Chapter 11

There were, however, other serious problems calling for immediate attention. The country had to be built up and converted from an agglomeration of scattered medieval principalities into a unified modern nation. The first questionProblems of the new government.Brigandage.which arose was that of brigandage in the south. Brigandage had always existed in the Neapolitan kingdom, largely owing to the poverty of the people; but the evil was now aggravated by the mistake of the new government in dismissing the Bourbon troops, and then calling them out again as recruits. A great many turned brigands rather than serve again, and together with the remaining adherents of Bourbon rule and malefactors of all kinds, were made use of by the ex-king and hisentourageto harass the Italian administration. Bands of desperadoes were formed, commanded by the most infamous criminals and by foreigners who came to fight in what they were led to believe was an ItalianVendÃ©e, but which was in reality a campaign of butchery and plunder. Villages were sacked and burnt, men, women and children mutilated, tortured or roasted alive, and women outraged. The authors of these deeds when pursued by troops fled into papal territory, where they were welcomed by the authorities and allowed to refit and raise fresh recruits under the aegis of the Church. The prime organizers of the movement were King Francisâ€™s uncle, the count of Trapani, and Mons. de MÃ©rode, a Belgian ecclesiastic who enjoyed immense influence at the Vatican. The task of suppressing brigandage was entrusted to Generals La Marmora and Cialdini; but in spite of extreme severity, justifiable in the circumstances, it took four or five years completely to suppress the movement. Its vitality, indeed, was largely due to the mistakes made by the new administration, conducted as this was by officials ignorant of southern conditions and out of sympathy with a people far more primitive than in any other part of the peninsula. Politically, its sole outcome was to prove the impossibility of allowing the continuance of an independent Roman state in the heart of Italy.Another of the governmentâ€™s difficulties was the question of what to do with Garibaldiâ€™s volunteers. Fanti, the minister of war, had three armies to incorporate in that of Piedmont, viz. that of central Italy, that of the Bourbons and that of Garibaldi.Garibaldiâ€™s volunteers.The first caused no difficulty; the rank and file of the second were mostly disbanded, but a number of the officers were taken into the Italian army; the third offered a more serious problem. Garibaldi demanded that all his officers should be given equivalent rank in the Italian army, and in this he had the support of Fanti. Cavour, on the other hand, while anxious to deal generously with the Garibaldians, recognized the impossibility of such a course, which would not only have offended the conservative spirit of the Piedmontese military caste, which disliked and despised irregular troops, but would almost certainly have introduced into the army an element of indiscipline and disorder.

Another of the governmentâ€™s difficulties was the question of what to do with Garibaldiâ€™s volunteers. Fanti, the minister of war, had three armies to incorporate in that of Piedmont, viz. that of central Italy, that of the Bourbons and that of Garibaldi.Garibaldiâ€™s volunteers.The first caused no difficulty; the rank and file of the second were mostly disbanded, but a number of the officers were taken into the Italian army; the third offered a more serious problem. Garibaldi demanded that all his officers should be given equivalent rank in the Italian army, and in this he had the support of Fanti. Cavour, on the other hand, while anxious to deal generously with the Garibaldians, recognized the impossibility of such a course, which would not only have offended the conservative spirit of the Piedmontese military caste, which disliked and despised irregular troops, but would almost certainly have introduced into the army an element of indiscipline and disorder.

On the 18th of April the question of the volunteers was discussed in one of the most dramatic sittings of the Italian parliament. Garibaldi, elected member for Naples, denounced Cavour in unmeasured terms for his treatment of the volunteers and for the cession of Nice, accusing him of leading the country to civil war. These charges produced a tremendous uproar, but Bixio by a splendid appeal for concord succeeded in calming the two adversaries. On the 23rd of April they were formally reconciled in the presence of the king, but the scene of the 18th of April hastened Cavourâ€™s end. In May the Roman question was discussed in parliament. Cavour had often declared that in the end the capital of Italy must be Rome, for it alone of all Italian cities had an unquestioned claim to moral supremacy, and his views of a free church in a free state were well known. He had negotiated secretly with the pope through unofficial agents, and sketched out a scheme of settlement of the Roman question, which foreshadowed in its main features the law of papal guarantees. But it was not given him to see this problemDeath of Cavour.solved, for his health was broken by the strain of the last few years, during which practically the whole administration of the country was concentrated in his hands. He died after a short illness on the 6th of June 1861, at a moment when Italy had the greatest need of his statesmanship.

Ricasoli now became prime minister, Cavour having advised the king to that effect. The financial situation was far from brilliant, for the expenses of the administration of Italy were far larger than the total of those of all theRicasoli Ministry. Financial difficulties.separate states, and everything had to be created or rebuilt. The budget of 1861 showed a deficit of 344,000,000 lire, while the service of the debt was 110,000,000; deficits were met by new loans issued on unfavourable terms (that of July 1861 for 500,000,000 lire cost the government 714,833,000), and government stock fell as low as 36. It was now that the period of reckless finance began which, save for a lucid interval under Sella, was to last until nearly the end of the century. Considering the state of the country and the coming war for Venice, heavy expenditure was inevitable, but good management might have rendered the situation less dangerous. Ricasoli, honest and capable as he was, failed to win popularity; his attitude on the Roman question, which became more uncompromising after the failure of his attempt at conciliation, and his desire to emancipate Italy from French predominance, brought down on him the hostility of Napoleon. He fell in March 1862, and was succeeded by Rattazzi, who being moreRattazzi Ministry.pliable and intriguing managed at first to please everybody, including Garibaldi. At this time the extremists and even the moderates were full of schemes for liberating Venice and Rome. Garibaldi had a plan, with which the premier was connected, for attacking Austria by raising a revolt in the Balkans and Hungary, and later he contemplated a raidinto the Trentino; but the government, seeing the danger of such an attempt, arrested several Garibaldians at Sarnico (near Brescia), and in theÃ©meutewhich followed several persons were shot. Garibaldi now became an opponent of the ministry, andGaribaldi and Rome. Affair of Aspromonte, 1862.in June went to Sicily, where, after taking counsel with his former followers, he decided on an immediate raid on Rome. He summoned his legionaries, and in August crossed over to Calabria with 1000 men. His intentions in the main were still loyal, for he desired to capture Rome for the kingdom; and he did his best to avoid the regulars tardily sent against him. On the 29th of August 1862, however, he encountered a force under Pallavicini at Aspromonte, and, although Garibaldi ordered his men not to fire, some of the raw Sicilian volunteers discharged a few volleys which were returned by the regulars. Garibaldi himself was seriously wounded and taken prisoner. He was shut up in the fortress of Varignano, and after endless discussions as to whether he should be tried or not, the question was settled by anMinghetti Ministry.amnesty. The affair made the ministry so unpopular that it was forced to resign. Farini, who succeeded, retired almost at once on account of ill-health, and Minghetti became premier, with Visconti-Venosta as minister for foreign affairs. The financial situation continued to be seriously embarrassing; deficit was piled on deficit, loan upon loan, and the service of the debt rose from 90,000,000 lire in 1860 to 220,000,000 in 1864.

Negotiations were resumed with Napoleon for the evacuation of Rome by the French troops; but the emperor, though he saw that the temporal power could not for ever be supported by French bayonets, desired some guarantee that theFrance, Italy and the Roman question.evacuation should not be followed, at all events immediately, by an Italian occupation, lest Catholic opinion should lay the blame for this upon France. Ultimately the two governments concluded a convention on the 15th of September 1864, whereby France agreed to withdraw her troops from Rome so soon as the papal army should be reorganized, or at the outside within two years, Italy undertaking not to attack it nor permit others to do so, and to transfer the capital from Turin to some other city within six months.18The change of capital would have the appearance of a definite abandonment of theRoma capitaleprogramme, although in reality it was to be merely atappa(stage) on the way. The convention was kept secret,Capital transferred to Florence, 1865.but the last clause leaked out and caused the bitterest feeling among the people of Turin, who would have been resigned to losing the capital provided it were transferred to Rome, but resented the fact that it was to be established in any other city, and that the convention was made without consulting parliament. Demonstrations were held which were repressed with unnecessary violence, and although the change of capital was not unpopular in the rest of Italy, where thePiemontesismoof the new rÃ©gime was beginning to arouse jealousy, the secrecy with which the affair was arranged and the shooting down of the people in Turin raised such a storm of disapproval that the king for the first time used his privilegeLa Marmora Ministry.of dismissing the ministry. Under La Marmoraâ€™s administration the September convention was ratified, and the capital was transferred to Florence the following year. This affair resulted in an important political change, for the Piedmontese deputies, hitherto the bulwarks of moderate conservatism, now shifted to the Left or constitutional opposition.

Meanwhile, the Venetian question was becoming more and more acute. Every Italian felt the presence of the Austrians in the lagoons as a national humiliation, and between 1859 and 1866 countless plots were hatched for theirVenetian question.expulsion. But, in spite of the sympathy of the king, the attempt to raise armed bands in Venetia had no success, and it became clear that the foreigner could only be driven from the peninsula by regular war. To wage this alone Italy was still too weak, and it was necessary to look round for an ally. Napoleon was sympathetic; he desired to see the Austrians expelled, and the Syllabus of Pius IX., which had stirred up the more aggressive elements among the French clergy against his government, had brought him once more into harmony with the views of Victor Emmanuel; but he dared not brave French public opinion by another war with Austria, nor did Italy desire an alliance which would only have been bought at the price of further cessions. There remained Prussia, which, now that the Danish campaign of 1864 was over, was completing her preparations for the final struggle with Austria for the hegemony of Germany; and Napoleon, who saw in the furthering of Bismarckâ€™s plans the surest means of securing his own influence in a divided Europe, willingly lent his aid in negotiating a Prusso-Italian alliance. In the summer of 1865 Bismarck made formal proposals to La Marmora; but thepourparlerswere interrupted by the conclusion of the convention of Gastein (August 14), to which Austria agreed partly under pressure of the Prusso-Italianentente.Prusso-Italian Alliance of 1866.To Italy the convention seemed like a betrayal; to Napoleon it was a set-back which he tried to retrieve by suggesting to Austria the peaceful cession of Venetia to the Italian kingdom, in order to prevent any danger of its alliance with Prussia. This proposal broke on the refusal of the emperor Francis Joseph to cede Austrian territory except as the result of a struggle; and Napoleon, won over by Bismarck at the famous interview at Biarritz, once more took up the idea of a Prusso-Italian offensive and defensive alliance. This was actually concluded on the 8th of April 1866. Its terms, dictated by a natural suspicion on the part of the Italian government, stipulated that it should only become effective in the event of Prussia declaring war on Austria within three months. Peace was not to be concluded until Italy should have received Venetia, and Prussia an equivalent territory in Germany.

The outbreak of war was postponed by further diplomatic complications. On the 12th of June Napoleon, whose policy throughout had been obscure and contradictory, signed a secret treaty with Austria, under which Venice was to be handed over to him, to be given to Italy in the event of her making a separate peace. La Marmora, however, who believed himself bound in honour to Prussia, refused to enter into a separate arrangement. On the 16th the Prussians began hostilities, and on the 20th Italy declared war.

Victor Emmanuel took the supreme command of the Italian army, and La Marmora resigned the premiership (which was assumed by Ricasoli), to become chief of the staff. La Marmora had three army corps (130,000 men)Ricasoli Ministry.under his immediate command, to operate on the Mincio, while Cialdini with 80,000 men was to operate on the Po. The Austrian southern army consisting of 95,000 men was commanded by the archduke Albert, with General von John as chief of the staff. On the 23rd of June La Marmora crossed the Mincio, and on the 24th a battle was fought at Custozza, under circumstances highly disadvantageous to the Italians, which after a stubborn contest ended in a crushing Austrian victory. Bad generalship, bad organization and the jealousy between La Marmora and Della Rocca were responsible for this defeat. Custozza might have been afterwards retrieved, for the Italians had plenty of fresh troops besides Cialdiniâ€™s army; but nothing was done, as both the king and La Marmora believed the situation to be much worse than it actually was. On theBattle of KÃ¶niggrÃ¤tz.3rd of July the Prussians completely defeated the Austrians at KÃ¶niggrÃ¤tz, and on the 5th Austria ceded Venetia to Napoleon, accepting his mediation in favour of peace. The Italian iron-clad fleet commanded by the incapable Persano, after wasting much time at Taranto and Ancona, made an unsuccessful attack on the Dalmatian island of Lissa on the 18th of July, and on the 20th was completely defeated by the Austrian squadron, consisting of wooden ships, but commanded by the capable Admiral Tegethoff.

On the 22nd Prussia, without consulting Italy, made an armistice with Austria, while Italy obtained an eight daysâ€™ truce on condition of evacuating the Trentino, which had almost entirelyfallen into the hands of Garibaldi and his volunteers. Ricasoli wished to go on with the war, rather than accept Venetia as a gift from France; but the king and La Marmora saw that peace must be made, as the whole Austrian army of 350,000 men was now free to fall on Italy. An armistice was accordingly signed at Cormons on the 12th of August; AustriaVenice united to Italy.handed Venetia over to General Leboeuf, representing Napoleon; and on the 3rd of October peace between Austria and Italy was concluded at Vienna. On the 19th Leboeuf handed Venetia over to the Venetian representatives, and at the plebiscite held on the 21st and 22nd, 647,246 votes were returned in favour of union with Italy, only 69 against it. When this result was announced to the king by a deputation from Venice he said: â€œThis is the finest day of my life; Italy is made, but it is not complete.â€ Rome was still wanting.

Custozza and Lissa were not Italyâ€™s only misfortunes in 1866. There had been considerable discontent in Sicily, where the government had made itself unpopular. The priesthoodRevolt in Sicily, 1866.and the remnants of the Bourbon party fomented an agitation, which in September culminated in an attack on Palermo by 3000 armed insurgents, and in similar outbreaks elsewhere. The revolt was put down owing to the energy of the mayor of Palermo, Marquis A. Di Rudini, and the arrival of reinforcements. The Ricasoli cabinet fell over the law against the religious houses, and was succeededRattazzi Ministry.by that of Rattazzi, who with the support of the Left was apparently more fortunate. The French regular troops were withdrawn from Rome in December 1866; but the pontifical forces were largely recruited in France and commanded by officers of the imperial army, and service under the pope was considered by the French war office as equivalent to service in France. This was a violation of the letter as well as of the spirit of the September convention, and a stronger and more straightforward statesman than Rattazzi would have declared Italy absolved from its provisions. Mazzini now wanted to promote an insurrection in Roman territory, whereas Garibaldi advocated an invasion from without. He delivered a series of violent speeches against the papacy, and made open preparations for a raid, which were not interfered with by the government; but on the 23rd of September 1867 Rattazzi had him suddenly arrested and confined to Caprera. In spite of theGaribaldi attacks Rome.vigilance of the warships he escaped on the 14th of October and landed in Tuscany. Armed bands had already entered papal territory, but achieved nothing in particular. Their presence, however, was a sufficient excuse for Napoleon, under pressure of the clerical party, to send another expedition to Rome (26th of October). Rattazzi, after ordering a body of troops to enter papal territory with noMenabrea Ministry.definite object, now resigned, and was succeeded by Menabrea. Garibaldi joined the bands on the 23rd, but his ill-armed and ill-disciplined force was very inferior to his volunteers of â€™49, â€™60 and â€™66. On the 24th he captured Monte Rotondo, but did not enter Rome as the expected insurrection had not broken out. On the 29th a French force, under de Failly, arrived, and on the 3rd of November a battleBattle of Mentana.took place at Mentana between 4000 or 5000 red-shirts and a somewhat superior force of French and pontificals. The Garibaldians, mowed down by the new FrenchchassepÃ´trifles, fought until their last cartridges were exhausted, and retreated the next day towards the Italian frontier, leaving 800 prisoners.

The affair of Mentana caused considerable excitement throughout Europe, and the Roman question entered on an acute stage. Napoleon suggested his favourite expedient of a congress but the proposal broke down owing to Great Britainâ€™s refusal to participate; and Rouher, the French premier, declared in the Chamber (5th of December 1867) that France could never permit the Italians to occupy Rome. The attitude of France strengthened that anti-French feeling in Italy which had begun with Villafranca; and Bismarck was not slow to make use of this hostility, with a view to preventing Italy from taking sides with France against Germany in the struggle between the two powers which he saw to be inevitable. At the same time Napoleon was making overtures both to Austria and to Italy, overtures which were favourably received. Victor Emmanuel was sincerely anxious to assist Napoleon, for in spite of Nice and Savoy and Mentana he felt a chivalrous desire to help the man who had fought for Italy. But with the French at Civitavecchia (they had left Rome very soon after Mentana) a war for France was not to be thought of, and Napoleon would not promise more than the literal observance of the September convention. Austria would not join France unless Italy did the same, and she realized that that was impossible unless Napoleon gave way about Rome. Consequently the negotiations were suspended.Lanza Ministry.A scandal concerning the tobacco monopoly led to the fall of Menabrea, who was succeeded in December 1869 by Giovanni Lanza, with Visconti-Venosta at the foreign office and Q. Sella as finance minister. The latter introduced a sounder financial policy, which was maintained until the fall of the Right in 1876. Mazzini, now openly hostile to the monarchy, was seized with a perfect monomania for insurrections, and promoted various small risings, the only effect of which was to show how completely his influence was gone.

In December 1869 the XXI. oecumenical council began its sittings in Rome, and on the 18th of July 1870 proclaimed the infallibility of the pope (seeVatican Council). Two days previously Napoleon had declared war on Prussia, and immediately afterwards he withdrew his troops from Civitavecchia; but he persuaded Lanza to promise to abide by the September convention, and it was not until after Worth and Gravelotte that he offered to give Italy a free hand to occupy Rome. Then it was too late; Victor Emmanuel asked Thiers if he could give his word of honour that with 100,000 Italian troops France could be saved, but Thiers remained silent. Austria replied like Italy: â€œIt is too late.â€ On the 9th of August Italy made a declaration of neutrality, and three weeks later Visconti-Venosta informed the powers that Italy was about to occupy Rome. On the 3rd of September the news of SÃ©dan reached Florence, and with the fall of Napoleonâ€™s empire the September convention ceased to have any value. The powers having engaged to abstain from intervention in Italian affairs, Victor Emmanuel addressed a letter to Pius IX. asking him in the name of religion and peace to accept Italian protection instead of theItalian occupation of Rome.temporal power, to which the pope replied that he would only yield to force. On the 11th of September General Cadorna at the head of 60,000 men entered papal territory. The garrison of Civitavecchia surrendered to Bixio, but the 10,000 men in Rome, mostly French, Belgians, Swiss and Bavarians, under Kanzler, were ready to fight. Cardinal Antonelli would have come to terms, but the pope decided on making a sufficient show of resistance to prove that he was yielding to force. On the 20th the Italians began the attack, and General MazÃ© de la Rocheâ€™s division having effected a breach in the Porta Pia, the pope ordered the garrison to cease fire and the Italians poured into the Eternal City followed by thousands of Roman exiles. By noon the whole city on the left of the Tiber was occupied and the garrison laid down their arms; the next day, at the popeâ€™s request, the Leonine City on the right bank was also occupied. It had been intended to leave that part of Rome to the pope, but by the earnest desire of the inhabitants it too was included in the Italian kingdom. At the plebiscite there were 133,681 votes for union and 1507 against it. In July 1872 King Victor Emmanuel made his solemn entry into Rome, which was then declared the capital of Italy. Thus, after a struggle of more than half a century, in spite of apparently insuperable obstacles, the liberation and the unity of Italy were accomplished.

Bibliography.â€”A vast amount of material on the Risorgimento has been published both in Italy and abroad as well as numerous works of a literary and critical nature. The most detailed Italian history of the period is Carlo Tivaroniâ€™sStoria critica del Risorgimento Italianoin 9 vols. (Turin, 1888-1897), based on a diligent study of the original authorities and containing a large amount of information; the author is a Mazzinian, which fact should be taken intoaccount, but he generally quotes the opinions of those who disagree with him as well. Another voluminous but less valuable work is F. Bertoliniâ€™sStoria dâ€™Italia dal 1814 al 1878, in 2 parts (Milan, 1880-1881.) L. Chialaâ€™sLettere del Conte di Cavour(7 vols., Turin, 1883-1887) and D. Zanichelliâ€™sScritti del Conte di Cavour(Bologna, 1892) are very important, and so are Prince Metternichâ€™sMÃ©moires(7 vols., Paris, 1881). P. Orsiâ€™sLâ€™Italia moderna(Milan, 1901) should also be mentioned. N. Bianchiâ€™sStoria della diplomazia europea in Italia(8 vols., Turin, 1865) is an invaluable and thoroughly reliable work. See also Ziniâ€™sStoria dâ€™ Italia(4 vols., Milan, 1875); Gualterioâ€™sGli ultimi rivolgimenti italiani(4 vols., Florence, 1850) is important for the period from 1831 to 1847, and so also is L. Farinaâ€™sStoria dâ€™ Italia dal 1815 al 1849(5 vols., Turin, 1851); W. R. Thayerâ€™sDawn of Italian Independence(Boston, 1893) is gushing and not always accurate; C. CantÃ¹â€™sDellâ€™ indipendenza italiana cronistoria(Naples, 1872-1877) is reactionary and often unreliable; V. Bersezio,Il Regno di Vittorio Emanuele II(8 vols., Turin, 1889, &c.). For English readers Countess E. Martinengo Cesarescoâ€™sLiberation of Italy(London, 1895) is to be strongly recommended, and is indeed, for accuracy, fairness and synthesis, as well as for charm of style, one of the very best books on the subject in any language; Bolton Kingâ€™sHistory of Italian Unity(2 vols., London, 1899) is bulkier and less satisfactory, but contains a useful bibliography. A succinct account of the chief events of the period will be found in Sir Spencer Walpoleâ€™sHistory of Twenty-Five Years(London, 1904). See also theCambridge Modern History, vols. x. and xi. (Cambridge, 1907, &c.), where full bibliographies will be found.

(L. V.*)

F. History, 1870-1902

The downfall of the temporal power was hailed throughout Italy with unbounded enthusiasm. Abroad, Catholic countries at first received the tidings with resignation, and Protestant countries with joy. In France, where theItalian occupation of Rome.Government of National Defence had replaced the Empire, CrÃ©mieux, as president of the government delegation at Tours, hastened to offer his congratulations to Italy. The occupation of Rome caused no surprise to the French government, which had been forewarned on 11th September of the Italian intentions. On that occasion Jules Favre had recognized the September convention to be dead, and, while refusing explicitly to denounce it, had admitted that unless Italy went to Rome the city would become a prey to dangerous agitators. At the same time he made it clear that Italy would occupy Rome upon her own responsibility. Agreeably surprised by this attitude on the part of France, Visconti-Venosta lost no time in conveying officially the thanks of Italy to the French government. He doubtless foresaw that the language of Favre and CrÃ©mieux would not be endorsed by the French Clericals. Prussia, while satisfied at the fall of the temporal power, seemed to fear lest Italy might recompense the absence of French opposition to the occupation of Rome by armed intervention in favour of France. Bismarck, moreover, was indignant at the connivance of the Italian government in the Garibaldian expedition to Dijon, and was irritated by Visconti-Venostaâ€™s plea in the Italian parliament for the integrity of French territory. The course of events in France, however, soon calmed German apprehensions. The advent of Thiers, his attitude towards the petition of French bishops on behalf of the pope, the recall of Senard, the French minister at Florenceâ€”who had written to congratulate Victor Emmanuel on the capture of Romeâ€”and the instructions given to his successor, the comte de Choiseul, to absent himself from Italy at the moment of the kingâ€™s official entry into the new capital (2nd July 1871), together with the haste displayed in appointing a French ambassador to the Holy See, rapidly cooled the cordiality of Franco-Italian relations, and reassured Bismarck on the score of any dangerous intimacy between the two governments.

The friendly attitude of France towards Italy during the period immediately subsequent to the occupation of Rome seemed to cow and to dishearten the Vatican. For a few weeks the relations between the Curia and theAttitude of the Vatican.Italian authorities were marked by a conciliatory spirit. The secretary-general of the Italian foreign office, Baron Blanc, who had accompanied General Cadorna to Rome, was received almost daily by Cardinal Antonelli, papal secretary of state, in order to settle innumerable questions arising out of the Italian occupation. The royal commissioner for finance, Giacomelli, had, as a precautionary measure, seized the pontifical treasury; but upon being informed by Cardinal Antonelli that among the funds deposited in the treasury were 1,000,000 crowns of Peterâ€™s Pence offered by the faithful to the pope in person, the commissioner was authorized by the Italian council of state not only to restore this sum, but also to indemnify the Holy See for moneys expended for the service of the October coupon of the pontifical debt, that debt having been taken over by the Italian state. On the 29th of September Cardinal Antonelli further apprised Baron Blanc that he was about to issue drafts for the monthly payment of the 50,000 crowns inscribed in the pontifical budget for the maintenance of the pope, the Sacred College, the apostolic palaces and the papal guards. The Italian treasury at once honoured all the papal drafts, and thus contributed a first instalment of the 3,225,000 lire per annum afterwards placed by Article 4 of the Law of Guarantees at the disposal of the Holy See. Payments would have been regularly continued had not pressure from the French Clerical party coerced the Vatican into refusing any further instalment.

Once in possession of Rome, and guarantor to the Catholic world of the spiritual independence of the pope, the Italian government prepared juridically to regulate its relations to the Holy See. A bill known as the Law ofThe Law of Guarantees.Guarantees was therefore framed and laid before parliament. The measure was an amalgam of Cavourâ€™s scheme for a â€œfree church in a free state,â€ of Ricasoliâ€™s Free Church Bill, rejected by parliament four years previously, and of the proposals presented to Pius IX. by Count Ponza di San Martino in September 1870. After a debate lasting nearly two months the Law of Guarantees was adopted in secret ballot on the 21st of March 1871 by 185 votes against 106.

It consisted of two parts. The first, containing thirteen articles, recognized (Articles 1 and 2) the person of the pontiff as sacred and intangible, and while providing for free discussion of religious questions, punished insults and outrages against the pope in the same way as insults and outrages against the king. Royal honours were attributed to the pope (Article 3), who was further guaranteed the same precedence as that accorded to him by other Catholic sovereigns, and the right to maintain his Noble and Swiss guards. Article 4 allotted the pontiff an annuity of 3,225,000 lire (Â£129,000) for the maintenance of the Sacred College, the sacred palaces, the congregations, the Vatican chancery and the diplomatic service. The sacred palaces, museums and libraries were, by Article 5, exempted from all taxation, and the pope was assured perpetual enjoyment of the Vatican and Lateran buildings and gardens, and of the papal villa at Castel Gandolfo. Articles 6 and 7 forbade access of any Italian official or agent to the above-mentioned palaces or to any eventual conclave or oecumenical council without special authorization from the pope, conclave or council. Article 8 prohibited the seizure or examination of any ecclesiastical papers, documents, books or registers of purely spiritual character. Article 9 guaranteed to the pope full freedom for the exercise of his spiritual ministry, and provided for the publication of pontifical announcements on the doors of the Roman churches and basilicas. Article 10 extended immunity to ecclesiastics employed by the Holy See, and bestowed upon foreign ecclesiastics in Rome the personal rights of Italian citizens. By Article 11, diplomatists accredited to the Holy See, and papal diplomatists while in Italy, were placed on the same footing as diplomatists accredited to the Quirinal. Article 12 provided for the transmission free of cost in Italy of all papal telegrams and correspondence both with bishops and foreign governments, and sanctioned the establishment, at the expense of the Italian state, of a papal telegraph office served by papal officials in communication with the Italian postal and telegraph system. Article 13 exempted all ecclesiastical seminaries, academies, colleges and schools for the education of priests in the city of Rome from all interference on the part of the Italian government.This portion of the law, designed to reassure foreign Catholics, met with little opposition; but the second portion, regulating the relations between state and church in Italy, was sharply criticized by deputies who, like Sella, recognized the ideal of a â€œfree church in a free stateâ€ to be an impracticable dream. The second division of the law abolished (Article 14) all restrictions upon the right of meeting of members of the clergy. By Article 15 the government relinquished its rights to apostolic legation in Sicily, and to the appointment of its own nominees to the chief benefices throughout the kingdom. Bishops were further dispensed from swearing fealty to the king, though, except in Rome and suburbs, the choice of bishops was limited to ecclesiastics of Italian nationality. Article 16 abolished the need for royalexequaturandplacetfor ecclesiastical publications, but subordinated the enjoyment of temporalities bybishops and priests to the concession of stateexequaturandplacet. Article 17 maintained the independence of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in spiritual and disciplinary matters, but reserved for the state the exclusive right to carry out coercive measures.

This portion of the law, designed to reassure foreign Catholics, met with little opposition; but the second portion, regulating the relations between state and church in Italy, was sharply criticized by deputies who, like Sella, recognized the ideal of a â€œfree church in a free stateâ€ to be an impracticable dream. The second division of the law abolished (Article 14) all restrictions upon the right of meeting of members of the clergy. By Article 15 the government relinquished its rights to apostolic legation in Sicily, and to the appointment of its own nominees to the chief benefices throughout the kingdom. Bishops were further dispensed from swearing fealty to the king, though, except in Rome and suburbs, the choice of bishops was limited to ecclesiastics of Italian nationality. Article 16 abolished the need for royalexequaturandplacetfor ecclesiastical publications, but subordinated the enjoyment of temporalities bybishops and priests to the concession of stateexequaturandplacet. Article 17 maintained the independence of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in spiritual and disciplinary matters, but reserved for the state the exclusive right to carry out coercive measures.

On the 12th of July 1871, Articles 268, 269 and 270 of the Italian Penal Code were so modified as to make ecclesiastics liable to imprisonment for periods varying from six months to five years, and to fines from 1000 to 3000 lire, for spoken or written attacks against the laws of the state, or for the fomentation of disorder. An encyclical of Pius IX. to the bishops of the Catholic Church on the 15th of May 1871 repudiated the Law of Guarantees, and summoned Catholic princes to co-operate in restoring the temporal power. Practically, therefore, the law has remained a one-sided enactment, by which Italy considers herself bound, and of which she has always observed the spirit, even though the exigencies of self-defence may have led in some minor respects to non-observance of the letter. The annuity payable to the pope has, for instance, been made subject to quinquennial prescription, so that in the event of tardy recognition of the law the Vatican could at no time claim payment of more than five yearsâ€™ annuity with interest.

For a few months after the occupation of Rome pressing questions incidental to a new change of capital and to the administration of a new domain distracted public attention from the real condition of Italian affairs. The rise of the Tiber and the flooding of Rome in December 1870 (tactfully used by Victor Emmanuel as an opportunity for a first visit to the new capital) illustrated the imperative necessity of reorganizing the drainage of the city and of constructing the Tiber embankment. In spite of pressure from the French government, which desired Italy to maintain Florence as the political and to regard Rome merely as the moral capital of the realm, the government offices and both legislative chambers were transferred in 1871 to the Eternal City. Early in the year the crown prince Humbert with the Princess Margherita took up their residence in the Quirinal Palace, which, in view of the Vatican refusal to deliver up the keys, had to be opened by force. Eight monasteries were expropriated to make room for the chief state departments, pending the construction of more suitable edifices. The growth of Clerical influence in France engendered a belief that Italy would soon have to defend with the sword her newly-won unity, while the tremendous lesson of the Franco-Prussian War convinced the military authorities of the need for thorough military reform. General Ricotti Magnani, minister of war, therefore framed an Army Reform Bill designed to bring the Italian army as nearly as possible up to the Prussian standard. Sella, minister of finance, notwithstanding the sorry plight of the Italian exchequer, readily granted the means for the reform. â€œWe must arm,â€ he said, â€œsince we have overturned the papal throne,â€ and he pointed to France as the quarter from which attack was most likely to come.

Though perhaps less desperate than during the previous decade, the condition of Italian finance was precarious indeed. With taxation screwed up to breaking point on personal and real estate, on all forms of commercial and industrialFinance.activity, and on salt, flour and other necessaries of life; with a deficit of Â£8,500,000 for the current year, and the prospect of a further aggregate deficit of Â£12,000,000 during the next quinquennium, Sellaâ€™s heroic struggle against national bankruptcy was still far from a successful termination. He chiefly had borne the brunt and won the laurels of the unprecedented fight against deficit in which Italy had been involved since 1862. As finance minister in the Rattazzi cabinet of that year he had been confronted with a public debt of nearly Â£120,000,000, and with an immediate deficit of nearly Â£18,000,000. In 1864, as minister in the La Marmora cabinet, he had again to face an excess of expenditure over income amounting to more than Â£14,600,000. By the seizure and sale of Church lands, by the sale of state railways, by â€œeconomy to the boneâ€ and on one supreme occasion by an appeal to taxpayers to advance a yearâ€™s quota of the land-tax, he had met the most pressing engagements of that troublous period. The king was persuaded to forgo one-fifth of his civil list, ministers and the higher civil servants were required to relinquish a portion of their meagre salaries, but, in spite of all, Sella had found himself in 1865 compelled to propose the most hated of fiscal burdensâ€”a grist tax on cereals. This tax (macinato) had long been known in Italy. Vexatious methods of assessment and collection had made it so unpopular that the Italian government in 1859-1860 had thought it expedient to abolish it throughout the realm. Sella hoped by the application of a mechanical meter both to obviate the odium attaching to former methods of collection and to avoid the maintenance of an army of inspectors and tax-gatherers, whose stipends had formerly eaten up most of the proceeds of the impost. Before proposing the reintroduction of the tax, Sella and his friend Ferrara improved and made exhaustive experiments with the meter. The result of their efforts was laid before parliament in one of the most monumental and most painstaking preambles ever prefixed to a bill. Sella, nevertheless, fell before the storm of opposition which his scheme aroused. Scialoja, who succeeded him, was obliged to adopt a similar proposal, but parliament again proved refractory. Ferrara, successor of Scialoja, met a like fate; but Count Cambray-Digny, finance minister in the Menabrea cabinet of 1868-1869, driven to find means to cover a deficit aggravated by the interest on the Venetian debt, succeeded, with Sellaâ€™s help, in forcing a Grist Tax Bill through parliament, though in a form of which Sella could not entirely approve. When, on the 1st of January 1869, the new tax came into force, nearly half the flour-mills in Italy ceased work. In many districts the government was obliged to open mills on its own account. Inspectors and tax-gatherers did their work under police protection, and in several parts of the country riots had to be suppressedmanu militari. At first the net revenue from the impost was less than Â£1,100,000; but under Sellaâ€™s firm administration (1869-1873), and in consequence of improvements gradually introduced by him, the net return ultimately exceeded Â£3,200,000. The parliamentary opposition to the impost, which the Left denounced as â€œthe tax on hunger,â€ was largely factitious. Few, except the open partisans of national bankruptcy, doubted its necessity; yet so strong was the current of feeling worked up for party purposes by opponents of the measure, that Sellaâ€™s achievement in having by its means saved the financial situation of Italy deserves to rank among the most noteworthy performances of modern parliamentary statesmanship.

Under the stress of the appalling financial conditions represented by chronic deficit, crushing taxation, the heavy expenditure necessary for the consolidation of the kingdom, the reform of the army and the interest on the pontifical debt, Sella, on the 11th of December 1871, exposed to parliament the financial situation in all its nakedness. He recognized that considerable improvement had already taken place. Revenue from taxation had risen in a decade from Â£7,000,000 to Â£20,200,000; profit on state monopolies had increased from Â£7,000,000 to Â£9,400,000; exports had grown to exceed imports; income from the working of telegraphs had tripled itself; railways had been extended from 2200 to 6200 kilometres, and the annual travelling public had augmented from 15,000,000 to 25,000,000 persons. The serious feature of the situation lay less in the income than in the â€œintangibleâ€ expenditure, namely, the vast sums required for interest on the various forms of public debt and for pensions. Within ten years this category of outlay had increased from Â£8,000,000 to Â£28,800,000. During the same period the assumption of the Venetian and Roman debts, losses on the issue of loans and the accumulation of annual deficits, had caused public indebtedness to rise from Â£92,000,000 to Â£328,000,000, no less than Â£100,000,000 of the latter sum having been sacrificed in premiums and commissions to bankers and underwriters of loans. By economies and new taxes Sella had reduced the deficit to less than Â£2,000,000 in 1871, but for 1872 he found himself confronted with a total expenditure of Â£8,000,000 in excess of revenue. He therefore proposed to make over the treasury service to the state banks, to increase the forced currency, to raise the stamp and registration duties andto impose a new tax on textile fabrics. An optional conversion of sundry internal loans into consolidated stock at a lower rate of interest was calculated to effect considerable saving. The battle over these proposals was long and fierce. But for the tactics of Rattazzi, leader of the Left, who, by basing his opposition on party considerations, impeded the secession of Minghetti and a part of the Right from the ministerial majority, Sella would have been defeated. On the 23rd of March 1872, however, he succeeded in carrying his programme, which not only provided for the pressing needs of the moment, but laid the foundation of the much-needed equilibrium between expenditure and revenue.

In the spring of 1873 it became evident that the days of the Lanza-Sella cabinet were numbered. Fear of the advent of a Radical administration under Rattazzi alone prevented the Minghettian Right from revolting against the government. The Left, conscious of its strength, impatiently awaited the moment of accession to power. Sella, the real head of the Lanza cabinet, was worn out by four yearsâ€™ continuous work and disheartened by the perfidious misrepresentation in which Italian politicians, particularly those of the Left, have ever excelled. By sheer force of will he compelled the Chamber early in 1873 to adopt some minor financial reforms, but on the 29th of April found himself in a minority on the question of a credit for a proposed state arsenal at Taranto. Pressure from all sides of the House, however, induced the ministry to retain office until after the debate on the application to Rome and the Papal States of the Religious Orders Bill (originally passed in 1866)â€”a measure which, with the help of Ricasoli, was carried at the end of May. While leaving intact the general houses of the various confraternitiesReligious Orders Bill.(except that of the Jesuits), the bill abolished the corporate personality of religious orders, handed over their schools and hospitals to civil administrators, placed their churches at the disposal of the secular clergy, and provided pensions for nuns and monks, those who had families being sent to reside with their relatives, and those who by reason of age or bereavement had no home but their monasteries being allowed to end their days in religious houses specially set apart for the purpose. The proceeds of the sale of the suppressed convents and monasteries were partly converted into pensions for monks and nuns, and partly allotted to the municipal charity boards which had undertaken the educational and charitable functions formerly exercised by the religious orders. To the pope was made over Â£16,000 per annum as a contribution to the expense of maintaining in Rome representatives of foreign orders; the Sacred College, however, rejected this endowment, and summoned all the suppressed confraternities to reconstitute themselves under the ordinary Italian law of association. A few days after the passage of the Religious Orders Bill, the death of Rattazzi (5th June 1873) removed all probability of the immediate advent of the Left. Sella, uncertain of the loyalty of the Right, challenged a vote on the immediate discussion of further financial reforms, and on the 23rd of June was overthrown by a coalition of the Left under Depretis with a part of the Right under Minghetti and the Tuscan Centre under Correnti. The administration which thus fell was unquestionably the most important since the death of Cavour. It had completed national unity, transferred the capital to Rome, overcome the chief obstacles to financial equilibrium, initiated military reform and laid the foundation of the relations between state and church.

The succeeding Minghetti-Visconti-Venosta cabinetâ€”which held office from the 10th of July 1873 to the 18th of March 1876â€”continued in essential points the work of the preceding administration. Minghettiâ€™s finance, though less clear-sightedMinghetti.and less resolute than that of Sella, was on the whole prudent and beneficial. With the aid of Sella he concluded conventions for the redemption of the chief Italian railways from their French and Austrian proprietors. By dint of expedients he gradually overcame the chronic deficit, and, owing to the normal increase of revenue, ended his term of office with the announcement of a surplus of some Â£720,000. The question whether this surplus was real or only apparent has been much debated, but there is no reason to doubt its substantial reality. It left out of account a sum of Â£1,000,000 for railway construction which was covered by credit, but, on the other hand, took no note of Â£360,000 expended in the redemption of debt. Practically, therefore, the Right, of which the Minghetti cabinet was the last representative administration, left Italian finance with a surplus of Â£80,000. Outside the all-important domain of finance, the attention of Minghetti and his colleagues was principally absorbed by strife between church and state, army reform and railway redemption. For some time after the occupation of Rome the pope, in order to substantiate the pretence that his spiritual freedom had been diminished, avoided the creation of cardinals and the nomination of bishops. On the 22nd of December 1873, however, he unexpectedly created twelve cardinals, and subsequently proceeded to nominate a number of bishops. Visconti-Venosta, who had retained the portfolio for foreign affairs in the Minghetti cabinet, at once drew the attention of the European powers to this proof of the popeâ€™s spiritual freedom and of the imaginary nature of his â€œimprisonmentâ€ in the Vatican. At the same time he assured them that absolute liberty would be guaranteed to the deliberations of a conclave. In relation to the Church in Italy, Minghettiâ€™s policy was less perspicacious. He let it be understood that the announcement of the appointment of bishops and the request for the royalexequaturmight be made to the government impersonally by the congregation of bishops and regulars, by a municipal council or by any other corporate bodyâ€”a concession of which the bishops were quick to take advantage, but which so irritated Italian political opinion that, in July 1875, the government was compelled to withdraw the temporalities of ecclesiastics who had neglected to apply for theexequatur, and to evict sundry bishops who had taken possession of their palaces without authorization from the state. Parliamentary pressure further obliged Bonghi, minister of public instruction, to compel clerical seminaries either to forgo the instruction of lay pupils or to conform to the laws of the state in regard to inspection and examination, an ordinance which gave rise to conflicts between ecclesiastical and lay authorities, and led to the forcible dissolution of the Mantua seminary and to the suppression of the Catholic university in Rome.

More noteworthy than its management of internal affairs were the efforts of the Minghetti cabinet to strengthen and consolidate national defence. Appalled by the weakness, or rather the non-existence, of the navy, AdmiralMilitary and naval reform.Saint-Bon, with his coadjutor Signor Brin, addressed himself earnestly to the task of recreating the fleet, which had never recovered from the effects of the disaster of Lissa. During his three years of office he laid the foundation upon which Brin was afterwards to build up a new Italian navy. Simultaneously General Ricotti Magnani matured the army reform scheme which he had elaborated under the preceding administration. His bill, adopted by parliament on the 7th of June 1875, still forms the ground plan of the Italian army.

It was fortunate for Italy that during the whole period 1860-1876 the direction of her foreign policy remained in the experienced hands of Visconti-Venosta, a statesman whose trustworthiness, dignity and moderation even politicalForeign policy under the Right.opponents have been compelled to recognize. Diplomatic records fail to substantiate the accusations of lack of initiative and instability of political criterion currently brought against him by contemporaries. As foreign minister of a young state which had attained unity in defiance of the most formidable religious organization in the world and in opposition to the traditional policy of France, it could but be Visconti-Venostaâ€™s aim to uphold the dignity of his country while convincing European diplomacy that United Italy was an element of order and progress, and that the spiritual independence of the Roman pontiff had suffered no diminution. Prudence, moreover, counselled avoidance of all action likely to serve the predominant anti-Italian party in France as a pretext for violent intervention in favour of the pope. On the occasion of the Metrical Congress, which met in Paris in 1872, he, however, successfully protested against the recognition of the Vatican delegate, Father Secchi,as a representative of a â€œstate,â€ and obtained from Count de RÃ©musat, French foreign minister, a formal declaration that the presence of Father Secchi on that occasion could not constitute a diplomatic precedent. The irritation displayed by Bismarck at the Francophil attitude of Italy towards the end of the Franco-German War gave place to a certain show of goodwill when the great chancellor found himself in his turn involved in a struggle against the Vatican and when the policy of Thiers began to strain Franco-Italian relations. Thiers had consistently opposed the emperor Napoleonâ€™s pro-Italian policy. In the case of Italy, as in that of Germany, he frankly regretted the constitution of powerful homogeneous states upon the borders of France. Personal pique accentuated this feeling in regard to Italy. The refusal of Victor Emmanuel II. to meet Thiers at the opening of the Mont Cenis tunnel (a refusal not unconnected with offensive language employed at Florence in October 1870 by Thiers during his European tour, and with his instructions to the French minister to remain absent from Victor Emmanuelâ€™s official entry into Rome) had wounded theamour propreof the French statesman, and had decreased whatever inclination he might otherwise have felt to oppose the French Clerical agitation for the restoration of the temporal power, and for French interference with the Italian Religious Orders Bill. Consequently relations between France and Italy became so strained that in 1873 both the French minister to the Quirinal and the Italian minister to the Republic remained for several months absent from their posts. At this juncture the emperor of Austria invited Victor Emmanuel to visit the Vienna Exhibition, and the Italian government received a confidential intimation that acceptance of the invitation to Vienna would be followed by a further invitation from Berlin. Perceiving the advantage of a visit to the imperial and apostolic court after the Italian occupation of Rome and the suppression of the religious orders, and convinced of the value of more cordial intercourse with the German empire, Visconti-Venosta and Minghetti advised their sovereign to accept both the Austrian and the subsequent German invitations. The visit to Vienna took place on the 17th to the 22nd of September, and that to Berlin on the 22nd to the 26th of September 1873, the Italian monarch being accorded in both capitals a most cordial reception, although the contemporaneous publication of La Marmoraâ€™s famous pamphlet,More Light on the Events of 1866, prevented intercourse between the Italian ministers and Bismarck from being entirely confidential. Visconti-Venosta and Minghetti, moreover, wisely resisted the chancellorâ€™s pressure to override the Law of Guarantees and to engage in an ItalianKulturkampf. Nevertheless the royal journey contributed notably to the establishment of cordial relations between Italy and the central powers, relations which were further strengthened by the visit of the emperor Francis Joseph to Victor Emmanuel at Venice in April 1875, and by that of the German emperor to Milan in October of the same year. Meanwhile Thiers had given place to Marshal Macmahon, who effected a decided improvement in Franco-Italian relations by recalling from Civitavecchia the cruiser â€œOrÃ©noque,â€ which since 1870 had been stationed in that port at the disposal of the pope in case he should desire to quit Rome. The foreign policy of Visconti-Venosta may be said to have reinforced the international position of Italy without sacrifice of dignity, and without the vacillation and short-sightedness which was to characterize the ensuing administrations of the Left.

The fall of the Right on the 18th of March 1876 was an event destined profoundly and in many respects adversely to affect the course of Italian history. Except at rare and not auspicious intervals, the Right had held office from 1849 to 1876. Its rule was associated in the popular mind with severe administration; hostility to the democratic elements represented by Garibaldi, Crispi, Depretis and Bertani; ruthless imposition and collection of taxes in order to meet the financial engagements forced upon Italy by the vicissitudes of her Risorgimento; strong predilection for Piedmontese, Lombards and Tuscans, and a steady determination, not always scrupulous in its choice of means, to retain executive power and the most important administrative offices of the state for theconsorteria, or close corporation, of its own adherents. For years the men of the Left had worked to inoculate the electorate with suspicion of Conservative methods and with hatred of the imposts which they nevertheless knew to be indispensable to sound finance. In regard to the grist tax especially, the agitators of the Left had placed their party in a radically false position. Moreover, the redemption of the railways by the stateâ€”contracts for which had been signed by Sella in 1875 on behalf of the Minghetti cabinet with Rothschild at Basel and with the Austrian government at Viennaâ€”had been fiercely opposed by the Left, although its members were for the most part convinced of the utility of the operation. When, at the beginning of March 1876, these contracts were submitted to parliament, a group of Tuscan deputies, under Cesare Correnti, joined the opposition, and on the 18th of March took advantage of a chance motion concerning the date of discussion of an interpellation on the grist tax to place the Minghetti cabinet in a minority. Depretis, ex-pro-dictator of Sicily, and successor of Rattazzi in the leadership of the Left, was entrusted by the king with the formation of a Liberal ministry. Besides the premiership, Depretis assumed theFirst Depretis Cabinet.portfolio of finance; Nicotera, an ex-Garibaldian of somewhat tarnished reputation, but a man of energetic and conservative temperament, was placed at the ministry of the interior; public works were entrusted to Zanardelli, a Radical doctrinaire of considerable juridical attainments; General Mezzacapo and Signor Brin replaced General Ricotti Magnani and Admiral Saint-Bon at the war office and ministry of marine; while to Mancini and Coppino, prominent members of the Left, were allotted the portfolios of justice and public instruction. Great difficulty was experienced in finding a foreign minister willing to challenge comparison with Visconti-Venosta. Several diplomatists in active service were approached, but, partly on account of their refusal, and partly from the desire of the Left to avoid giving so important a post to a diplomatist bound by ties of friendship or of interest to the Right, the choice fell upon Melegari, Italian minister at Bern.

The new ministers had long since made monarchical professions of faith, but, up to the moment of taking office, were nevertheless considered to be tinged with an almost revolutionary hue. The king alone appeared to feel no misgiving. His shrewd sense of political expediency and his loyalty to constitutional principles saved him from the error of obstructing the advent and driving into an anti-dynastic attitude politicians who had succeeded in winning popular favour. Indeed, the patriotism and loyalty of the new ministers were above suspicion. Danger lay rather in entrusting men schooled in political conspiracy and in unscrupulous parliamentary opposition with the government of a young state still beset by enemies at home and abroad. As an opposition party the Left had lived upon the facile credit of political promises, but had no well-considered programme nor other discipline nor unity of purpose than that born of the common eagerness of its leaders for office and their common hostility to the Right. Neither Depretis, Nicotera, Crispi, Cairoli nor Zanardelli was disposed permanently to recognize the superiority of any one chief. The dissensions which broke out among them within a few months of the accession of their party to power never afterwards disappeared, except at rare moments when it became necessary to unite in preventing the return of the Conservatives. Considerations such as these could not be expected to appeal to the nation at large, which hailed the advent of the Left as the dawn of an era of unlimited popular sovereignty, diminished administrative pressure, reduction of taxation and general prosperity. The programme of Depretis corresponded only in part to these expectations. Its chief points were extension of the franchise, incompatibility of aProgramme of the Left.parliamentary mandate with an official position, strict enforcement of the rights of the State in regard to the Church, protection of freedom of conscience, maintenance of the military and naval policy inaugurated by the Conservatives, acceptance of the railway redemption contracts, consolidation of the financial equilibrium, abolition of the forcedcurrency, and, eventually, fiscal reform. The long-promised abolition of the grist tax was not explicitly mentioned, opposition to the railway redemption contracts was transformed into approval, and the vaunted reduction of taxation replaced by lip-service to the Conservative deity of financial equilibrium. The railway redemption contracts were in fact immediately voted by parliament, with a clause pledging the government to legislate in favour of farming out the railways to private companies.

Nicotera, minister of the interior, began his administration of home affairs by a sweeping change in thepersonnelof the prefects, sub-prefects and public prosecutors, but found himself obliged to incur the wrath of his supporters by prohibiting Radical meetings likely to endanger public order, and by enunciating administrative principles which would have befitted an inveterate Conservative. In regard to the Church, he instructed the prefects strictly to prevent infraction of the law against religious orders. At the same time the cabinet, as a whole, brought in a Clerical Abuses Bill, threatening with severe punishment priests guilty of disturbing the peace of families, of opposing the laws of the state, or of fomenting disorder. Depretis, for his part, was compelled to declare impracticable the immediate abolition of the grist tax, and to frame a bill for the increase of revenue, acts which caused the secession of some sixty Radicals and Republicans from the ministerial majority, and gave the signal for an agitation against the premier similar to that which he himself had formerly undertaken against the Right. The first general election under the Left (November 1876) had yielded the cabinet the overwhelming majority of 421 Ministerialists against 87 Conservatives, but the very size of the majority rendered it unmanageable. The Clerical Abuses Bill provoked further dissensions: Nicotera was severely affected by revelations concerning his political past; Zanardelli refused to sanction the construction of a railway in Calabria in which Nicotera was interested; and Depretis saw fit to compensate the supporters of his bill for the increase of revenue by decorating at one stroke sixty ministerial deputies with the Order of the Crown of Italy. A further derogation from the ideal of democratic austerity was committed by adding Â£80,000 per annum to the kingâ€™s civil list (14th May 1877) and by burdening the state exchequer with royal household pensions amounting to Â£20,000 a year. The civil list, which the law of the 10th of August 1862 had fixed at Â£650,000 a year, but which had been voluntarily reduced by the king to Â£530,000 in 1864, and to Â£490,000 in 1867, was thus raised to Â£570,000 a year. Almost the only respect in which the Left could boast a decided improvement over the administration of the Right was the energy displayed by Nicotera in combating brigandage and the mafia in Calabria and Sicily. Successes achieved in those provinces failed, however, to save Nicotera from the wrath of the Chamber, and on the 14th of December 1877 a cabinet crisis arose over a question concerning the secrecy of telegraphic correspondence. Depretis thereupon reconstructed his administration, excluding Nicotera, Melegari and Zanardelli, placing Crispi at the home office, entrusting Magliani with finance, and himself assuming the direction of foreign affairs.

In regard to foreign affairs, the dÃ©but of the Left as a governing party was scarcely more satisfactory than its home policy. Since the war of 1866 the Left had advocated an Italo-Prussian alliance in opposition to the FrancophilForeign policy of the Left.tendencies of the Right. On more than one occasion Bismarck had maintained direct relations with the chiefs of the Left, and had in 1870 worked to prevent a Franco-Italian alliance by encouraging the â€œparty of actionâ€ to press for the occupation of Rome. Besides, the Left stood for anti-clericalism and for the retention by the State of means of coercing the Church, in opposition to the men of the Right, who, with the exception of Sella, favoured Cavourâ€™s ideal of â€œa free Church in a free State,â€ and the consequent abandonment of state control over ecclesiastical government. Upon the outbreak of the PrussianKulturkampfthe Left had pressed the Right to introduce an Italian counterpart to the Prussian May laws, especially as the attitude of Thiers and the hostility of the French Clericals obviated the need for sparing French susceptibilities. Visconti-Venosta and Minghetti, partly from aversion to a Jacobin policy, and partly from a conviction that Bismarck sooner or later would undertake hisGang nach Canossa, regardless of any tacit engagement he might have assumed towards Italy, had wisely declined to be drawn into any infraction of the Law of Guarantees. It was, however, expected that the chiefs of the Left, upon attaining office, would turn resolutely towards Prussia in search of a guarantee against the Clerical menace embodied in the rÃ©gime of Marshal Macmahon. On the contrary, Depretis and Melegari, both of whom were imbued with French Liberal doctrines, adopted towards the Republic an attitude so deferential as to arouse suspicion in Vienna and Berlin. Depretis recalled Nigra from Paris and replaced him by General Cialdini, whose ardent plea for Italian intervention in favour of France in 1870, and whose comradeship with Marshal Macmahon in 1859, would, it was supposed, render himpersona gratissimato the French government. This calculation was falsified by events. Incensed by the elevation to the rank of embassies of the Italian legation in Paris and the French legation to the Quirinal, and by the introduction of the Italian bill against clerical abuses, the French Clerical party not only attacked Italy and her representative, General Cialdini, in the Chamber of Deputies, but promoted a monster petition against the Italian bill. Even thecoup dâ€™Ã©tatof the 16th of May 1877 (when Macmahon dismissed the Jules Simon cabinet for opposing the Clerical petition) hardly availed to change the attitude of Depretis. As a precaution against an eventual French attempt to restore the temporal power, orders were hurriedly given to complete the defences of Rome, but in other respects the Italian government maintained its subservient attitude. Yet at that moment the adoption of a clear line of policy, in accord with the central powers, might have saved Italy from the loss of prestige entailed by her bearing in regard to the Russo-Turkish War and the Austrian acquisition of Bosnia, and might have prevented the disappointment subsequently occasioned by the outcome of the Congress of Berlin. In the hope of inducing the European powers to â€œcompensateâ€ Italy for the increase of Austrian influence on the Adriatic, Crispi undertook in the autumn of 1877, with the approval of the king, and in spite of the half-disguised opposition of Depretis, a semi-official mission to Paris, Berlin, London and Vienna. The mission appears not to have been an unqualified success, though Crispi afterwards affirmed in the Chamber (4th March 1886) that Depretis might in 1877 â€œhave harnessed fortune to the Italian chariot.â€ Depretis, anxious only to avoid â€œa policy of adventure,â€ let slip whatever opportunity may have presented itself, and neglected even to deal energetically with the impotent but mischievous Italian agitation for a â€œrectificationâ€ of the Italo-Austrian frontier. He greeted the treaty of San Stefano (3rd March 1878) with undisguised relief, and by the mouth of the king, congratulated Italy (7th March 1878) on having maintained with the powers friendly and cordial relations â€œfree from suspicious precautions,â€ and upon having secured for herself â€œthat most precious of alliances, the alliance of the futureâ€â€”a phrase of which the empty rhetoric was to be bitterly demonstrated by the Berlin Congress and the French occupation of Tunisia.

The entry of Crispi into the Depretis cabinet (December 1877) placed at the ministry of the interior a strong hand and sure eye at a moment when they were about to become imperatively necessary. Crispi was the only man of trulyCrispi.statesmanlike calibre in the ranks of the Left. Formerly a friend and disciple of Mazzini, with whom he had broken on the question of the monarchical form of government which Crispi believed indispensable to the unification of Italy, he had afterwards been one of Garibaldiâ€™s most efficient coadjutors and an active member of the â€œparty of action.â€ Passionate, not always scrupulous in his choice and use of political weapons, intensely patriotic, loyal with a loyalty based rather on reason than sentiment, quick-witted, prompt in action, determined and pertinacious, he possessed in eminent degree many qualities lacking in otherLiberal chieftains. Hardly had he assumed office when the unexpected death of Victor Emmanuel II. (9th JanuaryDeaths of Victor Emmanuel II. and Pius IX.1878) stirred national feeling to an unprecedented depth, and placed the continuity of monarchical institutions in Italy upon trial before Europe. For thirty years Victor Emmanuel had been the centre point of national hopes, the token and embodiment of the struggle for national redemption. He had led the country out of the despondency which followed the defeat of Novara and the abdication of Charles Albert, through all the vicissitudes of national unification to the final triumph at Rome. His disappearance snapped the chief link with the heroic period, and removed from the helm of state a ruler of large heart, great experience and civil courage, at a moment when elements of continuity were needed and vital problems of internal reorganization had still to be faced. Crispi adopted the measures necessary to ensure the tranquil accession of King Humbert with a quick energy which precluded any Radical or Republican demonstrations. His influence decided the choice of the Roman Pantheon as the late monarchâ€™s burial-place, in spite of formidable pressure from the Piedmontese, who wished Victor Emmanuel II. to rest with the Sardinian kings at Superga. He also persuaded the new ruler to inaugurate, as King Humbert I., the new dynastical epoch of the kings of Italy, instead of continuing as Humbert IV. the succession of the kings of Sardinia. Before the commotion caused by the death of Victor Emmanuel had passed away, the decease of Pius IX (7th February 1878) placed further demands upon Crispiâ€™s sagacity and promptitude. Like Victor Emmanuel, Pius IX. had been bound up with the history of the Risorgimento, but, unlike him, had represented and embodied the anti-national, reactionary spirit. Ecclesiastically, he had become the instrument of the triumph of Jesuit influence, and had in turn set his seal upon the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, the Syllabus and Papal Infallibility. Yet, in spite of all, his jovial disposition and good-humoured cynicism saved him from unpopularity, and rendered his death an occasion of mourning. Notwithstanding the pontiffâ€™s bestowal of the apostolic benedictionin articulo mortisupon Victor Emmanuel, the attitude of the Vatican had remained so inimical as to make it doubtful whether the conclave would be held in Rome. Crispi, whose strong anti-clerical convictions did not prevent him from regarding the papacy as preeminently an Italian institution, was determined both to prove to the Catholic world the practical independence of the government of the Church and to retain for Rome so potent a centre of universal attraction as the presence of the future pope. The Sacred College having decided to hold the conclave abroad, Crispi assured them of absolute freedom if they remained in Rome, or of protection to the frontier should they migrate, but warned them that, once evacuated, the Vatican would be occupied in the name of the Italian government and be lost to the Church as headquarters of the papacy. The cardinals thereupon overruled their former decision, and the conclave was held in Rome, the new pope, Cardinal Pecci, being elected on the 20th of February 1878 without let or hindrance. The Italian government not onlyLeo XIII.prorogued the Chamber during the conclave to prevent unseemly inquiries or demonstrations on the part of deputies, but by means of Mancini, minister of justice, and Cardinal di Pietro, assured the new pope protection during the settlement of his outstanding personal affairs, an assurance of which Leo XIII. on the evening after his election, took full advantage. At the same time the duke of Aosta, commander of the Rome army corps, ordered the troops to render royal honours to the pontiff should he officially appear in the capital. King Humbert addressed to the pope a letter of congratulation upon his election, and received a courteous reply. The improvement thus signalized in the relations between Quirinal and Vatican was further exemplified on the 18th of October 1878, when the Italian government accepted a papal formula with regard to the granting of the royalexequaturfor bishops, whereby they, upon nomination by the Holy See, recognized state control over, and made application for, the payment of their temporalities.

The Depretis-Crispi cabinet did not long survive the opening of the new reign. Crispiâ€™s position was shaken by a morally plausible but juridically untenable charge of bigamy, while on the 8th of March the election of Cairoli, anCairoli.opponent of the ministry and head of the extremer section of the Left, to the presidency of the Chamber, induced Depretis to tender his resignation to the new king. Cairoli succeeded in forming an administration, in which his friend Count Corti, Italian ambassador at Constantinople, accepted the portfolio of foreign affairs, Zanardelli the ministry of the interior, and Seismit Doda the ministry of finance. Though the cabinet had no stable majority, it induced the Chamber to sanction a commercial treaty which had been negotiated with France and a general â€œautonomousâ€ customs tariff. The commercial treaty was, however, rejected by the French Chamber in June 1878, a circumstance necessitating the application of the Italian general tariff, which implied a 10 to 20% increase in the duties on the principal French exports. A highly imaginative financial exposition by Seismit Doda, who announced a surplus of Â£2,400,000, paved the way for a Grist Tax Reduction Bill, which Cairoli had taken over from the Depretis programme. The Chamber, though convinced of the danger of this reform, the perils of which were incisively demonstrated by Sella, voted by an overwhelming majority for an immediate reduction of the impost by one-fourth, and its complete abolition within four years. Cairoliâ€™s premiership was, however, destined to be cut short by an attempt made upon the kingâ€™s life in November 1878, during a royal visit to Naples, by a miscreant named Passanante. In spite of the courage and presence of mind of Cairoli, who received the dagger thrust intended for the king, public and parliamentary indignation found expression in a vote which compelled the ministry to resign.

Though brief, Cairoliâ€™s term of office was momentous in regard to foreign affairs. The treaty of San Stefano had led to the convocation of the Berlin Congress, and though Count Corti was by no means ignorant of the rumours concerningItaly and the Berlin Congress.secret agreements between Germany, Austria and Russia, and Germany, Austria and Great Britain, he scarcely seemed alive to the possible effect of such agreements upon Italy. Replying on the 9th of April 1878 to interpellations by Visconti-Venosta and other deputies on the impending Congress of Berlin, he appeared free from apprehension lest Italy, isolated, might find herself face to face with a change of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and declared that in the event of serious complications Italy would be â€œtoo much sought after rather than too much forgotten.â€ The policy of Italy in the congress, he added, would be to support the interests of the young Balkan nations. Wrapped in this optimism, Count Corti proceeded, as first Italian delegate, to Berlin, where he found himself obliged, on the 28th of May, to join reluctantly in sanctioning the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the 8th of July the revelation of the Anglo-Ottoman treaty for the British occupation of Cyprus took the congress by surprise. Italy, who had made the integrity of the Ottoman empire a cardinal point of her Eastern policy, felt this change of the Mediterraneanstatus quothe more severely inasmuch as, in order not to strain her relations with France, she had turned a deaf ear to Austrian, Russian and German advice to prepare to occupy Tunisia in agreement with Great Britain. Count Corti had no suspicion that France had adopted a less disinterested attitude towards similar suggestions from Bismarck and Lord Salisbury. He therefore returned from the German capital with â€œcleanâ€ but empty hands, a plight which found marked disfavour in Italian eyes, and stimulated anti-Austrian Irredentism.Irredentism.Ever since Venetia had been ceded by Austria to the emperor Napoleon, and by him to Italy, after the war of 1866, secret revolutionary committees had been formed in the northern Italian provinces to prepare for the â€œredemptionâ€ of Trent and Trieste. For twelve years these committees had remained comparatively inactive, but in 1878 the presence of the ex-Garibaldian Cairoli at the head of the government, and popular dissatisfaction at thespread of Austrian sway on the Adriatic, encouraged them to begin a series of noisy demonstrations. On the evening of the signature at Berlin of the clause sanctioning the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an Irredentist riot took place before the Austrian consulate at Venice. The Italian government attached little importance to the occurrence, and believed that a diplomatic expression of regret would suffice to allay Austrian irritation. Austria, indeed, might easily have been persuaded to ignore the Irredentist agitation, had not the equivocal attitude of Cairoli and Zanardelli cast doubt upon the sincerity of their regret. The former at Pavia (15th October 1878), and the latter at Arco (3rd November), declared publicly that Irredentist manifestations could not be prevented under existing laws, but gave no hint of introducing any law to sanction their prevention. â€œRepression, not preventionâ€ became the official formula, the enunciation of which by Cairoli at Pavia caused Count Corti and two other ministers to resign.

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