryThe South African War.and artillery underwent a profound change. As regards the South African War, the clear atmosphere, the trained sight of the Boers, and the alternation of level plain and high concave kopjes which constituted the usual battlefield, made the front to front infantry attacks not merely difficult but almost impossible. For years, indeed ever since the Peninsular War, the tendency of the British army to deploy early had afforded a handle to European critics of its tactical methods. It was a tendency that survived with the rest of the “linear” tradition. But in South Africa, owing to the special advantages of the defenders, which denied to the assailant all reliable indications of the enemy’s strength and positions, this early deployment had to take a non-committal form—viz. many successive lines of skirmishers. The application of this form was, indeed, made easy by the openness of the ground, but like all “schematic” formations, open or close, it could not be maintained under fire, with the special disadvantage that the extensions were so wide as to make any manœuvring after the fight had cleared up a situation a practical impossibility. Hence somepreconceived ideaof an objective was an essential preliminary, and as the Boer mounted infantry hardly ever stood to defend any particular position to the last (as they could always renew the fight at some other point in their vast territory), the preconceived idea was always, after the early battles, an envelopment in which the troops told off to the frontal holding attack were required, not to force their advance to its logical conclusion, but to keep the fight alive until the flank attack made itself felt. The principal tendency of British infantry tactics after the Boer War was therefore quite naturally, under European as well as colonial conditions, to deploy at the outset in great depth,i.e.in many lines of skirmishers, each line, when within about 1400 yds. of the enemy’s position, extending to intervals of 10 to 20 paces between individuals. The reserves were strong and their importance was well marked in the 1902 training manual, but their functions were rather to extend or feed the firing line, to serve as a rallying point in case of defeat and to take up the pursuit (par. 220,Infantry Training, 1902), than to form the engine ofa decisive attack framed by the commander-in-chief after “engaging everywhere and then seeing” as Napoleon did. The 1905 regulations adhered to this theory of the attack in the main, only modifying a number of tactical prescriptions whichFormulation of the British “Doctrine.”had not proved satisfactory after their transplantation from South Africa to Europe, but after the Russo-Japanese War a series of important amendments was issued which gave greater force and still greater elasticity to the attack procedure, and in 1909 the tactical “doctrine” of the British army was definitively formulated inField Service Regulations, paragraph 102, of which after enumerating the advantages and disadvantages of the “preconceived idea” system, laid it down, as the normal procedure of the British Army, that the general should “obtain the decision bymanœuvre on the battlefieldwith a large general reserve maintained in his own hand” and “strike with his reserve at the right place and time.”

The rehabilitation of the Napoleonic attack idea thus frankly accepted in Great Britain had taken place in France several years before the South African War, and neither this war nor that in Manchuria effectively shook the faith of the French army in the principle, while on the other hand Germany remains faithful to the “preconceived idea,” both in strategy and tactics.17This essential difference in the two rival “doctrines” is intimately connected with the revival of the Napoleonic artillery attack, in the form of concentrated time shrapnel.

The Napoleonic artillery preparation, it will be remembered, was a fire of overwhelming intensity delivered against the selected point of the enemy’s position, at the moment of the massed and decisive assault of the reserves. In Napoleon’s time the artillery went in to within 300 or 400 yds. range for this act,i.e.in front of the infantry, whereas now the guns fire over the heads of the infantry and concentrate shells instead of guns on the vital point. The principle is, however, the same. A model infantry attack in the Napoleonic manner was that of Okasaki’s brigade on the Terayama hill at the battle of Shaho, described by Sir Ian Hamilton in hisStaff Officer’s Scrap-Book. The Japanese, methodical and cautious as they were, only sanctioned a pure open force assault as a last resort. Then the brigadier Okasaki, a peculiarly resolute leader, arrayed his brigade in a “schematic” attack formation of four lines, the first two in single rank, the third in line and the fourth in company columns. Covered by a powerful converging shrapnel fire, the brigade covered the first 900 yds. of open plain without firing a shot. Then, however, it disappeared from sight amongst the houses of a village, and the spectators watched the thousands of flashes fringing the further edge that indicated a fire-fight at decisive range (the Terayama was about 600 yds. beyond the houses). Forty minutes passed, and the army commander Kuroki said, “He cannot go forward. We are in check to-day all along the line.” But at that moment Okasaki’s men, no longer in a “schematic” formation but in many irregularly disposed groups—some of a dozen men and some of seventy, some widely extended and some practically in close order—rushed forward at full speed over 600 yds. of open ground, and stormed the Terayama with the bayonet.

Such an attack as that at the battle of Shaho is rare, but so it has always been with masterpieces of the art of war. We have only to multiply the front of attack by two and the forces engaged by five—and to find the resoluteThe decisive attack.general to lead them—to obtain the ideal decisive attack of a future European war. Instead of the bare open plain over which the advance to decisive range was made, a European general would in most cases dispose of an area of spinneys, farm-houses and undulating fields. The schematic approach-march would be replaced in France and England by a forward movement of bodies in close order, handy enough to utilize the smallest covered ways. Then the fire of both infantry and artillery would be augmented to its maximum intensity, overpowering that of the defence, and the whole of the troops opposite the point to be stormed would be thrown forward for the bayonet charge. The formation for this scarcely matters. What is important is speed and the will to conquer, and for this purpose small bodies (sections, half-companies or companies), not in the close order of the drill book but grouped closely about the leader who inspires and controls them, are as potent an instrument as a Frederician line or a Napoleonic column.

Controversy, in fact, does not turn altogether on the method of the assault, or even on the method of obtaining the fire-superiority of guns and rifles that justifies it. Although one nation may rely on its guns more than on the rifles, or vice versa, all are agreed that at decisive range the firing line should contain as many men as can use their rifles effectually. Perhaps the most disputed point is the form of the “approach-march,” viz. the dispositions and movements of the attacking infantry between about 1400 and about 600 yds. from the position of the enemy.

The condition of the assailant’s infantry when it reaches decisive ranges is largely governed by the efforts it has expended and the losses it has suffered in its progress. Sometimes even after a firing line of some strength has beenThe approach-march.established at decisive range, it may prove too difficult or too costly for the supports (sent up from the rear to replace casualties and to augment fire-power) to make their way to the front. Often, again, it may be within the commander’s intentions that his troops at some particular point in the line should not be committed to decisive action before a given time—perhaps not at all. It is obvious then that no “normal” attack procedure which can be laid down in a drill book (though from time to time the attempt has been made, as in the French regulations of 1875) can meet all cases. But here again, though all armies formally and explicitly condemn the normal attack, each has its own well-marked tendencies.

The German regulations of 1906 define the offensive as “transporting fire towards the enemy, if necessary to his immediate proximity”; the bayonet attack “confirms” the victory. Every attack begins with deploymentCurrent views on the infantry attack.into extended order, and the leading line advances as close to the enemy as possible before opening fire. In ground offering cover, the firing line has practically its maximum density at the outset. In open ground, however, half-sections, groups and individuals, widely spaced out, advance stealthily one after the other till all arein position. It is on this position, called the “first fire position” and usually about 1000 yds. from the enemy, that the full force of the attack is deployed, and from this position, as simultaneously as possible, it opens the fight for fire-superiority. Then, each unit covering the advance of its neighbours, the whole line fights its way by open force to within charging distance. If at any point a decision is not desired, it is deliberately made impossible by employing there such small forces as possess no offensive power. Where the attack is intended to be pushed home, the infantry units employed act as far as possible simultaneously, resolutely and in great force (see the GermanInfantry Regulations, 1906, §§ 324 et seq.).

While in Germany movement “transports the fire,” in France fire is regarded as the way to make movement possible. It is considered (see Grandmaison,Dressage de l’infanterie) that a premature and excessive deployment enervates the attack, that the ground (i.e.covered ways of approach for small columns, not for troops showing a fire front) should be used as long as possible to march “en troupe” and that a firing line should only be formed when it is impossible to progress without acting upon the enemy’s means of resistance. Thereafter each unit, in such order as its chief can keep, should fight its way forward, and help others to do so—like Okasaki’s brigade in the last stage of its attack—utilizing bursts of fire or patches of wood or depressions in the ground, as each is profitable or available to assist the advance. “From the moment when a fighting unit is ‘uncoupled,’ its action must be ruled by two conditions, and by those only: the one material, an object to be reached; the other moral, the will to reach the object.”

The BritishField Service Regulationsof 1909 are in spirit more closely allied to the French than to the German. “The climax of the infantry attack is the assault, which is made possible by superiority of fire” is the principle (emphasized in the book itself by the use of conspicuous type), and a “gradualbuilding up of the firing line within close rangeof the position,” coupled with the closest artillery support, and the final blow of the reserves delivered “unexpectedly and in the greatest possible strength” are indicated as the means.18

Thedefence, as it used to be understood, needs no description. To-day in all armies the defence is looked upon not as a means of winning a battle, but as a means of temporizing and avoiding the decision until the commander ofDefence.the defending party is enabled, by the general military situation or by the course and results of the defensive battle itself, to take the offensive. In the BritishField Service Regulationsit is laid down that when an army acts on the defensive no less than half of it should if possible be earmarked, suitably posted and placed under a single commander, for the purpose of delivering a decisive counter-attack. The object of the purely defensive portion, too, is not merely to hold the enemy’s firing line in check, but to drive it back so that the enemy may be forced to use up his local reserve resources to keep the fight alive. A firing line covered and steadied by entrenchments, and restless local reserves ever on the look-out for opportunities of partial counterstrokes, are the instruments of this policy.

A word must be added on the use of entrenchments by infantry, a subject the technical aspect of which is fully dealt with and illustrated inFortification and Siegecraft:Field Defences. Entrenchments of greater or less strength by themselvesEntrenchments.have always been used by infantry on the defensive, especially in the wars of position of the 17th and 18th centuries. In the Napoleonic and modern “wars of movement,” they are regarded, not as a passive defence—they have long ceased to present a physical barrier to assault—but as fire positions so prepared as to be defensible by relatively few men. Their purpose is, by economizing force elsewhere, to give the maximum strength to the troops told off for the counter-offensive. In the later stages of the American Civil War, and also in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905—each in its way an example of a “war of positions”—the assailant has also made use of the methods of fortification to secure every successive step of progress in the attack. The usefulness and limitations of this procedure are defined in generally similar terms in the most recent training manuals of nearly every European army. Section 136, § 7 of the BritishInfantry Training(1905, amended 1907) says: “During the process of establishing a superiority of fire, successive fire positions will be occupied by the firing line. As a rule those affording natural cover will be chosen, but if none exist and the intensity of the hostile fire preclude any immediate further advance, it may be expedient for the firing line to create some. This hastily constructed protection will enable the attack to cope with the defender’s fire and thus prepare the way for a farther advance. The construction of cover during an attack, however, will entail delay and a temporary loss of fire effectand should therefore be resorted to only when absolutely necessary.... As soon as possible the advance should be resumed, &c.” The German regulations are as follows (Infantry Training, 1906, § 313): “In the offensive the entrenching tool may be used where it is desired, for the moment, to content one’s self with maintaining the ground gained.... The entrenching tool is only to be used with the greatest circumspection, because of the great difficulty of getting an extended line to go forward under fire when it has expended much effort in digging cover for itself. The construction of trenches must never paralyze the desire for the irresistible advance,and above all must not kill the spirit of the offensive.”Organization and EquipmentThe organization of infantry varies rather more than that of other arms in different countries. Taking the British system first, the battalion (and not as elsewhere the regiment of two, three or more battalions) is the administrative and manœuvre unit. It is about 1000 strong, and is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, who has a major and an adjutant (captain or lieutenant) to assist him, and an officer of lieutenant’s or captain’s rank (almost invariably promoted from the ranks), styled the quartermaster, to deal with supplies, clothing, &c. There are eight companies of a nominal strength of about 120 each. These are commanded by captains (or by junior majors), and each captain has or should have two lieutenants or second lieutenants to assist him. Machine guns are in Great Britain distributed to the battalions and not massed in permanent batteries. In addition there are various regimental details, such as orderly-room staff, cooks, cyclists, signallers, band and ambulance men. The company is divided into four sections of thirty men each and commanded by sergeants. A half-company of two sections is under the control of a subaltern officer. A minor subdivision of the section into two “squads” is made unless the numbers are insufficient to warrant it. In administrative duties the captain’s principal assistant is the colour-sergeant or pay-sergeant, who is not assigned to a section command. The lieutenant-colonel, the senior major and the adjutant are mounted. The commanding officer is assisted by a battalion staff, at the head of which is the adjutant. The sergeant-major holds a “warrant” from the secretary of state for war, as does the bandmaster. Other members of the battalion staff are non-commissioned officers, appointed by the commanding officer. The most important of these is the quartermaster-sergeant, who is the assistant of the quartermaster. The two colours (“king’s” and “regimental”) are in Great Britain carried by subalterns and escorted by colour-sergeants (seeColours).The “tactical” unit of infantry is now thecompany, which varies very greatly in strength in the different armies. Elsewhere the company of 250 rifles is almost universal, but in Great Britain the company has about 110 men in the ranks, forming four sections. These sections, each of about 28 rifles, are the normal “fire-units,” that is to say, the unit which delivers its fire at the orders of and with the elevation and direction given by its commander. This, it will be observed, gives little actual executive work for the junior officers. But a more serious objection than this (which is modified in practice by arrangement and circumstances) is the fact that a small unit is more affected by detachments than a large one. In the home battalions of the Regular Army such detachments are very large, what with finding drafts for the foreign service battalions and for instructional courses, while in the Territorial Force, where it is so rarely possible to assemble all the men at once, the company as organized is often too small to drill as such. On the other hand, the full war-strength company is an admirable unit for control and manœuvre in the field, owing to its rapidity of movement, handiness in using accidents of ground and cover, and susceptibility to the word of command of one man. But as soon as its strength falls below about 80 the advantages cease to counterbalance the defects. The sections become too small as fire-units to effect really useful results, and the battalion commander has to coordinate and to direct 8 comparatively ineffective units instead of 4 powerful ones. The British regular army, therefore, has since the South African War, adopted thedouble companyas the unit of training. This gives at all times a substantial unit for fire and manœuvre training, but the disadvantage of having a good many officers only half employed is accentuated. As to the tactical value of the large or double company, opinions differ. Some hold that as the small company is a survival from the days when the battalion was the tactical unit and the company was the unit of volley-fire, it is unsuited to the modern exigencies that have broken up the old rigid line into several independent and co-operating fractions. Others reply that the strong continental company of 250 rifles came into existence in Prussia in the years after Waterloo, not from tactical reasons, but because the state was too poor to maintain a large establishment of officers, and that in 1870, at any rate, there were many instances of its tactical unwieldiness. The point that is common to both organizations is the fact that there is theoretically one subaltern to every 50 or 60 rifles, and this reveals an essential difference between the British and the Continental systems, irrespective of the sizes or groupings of companies. The French or German subaltern effectively commands his 50 men as a unit, whereas the British subaltern supervises two groups of 25 to 30 men under responsible non-commissioned officers. That is to say, a British sergeant may find himself in such a position that he has to be as expert in controlling and obtaining good results from collective fire as a German lieutenant. For reasons mentioned inArmy, § 40, non-commissioned officers, of the type called by Kipling the “backbone of the army,” are almost unobtainable with the universal service system, and the lowest unit that possesses any independence is the lowest unit commanded by an officer. But apart from the rank of the fire-unit commander, it is questionable whether the section, as understood in England, is not too small a fire-unit, for European warfare at any rate. The regulations of the various European armies, framed for these conditions, practically agree that the fire-unit should be commanded by an officer and should be large enough to ensure good results from collective fire. The number of rifles meeting this second condition is 50 to 80 and their organization a “section” (corresponding to the British half-company) under a subaltern officer. The British army has, of course, to be organized and trained for an infinitely wider range of activity, and no one would suggest the abolition of the small section as a fire-unit. But in a great European battle it would be almost certainly better to group the two sections into a real unit for fire effect. (For questions of infantry fire tactics seeRifle: §Musketry.)On the continent of Europe the “regiment,” which is a unit, acting in peace and war as such, consists normally of three battalions, andeach battalion of four companies or 1000 rifles. The company of 250 rifles is commanded by a captain, who is mounted. In France the company has four sections, commanded in war by the three subalterns and the “adjudant” (company sergeant-major); the sections are further grouped in pairs to constitutepelotons(platoons) or half-companies under the senior of the two section leaders. In peace there are two subalterns only, and thepelotonis the normal junior officer’s command. The battalion is commanded by a major (commandantor strictlychef de bataillon), the regiment (three or four battalions) by a colonel with a lieutenant-colonel as second. An organization of 3-battalion regiments and 3-company battalions was proposed in 1910.In Germany, where what we have called the continental company originated, the regiment is of three battalions under majors, and the battalion of four companies commanded by captains. The company is divided into threeZüge(sections), each under a subaltern, who has as his second a sergeant-major, a “vice-sergeant-major” or a “sword-knot ensign” (aspirant officer). In war there is one additional officer for company. TheZugat war-strength has therefore about 80 rifles in the ranks, as compared with the French “section” of 50, and the British section of 30.The system prevailing in the United States since the reorganization of 1901 is somewhat remarkable. The regiment, which is a tactical as well as an administrative unit, consists of three battalions. Each battalion has four companies of (at war-strength) 3 officers and 150 rifles each. The regiment in war therefore consists of about 1800 rifles in three small and handy battalions of 600 each. The circumstances in which this army serves, and in particular the maintenance of small frontier posts, have always imposed upon subalterns the responsibilities of small independent commands, and it is fair to assume that the 75 rifles at a subaltern’s disposal are regarded as a tactical unit.In sum, then, the infantry battalion is in almost every country about 1000 rifles strong in four companies. In the United States it is 600 strong in four companies, and in Great Britain it is 1000 strong in eight. The captain’s command is usually 200 to 250 men, in the United States 150, and in Great Britain 120. The lieutenant or second lieutenant commands in Germany 80 rifles, in France 50, in the United States 75, as a unit of fire and manœuvre. In Great Britain he commands, with relatively restricted powers, 60.A short account of the infantry equipments—knapsack or valise, belt, haversack, &c.—in use in various countries will be found inUniforms, Naval and Military. The armament of infantry is, in all countries, the magazine rifle (seeRifle) and bayonet (q.v.), for officers and for certain under-officers sword (q.v.) and pistol (q.v.). Ammunition (q.v.) in the British service is carried (a) by the individual soldier, (b) by the reserves (mules and carts) in regimental charge, some of which in action are assembled from the battalions of a brigade to form a brigade reserve, and (c) by the ammunition columns.Bibliography.—The following works are selected to show (1) the historical development of the arm, and (2) the different “doctrines” of to-day as to its training and functions:—Ardant du Picq,Études sur le combat; C. W. C. Oman,The Art of War: Middle Ages; Biottot,Les Grands Inspirés—Jeanne d’Arc; Hardy de Périni,Batailles françaises; C. H. Firth,Cromwell’s Army; German official history of Frederick the Great’s wars, especiallyErster Schlesische Krieg, vol. i.; Susane,Histoire de l’infanterie française; French General Staff,La Tactique au XVIIIme—l’infanterieandLa Tactique et la discipline dans les armées de la Révolution—Général Schauenbourg; J. W. Fortescue,History of the British Army; Moorsom,History of the 52nd Regiment; de Grandmaison,Dressage de l’infanterie(Paris, 1908); works of W. v. Scherff; F. N. Maude,Evolution of Infantry Tactics and Attack and Defence; [Meckel]Ein Sommernachtstraum(Eng. trans, inUnited Service Magazine, 1890); J. Meckel,Taktik; Malachowski,Scharfe- und Revuetaktik; H. Langlois,Enseignements de deux guerres; F. Hoenig,Tactics of the FutureandTwenty-four Hours of Moltke’s Strategy(Eng. trans.); works of A. von Boguslowski;British Officers’ Reports on the Russo-Japanese War; H. W. L. Hime,Stray Military Papers; Grange, “Les Réalités du champ de bataille—Woerth” (Rev. d’infanterie, 1908-1909); V. Lindenau, “The Boer War and Infantry Attack” (Journal R. United Service Institution, 1902-1903); Janin, “Aperçus sur la tactique—Mandchourie” (Rev. d’infanterie, 1909); Soloviev, “Infantry Combat in the Russo-Jap. War” (Eng. trans.Journal R.U.S.I., 1908); British OfficialField Service Regulations, part i. (1909), andInfantry Training(1905); German drill regulations of 1906 (Fr. trans.); French drill regulations of 1904; Japanese regulations 1907 (Eng. trans.). The most important journals devoted to the infantry arm are the French officialRevue d’infanterie(Paris and Limoges), and theJournal of the United Stales Infantry Association(Washington, D. C).

Organization and Equipment

The organization of infantry varies rather more than that of other arms in different countries. Taking the British system first, the battalion (and not as elsewhere the regiment of two, three or more battalions) is the administrative and manœuvre unit. It is about 1000 strong, and is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, who has a major and an adjutant (captain or lieutenant) to assist him, and an officer of lieutenant’s or captain’s rank (almost invariably promoted from the ranks), styled the quartermaster, to deal with supplies, clothing, &c. There are eight companies of a nominal strength of about 120 each. These are commanded by captains (or by junior majors), and each captain has or should have two lieutenants or second lieutenants to assist him. Machine guns are in Great Britain distributed to the battalions and not massed in permanent batteries. In addition there are various regimental details, such as orderly-room staff, cooks, cyclists, signallers, band and ambulance men. The company is divided into four sections of thirty men each and commanded by sergeants. A half-company of two sections is under the control of a subaltern officer. A minor subdivision of the section into two “squads” is made unless the numbers are insufficient to warrant it. In administrative duties the captain’s principal assistant is the colour-sergeant or pay-sergeant, who is not assigned to a section command. The lieutenant-colonel, the senior major and the adjutant are mounted. The commanding officer is assisted by a battalion staff, at the head of which is the adjutant. The sergeant-major holds a “warrant” from the secretary of state for war, as does the bandmaster. Other members of the battalion staff are non-commissioned officers, appointed by the commanding officer. The most important of these is the quartermaster-sergeant, who is the assistant of the quartermaster. The two colours (“king’s” and “regimental”) are in Great Britain carried by subalterns and escorted by colour-sergeants (seeColours).

The “tactical” unit of infantry is now thecompany, which varies very greatly in strength in the different armies. Elsewhere the company of 250 rifles is almost universal, but in Great Britain the company has about 110 men in the ranks, forming four sections. These sections, each of about 28 rifles, are the normal “fire-units,” that is to say, the unit which delivers its fire at the orders of and with the elevation and direction given by its commander. This, it will be observed, gives little actual executive work for the junior officers. But a more serious objection than this (which is modified in practice by arrangement and circumstances) is the fact that a small unit is more affected by detachments than a large one. In the home battalions of the Regular Army such detachments are very large, what with finding drafts for the foreign service battalions and for instructional courses, while in the Territorial Force, where it is so rarely possible to assemble all the men at once, the company as organized is often too small to drill as such. On the other hand, the full war-strength company is an admirable unit for control and manœuvre in the field, owing to its rapidity of movement, handiness in using accidents of ground and cover, and susceptibility to the word of command of one man. But as soon as its strength falls below about 80 the advantages cease to counterbalance the defects. The sections become too small as fire-units to effect really useful results, and the battalion commander has to coordinate and to direct 8 comparatively ineffective units instead of 4 powerful ones. The British regular army, therefore, has since the South African War, adopted thedouble companyas the unit of training. This gives at all times a substantial unit for fire and manœuvre training, but the disadvantage of having a good many officers only half employed is accentuated. As to the tactical value of the large or double company, opinions differ. Some hold that as the small company is a survival from the days when the battalion was the tactical unit and the company was the unit of volley-fire, it is unsuited to the modern exigencies that have broken up the old rigid line into several independent and co-operating fractions. Others reply that the strong continental company of 250 rifles came into existence in Prussia in the years after Waterloo, not from tactical reasons, but because the state was too poor to maintain a large establishment of officers, and that in 1870, at any rate, there were many instances of its tactical unwieldiness. The point that is common to both organizations is the fact that there is theoretically one subaltern to every 50 or 60 rifles, and this reveals an essential difference between the British and the Continental systems, irrespective of the sizes or groupings of companies. The French or German subaltern effectively commands his 50 men as a unit, whereas the British subaltern supervises two groups of 25 to 30 men under responsible non-commissioned officers. That is to say, a British sergeant may find himself in such a position that he has to be as expert in controlling and obtaining good results from collective fire as a German lieutenant. For reasons mentioned inArmy, § 40, non-commissioned officers, of the type called by Kipling the “backbone of the army,” are almost unobtainable with the universal service system, and the lowest unit that possesses any independence is the lowest unit commanded by an officer. But apart from the rank of the fire-unit commander, it is questionable whether the section, as understood in England, is not too small a fire-unit, for European warfare at any rate. The regulations of the various European armies, framed for these conditions, practically agree that the fire-unit should be commanded by an officer and should be large enough to ensure good results from collective fire. The number of rifles meeting this second condition is 50 to 80 and their organization a “section” (corresponding to the British half-company) under a subaltern officer. The British army has, of course, to be organized and trained for an infinitely wider range of activity, and no one would suggest the abolition of the small section as a fire-unit. But in a great European battle it would be almost certainly better to group the two sections into a real unit for fire effect. (For questions of infantry fire tactics seeRifle: §Musketry.)

On the continent of Europe the “regiment,” which is a unit, acting in peace and war as such, consists normally of three battalions, andeach battalion of four companies or 1000 rifles. The company of 250 rifles is commanded by a captain, who is mounted. In France the company has four sections, commanded in war by the three subalterns and the “adjudant” (company sergeant-major); the sections are further grouped in pairs to constitutepelotons(platoons) or half-companies under the senior of the two section leaders. In peace there are two subalterns only, and thepelotonis the normal junior officer’s command. The battalion is commanded by a major (commandantor strictlychef de bataillon), the regiment (three or four battalions) by a colonel with a lieutenant-colonel as second. An organization of 3-battalion regiments and 3-company battalions was proposed in 1910.

In Germany, where what we have called the continental company originated, the regiment is of three battalions under majors, and the battalion of four companies commanded by captains. The company is divided into threeZüge(sections), each under a subaltern, who has as his second a sergeant-major, a “vice-sergeant-major” or a “sword-knot ensign” (aspirant officer). In war there is one additional officer for company. TheZugat war-strength has therefore about 80 rifles in the ranks, as compared with the French “section” of 50, and the British section of 30.

The system prevailing in the United States since the reorganization of 1901 is somewhat remarkable. The regiment, which is a tactical as well as an administrative unit, consists of three battalions. Each battalion has four companies of (at war-strength) 3 officers and 150 rifles each. The regiment in war therefore consists of about 1800 rifles in three small and handy battalions of 600 each. The circumstances in which this army serves, and in particular the maintenance of small frontier posts, have always imposed upon subalterns the responsibilities of small independent commands, and it is fair to assume that the 75 rifles at a subaltern’s disposal are regarded as a tactical unit.

In sum, then, the infantry battalion is in almost every country about 1000 rifles strong in four companies. In the United States it is 600 strong in four companies, and in Great Britain it is 1000 strong in eight. The captain’s command is usually 200 to 250 men, in the United States 150, and in Great Britain 120. The lieutenant or second lieutenant commands in Germany 80 rifles, in France 50, in the United States 75, as a unit of fire and manœuvre. In Great Britain he commands, with relatively restricted powers, 60.

A short account of the infantry equipments—knapsack or valise, belt, haversack, &c.—in use in various countries will be found inUniforms, Naval and Military. The armament of infantry is, in all countries, the magazine rifle (seeRifle) and bayonet (q.v.), for officers and for certain under-officers sword (q.v.) and pistol (q.v.). Ammunition (q.v.) in the British service is carried (a) by the individual soldier, (b) by the reserves (mules and carts) in regimental charge, some of which in action are assembled from the battalions of a brigade to form a brigade reserve, and (c) by the ammunition columns.

Bibliography.—The following works are selected to show (1) the historical development of the arm, and (2) the different “doctrines” of to-day as to its training and functions:—Ardant du Picq,Études sur le combat; C. W. C. Oman,The Art of War: Middle Ages; Biottot,Les Grands Inspirés—Jeanne d’Arc; Hardy de Périni,Batailles françaises; C. H. Firth,Cromwell’s Army; German official history of Frederick the Great’s wars, especiallyErster Schlesische Krieg, vol. i.; Susane,Histoire de l’infanterie française; French General Staff,La Tactique au XVIIIme—l’infanterieandLa Tactique et la discipline dans les armées de la Révolution—Général Schauenbourg; J. W. Fortescue,History of the British Army; Moorsom,History of the 52nd Regiment; de Grandmaison,Dressage de l’infanterie(Paris, 1908); works of W. v. Scherff; F. N. Maude,Evolution of Infantry Tactics and Attack and Defence; [Meckel]Ein Sommernachtstraum(Eng. trans, inUnited Service Magazine, 1890); J. Meckel,Taktik; Malachowski,Scharfe- und Revuetaktik; H. Langlois,Enseignements de deux guerres; F. Hoenig,Tactics of the FutureandTwenty-four Hours of Moltke’s Strategy(Eng. trans.); works of A. von Boguslowski;British Officers’ Reports on the Russo-Japanese War; H. W. L. Hime,Stray Military Papers; Grange, “Les Réalités du champ de bataille—Woerth” (Rev. d’infanterie, 1908-1909); V. Lindenau, “The Boer War and Infantry Attack” (Journal R. United Service Institution, 1902-1903); Janin, “Aperçus sur la tactique—Mandchourie” (Rev. d’infanterie, 1909); Soloviev, “Infantry Combat in the Russo-Jap. War” (Eng. trans.Journal R.U.S.I., 1908); British OfficialField Service Regulations, part i. (1909), andInfantry Training(1905); German drill regulations of 1906 (Fr. trans.); French drill regulations of 1904; Japanese regulations 1907 (Eng. trans.). The most important journals devoted to the infantry arm are the French officialRevue d’infanterie(Paris and Limoges), and theJournal of the United Stales Infantry Association(Washington, D. C).

(C. F. A.)

1At Bouvines, it is recorded with special emphasis that Guillaume des Barres, when in the act of felling the emperor, heard the call to rescue King Philip Augustus and, forfeiting his rich prize, made his way back to help his own sovereign.2Crossbows indeed were powerful, and also handled by professional soldiers (e.g.the Genoese at Crécy), but they were slow in action, six times as slow as the long bow, and the impatient gendarmerie generally became tired of the delay and crowded out or rode over the crossbowmen.3As for instance when thirty men-at-arms “cut out” the Captal de Buch from the midst of his army at Cocherel.4This tendency of the French military temperament reappears at almost every stage in the history of armies.5The termlandsknecht, it appears, was not confined to the right bank of the Rhine. The French “lansquenets” came largely from Alsace, according to General Hardy de Périni. In the Italian wars Francis I. had in his service a famous corps called the “black bands” which was recruited, in the lower Rhine countries.6This practice of “maintenance” on a large scale continued to exist in France long afterwards. As late as the battle of Lens (1648) we find figuring in the king of France’s army three “regiments of the House of Condé.”7Even as late as 1645 a battalion of infantry in England was called a “tercio” or “tertia” (seeArmy;Spanish army).8In France it is recorded that theGardes françaises, when warned for duty at the Louvre, used to stroll thither in twos and threes.9About this time there was introduced, for resisting cavalry, the well-known hollow battalion square, which, replacing the former masses of pikes, represented up to the most modern times the defensive, as the line or column represented the offensive formation of infantry.10The Prussian Grenadier battalions in the Silesian and Seven Years’ Wars were more and more confined strictly to line-of-battle duties as the irregular light infantry developed in numbers.11Even when the hostile artillery was still capable of fire these masses were used, for in no other formation could the heterogeneous and ill-trained infantry of Napoleon’s vassal states (which constituted half of his army) be brought up at all.12Rifles had, of course, been used by corps of light troops (both infantry and mounted) for many years. The British Rifle Brigade was formed in 1800, but even in the Seven Years’ War there were rifle-corps or companies in the armies of Prussia and Austria. These older rifles could not compare in rapidity or volume of fire with the ordinary firelock.13The Prussian company was about 250 strong (see below under “Organization”). This strength was adopted after 1870 by practically all nations which adopted universal service. The battalion had 4 companies.14The 1902 edition ofInfantry Trainingindeed treated the new scouts as a thin advanced firing line, but in 1907, at which date important modifications began to be made in the “doctrine” of the British Army, the scouts were expressly restricted to the old-fashioned “skirmishing” duties.15This is no new thing, but belongs, irrespective of armament, to the “War of masses.” The king of Prussia’s fighting instructions of the 10th of August 1813 lay down the principle as clearly as any modern work.16In the British Service, men whose nerves betray them on the shooting range are ordered more gymnastics (Musketry Regulations, 1910).17In 1870 the “preconceived idea” was practically confined to strategy, and the tactical improvisations of the Germans themselves deranged the execution of the plan quite as often as the act of the enemy. Of late years, therefore, the “preconceived idea” has been imposed on tactics also in that country. Special care and study is given to the once despised “early deployments” in cases where a fight is part of the “idea,” and to the difficult problem of breaking off the action, when it takes a form that is incompatible with the development of the main scheme.18In February 1910 a newInfantry Trainingwas said to be in preparation. TheI.T.of 1905 is in some degree incompatible with the later and ruling doctrine of theF.S. Regulations, and in the winter of 1909 the Army Council issued a memorandum drawing attention to the different conceptions of the decisive attack as embodied in the latter and as revealed in manœuvre procedure.

2Crossbows indeed were powerful, and also handled by professional soldiers (e.g.the Genoese at Crécy), but they were slow in action, six times as slow as the long bow, and the impatient gendarmerie generally became tired of the delay and crowded out or rode over the crossbowmen.

3As for instance when thirty men-at-arms “cut out” the Captal de Buch from the midst of his army at Cocherel.

4This tendency of the French military temperament reappears at almost every stage in the history of armies.

5The termlandsknecht, it appears, was not confined to the right bank of the Rhine. The French “lansquenets” came largely from Alsace, according to General Hardy de Périni. In the Italian wars Francis I. had in his service a famous corps called the “black bands” which was recruited, in the lower Rhine countries.

6This practice of “maintenance” on a large scale continued to exist in France long afterwards. As late as the battle of Lens (1648) we find figuring in the king of France’s army three “regiments of the House of Condé.”

7Even as late as 1645 a battalion of infantry in England was called a “tercio” or “tertia” (seeArmy;Spanish army).

8In France it is recorded that theGardes françaises, when warned for duty at the Louvre, used to stroll thither in twos and threes.

9About this time there was introduced, for resisting cavalry, the well-known hollow battalion square, which, replacing the former masses of pikes, represented up to the most modern times the defensive, as the line or column represented the offensive formation of infantry.

10The Prussian Grenadier battalions in the Silesian and Seven Years’ Wars were more and more confined strictly to line-of-battle duties as the irregular light infantry developed in numbers.

11Even when the hostile artillery was still capable of fire these masses were used, for in no other formation could the heterogeneous and ill-trained infantry of Napoleon’s vassal states (which constituted half of his army) be brought up at all.

12Rifles had, of course, been used by corps of light troops (both infantry and mounted) for many years. The British Rifle Brigade was formed in 1800, but even in the Seven Years’ War there were rifle-corps or companies in the armies of Prussia and Austria. These older rifles could not compare in rapidity or volume of fire with the ordinary firelock.

13The Prussian company was about 250 strong (see below under “Organization”). This strength was adopted after 1870 by practically all nations which adopted universal service. The battalion had 4 companies.

14The 1902 edition ofInfantry Trainingindeed treated the new scouts as a thin advanced firing line, but in 1907, at which date important modifications began to be made in the “doctrine” of the British Army, the scouts were expressly restricted to the old-fashioned “skirmishing” duties.

15This is no new thing, but belongs, irrespective of armament, to the “War of masses.” The king of Prussia’s fighting instructions of the 10th of August 1813 lay down the principle as clearly as any modern work.

16In the British Service, men whose nerves betray them on the shooting range are ordered more gymnastics (Musketry Regulations, 1910).

17In 1870 the “preconceived idea” was practically confined to strategy, and the tactical improvisations of the Germans themselves deranged the execution of the plan quite as often as the act of the enemy. Of late years, therefore, the “preconceived idea” has been imposed on tactics also in that country. Special care and study is given to the once despised “early deployments” in cases where a fight is part of the “idea,” and to the difficult problem of breaking off the action, when it takes a form that is incompatible with the development of the main scheme.

18In February 1910 a newInfantry Trainingwas said to be in preparation. TheI.T.of 1905 is in some degree incompatible with the later and ruling doctrine of theF.S. Regulations, and in the winter of 1909 the Army Council issued a memorandum drawing attention to the different conceptions of the decisive attack as embodied in the latter and as revealed in manœuvre procedure.

INFANT SCHOOLS.The provision in modern times of systematized training for children below the age when elementary education normally begins may be dated from the village school at Waldbach founded by Jean Frédéric Oberlin in 1774. Robert Owen started an infant school at New Lanark in 1800, and great interest in the question was taken in Great Britain during the early years of the 19th century, leading to the foundation in 1836 of the Home and Colonial School Society for the training of teachers in infant schools; this in turn reacted upon other countries, especially Germany. Further impetus and a new direction were given to the movement by Friedrich W. A. Froebel, and the methods of training adopted for children between the ages of three and six have in most countries been influenced by, if not based on, that system of directed activities which was the foundation of the type of “play-school” called by him theKinder Garten, or “children’s garden.” The growing tendency in England to lay stress on the mental training of very young children, and to use the “infant school” as preparatory to the elementary school, has led to a considerable reaction; medical officers of health have pointed out the dangers of infection to which children up to the age of five are specially liable when congregated together—also the physical effects of badly ventilated class-rooms, and there is a consensus of opinion that formal mental teaching is directly injurious before the age of six or even seven years. At the same time the increase in the industrial employment of married women, with the consequent difficulty of proper care of young children by the mother in the home, has somewhat shifted the ground from a purely educational to a social and physical aspect. While it is agreed that the ideal place for a young child is the home under the supervision of its mother, the present industrial conditions often compel a mother to go out to work, and leave her children either shut up alone, or free to play about the streets, or in the care of a neighbour or professional “minder.” In each case the children must suffer. The provision by a public authority of opportunities for suitable training for such children seems therefore a necessity. The moral advantages gained by freeing the child from the streets, by the superintendence of a trained teacher over the games, by the early inculcation of habits of discipline and obedience; the physical advantages of cleanliness and tidiness, and the opportunity of disclosing incipient diseases and weaknesses, outweigh the disadvantages which the opponents of infant training adduce. It remains to give a brief account of what is done in Great Britain, the United States of America, and certain other countries. A valuable report was issued for the English Board of Education by a Consultative Committee upon the school attendance of children below the age of five (vol. 22 of theSpecial Reports, 1909), which also gives some account of the provision of day nurseries orcrèchesfor babies.

United Kingdom.—Up to 1905 it was the general English practice since the Education Act of 1870 for educational authorities to provide facilities for the teaching of children between three and five years old whose parents desired it. In 1905, of an estimated 1,467,709 children between those ages, 583,268 were thus provided for in England and Wales. In 1905 the objections, medical and educational, already stated, coupled with the increasing financial strain on the local educational authorities, led to the insertion in the code of that year of Article 53, as follows: “Where the local education authority have so determined in the case of any school maintained by them, children who are under five years may be refused admission to that school.” In consequence in 1907 the numbers were found to have fallen to 459,034 out of an estimated 1,480,550 children, from 39.74% in 1905 to 31%. In the older type of infant school stress was laid on the mental preparation of children for the elementary teaching which was to come later. This forcing on of young children was encouraged by the system under which the government grant was allotted; children in the infant division earned an annual grant of 17s. per head, on promotion to the upper school this would be increased to 22s. In 1909 the system was altered; a rate of 21s. 4d. was fixed as the grant for all children above five, and the grant for those below the age was reduced to 13s. 4d. Different methods of training the teachers in these schools as well as the children themselves have been now generally adopted. These methods are largely based on the Froebelian plan, and greater attention is being paid to physical development. In one respect England is perhaps behind the more progressive of other Europeancountries, viz. in providing facilities for washing and attending to the personal needs of the younger children. There is nofemme de serviceas in Belgium on the staff of English schools. While in Ireland the children below the age of five attend the elementary schools in much the same proportion as in England and Wales, in Scotland it has never been the general custom for such children to attend school.

United States of America.—In no country has the kindergarten system taken such firm root, and the provision made for children below the compulsory age is based upon it. In 1873 there were 42 kindergartens with 1252 pupils; in 1898 the numbers had risen to 2884 with 143,720 pupils; more than half these were private schools, managed by charitable institutions or by individuals for profit. In 1904-1905 there were 3176 public kindergartens with 205,118 pupils.

Austria Hungary.—Provision in Austria is made for children under six by two types of institution, the Day Nursery (Kinderbewahranstalten) and the Kindergarten. In 1872 as the result of a State Commission the Kindergarten was established in the state system of education. Its aim is to “confirm and complete the home education of children under school age, so that through regulated exercise of body and mind they may be prepared for institution in the primary school.” No regular teaching in ordinary school subjects is allowed; games, singing and handwork, and training of speech and observation by objects, tales and gardening are the means adopted. The training for teachers in these schools is regulated by law. No children are to be received in a kindergarten til! the beginning of the fourth and must leave at the end of the sixth year. In 1902-1903 there were 77,002 children in kindergartens and 74,110 in the day nurseries. In Hungary a law was passed in 1891 providing for the education and care of children between three and six, either by asyle or nurseries open all the year round in communes which contribute from £830 to £1250 in state taxation, or during the summer in those whose contribution is less. Communes above the higher sum must provide kindergartens. In 1904 there were over 233,000 children in such institutions.Belgium.—For children between three and six education and training are provided byÉcoles gardiennesorJardins d’enfants. They are free but not compulsory, are provided and managed by the communes, receive a state grant, and are under government inspection. Schools provided by private individuals or institutions must conform to the conditions of the communal schools. There is a large amount of voluntary assistance especially in the provision of clothes and food for the poorer children. The state first recognized these schools in 1833. In 1881 there were 708 schools with accommodation for over 56,000 children; in 1907 there were 2837 and 264,845 children, approximately one-half of the total number of children in the country between the ages of three and six. In 1890 the minister of Public Instruction issued a code of rules on which is based the organization of theÉcoles gardiennesthroughout Belgium, but some of the communes have regulations of their own. A special examination for teachers in theÉcoles gardienneswas started in 1898. All candidates must pass this examination before acertificat de capacitéis granted. The training includes a course in Froebelian methods. While Froebel’s system underlies the training in these schools, the teaching is directed very much towards the practical education of the child, special stress being laid on manual dexterity. Reading, writing and arithmetic are also allowed in the classes for the older children. A marked feature of the Belgian schools is the close attention paid to health and personal cleanliness. In all schools there is afemme de service, not a teacher, but an attendant, whose duty it is to see to the tidiness and cleanliness of the children, and to their physical requirements.France.—The first regular infant school was established in Paris at the beginning of the 19th century and styled aSalle d’essai. In 1828 a model school, called aSalle d’asile, was started, followed shortly by similar institutions all over France. State recognition and inspection were granted, and by 1836 there were over 800 in Paris and the provinces. In 1848 they became establishments of public instruction, and the nameÉcole maternellewhich they have since borne was given them. Every commune with 2000 inhabitants must have one of these schools or aClasse enfantine. Admission is free, but not compulsory, for children between two and six. Food and clothes are provided in exceptional cases. Formal mental instruction is still given to a large extent, and the older children are taught reading, writing and arithmetic. Though the staffs of the school includefemmes de service, not so much attention is paid to cleanliness as in Belgium, nor is so much stress laid on hygiene. In 1906-1907 there were 4111 public and privateÉcoles maternellesin France, with over 650,000 pupils. The closing of the clerical schools has led to some diminution in the numbers.Germany.—There are two classes of institution in Germany for children between the ages of 2½ or 3 and 6. These are theKleinkinderbewahranstaltenandKindergarten. The first are primarily social in purpose, and afford a place for the children of mothers who have to leave their homes for work. These institutions, principally conducted by religious or charitable societies, remain open all day and meals are provided. Many of them have a kindergarten attached, and others provide some training on Froebelian principles. The kindergartens proper are also principally in private hands, though most municipalities grant financial assistance. They are conducted on advanced Froebelian methods, and formal teaching in reading, writing and arithmetic is excluded. In Cologne, Düsseldorf, Frankfort and Munich there are municipal schools. The state gives no recognition to these institutions and they form no part of the public system of education.Switzerland.—In the German speaking cantons the smaller towns and villages provide for the younger children byBewahranstalten, generally under private management with public financial help. The larger towns provide kindergartens where the training is free but not compulsory for children from four to six. These are generally conducted on Froebel’s system and there is no formal instruction. In the French speaking cantons theÉcoles enfantinesare recognized as the first stage of elementary education. They are free and not compulsory for children from three to six years of age.

Belgium.—For children between three and six education and training are provided byÉcoles gardiennesorJardins d’enfants. They are free but not compulsory, are provided and managed by the communes, receive a state grant, and are under government inspection. Schools provided by private individuals or institutions must conform to the conditions of the communal schools. There is a large amount of voluntary assistance especially in the provision of clothes and food for the poorer children. The state first recognized these schools in 1833. In 1881 there were 708 schools with accommodation for over 56,000 children; in 1907 there were 2837 and 264,845 children, approximately one-half of the total number of children in the country between the ages of three and six. In 1890 the minister of Public Instruction issued a code of rules on which is based the organization of theÉcoles gardiennesthroughout Belgium, but some of the communes have regulations of their own. A special examination for teachers in theÉcoles gardienneswas started in 1898. All candidates must pass this examination before acertificat de capacitéis granted. The training includes a course in Froebelian methods. While Froebel’s system underlies the training in these schools, the teaching is directed very much towards the practical education of the child, special stress being laid on manual dexterity. Reading, writing and arithmetic are also allowed in the classes for the older children. A marked feature of the Belgian schools is the close attention paid to health and personal cleanliness. In all schools there is afemme de service, not a teacher, but an attendant, whose duty it is to see to the tidiness and cleanliness of the children, and to their physical requirements.

France.—The first regular infant school was established in Paris at the beginning of the 19th century and styled aSalle d’essai. In 1828 a model school, called aSalle d’asile, was started, followed shortly by similar institutions all over France. State recognition and inspection were granted, and by 1836 there were over 800 in Paris and the provinces. In 1848 they became establishments of public instruction, and the nameÉcole maternellewhich they have since borne was given them. Every commune with 2000 inhabitants must have one of these schools or aClasse enfantine. Admission is free, but not compulsory, for children between two and six. Food and clothes are provided in exceptional cases. Formal mental instruction is still given to a large extent, and the older children are taught reading, writing and arithmetic. Though the staffs of the school includefemmes de service, not so much attention is paid to cleanliness as in Belgium, nor is so much stress laid on hygiene. In 1906-1907 there were 4111 public and privateÉcoles maternellesin France, with over 650,000 pupils. The closing of the clerical schools has led to some diminution in the numbers.

Germany.—There are two classes of institution in Germany for children between the ages of 2½ or 3 and 6. These are theKleinkinderbewahranstaltenandKindergarten. The first are primarily social in purpose, and afford a place for the children of mothers who have to leave their homes for work. These institutions, principally conducted by religious or charitable societies, remain open all day and meals are provided. Many of them have a kindergarten attached, and others provide some training on Froebelian principles. The kindergartens proper are also principally in private hands, though most municipalities grant financial assistance. They are conducted on advanced Froebelian methods, and formal teaching in reading, writing and arithmetic is excluded. In Cologne, Düsseldorf, Frankfort and Munich there are municipal schools. The state gives no recognition to these institutions and they form no part of the public system of education.

Switzerland.—In the German speaking cantons the smaller towns and villages provide for the younger children byBewahranstalten, generally under private management with public financial help. The larger towns provide kindergartens where the training is free but not compulsory for children from four to six. These are generally conducted on Froebel’s system and there is no formal instruction. In the French speaking cantons theÉcoles enfantinesare recognized as the first stage of elementary education. They are free and not compulsory for children from three to six years of age.

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