II.

O, dread was the time, and more dreadful the omen,When the brave on Marengo lay slaughtered in vain,And beholding broad Europe bow’d down by her foemen,Pitt closed in his anguish the map of her reign!Not the fate of broad Europe could bend his brave spiritTo take for his country the safety of shame;O, then in her triumph remember his spirit,And hallow the goblet that flows to his name.

Not the fate of broad Europe could bend his brave spiritTo take for his country the safety of shame;O, then in her triumph remember his spirit,And hallow the goblet that flows to his name.

Round the husbandman’s head while he traces the furrowThe mists of the winter may mingle with rain.He may plough it with labour and sow it in sorrow,And sigh while he fears he has sow’d it in vain;He may die ere his children shall reap in their gladness;But the blithe harvest-home shall remember his claim;And their jubilee-shout shall be softened with sadness,While they hallow the goblet that flows to his name.

Though anxious and timeless his life was expended,It toils for our country preserved by his care,Though he died ere one ray o’er the nations ascended,To light the long darkness of doubt and despair;The storms he endured in our Britain’s December,The perils his wisdom foresaw and o’ercame,In her glory’s rich harvest shall Britain remember,And hallow the goblet that flows to his name.

February 1.—His Royal Highness was cold with me for several days; but when he found my opinion to be the prevalent one, and even that of the King himself, he very handsomely gave way, and, having sent for me, by a fair and honest avowal of his mistake, left me more satisfied with him than before. The new Ministry was appointed a few days after this.

Lord Grenville and Fox were its two leaders, and their respective adherents and friends made up the Cabinet.[9]

The Prince of Wales went most heartily andunbecominglywith them, and lowered his dignity by soliciting office and places for his dependents, and by degrading himself into the size of a common party leader.

From this moment I withdrew entirely from official men, my determination being to act as if Mr. Pitt was alive, and to endeavour to regulate my political conduct, and that of those I influenced, on what I supposed would be his, were he still in existence, whether in or out of office.

I told this to Lords Bathurst and Camden on the 27th January, considering these two as morepersonally, and less politically, attached to him, than any one else, not excepting Canning himself.

On the 4th February, Lord Carrington came to me in consequence of my having canvassed him for his interest at Cambridge University for Lord Palmerston. This he promised me in the handsomest manner; but I was surprised—when I lamented Mr. Pitt’s death, and spoke of the wisdom and propriety of his friends’ acting together, and in conformity to his doctrines and principles—to find Lord Carrington lukewarm on the subject. He said he conceived “wewere allnowfree to act as we pleased. All bond of union was dissolved; no obligation remained with anyone to abide by a party which had lost its leader,and with its leader everything.” He said this in so very positive a way, that I contented myself with saying my sentiments were directly contrary to his, but that it was not for me to dispute with him on a point rather of feeling than of party. Lord Carrington was profuse in his lamentations on the death of Pitt, and equally so in his profession of friendship and gratitude to him, and respect for his memory, and, as a proof, he instanced his wish, that the part of Mr. Pitt’s debts, arising from a loan his friends contributed to raise for him in 1800, should not be produced when the items of them were laid before the House. [N.B. the House had voted a public funeral, and to pay Mr. Pitt’s debts immediately after his death, which Wyndham (strange to say) opposed, giving as a motive that no publicfuneral had been decreed to Burke.] Lord Carrington, however, said he was overruled by the Bishop of Lincoln, Prettyman[10](who had been Pitt’s private tutor at Cambridge), who assured him it was one of Pitt’s last dying requests, that the six friends who had advanced him certain sums should be repaid. (They were Lord Bathurst and Carrington, Steele, Bishop of Lincoln, and two others, who at the time never would take any acknowledgment, or ever expected to be repaid.) This assertion of the Bishop of Lincoln, Lord Carrington said, shut his mouth, and the debt was laid before the House, which raised his (Pitt’s) debts to 43,000l.

Ministers went on quietly, and with a very large majority, the whole year of 1806. In June an idea was suggested to make a push at them before the Recess, and I had several conversations with Canning, and one with Perceval on the subject, and constant ones with the Duke of Portland, who, by having undergone an operation for the stone, was wonderfully recovered.

House of Commons.—Mr. Fox attended; and Mr. Wyndham opened his military plans: about 350 Members present. His speech lasted four hours. Lord Castlereagh spoke next—about an hour and a half. Mr. Fox about an hour, and Mr. Yorke the same; he was followed by Sir James Pulteney, General Tarleton, and Colonel Crawfurd, &c. The House rose at half-past one without any division; and leave was given to bring in four Bills. The first of which was for the repeal of the additional force, or Parish Recruiting Act; the others for further suspending the militia ballot; altering the levyen masse, or training Act; and for increasing the Chelsea Hospital privileges and allowances.

Mr. Wyndham’s plan consisted in these points:—

1. To supply, maintain, and increase the regular army, byrecruiting for term of years, renewing the service at the end of seven and fourteen years: even for a further period; making twenty-one years in the whole. The second and third periods of renewed service to be attended with some small increase of pay,e.g.6d. for the first, and 1s. per week for the second period, and an increased Chelsea pension to every soldier at the end of twenty-one years. Also an increase of widows’ pensions, and of the Compassionate List; and this to be the only mode of recruiting.

2. To reduce the militia gradually to its original or lowest standard, viz. about 36,000 for England, by not filling up the vacancies.

3. The volunteer establishment to be reduced in expense, by striking off inspecting field officers, permanent duty pay, and lowering the high allowances to the lowest rate, called the August allowances. The clothing now due (being the fourth year) to be continued for this issue only, and no person hereafter becoming volunteer to have any assistance from Government but arms; and an exemption from the operation of the General Training Act.

4. All persons of military age, from eighteen to forty, to be liable to be trained to arms when called out by classes, but not to be embodied in corps; and to be relieved also from the training, either by entering into a volunteer corps, or paying a fine; and the numbers for training,e.g.100,000 for one year, to be taken by lot out of the given classes.

Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 92.

[Feb.]28th.—Lord Hawkesbury called on the Catholic clauses in the Mutiny Bill, to express his alarms, and those of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Perceval and Sir William Scott, about the apprehended extension of the Irish law of 1793, by now enabling Catholics to be Generals on the Staff.

Sunday, March 1st.—Lord Sidmouth called. He desired to deposit with me his determination not to agree to granting the Catholics liberty to hold staff commissions. The King had with difficulty been persuaded by Lord Sidmouth to consent even to extend the Irish Act of 1793 to Catholic officers in the army, when coming to England; but had acceded to it at last, as a strict consequence of the Union; the Irish law then in force being virtually adopted for England. Lord Howick admitted that in the House of Commons he had given no other intimation of his notice. The Duke of Bedford and the Irish Government had understood the same things, and explained the concession on this ground to be only to the Catholics in Dublin. That it was now proposed, because the minute of Cabinet had been worded generally, that it should be carried into effect in its largest sense; and the King was again to be asked for his consent. The Cabinet were about to meet this day upon that express topic.

2nd.—Lord Sidmouth called. The Cabinet had parted yesterday upon a resolution to proceed with the Catholic clauses, although they admitted that the King had not been specifically acquainted with that part of the measure which enabled Catholics to become Generals on the Staff; and although Lord Sidmouth had consented only to the application of the law of 1793; and although Lord Henry Petty, and Lord Holland, and Lord Howick allowed that he had never consented beyond that; and although Lord Howick admitted that, in his notice to the House of Commons, he had not in his own mind, any larger measure, &c. &c. But Lord Grenville declined to be the person who should state the subject again to the King or ask his consent upon it. Lord Sidmouth said he certainly would not interfere by volunteering his advice to the King; but, when he should see the King on Wednesday, he should, if asked by the King, give his own opinion and act upon it, whether sanctioned by the King or not; and so the Cabinet parted.

In the House of Commons Lord Howick first mentioned to me the Catholic clauses, and asked whether I thought they mustnecessarily pass through a Committee of the whole House, as being of religion. I told him that had really never occurred to me, but I would look into it and let him know; and although I entirely disapproved of what he was about, it was no reason why we should not freely converse about all the forms of proceeding.

The House engaged from six in the evening till six in the morning, hearing counsel and witnesses on the Westminster petition, complaining of Mr. Sheridan for having tampered with witnesses.

3rd.—Searched precedents for Catholic clauses. Lord Howick postponed the Mutiny Bill Committee. I showed him the precedents I had collected. He hoped “I should not take any part in the Committee.” But I told him that “I must inevitably do so.”

4th.—Lord Howick wrote me the following note:—

[Private.]

Stratton Street,March 4, 1807.

My dear Sir,

I believe I shall alter my course of proceeding respecting the new clauses, and introduce a new Bill instead. As themeasureis the subject of a notice for discussion to-day, though in another form, I take it for granted there can be no objection to my moving for leave to bring in a Bill, if I should ultimately determine to do so, instead of moving an instruction on the clauses in a committee.

I am afraid I have been guilty of an omission in not moving for an address in answer to the King’s message, which I see was done in the House of Lords yesterday; but, as the treaty was not laid before the House, and the only matter on which a proceeding of the House was to be had was voting the money, I thought it was the best way to refer the message to the Committee of Supply; in which it was proposed to vote to-day the sum advanced to the King of Prussia. Will you have the goodness to let me know, when I come to the Houseto-day, whether this has been the usual course of proceeding; or whether, if it should not be deemed sufficiently respectful, anything can now be done to correct the error.

I am, my dear Sir,Ever yours sincerely,Howick.

He drank tea with me in my room behind the chair. I told him I wished he would confine his Bill to the Irish Law of 1793. To that I could agree; but not without the same exclusion from the high military offices. He said, “That was buta small object.” I replied, “But the principle is large. You will never satisfy Mr. Keogh.” He said, “Oh, I did not think of trying at that. But I have said too much on this subject to let things remain as they are; we must do what satisfies us, whether it satisfies Mr. Keogh or not.”

Source.—Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, first Earl of Malmesbury, 1844. Vol. iv., p. 360.

Copy of a Letter from the Duke of Portland to the King, sent Thursday Evening, March 12th, 1807, to the Queen’s House, acknowledged by Colonel Taylor Friday Morning the 13th.

Burlington House,March 12th, 1807.

Sir,

I am so sensible of my presumption in addressing your Majesty on a subject of a public nature, that nothing but the confidence I have in your Majesty’s goodness, and the attachment I bear your Majesty, would induce me to do it. But it is a subject of such infinite magnitude, that, were I silent, I feel I should deserve to forfeit that I am most ambitious to be considered, of being looked upon by your Majesty as one of your Majesty’s most loyal and devoted subjects and servants.

Your Majesty will probably anticipate the subject on which I cannot but express my anxiety to lay my sentiments at your Majesty’s feet.

It is the Bill just proposed by Lord Howick, granting indulgences to the Catholics; a measure, that should any peculiarityof circumstances have induced your Majesty to acquiesce in, I should still think that by following the dictates of my own conscience and voting against it, I should not offend your Majesty.

But, impressed as I am with a belief of what must be your Majesty’s opinions and wishes, I could not forgive myself were I to conceal from your Majesty that your opinion is mistaken and your wishes not generally understood; and, humbly permit me to represent to your Majesty that it cannot well be otherwise, since one of your Majesty’s principal Ministers in the House of Commons brings in the Bill. Should I be wrong, and your Majesty has not given your consent to the measure in its present shape, I have little apprehension in giving it as my opinion that it may ultimately be defeated in its progress, though not, I fear, till it comes into the House of Lords; but, for this purpose, I must fairly state to your Majesty, that your wishes must be distinctly known, and that your present Ministers should not have any pretext for equivocating upon the subject, or any ground whatever to pretend ignorance of your Majesty’s sentiments and determination, not only to withhold your sanction from the present measure, but to use all your influence in resisting it.

The effect of such a proceeding is so obvious, that I would not suggest it, did I not believe that your Majesty’s business would be at a stand in such a case; and that persons would not be ready to come forward (should your Majesty think fit to call upon them) who are capable and willing to undertake the management of your Majesty’s affairs. But for this purpose it would be highly necessary and advantageous that the public should know the necessity to which your Majesty was driven of taking the conduct of your affairs out of the hands of those who now administer them; that for this purpose your Majesty should send for Lord Grenville, and state to him distinctly, that either your sentiments had been misrepresented or that you never had consented to the measure proposed by Lord Howick, and that, consistently with the opinion your Majesty had uniformly expressed, it never could or would have your Royal assent. It would then remain with LordGrenville and his colleagues to take their part; possibly they might give way and still remain your Majesty’s Ministers; but, should they refuse to submit themselves to your Majesty’s pleasure, the necessity of employing other persons would be obvious to the whole world. The designs (which my feelings may possibly lead me unjustly to attribute to them) could no longer be mistaken, viz.: that the most venerated and sacred barriers of our constitution should be undermined and sapped for the purpose of introducing a new system into Church and State, and that your Majesty was reduced to the necessity of submitting to them or quarrelling with your Parliament.

Under such circumstances I cannot but believe, and cannot fear to assure your Majesty, that the nation as well as individuals will come forward in support of the established laws of the realm, and that persons will be found able to carry on your Majesty’s business with talents and abilities equal to those of your present Ministers. If your Majesty should suppose that in the forming of such an Administration, I can offer your Majesty any services, I am devoted to your Majesty’s commands; but, while I say this, I feel conscious that my time of life, my infirmities, and my want of abilities are not calculated for so high a trust. I, however, can say that if, in this very momentous crisis, your Majesty calls upon me, I will serve you zealously and faithfully to the end of my existence.[11]

The great error of politicians is that old fancy of Solon, who insisted that it was infamous for a citizen to be of no party, and endeavoured by a law to make the Athenians hypocrites. This conceit not only destroys every idea of mediation between two parties, but does not even suppose that both may be wrong. Yet all history may convince us,that he who resolutely professes himself attached to any party, is in danger of yielding to every extreme for the mere reputation of his opinion: he will argue for the most manifest errors of this or that statesman, because he has hitherto agreed with him—an obstinacy as stupid, as if a pedestrian were to express his satisfaction with a tempest at night, because he had enjoyed sunshine in the morning.

The big and little Endians inGulliverhave not yet taught us the folly of mere party: and one of the most ridiculous inconsistencies in the human character is that enjoyment which all ages have expressed in satirical productions, without receiving benefit from them: they drink the physic with a bold and pleasant countenance, and instantly prepare to counteract its effect; or rather, every man thinks the physic excellent for everybody but himself.—“Party,” says Swift, “is the madness of many for the gain of a few.” WhenScarmentadoin Voltaire arrived at Ispahan, he was asked whether he was for black mutton or white mutton: he replied, that it was equally indifferent to him, provided it was tender. A wise man knows no party abstracted from its utility, or existing, like a shadow, merely from the opposition of some body. Yet, in the present day, we are all so erroneously sociable, that every man, as well as every journal, must belong to some class of politicians; he is either Pittite or Foxite, Windhamite, Wilberforcite, or Burdettite: though at the same time two-thirds of these disturbers of coffee-houses might with as much reason call themselves Hivites or Shunamites, or perhaps Bedlamites.

Tuesday, December 1st.—Received the following letter from Perceval:

Dear Mr. Speaker,

The Parliament will not meet till the Thursday after the birthday. I am culpable in not having sent you earlierintelligence, but the day was not fixed till Wednesday last, and, of the determination not to meet till near the birthday, unless circumstances particularly required it, you were apprised by me before.

* * * * * * * *

The business of recasting the law of trade and navigation, as far as belligerent principles are concerned, for the whole world, has occupied me very unremittingly for a long time; and the subject is so extensive, and the combinations so various, that, even supposing our principles to be right, I cannot hope that the execution of the principle must not in many respects be defective; and I have no doubt we shall have to watch it with new provisions and regulations for some time.

The short principle is that trade in British produce and manufactures, and trade either from a British port or with a British destination, is to be protected as much as possible. For this purpose all the countries where French influence prevails to exclude the British flag shall have no trade but to and from the country, or from its allies. All other countries, the few that remain strictly neutral (with the exception of the colonial trade, which backwards and forwards direct they may carry on) cannot trade but through this being done as an ally with any of the countries connected with France. If, therefore, we can accomplish our purposes, it will come to this, that either those countries will have no trade, or they must be content to accept it through us.

This is a formidable and tremendous state of the world; but all the part of it which is particularly harassing to English interests was existing through the new severity with which Buonaparte’s decrees of exclusion against our trade were called into action.

Our proceeding does not aggravate our distress from it. If he can keep out our trade he will; and he would do so if he could, independent of our orders. Our orders only add this circumstance: they say to the enemy, if you will not haveourtrade, as far as we can help it you shall havenone. And as to so much of any trade as you can carry on yourselves,or others carry on with you through us, if you admit it, you shall pay for it. The only trade cheap and untaxed which you shall have, shall be either direct from us, in our own produce and manufactures, or from our allies, whose increased prosperity will be an advantage to us.

* * * * * * * *

Yours, very truly,Sp. Perceval.

Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester.Vol. ii., p. 164.

[Jan.]21st.—The annexed bulletin was circulated.

Downing Street,Jan. 21st.

Brigadier General Stewart arrived this morning at Lord Castlereagh’s with despatches from Sir John Moore, dated Corunna, 13th inst., upon which place he had directed his retreat, and not on Vigo, as he originally intended. Sir John Moore had effected his retreat to Corunna with the loss of only part of his baggage; there had been repeated skirmishes with the rear guard, in which we had uniformly repulsed the enemy, and at Vigo Sir John Moore offered the enemy battle, but the French declined it. The enemy, when Brigadier General Stewart left Corunna, were in force in the neighbourhood, but it was trusted that Sir John Moore would effect his re-embarkation without much loss, as the transports which he had sent for from Vigo were entering the Bay at Corunna, when General Stewart sailed on the 14th.

Source.—Charles Wolfe.

Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note,As his corse to the rampart we hurried;Not a soldier discharged his farewell shotO’er the grave where our hero we buried.

We buried him darkly, at dead of night,The sods with our bayonets turning;By the struggling moonbeam’s misty light,And the lantern dimly burning.

No useless coffin enclosed his breast,Not in sheet or in shroud we wound him;But he lay like a warrior taking his rest,With his martial cloak around him.

Few and short were the prayers we said,And we spoke not a word of sorrow;But we steadfastly gazed on the face that was dead,And we bitterly thought of the morrow.

We thought, as we hollowed his narrow bed,And smoothed down his lonely pillow,That the foe and the stranger would tread o’er his head,And we far away on the billow!

Lightly they’ll talk of the spirit that’s gone,And o’er his cold ashes upbraid him;—But little he’ll reck, if they let him sleep onIn the grave where a Briton has laid him.

But half of our heavy task was doneWhen the clock struck the note for retiring:And we heard the distant and random gunThat the foe was sullenly firing.

Slowly and sadly we laid him down,From the field of his fame fresh and gory;We carved not a line, and we raised not a stone—But we left him alone with his glory!

Lord Mulgrave to Mr. Rose.

Admiralty,Feb. 4th, 1809.

My dear Rose,

It must be ever unpleasant to me not to accede at once to any measure proposed by you and by Canning; more especially as I find the Memorial is in the hands of the clerks of the Council before I had an opportunity of answering your note.

Since I came into office I have proceeded on all questions of augmentation of salaries, on a strong impression of the importance of public economy, and on a full conviction that the advance of any one salary does not rest there, but raises a cry of claim, founded upon relative duties and rank, with an air of justice from precedent; which involves either an excessive increase of charge to the public, or an imputation of harshness and injustice, against the person in authority, who rejects the authority of the precedent, and refuses the increase demanded. I feel how impossible it is for me to follow up the principle I have set out upon either with comfort to myself or advantage to the public, if I alone pursue it. Upon all the demands of clerks for increase of salary, I have consulted Perceval, to ascertain how far the general charges upon the funds of Government would be influenced by such increase; because I know that the advance in one department must be followed by a similar advance in every other. I relinquished, on the representation of Perceval, a most important, and almost necessary, measure of increasing the appointments oftheNavalLords of the Admiralty. I rejected the recommendation of the Commissioners of Naval Revision for the addition of £200 per annum to the Commissioners of the Navy, because I did not think that increase necessary, whilst so many eager candidates were pressing for the situation. If the Paymaster to the Treasurer of the Navy has his salary raised, will not the Commissioners of Victualling and Transport Boards, whose duties are so constant and laborious, especially the former, have a claim to a similar advance? I have refused the advance to the Commissioners at the Cape as recommended by the Commissioners of Naval Revision; and in short I have consented to no increase of salary without being persuaded that proper persons could not be found without such increase; and therefore, as far as my consent is required, I cannot give it, but upon that persuasion, in any case. I am aware that I have created much dissatisfaction by holding the public purse-strings so close; but it is from an apprehension that without very rigid economy we can neither retain the goodwill of the public, nor hold out against the perseverance and resources of the enemy.

Ever yours sincerely,Mulgrave.

Sunday, Sept. 10th.—Received the following letter from Perceval.

[Most private and confidential.]

Downing Street,Sept. 9th, 1809.

My dear Mr. Speaker,

I cannot let the week close without giving you some information (though I have delayed till now giving you any, with the hopes of giving you more than I am able, even at present) upon a subject of great importance.

The Duke of Portland has resigned, the King only desiring he would keep his office till some arrangement might be made for his successor. The story is a great deal too long fora note or a letter; suffice it to say, that it is mixed in some respects with the most painful considerations that it has ever been my misfortune to have felt.

Whether it will be possible for us to form any arrangement, or what it will be, I really cannot at present state to you, as I do not know myself. According to present appearances, Castlereaghcannotstay with us, from a sense of what is due to himself; and Canningwillnot. Conceive me then, and my situation in your house, under such circumstances, and judge whether, if these appearances are realised, it would be just by the King or by the country in me, to affect to be able to remain either without them or some otherstrength, where how to acquire it is not very easy to imagine.

I wished you not to know this subject from any other quarter but myself, and I feel that I have only whetted your curiosity, and it would take a volume to communicate it fully. Possibly, therefore, till a personal meeting, I must defer the full explanation. The result, whatever it may be, you shall hear as soon as I can tell you. The cruel thing upon Castlereagh is, that though this is entirely independent of the late expedition, it is next to impossible but that the public impression will connect the two together.

I am, my dear Mr. Speaker,Yours very truly,Sp. Perceval.

Letter from Mr. Perceval.

Downing Street,Sept. 20th, 1809.

Dear Mr. Speaker,

I have had so much to say that I have no time to say it; but I might have found time to have thanked you for your kind and ready answer to my former letter.

You have judged meperfectly right. If you had asked myadvice I could not have been so dishonest as not to have given it for the decision you have made. Castlereagh and Canning have been fighting. Thank God Canning is not severely hurt, and Castlereagh is not touched. Terrible, all this, for public impression. What we are to do is not finally settled. It must end in an attempt to form an united Government with our opponents. But it is a bitter pill to swallow for more than one.

When I can tell you anything positive, and can get a moment to tell it, I will.

Yours very truly,Sp. Perceval.

January 26, 1810.—The thanks of the Lords were voted to Lord Viscount Wellington for his services on the 27th and 28th of July, 1809, at the victory of Talavera. The title of Viscount Wellington of Talavera was conferred on the 4th of September, 1809. The motion was made by Lord Liverpool and opposed by Lords Suffolk, Grosvenor, and Grey. The following protest was inserted:

1st. Because in the battle of Talavera, though eminently distinguished by those splendid proofs of discipline and valour which his Majesty’s troops have never failed to display, we cannot recognize those unequivocal characteristics of victory which can alone form an adequate title to the thanks of this House. On the contrary, that the British army appears to have been improvidently led into a situation, in which the repulse of the enemy, effected with a great loss, produced neither security from a subsequent attack, nor relief from the distress under which our brave troops were suffering, and was immediately followed by the necessity of a precipitate retreat, whereby our wounded were left to fall into the hands of the enemy.2ndly, Because, by voting the thanks of this House on such an occasion, we diminish the value of the most honourable reward we have it in our power to confer, whilst we indirectly sanction the propriety of that elevation to the honours of the peerage, with which his Majesty, without inquiry, was advised to mark his approbation of the commander of his army in Spain, at a time when his ministers were informed of the unfortunate consequences which might be expected to follow, and in fact did follow, that dear-bought success.Charles Grey,Earl Grey.James Maitland,Lord Lauderdale(Earl of Lauderdale).

2ndly, Because, by voting the thanks of this House on such an occasion, we diminish the value of the most honourable reward we have it in our power to confer, whilst we indirectly sanction the propriety of that elevation to the honours of the peerage, with which his Majesty, without inquiry, was advised to mark his approbation of the commander of his army in Spain, at a time when his ministers were informed of the unfortunate consequences which might be expected to follow, and in fact did follow, that dear-bought success.

Charles Grey,Earl Grey.James Maitland,Lord Lauderdale(Earl of Lauderdale).

Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 232.

The following squib was published in the papers at this time on the Walcheren Expedition:

Extract from the Grand Romantic Drama lately performed for the Amusement of the Emperor of France.

Act I., Scene 1.—Cabinet Council discovered; Naval and Military Officers attending.

First Cabinet Minister.We now are met in grave deliberationUpon the plan for Antwerp’s subjugation,That we may not despatch this expeditionWithout due caution, knowledge and precision.Ye officers of military fame,We wish for your opinion of the same.1st Mil. Officer.I wrote before my reasons in detail,Why I esteem your plan quite sure to fail.Lord C—gh.You think ’twill fail?2nd Mil. Officer.And so do I.3rd Mil. Officer.And I.Lord C—gh.All of you think so: better go and try.But, ere our army sails, ’tis fit we knowSomething about the place to which they’ll go.Pray, sirs, is Antwerp fortified or no?1st Mil. Officer.Rumour reports it fortified full well,But I, not having been there, cannot tell.2nd Mil. Officer.I know no more.3rd Mil. Officer.Nor I, I do declare.Lord C—gh.Well, well—they’ll see directly they get there.Lord M—ve.But as the chief design of this great feat,Captain, will be to take the Antwerp fleet;Say, can the frigates, or can any ship,Sail up above, and so give us the slip?Naval Officer.Had I been there, I could have told you whatThe water’s depth; but having ne’er, cannot.Lord M—ve.This is no cause our plan should be forsaken,It will be known as soon as Antwerp’s taken.Lord E—n.But shan’t we lose the fleet? Then there’ll be laughter.Lord M—ve.Lose it? If they go up, mayn’t we go after?Lord E—n.Our friend the smuggler says the troops are few;And then the garrison—Pray what think you?1st Mil. Officer.Few on the coast may be, and in the town;But from the country they can soon bring downA force too large for us to hope to lick;And all that’s done must be done very quick.Lord Ch—m.Fear not: delay was ne’er a fault of mine;And every morning I’ll get up at nine—Dressed, breakfast done by twelve—no speed I’ll lack,And do it all completely in a crack.1st Cab. Min.Brave warriors, your advice and informationHas now received our full consideration.[Exeunt Mil. and Naval Officers.Lord C—gh.As secrecy’s the soul of expeditions,I see no use in telling the physiciansWhither it’s going; but desire they wouldSend plenty of what physic they think good.EnterSir Lucas Pepys.(To Sir L. P.) Prepare (I can’t tell rightly against when)Physic enough for forty thousand men,But do it quick; what’s proper you can tell.[ExitSir L. P.Mr. P—l.Now there’s no fear but all will answer well;So excellent we’ve made each preparation,And all so accurate our information.When Parliament meets next how fine a storyShall we not have to tell of wars and glory.[Exeunt.Manet,Mr. C—g,Solus.Mr. C—g.Most of this plan is gibberish to me,But I shall quietly lie by and seeHow it goes on; and then, if all succeeds,I share the praise; but if it ill proceedsI’ll try what, leaving this ungoverned crew,Setting up statesmen for myself will do.[END OF ACT FIRST.]

The rest of the play is of so very tragic and horrible a cast, that we think the author will not be justified in bringing it forward, and we decline publishing any further extracts at present.

Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 243.

[March] 30th.—House of Commons. Resumed Walcheren debate. At four in the morning divided four times.

I. To censure the policy, 227; against it, 275.

II. To justify it, 272; against it, 232.

III. To censure the retention, 224; against the censure, 275.

IV. To excuse the delay in evacuating it, 253; against that, 232.

Adjourned after seven o’clock.

The second division, the largest in this Parliament except that of June 1807, upon the address of the change of Ministry.

N.B.—It was the general opinion that the only resolution upon this business which wasindisputably untruewas theunanimous votethat the failure was not imputable to any misconduct of the officers by sea or land.

My own opinion certainly was contrary to any such resolution. For, first, it was in evidence that the wind and weather did not prevent Lord Huntley from landing in Cadsand, in good time to have destroyed the batteries of Breskens, and opened a passage for the fleet up the Wieling Channel, clear of Flushing. And, secondly, there was no evidence to provethat the whole fleet might not have gone up that channel with Lord Gardner’s squadron, instead of going originally into the Stonediep: the further deviation into the Roompot, which ruined the whole prospect of getting to Antwerp up the West Scheldt, was probably inevitable after the fleet had once missed their entrance by Cadsand and the Wieling Channel.

It suited the Opposition to exculpate the land and naval service,becausethen the failure (by their reasoning) exclusively followed fromthe plan, and the plan only. It alsosuited the Ministers, partly because they had advised the King to tell the City of London that there was no ground for military inquiry (they then not knowing of Lord Chatham’s narrative); and partly from a proper desire to avoid throwing blame upon those who served under them by their own appointment.

Cartaxo,2nd Dec., 1810.

I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of their war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz, the seat of their Government, upon having one or two more or less British regiments; and that after having been shut in for 10 months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them. The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanishnation, till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.

Cartaxo,16th Dec., 1810.

I have had some difficulties lately with the Spanish muleteers attached to the British army, in consequence of the general requisition which is said to be made of all individuals of the military ages for the army.

I doubt very much whether this requisition is or can be enforced; and I believe that the magistrates in the different districts are very glad to show the activity and steadiness with which they execute the law, by calling for these people who they know will quit with reluctance the lucrative business in which they are engaged, to serve as soldiers. However, I cannot encourage them to stay away when they are called for; and I very much apprehend that the army will be reduced to the greatest distress if they should leave us, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken, and the expense which I have incurred, to have it equipped as it ought to be with the means of transport.

It appears to me that the production of a certificate from me, or Colonel Alava, or Colonel O’Lawlor, that a man is employed as a muleteer with the British army, might exempt him from service as a soldier, without any great violation of principle or any inconvenience. I do not believe that the whole number of persons of this description exceeds 500; and of these many cannot be of the military ages.

I hope some arrangement will be adopted upon this subject; and I can only say that if something is not done, and I am to be deprived of all those persons of this description who have until now been attached to this army, I shall be entirely crippled, and it will be a question whether we ought not to quit the Peninsula entirely. I doubt that even here we could exist one day without their assistance.

Cartaxo,21st Dec., 1810.

I did not know what to say about the reduction of the number of our transports in the Tagus: I have no apprehension that we shall be obliged to embark, and no idea that the enemy will for a length of time be in a situation to oblige us to think of such an operation; but I cannot, as an Officer, be so certain of the course of events as to tell you that the transports may be withdrawn.

It may be necessary to request your attention for a few moments to explain our situation in reference to that of the enemy, and the general state of affairs in the Peninsula as affecting this question. I have no doubt that the enemy is not, and does not consider himself, able to force the position of the allies in this country. Indeed, I believe I have the means of beating the force now opposed to me, in their own position, of course with the sacrifice of a certain loss of men.

I think that the paper published in theMoniteurof the 23rd November shows that our position in front of Lisbon is considered so strong, that it ought not to be attacked in front; and, from the perusal of that paper, I am of opinion that the enemy will endeavour to maintain a position in this country with the troops now in it, probably reinforced by some of those now on the frontier, and will endeavour to dislodge us by occupying the countries north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, and thus distress us for supplies. The accomplishment of this plan will require an enormous force and some length of time; but when I recollect that in the last year the whole of the north of Spain, and of Old Castille, were abandoned by the enemy, even before the battle of Talavera, I cannot doubt that they will abandon those countries likewise upon the existing emergency, which will give them a part of the force they require.

I am also certain that, if the British army should not be obliged to evacuate Portugal, the French army must withdrawfrom Andalusia. I think it not improbable, therefore, that a large part of it, if not the whole of the French army in Andalusia, will be introduced into the southern parts of this kingdom.

I do not despair of holding my ground against this accumulation of force, and I have taken measures to prevent the only inconvenience which it can produce, viz., a deficiency of supplies. But as these troops are all within a few marches of me, and an order from Paris would not only put them in motion, but they could be in this country almost before the transports could arrive in England, I cannot think it advisable, in the existing situation of affairs, to send them out of my reach.

The question whether I should attack the enemy in the position which he now occupies has been well considered by me. I have a superior army, I think, by 10,000 men, or one sixth, including the Spaniards; and, notwithstanding some defects in its composition, I think I should succeed. But the loss must necessarily be very great in killed and wounded; and the necessity which would exist of exposing the troops to the weather for some days and nights would throw a great proportion of this convalescent army into the hospital. Then what is to be gained in this action, in which failure would be the loss of the whole cause? Nothing at present that I know of, excepting to relieve the northern provinces and Andalusia from the presence of the enemy; which relief it is probable that the course of events will bring about, without the risk and loss of an action.

But there is another view of this question, which is a very serious one, and has made much impression upon my mind. If the northern provinces of Spain and Andalusia should be relieved from the pressure and presence of the enemy by the course of events, or by exertions in Portugal, what will the cause gain by this relief? In the last year I cannot forget that I brought upon myself and General Cuesta not less than 5corps d’armée, and the King’s guards and reserve, more than equal to a 6th corps; and that when the whole of Castille and the north of Spain was cleared of the enemy, not a manwas put in the field by those provinces, nor even one raised!

In this year I have had 3corps d’armée, the most numerous and efficient in Spain, upon my hands for 8 months. The kingdom of Galicia has been entirely free from the enemy, and Castille partially relieved. The Spanish army in Galicia have made no movement whatever, as General Mahy says, for want of great coats; but in fact, because they want pay, clothing, means of subsistence, transport, discipline, and every thing which can keep a body of men together in an operation. In Castille nothing has been done, excepting that the guerrillas have been more daring and successful in their robberies.

The relief of Andalusia would, I fear, make no difference in the situation of affairs there. I do not think it quite certain that the enemy would be obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz, although it is probable that he would. But if the siege of Cadiz were not raised, the general cause would derive no advantage from the relief of Andalusia; and even if the raising the siege of Cadiz were the consequence of the relief of Andalusia, I doubt that there are means at Cadiz of putting into the field the troops now composing the garrison of that place, so as to render them a disposable force for the cause of their allies, or that any benefit would be derived from that event, excepting that it would place at the disposal of the allies the means which the enemy have collected for the siege of Cadiz, and retard, and probably prevent, the operation.

Your Lordship will probably deem this a melancholy picture of prospect, in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth. This state of affairs in Spain is the result of some defects in the national character, aggravated by the false principles on which all the affairs of the country have been conducted since it attempted to shake off the yoke of France. The Spaniards have consequently no army; no means of raising one; no authority to discipline an army if they could raise one; no means to arm, equip, clothe, or feed anything which could be collected under that name. The war in the Peninsula,therefore, as far as the Spaniards are concerned in it, cannot take a regular shape. It must be confined to the operations of the guerrillas, upon which the calculations are very different from those which would be made in respect to the operations of a more regular force.

If all this be true, our business is not to fight the French army, which we certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but to give occupation to as large a portion of it as we can manage, and to leave the war in Spain to the guerrillas. As long as the French do not interfere with our supplies, or the resources of the Portuguese Government, or any point of our security, I think it very immaterial whether they are in Spain or Portugal. Indeed, adverting to the greater difficulties they have in subsisting in the latter country and in keeping up their communications, I believe it is more advantageous that they should be where they are. Their numbers are certainly diminishing daily, while they do us no mischief; on the contrary, we are nearer to our resources than ever we were, and they leave the whole of the north of Spain open to the operations of the guerrillas.

But if the army now in Portugal is to be assisted by other corps, operating north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, before I can have secured the supplies of provisions I require, I must then seek to dislodge them by more determined means than I have tried hitherto. These means, God knows, may fail; or I may be prevented from trying them by the weather, or by other circumstances over which I can have no control. In all these cases it would be terrible not to have transports at hand, and I cannot advise they should be sent away.

It is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in this country so long; and it is an extraordinary instance of what a French army can do. It is positively a fact that they brought no provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money, and having in our favour the good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could notmaintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals for more than 2 months. This time last year I was obliged to move the British cavalry only from the district which they now occupy with their whole army, because it could not be subsisted. But they take everything, and leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve.

[Feb.]5th.—Perceval showed me the following letter which he had just received from the Prince of Wales:

Carlton House,Feb. 4th, 1811.

The Prince of Wales[12]considers the moment to be arrived which calls for his decision with respect to the persons to be employed by him in the administration of the executive government of the country, according to the powers vested in him by the Bill passed by the two Houses of Parliament, and now on the point of receiving the sanction of the Great Seal.

The Prince feels it incumbent upon him at this precise juncture to communicate to Mr. Perceval his intention not to remove from their situations those whom he finds there as His Majesty’s official servants. At the same time the Prince owes it to the truth and sincerity of character, which, he trusts, will appear in every action of his life, in whatever situation he may be placed, explicitly to declare that the irresistible impulse of filial duty and affection to his beloved and afflicted father, leads him to dread that any act of the Regent might, in the smallest degree, have the effect of interfering with the progress of his sovereign’s recovery.

This consideration alone dictates the decision now communicated to Mr. Perceval.

Having thus performed an act of indispensable duty, from a just sense of what is due to his own consistency and honour, the Prince has only to add that, among the many blessings to be derived from His Majesty’s restoration to health, and to the personal exercise of his royal functions, it will not, in the Prince’s estimation, be the least, that that most fortunate event will at once rescue him from a situation of unexampled embarrassment, and put an end to a state of affairs, ill calculated, he fears, to sustain the interests of the United Kingdom in this awful and perilous crisis; and most difficult to be reconciled to the general principles of the British Constitution.

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