A convenient division of the special liens other than possessory on ships may be made by classifying them as maritime, statutory-maritime or quasi-maritime, and statutory. The first attach only in the case of damage done by collision between ships on the high seas, salvage on the high seas, bottomry and seamen’s wages so far as freight has been earned; the second attach in cases of damage by collision within the body of a county, salvage within the body of a county, life salvage everywhere, seamen’s wages even if no freight has been earned, master’s wages and disbursements. These two classes continue to attach notwithstanding a change of ownership without notice of the lien, if there have been no laches in enforcing it (the “Bold Buccleuch,” 1852, 7 Moo. P.C. 267; the “Kong Magnus,” 1891, P. 223). The third class, which only give a right to proceedin rem,i.e.against the ship itself, attach, so long as there is nobona fidechange of ownership, without citing the owners, in all cases of claims for damage to ship and of claims for damage to cargo where no owner is domiciled in England or Wales. Irrespective of this limitation, they attach in all cases not only of damage to cargo, but also of breaches of contract to carry where the damage does not exceed £300, when the suit must be commenced in a county court having admiralty jurisdiction; and in cases of claims for necessaries supplied elsewhere than in the ship’s home port, for wages earned even under a special contract by masters and mariners, and of claims for towage. In all three classes the lien also exists over cargo where the suit from its nature extends to it, as in salvage and in some cases of bottomry or respondentia, and in cases where proceedings are taken against cargo by the shipowner for a breach of contract (cargoex“Argos” and the “Hewsons,” 1873, L.R. 5 P.C. 134; the “Alina,” 1880, 5 Ex. D. 227).Elsewhere than in England, and those countries such as the United States which have adopted her jurisprudence in maritime matters generally, the doctrine of maritime lien, or that which is substituted for it, is very differently treated. Speaking generally, those states which have adopted the Napoleonic codes or modifications of them—France, Italy, Spain, Holland, Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, and to some extent Russia—have instead of a maritime lien the civil-law principle of privileged debts. Amongst these in all cases are found claims for salvage, wages, bottomry under certain restrictions, and necessaries. Each of these has a privileged claim against the ship, and in some cases against freight and cargo as well, but it is a matter of very great importance that, except in Belgium, a claim for collision damage (which as we have seen confers a maritime lien, and one of a very high order, in Great Britain) confers no privilege against the wrong-doing ship, whilst in all these countries an owner can get rid of his personal liability by abandoning the ship and freight to his creditor, and so, if the ship is sunk, escape all liability whilst retaining any insurance there may be. This, indeed, was at one time the law of Great Britain; the measure of damage was limited by the value of theres; and in the United States at the present time a shipowner can get rid of his liability for damage by abandoning the ship and freight. A different rule prevails in Germany and the Scandinavian states. There claims relating to the ship, unless the owner has specially rendered himself liable, confer no personal claim at all against him. The claim is limitedab initioto ship and freight, except in the case of seamen’s wages, which do confer a personal claim so far as they have been earned on a voyage or passage completed prior to the loss of the ship. In all maritime states, however, except Spain, a provisional arrest of the ship is allowed, and thus between the privilege accorded to the debt and the power to arrest till bail is given or the ship abandoned to creditors, a condition of things analogous to the maritime lien is established; especially as these claims when the proper legal steps have been taken to render them valid—usually by endorsement on the ship’s papers on board, or by registration at her port of registry—attach to the ship and follow her into the hands of a purchaser. They are in fact notice to him of the incumbrance.
A convenient division of the special liens other than possessory on ships may be made by classifying them as maritime, statutory-maritime or quasi-maritime, and statutory. The first attach only in the case of damage done by collision between ships on the high seas, salvage on the high seas, bottomry and seamen’s wages so far as freight has been earned; the second attach in cases of damage by collision within the body of a county, salvage within the body of a county, life salvage everywhere, seamen’s wages even if no freight has been earned, master’s wages and disbursements. These two classes continue to attach notwithstanding a change of ownership without notice of the lien, if there have been no laches in enforcing it (the “Bold Buccleuch,” 1852, 7 Moo. P.C. 267; the “Kong Magnus,” 1891, P. 223). The third class, which only give a right to proceedin rem,i.e.against the ship itself, attach, so long as there is nobona fidechange of ownership, without citing the owners, in all cases of claims for damage to ship and of claims for damage to cargo where no owner is domiciled in England or Wales. Irrespective of this limitation, they attach in all cases not only of damage to cargo, but also of breaches of contract to carry where the damage does not exceed £300, when the suit must be commenced in a county court having admiralty jurisdiction; and in cases of claims for necessaries supplied elsewhere than in the ship’s home port, for wages earned even under a special contract by masters and mariners, and of claims for towage. In all three classes the lien also exists over cargo where the suit from its nature extends to it, as in salvage and in some cases of bottomry or respondentia, and in cases where proceedings are taken against cargo by the shipowner for a breach of contract (cargoex“Argos” and the “Hewsons,” 1873, L.R. 5 P.C. 134; the “Alina,” 1880, 5 Ex. D. 227).
Elsewhere than in England, and those countries such as the United States which have adopted her jurisprudence in maritime matters generally, the doctrine of maritime lien, or that which is substituted for it, is very differently treated. Speaking generally, those states which have adopted the Napoleonic codes or modifications of them—France, Italy, Spain, Holland, Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, and to some extent Russia—have instead of a maritime lien the civil-law principle of privileged debts. Amongst these in all cases are found claims for salvage, wages, bottomry under certain restrictions, and necessaries. Each of these has a privileged claim against the ship, and in some cases against freight and cargo as well, but it is a matter of very great importance that, except in Belgium, a claim for collision damage (which as we have seen confers a maritime lien, and one of a very high order, in Great Britain) confers no privilege against the wrong-doing ship, whilst in all these countries an owner can get rid of his personal liability by abandoning the ship and freight to his creditor, and so, if the ship is sunk, escape all liability whilst retaining any insurance there may be. This, indeed, was at one time the law of Great Britain; the measure of damage was limited by the value of theres; and in the United States at the present time a shipowner can get rid of his liability for damage by abandoning the ship and freight. A different rule prevails in Germany and the Scandinavian states. There claims relating to the ship, unless the owner has specially rendered himself liable, confer no personal claim at all against him. The claim is limitedab initioto ship and freight, except in the case of seamen’s wages, which do confer a personal claim so far as they have been earned on a voyage or passage completed prior to the loss of the ship. In all maritime states, however, except Spain, a provisional arrest of the ship is allowed, and thus between the privilege accorded to the debt and the power to arrest till bail is given or the ship abandoned to creditors, a condition of things analogous to the maritime lien is established; especially as these claims when the proper legal steps have been taken to render them valid—usually by endorsement on the ship’s papers on board, or by registration at her port of registry—attach to the ship and follow her into the hands of a purchaser. They are in fact notice to him of the incumbrance.
Duration of Lien.—So long as the party claiming the lien at common law retains the property, the lien continues, notwithstanding the debt in respect of which it is claimed becoming barred by the Statute of Limitations (Higginsv.Scott, 1831, 2 B. & Ald. 413). But if he takes proceedings at law to recover the debt, and on a sale of the goods to satisfy the judgment purchases them himself, he so alters the nature of the possession that he loses his lien (Jacobsv.Latour, 5 Bing. 130). An equitable lien probably in all cases continues, provided the purchaser of the subject matter has notice of the lien at the time of his purchase. A maritime lien is in no respect subject to the Statute of Limitations, and continues in force notwithstanding a change in the ownership of the property without notice, and is only terminated when it has once attached, by laches on the part of the person claiming it (the “Kong Magnus,” 1891, P. 223). There is an exception in the case of seamen’s wages, where by 4 Anne c. 16 (Stat. Rev.4 & 5 Anne c. 3) all suits for seamen’s wages in the Admiralty must be brought within six years.
Ranking of Maritime Liens.—There may be several claimants holding maritime and other liens on the same vessel. For example, a foreign vessel comes into collision by her own fault and is damaged and her cargo also; she is assisted into port by salvors and ultimately under a towage agreement, and put into the hands of a shipwright who does necessary repairs. The innocent party to the collision has a maritime lien for his damage, and the seamen for their wages; the cargo owner has a suitin remor a statutory lien for damage, and the shipwright a possessory lien for the value of his repairs, while the tugs certainly have a rightin remand possibly a maritime lien also in the nature of salvage. The value of the property may be insufficient to pay all claims, and it becomes a matter of great consequence to settle whether any, and if so which, have priority over the others, or whether all rank alike and have to divide the proceeds of the propertypro ratâamongst them. The following general rules apply: liens for benefits conferred rank against the fund in the inverse, and those for the reparation of damage sustained in the direct order of their attaching to theres; as between the two classes those last mentioned rank before those first mentioned of earlier date; as between liens of the same class and the same date, the first claimant has priority over others who have not taken action. The courts of admiralty, however, allow equitable considerations, and enter into the question of marshalling assets. For example, if one claimant has a lien on two funds, or an effective right of action in addition to his lien, and another claimant has only a lien upon one fund, the first claimant will be obliged to exhaust his second remedy before coming into competition with the second. As regards possessory liens, the shipwright takes the ship as she stands,i.e.with her incumbrances, and it appears that the lien for seaman’s wages takes precedence of a solicitor’s lien for costs, under a charging order made in pursuance of the Solicitors Act 1860, § 28.
Subject to equitable considerations, the true principle appears to be that services rendered under an actual or implied contract, which confer a maritime lien, make the holder of the lien in some sort a proprietor of the vessel, and therefore liable for damage done by her—hence the priority of the damage lien—but, directly it has attached, benefits conferred on the property by enabling it to reach port in safety benefit the holder of the damage lien in common with all other prior holders of maritime liens. It is less easy to see why of two damage liens the earlier should take precedence of the later, except on the principle that thereswhich came into collision the second time is depreciated in value by the amount of the existing lien upon her for the first collision, and where there was more than one damage lien, and also liens for benefits conferred prior to the first collision between the two collisions and subsequent to the second, the court would have to make a special order to meet the peculiar circumstances. The claim of a mortgagee naturally is deferred to all maritime liens, whether they are for benefits conferred on the property in which he is interested or for damage done by it, and also for the same reason to the possessory lien of the shipwright, but both the possessory lien of the shipwright and the claim of the mortgagee take precedence over a claim for necessaries, which only confers a statutory lien or a right to proceedin remin certain cases. In other maritime states possessing codes of commercial law, the privileged debts are all set out in order of priority in these codes, though, as has been already pointed out, the lien for damage by collision—the most important in English law—has no counterpart in most of the foreign codes.
Subject to equitable considerations, the true principle appears to be that services rendered under an actual or implied contract, which confer a maritime lien, make the holder of the lien in some sort a proprietor of the vessel, and therefore liable for damage done by her—hence the priority of the damage lien—but, directly it has attached, benefits conferred on the property by enabling it to reach port in safety benefit the holder of the damage lien in common with all other prior holders of maritime liens. It is less easy to see why of two damage liens the earlier should take precedence of the later, except on the principle that thereswhich came into collision the second time is depreciated in value by the amount of the existing lien upon her for the first collision, and where there was more than one damage lien, and also liens for benefits conferred prior to the first collision between the two collisions and subsequent to the second, the court would have to make a special order to meet the peculiar circumstances. The claim of a mortgagee naturally is deferred to all maritime liens, whether they are for benefits conferred on the property in which he is interested or for damage done by it, and also for the same reason to the possessory lien of the shipwright, but both the possessory lien of the shipwright and the claim of the mortgagee take precedence over a claim for necessaries, which only confers a statutory lien or a right to proceedin remin certain cases. In other maritime states possessing codes of commercial law, the privileged debts are all set out in order of priority in these codes, though, as has been already pointed out, the lien for damage by collision—the most important in English law—has no counterpart in most of the foreign codes.
Stoppage in Transitu.—This is a lien held by an unpaid vendor in certain cases over goods sold after they have passed out of his actual possession. It has been much discussed whether it is an equitable or common-law right or lien. The fact appears to be that it has always been a part of the Law Merchant, which, properly speaking, is itself a part of the common law of England unless inconsistent with it. This particular right was, in the first instance, held by a court of equity to be equitable and not contrary to English law, and by that decision this particular part of the Law Merchant was approved and became part of the common law of England (see per Lord Abinger inGibsonv.Carruthers, 8 M. & W., p. 336 et seq.). It may be described as a lien by the Law Merchant, decided by equity to be part of the common law, but in its nature partaking rather of the character of an equitable lien than one at common law. “It is a right which arises solely upon the insolvency of the buyer, and is based on the plain reason of justice and equity that one man’s goods shall not be applied to the payment of another man’s debts. If, therefore, after the vendor has delivered the goods out of his own possession and put them in the hands of a carrier for delivery to the buyer, he discovers that the buyer is insolvent, he may re-take the goods if he can before they reach the buyer’s possession, and thus avoid having his property applied to paying debts due by the buyer to other people” (Benjamin on Sales, 2nd ed., 289). This right, though only recognized by English law in 1690, is highly favoured bythe courts on account of its intrinsic justice, and extends to quasi-vendors, or persons in the same position, such as consignors who have bought on behalf of a principal and forwarded the goods. It is, however, defeated by a lawful transfer of the document of title to the goods by the vendor to a third person, who takes itbonâ fideand for valuable consideration (Factors Act 1889; Sale of Goods Act 1893).
Assignment or Transfer of Lien.—A lien being a personal right acquired in respect of personal services, it cannot, as a rule, be assigned or transferred; but here again there are exceptions. The personal representative of the holder of a possessory lien on his decease would probably in all cases be held entitled to it; and it has been held that the lien over a client’s papers remains with the firm of solicitors notwithstanding changes in the constitution of the firm (Gregoryv.Cresswell, 14 L.J. Ch. 300). So also where a solicitor, having a lien on documents for his costs, assigned the debt to his bankers with the benefit of the lien, it was held that the bankers might enforce such lien in equity. But though a tradesman has a lien on the property of his customer for his charges for work done upon it, where the property is delivered to him by a servant acting within the scope of his employment, such lien cannot be transferred to the servant, even if he has paid the money himself; and the lien does not exist at all if the servant was acting without authority in delivering the goods, except where (as in the case of a common carrier) he is bound to receive the goods, in which case he retains his lien for the carriage against the rightful owner. Where, however, there is a lien on property of any sort not in possession, a person acquiring the property with knowledge of the lien takes it subject to such lien. This applies to equitable liens, and cannot apply to those common-law liens in which possession is necessary. It is, however, true that by statute certain common-law liens can be transferred,e.g.under the Merchant Shipping Act a master of a ship having a lien upon cargo for his freight can transfer the possession of the cargo to a wharfinger, and with it the lien (Merchant Shipping Act 1894, § 494). In this case, however, though the matter is simplified by the statute, if the wharfinger was constituted the agent or servant of the shipmaster, his possession would be the possession of the shipmaster, and there would be no real transfer of the lien; therefore the common-law doctrine is not altered, only greater facilities for the furtherance of trade are given by the statute, enabling the wharfinger to act in his own name without reference to his principal, who may be at the other side of the world. So also a lien may be retained, notwithstanding that the property passes out of possession, where it has to be deposited in some special place (such as the Custom-House) to comply with the law. Seamen cannot sell or assign or in any way part with their maritime lien for wages (Merchant Shipping Act 1894, § 156), but, nevertheless, with the sanction of the court, a person who pays seamen their wages is entitled to stand in their place and exercise their rights (theCornelia Henrietta, 1866, L.R. 1 Ad. & Ec. 51).
Waiver.—Any parting with the possession of goods is in general a waiver of the lien upon them; for example, when a factor having a lien on the goods of his principal gives them to a carrier to be carried at the expense of his principal, even if undisclosed, he waives his lien, and has no right to stop the goodsin transituto recover it; so also where a coach-builder who has a lien on a carriage for repairs allows the owner from time to time to take it out for use without expressly reserving his lien, he has waived it, nor has he a lien for the standage of the carriage except by express agreement, as mere standage does not give a possessory lien. It has even been held that where a portion of goods sold as a whole for a lump sum has been taken away and paid for proportionately, the conversion has taken place and the lien for the residue of the unpaid purchase-money has gone (Gurrv.Cuthbert, 1843, 12 L.J. Ex. 309). Again, an acceptance of security for a debt is inconsistent with the existence of a lien, as it substitutes the credit of the owner for the material guarantee of the thing itself, and so acts as a waiver of the lien. For the same reason even an agreement to take security is a waiver of the lien, though the security is not, in fact, given (Alliance Bankv.Broon, 11 L.T. 332).
Sale of Goods under Lien.—At common law the lien only gives a right to retain the goods, and ultimately to sell by legal process, against the owner; but in certain cases a right has been given by statute to sell without the intervention of legal process, such as the right of an innkeeper to sell the goods of his customer for his unpaid account (Innkeepers Act 1878, § 1), the right of a wharfinger to sell goods entrusted to him by a shipowner with a lien upon them for freight, and also for their own charges (Merchant Shipping Act 1894, §§ 497, 498), and of a railway company to sell goods for their charges (Railway Clauses Act 1845, § 97). Property affected by an equitable lien or a maritime lien cannot be sold by the holder of the lien without the interposition of the court to enforce an order, or judgment of the court. In Admiralty cases, where a sale is necessary, no bail having been given and the property being under arrest, the sale is usually made by the marshal in London, but may be elsewhere on the parties concerned showing that a better price is likely to be obtained.
American Law.—In the United States, speaking very generally, the law relating to liens is that of England, but there are some considerable differences occasioned by three principal causes. (1) Some of the Southern States, notably Louisiana, have never adopted the common law of England. When that state became one of the United States of North America it had (and still preserves) its own system of law. In this respect the law is practically identical with the Code Napoleon, which, again speaking generally, substitutes privileges for liens,i.e.gives certain claims a prior right to others against particular property. These privileges beingstrictissimae interpretationis, cannot be extended by any principle analogous to the English doctrine of equitable liens. (2) Probably in consequence of the United States and the several states composing it having had a more democratic government than Great Britain, in their earlier years at all events, certain liens have been created by statute in several states in the interest of the working classes which have no parallel in Great Britain,e.g.in some states workmen employed in building a house or a ship have a lien upon the building or structure itself for their unpaid wages. This statutory lien partakes rather of the nature of an equitable than of a common-law lien, as the property is not in the possession of the workman, and it may be doubted whether the right thus conferred is more beneficial to the workman than the priority his wages have in bankruptcy proceedings in England. Some of the states have also practically extended the maritime lien to matters over which it was never contended for in England. (3) By the constitution of the United States the admiralty and inter-state jurisdiction is vested in the federal as distinguished from the state courts, and these federal courts have not been liable to have their jurisdiction curtailed by prohibition from courts of common law, as the court of admiralty had in England up to the time of the Judicature Acts; consequently the maritime lien in the United States extends further than it does in England, even after recent enlargements; it covers claims for necessaries and by material men (seeMaritime Lien), as well as collision, salvage, wages, bottomry and damage to cargo.
Difficulties connected with lien occasionally arise in the federal courts in admiralty cases, from a conflict on the subject between the municipal law of the state where the court happens to sit and the admiralty law; but as there is no power to prohibit the federal court, its view of the admiralty law based on the civil law prevails. More serious difficulties arise where a federal court has to try inter-state questions, where the two states have different laws on the subject of lien; one for example, like Louisiana, following the civil law, and the other the common law and equitable practice of Great Britain. The question as to which law is to govern in such a case can hardly be said to be decided. “The question whether equitable liens can exist to be enforced in Louisiana by the federal courts, notwithstanding its restrictive law of privileges, is still an open one” (Derris,Contracts of Pledge, 517; and seeBurdon Sugar Refining Co.v.Payne, 167 U.S. 127).
British Colonies.—In those colonies which before the Canadian federation were known as Upper Canada and the Maritime Provinces of British North America, and in the several Australasian states where the English common law is enforced except as modified by colonial statute, the principles of lien, whether by common law or equitable or maritime, discussed above with reference to England, will prevail; but questions not dissimilar to those treated of in reference to the United States may arise where colonies have come to the crown of Great Britain by cession, and where different systems of municipal law are enforced. For example, in Lower Canada the law of France prior to the Revolution occupies the place of the common law in England, but is generally regulated by a code very similar to the Code Napoleon; in Mauritius and its dependencies the Code Napoleon itself is in force except so far as modified by subsequent ordinances. In South Africa, and to some extent in Ceylon and Guiana, Roman-Dutch law is in force; in the island of Trinidad old Spanish law, prior to the introduction of the present civil code of Spain, is the basis of jurisprudence. Each several system of law requires to be studied on the point; but, speaking generally, apart from the possessory lien of workmen and the maritime lien of the vice-admiralty courts, it may be assumed that the rules of the civil law, giving a privilege or priority in certain specified cases rather than a lien as understood in English law, prevail in those colonies where the English law is not in force.
(F. W. Ra.)
1This right, however, is not absolute, but depends on the custom of the port (Raittv.Mitchell, 1815, 4 Camp. 146).
1This right, however, is not absolute, but depends on the custom of the port (Raittv.Mitchell, 1815, 4 Camp. 146).
LIERRE(Flemish,Lier), a town in the province of Antwerp, Belgium; 9 m. S.E. of Antwerp. Pop. (1904) 24,229. It carries on a brisk industry in silk fabrics. Its church of St Gommaire was finished in 1557 and contains three fine glass windows, the gift of the archduke Maximilian, to celebrate his wedding with Mary of Burgundy.
LIESTAL,the capital (since 1833) of the half canton of Basel-Stadt in Switzerland. It is a well-built but uninteresting industrial town, situated on the left bank of the Ergolz stream, and is the most populous town in the entire canton of Basel, after Basel itself. By rail it is 9¼ m. S.E. of Basel, and 15¾ m. N.W. of Olten. In the 15th-century town hall (Rathaus) is preserved the golden drinking cup of Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy, which was taken at the battle of Nancy in 1477. In 1900 the population was 5403, all German-speaking and mainly Protestants. The town was sold in 1302 by its lord to the bishop of Basel who, in 1400, sold it to the city of Basel, at whose hands it suffered much in the Peasants’ War of 1653, and so consented gladly to the separation of 1833.
LIEUTENANT,one who takes the place, office and duty of and acts on behalf of a superior or other person. The word in English preserves the form of the French original (fromlieu, place,tenant, holding), which is the equivalent of the Lat.locum tenens, one holding the place of another. The usual English pronunciation appears early, the word being frequently spelledlieftenant,lyeftenantorluftenantin the 14th and 15th centuries. The modern American pronunciation islewtenant, while the German is represented by the present form of the wordLeutnant. In French history,lieutenant du roi(locum tenens regis) was a title borne by the officer sent with military powers to represent the king in certain provinces. With wider powers and functions, both civil as well as military, and holding authority throughout an entire province, such a representative of the king was calledlieutenant général du roi. The first appointment of these officials dates from the reign of Philip IV. the Fair (seeConstable). In the 16th century the administration of the provinces was in the hands ofgouverneurs, to whom thelieutenants du roibecame subordinates. The titleslieutenant civilorcriminelandlieutenant général de policehave been borne by certain judicial officers in France (seeChâteletandBailiff:Bailli). As the title of the representative of the sovereign, “lieutenant” in English usage appears in the title of the lord lieutenant of Ireland, and of the lords lieutenant of the counties of the United Kingdom (see below).
The most general use of the word is as the name of a grade of naval and military officer. It is common in this application to nearly every navy and army of the present day. In Italy and Spain the first part of the word is omitted, and an Italian and Spanish officer bearing this rank are calledtenenteortenienterespectively. In the British and most other navies the lieutenants are the commissioned officers next in rank to commanders, or second class of captains. Originally the lieutenant was a soldier who aided, and in case of need replaced, the captain, who, until the latter half of the 17th century, was not necessarily a seaman in any navy. At first one lieutenant was carried, and only in the largest ships. The number was gradually increased, and the lieutenants formed a numerous corps. At the close of the Napoleonic War in 1815 there were 3211 lieutenants in the British navy. Lieutenants now often qualify for special duties such as navigation, or gunnery, or the management of torpedoes. In the British army a lieutenant is a subaltern officer ranking next below a captain and above a second lieutenant. In the United States of America subalterns are classified as first lieutenants and second lieutenants. In France the two grades arelieutenantandsous-lieutenant, while in Germany theLeutnantis the lower of the two ranks, the higher beingOber-leutnant(formerlyPremier-leutnant). A “captain lieutenant” in the British army was formerly the senior subaltern who virtually commanded the colonel’s company or troop, and ranked as junior captain, or “puny captain,” as he was called by Cromwell’s soldiers.
The lord lieutenant of a county, in England and Wales and in Ireland, is the principal officer of a county. His creation dates from the reign of Henry VIII. (or, according to some, Edward VI.), when the military functions of the sheriff were handed over to him. He was responsible for the efficiency of the militia of the county, and afterwards of the yeomanry and volunteers. He was commander of these forces, whose officers he appointed. By the Regulation of the Forces Act 1871, the jurisdiction, duties and command exercised by the lord lieutenant were revested in the crown, but the power of recommending for first appointments was reserved to the lord lieutenant. By the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907, the lord lieutenant of a county was constituted president of the county association. The office of lord lieutenant is honorary, and is held during the royal pleasure, but virtually for life. Appointment to the office is by letters patent under the great seal. Usually, though not necessarily, the person appointed lord lieutenant is also appointed custos rotulorum (q.v.). Appointments to the county bench of magistrates are usually made on the recommendation of the lord lieutenant (seeJustice of the Peace).A deputy lieutenant (denoted frequently by the addition of the letters D.L. after a person’s name) is a deputy of a lord lieutenant of a county. His appointment and qualifications previous to 1908 were regulated by the Militia Act 1882. By s. 30 of that act the lieutenant of each county was required from time to time to appoint such properly qualified persons as he thought fit, living within the county, to be deputy lieutenants. At least twenty had to be appointed for each county, if there were so many qualified; if less than that number were qualified, then all the duly qualified persons in the county were to be appointed. The appointments were subject to the sovereign’s approval, and a return of all appointments to, and removals from, the office had to be laid before parliament annually. To qualify for the appointment of deputy lieutenant a person had to be (a) a peer of the realm, or the heir-apparent of such a peer, having a place of residence within the county; or (b) have in possession an estate in land in the United Kingdom of the yearly value of not less than £200; or (c) be the heir-apparent of such a person; or (d) have a clear yearly income from personalty within the United Kingdom of not less than £200 (s. 33). If the lieutenant were absent from the United Kingdom, or through illness or other cause were unable to act, the sovereign might authorize any three deputy lieutenants to act as lieutenant (s. 31), or might appoint a deputy lieutenant to act as vice-lieutenant. Otherwise, the duties of the office were practically nominal, except that a deputy lieutenant might attest militia recruits and administer the oath of allegiance to them. The reorganization in 1907 of the forces of the British crown, and the formation of county associations to administer the territorial army, placed increased duties on deputy lieutenants, and it was publicly announced that the king’s approval of appointments to that position would only be given in the case of gentlemen who had served for ten years in some force of the crown, or had rendered eminent service in connexion with a county association.The lord lieutenant of Ireland is the head of the executive in that country. He represents his sovereign and maintains the formalities of government, the business of government being entrusted to thedepartment of his chief secretary, who represents the Irish government in the House of Commons, and may have a seat in the cabinet. The chief secretary occupies an important position, and in every cabinet either the lord lieutenant or he has a seat.Lieutenant-governor is the title of the governor of an Indian province, in direct subordination to the governor-general in council. The lieutenant-governor comes midway in dignity between the governors of Madras and Bombay, who are appointed from England, and the chief commissioners of smaller provinces. In the Dominion of Canada the governors of provinces also have the title of lieutenant-governor. The representatives of the sovereign in the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands are likewise styled lieutenant-governors.
The lord lieutenant of a county, in England and Wales and in Ireland, is the principal officer of a county. His creation dates from the reign of Henry VIII. (or, according to some, Edward VI.), when the military functions of the sheriff were handed over to him. He was responsible for the efficiency of the militia of the county, and afterwards of the yeomanry and volunteers. He was commander of these forces, whose officers he appointed. By the Regulation of the Forces Act 1871, the jurisdiction, duties and command exercised by the lord lieutenant were revested in the crown, but the power of recommending for first appointments was reserved to the lord lieutenant. By the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907, the lord lieutenant of a county was constituted president of the county association. The office of lord lieutenant is honorary, and is held during the royal pleasure, but virtually for life. Appointment to the office is by letters patent under the great seal. Usually, though not necessarily, the person appointed lord lieutenant is also appointed custos rotulorum (q.v.). Appointments to the county bench of magistrates are usually made on the recommendation of the lord lieutenant (seeJustice of the Peace).
A deputy lieutenant (denoted frequently by the addition of the letters D.L. after a person’s name) is a deputy of a lord lieutenant of a county. His appointment and qualifications previous to 1908 were regulated by the Militia Act 1882. By s. 30 of that act the lieutenant of each county was required from time to time to appoint such properly qualified persons as he thought fit, living within the county, to be deputy lieutenants. At least twenty had to be appointed for each county, if there were so many qualified; if less than that number were qualified, then all the duly qualified persons in the county were to be appointed. The appointments were subject to the sovereign’s approval, and a return of all appointments to, and removals from, the office had to be laid before parliament annually. To qualify for the appointment of deputy lieutenant a person had to be (a) a peer of the realm, or the heir-apparent of such a peer, having a place of residence within the county; or (b) have in possession an estate in land in the United Kingdom of the yearly value of not less than £200; or (c) be the heir-apparent of such a person; or (d) have a clear yearly income from personalty within the United Kingdom of not less than £200 (s. 33). If the lieutenant were absent from the United Kingdom, or through illness or other cause were unable to act, the sovereign might authorize any three deputy lieutenants to act as lieutenant (s. 31), or might appoint a deputy lieutenant to act as vice-lieutenant. Otherwise, the duties of the office were practically nominal, except that a deputy lieutenant might attest militia recruits and administer the oath of allegiance to them. The reorganization in 1907 of the forces of the British crown, and the formation of county associations to administer the territorial army, placed increased duties on deputy lieutenants, and it was publicly announced that the king’s approval of appointments to that position would only be given in the case of gentlemen who had served for ten years in some force of the crown, or had rendered eminent service in connexion with a county association.
The lord lieutenant of Ireland is the head of the executive in that country. He represents his sovereign and maintains the formalities of government, the business of government being entrusted to thedepartment of his chief secretary, who represents the Irish government in the House of Commons, and may have a seat in the cabinet. The chief secretary occupies an important position, and in every cabinet either the lord lieutenant or he has a seat.
Lieutenant-governor is the title of the governor of an Indian province, in direct subordination to the governor-general in council. The lieutenant-governor comes midway in dignity between the governors of Madras and Bombay, who are appointed from England, and the chief commissioners of smaller provinces. In the Dominion of Canada the governors of provinces also have the title of lieutenant-governor. The representatives of the sovereign in the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands are likewise styled lieutenant-governors.
LIFE,the popular name for the activity peculiar to protoplasm (q.v.). This conception has been extended by analogy to phenomena different in kind, such as the activities of masses of water or of air, or of machinery, or by another analogy, to the duration of a composite structure, and by imagination to real or supposed phenomena such as the manifestations of incorporeal entities. From the point of view of exact science life is associated with matter, is displayed only by living bodies, by all living bodies, and is what distinguishes living bodies from bodies that are not alive. Herbert Spencer’s formula that life is “the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations” was the result of a profound and subtle analysis, but omits the fundamental consideration that we know life only as a quality of and in association with living matter.
In developing our conception we must discard from consideration the complexities that arise from the organization of the higher living bodies, the differences between one living animal and another, or between plant and animal. Such differentiations and integrations of living bodies are the subject-matter of discussions on evolution; some will see in the play of circumambient media, natural or supernatural, on the simplest forms of living matter, sufficient explanation of the development of such matter into the highest forms of living organisms; others will regard the potency of such living matter so to develop as a mysterious and peculiar quality that must be added to the conception of life. Choice amongst these alternatives need not complicate investigation of the nature of life. The explanation that serves for the evolution of living matter, the vehicle of life, will serve for the evolution of life. What we have to deal with here is life in its simplest form.
The definition of life must really be a description of the essential characters of life, and we must set out with an investigation of the characters of living substance with the special object of detecting the differences between organisms and unorganized matter, and the differences between dead and living organized matter.
Living substance (seeProtoplasm), as it now exists in all animals and plants, is particulate, consisting of elementary organisms living independently, or grouped in communities, the communities forming the bodies of the higher animals and plants. These small particles or larger communities are subject to accidents, internal or external, which destroy them, immediately or slowly, and thus life ceases; or they may wear out, or become clogged by the products of their own activity. There is no reason to regard the mortality of protoplasm and the consequent limited duration of life as more than the necessary consequence of particulate character of living matter (seeLongevity).
Protoplasm, the living material, contains only a few elements, all of which are extremely common and none of which is peculiar to it. These elements, however, form compounds characteristic of living substance and for the most part peculiar to it. Proteid, which consists of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen and sulphur, is present in all protoplasm, is the most complex of all organic bodies, and, so far, is known only from organic bodies. A multitude of minor and simpler organic compounds, of which carbohydrates and fats are the best known, occur in different protoplasm in varying forms and proportions, and are much less isolated from the inorganic world. They may be stages in the elaboration or disintegration of protoplasm, and although they were at one time believed to occur only as products of living matter, are gradually being conquered by the synthetic chemist. Finally, protoplasm contains various inorganic substances, such as salts and water, the latter giving it its varying degrees of liquid consistency.
We attain, therefore, our first generalized description of life as the property or peculiar quality of a substance composed of none but the more common elements, but of these elements grouped in various ways to form compounds ranging from proteid, the most complex of known substances to the simplest salts. The living substance, moreover, has its mixture of elaborate and simple compounds associated in a fashion that is peculiar. The older writers have spoken of protoplasm or the cell as being in a sense “manufactured articles”; in the more modern view such a conception is replaced by the statement that protoplasm and the cell have behind them a long historical architecture. Both ideas, or both modes of expressing what is fundamentally the same idea, have this in common, that life is not a sum of the qualities of the chemical elements contained in protoplasm, but a function first of the peculiar architecture of the mixture, and then of the high complexity of the compounds contained in the mixture. The qualities of water are no sum of the qualities of oxygen and hydrogen, and still less can we expect to explain the qualities of life without regard to the immense complexity of the living substance.
We must now examine in more detail the differences which exist or have been alleged to exist between living organisms and inorganic bodies. There is no essential difference in structure. Confusion has arisen in regard to this point from attempts to compare organized bodies with crystals, the comparison having been suggested by the view that as crystals present the highest type of inorganic structure, it was reasonable to compare them with organic matter. Differences between crystals and organized bodies have no bearing on the problem of life, for organic substance must be compared with a liquid rather than with a crystal, and differs in structure no more from inorganic liquids than these do amongst themselves, and less than they differ from crystals. Living matter is a mixture of substances chiefly dissolved in water; the comparison with the crystals has led to a supposed distinction in the mode of growth, crystals growing by the superficial apposition of new particles and living substance by intussusception. But inorganic liquids also grow in the latter mode, as when a soluble substance is added to them.
The phenomena of movement do not supply any absolute distinction. Although these are the most obvious characters of life, they cannot be detected in quiescent seeds, which we know to be alive, and they are displayed in a fashion very like life by inorganic foams brought in contact with liquids of different composition. Irritability, again, although a notable quality of living substance, is not peculiar to it, for many inorganic substances respond to external stimulation by definite changes. Instability, again, which lies at the root of Spencer’s definition “continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations” is displayed by living matter in very varying degrees from the apparent absolute quiescence of frozen seeds to the activity of the central nervous system, whilst there is a similar range amongst inorganic substances.
The phenomena of reproduction present no fundamental distinction. Most living bodies, it is true, are capable of reproduction, but there are many without this capacity, whilst, on the other hand, it would be difficult to draw an effective distinction between that reproduction of simple organisms which consists of a sub-division of their substance with consequent resumption of symmetry by the separate pieces, and the breaking up of a drop of mercury into a number of droplets.
Consideration of the mode of origin reveals a more real if not an absolute distinction. All living substance so far as is known at present (seeBiogenesis) arises only from already existing living substance. It is to be noticed, however, that green plants have the power of building up living substance from inorganic material, and there is a certain analogy between thebuilding up of new living material only in association with pre-existing living material, and the greater readiness with which certain inorganic reactions take place if there already be present some trace of the result of the reaction.
The real distinction between living matter and inorganic matter is chemical. Living substance always contains proteid, and although we know that proteid contains only common inorganic elements, we know neither how these are combined to form proteid, nor any way in which proteid can be brought into existence except in the presence of previously existing proteid. The central position of the problem of life lies in the chemistry of proteid, and until that has been fully explored, we are unable to say that there is any problem of life behind the problem of proteid.
Comparison of living and lifeless organic matter presents the initial difficulty that we cannot draw an exact line between a living and a dead organism. The higher “warm-blooded” creatures appear to present the simplest case and in their life-history there seems to be a point at which we can say “that which was alive is now dead.” We judge from some major arrest of activity, as when the heart ceases to beat. Long after this, however, various tissues remain alive and active, and the event to which we give the name of death is no more than a superficially visible stage in a series of changes. In less highly integrated organisms, such as “cold-blooded” vertebrates, the point of death is less conspicuous, and when we carry our observations further down the scale of animal life, there ceases to be any salient phase in the slow transition from life to death.
The distinction between life and death is made more difficult by a consideration of cases of so-called “arrested vitality.” If credit can be given to the stories of Indian fakirs, it appears that human beings can pass voluntarily into a state of suspended animation that may last for weeks. The state of involuntary trance, sometimes mistaken for death, is a similar occurrence. A. Leeuwenhoek, in 1719, made the remarkable discovery, since abundantly confirmed, that many animalculae, notably tardigrades and rotifers, may be completely desiccated and remain in that condition for long periods without losing the power of awaking to active life when moistened with water. W. Preyer has more recently investigated the matter and has given it the name “anabiosis.” Later observers have found similar occurrences in the cases of small nematodes, rotifers and bacteria. The capacity of plant seeds to remain dry and inactive for very long periods is still better known. It has been supposed that in the case of the plant seeds and still more in that of the animals, the condition of anabiosis was merely one in which the metabolism was too faint to be perceptible by ordinary methods of observation, but the elaborate experiments of W. Kochs would seem to show that a complete arrest of vital activity is compatible with viability. The categories, “alive” and “dead,” are not sufficiently distinct for us to add to our conception of life by comparing them. A living organism usually displays active metabolism of proteid, but the metabolism may slow down, actually cease and yet reawaken; a dead organism is one in which the metabolism has ceased and does not reawaken.
Origin of Life.—It is plain that we cannot discuss adequately the origin of life or the possibility of the artificial construction of living matter (seeAbiogenesisandBiogenesis) until the chemistry of protoplasm and specially of proteid is more advanced. The investigations of O. Bütschli have shown how a model of protoplasm can be manufactured. Very finely triturated soluble particles are rubbed into a smooth paste with an oil of the requisite consistency. A fragment of such a paste brought into a liquid in which the solid particles are soluble, slowly expands into a honeycomb like foam, the walls of the minute vesicles being films of oil, and the contents being the soluble particles dissolved in droplets of the circumambient liquid. Such a model, properly constructed, that is to say, with the vesicles of the foam microscopic in size, is a marvellous imitation of the appearance of protoplasm, being distinguishable from it only by a greater symmetry. The nicely balanced conditions of solution produce a state of unstable equilibrium, with the result that internal streaming movements and changes of shape and changes of position in the model simulate closely the corresponding manifestations in real protoplasm. The model has no power of recuperation; in a comparatively short time equilibrium is restored and the resemblance with protoplasm disappears. But it suggests a method by which, when the chemistry of protoplasm and proteid is better known, the proper substances which compose protoplasm may be brought together to form a simple kind of protoplasm.
It has been suggested from time to time that conditions very unlike those now existing were necessary for the first appearance of life, and must be repeated if living matter is to be constructed artificially. No support for such a view can be derived from observations of the existing conditions of life. The chemical elements involved are abundant; the physical conditions of temperature pressure and so forth at which living matter is most active, and within the limits of which it is confined, are familiar and almost constant in the world around us. On the other hand, it may be that the initial conditions for the synthesis of proteid are different from those under which proteid and living matter display their activities. E. Pflüger has argued that the analogies between living proteid and the compounds of cyanogen are so numerous that they suggest cyanogen as the starting-point of protoplasm. Cyanogen and its compounds, so far as we know, arise only in a state of incandescent heat. Pflüger suggests that such compounds arose when the surface of the earth was incandescent, and that in the long process of cooling, compounds of cyanogen and hydrocarbons passed into living protoplasm by such processes of transformation and polymerization as are familiar in the chemical groups in question, and by the acquisition of water and oxygen. His theory is in consonance with the interpretation of the structure of protoplasm as having behind it a long historical architecture and leads to the obvious conclusion that if protoplasm be constructed artificially it will be by a series of stages and that the product will be simpler than any of the existing animals or plants.
Until greater knowledge of protoplasm and particularly of proteid has been acquired, there is no scientific room for the suggestion that there is a mysterious factor differentiating living matter from other matter and life from other activities. We have to scale the walls, open the windows, and explore the castle before crying out that it is so marvellous that it must contain ghosts.
As may be supposed, theories of the origin of life apart from doctrines of special creation or of a primitive and slow spontaneous generation are mere fantastic speculations. The most striking of these suggests an extra-terrestrial origin. H. E. Richter appears to have been the first to propound the idea that life came to this planet as cosmic dust or in meteorites thrown off from stars and planets. Towards the end of the 19th century Lord Kelvin (then Sir W. Thomson) and H. von Helmholtz independently raised and discussed the possibility of such an origin of terrestrial life, laying stress on the presence of hydrocarbons in meteoric stones and on the indications of their presence revealed by the spectra of the tails of comets. W. Preyer has criticized such views, grouping them under the phrase “theory of cosmozoa,” and has suggested that living matter preceded inorganic matter. Preyer’s view, however, enlarges the conception of life until it can be applied to the phenomena of incandescent gases and has no relation to ideas of life derived from observation of the living matter we know.