Scotland.—According to theRegiam Majestatem, which is identical with the treatise of Glanvill on the law of England (but whether the original or only a copy of that work is disputed), trial by jury existed in Scotland for civil and criminal cases from as early a date as in England, and there is reason to believe that at all events the system became established at a very early date. Its history was very different from that of the English jury system. There was no grand jury under Scots law, but it was introduced in 1708 for the purpose of high treason (7 Anne c. 21). For the trial of criminal cases the petty jury is represented by the criminal “assize.” This jury has always consisted of fifteen persons and the jurors are chosen by ballot by the clerk of the court from the list containing the names of the special and common jurors, five from the special, ten from the common. Prosecutor and accused each have five peremptory challenges, of which two only may be directed against the special jurors; but there is no limit to challenges for cause. The jury is not secluded during the trial except in capital cases or on special order of the court madeproprio motuor on the application of prosecutor or accused. The verdict need not be unanimous, nor is enclosure a necessary preliminary to a majority verdict. It is returned viva voce by the chancellor or foreman, and entered on the record by the clerk of the court, and the entry read to the jury. Besides the verdicts of “guilty” and “not guilty,” a Scots jury may return a verdict of “not proven,” which has legally the same effect as not guilty in releasing the accused from further proceedings on the particular charge, but inflicts on him the stigma of moral guilt.Jury trial in civil cases was at one time in general if not prevailing use, but was gradually superseded for most purposes on the institution of the Court of Session (1 Mackay,Ct. Sess. Pr.33). In this, as in many other matters, Scots law and procedure tend to follow continental rather than insular models. The civil jury was reintroduced in 1815 (55 Geo. III. c. 42), mainly on account of the difficulties experienced by the House of Lords in dealing with questions of fact raised on Scottish appeals. At the outset a special court was instituted in the nature of a judicial commission to ascertain by means of a jury facts deemed relevant to the issues in a cause and sent for such determination at the discretion of the court in which the cause was pending. The process was analogous to the sending of an issue out of chancery for trial in a superior court of common law, or in a court of assize. In 1830 the jury court ceased to exist as a separate tribunal and was merged in the Court of Session. By legislation of 1819 and 1823 certain classes of cases were indicated as appropriate to be tried by a jury; but in 1850 the cases so to be tried were limited to actions for defamation and nuisance, or properly and in substance actions for damages, and under an act of 1866 even in these cases the jury may be dispensed with by consent of parties.The civil jury consists as in England of twelve jurors chosen by ballot from the names on the list of those summoned. There is a right of peremptory challenge limited to four, and also a right to challenge for cause. Unanimity was at first but is not now required. The jury if unanimous may return a verdict immediately on the close of the case. If they are not unanimous they are enclosed and may at any time not less than three hours after being enclosed return a verdict by a bare majority. If after six hours they do not agree by the requisite majority,i.e.are equally divided, they must be discharged. It was stated by Commissioner Adam, under whom the Scots civil jury was originated, that in twenty years he knew of only one case in which the jury disagreed. Jury trial in civil cases in Scotland has not flourished or given general satisfaction, and is resorted to only in a small proportion of cases. This is partly due to its being transplanted from England.Ireland.—The jury laws of Ireland do not differ in substance from those of England. The qualifications of jurors are regulated by O’Hagan’s Acts 1871 and 1872, and the Juries Acts 1878 and 1894. In criminal cases much freer use is made than in England of the rights of the accused to challenge, and of the Crown to order jurors to stand by, and what is called “jury-packing” seems to be the object of both sides when some political or agrarian issue is involved in the trial. Until the passing of the Irish Local Government Act 1898, the grand jury, besides its functions as a jury of accusation, had large duties with respect to local government which are now transferred to the county councils and other elective bodies.British Empire.—In most parts of the British Empire the jury system is in force as part of the original law of the colonists or under the colonial charters of justice or by local legislation. The grand jury is not in use in India; was introduced but later abolished in the Cape Colony; and in Australia has been for most purposes superseded by the public prosecutor. The ordinary trial jury for criminal cases is twelve, but in India may be nine, seven, five or three, according to certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898. In countries where the British Crown has foreign jurisdiction the jury for criminal trials has in some cases been fixed at a less number than twelve and the right of the Crown to fix the number is established; seeex p. Carew, 1897, A.C. 719. In civil cases the number of the jury is reduced in some colonies,e.g.to seven in Tasmania and Trinidad.European Countries.—In France there is no civil jury. In criminal cases the place of the grand jury is taken by thechambre des mises en accusation, and the more serious crimes are tried before a jury of twelve which finds its verdict by a majority, the exact number of which may not be disclosed. In Belgium, Spain, Italy and Germany, certain classes of crime are tried with the aid of a jury.United States.—The English jury system was part of the law of the American colonies before the declaration of independence; and grand jury, coroner’s jury and petty jury continue in full use in the United States. Under the Federal Constitution (Article iii.) there is a right to trial by jury in all criminal cases (except on impeachment) and in all civil actions at common law in which the subject matter exceeds $20 in value (amendments vi. and vii.). The trial jury must be of twelve and its verdict must be unanimous; see Cooley,Constitutional Limitations(6th ed.), 389. The respective provinces of judge and jury have been much discussed and there has been a disposition to declare the jury supreme as to law as well as fact. The whole subject is fully treated by reference to English and American authorities, and the conflicting views are stated inSparfv.United States, 1895, 156 U.S. 61. The view of the majority of the court in that case was that it is the duty of the jury in a criminal case to receive the law from the court and to apply it as laid down by the court, subject to the condition that in giving a general verdict the jury may incidentally determine both law and fact as compounded in the issues submitted to them in the particular case. The power to give a general verdict renders the duty one of imperfect obligation and enables the jury to take its own view of the terms and merits of the law involved.The extent to which the jury system is in force in the states of the union depends on the constitution and legislation of each state. In some the use of juries in civil and even in criminal cases is reduced or made subject to the election of the accused. In others unanimous verdicts are not required, while the constitutions of others require the unanimous verdict of the common law dozen.
Scotland.—According to theRegiam Majestatem, which is identical with the treatise of Glanvill on the law of England (but whether the original or only a copy of that work is disputed), trial by jury existed in Scotland for civil and criminal cases from as early a date as in England, and there is reason to believe that at all events the system became established at a very early date. Its history was very different from that of the English jury system. There was no grand jury under Scots law, but it was introduced in 1708 for the purpose of high treason (7 Anne c. 21). For the trial of criminal cases the petty jury is represented by the criminal “assize.” This jury has always consisted of fifteen persons and the jurors are chosen by ballot by the clerk of the court from the list containing the names of the special and common jurors, five from the special, ten from the common. Prosecutor and accused each have five peremptory challenges, of which two only may be directed against the special jurors; but there is no limit to challenges for cause. The jury is not secluded during the trial except in capital cases or on special order of the court madeproprio motuor on the application of prosecutor or accused. The verdict need not be unanimous, nor is enclosure a necessary preliminary to a majority verdict. It is returned viva voce by the chancellor or foreman, and entered on the record by the clerk of the court, and the entry read to the jury. Besides the verdicts of “guilty” and “not guilty,” a Scots jury may return a verdict of “not proven,” which has legally the same effect as not guilty in releasing the accused from further proceedings on the particular charge, but inflicts on him the stigma of moral guilt.
Jury trial in civil cases was at one time in general if not prevailing use, but was gradually superseded for most purposes on the institution of the Court of Session (1 Mackay,Ct. Sess. Pr.33). In this, as in many other matters, Scots law and procedure tend to follow continental rather than insular models. The civil jury was reintroduced in 1815 (55 Geo. III. c. 42), mainly on account of the difficulties experienced by the House of Lords in dealing with questions of fact raised on Scottish appeals. At the outset a special court was instituted in the nature of a judicial commission to ascertain by means of a jury facts deemed relevant to the issues in a cause and sent for such determination at the discretion of the court in which the cause was pending. The process was analogous to the sending of an issue out of chancery for trial in a superior court of common law, or in a court of assize. In 1830 the jury court ceased to exist as a separate tribunal and was merged in the Court of Session. By legislation of 1819 and 1823 certain classes of cases were indicated as appropriate to be tried by a jury; but in 1850 the cases so to be tried were limited to actions for defamation and nuisance, or properly and in substance actions for damages, and under an act of 1866 even in these cases the jury may be dispensed with by consent of parties.
The civil jury consists as in England of twelve jurors chosen by ballot from the names on the list of those summoned. There is a right of peremptory challenge limited to four, and also a right to challenge for cause. Unanimity was at first but is not now required. The jury if unanimous may return a verdict immediately on the close of the case. If they are not unanimous they are enclosed and may at any time not less than three hours after being enclosed return a verdict by a bare majority. If after six hours they do not agree by the requisite majority,i.e.are equally divided, they must be discharged. It was stated by Commissioner Adam, under whom the Scots civil jury was originated, that in twenty years he knew of only one case in which the jury disagreed. Jury trial in civil cases in Scotland has not flourished or given general satisfaction, and is resorted to only in a small proportion of cases. This is partly due to its being transplanted from England.
Ireland.—The jury laws of Ireland do not differ in substance from those of England. The qualifications of jurors are regulated by O’Hagan’s Acts 1871 and 1872, and the Juries Acts 1878 and 1894. In criminal cases much freer use is made than in England of the rights of the accused to challenge, and of the Crown to order jurors to stand by, and what is called “jury-packing” seems to be the object of both sides when some political or agrarian issue is involved in the trial. Until the passing of the Irish Local Government Act 1898, the grand jury, besides its functions as a jury of accusation, had large duties with respect to local government which are now transferred to the county councils and other elective bodies.
British Empire.—In most parts of the British Empire the jury system is in force as part of the original law of the colonists or under the colonial charters of justice or by local legislation. The grand jury is not in use in India; was introduced but later abolished in the Cape Colony; and in Australia has been for most purposes superseded by the public prosecutor. The ordinary trial jury for criminal cases is twelve, but in India may be nine, seven, five or three, according to certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898. In countries where the British Crown has foreign jurisdiction the jury for criminal trials has in some cases been fixed at a less number than twelve and the right of the Crown to fix the number is established; seeex p. Carew, 1897, A.C. 719. In civil cases the number of the jury is reduced in some colonies,e.g.to seven in Tasmania and Trinidad.
European Countries.—In France there is no civil jury. In criminal cases the place of the grand jury is taken by thechambre des mises en accusation, and the more serious crimes are tried before a jury of twelve which finds its verdict by a majority, the exact number of which may not be disclosed. In Belgium, Spain, Italy and Germany, certain classes of crime are tried with the aid of a jury.
United States.—The English jury system was part of the law of the American colonies before the declaration of independence; and grand jury, coroner’s jury and petty jury continue in full use in the United States. Under the Federal Constitution (Article iii.) there is a right to trial by jury in all criminal cases (except on impeachment) and in all civil actions at common law in which the subject matter exceeds $20 in value (amendments vi. and vii.). The trial jury must be of twelve and its verdict must be unanimous; see Cooley,Constitutional Limitations(6th ed.), 389. The respective provinces of judge and jury have been much discussed and there has been a disposition to declare the jury supreme as to law as well as fact. The whole subject is fully treated by reference to English and American authorities, and the conflicting views are stated inSparfv.United States, 1895, 156 U.S. 61. The view of the majority of the court in that case was that it is the duty of the jury in a criminal case to receive the law from the court and to apply it as laid down by the court, subject to the condition that in giving a general verdict the jury may incidentally determine both law and fact as compounded in the issues submitted to them in the particular case. The power to give a general verdict renders the duty one of imperfect obligation and enables the jury to take its own view of the terms and merits of the law involved.
The extent to which the jury system is in force in the states of the union depends on the constitution and legislation of each state. In some the use of juries in civil and even in criminal cases is reduced or made subject to the election of the accused. In others unanimous verdicts are not required, while the constitutions of others require the unanimous verdict of the common law dozen.
(W. F. C.)
1I.e. the jury-box, or enclosed space in which the jurors sit in court.2Freeman,Norman Conquest, v. 451.3This fact would account for the remarkable development of the system on English ground, as contrasted with its decay and extinction in France.4Blackstone puts the principle as being that no man shall be convicted except by the unanimous voice of twenty-four of his equals or neighbours—twelve on the grand, and twelve on the petty jury.5The distinction between the functions of the grand jury, which presents or accuses criminals, and the petty jury, which tries them, has suggested the theory that the system of compurgation is the origin of the jury system—the first jury representing the compurgators of the accuser, the second the compurgators of the accused.6Forsyth, 206. The number of the jury (twelve) is responsible for some unfounded theories of the origin of the system. This use of twelve is not confined to England, nor in England or elsewhere to judicial institutions. “Its general prevalence,” says Hallam (Middle Ages, ch. viii.), “shows that in searching for the origin of trial by jury we cannot rely for a moment upon any analogy which the mere number affords.” In aGuide to English Juries(1682), by a person of quality (attributed to Lord Somers), the following passage occurs: “In analogy of late the jury is reduced to the number of twelve, like as the prophets were twelve to foretell the truth; the apostles twelve to preach the truth; the discoverers twelve, sent into Canaan to seek and report the truth; and the stones twelve that the heavenly Hierusalem is built on.” Lord Coke indulged in similar speculations.7SeeR.v.Dean of St. Asaph(1789), 3 T.R. 418.
1I.e. the jury-box, or enclosed space in which the jurors sit in court.
2Freeman,Norman Conquest, v. 451.
3This fact would account for the remarkable development of the system on English ground, as contrasted with its decay and extinction in France.
4Blackstone puts the principle as being that no man shall be convicted except by the unanimous voice of twenty-four of his equals or neighbours—twelve on the grand, and twelve on the petty jury.
5The distinction between the functions of the grand jury, which presents or accuses criminals, and the petty jury, which tries them, has suggested the theory that the system of compurgation is the origin of the jury system—the first jury representing the compurgators of the accuser, the second the compurgators of the accused.
6Forsyth, 206. The number of the jury (twelve) is responsible for some unfounded theories of the origin of the system. This use of twelve is not confined to England, nor in England or elsewhere to judicial institutions. “Its general prevalence,” says Hallam (Middle Ages, ch. viii.), “shows that in searching for the origin of trial by jury we cannot rely for a moment upon any analogy which the mere number affords.” In aGuide to English Juries(1682), by a person of quality (attributed to Lord Somers), the following passage occurs: “In analogy of late the jury is reduced to the number of twelve, like as the prophets were twelve to foretell the truth; the apostles twelve to preach the truth; the discoverers twelve, sent into Canaan to seek and report the truth; and the stones twelve that the heavenly Hierusalem is built on.” Lord Coke indulged in similar speculations.
7SeeR.v.Dean of St. Asaph(1789), 3 T.R. 418.
JUS PRIMAE NOCTIS,orDroit du Seigneur, a custom alleged to have existed in medieval Europe, giving the overlord a right to the virginity of his vassals’ daughters on their wedding night. For the existence of the custom in a legalized form there is no trustworthy evidence. That some such abuse of power may have been occasionally exercised by brutal nobles in the lawless days of the early middle ages is only too likely, but thejus, it seems, is a myth, invented no earlier than the 16th or 17th century. There appears to have been an entirely religious custom established by the council of Carthage in 398, whereby the Church required from the faithful continence on the wedding-night, and this may have been, and there is evidence that it was, known asDroit du Seigneur, or “God’s right.” Later the clerical admonition was extended to the first three days of marriage. This religious abstention, added to the undoubted fact that the feudal lord extorted fines on the marriages of his vassals and their children, doubtless gave rise to the belief that thejuswas once an established custom.
The whole subject has been exhaustively treated by Louis Veuillot inLe Droit du seigneur au moyen âge(1854).
The whole subject has been exhaustively treated by Louis Veuillot inLe Droit du seigneur au moyen âge(1854).
JUS RELICTAE,in Scots law, the widow’s right in the movable property of her deceased husband. The deceased must have been domiciled in Scotland, but the right accrues from movable property, wherever situated. The widow’s provision amounts to one-third where there are children surviving, and to one-half where there are no surviving children. The widow’s right vests by survivance, and is independent of the husband’s testamentary provisions; it may however be renounced by contract, or be discharged by satisfaction. It is subject to alienation of the husband’s movable estate during his lifetime or by its conversion into heritage. See alsoWill.
JUSSERAND, JEAN ADRIEN ANTOINE JULES(1855- ), French author and diplomatist, was born at Lyons on the 18th of February 1855. Entering the diplomatic service in 1876, he became in 1878 consul in London. After an interval spent in Tunis he returned to London in 1887 as a member of the French Embassy. In 1890 he became French minister at Copenhagen, and in 1902 was transferred to Washington. A close student of English literature, he produced some very lucid and vivacious monographs on comparatively little-known subjects:Le Théâtre en Angleterre depuis la conquête jusqu’ aux prédécesseurs immédiats de Shakespeare(1878);Le Roman au temps de Shakespeare(1887; Eng. trans. by Miss E. Lee, 1890);Les Anglais au moyen âge: la vie nomade et les routes d’Angleterre au XIVesiècle(1884; Eng. trans.,English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages, by L. T. Smith, 1889); andL’Épopée de Langland(1893; Eng. trans.,Piers Plowman, by M. C. R., 1894). HisHistoire littéraire du peuple anglais, the first volume of which was published in 1895, was completed in three volumes in 1909. In English he wroteA French Ambassador at the Court of Charles II.(1892), from the unpublished papers of the count de Cominges.
JUSSIEU, DE,the name of a French family which came into prominent notice towards the close of the 16th century, and for a century and a half was distinguished for the botanists it produced. The following are its more eminent members:—
1.Antoine de Jussieu(1686-1758), born at Lyons on the 6th of July 1686, was the son of Christophe de Jussieu (or Dejussieu), an apothecary of some repute, who published aNouveau traité de la thériaque(1708). Antoine studied at the university of Montpellier, and travelled with his brother Bernard through Spain, Portugal and southern France. He went to Paris in 1708, J. P. de Tournefort, whom he succeeded at the Jardin des Plantes, dying in that year. His own original publications are not of marked importance, but he edited an edition of Tournefort’sInstitutiones rei herbariae(3 vols., 1719), and also a posthumous work of Jacques Barrelier,Plantae per Galliam, Hispaniam, et Italiam observatae, &c. (1714). He practised medicine, chiefly devoting himself to the very poor. He died at Paris on the 22nd of April 1758.
2.Bernard de Jussieu(1699-1777), a younger brother of the above, was born at Lyons on the 17th of August 1699. He took a medical degree at Montpellier and began practice in 1720, but finding the work uncongenial he gladly accepted his brother’s invitation to Paris in 1722, when he succeeded Sébastien Vaillant as sub-demonstrator of plants in the Jardin du Roi. In 1725 he brought out a new edition of Tournefort’sHistoire des plantes qui naissent aux environs de Paris, 2 vols., which was afterwards translated into English by John Martyn, the original work being incomplete. In the same year he was admitted into the académie des sciences, and communicated several papers to that body. Long before Abraham Trembley (1700-1784) published hisHistoire des polypes d’eau douce, Jussieu maintained the doctrine that these organisms were animals, and not the flowers of marine plants, then the current notion; and to confirm his views he madethree journeys to the coast of Normandy. Singularly modest and retiring, he published very little, but in 1759 he arranged the plants in the royal garden of the Trianon at Versailles, according to his own scheme of classification. This arrangement is printed in his nephew’sGenera, pp. lxiii.-lxx., and formed the basis of that work. He cared little for the credit of enunciating new discoveries, so long as the facts were made public. On the death of his brother Antoine, he could not be induced to succeed him in his office, but prevailed upon L. G. Lemonnier to assume the higher position. He died at Paris on the 6th of November 1777.
3.Joseph de Jussieu(1704-1779), brother of Antoine and Bernard, was born at Lyons on the 3rd of September 1704. Educated like the rest of the family for the medical profession, he accompanied C. M. de la Condamine to Peru, in the expedition for measuring an arc of meridian, and remained in South America for thirty-six years, returning to France in 1771. Amongst the seeds he sent to his brother Bernard were those ofHeliotropium peruvianum, Linn., then first introduced into Europe. He died at Paris on the 11th of April 1779.
4.Antoine Laurent de Jussieu(1748-1836), nephew of the three preceding, was born at Lyons on the 12th of April 1748. Called to Paris by his uncle Bernard, and carefully trained by him for the pursuits of medicine and botany, he largely profited by the opportunities afforded him. Gifted with a tenacious memory, and the power of quickly grasping the salient points of subjects under observation, he steadily worked at the improvement of that system of plant arrangement which had been sketched out by his uncle. In 1789 was issued hisGenera plantarum secundum ordines naturales disposita, juxta methodum in horto regio Parisiensi exaratam, annoMDCCLXXIV. This volume formed the basis of modern classification; more than this, it is certain that Cuvier derived much help in his zoological classification from its perusal. Hardly had the last sheet passed through the press, when the French Revolution broke out, and the author was installed in charge of the hospitals of Paris. The muséum d’histoire naturelle was organized on its present footing mainly by him in 1793, and he selected for its library everything relating to natural history from the vast materials obtained from the convents then broken up. He continued as professor of botany there from 1770 to 1826, when his son Adrien succeeded him. Besides theGenera, he produced nearly sixty memoirs on botanical topics. He died at Paris on the 17th of September 1836.
5.Adrien Laurent Henri de Jussieu(1797-1853), son of Antoine Laurent, was born at Paris on the 23rd of December 1797. He displayed the qualities of his family in his thesis for the degree of M.D.,De Euphorbiacearum generibus medicisque earundem viribus tentamen, Paris, 1824. He was also the author of valuable contributions to botanical literature on theRutaceae,MeliaceaeandMalpighiaceaerespectively, of “Taxonomie” in theDictionnaire universelle d’histoire naturelle, and of an introductory work styled simplyBotanique, which reached nine editions, and was translated into the principal languages of Europe. He also edited his father’sIntroductio in historiam plantarum, issued at Paris, without imprint or date, it being a fragment of the intended second edition of theGenera, which Antoine Laurent did not live to complete. He died at Paris on the 29th of June 1853, leaving two daughters, but no son, so that with him closed the brilliant botanical dynasty.
6.Laurent Pierre de Jussieu(1792-1866), miscellaneous writer, nephew of Antoine Laurent, was born at Villeurbanne on the 7th of February 1792. HisSimon de Nantua, ou le marchand forain(1818), reached fifteen editions, and was translated into seven languages. He also wroteSimples notions de physique et d’histoire naturelle(1857), and a few geological papers. He died at Passy on the 23rd of February 1866.
JUSTICE(Lat.justitia), a term used both in the abstract, for the quality of being or doing what is just,i.e.right in law and equity, and in the concrete for an officer deputed by the sovereign to administer justice, and do right by way of judgment. It has long been the official title of the judges of two of the English superior courts of common law, and it is now extended to all the judges in the supreme court of judicature—a judge in the High Court of Justice being styled Mr Justice, and in the court of appeal Lord Justice. The president of the king’s bench division of the High Court is styled Lord Chief Justice (q.v.). The word is also applied, and perhaps more usually, to certain subordinate magistrates who administer justice in minor matters, and who are usually calledjustices of the peace(q.v.).
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE,an inferior magistrate appointed in England by special commission under the great seal to keep the peace within the jurisdiction for which he is appointed. The title is commonly abbreviated to J.P. and is used after the name. “The whole Christian world,” said Coke, “hath not the like office as justice of the peace if duly executed.” Lord Cowper, on the other hand, described them as “men sometimes illiterate and frequently bigoted and prejudiced.” The truth is that the justices of the peace perform without any other reward than the consequence they acquire from their office a large amount of work indispensable to the administration of the law, and (though usually not professional lawyers, and therefore apt to be ill-informed in some of their decisions) for the most part they discharge their duties with becoming good sense and impartiality. For centuries they have necessarily been chosen mainly from the landed class of country gentlemen, usually Conservative in politics; and in recent years the attempt has been made by the Liberal party to reduce the balance by appointing others than those belonging to the landed gentry, such as tradesmen, Nonconformist ministers, and working-men. But it has been recognized that the appointment of justices according to their political views is undesirable, and in 1909 a royal commission was appointed to consider and report whether any and what steps should be taken to facilitate the selection of the most suitable persons to be justices of the peace irrespective of creed and political opinion. In great centres of population, when the judicial business of justices is heavy, it has been found necessary to appoint paid justices or stipendiary magistrates1to do the work, and an extension of the system to the country districts has been often advocated.
The commission of the peace assigns to justices the duty of keeping and causing to be kept all ordinances and statutes for the good of the peace and for preservation of the same, and for the quiet rule and government of the people, and further assigns “to you and every two or more of you (of whom any one of the aforesaid A, B, C, D, &c., we will, shall be one) to inquire the truth more fully by the oath of good and lawful men of the county of all and all manner of felonies, poisonings, enchantments, sorceries, arts, magic, trespasses, forestallings, regratings, engrossings, and extortions whatever.” This part of the commission is the authority for the jurisdiction of the justices insessions. Justices named specially in the parenthetical clause are said to be on the quorum. Justices for counties are appointed by the Crown on the advice of the lord chancellor, and usually with the recommendation of the lord lieutenant of the county. Justices for boroughs having municipal corporations and separate commissions of the peace are appointed by the crown, the lord chancellor either adopting the recommendation of the town council or acting independently. Justices cannot act as such until they have taken the oath of allegiance and the judicial oath. A justice for a borough while acting as such must reside in or within seven miles of the borough or occupy a house, warehouse or other property in the borough, but he need not be a burgess. The mayor of a borough isex officioa justice during his year of office and the succeeding year. He takes precedence over all borough justices, but not over justices acting in and for the county in which the borough or any part thereof is situated, unless when acting in relation to the business of the borough.The chairman of a county council isex officioa justice of the peace for the county, and the chairman of an urban or rural district council for the county in which the district is situated. Justices cannot act beyond the limits of the jurisdiction for which they are appointed, and the warrant of a justice cannot be executed out of his jurisdiction unless it be backed, that is, endorsed by a justice of the jurisdiction in which it is to be carried into execution. A justice improperly refusing to act on his office, or acting partially and corruptly, may be proceeded against by a criminal information, and a justice refusing to act may be compelled to do so by the High Court of Justice. An action will lie against a justice for any act done by him in excess of his jurisdiction, and for any act within his jurisdiction which has been done wrongfully and with malice, and without reasonable or probable cause. But no action can be brought against a justice for a wrongful conviction until it has been quashed. By the Justices’ Qualification Act 1744, every justice for a county was required to have an estate of freehold, copyhold, or customary tenure in fee, for life or a given term, of the yearly value of £100. By an act of 1875 the occupation of a house rated at £100 was made a qualification. No such qualifications were ever required for a borough justice, and it was not until 1906 that county justices were put on the same footing in this respect. The Justices of the Peace Act 1906 did away with all qualification by estate. It also removed the necessity for residence within the county, permitting the same residential qualification as for borough justices, “within seven miles thereof.” The same act removed the disqualification of solicitors to be county justices and assimilated to the existing power to remove other justices from the commission of the peace the power to excludeex officiojustices.
The justices for every petty sessional division of a county or for a borough having a separate commission of the peace must appoint a fit person to be their salaried clerk. He must be either a barrister of not less than fourteen years’ standing, or a solicitor of the supreme court, or have served for not less than seven years as a clerk to a police or stipendiary magistrate or to a metropolitan police court. An alderman or councillor of a borough must not be appointed as clerk, nor can a clerk of the peace for the borough or for the county in which the borough is situated be appointed. A borough clerk is not allowed to prosecute. The salary of a justice’s clerk comes, in London, out of the police fund; in counties out of the county fund; in county boroughs out of the borough fund, and in other boroughs out of the county fund.
The vast and multifarious duties of the justices cover some portion of every important head of the criminal law, and extend to a considerable number of matters relating to the civil law.
In the United States these officers are sometimes appointed by the executive, sometimes elected. In some states, justices of the peace have jurisdiction in civil cases given to them by local regulations.
1Where a borough council desire the appointment of a stipendiary magistrate they may present a petition for the same to the secretary of state and it is thereupon lawful for the king to appoint to that office a barrister of seven years’ standing. He is by virtue of his office a justice for the borough, and receives a yearly salary, payable in four equal quarterly instalments. On a vacancy, application must again be made as for a first appointment. There may be more than one stipendiary magistrate for a borough.
1Where a borough council desire the appointment of a stipendiary magistrate they may present a petition for the same to the secretary of state and it is thereupon lawful for the king to appoint to that office a barrister of seven years’ standing. He is by virtue of his office a justice for the borough, and receives a yearly salary, payable in four equal quarterly instalments. On a vacancy, application must again be made as for a first appointment. There may be more than one stipendiary magistrate for a borough.
JUSTICIAR(med. Lat.justiciariusorjustitiarius, a judge), in English history, the title of the chief minister of the Norman and earlier Angevin kings. The history of the title in this connotation is somewhat obscure.Justiciariusmeant simply “judge,” and was originally applied, as Stubbs points out (Const. Hist.i. 389, note), to any officer of the king’s court, to the chief justice, or in a very general way to all and sundry who possessed courts of their own or were qualified to act asjudicesin the shire-courts, even the stylecapitalis justiciariusbeing used of judges of the royal court other than the chief. It was not till the reign of Henry II. that the titlesummusorcapitalis justiciarius, orjusticiarius totius Angliaewas exclusively applied to the king’s chief minister. The office, however, existed before the style of its holder was fixed; and, whatever their contemporary title (e.g.Custos Angliae), later writers refer to them asjusticiarii, with or without the prefixsummusorcapitalis(ibid. p. 346). Thus Ranulf Flambard, the minister of William II., who was probably the first to exercise the powers of a justiciar, is calledjusticiariusby Ordericus Vitalis.
The origin of the justiciarship is thus given by Stubbs (ibid. p. 276). The sheriff “was the king’s representative in all matters judicial, military and financial in the shire. From him, or from the courts of which he was the presiding officer, appeal lay to the king alone; but the king was often absent from England and did not understand the language of his subjects. In his absence the administration was entrusted to a justiciar, a regent or lieutenant of the kingdom; and the convenience being once ascertained of having a minister who could in the whole kingdom represent the king, as the sheriff did in the shire, the justiciar became a permanent functionary.”
The fact that the kings were often absent from England, and that the justiciarship was held by great nobles or churchmen, made this office of an importance which at times threatened to overshadow that of the Crown. It was this latter circumstance which ultimately led to its abolition. Hubert de Burgh (q.v.) was the last of the great justiciars; after his fall (1231) the justiciarship was not again committed to a great baron, and the chancellor soon took the position formerly occupied by the justiciar as second to the king in dignity, as well as in power and influence. Finally, under Edward I. and his successor, in place of the justiciar—who had presided over all causesvice regis—separate heads were established in the three branches into which thecuria regisas a judicial body had been divided: justices of common pleas, justices of the king’s bench and barons of the exchequer.
Outside England the title justiciar was given under Henry II. to the seneschal of Normandy. In Scotland the title of justiciar was borne, under the earlier kings, by two high officials, one having his jurisdiction to the north, the other to the south of the Forth. They were the king’s lieutenants for judicial and administrative purposes and were established in the 12th century, either by Alexander I. or by his successor David I. In the 12th century amagister justitiariusalso appears in the Norman kingdom of Sicily, title and office being probably borrowed from England; he presided over the royal court (Magna curia) and was, with his assistants, empowered to decide,inter alia, all cases reserved to the Crown (see Du Cange,s.v. Magister Justitiarius).
See W. Stubbs,Const. Hist. of England; Du Cange,Glossarium(Niort, 1885)s.v.“Justitiarius.”
See W. Stubbs,Const. Hist. of England; Du Cange,Glossarium(Niort, 1885)s.v.“Justitiarius.”
JUSTICIARY, HIGH COURT OF,in Scotland, the supreme criminal court, consisting of five of the lords of session together with the lord justice-general and the lord justice-clerk as president and vice-president respectively. The constitution of the court is settled by the Act 1672 c. 16. The lords of justiciary hold circuits regularly twice a year according to the ancient practice, which, however, had been allowed to fall into disuse until revived in 1748. For circuit purposes Scotland is divided into northern, southern and western districts (seeCircuit). Two judges generally go on a circuit, and in Glasgow they are by special statute authorized to sit in separate courts. By the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887 all the senators of the college of justice are lords commissioners of justiciary. The high court, sitting in Edinburgh, has, in addition to its general jurisdiction, an exclusive jurisdiction for districts not within the jurisdiction of the circuits—the three Lothians, and Orkney and Shetland. The high court also takes up points of difficulty arising before the special courts, like the court for crown cases reserved in England. The court of justiciary has authority to try all crimes, unless when its jurisdiction has been excluded by special enactment of the legislature. It is also stated to have an inherent jurisdiction to punish all criminal acts, even if they have never before been treated as crimes. Its judgments are believed to be not subject to any appeal or review, but it may be doubted whether an appeal on a point of law would not lie to the house of lords. The following crimes must be prosecuted in the court of justiciary: treason, murder, robbery, rape, fire-raising, deforcement of messengers, breach of duty by magistrates, and all offences for which a statutory punishment higher than imprisonment is imposed.
JUSTIFICATION,in law, the showing by a defendant in a suit of sufficient reason why he did what he was called upon to answer,For example, in an action for assault and battery, the defendant may prove in justification that the prosecutor assaulted or beat him first, and that he acted merely in self-defence. The word is employed particularly in actions for defamation, and has in this connexion a somewhat special meaning. When a libel consists of a specific charge a plea of justification is a plea that the words are true in substance and in fact (seeLibel and Slander).
JUSTIN I.(450-527), East Roman emperor (518-527), was born in 450 as a peasant in Asia, but enlisting under Leo I. he rose to be commander of the imperial guards of Anastasius. On the latter’s death in 518 Justin used for his own election to the throne money that he had received for the support of another candidate. Being ignorant even of the rudiments of letters, Justin entrusted the administration of state to his wise and faithful quaestor Proclus and to his nephew Justinian, though his own experience dictated several improvements in military affairs. An orthodox churchman himself, he effected in 519 a reconciliation of the Eastern and Western Churches, after a schism of thirty-five years (seeHormisdas). In 522 he entered upon a desultory war with Persia, in which he co-operated with the Arabs. In 522 also Justin ceded to Theodoric, the Gothic king of Italy, the right of naming the consuls. On the 1st of April 527 Justin, enfeebled by an incurable wound, yielded to the request of the senate and assumed Justinian at his colleague; on the 1st of August he died. Justin bestowed much care on the repairing of public buildings throughout his empire, and contributed large sums to repair the damage caused by a destructive earthquake at Antioch.
See E. Gibbon,Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire(ed. Bury, 1896), iv. 206-209.
See E. Gibbon,Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire(ed. Bury, 1896), iv. 206-209.
JUSTIN II.(d. 578), East Roman emperor (565-578), was the nephew and successor of Justinian I. He availed himself of his influence as master of the palace, and as husband of Sophia, the niece of the late empress Theodora, to secure a peaceful election. The first few days of his reign—when he paid his uncle’s debts, administered justice in person, and proclaimed universal religious toleration—gave bright promise, but in the face of the lawless aristocracy and defiant governors of provinces he effected few subsequent reforms. The most important event of his reign was the invasion of Italy by the Lombards (q.v.), who, entering in 568, under Alboin, in a few years made themselves masters of nearly the entire country. Justin’s attention was distracted from Italy towards the N. and E. frontiers. After refusing to pay the Avars tribute, he fought several unsuccessful campaigns against them. In 572 his overtures to the Turks led to a war with Persia. After two disastrous campaigns, in which his enemies overran Syria, Justin bought a precarious peace by payment of a yearly tribute. The temporary fits of insanity into which he fell warned him to name a colleague. Passing over his own relatives, he raised, on the advice of Sophia, the general Tiberius (q.v.) to be Caesar in December 574 and withdrew for his remaining years into retirement.
See E. Gibbon,Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire(ed. Bury, 1896), v. 2-17; G. Finlay,History of Greece(ed. 1877), i. 291-297; J. Bury,The Later Roman Empire(1889), ii. 67-79.
See E. Gibbon,Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire(ed. Bury, 1896), v. 2-17; G. Finlay,History of Greece(ed. 1877), i. 291-297; J. Bury,The Later Roman Empire(1889), ii. 67-79.
(M. O. B. C.)
JUSTIN(Junianus Justinus), Roman historian, probably lived during the age of the Antonines. Of his personal history nothing is known. He is the author ofHistoriarum Philippicarum libri XLIV., a work described by himself in his preface as a collection of the most important and interesting passages from the voluminousHistoriae philippicae et totius mundi origines et terrae situs, written in the time of Augustus by Pompeius Trogus (q.v.). The work of Trogus is lost; but theprologior arguments of the text are preserved by Pliny and other writers. Although the main theme of Trogus was the rise and history of the Macedonian monarchy, Justin yet permitted himself considerable freedom of digression, and thus produced a capricious anthology instead of a regular epitome of the work. As it stands, however, the history contains much valuable information. The style, though far from perfect, is clear and occasionally elegant. The book was much used in the middle ages, when the author was sometimes confounded with Justin Martyr.
Ed. princeps (1470); J. G. Graevius (1668); J. F. Gronovius (1719); C. H. Frotscher (1827-1830); J. Jeep (1859); F. Rühl (1886, with prologues); see also J. F. Fischer,De elocutione Justini(1868); F. Rühl,Die Verbreitung des J. im Mittelalter(1871); O. Eichert,Wörterbuch zuJ. (1881); Köhler and Rühl inNeue Jahrbücher für Philologie, xci., ci., cxxxiii. There are translations in the chief European languages; in English by A. Goldyng (1564); R. Codrington (1682); Brown-Dykes (1712); G. Turnbull (1746); J. Clarke (1790); J. S. Watson (1853).
Ed. princeps (1470); J. G. Graevius (1668); J. F. Gronovius (1719); C. H. Frotscher (1827-1830); J. Jeep (1859); F. Rühl (1886, with prologues); see also J. F. Fischer,De elocutione Justini(1868); F. Rühl,Die Verbreitung des J. im Mittelalter(1871); O. Eichert,Wörterbuch zuJ. (1881); Köhler and Rühl inNeue Jahrbücher für Philologie, xci., ci., cxxxiii. There are translations in the chief European languages; in English by A. Goldyng (1564); R. Codrington (1682); Brown-Dykes (1712); G. Turnbull (1746); J. Clarke (1790); J. S. Watson (1853).
JUSTINIAN I.(483-565). Flavius Anicius Justinianus, surnamed the Great, the most famous of all the emperors of the Eastern Roman Empire, was by birth a barbarian, native of a place called Tauresium in the district of Dardania, a region of Illyricum,1and was born, most probably, on the 11th of May 483. His family has been variously conjectured, on the strength of the proper names which its members are stated to have borne, to have been Teutonic or Slavonic. The latter seems the more probable view. His own name was originally Uprauda.2Justinianus was a Roman name which he took from his uncle Justin I., who adopted him, and to whom his advancement in life was due. Of his early life we know nothing except that he went to Constantinople while still a young man, and received there an excellent education. Doubtless he knew Latin before Greek; it is alleged that he always spoke Greek with a barbarian accent. When Justin ascended the throne in 518, Justinian became at once a person of the first consequence, guiding, especially in church matters, the policy of his aged, childless and ignorant uncle, receiving high rank and office at his hands, and soon coming to be regarded as his destined successor. On Justin’s death in 527, having been a few months earlier associated with him as co-emperor, Justinian succeeded without opposition to the throne. About 523 he had married the famous Theodora (q.v.), who, as empress regnant, was closely associated in all his actions till her death in 547.
Justinian’s reign was filled with great events, both at home and abroad, both in peace and in war. They may be classed under four heads: (1) his legal reforms; (2) his administration of the empire; (3) his ecclesiastical policy; and (4) his wars and foreign policy generally.
1. It is as a legislator and codifier of the law that Justinian’s name is most familiar to the modern world; and it is therefore this department of his action that requires to be most fully dealt with here. He found the law of the Roman empire in a state of great confusion. It consisted of two masses, which were usually distinguished as old law (jus vetus) and new law (jus novum). The first of these comprised: (i.) all such of the statutes (leges) passed under the republic and early empire as had not become obsolete; (ii.) the decrees of the senate (senatus consulta) passed at the end of the republic and during the first two centuries of the empire; (iii.) the writings of the jurists of the later republic and of the empire, and more particularly of those jurists to whom the right of declaring the law with authority (jus respondendi) had been committed by the emperors. As these jurists had in their commentaries upon theleges,senatus consultaand edicts of the magistrates practically incorporated all that was of importance in those documents, the books of the jurists may substantially be taken as including (i.) and (ii.). These writings were of course very numerous, and formed a vast mass of literature. Many of them had become exceedingly scarce—many had been altogether lost. Some were of doubtful authenticity. They were so costly that no person of moderate means could hope to possess any large number; even the public libraries had nothing approaching to a complete collection. Moreover, as they proceeded from a large number of independent authors, who wrote expressing their own opinions, they contained many discrepancies and contradictions, the dicta of one writer being controverted by another, while yet both writers might enjoy the same formal authority. A remedy had been attempted to be applied to this evil by a law of theemperors Theodosius II. and Valentinian III., which gave special weight to the writings of five eminent jurists (Papinian, Paulus, Ulpian, Modestinus, Gaius); but it was very far from removing it. As regards thejus vetus, therefore, the judges and practitioners of Justinian’s time had two terrible difficulties to contend with—first, the bulk of the law, which made it impossible for any one to be sure that he possessed anything like the whole of the authorities bearing on the point in question, so that he was always liable to find his opponent quoting against him some authority for which he could not be prepared; and, secondly, the uncertainty of the law, there being a great many important points on which differing opinions of equal legal validity might be cited, so that the practising counsel could not advise, nor the judge decide, with any confidence that he was right, or that a superior court would uphold his view.
The new law (jus novum), which consisted of the ordinances of the emperors promulgated during the middle and later empires (edicta,rescripta,mandata,decreta, usually called by the general name ofconstitutiones), was in a condition not much better. These ordinances or constitutions were extremely numerous. No complete collection of them existed, for although two collections (Codex gregorianusandCodex hermogenianus) had been made by two jurists in the 4th century, and a large supplementary collection published by the emperor Theodosius II. in 438 (Codex theodosianus), these collections did not include all the constitutions; there were others which it was necessary to obtain separately, but many whereof it must have been impossible for a private person to procure. In this branch too of the law there existed some, though a less formidable, uncertainty; for there were constitutions which practically, if not formally, repealed or superseded others without expressly mentioning them, so that a man who relied on one constitution might find that it had been varied or abrogated by another he had never heard of or on whose sense he had not put such a construction. It was therefore clearly necessary with regard to both the older and the newer law to take some steps to collect into one or more bodies or masses so much of the law as was to be regarded as binding, reducing it within a reasonable compass, and purging away the contradictions or inconsistencies which it contained. The evil had been long felt, and reforms apparently often proposed, but nothing (except by the compilation of theCodex theodosianus) had been done till Justinian’s time. Immediately after his accession, in 528, he appointed a commission to deal with the imperial constitutions (jus novum), this being the easier part of the problem. The commissioners, ten in number, were directed to go through all the constitutions of which copies existed, to select such as were of practical value, to cut these down by retrenching all unnecessary matter, and gather them, arranged in order of date, into one volume, getting rid of any contradictions by omitting one or other of the conflicting passages.3These statute law commissioners, as one may call them, set to work forthwith, and completed their task in fourteen months, distributing the constitutions which they placed in the new collection into ten books, in general conformity with the order of the Perpetual Edict as settled by Salvius Julianus and enacted by Hadrian. By this means the bulk of the statute law was immensely reduced, its obscurities and internal discrepancies in great measure removed, its provisions adapted, by the abrogation of what was obsolete, to the circumstances of Justinian’s own time. ThisCodex constitutionumwas formally promulgated and enacted as one great consolidating statute in 529, all imperial ordinances not included in it being repealed at one stroke.
The success of this first experiment encouraged the emperor to attempt the more difficult enterprise of simplifying and digesting the older law contained in the treatises of the jurists. Before entering on this, however, he wisely took the preliminary step of settling the more important of the legal questions as to which the older jurists had been divided in opinion, and which had therefore remained sources of difficulty, a difficulty aggravated by the general decline, during the last two centuries, of the level of forensic and judicial learning. This was accomplished by a series of constitutions known as the “Fifty Decisions” (Quinquaginta decisiones), along with which there were published other ordinances amending the law in a variety of points, in which old and now inconvenient rules had been suffered to subsist. Then in December 530 a new commission was appointed, consisting of sixteen eminent lawyers, of whom the president, the famous Tribonian (who had already served on the previous commission), was an exalted official (quaestor), four were professors of law, and the remaining eleven practising advocates. The instructions given to them by the emperor were as follows:—they were to procure and peruse all the writings of all the authorized jurists (those who had enjoyed thejus respondendi); were to extract from these writings whatever was of most permanent and substantial value, with power to change the expressions of the author wherever conciseness or clearness would be thereby promoted, or wherever such a change was needed in order to adapt his language to the condition of the law as it stood in Justinian’s time; were to avoid repetitions and contradictions by giving only one statement of the law upon each point; were to insert nothing at variance with any provision contained in theCodex constitutionum; and were to distribute the results of their labours into fifty books, subdividing each book into titles, and following generally the order of the Perpetual Edict.4
These directions were carried out with a speed which is surprising when we remember not only that the work was interrupted by the terrible insurrection which broke out in Constantinople in January 532, and which led to the temporary retirement from office of Tribonian, but also that the mass of literature which had to be read through consisted of no less than two thousand treatises, comprising three millions of sentences. The commissioners, who had for greater despatch divided themselves into several committees, presented their selection of extracts to the emperor in 533, and he published it as an imperial statute on December 16th of that year, with two prefatory constitutions (those known asOmnem reipublicaeandDedit nobis). It is the Latin volume which we now call theDigest(Digesta) orPandects(Πάνδεκται) and which is by far the most precious monument of the legal genius of the Romans, and indeed, whether one regards the intrinsic merits of its substance or the prodigious influence it has exerted and still exerts, the most remarkable law-book that the world has seen. The extracts comprised in it are 9123 in number, taken from thirty-nine authors, and are of greatly varying length, mostly only a few lines long. About one-third (in quantity) come from Ulpian, a very copious writer; Paulus stands next. To each extract there is prefixed the name of the author, and of the treatise whence it is taken.5The worst thing about theDigestis its highly unscientific arrangement. The order of the Perpetual Edict, which appears to have been taken as a sort of model for the general scheme of books and titles, was doubtless convenient to the Roman lawyers from their familiarity with it, but was in itself rather accidental and historical than logical. The disposition of the extracts inside each title was still less rational; it has been shown by a modern jurist to have been the result of the way in which the committees of the commissioners worked through the books they had to peruse.6In enacting theDigestas a law book, Justinian repealed all the other law contained in the treatises of the jurists (thatjus vetuswhich has been already mentioned), and directed that those treatises should never be cited in future even by way of illustration; and he of course at the same time abrogated all the older statutes, from the Twelve Tables downwards, which had formed a part of thejus vetus. This was a necessary incident of his scheme of reform. But he wenttoo far, and indeed attempted what was impossible, when he forbade all commentaries upon theDigest. He was obliged to allow a Greek translation to be made of it, but directed this translation to be exactly literal.
These two great enterprises had substantially despatched Justinian’s work; however, he, or rather Tribonian, who seems to have acted both as his adviser and as his chief executive officer in all legal affairs, conceived that a third book was needed, viz. an elementary manual for beginners which should present an outline of the law in a clear and simple form. The little work of Gaius, most of which we now possess under the title ofCommentarii institutionum, had served this purpose for nearly four centuries; but much of it had, owing to changes in the law, become inapplicable, so that a new manual seemed to be required. Justinian accordingly directed Tribonian, with two coadjutors, Theophilus, professor of law in the university of Constantinople, and Dorotheus, professor in the great law school at Beyrout, to prepare an elementary textbook on the lines of Gaius. This they did while theDigestwas in progress, and produced the useful little treatise which has ever since been the book with which students commonly begin their studies of Roman law, theInstitutes of Justinian. It was published as a statute with full legal validity shortly before theDigest. Such merits as it possesses—simplicity of arrangement, clearness and conciseness of expression—belong less to Tribonian than to Gaius, who was closely followed wherever the alterations in the law had not made him obsolete. However, the spirit of that great legal classic seems to have in a measure dwelt with and inspired the inferior men who were recasting his work; theInstitutesis better both in Latinity and in substance than we should have expected from the condition of Latin letters at that epoch, better than the other laws which emanate from Justinian.
In the four years and a half which elapsed between the publication of theCodexand that of theDigest, many important changes had been made in the law, notably by the publication of the “Fifty Decisions,” which settled many questions that had exercised the legal mind and given occasion to intricate statutory provisions. It was therefore natural that the idea should present itself of revising theCodex, so as to introduce these changes into it, for by so doing, not only would it be simplified, but the one volume would again be made to contain the whole statute law, whereas now it was necessary to read along with it the ordinances issued since its publication. Accordingly another commission was appointed, consisting of Tribonian with four other coadjutors, full power being given them not only to incorporate the new constitutions with theCodexand make in it the requisite changes, but also to revise theCodexgenerally, cutting down or filling in wherever they thought it necessary to do so. This work was completed in a few months; and in November 534 the revisedCodex(Codex repetitae praelectionis) was promulgated with the force of law, prefaced by a constitution (Cordi nobis) which sets forth its history, and declares it to be alone authoritative, the formerCodexbeing abrogated. It is this revisedCodexwhich has come down to the modern world, all copies of the earlier edition having disappeared.