Chapter 13

JUDGMENT,in law, a term used to describe (1) the adjudication by a court of justice upon a controversy submitted to itinter partes(post litem contestatam) and determining the rights of the parties and the relief to be awarded by the court as between them; (2) the formal document issuing from the courtin which that adjudication is expressed; (3) the opinions of the judges expressed in a review of the facts and law applicable to the controversy leading up to the adjudication expressed in the formal document. When the judgment has been passed and entered and recorded it binds the parties: the controversy comes to an end (transit in rem judicatam), and the person in whose favour the judgment is entered is entitled to enforce it by the appropriate method of “execution.” There has been much controversy among lawyers as to the meaning of the expressions “final” and “interlocutory” as applied to judgments, and as to the distinction between a “judgment,” a “decree,” and an “order.” These disputes arise upon the wording of statutes or rules of court and with reference to the appropriate times or modes of appeal or of execution.

The judgments of one country are not as a rule directly enforceable in another country. In Europe, by treaty or arrangement, foreign judgments are in certain cases and on compliance with certain formalities made executory in various states. A similar provision is made as between England, Scotland and Ireland, for the registry and execution in each country of certain classes of judgments given in the others. But as regards the rest of the king’s dominions and foreign states, a “foreign” judgment is in England recognized only as constituting a cause of action which may be sued upon in England. If given by a court of competent jurisdiction it is treated as creating a legal obligation to pay the sum adjudged to be due. Summary judgment may be entered in an English action based on a foreign judgment unless the defendant can show that the foreign court had not jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter of the action, or that there was fraud on the part of the foreign court or the successful party, or that the foreign proceedings were contrary to natural justice,e.g.concluded without due notice to the parties affected. English courts will not enforce foreign judgments as to foreign criminal or penal or revenue laws.

JUDGMENT DEBTOR,in English law, a person against whom a judgment ordering him to pay a sum of money has been obtained and remains unsatisfied. Such a person may be examined as to whether any and what debts are owing to him, and if the judgment debt is of the necessary amount he may be made bankrupt if he fails to comply with a bankruptcy notice served on him by the judgment creditors, or he may be committed to prison or have a receiving order made against him in a judgment summons under the Debtors Act 1869.

JUDGMENT SUMMONS,in English law, a summons issued under the Debtors Act 1869, on the application of a creditor who has obtained a judgment for the payment of a sum of money by instalments or otherwise, where the order for payment has not been complied with. The judgment summons cites the defendant to appear personally in court, and be examined on oath as to the means he has, or has had, since the date of the order or judgment made against him, to pay the same, and to show cause why he should not be committed to prison for his default. An order of commitment obtained in a judgment summons remains in force for a year only, and the extreme term of imprisonment is six weeks, dating from the time of lodging in prison. When a debtor has once been imprisoned, although for a period of less than six weeks, no second order of commitment can be made against him in respect of the same debt. But if the judgment be for payment by instalments a power of committal arises on default of payment for each instalment. If an order of commitment has never been executed, or becomes inoperative through lapse of time, a fresh commitment may be made. Imprisonment does not operate as a satisfaction or extinguishment of a debt, or deprive a person of a right of execution against the land or goods of the person imprisoned in the same manner as if there had been no imprisonment.

JUDICATURE ACTS,an important series of English statutes having for their object the simplification of the system of judicature in its higher branches. They are the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66) and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 77), with various amending acts, the twelfth of these being in 1899. By the act of 1873 the court of chancery, the court of queen’s (king’s) bench, the court of common pleas, the court of exchequer, the high court of admiralty, the court of probate and the court of divorce and matrimonial causes were consolidated into one Supreme1Court of Judicature (sec. 3), divided into two permanent divisions, called “the high court,” with (speaking broadly) original jurisdiction, and “the court of appeal” (sec. 4). The objects of the act were threefold—first, to reduce the historically independent courts of common law and equity into one supreme court; secondly, to establish for all divisions of the court a uniform system of pleading and procedure; and thirdly, to provide for the enforcement of the same rule of law in those cases where chancery and common law recognized different rules. It can be seen at once how bold and revolutionary was this new enactment. By one section the august king’s bench, the common pleas, in which serjeants only had formerly the right of audience, and the exchequer, which had its origin in the reign of Henry I., and all their jurisdiction, criminal, legal and equitable, were vested in the new court. It must be understood, however, that law and equity were not fused in the sense in which that phrase has generally been employed. The chancery division still remains distinct from the common law division, having a certain range of legal questions under its exclusive control, and possessing to a certain extent a peculiar machinery of its own for carrying its decrees into execution. But all actions may now be brought in the high court of justice, and, subject to such special assignments of business as that alluded to, may be tried in any division thereof.

There were originally three common law divisions of the High Court corresponding with the three former courts of common law. But after the death of Lord Chief Baron Kelly on the 17th of September 1880, and of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn on the 20th of November 1880, the common pleas and exchequer divisions were (by order in council, 10th December 1880) consolidated with the king’s bench division into one division under the presidency of the lord chief justice of England, to whom, by the 25th section of the Judicature Act 1881, all the statutory jurisdiction of the chief baron and the chief justice of the common pleas was transferred. The high court, therefore, now consists of the chancery division, the common law division, under the name of the king’s bench division; and the probate, divorce and admiralty division. To the king’s bench division is also attached, by order of the lord chancellor (Jan. 1, 1884), the business of the London court of bankruptcy.

For a more detailed account of the composition of the various courts, seeChancery;King’s Bench; andProbate, Divorce and Admiralty Court.

The keystone of the structure created by the Judicature Acts was a strong court of appeal. The House of Lords remained the last court of appeal, as before the acts, but its judicial functions were virtually transferred to an appeal committee, consisting of the lord chancellor and other peers who have held high judicial office, and certain lords of appeal in ordinary created by the act of 1873 (seeAppeal).

The practice and procedure of the Supreme Court are regulated by rules made by a committee of judges, to which have been added the president of the incorporated law society and a practising barrister and one other person nominated by the lord chancellor. The rules now in force are those of 1883, with some subsequent amendments. With the appendices they fill a moderate-sized volume. Complaints are made that they go into too much detail, and place a burden on the time and temper of the busy practitioner which he can ill afford to bear. It is possible that the authors of the rules attempted too much, and it might have been better to provide a simpler and more elastic code of procedure. Rules have sometimes been made to meet individual cases of hardship, and rules of procedure have been piled up from time to time, sometimes embodying a new experiment, and not always consistent with former rules.The most important matter dealt with by the rules is the mode of pleading. The authors of the Judicature Act had before them two systems of pleading, both of which were open to criticism. The common law pleadings (it was said) did not state the facts on which the pleader relied, but only the legal aspect of the facts or the inferences from them, while the chancery pleadings were lengthy, tedious and to a large extent irrelevant and useless. There was some exaggeration in both statements. In pursuing the fusion of law and equity which was the dominant legal idea of law reformers of that period, the framers of the first set of rules devised a system which they thought would meet the defects of both systems, and be appropriate for both the common-law and the chancery divisions. In a normal case, the plaintiff delivered his statement of claim, in which he was to set forth concisely the facts on which he relied, and the relief which he asked. The defendant then delivered his statement of defence, in which he was to say whether he admitted or denied the plaintiff’s facts (every averment not traversed being taken to be admitted), and any additional facts and legal defences on which he relied. The plaintiff might then reply, and the defendant rejoin, and so on until the pleaders had exhausted themselves. This system of pleading was not a bad one if accompanied by the right of either party to demur to his opponent’s pleading,i.e.to say, “admitting all your averments of fact to be true, you still have no cause of action,” or “defence” (as the case may be). It may be, however, that the authors of the new system were too intent on uniformity when they abolished the common-law pleading, which, shorn of its abuses (as it had been by the Common Law Procedure Acts), was an admirable instrument for defining the issue between the parties though unsuited for the more complicated cases which are tried in chancery, and it might possibly have been better to try the new system in the first instance in the chancery division only. It should be added that the rules contain provisions for actions being tried without pleadings if the defendant does not require a statement of claim, and for the plaintiff in an action of debt obtaining immediate judgment unless the defendant gets leave to defend. In the chancery division there are of course no pleadings in those matters which by the rules can be disposed of by summons in chambers instead of by ordinary suit as formerly.The judges seem to have been dissatisfied with the effect of their former rules, for in 1883 they issued a fresh set of consolidated rules, which, with subsequent amendments, are those now in force. By these rules a further attempt was made to prune the exuberance of pleading. Concise forms of statement of claim and defence were given in the appendix for adoption by the pleader. It is true that these forms do not display a high standard of excellence in draftsmanship, and it was said that many of them were undoubtedly demurrable, but that was not of much importance. Demurrers were abolished, and instead thereof it was provided that any point of law raised by the pleadings should be disposed of at or after the trial, provided that by consent or order of the court the same might be set down and disposed of before the trial (Order xxv. rules 1, 2). This, in the opinion of Lord Davey in 1902 (Ency. Brit., 10th ed., xxx. 146), was a disastrous change. The right of either party to challenge his opponentin limine, either where the question between them was purely one of law, or where even the view of the facts taken and alleged by his opponent did not constitute a cause of action or defence, was a most valuable one, and tended to the curtailment of both the delay and the expense of litigation. Any possibility of abuse by frivolous or technical demurrers (as undoubtedly was formerly the case) had been met by powers of amendment and the infliction of costs. Many of the most important questions of law had been decided on demurrer both in common law and chancery. Lord Davey considered that demurrer was a useful and satisfactory mode of trying questions in chancery (on bill and demurrer), and it was frequently adopted in preference to a special case, which requires the statement of facts to be agreed to by both parties and was consequently more difficult and expensive. It is obvious that a rule which makes the normal time for decision of questions at law the trial or subsequently, and a preliminary decision the exception, and such exception dependent on the consent of both parties or an order of the court, is a poor substitute for a demurrer as of right, and it has proved so in practice. The editors of theYearly Practicefor 1901 (Muir Mackenzie, Lushington and Fox) said (p. 272): “Points of law raised by the pleadings are usually disposed of at the trial or on further consideration after the trial of the issues of fact,” that is to say, after the delay, worry and expense of a trial of disputed questions of fact which after all may turn out to be unnecessary. The abolition of demurrers has also (it is believed) had a prejudicial effect on the standard of legal accuracy and knowledge required in practitioners. Formerly the pleader had the fear of a demurrer before him. Nowadays he need not stop to think whether his cause of action or defence will hold water or not, and anything which is not obviously frivolous or vexatious will do by way of pleading for the purpose of the trial and for getting the opposite party into the box.Another change was made by the rules of 1883, which was regarded by some common law lawyers as revolutionary. Formerly every issue of fact in a common law action, including the amount of damage, had to be decided by the verdict of a jury. “The effect of the rules of 1883,” said Lord Lindley, who was a member of the rule committee, “was to make trial without a jury the normal mode of trial, except where trial with a jury is ordered under rules 6 or 7a, or may be had without an order under rule 2” (Timsonv.Wilson, 38 Ch. D. 72, at p. 76). The effect of the rules may be thus summarized: (1) In the chancery division no trial by jury unless ordered by the judge. (2) Generally the judge may order trial without a jury of any cause or issue, which before the Judicature Act might have been so tried without consent of parties, or which involves prolonged investigation of documents or accounts, or scientific or local investigation. (3) Either party has a right to a jury in actions of slander, libel, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction or breach of promise of marriage, upon notice without order; (4) or in any other action, by order. (5) Subject as above, actions are to be tried without a jury unless the judge, of his own motion, otherwise orders.Further steps have been taken with a view to simplification of procedure. By Order xxx. rule 1 (as amended in 1897), a summons, called a summons for directions, has to be taken out by a plaintiff immediately after the appearance of the defendant, and upon such summons an order is to be made respecting pleadings, and a number of interlocutory proceedings. To make such an order at that early stage would seem to demand a prescience and intelligent anticipation of future events which can hardly be expected of a master, or even a judge in chambers, except in simple cases, involving a single issue of law or fact which the parties are agreed in presenting to the court. The effect of the rule is that the plaintiff cannot deliver his statement of claim, or take any step in the action without the leave of the judge. In chancery cases the order usually made is that the plaintiff deliver his statement of claim, and the rest of the summons stand over, and the practical effect is merely to add a few pounds to the costs. It may be doubted whether, as applied to the majority of actions, the rule does not proceed on wrong lines, and whether it would not be better to leave the parties, who know the exigencies of their case better even than a judge in chambers, to proceed in their own way, subject to stringent provisions for immediate payment of the costs occasioned by unnecessary, vexatious, or dilatory proceedings. The order does not apply to admiralty cases or to proceedings under the order next mentioned.The Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Ireland) 1877 follows the same lines as the English acts. The pre-existing courts were consolidated into a supreme court of judicature, consisting of a high court of justice and a court of appeal. The judicature acts did not affect Scottish judicature, but the Appellate Jurisdiction Act included the court of session among the courts from which an appeal lies to the House of Lords.

The most important matter dealt with by the rules is the mode of pleading. The authors of the Judicature Act had before them two systems of pleading, both of which were open to criticism. The common law pleadings (it was said) did not state the facts on which the pleader relied, but only the legal aspect of the facts or the inferences from them, while the chancery pleadings were lengthy, tedious and to a large extent irrelevant and useless. There was some exaggeration in both statements. In pursuing the fusion of law and equity which was the dominant legal idea of law reformers of that period, the framers of the first set of rules devised a system which they thought would meet the defects of both systems, and be appropriate for both the common-law and the chancery divisions. In a normal case, the plaintiff delivered his statement of claim, in which he was to set forth concisely the facts on which he relied, and the relief which he asked. The defendant then delivered his statement of defence, in which he was to say whether he admitted or denied the plaintiff’s facts (every averment not traversed being taken to be admitted), and any additional facts and legal defences on which he relied. The plaintiff might then reply, and the defendant rejoin, and so on until the pleaders had exhausted themselves. This system of pleading was not a bad one if accompanied by the right of either party to demur to his opponent’s pleading,i.e.to say, “admitting all your averments of fact to be true, you still have no cause of action,” or “defence” (as the case may be). It may be, however, that the authors of the new system were too intent on uniformity when they abolished the common-law pleading, which, shorn of its abuses (as it had been by the Common Law Procedure Acts), was an admirable instrument for defining the issue between the parties though unsuited for the more complicated cases which are tried in chancery, and it might possibly have been better to try the new system in the first instance in the chancery division only. It should be added that the rules contain provisions for actions being tried without pleadings if the defendant does not require a statement of claim, and for the plaintiff in an action of debt obtaining immediate judgment unless the defendant gets leave to defend. In the chancery division there are of course no pleadings in those matters which by the rules can be disposed of by summons in chambers instead of by ordinary suit as formerly.

The judges seem to have been dissatisfied with the effect of their former rules, for in 1883 they issued a fresh set of consolidated rules, which, with subsequent amendments, are those now in force. By these rules a further attempt was made to prune the exuberance of pleading. Concise forms of statement of claim and defence were given in the appendix for adoption by the pleader. It is true that these forms do not display a high standard of excellence in draftsmanship, and it was said that many of them were undoubtedly demurrable, but that was not of much importance. Demurrers were abolished, and instead thereof it was provided that any point of law raised by the pleadings should be disposed of at or after the trial, provided that by consent or order of the court the same might be set down and disposed of before the trial (Order xxv. rules 1, 2). This, in the opinion of Lord Davey in 1902 (Ency. Brit., 10th ed., xxx. 146), was a disastrous change. The right of either party to challenge his opponentin limine, either where the question between them was purely one of law, or where even the view of the facts taken and alleged by his opponent did not constitute a cause of action or defence, was a most valuable one, and tended to the curtailment of both the delay and the expense of litigation. Any possibility of abuse by frivolous or technical demurrers (as undoubtedly was formerly the case) had been met by powers of amendment and the infliction of costs. Many of the most important questions of law had been decided on demurrer both in common law and chancery. Lord Davey considered that demurrer was a useful and satisfactory mode of trying questions in chancery (on bill and demurrer), and it was frequently adopted in preference to a special case, which requires the statement of facts to be agreed to by both parties and was consequently more difficult and expensive. It is obvious that a rule which makes the normal time for decision of questions at law the trial or subsequently, and a preliminary decision the exception, and such exception dependent on the consent of both parties or an order of the court, is a poor substitute for a demurrer as of right, and it has proved so in practice. The editors of theYearly Practicefor 1901 (Muir Mackenzie, Lushington and Fox) said (p. 272): “Points of law raised by the pleadings are usually disposed of at the trial or on further consideration after the trial of the issues of fact,” that is to say, after the delay, worry and expense of a trial of disputed questions of fact which after all may turn out to be unnecessary. The abolition of demurrers has also (it is believed) had a prejudicial effect on the standard of legal accuracy and knowledge required in practitioners. Formerly the pleader had the fear of a demurrer before him. Nowadays he need not stop to think whether his cause of action or defence will hold water or not, and anything which is not obviously frivolous or vexatious will do by way of pleading for the purpose of the trial and for getting the opposite party into the box.

Another change was made by the rules of 1883, which was regarded by some common law lawyers as revolutionary. Formerly every issue of fact in a common law action, including the amount of damage, had to be decided by the verdict of a jury. “The effect of the rules of 1883,” said Lord Lindley, who was a member of the rule committee, “was to make trial without a jury the normal mode of trial, except where trial with a jury is ordered under rules 6 or 7a, or may be had without an order under rule 2” (Timsonv.Wilson, 38 Ch. D. 72, at p. 76). The effect of the rules may be thus summarized: (1) In the chancery division no trial by jury unless ordered by the judge. (2) Generally the judge may order trial without a jury of any cause or issue, which before the Judicature Act might have been so tried without consent of parties, or which involves prolonged investigation of documents or accounts, or scientific or local investigation. (3) Either party has a right to a jury in actions of slander, libel, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction or breach of promise of marriage, upon notice without order; (4) or in any other action, by order. (5) Subject as above, actions are to be tried without a jury unless the judge, of his own motion, otherwise orders.

Further steps have been taken with a view to simplification of procedure. By Order xxx. rule 1 (as amended in 1897), a summons, called a summons for directions, has to be taken out by a plaintiff immediately after the appearance of the defendant, and upon such summons an order is to be made respecting pleadings, and a number of interlocutory proceedings. To make such an order at that early stage would seem to demand a prescience and intelligent anticipation of future events which can hardly be expected of a master, or even a judge in chambers, except in simple cases, involving a single issue of law or fact which the parties are agreed in presenting to the court. The effect of the rule is that the plaintiff cannot deliver his statement of claim, or take any step in the action without the leave of the judge. In chancery cases the order usually made is that the plaintiff deliver his statement of claim, and the rest of the summons stand over, and the practical effect is merely to add a few pounds to the costs. It may be doubted whether, as applied to the majority of actions, the rule does not proceed on wrong lines, and whether it would not be better to leave the parties, who know the exigencies of their case better even than a judge in chambers, to proceed in their own way, subject to stringent provisions for immediate payment of the costs occasioned by unnecessary, vexatious, or dilatory proceedings. The order does not apply to admiralty cases or to proceedings under the order next mentioned.

The Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Ireland) 1877 follows the same lines as the English acts. The pre-existing courts were consolidated into a supreme court of judicature, consisting of a high court of justice and a court of appeal. The judicature acts did not affect Scottish judicature, but the Appellate Jurisdiction Act included the court of session among the courts from which an appeal lies to the House of Lords.

1The comte de Franqueville in his interesting work,Le Système judiciaire de la Grande Bretagne, criticizes the use of the word “supreme” as a designation of this court, inasmuch as its judgments are subject to appeal to the House of Lords, but in the act of 1873 the appeal to the House of Lords was abolished. He is also severe on the illogical use of the words “division” and “court” in many different senses (i. 180-181).

JUDITH, THE BOOK OF,one of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament. It takes its name from the heroine Judith (Ἰουδίθ, Ἰουδήθ,i.e.יהודית, Jewess), to whom the last nine of its sixteen chapters relate. In the Septuagint and Vulgate it immediately precedes Esther, and along with Tobit comes after Nehemiah; in the English Apocrypha it is placed between Tobit and the apocryphal additions to Esther.

Argument.—In the twelfth year of his reign Nebuchadrezzar, who is described as king of Assyria, having his capital in Nineveh, makes war against Arphaxad, king of Media, and overcomes him in his seventeenth year. He then despatches his chief general Holofernes to take vengeance on the nations of the west who had withheld their assistance. This expedition has already succeeded in its main objects when Holofernes proceeds to attack Judaea. The children of Israel, who are described as having newly returned from captivity, are apprehensive of a desecration of their sanctuary, and resolve on resistance to the uttermost. The inhabitants of Bethulia (Betylūa) and Betomestham in particular (neither place can be identified), directed by Joachim the high priest, guard the mountain passes near Dothaim, and place themselves under God’s protection. Holofernes now inquires of the chiefs who are with him about the Israelites, and is answered by Achior the leader of the Ammonites, who enters upon a long historical narrative showing the Israelites to be invincible except when they have offended God. For this Achior is punished by being handed over to the Israelites, who lead him to the governor of Bethulia. Next day the siege begins, and after forty days the famished inhabitants urge the governor Ozias to surrender, which he consents to do unless relieved in five days. Judith, a beautiful and pious widow of the tribe of Simeon, now appears on the scene with a plan of deliverance. Wearing her rich attire, and accompanied by her maid, who carries a bag of provisions, she goes over to the hostile camp, where she is at once conducted to the general, whose suspicions are disarmed by the tales she invents. After four days Holofernes, smitten with her charms, at the close of asumptuous entertainment invites her to remain within his tent over night. No sooner is he overcome with sleep than Judith, seizing his sword, strikes off his head and gives it to her maid; both now leave the camp (as they had previously been accustomed to do, ostensibly for prayer) and return to Bethulia, where the trophy is displayed amid great rejoicings and thanksgivings. Achior now publicly professes Judaism, and at the instance of Judith the Israelites make a sudden victorious onslaught on the enemy. Judith now sings a song of praise, and all go up to Jerusalem to worship with sacrifice and rejoicing. The book concludes with a brief notice of the closing years of the heroine.

Versions.—Judith was written originally in Hebrew. This is shown not only by the numerous Hebraisms, but also by mistranslations of the Greek translation, as in ii. 2, iii. 9, and other passages (see Fritzsche and Ballin loc.), despite the statement of Origen (Ep. ad Afric.13) that the book was not received by the Jews among their apocryphal writings. In his preface to Judith, Jerome says that he based his Latin version on the Chaldee, which the Jews reckoned among their Hagiographa. Ball (Speaker’s Apocrypha, i. 243) holds that the Chaldee text used by Jerome was a free translation or adaptation of the Hebrew. The book exists in two forms: the shorter, which is preserved only in Hebrew (see underHebrew Midrashimbelow), is, according to Scholz, Lipsius, Ball and Gaster, the older; the longer form is that contained in the versions.Greek Version.—This is found in three recensions: (1) in A B,א; (2) in codices 19, 108 (Lucian’s text); (3) in codex 58, the source of the old Latin and Syriac.Syriac and Latin Versions.—Two Syriac versions were made from the Greek—the first, that of the Peshito; and the second, that of Paul of Tella, the so-called Hexaplaric. The Old Latin was derived from the Greek, as we have remarked above, and Jerome’s from the Old Latin, under the control of a Chaldee version.Later Hebrew Midrashim.—These are printed in Jellinek’sBet ha-Midrasch, i. 130-131; ii. 12-22; and by Gaster inProceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology(1894), pp. 156-163.

Greek Version.—This is found in three recensions: (1) in A B,א; (2) in codices 19, 108 (Lucian’s text); (3) in codex 58, the source of the old Latin and Syriac.

Syriac and Latin Versions.—Two Syriac versions were made from the Greek—the first, that of the Peshito; and the second, that of Paul of Tella, the so-called Hexaplaric. The Old Latin was derived from the Greek, as we have remarked above, and Jerome’s from the Old Latin, under the control of a Chaldee version.

Later Hebrew Midrashim.—These are printed in Jellinek’sBet ha-Midrasch, i. 130-131; ii. 12-22; and by Gaster inProceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology(1894), pp. 156-163.

Date.—The book in its fuller form was most probably written in the 2nd centuryB.C.The writer places his romance two centuries earlier, in the time of Ochus, as we may reasonably infer from the attack made by Holofernes and Bagoas on Judaea; for Artaxerxes Ochus made an expedition against Phoenicia and Egypt in 350B.C., in which his chief generals were Holofernes and Bagoas.

Recent Literature.—Ball,Speaker’s Apocrypha(1888), an excellent piece of work; Scholz,Das Buch Judith(1896); Löhr,Apok. und Pseud.(1900), ii. 147-164; Porter in Hastings’sDict. Bible, ii. 822-824; Gaster,Ency. Bib., ii. 2642-2646. See Ball, pp. 260-261, and Schürerin loc., for a full bibliography.

(R. H. C.)

JUDSON, ADONIRAM(1788-1850), American missionary, was born at Malden, Massachusetts, on the 9th of August 1788, the son of a Congregational minister. He graduated at Brown University in 1807, was successively a school teacher and an actor, completed a course at the Andover Theological Seminary in September 1810, and was at once licensed to preach as a Congregational clergyman. In the summer of 1810 he with several of his fellows students at Andover had petitioned the general association of ministers to be sent to Asiatic missionary fields. This application resulted in the establishment of the American board of commissioners for foreign missions, which sent Judson to England to secure, if possible, the co-operation of the London Missionary Society. His ship fell into the hands of a French privateer and he was for some time a prisoner in France, but finally proceeded to London, where his proposal was considered without anything being decided. He then returned to America, where he found the board ready to act independently. His appointment to Burma followed, and in 1812, accompanied by his wife, Ann Hasseltine Judson (1789-1826), he went to Calcutta. On the voyage both became advocates of baptism by immersion, and being thus cut off from Congregationalism, they began independent work. In 1814 they began to receive support from the American Baptist missionary union, which had been founded with the primary object of keeping them in the field. After a few months at Madras, they settled at Rangoon. There Judson mastered Burmese, into which he translated part of the Gospels with his wife’s help. In 1824 he removed to Ava, where during the war between the East India Company and Burma he was imprisoned for almost two years. After peace had been brought about (largely, it is said, through his exertions) Mrs Judson died. In 1827 Judson removed his headquarters to Maulmain, where school buildings and a church were erected, and where in 1834 he married Sarah Hall Boardman (1803-1845). In 1833 he completed his translation of the Bible; in succeeding years he compiled a Burmese grammar, a Burmese dictionary, and a Pali dictionary. In 1845 his wife’s failing health decided Judson to return to America, but she died during the voyage, and was buried at St Helena. In the United States Judson married Emily Chubbuck (1817-1854), well-known as a poet and novelist under the name of “Fanny Forrester,” who was one of the earliest advocates in America of the higher education of women. She returned with him in 1846 to Burma, where the rest of his life was devoted largely to the rewriting of his Burmese dictionary. He died at sea on the 12th of April 1850, while on his way to Martinique, in search of health. Judson was perhaps the greatest, as he was practically the first, of the many missionaries sent from the United States into foreign fields; his fervour, his devotion to duty, and his fortitude in the face of danger mark him as the prototype of the American missionary.

The Judson Memorial, an institutional church, was erected on Washington Square South, New York City, largely through the exertions of his son, Rev. Edward Judson (b. 1844), who became its pastor and director, and who prepared a life of Dr Judson (1883; new ed. 1898). Another biography is by Francis Wayland (2 vols., 1854). See also Robert T. Middleditch’sLife of Adoniram Judson, Burmah’s Great Missionary(New York, 1859). For the three Mrs. Judsons, see Knowles,Life of Ann Hasseltine Judson(1829); Emily C. Judson,Life of Sarah Hall Boardman Judson(1849); Asahel C. Kendrick,Life and Letters of Emily Chubbuck Judson(1861).

JUEL, JENS(1631-1700), Danish statesman, born on the 15th of July 1631, began his diplomatic career in the suite of Count Christian Rantzau, whom he accompanied to Vienna and Regensburg in 1652. In August 1657 Juel was accredited to the court of Poland, and though he failed to prevent King John Casimir from negotiating separately with Sweden he was made a privy councillor on his return home. But it was the reconciliation of Juel’s uncle Hannibal Sehested with King Frederick III. which secured Juel’s future. As Sehested’s representative, he concluded the peace of Copenhagen with Charles X., and after the Danish revolution of 1660 was appointed Danish minister at Stockholm, where he remained for eight years. Subsequently the chancellor Griffenfeldt, who had become warmly attached to him, sent him in 1672, and again in 1674, as ambassador extraordinary to Sweden, ostensibly to bring about a closer union between the two northern kingdoms, but really to give time to consolidate Griffenfeldt’s far-reaching system of alliances. Juel completely sympathized with Griffenfeldt’s Scandinavian policy, which aimed at weakening Sweden sufficiently to re-establish something like an equilibrium between the two states. Like Griffenfeldt, Juel also feared, above all things, a Swedo-Danish war. After the unlucky Seaman War of 1675-79, Juel was one of the Danish plenipotentiaries who negotiated the peace of Lund. Even then he was for an alliance with Sweden “till we can do better.” This policy he consistently followed, and was largely instrumental in bringing about the marriage of Charles XI. with Christian V.’s daughter Ulrica Leonora. But for the death of the like-minded Swedish statesman Johan Gyllenstjerna in June 1680, Juel’s “Scandinavian” policy might have succeeded, to the infinite advantage of both kingdoms. He represented Denmark at the coronation of Charles XII. (December 1697), when he concluded a new treaty of alliance with Sweden. He died in 1700.

Juel, a man of very few words and a sworn enemy of phrase-making, was perhaps the shrewdest and most cynical diplomatist of his day. His motto was: “We should wish for what we can get.” Throughout life he regarded the political situation of Denmark with absolute pessimism. She was, he often said, the cat’s-paw of the Great Powers. While Griffenfeldt would have obviated this danger by an elastic political system, adaptable to all circumstances, Juel preferred seizing whatever he could get in favourable conjunctures. In domestic affairs Juel was anadherent of the mercantile system, and laboured vigorously for the industrial development of Denmark and Norway. For an aristocrat of the old school he was liberally inclined, but only favoured petty reforms, especially in agriculture, while he regarded emancipation of the serfs as quite impracticable. Juel made no secret of his preference for absolutism, and was one of the few patricians who accepted the title of baron. He saw some military service during the Scanian War, distinguishing himself at the siege of Venersborg, and by his swift decision at the critical moment materially contributing to his brother Niels’s naval victory in the Bay of Kjöge. To his great honour he remained faithful to Griffenfeldt after his fall, enabled his daughter to marry handsomely, and did his utmost, though in vain, to obtain the ex-chancellor’s release from his dungeon.

See Carl Frederik Bricka,Dansk biografisk lex., art. “Juel” (1887, &c.); Adolf Ditlev Jörgensen,P. Schumacher Griffenfeldt(1893-1894).

(R. N. B.)

JUEL, NIELS(1629-1697), Danish admiral, brother of the preceding, was born on the 8th of May 1629, at Christiania. He served his naval apprenticeship under Van Tromp and De Ruyter, taking part in all the chief engagements of the war of 1652-54 between England and Holland. During a long indisposition at Amsterdam in 1655-1656 he acquired a thorough knowledge of ship-building, and returned to Denmark in 1656 a thoroughly equipped seaman. He served with distinction during the Swedo-Danish wars of 1658-60 and took a prominent part in the defence of Copenhagen against Charles X. During fifteen years of peace, Juel, as admiral of the fleet, laboured assiduously to develop and improve the Danish navy, though he bitterly resented the setting over his head in 1663 of Cort Adelaar on his return from the Turkish wars. In 1661 Juel married Margrethe Ulfeldt. On the outbreak of the Scanian War he served at first under Adelaar, but on the death of the latter in November 1675 he was appointed to the supreme command. He then won a European reputation, and raised Danish sea-power to unprecedented eminence, by the system of naval tactics, afterwards perfected by Nelson, which consists in cutting off a part of the enemy’s force and concentrating the whole attack on it. He first employed this manœuvre at the battle of Jasmund off Rügen (May 25, 1676) when he broke through the enemy’s line in close column and cut off five of their ships, which, however, nightfall prevented him from pursuing. Juel’s operations were considerably hampered at this period by the overbearing conduct of his Dutch auxiliary, Philip Almonde, who falsely accused the Danish admiral of cowardice. A few days after the battle of Jasmund, Cornelius Van Tromp the younger, with 17 fresh Danish and Dutch ships of the line, superseded Juel in the supreme command. Juel took a leading part in Van Tromp’s great victory off Öland (June 1, 1676), which enabled the Danes to invade Scania unopposed. On the 1st of June 1677 Juel defeated the Swedish admiral Sjöblad off Möen; on the 30th of June 1677 he won his greatest victory, in the Bay of Kjöge, where, with 25 ships of the line and 1267 guns, he routed the Swedish admiral Evert Horn with 36 ships of the line and 1800 guns. For this great triumph, the just reward of superior seamanship and strategy—at an early stage of the engagement Juel’s experienced eye told him that the wind in the course of the day would shift from S.W. to W. and he took extraordinary risks accordingly—he was made lieutenant admiral general and a privy councillor. This victory, besides permanently crippling the Swedish navy, gave the Danes a self-confidence which enabled them to keep their Dutch allies in their proper place. In the following year Van Tromp, whose high-handedness had become unbearable, was discharged by Christian V., who gave the supreme command to Juel. In the spring of 1678 Juel put to sea with 84 ships carrying 2400 cannon, but as the Swedes were no longer strong enough to encounter such a formidable armament on the open sea, his operations were limited to blockading the Swedish ports and transporting troops to Rügen. After the peace of Lund Juel showed himself an administrator and reformer of the first order, and under his energetic supervision the Danish navy ultimately reached imposing dimensions, especially after Juel became chief of the admiralty in 1683. Personally Juel was the noblest and most amiable of men, equally beloved and respected by his sailors, simple, straightforward and unpretentious in all his ways. During his latter years he was popularly known in Copenhagen as “the good old knight.” He died on the 8th of April 1697.

See Garde,Niels Juel(1842), andDen dansk. norske Sömagts Historie, 1535-1700(1861).

(R. N. B.)

JUG,a vessel for holding liquid, usually with one handle and a lip, made of earthenware, glass or metal. The origin of the word in this sense is uncertain, but it is probably identical with a shortened form of the feminine name Joan or Joanna; cf. the similar use of Jack and Jill or Gill for a drinking-vessel or a liquor measure. It has also been used as a common expression for a homely woman, a servant-girl, a sweetheart, sometimes in a sense of disparagement. In slang, “jug” or “stone-jug” is used to denote a prison; this may possibly be an adaptation of Fr.joug, yoke, Lat.jugum. The word “jug” is probably onomatopoeic when used to represent a particular note of the nightingale’s song, or applied locally to various small birds, as the hedge-jug, &c.

The British Museum contains a remarkable bronze jug which was found at Kumasi during the Ashanti Expedition of 1896. It dates from the reign of Richard II., and is decorated in relief with the arms of England and the badge of the king. It has a lid, spout and handle, which ends in a quatrefoil. An inscription, on three raised bands round the body of the vessel, modernized runs:—“He that will not spare when he may shall not spend when he would. Deem the best in every doubt till the truth be tried out.” TheBritish Museum Guide to the Medieval Roomcontains an illustration of this vessel.

A particular form of jug is the “ewer,” the precursor of the ordinary bedroom jug (an adaptation of O. Fr.ewaire, med. Lat.aquaria, water-pitcher, fromaqua, water). The ewer was a jug with a wide spout, and was principally used at table for pouring water over the hands after eating, a matter of some necessity before the introduction of forks. Early ewers are sometimes mounted on three feet, and bear inscriptions such asVenez laver. A basin of similar material and design accompanied the ewer. In the 13th and 14th centuries a special type of metal ewer takes the form of animals, men on horseback, &c.; these are generally known asaquamaniles, from med. Lat.aqua manileoraqua manale(aqua, water, andmanare, to trickle, pour, drip). The British Museum contains several examples.

In the 18th and early 19th centuries were made the drinking-vessels of pottery known as “Toby jugs,” properly Toby Fillpots or Philpots. These take the form of a stout old man, sometimes seated, with a three-cornered hat, the corners of which act as spouts. Similar drinking-vessels were also made representing characters popular at the time, such as “Nelson jugs,” &c.

JUGE, BOFFILLE DE(d. 1502), French-Italian adventurer and statesman, belonged to the family of del Giudice, which came from Amalfi, and followed the fortunes of the Angevin dynasty. When John of Anjou, duke of Calabria, was conquered in Italy (1461) and fled to Provence, Boffille followed him. He was given by Duke John and his father, King René, the charge of upholding by force of arms their claims on Catalonia. Louis XI., who had joined his troops to those of the princes of Anjou, attached Boffille to his own person, made him his chamberlain and conferred on him the vice-royalty of Roussillon and Cerdagne (1471), together with certain important lordships, among others the countship of Castres, confiscated from James of Armagnac, duke of Nemours (1476), and the temporalities of the bishopric of Castres, confiscated from John of Armagnac. He also entrusted him with diplomatic negotiations with Flanders and England. In 1480 Boffille married Marie d’Albret, sister of Alain the Great, thus confirming the feudal position which the king had given him in the south. He was appointed as one of the judges in the trial of René of Alençon, and showed such zeal in the discharge of his functions that Louis XI. rewarded him by fresh gifts. However, the bishop of Castres recovered his diocese (1483), and the heirs of the duke of Nemours took legal proceedings forthe recovery of the countship of Castres. Boffille, with the object of escaping from his enemies, applied for the command of the armies of the republic of Venice. His application was refused, and he further lost the vice-royalty of Roussillon (1491). His daughter Louise married against his will a gentleman of no rank, and this led to terrible family dissensions. In order to disinherit his own family, Boffille de Juge gave up the countship of Castres to his brother-in-law, Alain d’Albret (1494). He died in 1502.

See P. M. Perret,Boffille de Juge, comte de Castres, et la république de Venise(1891); F. Pasquier,Inventaire des documents concernant Boffille de Juge(1905).

(M. P.*)

JUGGERNAUT,a corruption of Sans.Jagannātha, “Lord of the World,” the name under which the Hindu god Vishnu is worshipped at Puri in Orissa. The legend runs that the sacred blue-stone image of Jagannātha was worshipped in the solitude of the jungle by an outcast, a Savara mountaineer, called Basu. The king of Malwa, Indradyumna, had despatched Brahmans to all quarters of the peninsula, and at last discovered Basu. Thereafter the image was taken to Puri, and a temple, begun in 1174, was completed fourteen years later at a cost of upwards of half a million sterling. The site had been associated for centuries before and after the Christian era with Buddhism, and the famous Car festival is probably based on the Tooth festival of the Buddhists, of which the Chinese pilgrim Fa-Hien gives an account. The present temple is a pyramidal building, 192 ft. high, crowned with the mystic wheel and flag of Vishnu. Its inner enclosure, nearly 400 ft. by 300 ft., contains a number of small temples and shrines. The main temple has four main rooms—the hall of offerings, the dancing hall, the audience chamber, and the shrine itself—the two latter being each 80 ft. square. The three principal images are those of Vishnu, his brother and his sister, grotesque wooden figures roughly hewn. Elaborate services are daily celebrated all the year round, the images are dressed and redressed, and four meals a day are served to them. The attendants on the god are divided into 36 orders and 97 classes. Special servants are assigned the tasks of putting the god to bed, of dressing and bathing him. The annual rent-roll of the temple was put at £68,000 by Sir W. W. Hunter; but the pilgrims’ offerings, which form the bulk of the income, are quite unknown and have been said to reach as much as £100,000 in one year. Ranjit Singh bequeathed the Koh-i-nor to Jagannath. There are four chief festivals, of which the famous Car festival is the most important.

The terrible stories of pilgrims crushed to death in the god’s honour have made the phrase “Car of Juggernaut” synonymous with the merciless sacrifice of human lives, but these have been shown to be baseless calumnies. The worship of Vishnu is innocent of all bloody rites, and a drop of blood even accidentally spilt in the god’s presence is held to pollute the officiating priests, the people, and the consecrated food. The Car festival takes place in June or July, and the feature of its celebration is the drawing of the god from the temple to his “country-house,” a distance of less than a mile. The car is 45 ft. in height and 35 ft. square, and is supported on 16 wheels of 7 ft. in diameter. Vishnu’s brother and sister have separate cars, slightly smaller. To these cars ropes are attached, and thousands of eager pilgrims vie with each other to have the honour of dragging the god. Though the distance is so short the journey lasts several days, owing to the deep sand in which the wheels sink. During the festival serious accidents have often happened. Sir W. W. Hunter in theGazetteer of Indiawrites: “In a closely packed, eager throng of a hundred thousand men and women under the blazing tropical sun, deaths must occasionally occur. There have doubtless been instances of pilgrims throwing themselves under the wheels in a frenzy of religious excitement, but such instances have always been rare, and are now unknown. The few suicides that did occur were, for the most part, cases of diseased and miserable objects who took this means to put themselves out of pain. The official returns now place this beyond doubt. Nothing could be more opposed to the spirit of Vishnu-worship than self-immolation. Accidental death within the temple renders the whole place unclean. According to Chaitanya, the apostle of Jagannath, the destruction of the least of God’s creatures is a sin against the Creator.”See also Sir W. W. Hunter’sOrissa(1872); andDistrict Gazetteer of Puri(1908).

See also Sir W. W. Hunter’sOrissa(1872); andDistrict Gazetteer of Puri(1908).

JUGGLER(Lat.joculator, jester), in the modern sense a performer of sleight-of-hand tricks and dexterous feats of skill in tossing balls, plates, knives, &c. The term is practically synonymous with conjurer (seeConjuring). Thejoculatoreswere the mimes of the middle ages (seeDrama); the French use of the wordjongleurs(an erroneous form ofjougleur) included the singers known astrouvères; and the humbler English minstrels of the same type gradually passed into the strolling jugglers, from whose exhibitions the term came to cover loosely any acrobatic, pantomimic and sleight-of-hand performances. In ancient Rome various names were given to what we call jugglers,e.g.ventilatores(knife-throwers), andpilarii(ball-players).

JUGURTHA(Gr.Ἰογόρθας), king of Numidia, an illegitimate son of Mastanabal, and grandson of Massinissa. After his father’s death he was brought up by his uncle Micipsa together with his cousins Adherbal and Hiempsal. Jugurtha grew up strong, handsome and intelligent, a skilful rider, and an adept in warlike exercises. He inherited much of Massinissa’s political ability. Micipsa, naturally afraid of him, sent him to Spain (134B.C.) in command of a Numidian force, to serve under P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Minor. He became a favourite with Scipio and the Roman nobles, some of whom put into his head the idea of making himself sole king of Numidia, with the help of Roman money.

In 118B.C.Micipsa died. By his will, Jugurtha was associated with Adherbal and Hiempsal in the government of Numidia. Scipio had written to Micipsa a strong letter of recommendation in favour of Jugurtha; and to Scipio, accordingly, Micipsa entrusted the execution of his will. None the less, his testamentary arrangements utterly failed. The princes soon quarrelled, and Jugurtha claimed the entire kingdom. Hiempsal he contrived to have assassinated; Adherbal he quickly drove out of Numidia. He then sent envoys to Rome to defend his usurpation on the ground that he was the injured party. The senate decided that Numidia was to be divided, and gave the western, the richer and more populous half, to Jugurtha, while the sands and deserts of the eastern half were left to Adherbal. Jugurtha’s envoys appear to have found several of the Roman nobles and senators accessible to bribery. Having secured the best of the bargain, Jugurtha at once began to provoke Adherbal to a war of self-defence. He completely defeated him near the modern Philippeville, and Adherbal sought safety in the fortress of Cirta (Constantine). Here he was besieged by Jugurtha, who, notwithstanding the interposition of a Roman embassy, forced the place to capitulate, and treacherously massacred all the inhabitants, among them his cousin Adherbal and a number of Italian merchants resident in the town. There was great wrath at Rome and throughout Italy; and the senate, a majority of which still clung to Jugurtha, were persuaded in the same year (111) to declare war. An army was despatched to Africa under the consul L. Calpurnius Bestia, several of the Numidian towns voluntarily surrendered, and Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, and Jugurtha’s father-in-law, offered the Romans his alliance. Jugurtha was alarmed, but having at his command the accumulated treasures of Massinissa, he was successful in arranging with the Roman general a peace which left him in possession of the whole of Numidia. When the facts were known at Rome, the tribune Memmius insisted that Jugurtha should appear in person and be questioned as to the negotiations. Jugurtha appeared under a safe conduct, but he had partisans, such as the tribune C. Baebius, who took care that his mouth should be closed. Soon afterwards he caused his cousin Massiva, then resident at Rome and a claimant to the throne of Numidia, to be assassinated. The treaty was thereupon set aside, and Jugurtha was ordered to quit Rome. On this occasion he uttered the well-known words, “A city for sale, and doomed to perish as soon as it finds a purchaser!” (Livy,Epit.64). The war was renewed, and the consul Spurius Albinus entrusted with the command. The Roman army in Africa was thoroughly demoralized. An unsuccessful attempt was made on a fortified town, Suthul, in which the royal treasures were deposited. The army was surprised by the enemy in a night attack, and the camp was taken andplundered. Every Roman was driven out of Numidia, and a disgraceful peace was concluded (109).

By this time the feeling at Rome and in Italy against the corruption and incapacity of the nobles had become so strong that a number of senators were prosecuted and Bestia and Albinus sentenced to exile. The war was now entrusted to Quintus Metellus, an able soldier and stern disciplinarian, and from the year 109 to its close in 106 the contest was carried on with credit to the Roman arms. Jugurtha was defeated on the river Muthul, after an obstinate and skilful resistance. Once again, however, he succeeded in surprising the Roman camp and forcing Metellus into winter quarters. There were fresh negotiations, but Metellus insisted on the surrender of the king’s person, and this Jugurtha refused. Numidia on the whole seemed disposed to assert its independence, and Rome had before her the prospect of a troublesome guerrilla war. Negotiations, reflecting little credit on the Romans, were set on foot with Bocchus (q.v.) who for a time played fast and loose with both parties. In 106, Marius was called on by the vote of the Roman people to supersede Metellus, but it was through the perfidy of Bocchus and the diplomacy of L. Cornelius Sulla, Marius’s quaestor, that the war was ended. Jugurtha fell into an ambush, and was conveyed a prisoner to Rome. Two years afterwards, in 104, he figured with his two sons in Marius’s triumph, and in the subterranean prison beneath the Capitol—“the bath of ice,” as he called it—he was either strangled or starved to death.

Though doubtless for a time regarded by his countrymen as their deliverer from the yoke of Rome, Jugurtha mainly owes his historical importance to the full and minute account of him which we have from the hand of Sallust, himself afterwards governor of Numidia.

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