“His Majesty the king of kings of Ethiopiaconsentsto make use of the government of His Majesty the king of Italy for the treatment of all questions concerning other powers and governments.”
“His Majesty the king of kings of Ethiopiaconsentsto make use of the government of His Majesty the king of Italy for the treatment of all questions concerning other powers and governments.”
Upon this clause Italy founded her claim to a protectorate over Abyssinia. In September 1889 the treaty of Uccialli was ratified in Italy by Menelek’s lieutenant, the Ras Makonnen. Makonnen further concluded with the Italian premier, Crispi, a convention whereby Italy recognized Menelek as emperor of Ethiopia, Menelek recognized the Italian colony, and arranged for a special Italo-Abyssinian currency and for a loan. On the 11th of October Italy communicated article 17 of the treaty of Uccialli to the European powers, interpreting it as a valid title to an Italian protectorate over Abyssinia. Russia alone neglected to take note of the communication, and persisted in the hostile attitude she had assumed at the moment of the occupation of Massawa. Meanwhile the Italian mint coined thalers bearing the portrait of King Humbert, with an inscription referring to the Italian protectorate, and on the 1st of January 1890 a royal decree conferred upon the colony the name of “Eritrea.”
In the colony itself General Baldissera, who had replaced General Saletta, delayed the movement against Mangashà desired by Menelek. The Italian general would have preferred to wait until his intervention was requestedOperations in Abyssinia.by both pretenders to the Abyssinian throne. Pressed by the home government, he, however, instructed a native ally to occupy the important positions of Keren and Asmarà, and prepared himself to take the offensive against Mangashà and Ras Alula. The latter retreated south of the river Mareb, leaving the whole of the cis-Mareb territory, including the provinces of Hamasen, Agameh, Seraè and Okulè-Kusai, in Italian hands. General Orero, successor of Baldissera, pushed offensive action more vigorously, and on the 26th of January 1890 entered Adowa, a city considerably to the south of the Mareb—an imprudent step which aroused Menelek’s suspicions, and had hurriedly to be retraced. Mangashà, seeing further resistance to be useless, submitted to Menelek, who at the endof February ratified at Makallé the additional convention to the treaty of Uccialli, but refused to recognize the Italian occupation of the Mareb. The negus, however, conformed to article 17 of the treaty of Uccialli by requesting Italy to represent Abyssinia at the Brussels anti-slavery conference, an act which strengthened Italian illusions as to Menelek’s readiness to submit to their protectorate. Menelek had previously notified the chief European powers of his coronation at Entotto (14th December 1889), but Germany and Great Britain replied that such notification should have been made through the Italian government. Germany, moreover, wounded Menelek’s pride by employing merely the title of “highness.” The negus took advantage of the incident to protest against the Italian text of article 17, and to contend that the Amharic text contained no equivalent for the word “consent,” but merely stipulated that Abyssinia “might” make use of Italy in her relations with foreign powers. On the 28th of October 1890 Count Antonelli, negotiator of the treaty, was despatched to settle the controversy, but on arriving at Adis Ababa, the new residence of the negus, found agreement impossible either with regard to the frontier or the protectorate. On the 10th of April 1891, Menelek communicated to the powers his views with regard to the Italian frontier, and announced his intention of re-establishing the ancient boundaries of Ethiopia as far as Khartum to the north-west and Victoria Nyanza to the south. Meanwhile the marquis de Rudini, who had succeeded Crispi as Italian premier, had authorized the abandonment of article 17 even before he had heard of the failure of Antonelli’s negotiations. Rudini was glad to leave the whole dispute in abeyance and to make with the local ras, or chieftains, of the high plateau an arrangement securing for Italy the cis-Mareb provinces of Seraè and Okulè-Kusai under the rule of an allied native chief named Bath-Agos. Rudini, however, was able to conclude two protocols with Great Britain (March and April 1891) whereby the British government definitely recognized Abyssinia as within the Italian sphere of influence in return for an Italian recognition of British rights in the Upper Nile.
The period 1887-1890 was marked in Italy by great political activity. The entry of Crispi into the Depretis cabinet as minister of the interior (4th April 1887) introduced into the government an element of vigour which hadFirst Crispi Cabinet.long been lacking. Though sixty-eight years of age, Crispi possessed an activity, a rapidity of decision and an energy in execution with which none of his contemporaries could vie. Within four months the death of Depretis (29th July 1887) opened for Crispi the way to the premiership. Besides assuming the presidency of the council of ministers and retaining the ministry of the interior, Crispi took over the portfolio of foreign affairs which Depretis had held since the resignation of Count di Robilant. One of the first questions with which he had to deal was that of conciliation between Italy and the Vatican. At the end of May the pope, in an allocution to the cardinals, had spoken of Italy in terms of unusual cordiality, and had expressed a wish for peace. A few days later Signor Bonghi, one of the framers of the Law of Guarantees, published in theNuova Antologiaa plea for reconciliation on the basis of an amendment to the Law of Guarantees and recognition by the pope of the Italian title to Rome. The chief incident cf the movement towards conciliation consisted, however, in the publication of a pamphlet entitledLa Conciliazioneby Father Tosti, a close friend and confidant of the pope, extolling the advantages of peace between Vatican and Quirinal. Tosti’s pamphlet was known to represent papal ideas, and Tosti himselfTosti and conciliation.waspersona gratato the Italian government. Reconciliation seemed within sight when suddenly Tosti’s pamphlet was placed on the Index, ostensibly on account of a phrase, “The whole of Italy entered Rome by the breach of Porta Pia; the king cannot restore Rome to the pope, since Rome belongs to the Italian people.” On the 4th of June 1887 the official Vatican organ, theOsservatore Romano, published a letter written by Tosti to the pope conditionally retracting the views expressed in the pamphlet. The letter had been written at the pope’s request, on the understanding that it should not be published. On the 15th of June the pope addressed to Cardinal Rampolla del Tindaro, secretary of state, a letter reiterating in uncompromising terms the papal claim to the temporal power, and at the end of July Cardinal Rampolla reformulated the same claim in a circular to the papal nuncios abroad. The dream of conciliation was at an end, but the Tosti incident had served once more to illustrate the true position of the Vatican in regard to Italy. It became clear that neither the influence of the regular clergy, of which the Society of Jesus is the most powerful embodiment, nor that of foreign clerical parties, which largely control the Peter’s Pence fund, would ever permit renunciation of the papal claim to temporal power. France, and the French Catholics especially, feared lest conciliationTerms of the “Roman Question.”should diminish the reliance of the Vatican upon France, and consequently French hold over the Vatican. The Vatican, for its part, felt its claim to temporal power to be too valuable a pecuniary asset and too efficacious an instrument of church discipline lightly to be thrown away. The legend of an “imprisoned pope,” subject to every whim of his gaolers, had never failed to arouse the pity and loosen the purse-strings of the faithful; dangerous innovators and would-be reformers within the church could be compelled to bow before the symbol of the temporal power, and their spirit of submission tested by their readiness to forgo the realization of their aims until the head of the church should be restored to his rightful domain. More important than all was the interest of the Roman curia, composed almost exclusively of Italians, to retain in its own hands the choice of the pontiff and to maintain the predominance of the Italian element and the Italian spirit in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Conciliation with Italy would expose the pope and his Italianentourageto suspicion of being unduly subject to Italian political influence—of being, in a word, more Italian than Catholic. Such a suspicion would inevitably lead to a movement in favour of the internationalization of the curia and of the papacy. In order to avoid this danger it was therefore necessary to refuse all compromise, and, by perpetual reiteration of a claim incompatible with Italian territorial unity, to prove to the church at large that the pope and the curia were more Catholic than Italian. Such rigidity of principle need not be extended to the affairs of everyday contact between the Vatican and the Italian authorities, with regard to which, indeed, a tacitmodus vivendiwas easily attainable. Italy, for her part, could not go back upon the achievements of the Risorgimento by restoring Rome or any portion of Italian territory to the pope. She had hoped by conciliation to arrive at an understanding which should have ranged the church among the conservative and not among the disruptive forces of the country, but she was keenly desirous to retain the papacy as a preponderatingly Italian institution, and was ready to make whatever formal concessions might have appeared necessary to reassure foreign Catholics concerning the reality of the pope’s spiritual independence. The failure of the conciliation movement left profound irritation between Vatican and Quirinal, an irritation which, on the Vatican side, found expression in vivacious protests and in threats of leaving Rome; and, on the Italian side, in the deposition of the syndic of Rome for having visited the cardinal-vicar, in the anti-clerical provisions of the new penal code, and in the inauguration (9th June 1889) of a monument to Giordano Bruno on the very site of his martyrdom.
The internal situation inherited by Crispi from Depretis was very unsatisfactory. Extravagant expenditure on railways and public works, loose administration of finance, the cost of colonial enterprise, the growing demands for the army and navy, the impending tariff war with France, and the over-speculation in building and in industrial ventures, which had absorbed all the floating capital of the country, had combined to produce a state of affairs calling for firm and radical treatment. Crispi, burdened by the premiership and by the two most important portfolios in the cabinet, was, however, unable to exercise efficient control over all departments of state. Nevertheless his administration was by no means unfruitful. Zanardelli,minister of justice, secured in June 1888 the adoption of a new penal code; state surveillance was extended to theopere pie, or charitable institutions; municipal franchise was reformed by granting what was practically manhood suffrage with residential qualification, provision being made for minority representation; and the central state administration was reformed by a bill fixing the number and functions of the various ministries. The management of finance was scarcely satisfactory, for though Giolitti, who had succeeded Magliani and Perazzi at the treasury, suppressed the former’s illusory “pension fund,” he lacked the fibre necessary to deal with the enormous deficit of nearly £10,000,000 in 1888-1889, the existence of which both Perazzi and he had recognized. The most successful feature of Crispi’s term of office was his strict maintenance of order and the suppression of Radical and Irredentist agitation. So vigorous was his treatment of Irredentism that he dismissed without warning his colleague Seismit Doda, minister of finance, for having failed to protest against Irredentist speeches delivered in his presence at Udine. Firmness such as this secured for him the support of all constitutional elements, and after three years’ premiership his position was infinitely stronger than at the outset. The general election of 1890 gave the cabinet an almost unwieldy majority, comprising four-fifths of the Chamber. A lengthy term of office seemed to be opening out before him when, on the 31st of January 1891, Crispi, speaking in a debate upon an unimportant bill, angrily rebuked the Right for its noisy interruptions. The rebuke infuriated the Conservative deputies, who, protesting against Crispi’s words in the name of the “sacred memories” of their party, precipitated a division and placed the cabinet in a minority. The incident, whether due to chance or guile, brought about the resignation of Crispi. A few days later he was succeeded in the premiership by the marquis di Rudini, leader of the Right, who formed a coalition cabinet with Nicotera and a part of the Left.
The sudden fall of Crispi wrought a great change in the character of Italian relations with foreign powers. His policy had been characterized by extreme cordiality towards Austria and Germany, by a close understanding withRudini.Great Britain in regard to Mediterranean questions, and by an apparent animosity towards France, which at one moment seemed likely to lead to war. Shortly before the fall of the Depretis-Robilant cabinet Count Robilant had announced the intention of Italy to denounce the commercial treaties with France and Austria, which would lapse on the 31st of December 1887, and had intimated his readiness to negotiate new treaties. On the 24th of June 1887, in view of a possible rupture of commercial relations with France, the Depretis-Crispi cabinet introduced a new general tariff. The probability of the conclusion of a new Franco-Italian treaty was small, both on account of the protectionist spirit of France and of French resentment at the renewal of the triple alliance, but even such slight probability vanished after a visit paid to Bismarck by Crispi (October 1887) within three months of his appointment to the premiership. Crispi entertained no a priori animosity towards France, but was strongly convinced that Italy must emancipate herself from the position of political dependence on her powerful neighbour which had vitiated the foreign policy of the Left. So far was he from desiring a rupture with France, that he had subordinated acceptance of the portfolio of the interior in the Depretis cabinet to an assurance that the triple alliance contained no provision for offensive warfare. But his ostentatious visit to Friedrichsruh, and a subsequent speech at Turin, in which, while professing sentiments of friendship and esteem for France, he eulogized the personality of Bismarck, aroused against him a hostility on the part of the French which he was never afterwards able to allay. France was equally careless of Italian susceptibilities, and in April 1888 Goblet made a futile but irritating attempt to enforce at Massawa the Ottoman régime of the capitulations in regard to non-Italian residents. In such circumstances the negotiations for the new commercial treaty could but fail, and though the old treaty was prolonged by special arrangement for two months, differential tariffs were put in force on both sides of the frontier on the 29th of February 1888. The value of French exports into Italy decreased immediately by one-half, while Italian exports to France decreased by nearly two-thirds. At the end of 1889 Crispi abolished the differential duties against French imports and returned to the general Italian tariff, but France declined to follow his lead and maintained her prohibitive dues. Meanwhile the enthusiastic reception accorded to the young German emperor on the occasion of his visit to Rome in October 1888, and the cordiality shown towards King Humbert and Crispi at Berlin in May 1889, increased the tension of Franco-Italian relations; nor was it until after the fall of Prince Bismarck in March 1890 that Crispi adopted towards the Republic a more friendly attitude by sending an Italian squadron to salute President Carnot at Toulon. The chief advantage derived by Italy from Crispi’s foreign policy was the increase of confidence in her government on the part of her allies and of Great Britain. On the occasion of the incident raised by Goblet with regard to Massawa, Bismarck made it clear to France that, in case of complications, Italy would not stand alone; and when in February 1888 a strong French fleet appeared to menace the Italian coast, the British Mediterranean squadron demonstrated its readiness to support Italian naval dispositions. Moreover, under Crispi’s hand Italy awoke from the apathy of former years and gained consciousness of her place in the world. The conflict with France, the operations in Eritrea, the vigorous interpretation of the triple alliance, the questions of Morocco and Bulgaria, were all used by him as means to stimulate national sentiment. With the instinct of a true statesman, he felt the pulse of the people, divined their need for prestige, and their preference for a government heavy-handed rather than lax. How great had been Crispi’s power was seen by contrast with the policy of the Rudini cabinet which succeeded him in February 1891. Crispi’s so-called “megalomania” gave place to retrenchment in home affairs and to a deferentialSecond renewal of the Triple Alliance.attitude towards all foreign powers. The premiership of Rudini was hailed by the Radical leader, Cavallotti, as a pledge of the non-renewal of the triple alliance, against which the Radicals began a vociferous campaign. Their tactics, however, produced a contrary effect, for Rudini, accepting proposals from Berlin, renewed the alliance in June 1891 for a period of twelve years. None of Rudini’s public utterances justify the supposition that he assumed office with the intention of allowing the alliance to lapse on its expiry in May 1892; indeed, he frankly declared it to form the basis of his foreign policy. The attitude of several of his colleagues was more equivocal, but though they coquetted with French financiers in the hope of obtaining the support of the Paris Bourse for Italian securities, the precipitate renewal of the alliance destroyed all probability of a close understanding with France. The desire of Rudini to live on the best possible terms with all powers was further evinced in the course of a visit paid to Monza by M. de Giers in October 1891, when the Russian statesman was apprised of the entirely defensive nature of Italian engagements under the triple alliance. At the same time he carried to a successful conclusion negotiations begun by Crispi for the renewal of commercial treaties with Austria and Germany upon terms which to some extent compensated Italy for the reduction of her commerce with France, and concluded with Great Britain conventions for the delimitation of British and Italian spheres of influence in north-east Africa. In home affairs his administration was weak and vacillating, nor did the economies effected in naval and military expenditure and in other departments suffice to strengthen the position of a cabinet which had disappointed the hopes of its supporters. On the 14th of April 1892 dissensions between ministers concerning the financial programme led to a cabinet crisis, and though Rudini succeeded in reconstructing his administration, he was defeated in the Chamber on the 5th of May and obliged to resign. King Humbert,Giolitti.who, from lack of confidence in Rudini, had declined to allow him to dissolve parliament, entrusted Signor Giolitti, a Piedmontese deputy, sometime treasury minister in the Crispi cabinet, with the formation of a ministry ofthe Left, which contrived to obtain six months’ supply on account, and dissolved the Chamber.
The ensuing general election (November 1892), marked by unprecedented violence and abuse of official pressure upon the electorate, fitly ushered in what proved to be the most unfortunate period of Italian history sinceBank scandals.the completion of national unity. The influence of Giolitti was based largely upon the favour of a court clique, and especially of Rattazzi, minister of the royal household. Early in 1893 a scandal arose in connexion with the management of state banks, and particularly of the Banca Romana, whose managing director, Tanlongo, had issued £2,500,000 of duplicate bank-notes. Giolitti scarcely improved matters by creating Tanlongo a member of the senate, and by denying in parliament the existence of any mismanagement. The senate, however, manifested the utmost hostility to Tanlongo, whom Giolitti, in consequence of an interpellation in the Chamber, was compelled to arrest. Arrests of other prominent persons followed, and on the 3rd of February the Chamber authorized the prosecution of De Zerbi, a Neapolitan deputy accused of corruption. On the 20th of February De Zerbi suddenly expired. For a time Giolitti successfully opposed inquiry into the conditions of the state banks, but on the 21st of March was compelled to sanction an official investigation by a parliamentary commission composed of seven members. On the 23rd of November the report of the commission was read to the Chamber amid intense excitement. It established that all Italian cabinets since 1880 had grossly neglected the state banks; that the two preceding cabinets had been aware of the irregularities committed by Tanlongo; that Tanlongo had heavily subsidized the press, paying as much as £20,000 for that purpose in 1888 alone; that a number of deputies, including several ex-ministers, had received from him loans of a considerable amount, which they had apparently made no effort to refund; that Giolitti had deceived the Chamber with regard to the state banks, and was open to suspicion of having, after the arrest of Tanlongo, abstracted a number of documents from the latter’s papers before placing the remainder in the hands of the judicial authorities. In spite of the gravity of the charges formulated against many prominent men, the report merely “deplored” and “disapproved” of their conduct, without proposing penal proceedings. Fear of extending still farther a scandal which had already attained huge dimensions, and the desire to avoid any further shock to national credit, convinced the commissioners of the expediency of avoiding a long series of prosecutions. The report, however, sealed the fate of the Giolitti cabinet, and on the 24th of November it resigned amid general execration.
Apart from the lack of scruple manifested by Giolitti in the bank scandals, he exhibited incompetence in the conduct of foreign and home affairs. On the 16th and 18th of August 1893 a number of Italian workmen wereAigues-Mortes massacre.massacred at Aigues-Mortes. The French authorities, under whose eyes the massacre was perpetrated, did nothing to prevent or repress it, and the mayor of Marseilles even refused to admit the wounded Italian workmen to the municipal hospital. These occurrences provoked anti-French demonstrations in many parts of Italy, and revived the chronic Italian rancour against France. The Italian foreign minister, Brin, began by demanding the punishment of the persons guilty of the massacre, but hastened to accept as satisfactory the anodyne measures adopted by the French government. Giolitti removed the prefect of Rome for not having prevented an expression of popular anger, and presented formal excuses to the French consul at Messina for a demonstration against that consulate. In the following December the French tribunal at Angoulême acquitted all the authors of the massacre. At home Giolitti displayed the same weakness. Riots at Naples in August 1893 and symptoms of unrest in Sicily found him, as usual, unprepared and vacillating. The closing of the French market to Sicilian produce, the devastation wrought by the phylloxera and the decrease of the sulphur trade had combined to produce in Sicily a discontent of which Socialist agitators took advantage to organize the workmen of the towns and the peasants of the country into groups known asfasci.Insurrection in Sicily.The movement had no well-defined object. Here and there it was based upon a bastard Socialism, in other places it was made a means of municipal party warfare under the guidance of the local mafia, and in some districts it was simply popular effervescence against the local octrois on bread and flour. As early as January 1893 a conflict had occurred between the police and the populace, in which several men, women and children were killed, an occurrence used by the agitators further to inflame the populace. Instead of maintaining a firm policy, Giolitti allowed the movement to spread until, towards the autumn of 1893, he became alarmed and drafted troops into the island, though in numbers insufficient to restore order. At the moment of his fall the movement assumed the aspect of an insurrection, and during the interval between his resignation (24th November) and the formation of a new Crispi cabinet (10th December) conflicts between the public forces and the rioters were frequent. The return of Crispi to power—a return imposed by public opinion as that of the only man capable of dealing with the desperate situation—marked the turning-point of the crisis. Intimately acquainted with the conditions of his native island, Crispi adopted efficacious remedies. Thefasciwere suppressed, Sicily was filled with troops, the reserves were called out, a state of siege proclaimed, military courts instituted and the whole movement crushed in a few weeks. The chief agitators were either sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment or were compelled to flee the country. A simultaneous insurrection at Massa-Carrara was crushed with similar vigour. Crispi’s methods aroused great outcry in the Radical press, but the severe sentences of the military courts were in time tempered by the Royal prerogative of amnesty.
But it was not alone in regard to public order that heroic measures were necessary. The financial situation inspired serious misgivings. While engagements contracted by Depretis in regard to public works had more thanFinancial crisis.neutralized the normal increase of revenue from taxation, the whole credit of the state had been affected by the severe economic and financial crises of the years 1889-1893. The state banks, already hampered by maladministration, were encumbered by huge quantities of real estate which had been taken over as compensation for unredeemed mortgages. Baron Sidney Sonnino, minister of finance in the Crispi cabinet, found a prospective deficit of £7,080,000, and in spite of economies was obliged to face an actual deficit of more than £6,000,000. Drastic measures were necessary to limit expenditure and to provide new sources of revenue. Sonnino applied, and subsequently amended, the Bank Reform Bill passed by the previous Administration (August 10, 1893) for the creation of a supreme state bank, the Bank of Italy, which was entrusted with the liquidation of the insolvent Banca Romana. The new law forbade the state banks to lend money on real estate, limited their powers of discounting bills and securities, and reduced the maximum of their paper currency. In order to diminish the gold premium, which under Giolitti had risen to 16%, forced currency was given to the existing notes of the banks of Italy, Naples and Sicily, while special state notes were issued to meet immediate currency needs. Measures were enforced to prevent Italian holders of consols from sending their coupons abroad to be paid in gold, with the result that, whereas in 1893 £3,240,000 had been paid abroad in gold for the service of the January coupons and only £680,000 in paper in Italy, the same coupon was paid a year later with only £1,360,000 abroad and £2,540,000 at home. Economies for more than £1,000,000, were immediately effected, taxes, calculated to produce £2,440,000, were proposed to be placed upon land, incomes, salt and corn, while the existing income-tax upon consols (fixed at 8% by Cambray-Digny in 1868, and raised to 13.20% by Sella in 1870) was increased to 20% irrespectively of the stockholders’ nationality. These proposals met with opposition so fierce as to cause a cabinet crisis, but Sonnino who resigned office as minister of finance,returned to power as minister of the treasury, promulgated some of his proposals by royal decree, and in spite of vehement opposition secured their ratification by the Chamber. The tax upon consols, which, in conjunction with the other severe fiscal measures, was regarded abroad as a pledge that Italy intended at all costs to avoid bankruptcy, caused a rise in Italian stocks. When the Crispi cabinet fell in March 1896 Sonnino had the satisfaction of seeing revenue increased by £3,400,000, expenditure diminished by £2,800,000, the gold premium reduced from 16 to 5%, consolidated stock at 95 instead of 72, and, notwithstanding the expenditure necessitated by the Abyssinian War, financial equilibrium practically restored.
While engaged in restoring order and in supporting Sonnino’s courageous struggle against bankruptcy, Crispi became the object of fierce attacks from the Radicals, Socialists and anarchists. On the 16th of June an attempt byAttacks on Crispi.an anarchist named Lega was made on Crispi’s life; on the 24th of June President Carnot was assassinated by the anarchist Caserio; and on the 30th of June an Italian journalist was murdered at Leghorn for a newspaper attack upon anarchism—a series of outrages which led the government to frame and parliament to adopt (11th July) a Public Safety Bill for the prevention of anarchist propaganda and crime. At the end of July the trial of the persons implicated in the Banca Romana scandal revealed the fact that among the documents abstracted by Giolitti from the papers of the bank manager, Tanlongo, were several bearing upon Crispi’s political and private life. On the 11th of December Giolitti laid these and other papers before the Chamber, in the hope of ruining Crispi, but upon examination most of them were found to be worthless, and the rest of so private a nature as to be unfit for publication. The effect of the incident was rather to increase detestation of Giolitti than to damage Crispi. The latter, indeed, prosecuted the former for libel and for abuse of his position when premier, but after many vicissitudes, including the flight of Giolitti to Berlin in order to avoid arrest, the Chamber refused authorization for the prosecution, and the matter dropped. A fresh attempt of the same kind was then made against Crispi by the Radical leader Cavallotti, who advanced unproven charges of corruption and embezzlement. These attacks were, however, unavailing to shake Crispi’s position, and in the general election of May 1895 his government obtained a majority of nearly 200 votes. Nevertheless public confidence in the efficacy of the parliamentary system and in the honesty of politicians was seriously diminished by these unsavoury occurrences, which, in combination with the acquittal of all the defendants in the Banca Romana trial, and the abandonment of the proceedings against Giolitti, reinforced to an alarming degree the propaganda of the revolutionary parties.
The foreign policy of the second Crispi Administration, in which the portfolio of foreign affairs was held by Baron Blanc, was, as before, marked by a cordial interpretation of the triple alliance, and by close accord with GreatComplications in Eritrea.Britain. In the Armenian question Italy seconded with energy the diplomacy of Austria and Germany, while the Italian fleet joined the British Mediterranean squadron in a demonstration off the Syrian coast. Graver than any foreign question were the complications in Eritrea. Under the arrangement concluded in 1891 by Rudini with native chiefs in regard to the Italo-Abyssinian frontier districts, relations with Abyssinia had remained comparatively satisfactory. Towards the Sudan, however, the Mahdists, who had recovered from a defeat inflicted by an Italian force at Agordat in 1890, resumed operations in December 1893. Colonel Arimondi, commander of the colonial forces in the absence of the military governor, General Baratieri, attacked and routed a dervish force 10,000 strong on the 21st of December. The Italian troops, mostly native levies, numbered only 2200 men. The dervish loss was more than 1000 killed, while the total Italian casualties amounted to less than 230. General Baratieri, upon returning to the colony, decided to execute acoup de mainagainst the dervish base at Kassala, both in order to relieve pressure from that quarter and to preclude a combined Abyssinian and dervish attack upon the colony at the end of 1894. The protocol concluded with Great Britain on the 15th of April 1891, already referred to, contained a clause to the effect that, were Kassala occupied by the Italians, the place should be transferred to the Egyptian government as soon as the latter should be in a position to restore order in the Sudan. Concentrating a little army of 2600 men, Baratieri surprised and captured Kassala on the 17th of July 1894, and garrisoned the place with native levies under Italian officers. Meanwhile Menelek, jealous of the extension of Italian influence to a part of northern Somaliland and to the Benadir coast, had, with the support of France and Russia, completed his preparations for asserting his authority as independent ruler of Ethiopia. On the 11th of May 1893 he denounced the treaty of Uccialli, but the Giolitti cabinet, absorbed by the bank scandals, paid no heed to his action. Possibly an adroit repetition in favour of Mangashà and against Menelek of the policy formerly followed in favour of Menelek against the negus John might have consolidated Italian influence in Abyssinia by preventing the ascendancy of any single chieftain. The Italian government, however, neglected this opening, and Mangashà came to terms with Menelek. Consequently the efforts of Crispi and his envoy, Colonel Piano, to conclude a new treaty with Menelek in June 1894 not only proved unsuccessful, but formed a prelude to troubles on the Italo-Abyssinian frontier. Bath-Agos, the native chieftain who ruled the Okulé-Kusai and the cis-Mareb provinces on behalf of Italy, intrigued with Mangashà, ras of the trans-Mareb province of Tigre, and with Menelek, to raise a revolt against Italian rule on the high plateau. In December 1894 the revolt broke out, but Major Toselli with a small force marched rapidly against Bath Agos, whom he routed and killed at Halai. General Baratieri, having reason to suspect the complicity of Mangashà in the revolt, called upon him to furnish troops for a projected Italo-Abyssinian campaign against the Mahdists. Mangashà made no reply, and Baratieri crossing the Mareb advanced to Adowa, but four days later was obliged to return northwards. Mangashà thereupon took the offensive and attempted to occupy the village of Coatit in Okulé-Kusai, but was forestalled and defeated by Baratieri on the 13th of January 1895. Hurriedly retreating to Senafé, hard pressed by the Italians, who shelled Senafé on the evening of the 15th of January, Mangashà was obliged to abandon his camp and provisions to Baratieri, who also secured a quantity of correspondence establishing the complicity of Menelek and Mangashà in the revolt of Bath-Agos.
The comparatively facile success achieved by Baratieri against Mangashà seems to have led him to undervalue his enemy, and to forget that Menelek, negus and king of Shoa, had an interest in allowing Mangashà to beConquest of Tigre.crushed, in order that the imperial authority and the superiority of Shoan over Tigrin arms might be the more strikingly asserted. After obtaining the establishment of an apostolic prefecture in Eritrea under the charge of Italian Franciscans, Baratieri expelled from the colony the French Lazarist missionaries for their alleged complicity in the Bath-Agos insurrection, and in March 1895 undertook the conquest of Tigre. Occupying Adigrat and Makallè, he reached Adowa on the 1st of April, and thence pushed forward to Axum, the holy city of Abyssinia. These places were garrisoned, and during the rainy season Baratieri returned to Italy, where he was received with unbounded enthusiasm. Whether he or the Crispi cabinet had any inkling of the enterprise to which they were committed by the occupation of Tigre is more than doubtful. Certainly Baratieri made no adequate preparations to repel an Abyssinian attempt to reconquer the province. Early in September both Mangashà and Menelek showed signs of activity, and on the 20th of September Makonnen, ras of Harrar, who up till then had been regarded as a friend and quasi-ally by Italy, expelled all Italians from his territory and marched with 30,000 men to join the negus. On returning to Eritrea, Baratieri mobilized his native reserves and pushed forward columns under Major Toselli and General Arimondi as far south as Amba Alagi. Mangashà fell back before the Italians, who obtained several minor successes; but on the 6th of December Toselli’s column, 2000 strong, whichthrough a misunderstanding continued to hold Amba Alagi, was almost annihilated by the Abyssinian vanguard of 40,000 men. Toselli and all but three officers and 300 men fell at their posts after a desperate resistance. Arimondi, collecting the survivors of the Toselli column, retreated to Makallè and Adigrat. At Makallè, however, he left a small garrison in the fort, which on the 7th of January 1896 was invested by the Abyssinian army. Repeated attempts to capture the fort having failed, Menelek and Makonnen opened negotiations with Baratieri for its capitulation, and on the 21st of January the garrison, under Major Galliano, who had heroically defended the position, were permitted to march out with the honours of war. Meanwhile Baratieri received reinforcements from Italy, but remained undecided as to the best plan of campaign. Thus a month was lost, during which the Abyssinian army advanced to Hausen, a position slightly south of Adowa. The Italian commander attempted to treat with Menelek, but his negotiations merely enabled the Italian envoy, Major Salsa, to ascertain that the Abyssinians were nearly 100,000 strong mostly armed with rifles and well supplied with artillery. The Italians, including camp-followers, numbered less than 25,000 men, a force too small for effective action, but too large to be easily provisioned at 200 m. from its base, in a roadless, mountainous country, almost devoid of water. For a moment Baratieri thought of retreat, especially as the hope of creating a diversion from Zaila towards Harrar had failed in consequence of the British refusal to permit the landing of an Italian force without the consent of France. The defection of a number of native allies (who, however, were attacked and defeated by Colonel Stevani on the 18th of February) rendered the Italian position still more precarious; but Baratieri, unable to make up his mind, continued to manœuvre in the hope of drawing an Abyssinian attack. These futile tactics exasperated the home government, which on the 22nd of February despatched General Baldissera, with strong reinforcements, to supersede Baratieri. On the 25th of February Crispi telegraphed to Baratieri, denouncing his operations as “mllitary phthisis,” and urging him to decide upon some strategic plan. Baratieri, anxious probably to obtain some success before the arrival of Baldissera, and alarmed by the rapid diminution of his stores, which precluded further immobility, called a council of war (29th of February) and obtained the approval of the divisional commanders for a plan of attack. During the night the army advanced towards Adowa in three divisions, under Generals Dabormida, Arimondi and Albertone, each division being between 4000 and 5000Battle of Adowa.strong, and a brigade 5300 strong under General Ellena remaining in reserve. All the divisions, save that of Albertone, consisted chiefly of Italian troops. During the march Albertone’s native division mistook the road, and found itself obliged to delay in the Arimondi column by retracing its steps. Marching rapidly, however, Albertone outdistanced the other columns, but, in consequence of allowing his men an hour’s rest, arrived upon the scene of action when the Abyssinians, whom it had been hoped to surprise at dawn, were ready to receive the attack. Pressed by overwhelming forces, the Italians, after a violent combat, began to give way. The Dabormida division, unsupported by Albertone, found itself likewise engaged in a separate combat against superior numbers. Similarly the Arimondi brigade was attacked by 30,000 Shoans, and encumbered by the débris of Albertone’s troops. Baratieri vainly attempted to push forward the reserve, but the Italians were already overwhelmed, and the battle—or rather, series of distinct engagements—ended in a general rout. The Italian loss is estimated to have been more than 6000, of whom 3125 were whites. Between 3000 and 4000 prisoners were taken by the Abyssinians, including General Albertone, while Generals Arimondi and Dabormida were killed and General Ellena wounded. The Abyssinians lost more than 5000 killed and 8000 wounded. Baratieri, after a futile attempt to direct the retreat, fled in haste and reached Adi-Cajè before the débris of his army. Thence he despatched telegrams to Italy throwing blame for the defeat upon his troops, a proceeding which subsequent evidence proved to be as unjustifiable as it was unsoldier-like. Placed under court-martial for his conduct, Baratieri was acquitted of the charge for having been led to give battle by other than military considerations, but the sentence “deplored that in such difficult circumstances the command should have been given to a general so inferior to the exigencies of the situation.”
In Italy the news of the defeat of Adowa caused deep discouragement and dismay. On the 5th of March the Crispi cabinet resigned before an outburst of indignation which the Opposition had assiduously fomented, and five days later a new cabinet was formed by General Ricotti-Magnani, who, however, made over the premiership to the marquis di Rudini. The latter, though leader of the Right, had long been intriguing with Cavallotti, leader of the Extreme Left, to overthrow Crispi, but without the disaster of Adowa his plan would scarcely have succeeded. The first act of the new cabinet was to confirm instructions given by its predecessor to General Baldissera (who had succeeded General Baratieri on the 2nd of March) to treat for peace with Menelek if he thought desirable. Baldissera opened negotiations with the negus through Major Salsa, and simultaneously reorganized the Italian army. The negotiations having failed, he marched to relieve the beleaguered garrison of Adigrat; but Menelek, discouraged by the heavy losses atAbyssinian settlement.Adowa, broke up his camp and returned southwards to Shoa. At the same time Baldissera detached Colonel Stevani with four native battalions to relieve Kassala, then hard pressed by the Mahdists. Kassala was relieved on the 1st of April, and Stevani a few days later severely defeated the dervishes at Jebel Mokram and Tucruff. Returning from Kassala Colonel Stevani rejoined Baldissera, who on the 4th of May relieved Adigrat after a well-executed march. By adroit negotiations with Mangashà the Italian general obtained the release of the Italian prisoners in Tigré, and towards the end of May withdrew his whole force north of the Mareb. Major Nerazzini was then despatched as special envoy to the negus to arrange terms of peace. On the 26th of October Nerazzini succeeded in concluding, at Adis Ababa, a provisional treaty annulling the treaty of Uccialli; recognizing the absolute independence of Ethiopia; postponing for one year the definitive delimitation of the Italo-Abyssinian boundary, but allowing the Italians meanwhile to hold the strong Mareb-Belesa-Muna line; and arranging for the release of the Italian prisoners after ratification of the treaty in exchange for an indemnity of which the amount was to be fixed by the Italian government. The treaty having been duly ratified, and an indemnity of £400,000 paid to Menelek, the Shoan prisoners were released, and Major Nerazzini once more returned to Abyssinia with instructions to secure, if possible, Menelek’s assent to the definitive retention of the Mareb-Belesa-Muna line by Italy. Before Nerazzini could reach Adis Ababa, Rudini, in order partially to satisfy the demands of his Radical supporters for the abandonment of the colony, announced in the Chamber the intention of Italy to limit her occupation to the triangular zone between the points Asmarà, Keren and Massawa, and, possibly, to withdraw to Massawa alone. This declaration, of which Menelek was swiftly apprised by French agents, rendered it impossible to Nerazzini to obtain more than a boundary leaving to Italy but a small portion of the high plateau and ceding to Abyssinia the fertile provinces of Seraè and Okulé-Kusai. The fall of the Rudini cabinet in June 1898, however, enabled Signor Ferdinando Martini and Captain Cicco di Cola, who had been appointed respectively civil governor of Eritrea and minister resident at Adis Ababa, to prevent the cession of Seraè and Okulé-Kusai, and to secure the assent of Menelek to Italian retention of the Mareb-Belesa-Muna frontier. Eritrea has now approximately the same extent as before the revolt of Bath-Agos, except in regard (1) to Kassala, which was transferred to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities on the 25th of December 1897, in pursuance of the above-mentioned Anglo-Italian convention; and (2) to slight rectifications of its northern and eastern boundaries by conventions concluded between the Eritrean and theAnglo-Egyptian authorities. Under Signor Ferdinando Martini’s able administration (1898-1906) the cost of the colony to Italy was reduced and its trade and agriculture have vastly improved.
While marked in regard to Eritrea by vacillation and undignified readiness to yield to Radical clamour, the policy of the marquis di Rudini was in other respects chiefly characterized by a desire to demolish Crispi and his supporters. Actuated by rancour against Crispi, he, on the 29th of April 1896, authorized the publication of a Green Book on Abyssinian affairs, in which, without the consent of Great Britain, the confidential Anglo-Italian negotiations in regard to the Abyssinian war were disclosed. This publication, which amounted to a gross breach of diplomatic confidence, might have endangered the cordiality of Anglo-Italian relations, had not the esteem of the British government for General Ferrero, Italian ambassador in London, induced it to overlook the incident. Fortunately for Italy, the marquis Visconti Venosta shortly afterwards consented to assume the portfolio of foreign affairs, which had been resigned by Duke Caetani di Sermoneta, and again to place, after an interval of twenty years, his unrivalled experience at the service of his country. In September 1896 he succeeded in concluding with France a treaty with regard to Tunisia in place of the old Italo-Tunisian treaty, denounced by the French Government a year previously. During the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 Visconti Venosta laboured to maintain the European concert, joined Great Britain in preserving Greece from the worst consequences of her folly, and lent moral and material aid in establishing an autonomous government in Crete. At the same time he mitigated the Francophil tendencies of some of his colleagues, accompanied King Humbert and Queen Margherita on their visit to Homburg in September 1897, and, by loyal observance of the spirit of the triple alliance, retained for Italy the confidence of her allies without forfeiting the goodwill of France.
The home administration of the Rudini cabinet compared unfavourably with that of foreign affairs. Bound by a secret understanding with the Radical leader Cavallotti, an able but unscrupulous demagogue, Rudini was compelled to bow to Radical exigencies. He threw all the influence of the government against Crispi, who was charged with complicity in embezzlements perpetrated by Favilla, managing director of the Bologna branch of the Bank of Naples. After being subjected to persecution for nearly two years, Crispi’s character was substantially vindicated by the report of a parliamentary commission appointed to inquire into his relations with Favilla. True, the commission proposed and the Chamber adopted a vote of censure upon Crispi’s conduct in 1894, when, as premier and minister of the interior, he had borrowed £12,000 from Favilla to replenish | the secret service fund, and had subsequently repaid the money as instalments for secret service were in due course furnished by the treasury. Though irregular, his action was to some extent justified by the depletion of the secret service fund under Giolitti and by the abnormal circumstances prevailing in 1893-1894, when he had been obliged to quell the insurrections in Sicily and Massa-Carrara. But the Rudini-Cavallotti alliance was destined to produce other results than those of the campaign against Crispi. Pressed by Cavallotti, Rudini in March 1897 dissolved the Chamber and conducted the general election in such a way as to crush by government pressure the partisans of Crispi, and greatly to strengthen the (Socialist, Republican and Radical) revolutionary parties. More than ever at the mercy of the Radicals and of their revolutionary allies, Rudini continued so to administer public affairs that subversive propaganda and associations obtained unprecedented extension. The effect was seen in May 1898, when, in consequence of a rise in the price of bread, disturbances occurred in southern Italy. The corn duty was reduced to meet the emergency, but the disturbedRiots of May, 1898.area extended to Naples, Foggia, Bari, Minervino-Murge, Molfetta and thence along the line of railway which skirts the Adriatic coast. At Faenza, Piacenza, Cremona, Pavia and Milan, where subversive associations were stronger, it assumed the complexion of a political revolt. From the 7th to the 9th of May Milan remained practically in the hands of the mob. A palace was sacked, barricades were erected and for forty-eight hours the troops under General Bava-Beccaris, notwithstanding the employment of artillery, were unable to restore order. In view of these occurrences, Rudini authorized the proclamation of a state of siege at Milan, Florence, Leghorn and Naples, delegating the suppression of disorder to special military commissioners. By these means order was restored, though not without considerable loss of life at Milan and elsewhere. At Milan alone the official returns confessed to eighty killed and several hundred wounded, a total generally considered below the real figures. As in 1894, excessively severe sentences were passed by the military tribunals upon revolutionary leaders and other persons considered to have been implicated in the outbreak, but successive royal amnesties obliterated these condemnations within three years.
No Italian administration since the death of Depretis underwent so many metamorphoses as that of the marquis di Rudini. Modified a first time within five months of its formation (July 1896) in connexion with General Ricotti’sPelloux and obstruction.Army Reform Bill, and again in December 1897, when Zanardelli entered the cabinet, it was reconstructed for a third time at the end of May 1898 upon the question of a Public Safety Bill, but fell for the fourth and last time on the 18th of June 1898, on account of public indignation at the results of Rudini’s home policy as exemplified in the May riots. On the 29th of June Rudini was succeeded in the premiership by General Luigi Pelloux, a Savoyard, whose only title to office was the confidence of the king. The Pelloux cabinet possessed no clear programme except in regard to the Public Safety Bill, which it had taken over from its predecessor. Presented to parliament in November 1898, the bill was read a second time in the following spring, but its third reading was violently obstructed by the Socialists, Radicals and Republicans of the Extreme Left. After a series of scenes and scuffles the bill was promulgated by royal decree, the decree being postdated to allow time for the third reading. Again obstruction precluded debate, and on the 22nd of July 1899 the decree automatically acquired force of law, pending the adoption of a bill of indemnity by the Chamber. In February 1900 it was, however, quashed by the supreme court on a point of procedure, and the Public Safety Bill as a whole had again to be presented to the Chamber. In view of the violence of Extremist obstruction, an effort was made to reform the standing orders of the Lower House, but parliamentary feeling ran so high that General Pelloux thought it expedient to appeal to the country. The general election of June 1900 not only failed to reinforce the cabinet, but largely increased the strength of the extreme parties (Radicals, Republicans and Socialists), who in the new Chamber numbered nearly 100 out of a total of 508. General Pelloux therefore resigned, and on the 24th of June a moderate Liberal cabinet was formed by the aged Signor Saracco, president of the senate. Within five weeks of its formation King Humbert was shot by an anarchist assassin named Bresci while leaving an athletic festival at Monza, where his Majesty had distributed the prizes (29th July 1900). The death of the unfortunateDeath of King Humbert.monarch, against whom an attempt had previously been made by the anarchist Acciarito (22nd April 1897), caused an outburst of profound sorrow and indignation. Though not a great monarch, King Humbert had, by his unfailing generosity and personal courage, won the esteem and affection of his people. During the cholera epidemic at Naples and Busca in 1884, and the Ischia earthquake of 1885, he, regardless of danger, brought relief and encouragement to sufferers, and rescued many lives. More than £100,000 of his civil list was annually devoted to charitable purposes.Accession of King Victor Emmanuel III.Humbert was succeeded by his only son, Victor Emmanuel III. (b. November 11, 1869), a liberal-minded and well-educated prince, who at the time of his father’s assassination was returning from a cruise in the eastern Mediterranean. The remains of King Humbert were laid to rest in the Pantheon at Rome beside those of his father, Victor Emmanuel II. (9th August). Twodays later Victor Emmanuel III. swore fidelity to the constitution before the assembled Houses of Parliament and in the presence of his consort, Elena of Montenegro, whom he had married in October 1896.
The later course of Italian foreign policy was marked by many vicissitudes. Admiral Canevaro, who had gained distinction as commander of the international forces in Crete (1896-1898), assumed the direction of foreignForeign affairs.affairs in the first period of the Pelloux administration. His diplomacy, though energetic, lacked steadiness. Soon after taking office he completed the negotiations begun by the Rudini administration for a new commercial treaty with France (October 1898), whereby Franco-Italian commercial relations were placed upon a normal footing after a breach which had lasted for more than ten years. By the despatch of a squadron to South America he obtained satisfaction for injuries inflicted thirteen years previously upon an Italian subject by the United States of Colombia. In December 1898 he convoked a diplomatic conference in Rome to discuss secret means for the repression of anarchist propaganda and crime in view of the assassination of the empress of Austria by an Italian anarchist (Luccheni), but it is doubtful whether results of practical value were achieved. The action of the tsar of Russia in convening the Peace Conference at The Hague in May 1900 gave rise to a question as to the right of the Vatican to be officially represented, and Admiral Canevaro, supported by Great Britain and Germany, succeeded in preventing the invitation of a papal delegate. Shortly afterwards his term of office was brought to a close by the failure of an attempt to secure for Italy a coaling station at Sanmen and a sphere of influence in China; but his policy of active participation in Chinese affairs was continued in a modified form by his successor, the Marquis Visconti Venosta, who, entering the reconstructed Pelloux cabinet in May 1899, retained the portfolio of foreign affairs in the ensuing Saracco administration, and secured the despatch of an Italian expedition, 2000 strong, to aid in repressing the Chinese outbreak and in protecting Italian interests in the Far East (July 1900). With characteristic foresight, Visconti Venosta promoted an exchange of views between Italy and France in regard to the Tripolitan hinterland, which the Anglo-French convention of 1899 had placed within the French sphere of influence—a modification of thestatus quo anteconsidered highly detrimental to Italian aspirations in Tripoli. For this reason the Anglo-French convention had caused profound irritation in Italy, and had tended somewhat to diminish the cordiality of Anglo-Italian relations. Visconti Venosta is believed, however, to have obtained from France a formal declaration that France would not transgress the limits assigned to her influence by the convention. Similarly, in regard to Albania, Visconti Venosta exchanged notes with Austria with a view to the prevention of any misunderstanding through the conflict between Italian and Austrian interests in that part of the Adriatic coast. Upon the fall of the Saracco cabinet (9th February 1901) Visconti Venosta was succeeded at the foreign office by Signor Prinetti, a Lombard manufacturer of strong temperament, but without previous diplomatic experience. The new minister continued in most respects the policy of his predecessor. The outset of his administration was marked by Franco-Italian fêtes at Toulon (10th to 14th April 1901), when the Italian fleet returned a visit paid by the French Mediterranean squadron to Cagliari in April 1899; and by the despatch of three Italian warships to Prevesa to obtain satisfaction for damage done to Italian subjects by Turkish officials.
The Saracco administration, formed after the obstructionist crisis of 1899-1900 as a cabinet of transition and pacification, was overthrown in February 1901 in consequence of its vacillating conduct towards a dock strike at Genoa.Zanardelli-Giolitti Cabinet.It was succeeded by a Zanardelli cabinet, in which the portfolio of the interior was allotted to Giolitti. Composed mainly of elements drawn from the Left, and dependent for a majority upon the support of the subversive groups of the Extreme Left, the formation of this cabinet gave the signal for a vast working-class movement, during which the Socialist party sought to extend its political influence by means of strikes and the organization of labour leagues among agricultural labourers and artisans. The movement was confined chiefly to the northern and central provinces. During the first six months of 1901 the strikes numbered 600, and involved more than 1,000,000 workmen.