Dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt.
Dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt.
Dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt.
Dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt.
XXX. But the national prejudice of which we have spoken hitherto, is, if we may so call it, an innocent vice compared to another, which by being more common, is more pernicious. I speak of that preposterous affection, which is not relative to a republic at large, but applies to a particular district or territory which we call our own. I do not deny, that by the term country, is understood not only the republic or state of which we are members, and which may be called our common country, but also the province, diocese, city or district, where every one drew his first breath, and which on that account may be termed his particular country; but it is certain, the phrase “love of our country,” cannot be supposed to be confined or apply to our country according to this second definition, but according to the first; for that is the sense, in which it is recommended and enforced, by examples, persuasions, and apophthegms, of historians, orators, andphilosophers. The country to which we should sacrifice our lives in heroic arms, and which we ought to esteem superior to all our private interests, and as the creditor of all our possible obsequies and services, is that body of state, under which we are united in one civil government, and protected by, and bound to the observance of the same laws. Thus Spain is the proper object of the love of a Spaniard, France of a Frenchman, and Poland of a Polander. But this should be understood, not to relate to such people, who by migrating to, and settling in other countries, make themselves members of other states, in which case, the duty they owe to the country where they reside, and are protected, ought to prevail over the affection they bear to the country in which they were born; and on this distinction, we shall in the sequel make an important remark. The dividing of a kingdom into provinces or districts, which is done for the convenience of administering justice, and conducting other business of government, has a material influence over, and is in a great measure the cause of dividing men’s hearts.
XXXI. The particular or limited love of one’s country, instead of being useful to a state, is in many respects injurious and hurtful, because it induces a division in the minds of those, whoought to be reciprocally united for the sake of making more firm and stable, the bond of common society; and because also this limited love of our country, is an incentive to civil wars, and revolts against the sovereign power; for always when a particular province or district fancies itself aggrieved, all the individuals of it think the redressing the grievances of their injured country, an obligation superior to all others; and finally, this confined principle, is an obstacle to the right administration of justice among all classes of people, and in every judicial and ministerial department.
XXXII. This last inconvenience is so common and apparent, as to be hidden from no man; and what is worse, no one endeavours to hide it. This pestilence of partiality to countrymen is, to the perversion and corruption of good regulation, introduced and cherished in the most bare-faced manner, into those departments which are vested with the power of distributing honourable and useful employments. What sanctuary has been able to protect or preserve us, from the violencies of this declared enemy of reason and equity? How many hearts, inaccessible to the temptations of gold, insensible to the allurements of ambition, intrepid, and proof against the threats of power, have suffered themselvesto be miserably deluded and perverted, by national passion? Now-a-days, if a man is a candidate for an office or employment, he always reckons upon as many protectors as he has countrymen, who have any concern or interest in the disposal of it. His pretensions being unreasonable, to a man swayed by national or provincial prejudice, are no objection, because the only merit with such a one, is the candidate’s being his countryman. We have seen men, in other respects of unimpeachable integrity, who were much infected with this malady; from hence I have been inclined to conclude, that this is an infernal machine, artfully invented by the Devil, to subdue those souls, who by all other ways are invincible; but alas, Achilles, although in one little part only, you are vulnerable, what does it avail you, if Paris, in shooting the arrow, has the skill and address to hit that little part?
XXXIII. I do not condemn that affection for our native soil, which does not operate to prejudice a third person. Aristotle’s employing his favour with Alexander, to procure the rebuilding the town of Stagira his native country,ruined by the soldiers of Philip, always appeared to me right and proper; and I condemn the indifference of Crates, whose city had suffered the same misfortune, for having, when Alexander asked him if he was desirous it should be rebuilt, answered,Of what use would the rebuilding it be, if there should come another Alexander to destroy it afresh?How exceedingly and ridiculously affected was the behaviour of that philosopher, who lost to his countrymen so signal a benefit, for the sake of a cold apophthegm? The misfortune was, that no other opportune sentence of a contrary tendency occurred to the philosopher just at that time; for if there had, he would have accepted the favour offered by Alexander. I have observed, that there are no people more unfit to be consulted upon serious and weighty points of business, than those who pride themselves in speaking with grace and elegance; for they are always apt to warp their opinion towards that side, on which a striking expression occurs to them, and provided they deliver themselves with air and brilliancy, they do not embarrass themselves about a little false reasoning.
XXXIV. I say once more, that I do not condemn any innocent or moderate affection for our native land. A love extremely soft and tender,is better suited to women, and more proper for children just rising up in the world, than for men; and therefore I am of opinion, the divine Homer humanizes Ulysses to a degree of excess, when he paints him, amidst all the regales of Pheacia, panting and pining, to see the smoke arise on the mountains of Ithaca, his own country:
Exoptans oculis surgentem cernere fumumNatalis terræ.
Exoptans oculis surgentem cernere fumumNatalis terræ.
Exoptans oculis surgentem cernere fumumNatalis terræ.
Exoptans oculis surgentem cernere fumum
Natalis terræ.
This tenderness in one of the wisest of the Greeks was very puerile; but with all, there is not much inconvenience in viewing with tenderness the smoke of one’s country, provided the smoke does not blind the eyes of him who looks at it. Let him view the smoke of his own country; but alas, do not let him prefer it to the light and splendour of foreign ones; but this is what we see every day. He who by being placed at the head of an eminent department, has the disposal of various employments at his pleasure, can scarce find any persons properly qualified for those employments, but people of his own country. In vain it is represented to him, that these men are unfit to fill the post, and that there are others better qualified. He finds the smoke of his country so grateful an aromatick, that he would abandon for it the most brilliant lights of other places. O how strangely does this smokeblind men’s eyes! How wonderfully does it disorder and affect their heads!
XXXV. In truth, some sin in this particular with their eyes wide open; I speak of those, who with the view of forming a party to support their authority, promote as many of their countrymen as they possibly can, without paying the least attention to merit. This is not manifesting their love to their country, but to themselves, and is benefiting their own soil, as the earth is benefited by the labour of the husbandman, who does not bestow it with a view of improving the land, but of advantaging himself. These are open and declared enemies of a republic, because it being next to impossible, that one district can furnish people sufficiently qualified for such a variety of employments, the places are filled with unworthy objects; this, if it is not the greatest evil that can befall a state, at least ultimately disposes towards producing such an evil.
XXXVI. Of those, who exercise their passion for their countrymen, from a belief that they are the most deserving, I am at a loss what to say, although the motive of their partiality in this matter frequently appears to me a voluntary blindness; and if that is the case, they do not stand excused. When the excess of merit in theperson set aside, is so notoriously superior to that of the man promoted, that it is manifest to all the world, except to him who dispensed the preferment, what doubt can there be, that he shut his eyes to avoid seeing it? or else, that the microscope of his passion magnified to his view, the virtues of the man preferred, and the defects of him neglected? There is scarce any man, who has not a portion of good and bad in his composition; a man without fault would be a miracle, and one without a single virtue would be a monster. This made St. Austin say, that gigantic vice was as rare to be found among us, as eminent virtue:Sicut magna pietas paucorum est, ita et magna impietas nihilominus paucorum est.(Serm. 10. de verbis Domini.) What happens then is, that passion, being to chuse between persons of unequal merit, magnifies what is good in the bad man, and also what is bad in the good one. There is not a more unfaithful balance to weigh merit in, than that of passion and prejudice; but this is what men commonly use for the purpose. This caused David to say, men are false in their balances:Mendaces filii hominum in stateris.Job, to express the greatness and power of God, says, that he is able to give weight to the wind:qui fecit ventis pondus. But I am not clear in what sense to understand this, because I also see, that the powerful of theworld in the balance of their passion, frequently give weight, and much weight to the air. What do you see in that person they have just raised? Nothing solid, nothing but air and vanity; but to this air, the great man who exalted him gave more weight, than to the gold of the other person who was his competitor for the office. But how was this done? Why, together with the air, he put earth into the scale, I mean the earth of the country in which he was born, and this earth weighs very heavy in that balance.
XXXVII. It happens in the contentions about occupying places, as it happened in the conflict between Hercules and Antæus. Hercules was much more valiant and powerful than the other, and threw him repeatedly to the ground; but the falls, enabled Antæus to renew the combat with redoubled vigour, because by his contact with the earth, his strength was doubled. The explanation of the matter is this: The antients under the veil of fables, concealed physical and moral maxims, and according to the heathen mythology, which was the term they used to signify the exposition of those mysterious fictions, Antæus was the son of the Earth. I believe, to make this fable apply to the present question, we need say no more, than that as things go in the world, every country by its recommendation,gives strength to its sons to overcome strangers, although they are people of superior abilities and vigour. Hercules lifted Antæus from the ground, and kept him suspended in the air, by which means he found no difficulty in overcoming him. It were much to be wished, that upon many occasions, in order to determine the worth of people, they should be examined divested of all favour and advantage they can derive from belonging to a particular country, for then it would be much better known to whom the preference is due.
XXXVIII. These men of national genius and prejudice, whose spirits are all flesh and blood, and whose breasts are always in contact with the earth, like that of a snake, do in a community, what the old serpent did in paradise, or as Luzbel did in Heaven, that is, introduce into it, seditions, revolts, schisms, and battles. No fire assails a civil edifice so violently, as the flame of national passion, for it consumes the very stones of the fabric, levels merit to the ground, and makes reason tremble, excites tumults and insults, and makes way for the triumphant entry of ambition. Those hearts which ought to becordially united by the bond of brotherly love, that bond being broken asunder, are miserably divided, and breathe nothing but vengeance and rancour. They form parties, inlist auxiliaries, and range their forces; but alas! in the end both the victors and vanquished are unfortunate and unhappy; the last lose the day and their patience, and the first by their conquest lose themselves.
XXXIX. In no words of sacred writ, is a call to a generous and virtuous life painted in more lively colours, than in those of the Psalmist, Psalm xliv.Mark me, my Son, incline your ear, and attend to my words, you must forget your townsmen, and the house of your father.But how greatly does he deviate from the precept contained in this admonition, who so far from forgetting his townsmen, and the house of his father, treasures up in his heart and memory, not only a house or a town, but a whole province or kingdom.
XL. Alexander, after he had conquered Persia, caused the Macedonian soldiers to marry Persian women, to the end, says Plutarch, that forgetting their native land, they should only esteem as their countrymen, those who were good, and regard as strangers those who were bad:Ut mundumpro patria, castra pro arce, bonos pro cognatis, malos pro peregrinis agnoscerent.
XLI. It is an apophthegm, of many learned and wise men among the Gentiles, that to a man of a strong and liberal mind, all the world is his country. He who attaches his heart to that corner of the earth in which he was born, cannot look upon all the world as his country, nor himself as a citizen of it, and therefore the world should despise him, as a narrow-minded and mean-spirited person.
XLII. I believe notwithstanding, that there is something figurative contained in the words of the sentences before quoted, for mankind can never be understood to be exempted from the love and service they owe to the republic of which they are members, in preference to all other states and kingdoms; but I apprehend also, that this obligation should not be confined to a republic, because we were born within its limits, but because we are members of its society; therefore, he who has legally transferred his residence from the kingdom in which he was born, to another different one, where he has settled himself, and taken up his abode, contracts with respect to that kingdom, the same obligations he owed to that in which he was born and nursed, and he oughtto regard it as the country to which he belongs. This is a distinction, that was not rightly understood by many great men of antiquity; and for this reason, we see in various authors of note, some actions celebrated as heroic, which ought to have been condemned as infamous. Demaratus King of Sparta, when he was unjustly dethroned and driven out of his kingdom by his own subjects, was kindly received and protected by the Persians. He lived among them as a member of the Persian empire, and owed to that country, besides the obligation of gratitude, the duty of a subject; but mark the sequel: the Persians meditate a military expedition against the Lacedemonians; and Demaratus, who is let into the secret, communicates the design to the Spartans, in order that they might be prepared to defeat the enterprize. Herodotus, and many other authors, celebrate this action, as a commendable mark of the glorious and heroic love which Demaratus entertained for his country; but I say, it was a perfidious, base, unworthy, and treacherous act; because in virtue of the antecedent circumstances, the obligation of his loyalty, together with his person, had been transferred from Lacedemonia to Persia.
XLIII. To conclude: I assert that if by reason of being born in it, we contract any obligationto a particular district or place, that obligation is inferior to, and ought to give place to every other christian or political one whatever. Surely the difference of being born in this or that country is not so material, that this should out-weigh every other consideration; therefore we ought never to prefer our countryman only because he is our countryman, except in those cases, where there is a perfect equality of all the other circumstances.
XLIV. In superior rulers, I don’t even with this limitation, admit of any partiality, with respect to countrymen, for the following reasons: first, because without being perfectly divested of this passion, it is hardly possible in one instance or another, to shun the danger of passing from favour to injustice. Secondly, that in whatever manner, favour to our countrymen is limited and restrained, we are apt to fall into an acceptation or preferable choice of persons, which by all those who govern ought to be studiously avoided. Thirdly, superior rulers being truly the fathers of their people, their impartial affection for them should be regarded as a consideration so incomparably superior to all others, that it ought to stifle and suffocate every kind of motive or inclination to preference, except that, which is derived from superior merit. It would be ridiculous in a father to love one child better than another, only becausethis was born in his own town or city, and the mother was delivered of the other in a different place, in consequence of her being from home on a journey. Therefore all those who govern, ought ever to retain in their hearts and memories, the maxim of the famous queen of Carthage, who being informed that the Trojans, in consequence of her marrying Eneas, entertained hopes of receiving superior indulgences to the Tyrians from her, declared her perfect indifference of affection for them all as a queen in the following words:
Tros, Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.
Tros, Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.
Tros, Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.
Tros, Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.
XLV. Having spoken in this discourse, of the favour that may be shewed to a countryman in preference to a stranger, in case he is a man of equal merit, I thought it would not be improper here, to take notice of a moral point, which frequently occurs in practice, and in which I have often seen men mistake, who in other respects are far from absurd. Those, who have annexed to their charges the distribution of honourable and useful employments, if they have not a perfect knowledge of the competitors for a vacant place, commonly avail themselves of judicial or extrajudicial informations touching their merits. Thisis a case that often occurs in the appointment to such professorships in many universities, as are in the disposal of the king, or his supreme council; and in these instances, all the doctors of this university of Oveido give their information to the royal council promiscuously. It is to be supposed, that the person, who by his own or delegated authority appoints to the office, when two persons of equal merit are proposed to him, may very consistently chuse which he pleases; but with respect to the equality of merit, if he is a stranger to the parties, he must be guided by the informations he receives; and I have seen it very common, when they had no just reason for doing it, for people to give their information in favour of the man they liked best, and I have known them go so far, as not only to recommend him in preference to his competitor, but to represent him as the only person qualified to fill the vacant office.
XLVI. I call this an error, because that in my opinion, such an information upon the face of it, is injurious and void of all probability, which I shall endeavour to demonstrate, by exposing the malice and indirect proceeding of him, who between two equal subjects, Peter and John for example, gives his information in favour of Peter, in preference to John; for I perceive in such behaviour,not only one, but three serious and distinct offences. And first, he offends materially in his information, against the virtue of legal and impartial justice, which requires, that he should represent people according to the true degree of their merits; but he swerves from this principle, who represents Peter as superior to John, when he is not so in reality. Secondly, he behaves unworthily and unjustly to his Prince, by usurping and preoccupying the right, which he has to chuse between the parties. Thirdly, he is guilty of injustice to the said John, who has a right to be represented according to the true degree of merit he possesses; and the proposing him as inferior to Peter, when in truth he is equal to him, is doing him a manifest injury, which besides prejudicing him with regard to other contingencies, renders it impossible in this instance, for him to partake of the king’s grace of chusing him in preference to his competitor Peter.
XLVII. From what has been premised, it may be inferred, that no contingent can ever happen, in which an informant or voter can consistently shew favour, or be partial to any man, either in such an instance as we have just mentioned, or in any other whatever, judicial or extrajudicial; because as we have shewn, competitions between subjects of equal merit do not admit of it, andif the merits of the competitors are unequal, the injustice of such a proceeding is self-evident; consequently, to him who acts conscientiously, all recommendations or solicitations are useless and improper; for he will not be biassed by friendship, country, gratitude, school-alliances, religion, college-connections, or any other motives whatever. But the misfortune is, that in the practice of the world, we see but few examples of such disinterested and upright conduct, even in cases where the merits of candidates are unequal; but on the contrary, whenever an opposition is set on foot, the favourers of each candidate, are more occupied in canvassing suffrages, than in studying questions, and more busied in examining the connections of voters, than books of faculty. The abuse is carried to such a length, that sometimes a man’s acting with integrity is imputed to him as a crime. If a voter, who is solicited by a man of eminence, answers ingenuously, and excuses himself from complying with what is requested of him; they say he is a rough, ill-bred, unpolished man: if he does not yield to the solicitations of a benefactor, they call him ungrateful; and if he does not give way to the intreaties of a friend, they exclaim that he is callous to the feelings of friendship. Finally, it appears to me, that a more intolerable error than this cannot exist, for I have seen men much esteemed by the generalityof mankind for their worth, who have always prostituted their votes to these or some other temporal motives; but in the name of reason, can a man have any friend so great or so good as God? Is there any benefactor, to whom we owe so much as to him? How shall we reconcile this? Can he be called a grateful, an honourable, or a good man, who can be wanting in his duty to his best friend and greatest benefactor, by acting unjustly to oblige a creature, to whom he owes this or that limited respect, and to whom also it is impossible he should owe any thing whatever, but what he owes principally, and in the first instance to God? In vain I have urged these arguments in various private conversations; and I believe it is in vain also, that I now use them with the public at large; but if they shall not be effectual to amend the abuse, they will at least serve to disburthen my mind, and give vent to my chagrin.
I. The signification of the word Urbanity is equivocal, so that when you read it in different authors who lived in distinct times, you will find, the sense they understood it in varied exceedingly. It’s immediate derivation is from the Latin wordUrbanus, which springs fromurbsa city; but notwithstanding this, it did not imply city in general; for it’s meaning at first, was confined in an especial manner to signify the city of Rome.
II. The reason of this was, that the wordurbanusbegan to be first made use of, at the time that the Roman republic was in the zenith of it’s prosperity, and this may be evidently inferred, from Quintilian’s saying the word was new in the days of Cicero;Cicero favorem, et urbanum nova credit.It was then that the generical wordurbsbegan to be used by way of eminence, to signify the city of Rome, on account of it’s portentous grandeur; and with the same pace that Rome proceeded to domineer over the world, that sort of culture which the Romans looked upon as an excellence peculiar to themselves, proceeded to gain ground, and prevail in the city, and it was then that the Romans began to make use of the wordUrbanus, to express that compound sort of cultivation that people received there, which seemed not to be confined to letters and sciences only, but also to comprehend manner and punctillo also;homo urbanus,sermo urbanus; and they used the wordurbanitas, to express those accomplishments in an abstracted sense.
III. But all authors did not give the same extension to the cultivation implied by the wordurbanitas. Cicero, as we know from his bookde claris oratoribus, restrained it to a graceful manner of speaking, which was peculiar to the Romans.
IV. Quintilian thinks, the graceful manner of speaking, which was peculiar to the Romans, and which consisted in their proper choice of words, their just application of them, and the decent tone of their voices, did not comprehend the whole, but was only a part of the accomplishment that was meant to be expressed by the term Urbanity; and he assigns as another part appertaining to it, a tincture of erudition acquired by frequent conversation with learned men;nam, et urbanitas dicitur, qua quidem significari sermonem præ se ferentem in verbis, et sono, et usu proprium quemdam gustum urbis, et sumptam ex conversatione doctorum tacitam eruditionem, denique cui contraria sit rusticitas.
V. Domitius Marsus, an author who lived about mid-way between the days of Cicero and Quintilian, and who wrote a treatise upon Urbanity, which we are indebted to Quintilian for the knowledge of, strikes into a new track, and maintains Urbanity to consist in the keenness and force of a short pithy expression, which delights and inclines the hearer to be affected in the manner the speaker could wish; and which is well adapted to excite either resistance or assent, according to the circumstances of persons and things:Urbanitas est virtus quædam in breve dictum coacta, et apta ad delectandos, movendosquein omnem affectum animos, maxime idonea ad resistendum, vel lacessendum, prout quæque res ac persona desiderant. (Quintilian ubi supra.)This definition is truly confused, and either explains nothing, or else, only explains a particular idea of the author, distinct from every thing that has hitherto been understood, respecting the meaning of the word Urbanity.
VI. The moral philosophers, who have studied and laboured to explain the admirable ethics of Aristotle, have considered this word as equivalent to the Greek oneEutrapelia, which Aristotle made use of to express that virtue, which influences people to observe moderation in the tone of their voice, and their manner of expressing themselves; as vicious extremes in these particulars, were apt to degenerate into rusticity, or else, to be attended with scurrility and buffoonry; and these are the sentiments of our cardinal Aguirre and count Manuel Thesaurus.
VII. But neither the word urbanity, nor that of rusticity, which is its opposite, are made use of to express at present, what they were understood to imply formerly. They call him now-a-days, an agreeable or well-bred man, and not a man of urbanity, who speaks in a moderate and pleasing tone of voice, and who expresses himself in decent and opportune phrases; and hewho delivers himself in an opposite manner, they do not call a rustic, but a coarse or an unpleasant man, or else describe him by phrases that are equivalent to those.
VIII. But to come to the acceptation that is given to the word Urbanity in these present times, and to the sense in which it seems now to be generally understood in Spain, it signifies the same asCortesania; but it is also true, that some give a more limited, and some a more extensive signification to this phrase. There are those who understand cortesane, or courteous, to mean the same as well-bred, and to express a man who in his commerce with other men, conducts himself with that decorum and ceremony which is prescribed by good education. But amongst those who define things with propriety, I believe a courteous man is understood to mean one, who, by his natural disposition, has a propensity in all his words and actions, to conduct himself with that temper and manner, that makes his conversation and company agreeable and pleasing to the rest of mankind. Taken in this sense, the Spanish wordCortesania, is equivalent to the French onePolitesse, to the Italian oneCivilitá, and to the Latin oneComitas.
IX. The derivation of the wordCortesania, is analogous to that ofUrbanitas; for as this last was taken from the wordUrbs, which according to the custom then in use, was looked upon to be applicable to the city of Rome, which was then the capital of a very great part of the world, the term Urbanity was understood to imply, that sort of cultivation which was then in vogue at Rome. Just soCortesania, which in Spain is derived fromCorte, or court, where it is generally supposed people behave with the greatest politeness is understood to imply that sort of good breeding which is generally practised there, and which we express by the termCortesania.
X. Understanding then the word Urbanity in this sense, I shall define it in the following manner;that it is a virtue, or virtuous habit, which directs and leads a man both in his words and actions in such a way, as makes his company and behaviour savoury, grateful, and engaging, to the rest of mankind. I shall not embarrass myself, about whether some people think this definition too redundant, and that it seems to express more than the term Urbanity implies. I adjust the definition to the interpretation I myself put upon the term, and to the sense it is understood in, by those who have treated of the subject in the most approved manner. Thosewho give less extension to the word, may, if they please, define the thing in another manner. Disputes about definitions are mere nominal questions, and may not improperly be called playing upon words. Every one defines a thing, according to the acceptation he gives to the word that expresses it. If all men were to agree in the acceptation of a word, they would scarce ever differ in the definition of the object that is expressed by it; but the misfortune is, that the same word, excites in different people different ideas with respect to the meaning of it, and hence it is, that we see such a variety of definitions.
XI. There is no doubt, but that all the particulars which compose a courteous carriage, should lead to the attainment of a certain end, and should be calculated to induce a certain manner in all a man’s exterior behaviour, that should be free from any mixture of the indecent, the offensive, or the tiresome; but that on the contrary it should rather be combined, with the grateful, the decent, and the opportune.
XII. Urbanity, like all other moral virtues, is placed between two vicious extremes; one of which it is apt to run into by exceeding, and the other by deficiency, or not doing enough.The first is occasioned by that excessive complaisance which borders upon meanness; and the second, by a rigid unsavoury reserve, which has the appearance of rusticity.
XIII. As there is no virtue, whose use is so general and common as than of Urbanity, so there is no one which is so much counterfeited and falsified by hypocrisy. There are men who by seldom finding themselves in a situation to exercise some particular virtues, are not very anxious about contriving means to imitate them by hypocrisy; but as Urbanity is a virtue that all men have opportunities of exercising, it is in the power of all men to counterfeit it by deceit. In truth, the hypocrites in the line of Urbanity are innumerable. All the world super-abound with expressions of submission and profound respect, with obsequious offers, and with exaggerated professions of esteem, with smiling countenances, whose essence consists in the command they have of their features, and in expressions of their lips, in which their hearts have not the least share; but on the contrary, are rather impressed with sentiments, that are quite opposite to those false appearances, and mock demonstrations.
XIV. What, then, should Urbanity be implanted in the heart? Without doubt it should, or it is at least from thence that it ought to derive its origin. If it was otherwise, how could it be a virtue? Reason tells us, that there is an honest complaisance due from one man to another; and whatever reason dictates should be esteemed a virtue. But how can a lying, deceitful, and affected complaisance be a virtue? It is evident it cannot. Urbanity then should arise from the bottom of the soul. What does not do that, is not Urbanity, but hypocrisy that counterfeits it. An honest soul, stands in no need of fiction to assist it in the observance of all those attentions which compose good-breeding, because it is naturally inclined to the observance of them, left alone to itself. By an innate propensity, accompanied by the light of reason, such a one will never, upon any occasion, be found wanting in the respect that is due to his superiors, nor in the condescension he should shew to his equals, nor in the affability he should practice with his inferiors, nor in the good-will and gracious manner, with which he should manifest to all men, both in words and deeds, these laudable dispositions of his mind, and his love of human society.
XV. I am not ignorant, that Urbanity is commonly understood to consist in our externaltestification of respect and benevolence to those with whom we converse. But if this testification, is not accompanied with the affections of the mind that are expressed by it, it becomes deceitful, and cannot possibly constitute that sort of urbanity, which consists in a virtuous habit; for in order to constitute such a one, it would be necessary that the testification should be sincere, which amounts to the same as saying, that there is essentially included in urbanity, the existence of those sentiments, which are expressed by courteous words and actions.
XVI. It is certain, that courts are the great public schools of true Urbanity; but they have mixed so much false in those schools in the practice of it, that some have been led to think, it has nearly obscured the true, of which, there seems to be scarce any thing left but the mere appearance. I believe, that without disparagement to any other courts we ever heard of, those of antient Rome, and modern Paris, may be esteemed the most cultivated and polite that have been known in the world. After mentioning this, let us hear what two authors say who were well versed in the practice of them both. The first is Juvenal, who clearly givesus to understand, that he who could not lie and flatter should withdraw from court, as there were no hopes of his getting any thing by his attendance there—
Quid Romæ faciam? Mentiri nescio; librumSi malus est, nequeo laudare, &c.
Quid Romæ faciam? Mentiri nescio; librumSi malus est, nequeo laudare, &c.
Quid Romæ faciam? Mentiri nescio; librumSi malus est, nequeo laudare, &c.
Quid Romæ faciam? Mentiri nescio; librum
Si malus est, nequeo laudare, &c.
XVII. The second is the abbot Boileau, a famous preacher at Paris in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth. This eminent man, in a treatise he published, entitledChoice Thoughts or Reflexions, drew such a picture of the court of Versailles, as shews the Urbanity exercised there, had degenerated not only into dissimulation, but even into treachery, although he admits, this was not the practice of every one who attended it. These are his words:
XVIII. “What are the manners and behaviour of a courtier? Why they consist in flattering his enemies while he is afraid of their power; and in endeavouring to destroy them whenever he finds an opportunity for doing it; in being civil to, and making use of his friends when he stands in need of their assistance, and in turning his back upon them when they can be of no further service to him; in seeking out powerful protectors,whom he fawns on, and idolizes exteriorly, and frequently despises in secret.
XIX. “Courtly Urbanity, consists in converting dissimulation and deceit, into the law or rule of a man’s actions; and representing all sorts of people in such colours, as your interest dictates to you that you should paint them; in bearing slights and disappointments with a forced reserve, and in awaiting with a strained appearance of modesty and composure, the favours of Fortune.
XX. “In a court, for the most part there is no sincerity, but almost every thing you see there, is compounded of hypocrisy, deceit, and malevolence; for example, in peoples doing underhand ill offices to each other; in contriving and laying snares that nobody can be aware of; in bearing painful and mortifying disgusts with a smiling countenance; and in hiding under an apparent shew of modesty, the pride of Lucifer. It is very common in a court, for a man not to be permitted to love whom he likes, to do what he should, nor to speak what he thinks. It is necessary to keep silence, in order to conceal your sentiments, and it is also necessary, to acquire a facility at changing them. You must applaud, abuse,love, abhor, speak, and live, not according to your own liking or inclination, but in conformity to the arbitrary will and caprice of other people.
XXI. “In what do the other manners and mode of a man’s conducting himself consist in a courtier? Why in dissembling injuries, and in revenging them; in flattering his enemies, and in destroying them; in promising every thing for the sake of obtaining a dignity or promotion, and in performing none of these promises after he has got it; in repaying favours with words, services with plausible assurances, and debts with threatenings. At court, they in the same breath implore and execrate Fortune, applaud and despise merit; and they also disguise the truth, under an ostentatious appearance of frankness.”
XXII. I believe there is a great deal of this sort of dissimulation all over the world; but it is natural to suppose, there is more of it practised in courts than in other places, for the incitements to the exercise of the before-mentioned vices, are generally stronger there, than they are found to be out of those circles. There is not a passion nor an appetite, which there a man does not seem within reach of indulging,and the objects which stimulate his desires, shine forth there also in their greatest splendor. The ambitious man fancies himself on the point of grasping honours, and the covetous one riches. The pretenders are vying with each other, the emulous contending with the emulous, and the envious with the envied. There the success of the unworthy man, is staring the neglected deserving one in the face, and there the hands of the unskilful artist fully employed, is exhibiting a disgusting spectacle, to the able one who has nothing to do. And although a modest man who only views this at a great distance, or who only hears it from report, may reason upon it, and contain himself like a philosopher, still, when the mortifying prospect is so near him, he can scarce speak of the thing with temper, nor look upon it without falling into a passion. Thus it is almost morally impossible, that the hearts of the neglected men should not be in a continual state of fermentation, and their feelings in a tumultuous agitation, which is attended, not so much with the corruption of the men themselves, as with that of their manners.
XXIII. But notwithstanding all that has been alledged, we ought to conclude, that the two before-named authors exaggerated the evils theymeant to reprehend. There is a great deal of bad in courts, but there is also some good to be found in them. The complaints that merit is neglected, are frequently nothing more than sighs, which express the grief and disappointments of the heart from whence they proceed. The same man who laments political mismanagement, while he is not permitted to go beyond the porch of thefavourite’s house, when he has once gained admittance into it, begins to applaud his conduct, as he ascends the steps leading to his levee-room; which is a proof that what he meant by mismanagement and a bad conducted government, was such a one as he got nothing under, and that what he understands by a good one, is such a one as is advantageous to him. I have at all times heard the administration ill spoken of, but if we come to enquire by whom, we shall find it is chiefly done, by importunate candidates for places and employments, who are unable to attain what they never deserved, and by litigious suitors, who were justly disappointed of success in their vexatious attempts, and who have been condemned to pay costs, for commencing unjust prosecutions; by delinquents who have been legally mulcted for their misdeeds; by ignorant people who have passed for men of understanding, and who without having studied in any other school, than that of a coffee-houseor a club-room, have presumed to give positive opinions, upon the most important and difficult political and military questions; and finally, by weak people, who fancy that a good government can effect impossibilities, and that they are able to make all the subjects of a state, happy and contented.
XXIV. Neither my genius, nor my destiny have allowed me to have much intercourse with ministers in high stations; but I have heard sincere judicious men, who have known many of them well, speak of them, in terms very different from those they have been spoken of by the vulgar; and who have expressed a different opinion, both of their abilities and their intentions, from that which has been commonly propagated. Nor indeed is it credible, that princes, who generally know men’s political characters better than private people, should make choice of men for their ministers, who are either incapable, or wickedly disposed. If in case that they should have been mistaken in the opinion they entertained of them, and they find upon trying them, that they are not equal to conduct the business they have confided to their management, they may easily remove them. Thus it is utterly improbable to me, that a man destituteof all merit, should for any length of time, occupy a post of great importance, or have the ear of his sovereign.
XXV. With respect to inferior ministers, such for example, as the principal people and magistrates in the provinces, I have had a great deal of experience, and protest, that for the most part, I have found them to be the best sort of men to be met with in the country. I say for the most part, for it cannot be denied, that among this class, there are men to be found that are not very upright, and more than a little addicted to avarice. And by what I find the principal directors, lawyers, and magistrates in the country to be, I judge of those about the court; and it seems natural to me, that the higher the sphere of life is in which people move, they are the more stimulated by motives of honour, and less likely to descend to, or be guilty of mean actions.
XXVI. Neither do I believe above half that is said, of the neglect that is shewn to merit, and the abandoned situation it finds itself in at court; for the number of candidates for prefermentthat may be found there, who have no merit at all, would upon enquiry appear to be very considerable, and that among them, you will meet with mischief-makers, together with crafty, deceitful, and treacherous people, whose bad practices and characters, it is almost beyond the power of language to describe; who are a sort of imps of Satan, that for the most part serve the Devil without pay; and are a kind of galley slaves upon earth, who join to that slavery, being the galley boatswains mates, or drivers of each other, whose oar, and whose scourge, are never out of their hands, for fear of their not being the first to arrive at the desired port, and to accomplish what they had in view. They are a species of idolaters of Fortune, who sacrifice as victims to that deity, their companions, their relations, their friends, and their benefactors; and in the end themselves also, or their own souls. What have we not to expect, or what have we not to fear from men of this character?
XXVII. I have been three times at court, but either from my natural incuriosity, or because my stay there each time was but short, I came away as ignorant of the practices of a court, as I went; and only took particular notice of one circumstance, which is relative tothe subject I am now treating of. I saw there, as in other places, Urbanity degenerate into that fulsome kind of ceremony, which may be termed cringing complaisance. Accident furnished me with numberless opportunities of seeing such things; and I have frequently observed two people who have usually met together in their walks, and who, as I have been informed, had a tolerable indifference for each other, and even looked upon one another with reciprocal contempt; I say I have seen these people upon their meeting, strive which should excel in expressions of the love, veneration and respect they bore to each other. There was scarce a word came out of their mouths, which was not accompanied with some affected gestures. Their eyes cast glances of tender devotion on each other, and milk and honey flowed from their lips; but at the same time their affectation was so palpable, that any man of the least discernment, might have perceived the disagreement there was, between their hearts and their appearances. I laughed inwardly at them both, and I believe they also in their hearts, laughed mutually at each other.
XXVIII. I saw once two lawyers accost each other, with such extreme expressions of tenderness, that a Portuguese might have learned fromthem, phrases and gestures for feats of gallantry. Both these people had places at court, on which account they could not avoid seeing each other pretty frequently; and there was no friendship between them; notwithstanding which, their expressions were like those of the most cordial friends, who had met together after a long absence.
XXXIX. Having expressed to some people who were used to the court, how disgusting this appeared to me, they answered that this was behaving in the court stile; but would not any one who hears this, conclude the court was nothing but a comic theatre, where all the world act the part of enamoratos; although to speak the truth, it was only in spirits of inferior order, that I noted this amorous kind of farrago. In those of more elevated hearts and minds, if they don’t owe the thing to their own genius and disposition, the education of a court produces a better effect, and exhibits people of a more noble behaviour, and such as is proper to, and expressive of true urbanity. I say I have observed in such, affability, sweetness, expressions of benevolence, and offers of kind services; all which were tendered with propriety, and in a decent generous manner, free from affected exaggerations, but animated at the same time,and expressed with so natural an air, that the articulations of the tongue, were indications of the emotions of the mind, and the feelings of the heart.
XXX. Cato, as Tully tells us, said, he wondered how two augurs whenever they met, could refrain from laughing at each other; as they both well knew, that their whole art was a mere imposture. I think the saying may be applied to two fulsomely complaisant courtiers; for I do not see how those who have once saluted each other in this cringing and affected way, can upon meeting again, forbear laughing in each others faces, as they both know, that all the hyperbolical professions of their esteem, affection, and readiness to oblige, mean nothing, and that this is all a mere common-place farrago or rhapsody, quite destitute of truth or reality.
XXXI. I have said, that in the lesser towns I have visited, I have not observed so much by a great deal, of this ridiculous parade. It is true, that you will find in them, some few people who walk about the streets with incense in their hands, to offer up to, and idolize all those, whom they fancy can be of any service to them; but they are looked upon like what they are, not as men of worth, but as men of craft, whose incensesmells savoury in the nostrils of none but fools. This sort of behaviour about the court, frequently passes for good-breeding; but in these other places it is condemned as meanness.
XXXII. I am persuaded that solid and brilliant urbanity, has much more of the natural than the acquired in its composition. A good, sound, and unembarrassed mind, accompanied with discretion, which is gentle without meanness, and is disposed by genius and inclination to conform to every thing that is not contrary to reason, to which dispositions there is annexed a clear understanding, or native prudence, which dictates to a man how he should speak and act, according to the different circumstances and situations in which he finds himself, will, without studying in any school, acquit himself well, and appear agreeable in his commerce with mankind. It is true, that he will be deficient in his knowledge of those forms, modes, and ceremonies, which people study in courts, and which are changed by caprice at every turn; but in the first place, natural advantages, which always are intrinsically valuable, and which will ever operate, will supply upon ordinary occasions, thewant of studied forms; and secondly, a modest and candid confession, to those you happen to be in company with, of your ignorance of political forms and ceremonies, on account of your having been born and bred in the provinces where they are not generally practised, will be a sufficient excuse for your transgression of those forms, and even your doing this, will appear better in the eyes of reasonable people, than your observing a strained and scrupulous attention to them.
XXXIII. I have availed myself many times of this resource at court; where I have made no scruple to declare, that I was born and bred in a small country town; and that I early entered myself a member of a religious order, whose principal care it was, to seclude its sons, and especially in their youth, from all commerce with the world. That my genius naturally disposed me to abhor bustle, and avoid great concourses of people; and excepting three years that I was a student at Salamanca, which may not improperly be termed three years of solitude, on account of the heads of our college not permitting their young members to have the least intercourse with secular people; I say excepting these three years, I have lived all the rest of my life, in Galicia and Asturias, which are provinces at a greatdistance from court; and besides all this, I have a natural dislike to studying ceremonies; but I am aware however, that not only the substance, but the forms of them also, are necessary to political society; although I do not consider that as an important form, which consists of rules that are established to-day, and changed to-morrow, just as whim and caprice dictate; some of which forms, or modes, prevail in one country, and are different in another; but I mean to speak of those forms or modes only, which reason dictates should be observed in all times, and in all places. From the before-named declaration, it may be easily conceived how little I understand of courtly ceremonies; notwithstanding which, with the assistance of the above frank confession, I never found myself the least embarrassed, and I perceived, nothing I said or did appeared disagreeable to those I conversed with, but that rather on the contrary, my natural behaviour seemed pleasing to them.
XXXIV. Men of sublime spirits and elevated understanding, possess a natural privilege to dispense with formalities whenever they think proper; just as musicians of great genius are allowed upon many occasions, to depart from the common rules of their art; their doing which, hardly ever renders the music ungrateful to theear; so men who are endowed with great talents, and display a manifest superiority in conversation, may dispense with the ordinary and common methods of speaking, without ever offending the ears of their auditors. Natural advantages shine forth with a greater lustre, and are more solid, and more pleasing than borrowed acquisitions. Thus the world are well satisfied, to accept the first in the room of the last, and look upon themselves as over-paid for the loss of the one, by the introduction of the other in its stead.
XXXV. I was even about to say, that the establishment of ceremonies of urbanity, was only calculated for people of middling or inferior geniuses, and was meant as a succedaneum for a discretion so superior to that which the others we have mentioned possess, as to be capable of dictating of itself, the rule of deportment one man should observe to another. I believe it happens in this, with very little difference, the same that it happens in all material movements. There are men, who naturally and without any teaching, have a grace and air in all their actions, in the motions of their hands, and their feet, in the bending their bodies, and inclining their heads, in the casting downwards and lifting up their eyes, and in whom in every motion and gesture, all is done with such a nativegrace, that it enamours those who behold them; and is that sort of excellence, which is described by Tibullus to have been possessed by Sulpicia: