Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey (Received July 29).Berlin, July 29, 1914.(Telegraphic.)I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing toGermany's obligation as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain was certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey (Received July 29).
Berlin, July 29, 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.
He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing toGermany's obligation as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain was certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.
His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.
In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.
Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.
To the foregoing outrageous proposition, the Government of Great Britain gave the proud andnoble reply which follows, for all times to be recorded in diplomatic annals to the eternal honour and glory of the Ministers who incurred the responsibility of, and of the distinguished diplomat who drafted, that memorable document:—
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.(Telegraphic.)Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.Your telegram of 29th July.His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the only way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, beipso factoimproved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.
Your telegram of 29th July.
His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.
Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.
You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the only way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, beipso factoimproved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.
And I will say this: if the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany will be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.
And I will say this: if the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany will be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.
The British Government could not take a more dignified stand and express their indignation at the infamous proposal in stronger and more noble terms.
Let us now read the indignant protest of Mr. Asquith, the British Prime Minister, against the outrageous German proposition, addressed to the House of Commons, where it raised a storm of applause, proclaiming to the World the dogged determination of England to wage war rather than agree to the dishonourable German proposal:—
What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free license to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in the last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemnguarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that without her knowledge we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty, and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporized, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees.
What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free license to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in the last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemnguarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that without her knowledge we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty, and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporized, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees.
After quoting and eulogizing the telegraphic despatch of Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, dated July 30, 1914, Mr. Asquith proceeded as follows:—
That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language, the attitude of this Government. Can any one who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can any one honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can any one doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose. I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced uponus. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilization. Every step we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war, we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the Country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.If I am asked what we are fighting for I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the military will of a strong and overmastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle.
That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language, the attitude of this Government. Can any one who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can any one honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can any one doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose. I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced uponus. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilization. Every step we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war, we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the Country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.
If I am asked what we are fighting for I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the military will of a strong and overmastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle.
The German Government refusing to order their army to retire from the Belgian territory it had violated, at midnight, 4th to 5th August, 1914, the whole British Empire was at war with the whole German Empire.
Surely, there is not the slightest necessity to argue any more that in the terrific war raging for the last four years, Justice and Right are on the side of England and her Allies. No war was ever more just, waged with equal honour for the triumph of Liberty and Civilization, for the protection of Humanity against the onslaught of barbarism developed to the cruelty of the darkest ages of History.
Every one knows how the news of the State of War between the British and German Empires were received in our great Canadian Dominion, after the days of anxious waiting which culminated in the rallying of England to the defence of the cause of Freedom and Civilization. When the call for duty was sounded in the Capital of the British Empire, it rolled over the mighty Atlantic, spreading over the length and breadth of Canada, being re-echoed with force in our Province of Quebec.
At once called to prepare for the emergency, the Canadian Parliament met and unanimously decided that the Dominion would, of her own free will and patriotic decision, participate in the Great War. The course of events in Canada, for the last four years, is well known by all. It is recent history.
My special object in condensing in this book the defence which I considered it my duty to make of the just and sacred cause of the British Empire, and her Allies, in the great war still raging with undiminished fury, being to show how I did, to the best of my ability, try to persuade my FrenchCanadian Countrymen where was the true path of duty, and how false and disloyal were the unscrupulous theories of "Nationalism", I must first review the successive movements of public opinion in the Province of Quebec.
In the preceding sentence, I have intently affirmed that the cause of the Allies was that of the whole British Empire. Surely, it should not be necessary to say so, as no truly loyal British subject would for a moment hesitate to come to that patriotic conclusion. Still, however incredible it is, the duty of the British colonies to rally to the flag to defend the Empire and participate in the deadly struggle between Civilization and barbarism, was challenged by the leaders of the "Nationalist school" in the Province of Quebec. Of course, that school never represented more than a small minority of thought and numbers. But, sad to admit, a fanatical minority, in days of trying sacrifices, can do a great deal of injury to a people by inflaming national and religious prejudices. We, French Canadians, have had much to suffer from the unpatriotic efforts of a few to bring our countrymen to take an erroneous view of the situation.
At the opening of the war, the general opinion in the Province of Quebec was without doubt strongly in favor of Canada's participation in the struggle. Any student of the working of our constitutional system knows how the strength of public opinion is ascertained, outside of a general election, in all cases, and more specially with regardto measures of paramount importance when the country has to deal with a national emergency.
The Parliament of Canada is the authorized representative of the Country. Called in a special session, at the very outbreak of the hostilities, they voted unanimously that it was our duty to participate in the war. All the representatives of the Province of Quebec heartily joined with those of all the other Provinces to vote this unanimous decision.
In the light of events ever since, who can now reasonably pretend that the patriotic decision of the Parliament of Canada was not entirely, even enthusiastically, approved by the Canadian people? The press, even in the Province of Quebec, with only one exception of any consequence, was unanimous in its approval of the action of Parliament.
The heads of our Church, the Archbishops and Bishops of the Ecclesiastical Provinces of Quebec, Montreal and Ottawa, in their very important Pastoral Letter on the duties of the Catholics in the present war, positively said:—
"We must acknowledge it—(nous ne saurions nous le dissimuler—): that conflict, one of the most terrific the world has yet seen, cannot but have its repercussion in our country. England is engaged into it, and who does not see that the fate of all the component parts of the Empire is bound with the fate of her arms. She relies upon our support, and that support, we are happy to say, hasbeen generously offered to her both in men and money."
No representative of public opinion, of any weight, outside of Parliament, professional men, leaders of finance, commerce and industry, in the Province of Quebec, raised a word of disapproval at the Parliamentary call to arms.
Not one meeting was called, not one resolution was moved, to oppose the decision of the Canadian Parliament.
Not one petition was addressed to the two Houses in Ottawa against Canada's participation in the war.
Every one in the Province of Quebec knew that participating in the war would entail heavy financial sacrifices, and that the taxation of the country would have to be largely increased to meet the new obligations we had freely decided to incur for the salvation of the Empire and of Civilization.
The Government of the day proposed the financial measures they considered necessary to raise the public revenue which the circumstances required. Those measures were unanimously approved by Parliament. The taxpayers of the country, those of the Province of Quebec like all the others, willingly and patriotically accepted and paid without complaint the new taxes into the public treasury. During more than the three first years of the war, I visited a good part of the Province of Quebec, and addressed several large publicmeetings. Everywhere my attention was forcibly struck by the prompt willingness of my French Canadian countrymen to bear their share of the financial sacrifices Canada was called upon to make for the triumph of the cause of the Allies.
No stronger evidence could be given of the determination of the country as a whole, and over all its component parts, to support Great Britain and her Allies to final success, than the truly wonderful record of the voluntary enlistment of more than four hundred thousand men, of all walks in life, to rush to the front.
Recruiting in the Province of Quebec indeed started very well. Several thousands of French Canadian youth rallied to the colors. I hope and trust that, sooner or later, it will be possible to make a more satisfactory statistical record of the number of French Canadians who enlisted. I am fully convinced that the total is somewhat much larger than the figures usually quoted. It would surely be conducive to a better understanding of the case, if such statistical information was carefully prepared and made public. It is easily conceivable that the pressure of the work of maintaining the splendid Canadian army renders it perhaps difficult to attend actually to the details of that compilation. So we can afford to wait for the redress of figures which may constitute a wrong to the race second in numbers but equal to any in patriotism in Canada.
Pending my remarks upon certain causes which have contributed to check recruiting amongst the French element in the Province of Quebec, I consider it important to mention those which were easy to ascertain and comprehend.
It is a well known fact that early marriages are a rule in the Province of Quebec much more than in the other Provinces of the Dominion. As a natural consequence, the available number of young unmarried men for recruiting purposes was proportionately less. I myself have known parishes in our Province where half a dozen of unmarried young men from twenty years of age and upwards could not be found.
It was easily to foresee that a comparison would be made between the number of Canadian-born volunteers in the English-speaking Provinces and that from the Province of Quebec. The degree of enthusiasm for enlistment in the other Provinces between the foreign born and the Canadian born has also been noticed. It has generally been admitted that most naturally the young men recently arrived in Canada were more strongly appealed to by all the sacred ties still binding them to their mother land. When generations have, for more than a century, enjoyed all the blessings of peace and lived far away from the turmoil of warlike preparations and military conflicts, is it to be much wondered at that the entire population is not at once permeated with the feeling of the dangers ahead, and do not rise rapidly to the full sense of the duty she is suddenly called upon to perform.
My daily personal intercourse with hundreds of my French Canadian compatriots allowed me to realize that many of them, even amongst the leading classes, were over-confident that the Allies representing at the beginning the united effort of England, France and Russia, soon to be reinforced by Italy, breaking away from the Central Powers, would certainly be equal to the task of being victorious over German militarism. Repeatedly, before public meetings and in very numerous private conversations, I urgently implored my hearers not to be so deluded, doing my best to convince them that it would be a fatal error to shut our eyes from the truth, that the military power of Central Europe, comprising the two great Empires of Germany and Austria, Bulgaria, with the help of Asiatic Turkey, and the undisguised support of baneful teutonic influences and intrigues at the courts of Petrograd and Athens, was gigantic, and that the terrible conflict would surely develop into a struggle for life and death between human freedom and barbarism.
This feeling of over-confidence was passing away, when it became evident that to triumph over the modern huns and their associates was no easy task; that the goal of freeing humanity from the threatening universal domination would require the most determined effort of the nations who had heroically undertaken to reach it.
The great struggle being waged with increased intensity, it was daily becoming more and more evident that the Allied nations were bound to muster all their courage, perseverance and resources to successfully fight their determined foe. It was just at the thick of this critical situation, calling forth the devotion and patriotism of all, that the "Nationalist" campaign of false theories and principles was launched with renewed activity in the Province of Quebec.
Mr. Henri Bourassa, ex-member of Labelle in the House of Commons, was, and still is, the recognized leader of the "Nationalist School" in our Province, and wherever it finds adherents. His personal organ, "Le Devoir," is daily expounding the doctrines of that School.
In October, 1915, Mr. Bourassa issued a pamphlet of over four hundred pages entitled:—"What do we owe England?"—in French:—"Que devons-nous à l'Angleterre?"
In the long overdrawn and farfetched argumentation of this volume, the author's effort is to try and prove that Canada owes nothing to England, that all those who favour the Canadian participationin the war are "revolutionists," that we are unduly paying a large tribute to the Empire.
In 1916, Mr. Bourassa supplemented his first book with a second pamphlet, entitled:—"Yesterday, To-day, To-morrow," in French:—"Hier, Aujourd'hui, Demain," in which he amplified the views expressed in the preceding volume.
I undertook to read Mr. Bourassa's works, and I must say that I was astonished at what I found therein. I felt very strongly that his erroneous views—without questioning their sincerity—were bound to pervert the opinion of my French compatriots, to enflame their prejudices, and to do a great deal of harm in promoting the ever dangerous conflict of race fanaticism. Over forty years of experience of public life had taught me how easy it is to introduce a prejudice in a man's mind, but how difficult it is to destroy it when once it has taken root.
To this question raised by Mr. Bourassa, and argued at length by himself in the negative, I answered by a chapter of my book:—"L'Angleterre, le Canada et la Grand Guerre"—"England, Canada and the Great War."
Great Britain, ever since she came to the conclusion that the days of the old colonial policy were passed, and agreed that we should freely govern ourselves, with ministerial responsibility, within the powers set forth in our constitutional charter, has scrupulously respected our political liberty. We have administered our own affairs at our own free will. The Imperial Government never attempted to interfere with the development of our federal politics. They would surely have declined such interference, if it had been asked for.
As long as we form part of the British Empire, it is evident that we owe to England that loyalty which every colony owes to her mother-country. Granted by the Sovereign Power ruling Canada the freest institutions, having the best of reasons to be fully satisfied with our relations with Great Britain, we are in duty bound to be loyal to her flag. We must be true to our allegiance.
We have freely decided to incur the sacrifices we are making for the war. We have so decided because we considered it of the greatest importance, for the future of Humanity, that the German ambition for universal domination be foiled; that the British Empire be maintained; that France should continue a first class Power, as expressed by Mr. Asquith; that before all, and above all, the eternal principles of Right, Justice and Civilization, shall not be trampled upon by the terrific assault of teutonic barbarism. Moreover, we are also in duty bound to judge with fairness England's part in the great society of nations, and, especially, that she plays in the great events of the present crisis. Beyond doubt, a truly loyal Canadian must refrain from poisoning foreign opinion and that of his fellow British subjects against Great Britain in attributing her course to selfish interests, wilfully taking no account of her broad and admirable foreign policy, ever inspired by the steady desire to maintain peace.
In the first mentioned work, Mr. Bourassa lays great stress on the fact that for nearly a century and a half, previous to the South African War, Canada did not participate in the wars of the Empire. He extensively quotes from the documents and the discussions between Canada's representatives and the Imperial Government, respecting the defence of our country, and that of the Empire herself. He concludes by pretending that the result of all these negotiations and conventionswas the agreement that Canada would have only to attend to her own defence, and that Great Britain was always obliged to protect us against all outside attacks. From these pretensions he draws the startling conclusion that all those who do not stand by the conventions he did his best to emphasize are doing revolutionary work.
The answer to such extravagant notions is rather plain and easy. There was not the slightest necessity for the Nationalist leader to multiply lengthy quotations to prove what mere common sense settles at first thought:—
First:—That any country, whether it be independent or a colony, must defend itself when attacked by an enemy.
Second:—That a Sovereign State is bound to defend all the territory under its authority and covered by its flag.
But all this has nothing whatever to do with the very different question of Canada's participation, outside her own territory, in a war in which Great Britain is engaged, which participation Canada has freely, deliberately approved and ordered. Such was the case in 1914. The Parliament and the people of Canada at once realized that in the gigantic conflict into which Germany had drawn all the Great Powers of Europe, our future destiny as much as that of England herself was at stake. Without the slightest hesitation, unasked and unsolicited by the Mother Country, we decidedthat we were in duty bound to do our share to defend the great Empire of which we are a very important component part, and to help saving the world from tyrannical domination.
Much too often giving to words a meaning which they positively cannot convey, Mr. Bourassa argued at length to prove that the agreements, conventions, and understandings arrived at between the Imperial and Canadian Governments, at different dates, were asolemn treaty.
How false and untenable such a pretention is, surely needs no lengthy argument. International Law knows no treaties but those made between Sovereign States. It is most absurd to pretend that a Sovereign State can make a treaty between herself and its own colony. Where is the man with the slightest notion of Constitutional Government who would pretend, for instance, that the British North American Act is a treaty between Great Britain and Canada. It is an Act passed by the Legislative authority of the Sovereign State to which we belong, enacting the conditions under which Canada would enjoy the rights and privileges of constitutional self-government, participating in the exercise of Sovereignty within the limits of the powers enumerated in the Act creating the Dominion. It was precisely because we knew we were acting within the limits of those powers, that we decided to join with England and her Allies in the great war.
As long as Canada will remain under the flag of Great Britain—and for one I hope it will yet be for many long years,—it is evident that it will not be a "Sovereign State" in the full sense of the word.
One can hardly believe that the Nationalist leader, at page 17 of his pamphlet—"Hier, Aujourd'hui, Demain"—"Yesterday, To-day, To-morrow," opens a chapter with the title: "Les Colonies autonomes sont des Etats Souverains."—"The autonomous colonies are Sovereign States."
Mr. Bourassa was evidently led to the grievous error contained in the preceding title by a complete misapprehension of the true meaning of the word "autonomous." He took "autonomy" for "Sovereignty," being under the delusion that the two are synonymous.
Any student of History knows, or ought to know, that after the war which culminated in the independence of the United States, England adopted an entirely new colonial policy. She was the first Sovereign Power, and has ever since remained the only one, to realize that the old system was doomed to failure, that it was worn out. Her leadingstatesmen, who always ranked amongst the most eminent the world over, were more and more convinced that the only safe colonial policy was that which would grant "self-government" to the colonies, trained to its harmonious working, for their interior management. The true meaning of this new policy was that several of the colonies were, by acts of the Imperial Parliament, called to the exercise of a share of the Sovereignty, well defined in their respective constitutional charters. Canada was one of the first British colonies to enjoy the advantages of such a large part of the Sovereign rights.
Such "autonomous colonies" as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, have been, and are to the present day, do not transform them into "Sovereign States," enjoying full "Sovereign powers." They are not "Independent States" in the full sense of the word.
That Canada is not a Sovereign State is proved beyond doubt by the very fact that she could not amend or change her constitutional charter by her own power and without a new Imperial law. If the Nationalist leader's pretention was sound, any member of the House of Commons, or of the Senate, in Ottawa, could propose a bill to repeal the British North America Act, 1867, and to replace it by another constitutional charter. The very supposition is absurd. Can it be imagined that His Excellency the Governor-General could be advised by his responsible Ministers to sanction, in thename of His Majesty the Sovereign of Great Britain, a bill repealing an Act of the Imperial Parliament? Still it is exactly what Mr. Bourassa's theory amounts to.
Our constitutional charter does not only provide what is called our Federal,—or National—autonomy, but also the Provincial autonomy. The powers of both are well defined in the Imperial Act. The Provinces of the Dominion also exercise that share of the Sovereign rights delegated to them by the Imperial Parliament. Would the Nationalist leader draw the extravagant conclusion that the territory of any one of the Provinces cannot be declared in the "State of War" with a Foreign Power, by His Majesty the King, without the assent of the Ministers of that Province? Still that absurd proposition would not be more so than that affirming the necessity of the assent of the Canadian Cabinet, to a declaration of War involving Canada in an Imperial struggle.
The Sovereign right of declaring war to, and of making peace with, another independent State, is vested in the King of Great Britain, acting upon the advice of his responsible Ministers in the United Kingdom. To the Imperial Parliament belongs the constitutional authority to deal with the Imperial Foreign Affairs.
It is plain that when Great Britain is at War with another Sovereign State the whole territory of the British Empire is in the "State of War" with that Nation.
It is inconceivable that Mr. Bourassa has seriously pretended that Canada was not at war with the German Empire the very moment the British Empire was so in consequence of the violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality. One can hardly believe that he has propounded the fallacious constitutional doctrine that His Majesty "the King of England hath not the right to declare Canada in the State of War without the assent of the Canadian Cabinet."
Where and when has the Nationalist leader discovered that the Canadian Ministers have the right to advise His Majesty upon all the questions pertaining to the Imperial Foreign Affairs? Any one conversant with the constitutional status of Canada knows that the Canadian Ministers have the right to advise the representative of the Sovereign only upon matters as defined by the British North America Act, 1867, and its amendments.
I was indeed very much surprised at the attempt of Mr. Bourassa to use the authority of Sir Erskine May in support of his erroneous pretension that the autonomous colonies of Great Britain were Sovereign States.
To all the students of the Constitutional History of England, Sir Erskine May is a very well known and appreciated writer. I have read his works several times over for many years. I was certain that he had never written anything to justify the Nationalist leader in quoting him as he did.
Here follows the paragraph of May's Constitutional History quoted by Mr. Bourassa in support of his own views:—
Parliament has recently pronounced it to be just that the Colonies which enjoy self-government, should undertake the responsibility and cost of their own military defence. To carry this policy into effect must be the work of time. But whenever it may be effected, the last material bond of connection with the Colonies will have been severed, and colonial states, acknowledging the honorary sovereignty of England, and fully armed for self-defence, as well against herself as others, will have grown out of the dependencies of the British Empire.
Parliament has recently pronounced it to be just that the Colonies which enjoy self-government, should undertake the responsibility and cost of their own military defence. To carry this policy into effect must be the work of time. But whenever it may be effected, the last material bond of connection with the Colonies will have been severed, and colonial states, acknowledging the honorary sovereignty of England, and fully armed for self-defence, as well against herself as others, will have grown out of the dependencies of the British Empire.
I must say that I am absolutely unable to detect one single word in the above quotation to authorize Mr. Bourassa to affirm that Sir Erskine May was of opinion that "the autonomous colonies were Sovereign States." The true meaning of the above extract is surely very plain. What does it say? It declares, what was a fact, that the BritishParliament has recently pronounced it to be just that the Colonies which enjoy self-government should undertake the responsibility and cost of their own military defence.
Would the British Parliament have deemed it necessary to express such an opinion, if the Colonies had, then, been Sovereign States, consequently obliged, in duty bound, to defend themselvesaloneagainst any possible enemy. Surely not, for the obvious reason that Great Britain would have had no more responsibility for the defence of territories no longer covered by her flag and under her Sovereignty.
The very fact that the British Parliament thought proper,under the then circumstances, to say that the Colonies enjoying self-government should undertake to defend themselves, is the convincing proof that they were not Sovereign States.
The following sentence of May's quotation says:—To carry this policy into effect must be the work of time.
It is clear that thepolicyrequiring the work of time to be carried into effect was not actually existent at the time Sir Erskine May was writing.
The extract quoted by Mr. Bourassa concludes by declaring that when such a policyhasbeen finally adopted, the Colonies will have developed into Colonial States havinggrown out of the dependencies of the British Empire.
Evidently, when the Dominions of Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, will have grown out of the dependencies of the British Empire, they will no longer be Colonies of Great Britain. But when will that very important event take place? Surely, Sir Erskine May could not foresee. Even to-day Mr. Bourassa cannot say more than any one else. Pending that unforeseen outcome, the Dominions will remain parts of the British Empire under her Sovereignty.
The above quotation was taken by Mr. Bourassa from the edition of Sir Erskine May's "Constitutional History" published in 1912. But they were first edited by the author in 1863. When has the Imperial Parliament adopted the above mentioned"Resolution"? It was voted in 1862—the 4th of March—more than fifty-six years ago. Quoted as it has been by Mr. Bourassa, it appears to have been only very recently adopted. The fact that it is more than half a century old, and was carried before the Federal Union of the Provinces, is a convincing proof that it has no bearing whatever upon the conditions of Canada's present colonial status. By the aforesaid "Resolution," the British House of Commons was only expressing the opinion that the time had come for the Colonies to undertake the responsibility and the cost of their defence. The "Resolution" does not say that Great Britain would no longer be called, in the exercise of the rights and duties of her Sovereignty, to defend her Colonial Empire.
By what reasoning can a mere expression of opinion by the English House of Commons be interpreted as at once transforming the Colonies into independent Sovereign States?
Any one somewhat conversant with the political events that led to the Federal Union of the Provinces knows that in applying to the British Parliament for the new Constitutional Charter, the Legislature of United Canada had a twofold object:—first, the settlement of the constitutional difficulties then pending between Upper and Lower Canada; secondly, a broader development of Canada and also of the British Empire. Such was the purpose of the coalition government formed in 1864. All the members of that Cabinet werestrongly in favour of the maintenance of Canada's union with Great Britain. I have heard them expounding their views on what the future of Canada ought to be. I am positive that neither Sir John A. Macdonald, Sir Georges Cartier, the honorable Georges Brown, nor any of their colleagues, of both political parties, ever said a word which could be construed as expressing the opinion that the proposed Federal Union would make of Canada an independent Sovereign State. It is incredible that Mr. Bourassa should have so erroneously understood their real views so as to pretend that they favoured Confederation for that very purpose.
As a proof of his pretension, he quoted the following words of Sir John A. Macdonald, in the Legislative Assembly of old United Canada:—
"With us the Sovereign, or, in this country the representative of the Sovereign, can act only on the advice of His Ministers, those Ministers being responsible to the people through Parliament."
Mr. Bourassa used the foregoing sentence in support of his contention that the King of England could not declare war without the assent of the Canadian Cabinet. It is impossible to understand how such a notion can be seriously held and expressed. His Majesty cannot ask nor accept such an advice, if it was tendered, for the very reason that the Canadian Cabinet has not the constitutional right to advise the King respecting the international relations of the Empire. And why?Precisely because the Canadian Ministers would not be responsible for their advice to the Imperial Parliament and to the electorate of the United Kingdom.
The true meaning of the above quoted sentence of Sir John A. Macdonald is very plain. Ministerial responsibility was the fundamental principle of the old Constitution, as it is of the Federal Charter. Sir John A. Macdonald was perfectly right in affirming that "in Canada, as in England, the Sovereign could act only on the advice of His Ministers," that is to say on the advice of His responsible Ministers within the constitutional powers of our Parliament on all matters respecting which they had the constitutional right to advise His Majesty.
Sir John A. Macdonald never said—he could not possibly say—that as Prime Minister of Canada, under the new Constitution, he would have the right to advise the Sovereign on all matters within the exclusive constitutional jurisdiction of the Imperial Parliament, for instance respecting the exercise of the Royal prerogative of declaring war against, or of making peace with, a foreign independent State. He has never propounded such an utterly false constitutional doctrine.
Mr. Bourassa went still further. He quoted the following sentence from Sir John A. Macdonald:—"We stand with regard to the people of Canada precisely in the same position as the House of Commons in England stands with regard to the people of England."
I was indeed most astonished to read Mr. Bourassa's inference from those words that Sir John A. Macdonaldhad affirmed the absolute equality of powers of the Imperial and the Canadian Parliaments.
If the opinion expressed by Sir John A. Macdonald could be so interpreted, he would have affirmed—what was radically wrong—that under the new Constitution, the Canadian Parliament would have,concurrently with the Imperial Parliament, absolutely the same powers. What did that mean? It meant that the Canadian Parliament, just as the Imperial Parliament, would have the right to edict laws establishing Home Rule in Ireland, regulating the government of India and the Crown Colonies, granting constitutional charters for the good government of the Australian and South African Dominions, &c., &c.
Surely it is not necessary to argue at any length to prove that Sir John A. Macdonald never for a moment entertained such an opinion. What he really said, in the above quoted words, was that within their constitutional jurisdiction, within the limits of their respective powers, the two Parliaments stood in the same position,respectively, with regard to the people of England and to the people of Canada. It was equivalent to saying—what was positively true—that the British Ministers and the British Parliament were responsible to the people of England, and that the Canadian Ministers and the Canadian Parliamentwere responsible to the people of Canada,—both of them within the limits of their respective constitutional powers.
If the Canadian Legislature had enjoyed all the constitutional powers of the British Parliament, she would not have been obliged to pass addresses asking the latter to enact a new charter creating the Federal Union of the Provinces. She could have repealed her then existing constitution and enacted the new one by her own authority. But that she could not do. She could not repeal the old, nor enact the new charter.
But the most extraordinary is that Mr. Bourassa went so far as to declare that Canada should have participated in the present war only as a "Nation," meaning, of course, as an independent Sovereign State.
On reading such a preposterous proposition, at once it strikes one's mind most forcibly that if Canada had really had the power to intervene in the world's struggle as a "Nation," she would have had the equal right to the choice of three alternatives.
First:—Declare war against Germany and in favor of the Allies.
Second:—Remain neutral.
Third:—Declare war against Great Britain and fight for Germany.
For it is obvious that all the Sovereign States—and Canada like them all if she had been one of them—had the Sovereign Right to fight for or against Great Britain, or to remainneutral. Of course, I am merely explaining in its entirety the Right of a Sovereign State. I surely do not mean to say that Canada, had she really been such a State, would in any way have been justifiable in joining with Germany in her dastardly attempt to crush Civilization in the barbarous throes of her domination.
What would His Excellency the Governor-General have answered his Prime Minister advising him to declare war against England, he who represents His Majesty at Ottawa? Would he not have told him at once that the Canadian Prime Minister had no right whatever to give him such an advice; that Canada, being a British Colony, could not declare war against her Sovereign State; that for the Canadian people to take up arms against England would be treasonable revolt?
It is absolutely incredible that a public man, aspiring to the leadership of his countrymen, can have been so completely lost to the sense of the Canadian constitutional situation as to boldly attempt to pervert their mind with such fallacious notions. He might as well pretend that the State of New York, for instance, has the Sovereign Right to declare war against the Government of the United States.
I, for one, cannot help wondering that any one can seriously think that a colony, always pretending to remain loyally so, can wage war against her Sovereign State. I feel sure that all sensible men do share my views on that point.
When Germany threw the gauntlet to the Powers of the "Entente," she labored under the delusion that the war would most surely break down the British Empire. She was determined to do her utmost to that end. But she utterly failed in her criminal efforts.
Strongly bound by ties of affection and constitutional freedom, the great autonomous Dominions and Colonies at once rallied with courage and patriotism to the defence of the Empire, of Justice, of Right and Civilization. India,—that great Indian Empire—to the utter disappointment of Germany, has stood admirably by Great Britain ever since the outbreak of the War, by her noble contributions of man-power and her munificent generosity of very large sums of money, in one instance amounting to $500,000,000.
The Crown Colonies have also done their share of duty with great devotion.
The admirable result which for the last four years has been shining bright and glorious all over the world, is that, contrary to teutonic expectations, the war, far from breaking asunder the British Empire, has wonderfully solidified her mighty edifice, by an intensity of loyalty to her free institutions, to her glorious flag, which the enjoyment of the blessings of peace would not have proved so easily possible.
The leaders of our Nationalist School have for years strenuously laboured to pervert the mind of our French-Canadian compatriots by the false pretensions that we were, in some mysterious way, coerced to participate in the European War. Even previous to the days of the South African conflict, they boldly took the stand that Canada should, on no account, and under no circumstances whatever, participate in what they called the Wars of the Empire—les guerres de l'Empire. Canada, they affirmed, had only to defend her own territory if attacked.
Fully appreciating how insidious and dangerous such theories were, I endeavoured to show, as forcibly as I could, that there had been no attempt by England at coercion of this Dominion to help her in the struggle against Germany. Of course, as previously explained, Great Britain being at war with the German Empire, the whole British Empire was at war. But no one in England ever intended to propose to force the colonies to engage actively into the fight. The Imperial Parliament would certainly not have taken into consideration any such proposition.
But is it not plain and beyond discussion that we,ourselves, had the undoubted right to intervene in the war to the extent that we would consider it our bounden duty to do so?
Evidently we could not remain neutral in the great conflict. At the very moment that Great Britain was at war with Germany, Canada, a British Colony, was part and parcel of the belligerent Sovereign State, the British Empire. By an incredible misconception, the Nationalist leaders confoundedneutralitywithnon-participationin the war, if we had so decided.
To be, or not to be, neutral, was not within our constitutional rights. If Germany, either by land or by sea, had attacked our territory, as she had the undoubted belligerent right to do, would it have availed us an iota to implore her mercy by affirming that we were neutral? Could we have pretended that she was violating neutral territory?
No one with the least notion of International Law would for a moment hesitate to give the true answers to those questions.
But the very different question to participate, or not, in the war, was for us alone to decide according to our constitutional charter. We have freely, deliberately, decided to do our share in the great war. We continue and persevere in our noble task, freely and deliberately.
It is admitted by all that under the actual constitutional organization of the Empire, theImperial Parliament could not require the autonomous colonies to participate in the war. But no one can assuredly deny to that Parliament the right, in the case of an imminent peril, to formulate the desire that the autonomous colonies would help Great Britain to conjure the threatened calamity.
But, in the present case, the Imperial Parliament has not even been under the necessity of expressing such a legitimate wish, for the obvious reason that the colonies at once took their patriotic stand in favor of the cause of England and her Allies. If the colonies had not so decided, of their own free will, it is most likely that the Imperial Parliament would not have expressed the wish for the assistance of the Dominions overseas.
The hearty support granted by the colonies to Great Britain, to develop its full value, had to be spontaneous, enthusiastic. Such it was, such it is, and such it will be to the last day of the conflict which victorious conclusion we are so strongly determined to achieve.
Not satisfied to do the best it could to persuade our French-Canadian countrymen that they had been coerced into the war by England, our "Nationalist School" extensively used the argument that Canada had not the right to intervene into the European struggle. I refuted this erroneous pretension by the following propositions, the very essence of our constitutional rights and liberties:—
1.—The Canadian Cabinet had the undoubted constitutional right to advise His Excellency the Governor-General to approve the measures to be taken to give effect to their decision to participate in the war, decision and measures for which they were responsible to the Canadian Parliament and to the Canadian Electorate.
2.—The Canadian Parliament had the undoubted constitutional right to approve or disapprove the decision and the measures of the Cabinet. Parliament approved that decision and those measures, acting within their constitutional right.
3.—Even at the time I was writing, it could evidently be affirmed that the Canadian Electoratehad approved the stand taken by both the Canadian Cabinet and the Canadian Parliament according to well known and defined constitutional usages.
Was it not proved beyond reasonable controversy, that the Canadian people heartily approved the decision of their Parliament to help in the great war?
Let me summarize the evidence as follows:—
1.—The war policy of the Cabinet, at the special session called in August, 1914, for that very purpose, was unanimously approved by Parliament, no Senator and no Member of the House of Commons moving to censure the responsible ministers for their decision to have Canada to participate in the war. The two great political parties have solemnly sanctioned that decision.
2.—Public opinion was also very strongly proved by the almost unanimity of the public press patriotically supporting the stand taken by Parliament. The exceptions were so few, that, as usual, they contributed to emphasize the soundness of the general rule.
3.—During the three years following the decision of the Canadian Parliament, a great number of large public meetings were held throughout Canada, and addressed by many leading and influential citizens all approving the action of Parliament. The meetings enthusiastically concurred in the powerful indorsation of the war policy of the speakers.
In a few public gatherings some disapprovalwas expressed, but not one meeting would go to the length of passing "Resolutions" censuring the Cabinet and the Parliament of Canada, or declaring that our Dominion should not have interfered into the war.
4.—Not one petition against the Canadian intervention into the war was addressed to Parliament.
5.—Leading Clergymen, of all denominations; leaders of political associations almost of all shades of opinion; financial, industrial, commercial leaders, all of them approved the patriotic interference of Canada into the war.
6.—The evident general approval of the unanimous decision, taken in 1916, to extend the Parliamentary term.
7.—The wonderful success of the public loans raised for war purposes.
8.—The enlightened and generous patriotism with which the country has accepted and paid war taxation.
9.—But, above all, the voluntary recruiting of four hundred thousand men of all social conditions who have rallied to the flag of the Empire for the defence of her existence and for the triumph of Civilization and Justice.
I, therefore, drew the undeniable conclusion that, contrary to the "Nationalist" pretension, Canada was participating in the war in the most regular constitutional way, without even the shadow of a breach of our Canadian autonomy, of our constitutional rights and liberties.
Having affirmed that Canada had no right to interfere in the war, the "Nationalist" leaders at once concluded that she was not in duty bound to do so. That most discreditable inference was, of course, the natural sequence of the wrong principle aforesaid. They further drew the conclusion that it was no part of the duty of Canadians to join the Colors to help winning the war.
It was in flat contradiction of those erroneous notions that I positively declared, in my letter dedicating my book to my French Canadian compatriots, that "in defending with the most sincere conviction the sacred cause of the Allies, I am doing my duty as a free subject of the British Empire, as a citizen of Canada and of the Province of Quebec, as a son of France, as a devoted servant of Justice and Right."
Very narrow minded indeed is the man who has no higher conception of his duty than the one limiting him to the observance of positive and negative laws enacted by the legitimate authority to protect society and every one of its members.
When England, together with the other leading nations, was brutally challenged by Germany,and threatened in her very national existence, it is beyond comprehension that Canada, and all the British colonial possessions overseas, could so mistake their bounden duty as to refuse rushing to help the Mother Country in such a trying occurrence. Moreover, have we not, merely as men, duties to perform to protect Civilization against the deadly attack of barbarism, to have Justice and Right triumphant in international relations?
It is a matter of deep wonder to me that any one could have been so blind as not to perceive that in joining with Great Britain to defend the cause of the Allies, we were surely defending our own territory, our own soil, our own homes. How incredible was the "Nationalist" contention that we should have waited for the actual German attack of our land before mustering our resources of resistance. Who could not see, at a glance, that if Germany had, as it fully expected, easily triumphed over the combined forces of France, England and Russia, it would have been sheer madness to attempt resisting the victorious onslaught of a few hundred thousands of her veteran soldiers, whose valour would have been doubled by the enthusiasm of their European conquest.
After mature consideration of the possible results of the disastrous defeat of the combined efforts of the Allies, both on land and sea, the conclusion was forced upon my mind that Germany, ferociously elated by such a wonderful success, would no doubt have exacted from England thecession of Canada to her Empire. So that without even firing a gun against our territory, our wide Dominion would have been instantly transferred from the British to the German Sovereignty. I shuddered at such a vision, and still more deeply realized how much we, Canadians, were all in duty bound to help the Allies in crushing Prussian militarism.
In the two previously mentioned pamphlets, Mr. Bourassa argued at length to prove that Canada had been led to intervene in the great European war as a consequence of her intervention in the South African War. It is well known throughout the Dominion that the South African conflict was the occasion chosen by the "Nationalist" leader to proclaim his doctrine that the autonomous colonies should have nothing to do with the wars of the Empire—les guerres de l'empire. He then strongly opposed Canadian support of Great Britain in her struggle in South Africa.
In one of his pamphlets, Mr. Bourassa affirmed that the Government of Sir John A. Macdonald had, in 1884, refused the request of the Imperial Government to interfere in its favour in the Soudanese war. Well aware of the events of this struggle, I positively knew that the "Nationalist" leader's assertion was not borne out by the facts, and was historically false. I considered it my duty, in a special chapter, to explain fully the circumstances of the case to my French Canadian countrymen.
It should be well remembered that England was brought into the Soudanese conflict on account of her relations with Egypt, which she had delivered from the Turkish yoke.
Mr. Bourassa prefaced his above mentioned affirmation by recalling the fact that it was in consideration of the Soudanese difficulties that "for the first time in the history of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain, offers of armed support were made by the autonomous colonies."
Is it not evident that if—as was true—such offers were made spontaneously by the Colonies, it cannot be pretended that the proffered armed support was asked by England. If England did not solicit such support, it is plain that Sir John A. Macdonald and his Cabinet could not refuse what was never applied for.
What are the true historical facts?
In November 1884, General Laurie, who has represented one of the electoral divisions of Nova Scotia at Ottawa, who has also held a seat in the British House of Commons, took the initiative to propose to raise a Canadian regiment for the campaign in the Soudan. In the regular official way, General Laurie's offer was addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Derby. The Imperial Government declined the offer.
On the 7th of February, 1885, on hearing the news of the disaster of Khartoum, which caused great excitement in England, and naturally created a strong public feeling to avenge the outrage,General Laurie, always enthusiastic, tendered anew his services. He was not the only Canadian officer wishing to go and fight the cruel Soudaneses. A member of the Canadian Parliament, Colonel Williams, commanding the 46th volunteer battalion of Durham-East, also desired to take part in the African campaign with his regiment. On the 9th of February, 1885, he tendered his proposition to Sir Charles Tupper, then High Commissioner in London, who sent it to the Colonial Office.
On the 10th of February, His Excellency the Governor General, Lord Lansdowne, cabled to the Colonial Secretary that the offers of military service were very numerous. This spontaneous movement, so rapidly spreading, was the forerunner of those of 1899 and 1914. Thirty years ago, and long before, there were brave men in Canada. There always have been and ever will be.
These news were no doubt very encouraging for the Imperial authorities.
Lord Derby, thanking Lord Lansdowne, begged him to say "Whether they(the offers of service)are sanctioned and recommended by the Dominion Government."
On the 12th of February, Lord Lansdowne answered Lord Derby that the Dominion Government was ready to approve recruiting in Canada for service in Egypt or elsewhere, provided that the men would be enlisted under the authority of the Imperial Army Discipline Act, and the expense paid by the Imperial Treasury.
It consequently follows from the above despatches that the Soudanese campaign offered to many officers of our volunteer Militia the long wished for opportunity to freely tender their services to the Imperial Government; that the British authorities never applied to the Canadian Government, then presided by Sir John A. Macdonald, for armed support in Soudanese Africa; that, on being officially informed of the offers of service received by His Excellency the Governor General, the Colonial Secretary, before accepting or declining them, enquired if the Canadian Government sanctioned and recommended them; that the Governor General answered him in the affirmative, the recruiting to be made according to the Imperial Military Act at the expense of the Imperial exchequer.
On the 16th of February, the War Minister, then the Marquis of Hartington, informed the Colonial Secretary that he had come to the conclusion to decline with thanks the offers of service from Canada, for the reason that it would have taken too long a time to recruit and organize the regiments offered by General Laurie and Colonel Williams.
Was I not right, when I refuted Mr. Bourassa's assertion, in saying that if arefusalwasthengiven, it was by the British Government who had received the freely tendered services, and not by the Canadian Government, to whom no demand of armed support had been made by Great Britain?
If it is indeed very astonishing that Mr. Bourassa should have taken the responsibility to affirm that the Government of Sir John A. Macdonald had refused to help Great Britain in the Soudanese campaign, it is easy to understand his object in so doing. His purpose was to convince his French Canadian readers that the political leaders at the head of the Government, in 1899 and 1914, together with the Canadian Parliament, had, in a revolutionary way, reversed the traditional policy of Canada of non-intervention in the "wars of the Empire"—les guerres de l'empire. And to achieve his end, so detrimental to the best interests of the Dominion, he did not hesitate to draw an absolutely erroneous conclusion from undeniable historical facts.
The "Nationalist" leader was very anxious to charge the chieftains of the two great political parties with an equal responsibility for what he terms a "Revolution" in our relations with the Mother Country. With this object constantly in view, he pretended that the intervention of Canada in the South African War created the precedent which brought about the Dominion participation in the European war, in 1914. In order to stir up to the utmost the prejudices of the French Canadians, he boldly qualified the South African conflict as aninfamous crimeon the part of England.
Unfortunately, the true history of the difficulties which culminated in the Boer War of 1899,was at the time little known throughout Canada, and even less particularly in the Province of Quebec. At the outbreak of the struggle, wishing to form a sound opinion of the causes of which it was the direct outcome, I made an exhaustive study of the South African question, beginning at the very inception of the Dutch settlement dating as far back as 1652, the year during which the Dutch East India Company occupied Table Bay. Six years later, in 1658, French Huguenots reached South Africa, joining with the Dutch Reformists, who rather energetically did all they could to assimilate them. Still later on, besides some few German immigrants, a third group of Europeans settled on the African coast. They were Englishmen.
All the Europeans, on landing in South Africa, few in numbers, had at once to contend with the black race numbering many millions. The history of the long struggle between European civilization, represented by the English and Dutch immigrants, and African barbarity, is indeed very interesting. Carefully read and studied in all its bearings, it strongly impressed upon my mind the conviction that had it not been for the timely armed protection they often solicited and received from England, the Dutch Boers would certainly have been annihilated by the tribes of the black race. They could not hope to successfully resist the onslaughts to which they were repeatedly submitted. They were saved from utter destructionby the strong arm of Great Britain, occupying an important strategical position by her Cape Colony. The British Government had favoured the settlement of the sons of England in South Africa, for the purpose of assuring, by a powerful naval station, the freedom of communication with the great regions soon to develop into her vast Indian Empire.
How, and under what circumstances, was British Sovereignty established in South Africa? I considered this question the most important to ascertain, in order to judge fairly the history of the last century in those regions. It was settled by the Peace Congress of Vienna, in 1815. All the European nations represented at that congress, have sanctioned British Sovereignty in South Africa upon the condition of the payment by England to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, of which Holland was then a part, of the sum of $30,000,000. Consequently the Sovereign Rights of Great Britain in South Africa were henceforth undeniable.